Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 65 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Acts of Will | Nietzsche | Danto III 136 Will/Nietzsche/Danto: If it is true that Nietzsche tries to escape the usual distinction between mental and material, then the will to power must seem contradictory. After all, "will" is an expression concerning the mental. (See Causality/Nietzsche, I, Ego, Self/Nietzsche, Subject/Nietzsche). Danto: That is not true. As with Schopenhauer, we have to combine connotations in Nietzsche concerning the usual and mental with the concept of "will" in the metaphysical sense. The will to power is not limited to the mental. If we do not respect this, we cannot understand Nietzsche. NietzscheVsActs of Will: Nietzsche attacks the "Acts of Will", which are not only accepted by philosophers. Danto III 137 Acts of Will/Danto: behave to actions like causes to effects. Hume/Danto: Hume rejected the idea that we could have an experience that corresponds to our idea of the causal nexus, how our will becomes active through our body parts or thoughts. Hume: we have absolutely no idea how the will works. Nevertheless, Hume accepts acts of will. >Regress. NietzscheVsHume: is more radial, there is simply nothing that can be proven to be linked to our actions. Danto III 138 Thinking/Certainty/Subject/NietzscheVsDescartes: Nietzsche disproves the Cartesian thought that our own mental processes are immediately transparent to us, that we know about our way of thinking. He disproves it by setting up a series of interlinked thoughts and letting them "freeze": When Descartes talks about his doubts about reality being at least certainly his own doubts, he drags a lot of tacit assumptions with him. NietzscheVsDescartes: if his argumentation boils down to an "It is thought", our belief in the concept of substance is already assumed and a subject is accepted.(1) >Reality/Nietzsche, >Subject/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 577. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Assertive Force | Geach | I 262 Assertive force/assertoric force/Geach: assertive force is demonstrated by the fact that a sentence is not included in a longer one. Cf. >Brandom: free-standing content. The assertion stroke adds no idea - so it should not be confudes with "it’s true that .."; ("true"can occur even in a not assertive sentence without changing its meaning). >Truth value, >Truth predicate, >Redundancy theory, >Assertion stroke. Error: to infer from this that "exist" adds no concept. (GeachVsHume). >Existence predicate. The sssertion stroke is a indefinable basic concept, cannot be explained. VsAttribution-theory: the predicate "poor" has no more claiming force than any other predicate, namely, none. >Predicates/Geach, >Predication/Geach. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Association | Hume | I 13 Association/Hume: association is a natural law. Ideas: the effect of the association of ideas has three forms: 1. general idea (similarity) 2. procedure/regularity (through idea of "substance" or "mode") 3. relation: an idea draws another to itself. Thereby ideas do not acquire new quality. >Ideas. I 126f Association/principle/Hume: problems: 1. Association only explains the form of thought, not the content. 2. Association does not explain the individual contents of the individual. Solution: the explanation lies in the circumstances of the perception - also substances, general ideas and modes require the circumstances. >Circumstances, >Perception, >Thoughts. I 137f Associations/KantVsHume/Deleuze: the "Law of Reproduction" (frequent consecutive ideas set a connection) assumes that the phenomena actually follow such a rule (Kant pro). There must be a reason a priori -> synthesis of the imagination (not of the senses!). >Imagination, >Senses, >a priori, >Principles., >Principles/Hume. KantVsHume: Hume's dualism (relations are outside of things ) forces him to grasp that as the accordance of subject with nature. But this cannot be a priori, otherwise it would remain unnoticed. I 154 Association/Hume: association cannot select. If the mind was only determined by principles, there would be no morality. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Brain/Brain State | Churchland | II 484 Brain/Consciousness/Churchland: the brain will not produce consciousness until it has produced a representation of itself. ((s)> McGinn: Thesis: the brain produces a theory of the brain.) Churchland: ... representation of himself ... KantVsHume would have expressed it in this way. It needs a representation that produces something similar to a "point of view". |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Causal Laws | Cartwright | I 10 Asymmetry: causal laws are asymmetrical: cause and effect cannot be interchanged. - By contrast, symmetrical: Laws of Association/Hume: E.g. length of the shadow/height of the mast. - Fraassen: Thesis: asymmetries by explanation are not real. - There is no fact about what explains what. - CartwrightVsFraassen - Association/CartwrightVsHume: not sufficient E.g. malaria control: for distinguishing effective from ineffective strategies. >Association, >Symmetries. I 30 Causal Law/Causal Explanation/Cartwright: causal laws are not transitive - i.e. the causal chain does not have to be determined by a single causal law. >Transitivity. I 32 Causal Law/Cartwright: something that is always the case ((s) universal occurrence, universal fact, "permanence") cannot be consequent of a causal law. - ((s) this is a convention). - Alternatively: universal fact: Alternatively, it could be said that everything is the cause of a universal fact. - ((s) Def Universal Fact/Cartwright/(s): probability = 1.). I 36 Causal Laws/Cartwright: the reason why we need them for the characterization of effectiveness is that they pick out the right properties to which we apply our conditions. I 43 Effective Strategy/Cartwright: can only be found with assumption of causal laws. - Partition: the right one is the one that is determined by which causal laws exist - without causal laws it is impossible to pick out the right factors. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Causality | Bigelow | I 264 Explanation/causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: because of impending circularity, we cannot explain causality by laws or counterfactual conditional or probability. >Circular reasoning, >Counterfactual conditionals, >Probability, >Laws, >Explanations, >Causal explanation. Counterfactual Conditional/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Conversely, counterfactual conditionals are analyzed in terms of causality. Just as necessary. >Necessity. Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Must be an unanalyzed basic concept. It is a structural universal. Fundamental forces play a major role. >Basic concepts, >Causation, >Universals, >Forces. Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are vectors. >Vectors. I 265 Causality/causation/explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: first we refute some common theories. Causation/Tradition/Bigelow/Pargetter: is often regarded as a kind of "necessary connection". Normally, this is expressed in such a way that either the cause is necessary for the effect or the effect is a necessary consequence of the cause. Then the cause is either a necessary or a sufficient condition or both. >Cause, >Effect. Weaker: some authors: it is only unlikely to find a cause without effect (or vice versa). (Probabilistic theories of causation, Lewis 1979(1), Tooley 1987)(2). >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. "Necessity Theories"/Bigelow/Pargetter: should explain on what kind of necessity they rely on. Cause/Effect/BigelowVsTradition/BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis that a cause does not have to be a sufficient or a necessary cause for an effect, the effect could have occurred without or by another cause, or without cause at all! One cannot always assume a high probability. A cause does not always have to increase the probability of an event. I 266 Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: that's what we learned from him. (HumeVsLewis). Causality/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: his conception of it has a theological background (from Descartes and Malebranche): Thesis: it could not be that God was bound by any restrictions. >Causality/Hume. Therefore, it could not be that God would be compelled to allow the effect to follow. It would always have to come out of God's free choice and be a miracle every time. Cf. >Causes/Nietzsche. Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: Hume's theory simply eliminates God. Hume simply asks us to imagine that the effect could not follow from the cause. Bigelow/Pargetter: he's right! It is not only logically possible, but also empirically possible. >Possibility, >Logical possibility, >Metaphysical possibility. Presentation/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: is for Hume the guide to the possibility. He thus swings from a theological to a psychological argument. Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: Causes are not sufficient conditions. They are not always necessary. >Sufficiency. I 267 Solution/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: inner expectations of regularities. Cause/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to Hume "sufficient" cannot be considered modal. That is, that "sufficient" must not be considered realistic. >Modalities, >Modal logic, >Realism. BigelowVsHume: Hume went too far in his rejection of necessity in laws. But not far enough in his rejection of the necessity approach of causality. 1. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76 2. Tooley, M. (1987). Causation. A realist's approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Causality | Goodman | II 113 Hume imagined the mind as something that leads us by observing regularities to corresponding predictions. GoodmanVsHume: We, however, see the mind as an activity from the beginning. It corrects itself gradually. >Thinking. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Causality | Kant | Danto I 298 Causality/Kant/Danto: is not derived from experience - but the condition or form of experience - the idea of causality is not causality itself. >Ideas/Kant. --- Kant I 26 Causality/Kant: things themselves are not subject to the time condition, so not causality. - (Solution of the third cosmological antinomy: namely, the antinomy of causality of freedom (that belongs to the things themselves) and causality according to nature (in the phenomenal world)). KantVsHume: causality does not apply to things themselves. VsKant: he does not stick to it himself. Mind/Kant: the mind has its own causality: the "spontaneity of terms". >Spontaneity/Kant. --- I 32 Subjectivity arises not only from causality (of freedom) but from the spontaneity of the terms - therefore metaphysics begins in empirical science. >Subjectivity/Kant, >Metaphysics/Kant. --- Vaihinger I 280 Causality/Idea/God/Kant/Vaihinger: I only underlie the idea of such a (highest) being to see the phenomena as systematically linked to each other according to the analogy of a causal determination. --- Vollmer I 25 Causality/Kant: outside of causality we cannot experience. >Experience/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Causality | Quine | I 33 Causality sentences as responses to stimuli. Graeser I 173 Causality/opportunity sentences/Quine: opportunity sentences provide us with causal hypotheses. Quine VI 106 Causality/Quine: we have no concept of causality that is as clear as we would like it to be. When science is particularly strict, it is content with constant correlations. (>Causality/Hume). VI 107 Disposition/Quine: this term is similar to causality in that it tolerates the substitutability of identity but blocks the predicate calculus. V 20/21 Def Cause/Quine: cause is ultimately the effect of forces on particles which is energy transmission (>Causality/Vollmer.) Causality/Quine: I am not interested in the epistemological basis like Hume, but in the ontological nature as the subject of a scientific theory. Even if the difference between energy and matter has been shaken in modern physics, the concept of cause is not out of place here. On a more abstract level, it simply plays no role. V 22 Cause/Quine: the interest in partial causes is remarkably independent of the share of energy transfer. For example, we have weak sound waves during communication and strong waves during a shot. V 23 Everyday language: "because" does not speak at all of energy transfer, but is also applied to logical premises, purposes, disposition. Disposition: is therefore often a better term than causality. >Dispositions/Quine. XI 112 Causality/QuineVsRegularity/QuineVsHume/Lauener: For example, to what kind of events does the crying of geese on the Capitol belong and to what belongs the salvation of Rome? |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Causality | Searle | I 287/88 (Note) Causality/identity/PlaceVsSearle: causal dependency requires separate entities (>Causality/Armstrong). SearleVsPlace: E.g. a liquid state may be causally dependent on the behavior of molecules while being a feature of the system. --- II 93 Causality/Searle: causality is not an external instance, only more experiences. II 101f Causality: e.g. pressure cooker: we can infer from steam to pressure. Through seeing there is no inference on physical objects. SearleVsHume: causality may well be experienced directly, but not independently, but causality is part of the experience. >Causality/Hume. II 152ff Causality/SearleVsHume: causality is real and directly observable. --- I 157 Logical causality: logical causality is not inference, but intentional content and an experience condition. There are not two experiences, but causation = intentional content. >Satisfaction conditions/Searle, >Intentional contents. --- II 179 Causality: causality is part of the experience, causation is part of the experience. --- Danto I 299 Causality/Searle: causality only arises through interpretation. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Causality | Strawson | IV 152 f Causality/Strawson: because of different possible descriptions in reality dependent on generality. Hume was right with that. - But it's also not a selection of individual descriptions. >Generality, >Generalization, >Description, >Description dependence, >Context dependence, >Causal dependence, >Causal explanation. IV 157 Causality/StrawsonVsHume: he overlooks the very obvious fact that objects exert physical force. (Dennett: and that is observable). >Causality/Hume, >Causality/Dennett. I 162 Pro Hume: you can observe many reactions without knowing what forces are at work. IV 163 VsHume: regularity is time neutral, it could also be reversed. (s) because (type-type, not type-token). >Regularity, >Regularity theory. IV 165 VsHume: we learn the regularity, because we already have the concept of causality. IV 172 Strawson: the utmost we can recognize are probability laws. >Probability, >Probability laws. Causality/Language: more in transitive verbs than in the word "cause". IV 175 Common Causes: easily possible: E.g. malaria - cause: denotes relation that occurs in different modes of being |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Causes | Quine | VI 106 Cause/Disposition/Quine: cause is not intensional but there is a problem: bringing nested sentences into play that are no longer dissolved by spelling. Instead of causality we assume today constant correlations and instead of dispositions one can speak also of symptoms (of fragility) - (symptom /(s): only if it is broken.) V 19 Cause/Regularity/QuineVsHume: Problem: one can also use the two single classes consisting of a and b for regularity. Then the fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc is reached. See >Causality/Hume. Dispositions: there is the same problem here. V 20/21 Def Cause/Quine: lastly, there is the influence of forces on particles which is energy transmission. See Causality/Vollmer. V 22 Cause/Quine: the interest in partial causes is remarkably independent of the share of energy transfer. For example, we have weak sound waves during communication and strong sound waves during a shot. V 23 Everyday language: "because" does not speak at all of energy transfer, but is also applied to logical premises, purposes and dispositions. Disposition: is therefore often a better term than causality. >Dispositions/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Conceptual Schemes | Quine | VII (a) 10f Conceptual Scheme/Quine: in various conceptual schemes we judge differently. e.g. that red houses, red sunsets and so on have something in common. Minimum acceptance: the conceptual schemes bring our raw experience into an order. Simplicity depends on the conceptual scheme. Each conceptual scheme can be regarded as fundamental. Our physicalistic conceptual scheme simplifies our countless unconnected sensations. VII (d) 78 Conceptual Scheme/Quine: we are born into it, but we can change it. However, we cannot escape by an objective comparison with a non-conceptual world. It is meaningless to understand the conceptual scheme ((s) which is then assumed to be non-conceptual) as a reflection of reality. I 208 Identity/Hume: "We cannot say that an object is the same as it is, unless we mean that an object existing at one time is identical to itself than at another time". QuineVsHume: Identity sentences run empty as long as the conceptual scheme for physical objects is not yet included. I 469 Words and their graphical representations are, in contrast to points (kilometres, classes, etc.), tangible objects of a popular order of magnitude on the marketplace where people with different terminology communicate with each other in the best possible way. II 58 Conceptual Scheme/Third Dogma/DavidsonVsQuine: Davidson says that I make a mysterious use of "conceptual scheme". In my opinion, it is part of colloquial language and does not perform a technical task. II 59 A triad conceptual scheme - language - world is not what I have in mind, but, like Davidson: language and world. Terminology/Quine: Elsewhere I have proposed a measure of the spacing of a conceptual scheme. (Perhaps better: conceptual distance from languages). The definition is based on the differing length of translated sentences. If there is a pair of acceptable sentences in a translation, choose the shorter sentence. Length ratios are then to be determined. Cf. >Two Dogmas. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Consciousness | Millikan | 91 Consciousness/tradition: we experience our consciousness directly. MillikanVsTradition: What kind of experience of intentionality is this? What kind of force should this argument have? >Self-identification, >Self-consciousness, >Self-knowledge, >Intentionality. The force should be epistemic and rational. Uncorrectability/MillikanVsTradition: the experience of consciousness (experience of intentionality) should have something infallible. We should also have an immediate understanding then. It should also assume the existence of intentionality and consciousness, otherwise the experience could not be "in" it. Consciousness/Tradition: tradition assumes that consciousness is transparent. And therefore it cannot consist solely of external relations to the external world, and even if these are necessary. MillikanVsVs: Suppose we reject this epistemically rationalist image, that is, we deny that there is "epistemically given". Then we could admit that people are sometimes aware of their thoughts. But we could maintain that this awareness is partly an external relation. The "inside" of this feeling (awareness)... >Awareness. I 92 ...does not guarantee that it is the inside of a true awareness relation. Consciousness/Millikan: self awareness of consciousness is not an immediate object. There is nothing transparent in consciousness. N.B./Millikan: that is disturbing because it follows - negative thesis: that it is possible that we do not know what we think! ((s) DavidsonVsHume: dito). That is, from the act of consciousness itself nothing is guaranteed. Rationalism/rationalisticiIntentionality/consciousness/MillikanVsRationalism/Millikan: the traditional rationalist view of consciousness and intentionality leads to a cul-de-sac one after another. >Rationalism. I 246 Consciousness/classical realism/Millikan: an act of becoming aware of an object is momentary and never has any relation to past or future consciousness acts. Problem: how should a thing then be identified as the one from earlier. From this, classical realism makes a mystery. Object/thing/classical realism: an object must then have no permanent existence. >Realism. Perception/Plato/Descartes/Locke/Millikan: Thesis: Nothing can be identified by perception alone, Recognition: is an act of pure thought in the reunion in the volatile flow of the things given to the senses. >Perception. Sense/Plato/Descartes/Locke: consisted then in the fact to direct the mind somehow to eternal objects. Thinking/Plato/Descartes/Locke: then one could only have thoughts of eternal objects, or of the eternal nature of volatile objects. Solution/Millikan: qualities and species were assumed as the eternal objects of which one could directly think. >Thinking/World, >Plato, >Descartes, >Locke. I 247 Problem: How should one explain that eternal objects (properties) are related to temporal states? How could involvement in the world be essential to it. Then one had to assume that there are properties and types that are not exemplified. Cf. >Temporal identity. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Correlation | Schurz | I 126 Correlation: is qualitative. Covariance: is the corresponding quantitative measure of correlation. Covariance between characteristics: Cov (A,K) = p(A u K) - p(K) times p(A). Covariance is numerically symmetric, i.e., Cov (A,K) = Cov(K,A). Correlation measure: on the other hand, is only qualitatively symmetric, i.e., Corr (A,K) > (<) 0, iff. Corr (K,A) > (<) 0. I 126 The correlation measure is usually not determined for individual characteristics but for the variables as a whole. Recently: Def Effect Strength/Statistics/Schurz: is a statistical correlation measure defined for individual characteristics. It assumes a binary antecedent variable A, ~A, and an arbitrarily scaled consequence characteristic, and is defined as the difference between the K mean in the A population and in the total population, divided by the K dispersion. Scale invariance: because effect size is scale-independent, it is popular in meta-analyses. Cf. >Covariance. I 146 Correlation/causality/statistics/Schurz: from high correlation one cannot conclude the existence of causality and also not the direction, if causality should be given. Correlation: is symmetrical, causality: asymmetrical. Hidden variables: that correlation exists without causality may be due to hidden variables. Ex. common cause. >Hidden variables. VsHume/(s): this one had temporal sequence assumed as condition or criterion of even substitute for causality). Ex Barometer: but its case is always temporally prior to the storm, without ever being the cause. Solution: common cause. >Causality, >Cause, >Causal relation, >Causal explanation. I 147 Common cause/correlation/Reichenbach/Schurz: solution: if the correlation of A and B is due to the common cause C, then the correlation A B must disappear with the values of the variable C held fixed. ("screening"). I 148 Shielding: direct causes shield indirect ones. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Empiricism | James | Diaz-Bone I 56 JamesVsEmpirism: "Nominalism": Empirists claim that there is a concept for every object. James: What about facts for which no concept exists? >Nominalism. Even worse: I 57 Language/James: language supports the nominalistic tendency to dismember the stream of consciousness. Nevertheless, James develops a position of radical empiricism (VsRationalism, VsEmpirism, which is represented by Hume;JamesVsHume). JamesVsHume: in order to be radical, empiricism must not contain elements which are not directly perceptible, nor exclude elements which are directly experienced. Cf. Empiricism/Hume. Radical Empiricism/James: 1. Only such issues can be discussed, which are based on categories of observation. 2. The relations between objects of experience are as accessible as the objects themselves. 3. Context as a result of partial experience is itself the object of experience. The experience of this connection is the stream of consciousness. 4. No preliminary reconstruction of subjective consciousness. |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Ethics | Husserl | I 115 ff HusserlVsHume: there is no ethics of feelings. HusserlVsKant: VsCategorical Imperative/HusserlVsKant: a formal generalization is not sufficient to characterize ethical correctness. Husserl: a fictitious observer must be able to understand my assessment: a) passively, by chance in circumstances or b) through acting on purpose, reasonable. >Categorical Imperative, >Circumstances, >Emotivism, >Noncognitivism, >Intersubjectivity/Husserl. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 |
| Existence | Geach | I 265 Existence/GeachVsHume/GeachVsGilson: the Hume-Brentano-Gilson thesis (that existence adds nothing conceptual) cannot be recognizably claimed if true. It treats existence as nonconceptual (not conceptualized) and tangible only in existence judgments, but this statement itself is not an existence statement and treats existence as conceptual: contradiction. >Existence statement, >Contradictions. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Experience | James | Suhr I 93 Experience/James: experience is a "double-barreled term": like "life" and "history". --- Diaz-Bone I 55 Experience/Sensation/JamesVsHume, JamesVsMill: "Associationism": sees in conceptual ideas and experiences only reflections of perceptible impressions which produce ideas by acting on the organism. James: This "determinism" probably explains the sensations of details, but not the experiences of utterances of will, feelings, rationality, memories. >Association. --- I 59 Pure Experience/James: Experience is the Reality! (> Berkeley: being is perceived, being of things is their being known.) JamesVsBerkeley: esse est percipere. ((s) = Being is perceiving.) |
Suhr I Martin Suhr John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Explanation | Mayr | I 99 Biology: Questions: e.g. unique events: "Why are there no hummingbirds in the old world"? E.g. "Where did Homo sapiens begin?" This leads to historical representation as the only possible form. This approach is fundamentally different from the explanation by means of causal laws. One can never categorically prove that a historical representation is "true". >Single-case causation, >Causality, >Causal explanation, >History, >Historiography. I 100 Reproducibility/Science: the uniqueness is not reserved for the living nature! E.g. each of the nine planets is unique. Every mountain range and stream has unique features on the earth. Hume/Science: cannot say anything satisfying about the cause of any unique phenomenon. >Causes, >Effect, >Causality/Hume. MayrVsHume: the historical representation can often explain unique events satisfactorily and sometimes even make verifiable predictions. >History/Mayr). I 101 History/Causation/Mayr: earlier events usually contribute causally to later ones. "Particularistic causality". I 103 Biology/explanation/Mayr: here we often find more than a causal explanation. Perhaps one has to explain most of the phenomena of biology even with several theories! A theory of science that cannot cope with pluralism is unsuitable for biology. >Theories. I 166 Explanation/biology: by direct causes: molecular biology, functional morphology, developmental biology, physiological genetics Indirect: evolutionary biology, classical genetics, ethology, systematics, comparative morphology, ecology. Problem: separation of morphology and genetics. Overlaps. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Generality | Bigelow | I 232 Natural Laws/Realism/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: a Humean theory of natural laws cannot be as realistic as ours. >Humean world. Generalisation/Regularity/Hume: the Humean can be realistic with regard to generalisations. >Laws of nature, >Regularities, >Generalization, >D. Hume, >Causality/Hume. I 233 "Total generality"/"pure" generality/Hume/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: may not contain a reference to an individual: It is too weak and too strong. a) too strong: for example, Kepler's laws refer to all planets but also to an individual, the sun. b) too weak: it is still not a law. For example, that everything moves towards the center of the earth. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Humanities | Gadamer | I 9 Humanities/"Geisteswissenschaften"/Tradition/Gadamer: The word "Geisteswissenschaften" has become established primarily through the translator of John Stuart Mill's logic. In his work, Mill seeks to begin by sketching the possibilities of applying induction logic to the moral sciences. The translator says humanities(1). >Humanities/Mill. I 10 GadamerVsTradition/GadamerVsMill/GadamerVsHume/GadamerVsInduction: But now the real problem that the humanities pose to thinking is that one has not correctly grasped the essence of the humanities when one measures them by the yardstick of progressive knowledge of regularity. The experience of the social-historical world cannot be elevated to a science by the inductive method of the natural sciences. Cf. >Hermeneutics, >Understanding, >Interpretation, >Cultural Transmission. 1. J. St. Mill, System der deduktiven und induktiven Logik, übertragen von Schiel, 1863, 6. Buch »Von der Logik der Geisteswissenschaften Oder moralischen Wissenschaften«. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Humanities | Mill | Gadamer I 9 Humanities/"Geisteswissenschaften"/Mill/Gadamer: The word " Geisteswissenschaften" has become established primarily through the translator of John Stuart Mill's logic(1). In his work, Mill seeks to sketch out the possibilities of applying induction logic to the moral sciences. Gadamer: It is already clear from the context of Mills' logic that it is not at all a matter of acknowledging a logic of its own in the humanities, but on the contrary of showing that it is the inductive method underlying all experiential science that is also valid in this field alone. Mill thus stands in an English tradition whose most effective formulation Hume gave in his introduction to the "Treatise"(2). Also in moral science it is important to recognize uniformities, regularities, regularities that make the individual phenomena and processes predictable. VsMill, VsHume see >Humanities/Gadamer. 1. J. St. Mill, System der deduktiven und induktiven Logik, übertragen von Schiel, 1863, 6. Buch »Von der Logik der Geisteswissenschaften Oder moralischen Wissenschaften«. 2. David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, Introduction. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| I, Ego, Self | Kant | Horwich I 404 f I/knowledge/Kant: representations (according to Putnam): "empirical I"/Kant/Putnam: is the author "in the game", not the right author. - This is the transcendental ego (out of game). - Internal realism/PutnamVsKant: 1. authors in the plural (social). 2.Tthe ones in the story are real! PutnamVsSkepticism: N.B.: it would be "crazy" if these were only fictions because a fictional character cannot be a real author. But these are true stories. >Knowledge/Kant, >Skepticism. --- Stegmüller IV 322 I/Kant: "Empirical I": working as a cause and as effect - "Noumenal I": (metaphysical): superfluous, passive viewer - metaphysical I: addressee of the moral ought. --- Strawson V 146 I/subject/Hume/Strawson: is obliged to explain the idea of what "I" means - as anti-rationalist he must declare our fiction - KantVsHume: Kant does not need that, he needs empirical criteria for the subject's identity. >Subject/Kant. --- Bubner I 108 I/Kant/Bubner: there is not the I, to which representations adhere, but to speak of the different representations among themselves as mine means to create self-consciousness in the first place. >Self-consciousness/Kant. --- Adorno XIII 64 I/transcendental subject/KantVsHume/Adorno: precisely this I, which is denied by Hume per se, must in reality be presupposed to constitute something like experience. Kant, however, has seen that this transcendental subject, which is greatly independent of the content of experience, has in itself a dynamic which goes beyond experience. >I, Ego, Self/Hume, >Subject/Hume. Kant has expressed this in the fact that reason, by going beyond its empirical use, is necessarily involved in contradictions, because thinking cannot be arbitrarily stopped once it comes into play. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| I, Ego, Self | Shoemaker | Frank I 50ff ShoemakerVsHume: 1st shows no more than that, as I find myself, I can not know - the second premise is false: although there is no index-free description, that does not prove that I would need such. >Self-identification. For identification the possibility of errors is necessary - but this is not given in the case of the self. >Incorrigibility. Anyway there is regress in self-identification. Hume did not deny self-consciousness. >Self-consciousness. Self-consciousness/Shoemaker: no kind of perception! (Rorty ditto). Pain: no (private) object, a person is not pain, and it is not painful, but one feels pain. >Pain. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Identity | Quine | I 208ff Identity/Davidson/Quine: we are unable to pick out the relationship that is constitutive for the knowledge of the identity of an object. The reason is that every property can be considered as relevant. If the mind can only think if it establishes a clear relationship to the object, then thought is impossible. (QuineVsRussell). Identity: does not work without conceptual scheme. Identity: QuineVsHume, QuineVsLeibniz: Confusion of word and object: there is no relation between different objects but a relationship between singular terms - a = b different names. I 211 Copula form indefinite singular terms: no longer Fa but a = b = E.g. Agnes = a lamb - but: Agnes bleats: Fa. I 211 Synonymy and analyticity is graded, identity is absolute. I 365 Identity conditions strong/weak/(s):> E.g. Paul and Elmer. II 23 Identity/absolutely distinguishable: an open sentence is only fulfilled by an object. Relatively distinguishable: only fulfilled in the given order. Identity: are objects that are not relatively distinguishable, not all objects that are not absolutely distinguishable. >Objects/Quine. I 397 Theseus' ship: it is not about the term "the same" but the term "ship" - each general term has its own individuation principle. II 156ff Individuation: in our world moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - for objects at random (everything can be the object), for predicates crucial truth value. Identification between possible worlds: is dependent on predicates - for body also from space displacement, composition, etc., therefore not cross-worlds - "The same object" is meaningless. -> singular term, instead predicate. Geach I 238 Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: identity is relative - if someone says x is identical to y, this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same A as y". (Weird that Frege has not supported this). Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single scheme: (1) l- Fa (x) (Fx ux = a) in everyday language: whatever is always true of something that is identical to an object y, is true of a and vice versa. From which we derive the law of self-identity from: l- a = a if we take Fx for x unequal to a then scheme (1) provides us with: (2) l- (a unequal a) Vx (x unequal a u x = a) - this results in l- a = a. Geach I 240 But Geach is for relative identity. Quine V 86 Identity/Quine: initially only means extending the time pointing - then it is a relative mass term: E.g. "the same dog as" - used for individuation of absolute general term E.g. "dog". Geach: this is a reduction to a relative term - Quine: that does not work when objects overlap. V 89 Identity/Geach: is only with respect to general terms the same thing. V 161 Identity: is restricted: in terms of general terms: "the same apple" - is unrestricted: Learning: 1. Anyone who agrees with the sentences [a = b] and [a is a g] also agrees to [b a g] ((s) > transitivity). 2. Disposition, to agree on [a = b], if it is recognized that one can agree [b is a g] due to [a is a g] for any g. - Relative identity: also this kind of identity is relative, because the identity scale depends on words. - [a = b] can get wrong when adding new terms. I 162 Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: x = y as the statement y is an element of every class, from which x is an element - characterization of the identity by using all relative clauses. V 162 Definition Identity/Set Theory/Quine: with quantification over classes is x = y defined as the statement y is a member of each class, from which x is element. Language learning: here initially still substitutional quantification - then no class, but exhaustion of relative clauses. VII (d) 65ff Identity/Quine: important: is the demand for processes or temporally extended objects - by assuming identity rather than flow kinship, one speaks of the flow instead of stages. IX 24 Definition identity/Quine: we can now simplify: for y = z - y = z stands for x (x ε y x ε z) - because we have identified the individuals with their classes. X 90 Definiton identity/Quine: then we define "x = y" as an abbreviation for: Ax ↔ Ay (z) (bzx ↔ bzy. Bxz ↔ Byz .Czx ↔ Czy .Cxz ↔ Cyz (z') (Dzz'x ↔.... .. Dzz'y .Dzxz'↔ Dzyz' Dxzz '↔ Dyzz')) - i.e. that the objects u x. y are not distinguishable by the four predicates, not even in terms of the relation to other objects z and z'. X 99 Identity/Quine: is only defined (in our appearance theory of set theory) between variables but it is not defined between abstraction expressions or their schematic letters. XII 71 Relative identity/Quine: results from ontological relativity, because no entity without identity - this is only explicable in the frame theory. - E.g. distinguishability of income classes. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Imagination | Quine | V 57f Imagination/Tradition/Quine: problem: imagine the same odd and even numbers. Solution: imagination as a hypothetical nervous state. Then you do not have to fix the number of spots on a chicken you are seeing. V 178 Imagination/liveliness/Hume: liveliness: is the differentiator for imagination: memory: is attenuated sensation. Fantasy: is attenuated recollection. QuineVsHume: imagination: is an event in the nervous system that leads to dispositions. V 57/58 Imagination/Tradition/Quine: Problem: For example, if one could imagine a number that would be both even and odd. Imagination/Quine: Solution: if you take imaginary images as hypothetical nerve states, there are no such problems. Concerning a nervous state one does not have to commit oneself to e.g. the number of spots of a chicken. Idea/Concept/Berkeley/Hume/Quine: the two were not innocent and even drew the line before the abstract idea of the triangle and only allowed ideas of certain triangles. QuineVsTradition: these are vain questions about the causal connection of ideas. Psychology/Peirce: the only way to examine a psychological question is to rely on external facts. V 59 Quine: Problem: how can you do that if you only talk about outer things and not about inner things like ideas? >Ideas/Quine. Solution/Quine: by talking about language. ((s) >Semantic Ascent). V 177 Past/Observation/Quine: but there are also reports of previous observations where the term was learned by definition rather than by conditioning. Since a defined term can be replaced by its definiendum, this results in a composite observation term. Example: "I have seen a black rabbit": Learning situation: once for black, once for rabbit, as well as for attributive composition. Imagination/Memory/Quine: in the language of imaginary images we can say that they are evoked even if the corresponding object is not present. Now, however, we must go further and require even more skills: the child must distinguish between two types of imaginary images: a) Imagination. b) Memories. V 178 QuineVsHume: has made little convincing reference to liveliness as a distinguishing feature. Def Memory/Hume: is attenuated sensation. Def Imagination/Hume: is weakened memory. >Memory/Quine. Def Imagination/QuineVsHume: is an event in the nervous system that leads to a state of readiness for corresponding stimulation. This indicative nerve process is perceived by the subject, i.e. it must be able to react specifically to it in two different ways: a) Summary of previously learned elements such as "black" and "rabbit". b) Strengthened by acquaintance: i.e. through a real previous encounter with a black rabbit. Is the basis for affirmation. V 179 Observation Sentence/Complete Thought/Reference/Quine: refers to the object and to the calendar clock and, if applicable, to a location. Is a complex observation term. Protocol Sentence: is a timeless sentence (of eternal duration) if place and time data are complete. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Individual Causation | Davidson | Armstrong III 94 Causality/DavidsonVsHume/Armstrong: individual causation: we often recognize that an individual case is causal, without having any idea to what regular sequence it belongs. Solution: differentiation knowledge-that: that there is a law/knowing what: the law is. Solution: there is a description, under which the event is lawlike. AnscombeVsDavidson: many characteristics are causally irrelevant, therefore causality is description dependent. >Causality/Davidson, cf. >regularities. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Individuals | Nietzsche | Danto III 173 Individual/Group/Nietzsche/Danto: compared to Nietzsche's view of the individual in the early work of the birth of tragedy(1), where he had an idea of how the individual could go up by music in a form of communion in the group, ... Danto III 174 ... one can hardly find anything of it in the late work. Nietzsche had meanwhile come to the conclusion that there was sufficient solidarity in life, but not enough individuality. Individual/Tradition/Danto: Hobbes and Locke (originally Plato in the Glaucon) were tempted to think of humans as primordial individuals, from whom societies were supposed to have formed in such a way that chemical bonds were supposed to have formed from elements or atoms and molecules. >Language and thought/Ancient philosohy, >Language/Hobbbes, >Social contract/Hobbes, >Language/Locke, >Social contract/Locke. Social relations would then only be external, or, as Hobbes says, "artificial". NietzscheVsLocke/NietzscheVsHume/NietzscheVsPlato/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche rejected such a theory; in his opinion, consciousness and language have a social origin and a social function,... Danto III 175 ...so that the individual only develops an awareness of those ideas that everyone has in common with everyone. Just as the individual could hardly survive without community, it is difficult for him to gain a sense of himself as an independent entity. >Consciousness/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche. Die Geburt der Tragödie, 4, KGW III. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Induction | Goodman | I 23 Defi Induction/Goodman: induction requires that some classes are seen as relevant classes by excluding others. >Relevance. --- II 82 The sharpest criticism VsHume/Goodman: Hume's analysis relates at best to the origin of predictions, not to their entitlement. II 88 The problem of induction is not a problem of proof, but a problem of definition of the difference between justified and unjustified predictions. >Justification, >Prediction. II 89 There is mutual adjustment between definition and language use. II 101f Grue/Goodman: problem: the same data supports contrasting predictions. Question: in what essential property must hypotheses be the same > law: are not in connection with e.g. an object in my pocket. "Grue" does not work as a conventional non-law-like hypotheses (it is limited in space or time) - one can reverse the derivation: red and green from gred and reen. II 109 Law-like or resumable hypotheses are not to be characterized purely syntactically. II 95 What confirms certain data, is not what is obtained by generalization of separate individual cases, but that which is obtained by generalization of the entire body of data material. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Knowledge | Davidson | McGinn I 179 McGinn: Domestication theories of knowledge: newer version: refers to the externalism with regard to the content of consciousness: the mind and the world can diverge, as far as the skeptic would like to accept. (Putnam, Davidson). >Externalism. Davidson I (eb) 18 DavidsonVsHume: there are infinitely many properties, so the ignorance of imaginary objects is possible. Sense/feature/FregeVsDavidson/Frege per Hume: only what is relevant belongs to the comprehension of sense. Therefore "hidden" features may not be part of the meaning. Dummett: these are the "internal characteristics". >Sense, >Relevance. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Knowledge | Hume | Stroud I 105f Knowledge/proof of existence/existence/Hume/Stroud: there are two principles: 1. No one knows of the existence of something when it is not perceived directly by someone > Apprehension: is unordered or the person knows what he/she has perceived directly, is a sign of the existence of this thing. 2. No one can know that a thing is a sign of something else, if he/she has not perceived these two things (thing and sign) directly. MooreVsHume: both principles are wrong: e.g. I know that this pencil exists. According to Hume I could not know that, so they are wrong. This is a reductio ad absurdum. StroudVsMoore: Hume's principles are valid. >Principles/Hume. Moore: for him it is relevant what is safe, the pencil or the principles. Skepticism/Stroud/(s): but skepticism is not a question of certainty. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Knowledge | Stroud | I 30 Knowledge/Stroud: science and everyday life have the same standards for knowledge - True belief is still no knowledge. Knowledge/Stroud thesis: we can know how things appear to us. - (Does not help against Descartes' skepticism). >Skepticism/Stroud, >Skepticism/Descartes, >Appearance/Sellars, >Appearance, >Perception. Descartes/Stroud: Descartes' skepticism, these are his "ideas". - Trying to get behind it, only leads to further representations. >Representation, >René Descartes. I 34 There is no "real knowledge" in contrast to knowledge. >Knowledge, >Certainty. I 61 Knowledge/Stroud: I cannot be described as someone who knows that John will not get hit by a meteorite. - But when John turns up it is right to say I knew he was coming. >Assertibility. I 76 Skepticism/knowledge/Stroud: deep problem: if we realize that our concept of knowledge or of truth leads us to skepticism, we feel that it is incorrect. - Depth: it is not just about knowledge, but about our practice and reflection. >Self-knowledge, >Reflection, >Practice, >Truth. I 110 Skepticism/Detective Example/crime case/Stroud: shows that it is not about greater security. - (As with MooreVsHume) - There is no competing hypothesis. - Rather, it shows a lack (incomplete list). - No misuse of the word "knowledge". >Evidence, >Moore's Hands, >Skepticism/Hume. Skepticism: does not only consider documents (like the detective) but also questions reasons. I 121 Wrong: Because I know that the butler was the perpetrator, I know that the list is complete. (analoge to Moore's hands). I 239 Knowledge/belief/Stroud: difference: true belief can be random, then the fact of belief is not an explanation for knowledge, no theory of knowledge. >Belief, >Causal theory of knowledge. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Meaning Theory | Fodor | II 120 Meaning Theory/m.th./meaning/essence/idea/FodorVsLocke/FodorVsHume: meaning theories that refer to beings or ideas, do not say anything because they do not show the cases in which two expressions express the same nature or the same idea. >Ideas, >Imagination, >Meaning, >Reference. --- IV 70 Meaning Theory/Davidson/Fodor/Lepore: there can be several meaning theories because of the semantic indeterminacy. Radical Interpretation: the radical interpretation is about the problem of finding the correct meaning theory. >Radical interpretation. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Memory | Quine | I 20 Memory: has no traces of earlier sensations, but is conceptually. V 176 Memory/Quine: is a disposition, to pronounce a name in the presence of the relevant - the observation sentence has nothing to do with the past - to forget a name is to forget a piece of language. V 177 Past/Observation/Quine: there are also reports of previous observations where the term was learned by definition rather than by conditioning. Since you can replace a defined term with its definiendum, this amounts to a composite observation term. Example "I have seen a black rabbit": >Observation/Quine. Learning situation: one for black, one for rabbits, as well as for attributive composition. Imagination/Memory/Quine: in the language of imaginary images, we can say that they are created even if the corresponding object is not present. But now we have to go further and assume even more abilities: the child has to distinguish between two types of images: a) Fantasies and b) Memories. V 178 QuineVsHume: has made little convincing reference to liveliness as a distinguishing feature. Def Memory/Hume: is a weakened sensation Def Fantasy/Hume: is a weakened memory. Def Imagination/QuineVsHume: is an event in the nervous system that leads to a state of readiness for a corresponding irritation. This indicative nerve process is perceived by the subject, i.e. it must be able to react specifically to it, in two different ways: a) Summary of elements that have been learned so far e.g. "black" and "rabbit". b) Reinforced by acquaintance: i.e. real earlier encounter with a black rabbit. Basis for the affirmative. V 179 Observation sentence/complete thought/reference/Quine: refers to the object and the calendar clock and, if applicable, to a location. Complex observation term. >Observation Sentence/Quine. Protocol sentence: timeless record (of eternal duration) if location and times are complete. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Mind | Goodman | II 113 Hume imagined the mind as something that leads us by observing regularities to corresponding predictions. GoodmanVsHume: We, however, see the mind as an activity from the beginning. It corrects itself gradually. >Process, >Regularities. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Miracles | Hume | Stegmüller IV 355 Miracle/probability/Hume/Stegmüller: probability must always be put into perspective with regard to the level of information. But Hume's argument would even be valid if the credibility of witnesses were a law of nature! Even then it would not be rational to believe in miracles. Miracle/Mackie: difference: a) Question: which law hypotheses should be adopted based on the reports? b) The weight of the evidence itself. Miracle/MackieVsHume: even the person reporting the event needs the concept of a well-founded natural law to classify the event as a miracle. IV 356 Hume does not take into account the strengthening of several independent witnesses. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Natural Laws | Armstrong | III 137 Laws of Nature/LoN/Natural Laws/Science/Form/Identification/Armstrong: theoretical identification of water and H2O is not a law of nature. - Intead there are two all-quantifications on molecules and water. - Each law of nature must have double-digit form of premise-conclusion. Ontology/Armstrong: what entities exist is inextricably linked with laws of nature. - But also distinguishable from it. III 158 Laws of nature/Armstrong: contingent - but not because they are discovered - the distinction a priori/a posteriori an epistemic one. II (a) 17 Laws of nature/Armstrong: Laws are not true >statements of law, but >truth-makers. ArmstrongVsHume: strong LoN: contain regularities, but cannot be reduced to them (because dispositions do not always show) - Def Natural law/Armstrong: can be identified with relations between universals (properties). Scientific camp: realistic view: e.g., possession of a property leads to possession of another property. - Laws of nature/Armstrong: are contingent! - But the regularity seems to be contained analytically. >Regularity. Place I 25 Law of nature/Armstrong: is a relation between categorical properties (not dispositional ones) - PlaceVsArmstrong: this smuggles modality into the laws (because the relations then have to be intentional or modal). >Modality. III 44 Laws of nature/Armstrong: laws are no causal factors. - A law exists only when it is instantiated. - That three values of volume, pressure, temperature always are connected is not because of the law! (Boyle's law is no law of nature). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Natural Laws | Bigelow | I 113 Natural Laws/Counterfactual Conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: are often formulated in terms of "ideal systems". To do this, they need the counterfactual conditionals. I 114 Similarly, thought experiments need counterfactual conditionals. I 214 Law/Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: For example,"What goes up must fall". Lucrez: what consists mainly of soil or water has to move downwards. "Down" was a marked direction. Atomism: Representative: Lucrez: Little astronomical knowledge yet. Aristotle/Ptolemaios: believed that everything that consists mainly of earth or water moves to the center of the cosmos, and since it moves to the center of the earth, it must be the center of the cosmos. I 215 Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: in one respect Aristotle is closer to the truth, in other respects it is Lucrez. He was right that the center of the earth is not marked. Natural Laws/Physics/Biology/Bigelow/Pargetter: a one-sided diet with examples from physics does not necessarily lead to a correct view of the natural laws. Instead, here are some examples from biology: Generalization/Biology: For example, a living being has father and mother of the same species as it itself. (Today we know that this has some exceptions). I 216 It was a surprise to discover that this also applies to some plants. I 217 Generalization: most of them have an exception. For example, without exception: perhaps the generalization "All mammals have a mother". Exceptions/counter-examples/Bigelow/Pargetter: one should not overestimate the threat posed by exceptions to laws. Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: we are looking for two things: a) something that is more than regularity, on the other hand b) less than a regularity without exception. It may be that we have discovered with a law an important property of the cases that are sufficient for it, even if not all cases satisfy it. Modal/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: the commonalities that satisfy the law are modal. Law/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not always need a law, for example to know that our cat is pregnant. >Generality, >Generalization. I 220 Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are improved: e.g. Aristotle - Copernicus - Newton. Copernicus: still thought that the material of the moon does not fall towards the earth, but towards the moon center. Therefore the moon is round. Newton/(s): first explained the circular motion of the moon. Aristotle: thesis: everything (earthly and watery) falls to a center and this is coincidentally the center of the earth. N.B.: thus he fulfils the quasi-copernican theory! I 221 VsAristotle: his theory was nevertheless wrong. But not because any movement would have been different, but because the reasoning was wrong: it is about gravity, Aristotle considered the center of the earth to be the center of the cosmos. Error: was not that Aristotle thought that no object would fall in a different direction, but because he thought that no object could fall in a different direction. (Necessity). I 221 Law/Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are generalizations (description of regularities) plus attribution of necessity. (Dretske 1977(1), Tooley 1977(2), Armstrong 1978(3), 1983(4)) >Possibilia, >Counterfactual conditional. Bigelow/Pargetter: if they are wrong, they must be strictly wrong or empty. (Cartwright 1983(5), Hacking 1983(6)). I 222 Definition Laws/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: are truths about Possibilia. Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: Actualia cannot be fully understood without understanding Possibilia. ((s) Here understanding is associated with objects, not sentences.) >Understanding. Possible Worlds/Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: we understand the actual world only by locating it in the logical space of possible worlds. >Possible worlds, >Possible worlds/Bigelow, >Actual world. Natural Law/Laws of nature/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: cannot be adequately described in a non-modal language. Because a natural law is not just a regularity. >Regularities, >Regularity theory, >Modalities, >Theory language. Logical form: i.e. a natural law cannot be merely defined as (x)(Fx > Gx). Logical form: of a natural law will often be a universal generalization (UG). >Universal generalization. But it can also be another generalization or other form of sentence. >Universal generalization. >Generality, >Generalization We assume, however, that natural laws (UG) will be involved and therefore have the following form: I 223 natN (x)(Fx > Gx). Natural necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: entails that natural laws involve counterfactual conditionals. Because they are about what would happen, not just what already happens. And even if things were different in certain respects. I.e. in addition to regularity (x)(Fx > Gx) it will be true that every F would be a G ((s) Logic of 2nd level!) Logical form/(s) counterfactual conditional instead of quantification of 2nd level: (x) Fx would be > would be Gx) we take this together as a truthmaker of the proposition natN (x)(Fx > Gx) (see above). >Truthmakers. Natural Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: this is the view of natural laws that we defend. LewisVsBigelow: (Lewis, 1979)(7) the theory is circular. >Natural laws/Lewis. I 226 Non-modal Theory/Natural Laws/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: (instead of relative necessity:) most non-modal theories of natural law are derived from Hume. Then we can accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity, without falling into a circle. >Necessity, >Necessity/Bigelow, >Necessity/Hume. N.B.: then we can simply accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on independent access to laws! Explanation: so it makes sense to use laws to explain nomic necessity rather than vice versa. And this is much less obscure than modal arguments. >Modalities. I 227 BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Humean theories are not able to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power. >Explanations, >Causal explanation. 1. Dretske, F.I. (1977). Laws of nature. Philosophy of Science 44, pp. 248-68 2. Tooley, M. (1977). The nature of laws. Canadian Journal of Philosphy 7, pp. 667-98. 3. Armstrong, D.M. (1978). Universals and scientific realism. Cambridge University Press. 4. Armstrong, D.M. (1983). What is a law of nature? Cambridge University Press. 5. Cartwright, N. (1983). How the laws of physics lie. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 6. Hacking, I. (1983). Representing and intervening: Introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science. Cambridge University Press. 7. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Natural Laws | Cartwright | I 3 Natural Laws/Truth// Cartwright: thesis: the truly explanatory (theoretical) laws of physics do not tell us the truth. >Explanations, >Physics, >Truth, >Reality. I 21 Laws of nature / Cartwright: two ways: a) Association / Hume: e.g. the equations of physics: whenever force acts on an object, the acceleration f/m. >Equations. b) causal laws: E.g. Smoking causes cancer. >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Causal laws, >Fundamental law/Cartwright. Hacking I 56 Laws of nature / Nancy Cartwright: deceptive, only phenomenological laws > possibility of truth. But it is possible that we know about causally effective communication. I 70 Laws do not reflect facts and do not evoke anything. CartwrightVsHume: the regularities are features of the processes by which we theorize - per Entity -Realism VsTheory-Realism. >Regularity. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Natural Laws | Place | Armstrong III 137 Laws of Nature/LoN/Natural Laws/Science/Form/Identification/Armstrong: theoretical identification of water and H2O is not a law of nature. - Intead there are two all-quantifications on molecules and water. - Each law of nature must have double-digit form of premise-conclusion. Ontology/Armstrong: what entities exist is inextricably linked with laws of nature. - But also distinguishable from it. III 158 Laws of nature/Armstrong: contingent - but not because they are discovered - the distinction a priori/a posteriori an epistemic one. Armstrong II (a) 17 Laws of nature/Armstrong: Laws are not true >statements of law, but >truth-makers. ArmstrongVsHume: strong LoN: contain regularities, but cannot be reduced to them (because dispositions do not always show) - Def Natural law/Armstrong: can be identified with relations between universals (properties). Scientific camp: realistic view: e.g., possession of a property leads to possession of another property. - Laws of nature/Armstrong: are contingent! - But the regularity seems to be contained analytically. >Regularity. Place I 25 Law of nature/Armstrong: is a relation between categorical properties (not dispositional ones) - PlaceVsArmstrong: this smuggles modality into the laws (because the relations then have to be intentional or modal). >Modality. Armstrong III 44 Laws of nature/Armstrong: laws are no causal factors. - A law exists only when it is instantiated. - That three values of volume, pressure, temperature always are connected is not because of the law! (Boyle's law is no law of nature). |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Naturalistic Fallacy | Black | III 81 Naturalistic fallacy/BlackVsHume: there are quite sentences with "should", which can have a trith value - then there is no logical separation of scientific and moral principles. (Original place: D. Hume, Treatise of human Nature, book 3, part I sec. 1) Black: the argument is deceptively simple: Hume/Black: all moralists make an imperceptible transition from observations of human affairs (or assertions about the existence of God) expressed with "is" and "is not" to normative conclusions with "should" or "should not". But this transition does not follow at all ("is of the least consequence"). We need a reason why this new relation (which seems unthinkable) could occur as a deduction from others. Deduction/Hume/naturalistic fallacy/Black: the core of the argument is that nothing can follow in a deduction that is not already contained in the premises. Naturalistic fallacy/BlackVsHume: but there is a way in which new evaluative or normative material can appear in a valid conclusion: For example, premise: you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs. (This can be regarded as factual) But it follows now: Conclusion: if you want to make an omelette, eggs should be broken. Hume/Black: what he means is that no categorical or unconditional "should" follows. BlackVsHume: this seems convincing at first sight. But: Problem: the absence of the word "should" is not a reliable criterion. For example, the conclusion that murder is a sin implies that one should not kill. But how can we judge from the mere linguistic form that the premise is not normative. One could say that the sentence about murder is unverifiable. III 81 Behind this are difficult questions of how we should understand the goals and procedures of science. >Science/Black. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Naturalistic Fallacy | Hume | Stegmüller IV 186 Is-ought problem/naturalistic fallacy/Hume: thesis: it is impossible to derive an ought-sentence solely from an is-sentences. ((s)> Moore: Moore renamed the problem to "naturalistic fallacy"). Stegmüller: if there is non-moral use there is no problem because of the hypothetical imperative: e.g. in chess, there is no problem of the transition from "is" to should. Reason: there is no expression of any new relationship! Implicit: what you want, you should. Solution/SearleVsHume: we can attach premises with obligations. Solution/Searle: it is about institutional facts. MackieVsSearle: this is a confusion of >exterior/interior problems. We cannot step outside of internalized rules. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Naturalistic Fallacy | Nietzsche | Danto III 168 Naturalistic Fallacy/NietzscheVsHume/Nietzsche/Danto: the Humean argument that there is no supposed to follow from being is then only valid when a distinction between two orders of judgement is introduced, between moral facts and not moral facts. However, there are no facts at all for Nietzsche. Instead, there are only interpretations. >Hume, >Interpretation/Nietzsche, >Fact, >Interpretation-philosophy. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Norms | Brandom | I 83 Norms/standards/Brandom: not from collective action, that does not exist. - Community must not be personalized - it is always about individual members. I 84 Basic: I-You relationship - instead I-We-relationship. - Community: how much agreement is enough? - Brandom: there are always authorities and experts. Cf. >I-you-relationship/Gadamer. I 96 Normes/Brandom: stem from what we do, not part of the nature of things. I ~ 105 Norms/standards/Brandom: depend on our community: they are our standards - concepts: irrespective of community, the facts decide about it - concepts are non-discoursive: Discussions do not decide about them. I 867 Norms/standards/Brandom: normative attitudes prevail - definitions are not causally effective on their own - standards are not objects in the causal order - talking about status cannot replace talk about actually occupied positions - what follows from p cannot be identified with my actual accounting - A: phenomenalistic view the standards, but it is a normative phenomenalism. Cf. >Phenomenalism. I 898 Norms/Brandom: our own practices confront us already with internal standards - 1) in the guise of deontic status: definition and authorization - (in the eye of the beholder) - 2) The accuracies themselves are being reflected (account management). --- II 52 Norms/HegelVsKant: not only noumenally but socially rooted. II 54 Standards/Hume: attributed to wishes - BrandomVsHume: explanation by definition on patterns of practical inference - i.e. What is a desire and what is not? |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Object | Davidson | I (b) 16 ff Thought/Knowledge/DavidsonVsHume: there are infinitely many properties, so ignorance of the imagined objects is possible Hume/Descartes: ... it is necessary to find objects for which mistakes are impossible. As objects that are necessary what they seem to be. DavidsonVsDescartes: Such objects simply do not exist. Not even appearances are all what they seem to be. Also, the aspects of sense data cannot be protected against misidentification, insofar as they are real objects. We must drop the idea that there are inner objects or mental images in the required sense. No "internal objects", no "uninterpreted given", "no stream" within a schema (VsSchema/content). >Scheme/Content, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mentalism. Frank I 678 Objects/Putnam/Fodor: a) "true inward", "in front of the mind", "conceived" by him - b) those who identify thoughts in the usual way. (external) - Davidson: I agree that there are no objects that serve both purposes - ((s) not an excellent class). - Putnam: the two cannot coincide, because otherwise the mind could not be deceived. Ideas/impressions/Hume: "are as it seems and seem as it is" - DavidsonVsHume: such objects do not exist - neither abstract nor concrete, neither public nor private. Even propositions do not exist - there is no object that would satisfy the dual function to be in front of the mind and also to determine the content of the thought - otherwise one could not be deceived. - meaning depends on the types of objects and events which have caused the person acausally to take the words as applicable. But the agent cannot ask himself/herself whether he/she regularly applies them correctly, because his/her regularity gives them importance. - Thus, authority of the first person and social character go hand in hand. >First Person. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Objects (Material Things) | Quine | III 270 Item/Thing/Object/Quine: is the sum of the simultaneous instantaneous states of distributed atoms or other small physical particles in space at any given moment. And over time it is the sum of its successive momentary states. QuineVsHeraclit: we can climb into the same river twice. What we cannot do is go twice to the same time stage of the river. (At least not if this part is shorter than the time we need to get in.) III 271 Change/Quine/(s): depends on the choice of time periods to be compared. XI 150 Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: accepting things only means choosing a certain language. It is not believing in those things. XI 151 CarnapVsQuine: its existence criterion (to be the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in that it only expresses a language choice. QuineVsCarnap: Language and theory cannot be separated in this way. Science is the continuation of our daily practice. >Language/Quine. VII (a) 18 Objects/Quine: their existence is postulated in order to simplify access to the stream of experience. >Experience/Quine. VII (d) 66f Objects/Particulars/Thing/Hume: the idea of physical objects arises from an error of identification. Every moment we really invent a new object! QuineVsHume: we do not need to share that. IX 35 Object/Class/Quine: every thing for us is a class, after we declared individuals in Chapter 4 to be their own elements, it follows that every class is a class of classes, and that every thing is in a class of classes. Benefit: wherever a free variable has a meaning, a set abstraction makes sense. Therefore, we can henceforth use Greek letters instead of variables in the free places. >Classes/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Rabbit-Duck-Head | Putnam | I (g) 178/9 Rabbit-Duck-Head/Wittgenstein: the rabbit-duck-head shows that the mental image is something other than the physical: while the physical picture can be seen in several aspects, this is not possible in case of the mental image. It can only clearly be a rabbit or a duck. The interpretation is incorporated in the mental image. The mental image is a construction. I (g) 179 Memory/KantVsHume: similar to Wittgenstein in relation to the rabbit-duck-head: the interpretation is incorporated. >Aspects, >Interpretation, >Intentionality. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Reason/Cause | Brandom | II 121 Reason/Hume/Brandom: must be accompanied by a desire to perform an action - KantVsHume: Desire (sensual inclination) can provide no basis for an action - in addition: recognition of an obligation. >Desire, >Actions, >Intentions, >Motives. II 122 Brandom: to have a reason is to be eligible to own practical commitment. II 123 Recognition of a commitment can cause and can be caused. >Score keeping. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Regularities | Armstrong | II (c) 42ff ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstrongVsRegularity: 1) it is impossible to distinguish regularity from coincidence because of laws of nature (LoN): E.g. every ball of uranium is smaller than 1 km, so is every ball of gold, but the latter by coincidence. 2) Laws of nature support counterfactual conditionals - regularities do not. 3) Regularity theory turns induction into an irrational procedure. 4) Probability: Problem: every connection of F"s and G"s can exist due to a merely probable law: although the distribution is manifestation of the law of nature, it is not identical with it. Solution: natural laws: connection of types of states. Solution: ad 1: properties instead of regularities: properties of the gold/Uranium. ad 2: universals make the number of instantiations irrelevant (unequal regularity). ad 3: universals turn induction into abduction (conclusion to the best explanation). ad 4: Relations between properties (universals) can occur in different strength, then deterministic laws of nature are a borderline case. II (c) 45 Regularity/Tooley: regularity is molecular fact: conjunction: This F is a G and this...and... In contrast to that: law of nature as a link between properties (universals): leeds to atomic facts: the number of instances irrelevant. >Armstrong: this is a solution for non-actual situations as truth makers of counterfactual conditionals. >Counterfactual conditionals, >Truthmakers, >Regularity Theory, >Natural Laws, >Facts. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Regularities | Quine | V 19 Cause/Regularity/QuineVsHume: Problem: you can also use the two unit classes consisting of a and b for regularity. Then one succumbs to the fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc. See Causality/Hume. Dispositions: here there is the same problem. XI 112 Causality/QuineVsRegularity/QuineVsHume/Lauener: For example, to what kind of events does the crying of geese on the Capitol and to what belongs the salvation of Rome? |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Regularities | Tooley | Armstrong II (c) 42ff ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstrongVsRegularity: 1) it is impossible to distinguish regularity from coincidence because of laws of nature (LoN): E.g. every ball of uranium is smaller than 1 km, so is every ball of gold, but the latter by coincidence. 2) Laws of nature support counterfactual conditionals - regularities do not. 3) Regularity theory turns induction into an irrational procedure. 4) Probability: Problem: every connection of F"s and G"s can exist due to a merely probable law: although the distribution is manifestation of the law of nature, it is not identical with it. Solution: natural laws: connection of types of states. Solution: ad 1: properties instead of regularities: properties of the gold/Uranium. ad 2: universals make the number of instantiations irrelevant (unequal regularity). ad 3: universals turn induction into abduction (conclusion to the best explanation). ad 4: Relations between properties (universals) can occur in different strength, then deterministic laws of nature are a borderline case. Armstrong II (c) 45 Regularity/Tooley: regularity is molecular fact: conjunction: This F is a G and this...and... In contrast to that: law of nature as a link between properties (universals): leeds to atomic facts: the number of instances irrelevant. Armstrong: this is a solution for non-actual situations as truth makers of counterfactual conditionals. >Counterfactual conditionals, >Truthmakers, >Regularity Theory, >Natural Laws, >Facts. |
Tooley I M. Tooley Time, Tense, And Causation Oxford 2000 |
| Relations | Hume | I 121/122 Relation/KantVsHume: relations are not external to ideas. HumeVsKant: each relation is external in their terms, e.g. equality is not a property of the figures themselves, e.g. neighboring and distant figures do not explain what neighborhood and distance is. Relation anticipates a synthesis. Space/time: space and time are in the mind only a composition, bearing relation through fiction. E.g. association: creates relation, but does not explain that distance is a relation. Cf. >Properties/Chisholm. >Association/Hume, >Mind/Hume. I 135 Relations/Hume: relations cannot be derived from experience, they are effects of association principles external to the things (atomism). KantVsHume: not externally. Kant: therefore, critical philosophy instead of empiricism. >KantVsHume. I 139 KantVsHume: relations are so far dependent on the nature of things, as things presuppose a synthesis as phenomena that result from the same source as the synthesis of relations. Therefore, the critical philosophy is not empiricism. There is an a priori, that means, the imagination is productive. >Imagination/Hume, >Imagination/Kant. I 145 Causality/Hume: causality is the only relation, from which something can be concluded. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Seeing | Ryle | I 336 f Seeing/vision/Ryle: we can only see something in a lifelike way that we do not really see. RyleVsHume: Hume confuses this: presentation is (falsely) seen as the perception of ghosts or as an echo of perception (shadowy). I 366 Seeing and hearing is not an activity. It is neither observable nor unobservable. ((s) LuhmannVsRyle: observation of observation). >Perception/Ryle, >Seeing, >Aspects, >Perspective/Ryle, >Observation. cf. >Observation/Luhmann. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Sensory Impressions | Leibniz | Holz I 43 Sensory impression/empiricism/Leibniz: what is given by the senses is unprovable. >Provability/Leibniz, >Proof/Leibniz, >Experience/Leibniz, >Perception/Leibniz. Impression/Sensory Impression/Identity/Leibniz: therefore Leibniz does not rely on the "impression" (terminology: Locke: "sensation", Hume: "impression"). Cf. >Perception/Locke, >Sensory impressions/Hume. LeibnizVsLocke/LeibnizVsHume: in the sensible givenness itself lies the identity relation. I 45/46 Sensory perception/proof/Leibniz: sensory perception is unprovable. Only what can be traced back to simple terms (by definition) from complex concepts can be proved. "Chain of definitions". >Concept/Leibniz, >Terminology/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Sensory Impressions | Quine | II 57 QuineVsSensory qualities - people do not talk and do not think about their stimuli - it is about stimulus and response. --- XII 87 Body/Hume: simply equated with sensory impressions - volatile - every time there is a new apple. - QuineVsHume: Problem: thus no general statements are possible and no statements about the future. (To date unsolved). Solution/Bentham: translation of whole sentences by defining context. - No more word-word equivalents. Sentences as the primary bearer of meaning. Definition body/object/QuineVsHume: sets of sets of sensory data. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Sensory Impressions | Sellars | McDowell I 168 Sensory Impressions/Sellars: distinguished from pieces of the given. No direct relationship with the knowledge. >Given/Sellars, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Perception, >Perception/Sellars. Active receptivity. But the receptivity cannot cooperate itself in a rational manner with the spontaneity. (VsQuine). --- I IX Sellars: no renunciation of sensations in toto. (Unlike Quine). >Sensations/Quine. I XXIII Sensory Impressions/Quine: manifolds, which are to be structured through various theory drafts. (SellarsVs). I XXIII Sellars: Physical and mental are not in a causal relationship, but belong to different world views. >Physical/psychic. Only conveyed by structure of world views. (Vs above). The frames are related by their structure and not by content. It is simply a wrongly asked question how impressions and electromagnetic fields can tolerate each other. I XXIX The theory of sensory impressions does not speak of inner objects. >Inner objects. I XXXVII Sellars: sensory impressions only have causal consequences of external physical objects. A red sensation can also occur if the external object only seems to be red. Both concepts explain why the speaker always speaks of something red. Only, the sensation is according to Sellars no object of knowledge, and even the category of the object is questioned by Sellars. >Object/Sellars, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Sensation/Sellars. I XL First, however, these states are states of a person. Not of a brain. In any case, they are imperceptible. Sensory Impressions: neither they have a color, nor do they have a shape. (> Perception/Sellars). Impressions: that these are theoretical entities, is shown to us by how to characterize them in an intrinsic way: not only as descriptions: "entity as such, that looking at a red and triangular object under such and such circumstances has the standard cause." But rather as predicates. These are no abbreviations for descriptions of properties. Example if one says that molecules have a mass, then the word "mass" is not an abbreviation of a description of the form "the property that ...". I 101 "Impression of a red triangle" does not only mean "impression like he ... through red and triangular objects ...." although it is a truth, namely a logical truth about impressions of red triangles. I 103 Impressions need to be inter-subjective, not completely dissolvable impressions in behavioral symptoms: states (but not physiological) - impressions are not objects. I 106 Sellars: Rylean Language: actual explanation, is more than just a code: conceptual framework public objects in space and time. >Rylean ancestors. Language of impressions: embodies the discovery that there are such things, but it is not specifically tailored to them (individual things no antecedent objects of thinking). SellarsVsHume: because he does not clearly distinguish between thoughts and impressions, he can assume that a natural derivative corresponds not only to a logical but also a temporal sequence. His theory must be extended so that it also includes cases such as the above or backwards: Thunder now, before a moment of lightning. --- II 328 Hume does not see that the perception of a configuration is also the configuration of perceptions. >Perception/Hume, >Impression/Hume, >Thinking/Hume, >David Hume. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Subjectivity | Husserl | Gadamer I 249 Subjectivity/Husserl/Gadamer: Validity of being (German: "Seinsgeltung") now also possesses human subjectivity [in Husserl's phenomenology](1). It is therefore to be regarded just as much, i.e. it too is to be explored in the multiplicity of its modes of existence. Such an exploration of the ego as a phenomenon is not "inner perception" of a real ego, but it is also not a mere reconstruction of the i.e. relationship of the contents of consciousness to a transcendental ego pole (Natorp)(2) but is a highly differentiated subject of transcendental reflection. Cf. >Objectivism/Husserl, >Consciousness/Husserl. Way of Givenness: This reflection represents the growth of a new dimension of research compared to the mere fact of phenomena of objective consciousness, a fact in intentional experiences. For there is also a given fact that is not itself the object of intentional acts. Every experience has implied horizons of the before and after and finally merges with the continuum of the before and after present experiences to form the unity of the stream of experience. >Time Consciousness/Husserl. Gadamer I 251 Subjectivity/Husserl/Gadamer: The fact that Husserl has that "performance" of transcendental subjectivity everywhere in mind simply corresponds to the task of phenomenological constitutional research. But it is characteristic of his actual intention that he no longer says consciousness, or even subjectivity, but "life". He simply wants to go back behind the actuality of the consciousness that means, yes, also behind the potentiality of the fellow-mine to the universality of a last, which alone is able to measure the universality of what has been accomplished, i.e. what is constituted in its validity. It is a fundamentally anonymous intentionality, i.e. one that is no longer performed by anyone by name, through which the all-encompassing world horizon is constituted. Husserl, consciously countering a concept of the world that encompasses the universe of that which can be objectified by the sciences, calls this phenomenological concept of the world "the life-world," i.e., the world "into" which we live in the natural setting, which does not as such ever become representational to us, but which represents the given ground of all experience. >Lifeworld/Husserl. Gadamer I 253 Subject/Husserl/Gadamer: "The radical view of the world is a systematic and pure inner view of the self in the outward subjectivity(3). It is like in the unity of a living organism, which we can well observe and dissect from the outside, but can only understand if we go back to its hidden roots...". Subject/Husserl: In this way, the subject's behavior in the world also has its comprehensibility not in the conscious experiences and their intentionality, but in the anonymous ones of life. >I, Ego, Self/Husserl. Subjectivity/Husserl/Gadamer: (...) this is how one is led into the proximity of the speculative concept of life of German idealism. What Husserl is trying to say is that one must not think of subjectivity as an opposition to objectivity, because such a concept of subjectivity would itself be objectivistic. His transcendental phenomenology wants to be "correlation research" instead. But this says: the relation is the primary, and the "poles" into which it unfolds are "enclosed by itself"(4) just as the living encloses all its expressions of life in the uniformity of its organic being. HusserlVsHume: "The naivety of the speech of the experiencing, recognizing, the really concretely performing subjectivity leaves completely out of question, the naivety of the scientist Gadamer I 254 of nature, of the world in general, who is blind to the fact that all the truths he gains as objective ones, and the objective world itself, which in his formulas is substrate, is his own life structure that has become in him - is of course no longer possible, as soon as life comes into focus," (Husserl writes this with reference to Hume(5)). 1. Husserliana VI. 169. 2. Natorp, Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode, 1888; Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode, 1912. 3. Husserliana VI, p. 116. 4. Cf. C. Wolzogen, „Die autonome Relation. Zum Problem der Beziehung im Spätwerk Paul Natorps. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theorien der Relation“ 1984 and my review in Philos. Rdsch. 32 (1985), p. 1601. 5. Husserliana VI p. 99 |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Subjects | Dilthey | Gadamer I 227 Subject/Dilthey/Gadamer: (...) [Dilthey] agreed (...) with the historical school: there is not a general subject, but only historical individuals. The ideality of meaning is not to be assigned to a transcendental subject, but arises from the historical reality of life. It is life itself that unfolds and forms itself into understandable units, and it is the single individual who understands these units as such. This is the self-evident starting point for Dilthey's analysis. The interrelation of life, as it is revealed to the individual (and in the biographical recognition it is experienced and understood by others), is created by the significance of certain experiences. From them, as from an organizing centre, the unity of a life course is formed, just as the meaning of a melody is formed - not from the mere one after the other of the tones, but from the musical motifs that determine their design unity. >Interrelation/Dilthey. Gadamer I 250 Subject/DiltheyVsLocke/DiltheylVsHume/DiltheyVsKant/Gadamer: "In the veins of the recognizing subject that Locke, Hume and Kant construct, real blood does not run".(1) Dilthey himself went back to the unity of life, to the "point of view of life", and very similarly, Husserl's "life of consciousness" is a word he apparently took over from Natorp, and which was already an indicator of the tendency that later became widely accepted, not only of individual experiences of consciousness, but of the veiled, anonymous implicit intentionalities Gadamer I 251 to study the consciousness and in this way to make the whole of all objective rules of being understandable. Later this means: to enlighten the achievements of the "performing life". >Subjectivity/Husserl. 1. W. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften, Bd. 1. S. XVIII. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Terminology | Kant | I 33 Supersensible/Supernatural/Kant: E.g. the moral law. I 38 The Unconditional/Kant: even unconditional condition ("Condition totality"). The system of all possibilities. Justification of a sentence by subsumption of something slightly below rules. I 39 1. The unconditioned of the categorical condition unit of presentation relation belongs to the representational subject. 2. The unconditioned of the hypothetical condition unit of presentation relation relates to the objects of perception. 3. The unconditioned of the disjunctive synthesis applies to objects of thought. I 41 Soul/Kant: the soul idea belongs to the idea of death. With it, the ego distances itself from its body - wrong: one cannot conclude from the I to the soul. - The logically underlying (subject) is made into a being-like (ontologically) underlying (substance). I 42 Pure apperception/Kant: actually comes only to God. - Direct, intellectual intuition. - Intelligible objects (for example, "I") - through mere apperception - human: in actions and internal determinations, which the human does not perceive through the senses. I 98 Apperception/KantVsHume: unity of apperception: I am making all ideas aware as my ideas. - So I stay in the unity of consciousness which can accompany all my ideas. - In addition, I have to keep in mind, how I add an idea to the other! Otherwise I will scatter myself. I 129/130 The Sublime/Kant: the sublime is moral beauty - it resembles moral obligation, that it initially inhibits the life forces and accumulates, in order to let them pour even stronger in a kind of emotion and to lead to moral action. - But I should exceed the nature morally, so it is about my superiority to nature. - Sublime/Burke: "in the sublime we encounter the harbingers of this king of the horrors of death". --- Adorno XII 177 Pure/Kant/Adorno: 1. all that is pure in the subject, is that which is thought of without admixture of empirical, without admixture of a sensual. 2. The pure will is that which is pure in the sense of the principle of reason, without getting dependent on any being which is itself not rationally understandingly. --- Adorno XIII 66 Constitution/Idealism/Kant/Adorno: the concept of constitution (...) is characterized in Kant by the fact that this mind or consciousness is not conceived as a part of the world, as a piece of existence, like every other existence. They should differ as a constituent from everything else. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Thoughts | Evans | Frank I 487 Thoughts/EvansVsRussell/EvansVsHume: (with Davidson): it may be that you simply think you have a thought - even about yourself. Cf. >Incorrigibility, >First Person. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Thoughts | Russell | Frank I 487 Russell/Evans: Cartesians: Thought: we only have a thought if the object really exists. >Cartesianism, >Nonexistence, >Truth value. I 487ff Thoughts/EvansVsRussell/EvansVsHume: (with Davidson): it may be that you simply think you have a thought - even about yourself. >Belief/Davidson, >Self-identification. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 Russell IV 87/88 Idea/concept/Russell: ambiguous: in a certain sense we can say that blackness "is in our consciousness" as an idea is, so to speak, an object of thought. Russell: Blackness must be an object here so that two people can think of it, or that we can think of it again. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mental objects. Universals/Russell: therefore universals are not mere thoughts but objects of the act of thinking. >Universals. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Understanding | McDowell | I 98f Understanding/McDowell: the distinction between two types of intelligibility distinguishes two kinds of terms, but not of objects. I 123 Natural laws/Nature/Understanding/Hume: Nature cannot be understood in terms of meaning, nor in terms of a law. >Nature/Hume. Natural laws/Nature/Understanding/KantVsHume: regains the comprehensibility of the natural laws, but not the comprehensibility of the meaning. >Nature/Kant, >Laws of nature/Kant, >Understanding/Kant. Nature is the domain of natural laws, and therefore without any meaning. The empirical world, however, is not outside the concepts. I 136 Natural laws/meaning: mandatory rules do not have to be known. Understanding/McDowell: must also play a role where it is a matter of grasping mere events without all meaning. Understanding/comprehensibility/modernity/today/McDowell: the field of comprehensibility is the realm of natural laws - albeit without meaning. We can, however, refuse to equate this area of comprehensibility with nature, and even more so with what is real. >Nature/McDowell. I 140 Experience/Content/Understanding/McDowell: Empirical content is only understandable in a context that allows us to make the direct rational control of the mind through the world itself insightful. >Experience/McDowell. It is impossible for a fact to exert an impression on a person that perceives. However, the image of openness to the world brings the idea of direct access to the facts. Only that we cannot be certain in any case that it is not a deception. --- II 55 Understanding/McDowell: understanding your own utterances: ability to know what a theoretical description of this ability would do - knowing truths conditions - not truth! - Even in sentences which are not decidable by means of evidence - but this does not mean that the truth condition for each sentence either exists or does not exist, even if we cannot say that it exists or does not exist. >Truth condition. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Will | Nietzsche | Danto III 136 Will/Nietzsche/Danto: If it is true that Nietzsche tries to escape the usual distinction between mental and material, then the will to power must seem contradictory. After all, "will" is an expression concerning the spiritual. (See Causality/Nietzsche, I, Ego, Self/Nietzsche, Subject/Nietzsche). Danto: That is not true. As with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche's usual connotations concerning the spiritual are combined with the concept of "will" in the metaphysical sense. The will to power is not limited to the mental. If we do not respect this, we cannot understand Nietzsche. NietzscheVsActs of Will: Nietzsche attacks the "Acts of Will", which are not only accepted by philosophers. Danto III 137 Acts of Will/Danto: behave to actions like causes to effects. Hume/Danto: Hume rejected the idea that we could have an experience that corresponds to our idea of causal nexus, just how our will becomes active through our body parts or thoughts. Hume: we have absolutely no idea how the will works. Nevertheless, Hume accepts acts of will. NietzscheVsHume: is more radial, there is simply nothing that can be proven to be linked to our actions. Danto III 138 Thinking/Certainty/Subject/NietzscheVsDescartes: Nietzsche disproves the Cartesian thought that our own mental processes are immediately transparent, that we know about our way of thinking. He disproves it by setting up a series of interlinked thoughts and letting them "freeze": When Descartes talks about his doubts about reality being at least certain that these are his own doubts, he drags a lot of tacit assumptions with him. NietzscheVsDescartes: if his argumentation boils down to an "It is thought", our belief in the concept of substance is already assumed and after that a subject is assumed.(1) Danto III 140 Will/NietzscheVsSchopenhauer/Nietzsche/Danto: The philosophers tend to talk about the will as if it were the most known thing in the world; yes, Schopenhauer suggested that the will alone was known to us.(2) DantoVsSchoepenhauer: in reality this is not the case. There is no simple, self-identifiable mental operation that would be recognized as an act of will and intuitively grasped. Nietzsche: There is no 'will': this is just a simplistic conception of the mind.(3) Danto III 141 Will/Nietzsche: Perhaps the worst of all these fallacies is the conclusion that 'wanting is enough for action'.(4) Danto III 143 Will/Nietzsche/Danto: The will does not move any more, therefore it does not explain anything - it merely accompanies processes, it can also be missing.(5) Danto: if there is no will, there is no free or unfree will.(6) Freedom of will/Nietzsche/Danto: This conclusion is hasty: the doctrine of free will does not depend at all on a psychological theory about the will as a mental phenomenon; 'free' is applied to actions, but not to the will. Nietzsche mostly puts the argument about free will on ice, the idea of free will is due to "logical emergency breeding". 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 577. 2. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 S.25. 3. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 913. 4. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 S.27. 5. F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI,3 S. 85. 6. Vgl. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 913. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| World | Freud | Rorty V 39 Freud/Rorty: belonged like Copernicus and Darwin to those who have decentered our worldview. Freud: "The I is not master in one's own home." > Mechanization of the worldview. V 41 Freud/RortyVsHume: in contrast to Hume, Freud has actually redesigned our self-image! If the I is not master in its own home, it is because there is indeed another person! The unconscious of Freud is actually effective. V 43 But it does not seem like a thing that we can claim, but as a person who claims us. The ego is populated by the counterparts of persons we must know in order to understand the behavior of a person. >Understanding, >Explanation. DavidsonVsFreud/Rorty: Splitting is always perceived by philosophers as disquieting. But: (pro Freud) there is no reason "you think subconsciously that p" instead of "there is something in you that causes you to act as if you believed that p". >Unconscious, >Morality, >Intention, >Morals, >Behavior, >Ethics. |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Association | Verschiedene Vs Association | I 125 Association/Hume: is not sufficient to explain the relationships, although it is association alone that makes the relationships possible: for example, it explains the relationship between two shades of blue immediately adjacent to each other, but it does not explain the more distant ones. One could say it explains A = B and B = C, but it does not explain A = C. I 125/126 The Association does not explain that distance itself is a relationship. Def natural relation (Relation)/Hume: by association. (Living imagination). Def Philosophical Relation/Hume: that which cannot be explained by association alone. Through mediation, however, nature loses liveliness. How can the mediations then be justified? Similarity does not always establish the connection! And that is when the quality is very general. VsAssociation/VsHume: most objections to the doctrine of association amount to the fact that it explains at most the form of thinking in general, but not the special contents. I 127 BergsonVsHume: any property can always be found that represents a similarity. In some way, two things are always similar. Hume/Deleuze: Hume saw it all. |
|
| Berkeley, G. | Hume Vs Berkeley, G. | Danto I 213 Hume and Berkeley: if I do not assume an external object x, what better reasons do I actually have for assuming the existence of a self, or of a mind? I 214 HumeVsBerkeley: Berkeley therefore had his hands full to assert that there is no idea of the self since minds for themselves are no ideas, were not perceptible for themselves. That is why he had to allow something as abstruse as the object x which he had actually discarded. Hume: so he should either drop the idea of the minds or allow the object existence. Hume: when I enter 'myself', I always stumble on perceptions of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself without any perception ('bundle of different perceptions, constantly on the move'). Hume: for him there is no object, of which the manifestations were manifestations, and no subject to which they would manifest themselves. --- Berkeley I 221 HumeVsBerkeley: another mind cannot cause an idea in a mind anymore than a substance. VsHume: the objection fails to recognize that Berkeley sees a conceptual contradiction in the concept of 'material thing', which cannot be transmitted in the same way to the mental substances. (A thing that is not perceived would be a contradiction, like a perception that is not perceived). |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Berkeley, G. | Russell Vs Berkeley, G. | Newen I 50 RussellVsBerkeley: his thesis must be wrong, because it has to accept God's existence and his perception to our own existence. --- I 51 Russell: one direction of the biconditional is wrong: why should something exist because it is perceived? --- Russell IV 84 Universals/quality/Russell: Suppose, we assume that someone would deny that there are even any universals. Then we would have to determine that we cannot prove that there are qualities, while we might well prove that there must be relations. --- IV 85 E.g. "blackness": if we deny that there is an "abstract idea", at which all black things participate, then we still need something like similarity. And this similarity is again something universal: a relationship, relation. One cannot say that there is another similarity for each pair. Because then we would have to admit that these similarities look similar. --- IV 86 RussellVsBerkeley, RussellVsHume: have overlooked counter objection against the denial of the "abstract ideas" because they, too, only thought of qualities as universals, and did not notice the relations (e.g. similarity). |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Dennett, D. | Brandom Vs Dennett, D. | I 113 Meaning / intentional systems / BrandomVsDennett: understanding belongs to meaning, and such systems do not understand. II 54 BrandomVsDennett: if you have to distinguish derivative intentionality from the primordial intentionality of the interpreter then a regress threatens. BrandomVsHume, BrandomVsLocke: we should play down, with which they have struggled: the similarity with animals. (Also Dennett, as a naturalist). We are cultural and not merely natural beings. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Descartes, R. | Evans Vs Descartes, R. | Frank I 497 EvansVsDescartes/EvansVsHume/EvansVsLocke/EvansVsKant: the "I" of mental self-attribution refers neither to a Cartesian "Ego" now to a Lockean person, nor to a Humean bundle of perceptions, nor to a Kantian I, but rather to an object of flesh and blood! Consequence: the background element of self-identification must be the localization in space and time. I 517 EvansVsDescartes: strongest antidote: the fact that these ways to acquire knowledge about ourselves must be incoporated in the information component of a functional characterization of our "I" ideas. I 522 Body Awareness/Descartes: not a way to achieve knowledge about oneself, but only about something that one has. EvansVsDescartes: It’s hard to make sense from this. (s) This is not an argument. Descartes: I have to admit defeat when Descartes says that this was a way to gain knowledge about myself, but one that uses my identification! Evans: I have to admit that. I 523 EvansVsDescartes: our "I" notions are notions of bearers of physical no less than mental properties. I 562 EvansVsDescartes: the use of "I" simply bridges the gap between the mental and the physical and is not more closely connected to one aspect than to the other. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Empiricism | James Vs Empiricism | I 57 JamesVsEmpiricism: "nominalism": empiricists assert that there is a term for any object. James: how about facts for which there is no concept?. - Worse: Language / James: supports the nominalist tendency to fragment the stream of consciousness. Nevertheless, James developed a position of radical empiricism (VsRationalism, Vsempiricism that is represented by Hume.). JamesVsHume: to be radical empiricism must neither accept elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly. Radical empiricism / James: 1st Only those issues can be discussed, that are based on categories of observation. 2nd The relationships between the objects of experience are just as accessible as the objects themselves. 3rd connection as a result of the sequence of partial experience is itself an object of experience. The experience of this relationship is the power of consciousness. 4th No upfront construction of subjective consciousness. |
|
| Empiricism | Wittgenstein Vs Empiricism | Stegmüller IV 59 Imagination/Kripke WittgensteinVsHume: 1. Assuming that the meaning understanding or meaning (to mean) would be a kind of headache or toothache, --- IV 60 and "+" meaning (to mean) would always be accompanied by a distinctive type of headache. How can the pain be a help for me to decide if the correct answer is "276" or "7"? (For a new task with which I did not previously face). (WittgensteinVsEmpiricism). There may be distinctive qualities, but this just does not help the VsSkepticism. --- Wittgenstein II 100 Rationalism/empiricism: WittgensteinVsRationalism: is wrong with the assumption that there are a priori synthetic judgments. They think you can always sit so, and only use reason. Empirists/Wittgenstein: they realized that we can only describe the world. That's right. WittgensteinVsEmpiricism: error: they were trying to make the philosophy empirically. Correct: the reason cannot decide everything. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Epiphenomenalism | Lewis Vs Epiphenomenalism | I (a) 18 Epiphenomenalism: a variant of my argument seems to miss: Assumed experiences would non-physical epiphenomena, which would be correlated by some causal law exactly with simultaneous physical states, then the experiences and their physical correlates were causally equivalent. I (a) 19 Then these non-physical experiences would still have their explanations: namely the defining physical effects. LewisVs: that would only double the experience. (The non-physical in addition to the physical). Moreover, it is not true that they would be causally equivalent: this is an error in the regularity theory of the cause (LewisVsHume): we know from elsewhere that the theory must be corrected in order to distinguish between genuine causes and pseudo causes that are their epiphenomenal correlates. E.g. the light does not cause the engine running, even though it is a legitimate perfect correlate of electrical current what actually causes the engine s running. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Freud, S. | Verschiedene Vs Freud, S. | Derrida I 101 Analogy/Artaud: it cannot teach us what her counterpart is. (ArtaudVsFreud). Derrida I 101 ArtaudVsFreud: the interpretation would deprive the theatre of its holiness, which belongs to it, because it is an expression of life in its elementary powers. Lacan I 41 LacanVsFreud: against the rule of the (wrong) me. - Not where "it" was, should become "I", but the "it" is to be revealed and opened up, so that the subject can understand and experience itself from this eccentricity as a being and saying. I 122 LacanVsFreud: not "I" instead of "it", but to reopen the horizon of "It speaks" and let the truth emerge behind the false objectivism. (BarthesVsLacan: there is no "behind"). Rorty V 42 Freud/RortyVsHume: in contrast to Hume, Freud has actually reshaped our self-image! If the ego is not master in its own house, it is because there is actually another person! The unconscious of Freud is actually effective. V 43 But it does not seem like a thing that we can claim, but like a person that claims us. The I is populated by counterparts of people we need to know in order to understand a person's behaviour. DavidsonVsFreud/Rorty: Splitting is always perceived as disturbing by philosophers. But: (pro Freud) there is no reason to assume "you unconsciously believe that p" instead of "there is something in you that causes you to act as if you believed that p". (Unconscious/unconscious/(s): "something in you..." then there are several brain users.) V 62 Rorty: Freud's greatest achievement is the gratifying character of the ironic, playful intellectual. V 63 MacIntyreVsFreud/Rorty: the abandonment of the Aristotelian "functional concept of the human" leads to "emotivism": to the annihilation of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations. Rorty: he was right, insofar moral concepts like "reason", "human nature" etc. only make sense from the Aristotelian point of view. Def Emotivism/MacIntyre/Rorty: value judgements nothing more than the expression of preferences, attitudes or feelings. V 64 "Ability"/Freud/Rorty: (according to Davidson): Freud drops the idea of "ability" at all and replaces it with a multitude of beliefs and desires. V 65 RortyVsMacIntyre: this criticism only makes sense if such judgements could have been something else (e.g. expression of a rational knowledge of nature). Freud/Rorty: if we take him seriously, we no longer need to decide between a "functional" Aristotelian concept of the human, which is decisive in matters of morality, and the "terrible freedom" of Sartre. V 66 We can track down psychological narratives without heroines or heroes. We tell the story of the whole machine as a machine, without central, privileged parts. V 67 Dignity/Machine/Human Dignity/Rorty: only if we believe we have to have reasons to treat others decently, we lose our human dignity by proposing that our stories were about mechanisms without a centre. V 67/68 Rationality/Traditional Philosophy/Tradition/Rorty: actually believes that there is a core of rationality in the deepest inner (even of the tormentor) to which I can always appeal. Freud: calls this "the pious world view". V 69 Ethics/Morality/Psychology/Rorty: such a striving results in nothing more than the continued oscillating pendulum between moral dogmatism and moral skepticism. V 70 What metaphysics has not been able to accomplish, psychology (no matter how "deep" it may be) cannot accomplish it either. Freud does not explain "moral motives" either. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Hume, D. | Armstrong Vs Hume, D. | Arm III 120 Then all universals would only be substances in Hume’s sense: i.e. something that logically might have an independent existence. III 121 ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstronVsTooley: it is wrong to think of universals like that. Then there are problems regarding how universals are to relate to their particulars (P). E.g. If a rel between Pa and Pb is something that is able to have an independent existence without a and b and any other P, would there not have to be at least one other rel to relate it with a and b?. And if this rel itself can be uninstantiated (e.g. in a universe with monads!), then this rel is just as questionable, etc. ad infinitum (Bradley’s regress). This can only be avoided if universals are merely abstract factors of states (but real). Arm II (b) 46 Causality/Causation/ArmstrongVsHume: E.g. Inhaling a quantum of cyanide leads to the death of the person who inhales it. There seems to be a causal relation here, i.e. one between types: one type produces the other type. II (b) 47 Analytic philosophy/Armstrong: hastens to reassure that we are dealing only with the truth of a universal proposition. "Any person who inhales cyanide dies." Those who represent a singularistic theory of causation will say that each (unique event of) inhaling by a particular person causes their death. (Armstrong pro). But that’s not the whole truth!. Surface structure/Proposition/Armstrong: the proposition itself asserts a connection of universals on its surface, from which individual causal findings follow. Thesis: this surface structure reflects something more profound. If the connection exists, then regularity is included at the level of universals, of course. But this Entailment can probably not be grasped formally. Rather, it is something like Carnap’s "meaning postulate"!. Place II 64 Causality/Hume/Armstrong: ... From this follows that we can never have an empirical proof of the truth of a counterfactual conditional. Law statement/Place: (universal counterfactual conditional): what we can have, however, is empirical proof that supports the truth of a universal Counterfactual Conditional. Proof/Hume/Armstrong: but the proof consists in nothing more than the observation of either regular following or coinciding with Type B and Type A. (Regularity). Place II 65 Ceteris paribus/PlaceVsHume/PlaceVsArmstrong: Such regularities are no evidence of the truth of the counterfactual conditional if it is not ensured that all circumstances remain the same. C.p. must supplement regularity in order for it to become proof. But then Armstrong does not need to refute the regularity theory. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Hume, D. | Black Vs Hume, D. | III 80 Deduction/Hume/Naturalistic fallacy/Black: the core of the argument is that in a deduction nothing can follow that is not already contained in the premises. Naturalistic fallacy/BlackVsHume: but there is a way how new evaluative or normative material can appear in a valid conclusion: E.g. premise: you cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs. (This can be seen as factual) But it follows now: Conclusion: if you want to make an omelet, eggs should be broken. Hume/Black: What he means is that no categorical or unconditional "should" follows. BlackVsHume: that seems convincing at first glance. But: Problem: the absence of the word "should" is not a reliable criterion. E.g. the fact that murder is a sin implies the conclusion that you should not kill. But how are we to judge based on the mere linguistic form that the premise is non-normative. Now one could say that the sentence about murder is unverifiable. III 81 Behind this are difficult questions about how we are to understand the objectives and procedures of science. Science/Black: should we see it as a special way of approaching truth, or as a discipline that shares the objectives of the whole spectrum of activities which are after the truth? BlackVsHume: his argument is circular: Thesis: I believe that certain categorical sentences with "should" have a truth value! I.e. they can be recognized as true without reference to hopes and wishes. Then Hume is mistaken if he assumes them to be different from scientific principles. Knowledge/Values/Standards/Black: Thesis: in a broader sense (beyond the narrow sense of science) knowledge can be understood in a way that some normative and evaluative sentences can be known to be true. If that is the case, Hume’s argument caves in. Then moral and practical questions can no longer be easily separated logically from scientific truths. Naturalistic fallacy/BlackVsHume/VsHume: many contemporary authors reject his argument (of the separation of science from moral sentences). III 81 Ethics/Morals/Values/Standards/Black: Thesis: regardless of whether Hume’s criticism of the naturalistic fallacy is valid, we are entitled to assume that human beings can agree on certain fundamental ethical principles regardless of their religious background. We must assume that in order for a rational discourse becoming possible at all. III 82 BlackVsNaturalistic fallacy: Then even in the case of a logical separation of factual and normative or evaluative sentences it is the introduction of certain generally acceptable non-factual premises that would enable the derivation of normative conclusions. In addition: (see below): every representation that regards scientific propositions as isolated, is one-sided. The biggest problems of neutrality are not affected by the assumed gap between the factual and the normative. If we look at science as something concrete, things look different. BlackVsNaturalistic fallacy: is one of the great half-truths or popular mistakes of Western culture. We should be wary of the following syllogism: 1) Science is a good thing 2) Science is necessarily neutral 3) Therefore scientific neutrality is a good thing. This might well be true for "bad" instead of "good". |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Hume, D. | Brandom Vs Hume, D. | II 54 BrandomVsHume, BrandomVsLocke: we should play down, with which they have struggled: the similarity with animals. (Also Dennett, as naturalist). We are cultural and not merely natural beings. II 58 Tradition (Hume): leads standards back to requests. Request / BrandomVsHume: is explained here by committing to certain patterns of practical inference, i.e. in terms of what is a desire for something, and not vice versa. II 112 Justify /justification/ Hume: consider all possible aspects. BrandomVsHume. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Hume, D. | Carnap Vs Hume, D. | Newen I 113 Constitution/constitutional system/Carnap/Newen: Thesis: our knowledge should be arranged step by step from a basis in a system. Basis: elementary experiences (appearances, impressions, feelings). Levels: Transition: through the constitutional relation. ((s) Impressions constitute objects at a higher level). I 114 Hume/Carnap/Newen: both accept phenomena of consciousness as a safe basis. CarnapVsHume: uses formal logic. Constitution/Newen: could still be maintained if the elementary experiences prove to be untenable. Constitution: e.g. from natural numbers as a basis rational and real numbers can be constituted. Constitution/Carnap: is ontologically neutral, i.e. in this way no decision has been made in favour of e.g. idealism or realism. Constitution/Carnap: is neither a creation nor a recognition of objects. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Hume, D. | Danto Vs Hume, D. | I 308 We are entering uncharted territory: in causal processes involving representation the mind moves forward on two rails, the logical and causal rail. Structural transformations. Logical transformations are those of sentences to sentences. DantoVsHume: This second track is missing Hume s view of the mind. We have the concept of knowledge, if we need true representations, not any rep.. Causality / Danto: Causal processes include representation states as causes or effects. Lübcke II 325 Geschichte/Erklärung/Hume/Danto: nach Hume‘s Theorie wären Bsp der Mord von Sarajevo und der Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs zwei logisch voneinander unabhängige Größen. VsHume: Frage: sind Motive auch unabhängig von Handlungen? Dann kann eine Motiverklärung keine Ursachenerklärung sein. Pia Lübcke,"Geschichte als Problem" aus: A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20 Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993 |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Hume, D. | Davidson Vs Hume, D. | Davidson I (b) 18 In Hume: the impressions and ideas were "what they seemed to be, and they appeared to be what they actually were." I.e. objects that have all the properties and only the properties that they have in our opinion (ideas). DavidsonVsHume: there are no such objects! Every object has infinitely many logically independent properties, (material objects), and that also applies to items whose entire "essential" properties (e.g. numbers) are given by us. (Hume thought since we are the producers of such objects, we have all properties "in our power" - DavidsonVs). DavidsonVsHume: infinitely many properties, therefore ignorance fo imaginary objects possible. Hume I 24 History/Causality/Hume: (I 172): the reports of wars, intrigues, factions and upheavals are as much collection of experimental facts ... in the same way as the physicist or naturalist gets to know the nature of plants and other external objects through the experimental facts that he collects for this purpose. Deleuze: so history is almost to be construed as physics of man (Hume). (DavidsonVsHume). Quine IV 415 Def Naturalism/Quine: understanding of man, of history, culture, knowledge and morals by means of the categories that have been trained for the knowledge of nature (Blumenberg). Naturalists in this sense were already Bacon and Hume. Hume (had the ambition of becoming the "Newton of Sciences"): it is necessary to review whether the science of man does not allow for the same as accuracy as that of nature. (HumeVsSupra-naturalism of the Middle Ages). (DavidsonVsHume: behavior not according to law). Rorty V73 Universe/DavidsonVsHume/Rorty: convictions are not isolated. Even though, as Hume says, there can be a universe that consists only of one single sensation, we cannot make ourselves understand a universe that consists of only the one single thought that Caesar had crossed the Rubicon. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Hume, D. | Evans Vs Hume, D. | Frank I 531 EvansVsHume: We have discarded the background for the perception metaphor on which Hume founds his argument. We have nothing that could be construed as a "stumbling" over perceptions. The internal states are indeed no "objects". E.g. What we become aware of when we see the tree is nothing but the tree itself. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Hume, D. | Frege Vs Hume, D. | I 67 Number/Hobbes: presupposes in mathematics among themselves equal units, from which it is constituted. Number/Hume/Frege: the constituent parts of quantity and number he considers quite similar. Number/FregeVsHobbes/FregeVsHume: just as one might view individuals as completely different! If one disregards the features by which things differ, it does not get as Lipschitz says: "the concept of the number of things considered", but Frege: a general term under that these things fall. I 94 Number/Equality/Equality of Numbers/Numerical Equality/Frege: we have to explain the meaning of the sentence "The number (sic) which is belongs to the concept F is the same as that which belongs to the concept G" in such a way that the expression: "The number (sic) which belongs to the concept F" does not occur. (Otherwise, circular). Number Equality/Hume/Solution: assigning each unit of a number to a unit of another number. ((s)> unique representation). I 95 FregeVsHume: this will result in logical difficulties which we may not pass by: Equality/Quantity/FregeVsHume/Frege: equality also occurs independent of numbers (sic), so that you might think it was already established before the quantity, and that from the concept of quantity (sic) and that of equality it would have to result when two quantities are equal, without need for a definition. FregeVs: That would explain equality only for each individual case! (By always making an equation). |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Hume, D. | Goodman Vs Hume, D. | II 112 Hume imagined the mind in a way that it can be caused to make forecasts according to regularities in the observable. GoodmanVsHume: We, however, see the mind as being in activity from the beginning. He corrects gradually. (Like Dennett) Sainsbury V 139 Grue/Goodman: "regularities are where we find them, and we find them everywhere." Grue/Goodman/Sainsbury: therefore, there are still many ramifications between confirmation and belief. Grue/GoodmanVsHume: shows that the regularity defined by Hume is not the only one. Problem: what is regularity after all (>regularity)? The connection of emeralds with "green" or the connection with "grue"? Problem: either we cannot explain what regularity is, then there is no induction, or we provide an explanation of regularity, which includes the unwanted connection with "grue". Regularity depends on description! This has led some people to extreme conventionalism according to which there is no separation of the world from the conventions. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
| Hume, D. | Husserl Vs Hume, D. | I 55 HusserlVsHume: the indubitable rest is the subjective performance of consciousness. I 115 HusserlVsHume: there is no emotional ethics. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 |
| Hume, D. | James Vs Hume, D. | I 55 JamesVsHume, JamesVsMill: "associationism": sees in conceptual ideas and experiences only reflections of perceptual impressions that generate by acting on the organism ideas. >Association. James: This "determinism" may explain the sensations of details, but not the experience of volition, moods, rationality, memories. I 57 VsRationalism, VsEmpiricism as it is represented by Hume.). JamesVsHume: radical empiricism must neither take elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly. |
|
| Hume, D. | Kant Vs Hume, D. | Kant I 27 KantVsHume: Causality: Limited to the range of experience. It does not apply to the domain of things themselves. Kant I 98 Hume: Imagination compounds are principally created by association. KantVsHume: Unity of apperception. I’m being conscious that all ideas are my ideas. Therefore, I stick to the unity of consciousness that accompany all my ideas. In addition, I need to bear in mind how I am adding an idea to another one, otherwise I will scatter myself. McDowell I 123 McDowell: Laws of nature/natural/understanding/KantVsHume: wins the intelligibility of natural laws again, but not the clarity of meaning. Nature is the realm of natural laws, and therefore of no importance. However, the empirical world is not outside the terms. Hume I 37 Moral/action/ethics/Hume: A in this way (avoiding wrong) created obligation is artificial however, contrary to the natural obligation arising from the natural interest as the driving force of every action. Moral obligation. It’s in my best interest to let the other have his property, provided that the other acts in the same vein towards me. (KantVsHume:> Categorical imperative). Hume I 122 KantVsHume: The latter erroneously presented mathematics as a system of analytic judgments. DeleuzeVsKant. Relation / HumeVsKant: Every relationship is external in its terms: the equality is not a property of the characters themselves, but only comes through comparison. Hume I 133 Associations / KantVsHume: Although it is merely an empirical law, according to which ideas, which often followed each other, thereby produce a link. This law of reproduction requires that the appearances themselves are indeed subjected to such a rule. Because without this our empirical imagination would never get to do something it is able to, so would lay like dead unknown wealth within us. If a word would be applied one time to this thing, another time to another one, no empirical synthesis of reproduction could happen. So there must be something that makes even this reproduction of phenomenons possible because it is the fact that it is the a priori reason of a necessary synthetic unity of itself. I 138 If we can now show that even our a priori purest intuitions do not provide knowledge, except if they contain such a connection that makes a continuous synthesis possible, this synthesis of imagination is also established on a priori principles prior to all experience. KantVsHume: His dualism forces him to understand the relationship between what is given and the subject as a match of the subject with nature. I 139 But if the given would not align itself and a priori, in accordance with those same principles, which the link of ideas also aligns itself, the subject would only notice this concordance by chance. Therefore, it must be reversed: The given is to refer to the subject, as a concordance of given and subject. Why? Because what is given is not a thing in itself, but an overall context of phenomena that can be only represented by an a priori synthesis. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Hume, D. | Kripke Vs Hume, D. | Apriori: Some philosophers modify the modalities in this characterization somehow from "may" to "shall". They think that if something belongs to the realm of a priori knowledge it is impossible to recognize it empirically.(Hume). This is wrong! (KripkeVsHume). E.g. The computer can give an answer to the question of whether particular numbers are primes. Nobody has calculated or proved this, but the computer gave the answer. I 45 A posteriori: A mathematical truth can be known a posteriori by looking at a computer or by asking a mathematician (e.g. naturally a posteriori). The philosophical analysis tells us that it could not be contingent and therefore all empirical knowledge of its truth is automatically an empirical knowledge of its necessity.(KripkeVsHume, KripkeVsKant) I 181 |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Hume, D. | Leibniz Vs Hume, D. | I 43 Impression/Sensory impression/Identität/Leibniz: Therefore, Leibniz does not use the "impression" ["Eindruck"](Terminology: Locke: "sensation", Hume: "impression"). LeibnizVsLocke/LeibnizVsHume: The identity is in the sensory reality. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Hume, D. | Mayr Vs Hume, D. | V 100 MayrVsHume: the historical representation can often satisfactorily explain unique events and sometimes even make testable predictions. (>History/Mayr). |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Hume, D. | Moore Vs Hume, D. | Stroud I 104 Knowledge/Proof of Existence/Existence/Hume/Stroud: two principles: 1. Nobody knows of the existence of anything if he/she has not perceived it directly (apprehended >apprehension: disorderly) or that he/she knows that something he/she has perceived directly is a sign of the existence of that thing. 2. Nobody can know that a thing is a sign of something else, if he/she did not perceive these two things (thing and sign) Stroud I 106 directly. (> StroudVsMoore: I do not understand why he accepts that (MooreVsDescartes). I also do not understand why he overlooks the consequences of sensory data theory. MooreVsHume: the two principles are wrong: for example, I know that this pen exists, but if Hume's principles were true, I could not do that. So they, one or both, are wrong. Moore/Stroud: accepts that if you start from Hume's position, it follows that he does not know that there is a pen. StroudVsMoore: both arguments are valid. And they have a common premise. For Moore, the question of what conclusion to accept amounts to whether it is safer to know that this is a pen or safer to know that Hume's principles are true. I 107 MooreVsHume: Example pen: is even the strongest argument to prove that its principles are wrong. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Hume, D. | Nietzsche Vs Hume, D. | Danto I 203 Hume: idea: a copy of a sensory impression. - Berkeley for him an idea was perhaps somewhat of a synonymous impression. I 204 Idea: according to Hume and Berkeley This term was hidden for almost any content of our mind, which was a sensory impression is not itself used. So the object is dissolved into the class of its appearances. NietzscheVs: Later Nietzsche considered it grammatical superstition. Hume I 12 Cause/Hume: can always be thought of as something that is in itself and goes beyond all allegories through which one indeed gives something a content. (NietzscheVsHume). |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Hume, D. | Nozick Vs Hume, D. | Brendel I 254 Skepticism/Dretske/Nozick/Brendel: both. Thesis: the truth of the skeptical hypothesis is, however, not to be excluded. But it does not follow the impossibility of any knowledge. DretskeVsHume/NozickVsHume/Brendel: knowledge and the possibility of skepticism can coexist peacefully. Nozick II 111 I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (self) as a property. I.e. not as an object. The solves the problem e.g. of localization and other problems: 1) Hume: "I cannot perceive myself independent of any other perception." NozickVsHume: perhaps he did not search thoroughly. He has done nothing specific to search for the self, has he? 2) Advantage: the approach explains why it is difficult to imagine the self without embodiment. 3) It is difficult to imagine how the self should be identical with any particular stuff. II 112 A property is never the identical with the object. The difficulty of specifying the relationsh of a property with an object is the general reason why we have such trouble locating the self, but that is not a particular problem of the relation between self and body. Property/Nozick: there are at least two ways how a person can be identified with a property: 1) with a non-indexical, non-reflexive property: E.g. "being Robert Nozick" 2) an identification whose definition uses a reflexive pronoun of the first person: E.g. "being me". This introduces reflexivity. Right into the nature of the self at that. I Problem: it is obscure, because it introduces the reflexivity in the nature of the self, but it explains why all public or physicalist descriptions leave me out, because they are not reflective. Unit/Merger/I/Self/Tradition: the I merges with the "one", but does not disappear in the process. The I is a property of the one, I am not separate from it. Reflexivity/Property: E.g. reflexive property: "being me". Problem: 1) P is the ability to be reflexively self-referring. People have P, tables do not. I have the property P and so do you, II 113 but you have it by virtue of the fact that you are you, I have it by virtue of the other fact that I am I. We both have the property of being me, but the property is indexical. I.e. the properties differ! Point: they both arise from the same non-indexical property P: being reflexively self-referring! |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Hume, D. | Putnam Vs Hume, D. | Hume I 26 Reason/Hume: can always be applied, but to a world that was already there before. PutnamVsHume there is no "ready made world". It presupposes a reason superordinate to morality. Practice and morality are indifferent according to the reason (Not according to the circumstances). Thus, the reason, because it is denied by the outside, can be skepticism. >Skepticism. Causality/PutnamVsHume: Forces may well be observed (for example, felt: pressure). >Causality/Hume. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Hume, D. | Quine Vs Hume, D. | Hume I 115 Time/Hume was structure of the mind, now the subject turns out to be a synthesis of the time. Memory/Hume: the re-emergence of an impression in the form of a still vivid imagination. ((s) QuineVsHume). Memory itself does not cause a synthesis of time. It does not overcome the structure. I 178 The achievement of memory does not consist in holding on to individual imaginations, but in retaining their order. Quine V 19 Cause/Regularity/QuineVsHume: Problem: you can just take the two single classes in regularity consisting of a and b. Then one succumbs to the fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc. Dispositions: here there is the same problem. V 88 Identity/Identity Predicate/Language Learning/Quine: it seems as though we have recognized the emergence of the identity predicate: it is nothing but a common constituent of various relative observation terms for substances such as V 89 e.g. "the same dog as" or even less: a word for the temporal extension of referencing (pointing). Identity/Locke/Hume: only useful for appearances of the same object at different times. QuineVsLocke/QuineVsHume: that fits very well with our present purpose of the individuation of things. However, identity goes beyond that. V 177 Past/Observation/Quine: but there are also reports of earlier observations, where the term was learned by definition instead of by conditioning. Since you can replace a defined term by its definiendum this amounts to a composite observation term. Example "I have seen a black rabbit": Learning situation: one for black, one for rabbits, as well as attributive composition. Imagination/Memory/Quine: in the language of mental images we can say that these are caused, even if the corresponding object does not exist. But now we must go further and assume even more skills: the child has to distinguish between two types of mental images: a) Fantasies b) Memories. V 178 QuineVsHume: referred unconvincingly to liveliness as a differentiator. Def Memory/Hume: attenuated sensation Def Fantasy/Hume: attenuated memory. Def Mental Image/QuineVsHume: is an event in the nervous system that leads to a state of readiness for a corresponding stimulus. This ostensive nervous process is perceived by the subject, i.e. it must be able to react specifically to it in two different ways: a) Summary of previously learned items e.g. "black" and "rabbit" b) strengthened by acquaintance: i.e. real earlier encounter with a black rabbit. Basis for affirmation. V 179 Observation Sentence/Complete Thought/Reference/Quine: refers to the object and the calendar clock and, where appropriate, to a location. Complex observation term. >Protocol Sentence: timeless sentence (forever-lasting) if location and times complete. Quine VII (d) 65 Objects/Individual Things/Thing/Hume: the notion of physical objects arises from a mistake in identification. In reality, we invent a new item every minute! QuineVsHume: we do not need to share it. Quine XI 112 Causality/QuineVsRegularity/QuineVsHume/Lauener: E.g. to what type of events does the cry of the geese heard on Capitol Hill belong and to which the fact that Rome is saved? |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Hume, D. | Ryle Vs Hume, D. | I 341 Impressions/Ideas/Notion/Emotion/Hume/Ryle: Hume is known to have believed that there were both "impressions" and "ideas", both sensations and notions. He looked in vain for a demarcation line. "Ideas"/Hume/Ryle: he thought they were generally paler than impressions and later in their formation, as they are traces, references and reproductions of impressions. Yet he realized that impressions may have any degree of pallor or weakness. And that ideas, although they are representations, do not appear with the stamp "copy", just as impressions do not appear as "original". According to Hume, therefore, an inspection cannot determine whether a perception is an impression or an idea. I 342 RyleVsHume: Hume's mistake was to confuse "seeing" and seeing and "perception" and perception. And to assume that "perception" is a genus of which there are two types, namely impressions and ghosts or echoes of impressions. E.g. Ghosts: There are no such ghosts, and if they did exist, they themselves would only be impressions. And they would belong to seeing, not to "seeing". Hume's attempt to distinguish between impressions and ideas as between things that are "living" and less "alive", was one of two serious errors. Suppose first that "alive" means "agile" in Hume. Someone can vividly imagine something, but he cannot vividly see. Idea/Ryle: can be "more vivid" than a different idea, but Impressions/Ryle: cannot be described as vivid, just like babies are not more lifelike than dolls. Someone who does not play is neither convincing, nor not convincing, and can therefore not be more convincing than an actor. RyleVsHume: let us assume then, that Hume understood "alive" to mean "intensive", "strong". Then he was in error in another respect. For while emotions can be compared in terms of their strength and intensity, so they cannot be compared with ideas in this regard. E.g. if I imagine to hear a huge noise, I hear neither a loud nor a soft noise. I have no auditory sensation at all. E.g. a scream that I imagine is not deafening, but on the other hand it is not a soft murmur either. Neither does it drown an actual murmur, nor will it be drowned by it. I 370 Fantasy/Notion/Ryle: in imaginary landscapes it is pointless to ask whether they are properly imagined, like with melodies that are not yet complete. E.g. Nevertheless, the actor pretends to give a convincing representation of a Martian. I 372 "Seeing"/RyleVsHume: now we see Hume's other mistake: in the mistaken belief that "seeing" and "hearing" consists in the having of shadow sensations (which includes the other error that such a thing exists), he championed the causal theory that you cannot have a particular idea, without previously having had the corresponding sensation. The only thing that is true about this theory, is: what I see in my mind's eye, is in some way linked to what I have seen before. But the nature of this link does not correspond to Hume's idea in any way. I 373 Memory/Notion/RyleVsTrace Theory: its followers should try to imagine the case where someone has a melody going through his head over and over again. Is that a reactivated trace of an auditory sensation, or a number of reactivated traces a series of auditory sensations? |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Hume, D. | Searle Vs Hume, D. | II 101 Perception/cause/SearleVsHume: my knowledge that my car has caused my visual experience, is because I know that I see the car, and not vice versa. I do not conclude that there is a car, but I just can see it. >Perception/Searle. II 102 Perception: the experience is not literally yellow, but it is caused literally. Moreover, it is experienced as caused, whether it is satisfied or not. But it is not experienced as yellow, but as of something yellow. II 103 Causality: I may very well experience directly! However, not independent but the being caused belongs to the experience. (This does not mean that the experience confirms itself). II 104 Causality: also for things characteristic, which are not directly observable such as ultraviolet and infrared.. If they could not have an impact on our measuring instruments, then we might not know about their existence. >Causality/Hume. ((s) Ultraviolet cannot be hallucination. But one can imagine a sunburn.) II 156 Causality/SearleVsHume: I believe that "to cause" describes a real relationship in the real world, but it does not follow a universal correlation of similar cases. II 160 Tradition: one never has a causing experience. SearleVsTradition: you have not often a causing experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such a causing experience! SearleVsHume: he looked for a wrong spot, he looked for a power. II 170 Regularity/SearleVsHume: not all regularities are causal. It is wrong to think that we can have in addition of an experience of cause and effect a hypothesis about regularities in the world. II 171 I have not the hypothesis, but I have the ability to distinguish regularity from irregularity. Regularity becomes the background. >Regularity/Hume. II 173 SearleVsCausal Law/SearleVsHume: does not need to be derived from the existence of causation. After 300 years of unsuccessful attempts with the regularity you have to see that the concept of to make something happening differs from the concept of regularity. II 174 There are not two types of causation: "Regularity causation" and "intentional causation". There is exactly one way: this is the action-causation. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Hume, D. | Sellars Vs Hume, D. | I 9 Imagination/Hume: the accumulation of ideas is imagination, it is not a fortune, but a reservoir, a collection without Scrapbook, a theater without a stage, a "river of perceptions". (SellarsVsHume). The place is not different from the action in which it takes place, the idea is not given in a subject. I 10 The imagination is not a factor, not a mediator, no decisive determination. Nothing happens by, everything happens in the imagination. Sellars II 327 Hume/Sellars: our "perceptions" are "images" of facts in a general spatiotemporal world. The uniformities of natural events tend to be reflected in our "ideas" as uniformities. The difference between acts of thinking and lightning obliterates. SellarsVsHume: he has difficulties in explaining the reference relation between a present idea and an earlier event. II 328 He notes the propositional form of his "ideas" not sufficiently and spoils himself thus the way to an explicit explanation of the difference between the conclusions Lightning now, so soon thunder and: Yesterday at 10:00 lightning, so yesterday at 10:01 thunder. SellarsVsHume: because it does not clearly distinguish between thoughts and impressions, it can be assumed that a natural derivative corresponds not only a logical but also a temporal sequence. His theory must be extended so that it also includes cases such as the above or backwards: Now thunder, therefore a moment ago lightning. Perception/complex/SellarsVsHume: he does not explicitly state that the perception of a configuration itself is a configuration of perceptions! Although this is true in the core, in principle, the previously troubles if you understand "perceptions" in the sense of "sensation or impression". |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Hume, D. | Strawson Vs Hume, D. | IV 157 Causality/StrawsonVsHume: he overlooks the very obvious fact that objects exert physical forces. (>Dennett: and they are observable). IV 160 Theory/Strawson: I do not want to draw a too sharp line between observation and theory. IV 162 Causality/Hume/Strawson: we can actually observe many actions and reactions without knowing what effects were actually working. IV 163 Regularity/causality/regularity/StrawsonVsHume: Regularity (happening according to rules) is time neutral. The regularity does not prohibit reversing the order. IV 165 KantVsHume: We learn a lot about rule-like sequences in the world by observing, but only because we already have the concept of causality. IV 166 Causality/Strawson: to understand it we are consciously or unconsciously using the model of our human behavior and experience, what forces we must exert ourselves and to what forces we are exposed to. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Hume, D. | Wittgenstein Vs Hume, D. | Stegmüller IV 63 Impressions/experience/sensation/introspection/WittgensteinVsHume/WittgensteinVsLocke: those "inner impressions" do not exist. This is not a behaviorist criticism Witt's, but happens on a genuinely introspective basis. Introspection/Wittgenstein: provide us with an image that completely differs from that of the empiricists. "capturing meaning" does not exist as a state. The so-called "aha-moment" cannot be it: two people can fully agree in their inner experiences, however, one could mean "plus" and the other "quus". |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Hume, D. | Verschiedene Vs Hume, D. | Hacking I 68 Causality/W.C.BroadVsHume: VsRegularity: For example we can see that the siren of Manchester howls every day at the same time, whereupon the workers of Leeds let the work rest for one hour. But no causation. Hacking I 70 CartwrightVsHume: the regularities are characteristics of the procedures with which we establish theories. (>Putnam). Hume I 131 Def Atomism/Hume/Deleuze: is the thesis that relations are external to conceptions. (KantVs). VsHume: Critics accuse him of having "atomized" the given. Theory/DeleuzeVsVs: with this one believes to have pilloried a whole system. As if it were a quirk of Hume. What a philosopher says is presented as if it were done or wanted by him. I 132 What do you think you can explain? A theory must be understood from its conceptual basis. A philosophical theory is an unfolded question. Question and critique of the question are one. I 133 It is not about knowing whether things are one way or the other, but whether the question is a good question or not. Apron I 238 Lawlikeness/lawlike/Schurz: b) in the narrower sense: = physical necessity (to escape the vagueness or graduality of the broad term). Problem: not all laws unlimited in space-time are legal in the narrower sense. Universal, but not physically necessary: Example: "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than one kilometre". Universality: is therefore not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for lawfulness. For example, the universal statement "All apples in this basket are red" is not universal, even if it is replaced by its contraposition: For example "All non-red objects are not apples in this basket". (Hempel 1965, 341). Strong Hume-Thesis/Hume/Schurz: Universality is a sufficient condition for lawlikeness. SchurzVs: that is wrong. Weak Hume-Thesis/Schurz: Universality is a necessary condition for lawfulness. ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): the claim that a condition is sufficient is stronger than the claim that it is necessary.) BhaskarVsWeak Hume-Thesis. BhaskarVsHume. Solution/Carnap/Hempel: Def Maxwell Condition/lawlikeness: Natural laws or nomological predicates must not contain an analytical reference to certain individuals or spacetime points. This is much stronger than the universality condition. (stronger/weaker). Example "All emeralds are grue": is universal in space-time, but does not meet the Maxwell condition. ((s) Because observed emeralds are concrete individuals?). I 239 Natural Law/Law of Nature/Armstrong: are relations of implication between universals. Hence no reference to individuals. (1983) Maxwell condition/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): it represents a physical principle of symmetry: i.e. laws of nature must be invariant under translation of their time coordinates and translation or rotation of their space coordinates. From this, conservation laws can be obtained. Symmetry Principles/Principle/Principles/Schurz: physical symmetry principles are not a priori, but depend on experience! Maxwell Condition/Schurz: is too weak for lawlikeness: Example "No lump of gold..." also this universal statement fulfills them. Stegmüller IV 243 StegmüllerVsHume: usually proceeds unsystematically and mixes contingent properties of the world with random properties of humans. Ethics/Morality/Hume: 1. In view of scarce resources, people must cooperate in order to survive. 2. HumeVsHobbes: all people have sympathy. If, of course, everything were available in abundance, respect for the property of others would be superfluous: IV 244 People would voluntarily satisfy the needs in the mutual interest according to their urgency. Moral/Ethics/Shaftesbury/ShaftesburyVsHume: wants to build all morality on human sympathy, altruism and charity. (>Positions). HumeVsShaftesbury: illusionary ideal. Ethics/Moral/Hume: 3. Human insight and willpower are limited, therefore sanctions are necessary. 4. Advantageous move: intelligence enables people to calculate long-term interests. IV 245 The decisive driving force is self-interest. It is pointless to ask whether the human is "good by nature" or "bad by nature". It is about the distinction between wisdom and foolishness. 5. The human is vulnerable. 6. Humans are approximately the same. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Hume, D. | Martin Vs Hume, D. | Arm II 94 logische Verbindung/Hume: zwischen getrennten Entitäten wie Ursache und Wirkung kann es keine logische Verbindung geben. (Armstrong pro). II 95 Armstrong: dieses Prinzip ergibt sich umgekehrt aus der Idee, daß absolute Notwendigkeit nur aus Identität entspringt (II 95). MartinVs: da muß man aber die Reichweite der Beispiele genau betrachten! Martin: Analogie: die Dispositionalität und Qualitativität jeder intrinsischen Eig sind analog zu Größe und Form von ausgedehnten Gegenständen: das eine kann nicht ohne das andere existieren, aber das eine kann ohne das andere variieren! (Asymmetrie, Abhängigkeit). MartinVsArmstrong/VsHume: sie sind verschieden, aber nicht getrennt! Unterschiedenheit/MartinVsArmstrong: es gibt sogar Fälle von Unterschiedenheit, die nicht separierbar sind. Bsp gleichseitig/gleichwinklig. Grenzsicht/Martin: nach ihr muß man Separabilität logisch ausschließen und die Notwendigkeit der Ko-Existenz von Dispositionalität und Qualitativität für jede Eig, aber dann ist man frei, in jedem Einzelfall zu entscheiden, ob die Kovarianz notwendig oder kontingent ist. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Hume, D. | Bigelow Vs Hume, D. | I 226 Non-modal theory/Laws of Nature/LoN/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: most non-modal theories of the LON descended from Hume. Then we can assume nomic necessity to be a relative necessity without falling into a circle. Important argument: then we can just assume nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on an independent approach to laws! Explanation: So it makes sense to make use of laws to explain nomic necessity, rather than vice versa. And that’s much less obscure than modal arguments. I 227 BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Hume’s theories are unable to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power. I 233 "Full generality"/"Pure" generality/Hume/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: may not contain any reference to an individual: This is too weak and too strong: a) too strong: E.g. Kepler’s laws relate to all the planets, but therefore also to an individual, the sun. b) too weak: it is still no law. E.g. that everything moves towards the earth’s center. I 235 LoN/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: in our opinion, it has nothing to do with them, E.g. whether they are useful, or whether they contradict our intuitions. Counterfactual conditional/Co.co/LoN/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: for the Humean, Counterfactual Conditional are circular, if they are to represent LoN. We ourselves only use a Counterfactual Conditional when we have recognized something as a law! When we ask ourselves whether something is a law, we ask ourselves not whether it fulfils a Counterfactual Conditional. I 236 HumeVsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: our modal approach for LoN is circular. BigelowVsVs: it is not! BigelowVsHume: most of Hume’s theories of the LON are circular themselves, with one exception: the theory that Lewis reads out of Ramsey. Ramsey/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory is based on the logical relations of laws among each other (coherence). (Ramsey 1929, 1931, Lewis 1973a, Mellor 1980). I 237 BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: if theories are sets of propositions, propositions must not be sets of possible worlds! For then the best theory for a possible worlds would have to be an axiom: the one-class of this possible worlds All facts of the world are then theorems of the axiom. There would be only one law for each world. No two possible worlds would have a law in common. I 267 BigelowVsHume: went too far in his rejection of necessity in laws. But not far enough in his rejection of the necessity approach to causality. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Hume, D. | Mackie Vs Hume, D. | Armstrong III 57 MackieVsHume: (1979) (Stove, et al.): overlooked the possibility that observational premises, while they do not contain any conclusion about the unobserved, still can yield a logical possibility, e.g. 99% of Fs are Gs. Then it is obviously rational to conclude that a is a G. So one can say that the observed cases provide a logical opportunity for unobserved cases. Purely mathematical argument about distribution. VsTheory of Regularity: yet there is a coherent reason why the principles of logical possibility alone cannot solve the problem of the theory of regularity. The issue with logical possibility is that it cannot distinguish between natural and non-natural classes. Ex.: grue as an unnatural predicate cannot readily be ruled out. III 58 That all emeralds are grue, has the same logical possibility (the same percentage as the green ones). Stegmüller IV 238 Virtue/Hume: distinction: natural virtue: is part of biological provisions. Moral philosophers before Hume exclusively referred to these virtues. Ex: generosity, forbearance, charitableness, altruism, moderation, impartiality. (Basis: human sympathy). artificial virtue: nothing but human inventions. Ex: respect for property; rules of transfer of property, promise, commitment to adhere to contracts, loyalty towards the government. IV 239 Artificial virtues have no natural origin. Ex: respecting other's property: 1. cannot originate from benevolence towards others: for then the respectation would depend on whether the property serves the welfare of all. 2. also, it cannot depend on whether the person concerned seems sympathetic or not. 3. sympathy is imaginable in gradations, respect for property is not. This applies mutatis mutandis to all artificial virtues. IV 240 Morality/Hume: I cannot base my duties on whether someone seems sympathetic or not. natural virtue/MackieVsHume/Stegmüller: to begin with, one would expect that the discussion of the natural virtues is much easier, since the first step (about the genesis) does not apply. Problem: (also recognized by Hume) if the natural virtues were an effluence of sympathy, they would have to run parallel. But this is not the case. Our sympathies are self-centered! We have more sympathy for people who are closest to us. IV 241 But we expect from moral judgments that they are impersonal and impartial. Thus, the seemingly absolute difference between natural and artificial virtues must partially be abandoned. The "natural" virtues, too, thus form a system of conventions. They are supposed to serve the "long-term interests" of all. The natural virtues then are such artificial virtues in which we find instinctive inclination to act accordingly. In the artificial virtues, we find no such basis. They are merely socialized. Stegmüller IV 355 Miracle/probability/Hume/Stegmüller: probability is always to be qualified by the level of information. But Hume's argument would even be valid if credibility of witnesses were a law of nature! Even then it would not be rational to believe in miracles. Miracle/Mackie: difference: a) question: on grounds of the reports, which hypotheses about laws should be assumed? b) the weight of the evidence itself. Miracle/MackieVsHume: also the reporter himself requires the notion of a well-founded natural law in order to classify the event as a miracle. IV 356 Hume does not anywhere considere the strengthening by several independent witnesses. IV 412 Teleological proof of God's existence/MackieVsHume: (by and large pro Hume): but one can interpret the conclusion by analogy in a way that God is introduced as that which caused the natural world and explains it. IV 413 But also here Hume would be proved to be correct that no further consequences arise therefrom. In particular, the relationship between God and the world remains unexplained. Science/theory/Mackie: Darwinian theory of evolution, too, does not facilitate any predictions! IV 414 Order/theory of evolution/Mackie/Stegmüller: in Darwinism order is not explained by the proposition, that God created the world for us, but that we have adapted to it. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Hume, D. | Cartwright Vs Hume, D. | I 10 Causation/Causal explanation/CartwrightVsHume: the laws of association are not sufficient to explain the difference between effective strategies (e.g. fight against malaria) and ineffective ones. Causal laws: are needed just as well. Simpson’s Paradox/Probability//Statistics/Causal explanation/Cartwright: was used by many authors as a counter-E.g. to probabilistic models of causation. I 42 Humeean world/Cartwright: this type of example (Figure 1) brings comfort to the representatives of the Humeean world. HumeVsCausal laws: the representatives reject them, because they have no independent access to them. They consider themselves able to determine laws of association, but they think that they will never have the causal initial information to apply condition C. If they are lucky, they do not need this initial knowledge: Perhaps they live in a world that is not a Humean world. ((s) because then this knowledge would be irrelevant). CartwrightVsHume: but a Humean world might still be one in which causal laws could be inferred from the laws of association. I 61 Force//Hume: it is wrong to distinguish between a force and its exercise. (Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford 1978, p 311). CartwrightVsHume: we need exactly this apparent distinction here. Causal force/Law of gravity/Cartwright: says that two bodies have the power to produce a force Gm m’/r², but they do not manage to exercise it. (Because other forces are at play). So the law does not speak of the behavior of the bodies, but of the powers they have. Problem: the facts-view cannot be given up so easily. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Hume, D. | Salmon Vs Hume, D. | Fraassen I 119 Kausalität/W. Salmon: früh: Kausal-Relation, es geht um inferentielle Fähigkeit zur Vorhersage und Retrodiktion durch Kenntnis der Mechanismen. spät: Kausalprozeß statt Kausalrelation. Was ist ein Prozeß und was ist kausale Interaktion? Dabei modifiziert Def Prozeß/Kausalprozeß/W. Salmon/Fraassen: ist eine raumzeitlich kontinuierliche Folge von Ereignissen. SalmonVsHume: eine Folge von Ereignissen im Kausalprozeß ist eben nicht diskret sondern kontinuierlich. Bsp ein Auto fährt die Straße entlang. Dabei macht es keine Sprünge. Pseudo-Prozeß: Bsp der Schatten des Autos begleitet das Auto, aber die frühere Position des Schattens ist keine Ursache für die spätere Position des Schattens und auch nicht des Autos! Lösung/Reichenbach: probabilistische Relationen: (FN 27) (1) die Wschk von A r+s gegeben Ar ist größer oder gleich der Wschk von Ar+s gegeben A r-t, die wiederum größer ist als die Wschk von Ar+s allein. Problem: das schließt noch keine Pseudoprozesse aus. (2) die Wschk von Ar+s gegeben beides, Ar und Ar-t ist gleich der Wschk von Ar+s gegeben Ar I 120 Und außerdem : „es gibt keine andere Folge von Ereignissen B, die Ar+s von Ar abschirmt für alle r. Vs: 1. (1) erinnert an eine wohlbekannte Eigenschaft stochastischer Prozesse: die Markov-Eigenschaft. Das ist zur stark für die Definition von Kausalprozessen. Warum sollte die ganze Vorgeschichte des Prozesses von Zeitpunkt r mehr Information darüber liefern was später geschieht, als r selbst? Markov-Eigenschaft: gesamte Vorgeschichte wichtig. Vs: 2. zusätzlich zu (2) müßten wir sagen, dass Br ein echter Kausalprozeß ist. Sonst ist die Bewegung des Autos selbst keiner, denn die Bewegung des Schattens wird die aufeinanderfolgenden Positionen des Autos voneinander abschirmen. Problem: wenn wir sagen, dass Br ein echter Kausalprozeß sein muss, haben wir einen Regreß! Lösung/Reichenbach: „Methode der Markierung“: stoppt den Regreß. Daher wird sie auch von W. Salmon bevorzugt: Bsp wenn ein Kotflügel einen Kratzer aus einem Zusammenstoß mit einer Mauer hat, wird diese Markierung von dem Auto noch lange Zeit später transportiert. Aber der Schatten als Pseudoprozeß transportiert den Kratzer nicht. (FN28). ((s)Vs: Problem: eine große Beule würde auch vom Schatten „transportiert“). |
Sal I Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 German Edition: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sal II W. Salmon The Foundations Of Scientific Inference 1967 SalN I N. Salmon Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II 2007 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Hume, D. | Castaneda Vs Hume, D. | Frank I 214 Subject/Object/Reflexivity/Castaneda: Tradition: Problem: how can a self be both subject and object of its own experience at the same time? CastanedaVs: this is a fictitious problem emanating from a monolithic self. There is no such self. CastanedaVsHume: this does, however, not justify Hume’s conclusion that there is no experience of the self! VsHume: wrong identification of the external ITself with the internal itSELF. There is no external self but there is an internal self. The internal self is what one refers to when one says "I". Then we can say that although there is no problem with the self, there is a serious problem with the Is! We can concentrate on the internal reflexivity without loss. Self-consciousness/SC/Castaneda: takes places in episodes of thinking about oneself qua oneself. The thinker appears to HIMself as himSELF, i.e. as I. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Hume, D. | Freud Vs Hume, D. | I 128 BergsonVsHume/FreudVsHume: the association of ideas only explains the superficial. Deleuze: Hume never said anything else. However, he was of the opinion that the formal also had to be explained. Circumstances/Hume: he often refers to them, they always denote affectivity. Also substances and modes as well as general ideas need the circumstances. |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 |
| Hume, D. | Vollmer Vs Hume, D. | I 103 Causality/VollmerVsHume: not a layperson, but also not a scientist feels comfortable with Hume's observation. Causality/Hume: attributes causality to an instinct that we have in common with animals. Causality/KantVsHume: Instincts can fail, the law of causality does not seem to fail. I 105 Causality/Regularity/VsHume: For example, although day and night follow each other regularly, we do not say that day is the cause for night. VollmerVsHume: has no convincing argument for it! Vollmer: no energy transfer from day to night, so one cannot be the cause of the other! I 106 Causality/Energy transfer/VollmerVsHume: the frequency is not decisive, how else could we explain the expansion of the universe (which by definition is unique) by the Big Bang? Energy conservation is relevant for our ontological interpretation of causality, not frequency. It is essential for the possibility of an effective energy transfer. I 107 However, in principle there could also be causal processes in which only half of the released energy is transferred, while the other half disappears in violation of the conservation law! Conversely, the "cause" does not need to provide the total energy for the effect. (butterfly effect). Vollmer: small cause - big effect? - Yes, but without a minimum of energy transfer there is no effect, no causality. II 47 Natural Law/Law/General Sentence/Vollmer: three classes of true, general sentences: 1. Randomly true - for example all balls in this box are red 2. Lawfully true without energy transfer: E.g. duration of oscillation = 2π √ (pendulum length multiplied by acceleration due to gravity). 3. Causal laws (with energy transfer) E.g. heating leads to expansion This does not imply that this causal "necessity" gives causal assertions any unassailable status. Here, too, the hypothetical character of all our knowledge remains. Causality/VollmerVsHume: nevertheless, causal assertions say more than mere subsequent assertions: their empirical content is greater. This, of course, makes them easier to refute. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Kant | Kripke Vs Kant | I 135Kant: "All analytic judgments are based entirely on the principle of contradiction and by their nature are a priori knowledge, the definitions on which they are based on may be empirical or not. Since the predicate has been thought of in terms of the subject, it cannot be negated by the first." I 181 That is precisely why all analytic propositions are a priori judgments even though their terms are empirical. E.g. gold is a yellow metal. In order to know this, I need no further experience beyond my definition of gold. If that makes up my definition, I am only able to segment my definition, I cannot look anywhere else for it. Kripke: Kant seems to say that gold means simply yellow metal. KripkeVsKant: Is Kant right? According to scientists, it is very difficult to define what a metal is. We also need to know the periodic table. One might think that there are actually two definitions, a phenomenological and a scientific one, where the latter replaces the former. Phenomenological: Stretchable, deformable, scientific: Periodic table. (KripkeVs). A posteriori: one can learn a mathematical truth a posteriori by looking at a computer or by asking a mathematician. (e.g. naturally a posteriori). The philosophical analysis tells us that it could not be contingent, and therefore any empirical knowledge of its truth is automatically an empirical knowledge of its necessity.(KripkeVsHume, KripkeVsKant) |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Kant | Nozick Vs Kant | II 12 Hypothesis/How-is-it-possible questions/Nozick: a hypothesis that is false does not explain how something is possible. But maybe it increases understanding. Hypothesis: must not even be plausible. How-is-it-possible question: can go so deep that the only answers that are sufficient, are implausible. One should not exclude that the p with which the question began is excluded at the end. (VsKant). II 110 Synthesis/Self/I/Nozick: VsKant: VsSynthesis: against the perspective of self-synthesizing self could be argued that it does not localize itself as an entity, it is not a "part of the equipment of the universe". possible solution: II 111 I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (self) as a property. I.e. not as an object. That solves, for example, the problem of the localization and other problems: 1) Hume: "I cannot perceive myself independent of any other perception." NozickVsHume: perhaps he has not searched thoroughly. He has done nothing specific to search for the self, has he? 2) Advantage: the approach explains why it is difficult to imagine the self without embodiment. 3) It is difficult to imagine how the self should be identical with any particular stuff. II 112 A property is never identical with the object. The difficulty to specify the relation of a property to the object is the general reason why we can only locate the self with difficulty, but it is not a specific problem of the relation between self and body. Property/Nozick: there are at least two ways to identify a person with a property: 1) with a non-indexical, non-reflexive property: E.g. "being Robert Nozick" 2) an identification whose definition uses a reflexive pronoun of the first person: E.g. "being me". This introduces reflexivity. Right into the nature of the self at that. I Problem: it is obscure, because it introduces the reflexivity in the nature of the self, but it explains why all public or physicalist descriptions leave me out, because they are not reflective. Unit/Merger/I/Self/Tradition: the I merges with the "one", but does not disappear in the process. The I is a property of the one, I am not separate from it. Reflexivity/Property: E.g. reflexive property: "being me". Problem: 1) P is the ability to be reflexively self-referring. People have P, tables do not. I have the property P and so do you, II 113 but you have it by virtue of the fact that you are you, I have it by virtue of the other fact that I am I. We both have the property of being me, but the property is indexical. I.e. the properties differ! Point: they both arise from the same non-indexical property P: being reflexively self-referring! II 318 Action/Decision/Free Will/Knowledge/Belief/Nozick: Is there a parallel between belief and action, according to the model by which we have established conditions for belief and knowledge in the previous chapter? Belief is in connection with facts (covariance). What are actions to be connected to? Just like beliefs should respond to facts, actions should respond to correctness or quality ("bestness", optimum, "optimal desirability", "the best"). Then we need to know the relevant facts as well. II 319 Our actions must be sensitive to accuracy or "the best". Conditions: (1) Action A is correct (2) S does A on purpose (intentionally) (III) if A were not right, S would not do A intentionally. (IV) if A were correct, S would intentionally do A. Distinction: "Allowed"/"the best" (nothing better). Similar: "Maximum": several maximums possible: even if there is nothing bigger. Maximum: only one possible. "bigger than all the others". then: correctness: (3) if A was not allowed, S would not do A (4) if A were mandatory, S would do A. "the best": (1) A is the best (at least maximum, perhaps maximum) (2) S does A intentionally (3) if A were not as good as a possible other thing, S would not do A (4) if A were better than anything else, S would do A. II 320 So here we can also introduce a reference to a motif M in accordance with conditions (3) and (4). Moral/Kant/Nozick: when we happen to do something moral, immoral motives may be present. Problem: it could be that if the act is immoral, other non-moral (neutral) motives move the person to carry out the action anyway. NozickVsKant: he would be better served with our conditions (3) and (4). In addition, we need the inclusion of methodologies (see above, example grandmother: would still believe, even if the facts were different. E.g. Theater/Nuclear Reactor: if it were not a play, the person would still believe it via other methods). Action: similar: E.g. someone carries out a mandatory action after careful consideration. If it were not right, its moral quality would never have come to his attention, but he could still have chosen it. Only this time without reflection on its correctness. Method/Action/Nozick: like with belief, methods can also be weighed against each other even with actions: A person meets the Kantian requirements if there is a motive M for which he does a, which satisfies the conditions (3) and (4), and outweighs any other motive M' that does not satisfy (3) and (4). II 352 Self-Choice/Action/Morality/Ethics/Free Will/Nozick: the concept of a free action as in connection with accuracy (or "the best") is defined in terms of the result. And not so much as a process. Tradition: Thinks that a free action emerges from a process of choice that could also have had an incorrect result. How close can we get to the process of choice in a simulation? II 353 Anyway, we will not get out of a causal nexus. 1) Locke/Hume/Tradition/Nozick: we are not free if our actions are caused. 2) Kant: we are free if our actions are in harmony with reason 3) Free actions must not be caused by any independent source, II 354 but must come forth from our nature. (Spinoza: only God is free). Hegel: combines 2) and 3): (with Aristotle) Reason and thought are the essence of man. We are free when we are limited by a law of reason in a way conscious of ourselves, which is a constitutive principle of our nature. Nozick: is that enough? Although our actions come forth from our nature, would we then not be unfree in the extent that we are bound by our nature? Could external sources not be as binding for us? Why should I want to be moral? Do I have to wish to be happy? Why should I want to be rational? "Your being is rationality, do what is rational to realize your nature". Why should I realize my nature? It's bad enough that it is so difficult. "Your nature, that is you." If I am not really me, do I have to wish to be me? Could I not wish to be the Messiah? "But you have no choice, you had to be what you are." So, that is what you offer me as freedom. Objective morality seems to be something inevitable. Categorical Imperative/Nozick: some read it as follows: "Do this if you wish to be rational" "Do this if you want to be free" (absurd: command). Freedom/Nozick: has to be something that does not bind us. II 355 Then there can be no free will with objective morality. Law/Kant/Nozick: the law that does not bind us is the one that we give ourselves, that is not borrowed from nature, but is set by reason itself as a necessity of its own nature. Nozick: but does that not bind us, too? Could we not act as autonomously out of very different motives? NozickVsKant: the status of morality in his theory is unclear. Example: Suppose someone finds out what the categorical imperative wants and then does the opposite. "But what motive could he have for that?" Perhaps he just wants autonomy? The chances are not good. Morality/Freedom/Nozick: Thesis: must not only be chosen by ourselves, it must also be given by something that is in turn chosen for its part! Only something that arises from a chosen nature will not bind us. But if the nature is chosen, how should then it be inevitable? (>self-choice, self-ownership.). |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Kant | Vollmer Vs Kant | I 25 VollmerVsKant: today people no longer believe that its categories are necessary. Also the laws of nature do not have the general and necessary validity! I 84 Theory/Vollmer: goes further than our mesocosm: But many philosophers do not understand that: VsKant, VsAnalytic Philosphy: Everyday language VsPositivism VsPhenomenalism: e.g. Mach: Sensory perception is everything. VsOperationalism: every term must be defined in mesocosmic operational terms. Vollmer: nevertheless, we cannot avoid connecting every object, every structure of empirical science with human (i.e. mesocosmic) experiences. I 103 Causality/KantVsHume: Instincts can fail, the causal law does not seem to fail. Causality/VollmerVsKant: what Kant describes is at best a normal adult cultural person. Evolutionary epistemology: Biology instead of synthetic a priori - is only mesocosmically appropriate. I 173 Epistemology/VollmerVsKant: he does not see that the field of his traditional epistemology is much too narrow. He does not notice the difference between mesocosmic and theoretical knowledge. He cannot answer the following questions: How are our categories created? Why do we have these forms of viewing and categories? Why are we bound to these a priori judgements and not to others? Kant gives wrong solutions for the following problems: Should we accept the idea of organismic evolution? Why can we understand each other? How is intersubjective knowledge possible? Can the categories be proved complete? (Vollmer: No!) Can they be scientifically justified? I 193 Synthetic judgments a priori/VollmerVsKant: up to today, nobody has supplied a single copy of such judgments. Although they seem logically possible. I 196 Deduction/Categories/Kant/Vollmer: one has to realize that Kant's "deduction" is not even intended to give a justification for special categories. He only shows how they are used. Categories/Kant/Vollmer: as terms they cannot be true or false (true/false). For each category, however, there is a principle of mind which, due to its transcendental character, provides a law of nature. Therefore, a discussion (and possible justification) of the categories can be replaced by one of the corresponding laws. I 197 Principles of the pure mind/Kant/Vollmer: four groups: 1. Axioms of View - applicability of Euclidean geometry to a. Objects, b. states, and c. Processes. 2. Anticipations of Perception a. Consistency of space, b. Consistency of time, c. Consistency of physical processes 3. Analogies of Experience a. Persistence of the substance, b. universal causality, c. universal interaction of the substances. 4. Postulates of empirical thinking at all (here not principles, but definitions). I 199 VollmerVsKant: he does not show anywhere that its reconstruction is the only possible one. His representation of Newton's physics is probably not appropriate. Physics/Kant/VollmerVsKant/Vollmer: Matter: he considers matter infinitely divisible (NewtonVs). Principle of inertia: he did not understand it, he mistakenly thinks that every change of state requires an external cause. Uniform motion, however, needs no cause! Mistakenly thought, bullets only reached their highest speed some time after leaving the barrel. (Principle of inertia Vs). Has never mastered infinitesimal calculation. Never fully understood the nature of the experimental method and underestimated the role of experience. I 202 Intersubjectivity/Kant/Vollmer: with animals intersubjectivity should be impossible. It should be impossible to communicate with chimpanzees. Worse still: we should not understand each other. Because according to Kant, there is no reason why the cognitive structures of other people should be identical to mine. Reason: For Kant, recognition and knowledge are bound to and limited to the transcendental cognitive structures of each individual. Therefore, it could also be completely idiosyncratic. Intersubjectivity/Vollmer: fortunately they exist on Earth. The transcendental philosopher can register this as a fact. He cannot explain them. VollmerVsKant: For Kant, the origin of intersubjectivity remains mysterious, inexplicable, a surprising empirical fact. Vollmer: Intersubjectivity is of course explained by the EE. EE/Vollmer: Our view of space is three-dimensional because space is. It is temporally directed because it is real processes. (PutnamVs). I 208 Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: obviously we have to distinguish between two levels of knowledge: 1. Perception and experience are oriented towards evolutionary success and therefore sufficiently correct. 2. Scientific knowledge is not oriented towards evolutionary success. Kant does not make this distinction. I 210 VollmerVsKant: from the fact that every factual finding is tested with mesocosmic means, he erroneously concludes that it is also limited to the mesocosm. I 304 Thing in itself/measuring/Vollmer: we measure the length of a body with some scale, but we still speak of the length of the body. (sic: reference to "thing in itself" by Vollmer). I 305 Knowledge/VollmerVsKant: although our knowledge is never absolutely certain, it differs considerably from knowledge about phenomena. I 306 Although many things may be unknown, there is no motive to postulate an unrecognisable reality behind the world. I 307 VollmerVsKant: the "naked reality" cannot be seen by us, but it can be recognized! II 48 Def Nature/Kant: the existence of things, if it is determined according to general laws. Nature/VollmerVsKant: unnecessarily narrow and petitio principii: because the generality of the categories thereby becomes an analytical consequence of this definition. (Circular). |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Locke, J. | Brandom Vs Locke, J. | II 54 BrandomVsHume, BrandomVsLocke: we should downplay, what they have struggled with: the similarity with animals. (Also Dennett, as a naturalist). We are cultural and not merely natural beings. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Mill, J. St. | James Vs Mill, J. St. | I 55 JamesVsHume, JamesVsMill: "associationism": sees in intellectual ideas and experiences only reflections of perceptible impressions that generate ideas by acting on the organism. >Association. James: This "determinism" explains well the feelings of the details, but not the experience of wills, emotional states, rationality, memories. |
|
| Millikan, R. | Verschiedene Vs Millikan, R. | Millikan I 90 Sentence/Belief/Language/Thinking/Millikan: it seems clear that if we had no beliefs, we would stop speaking or uttering sentences with meaning. But why is that clear? We need another explanation (see below). Sentence/Intentionality/Millikan: Thesis: a sentence (and any other typical intentional pattern) is intentional because of the eigenfunctions and normal relations that this pattern has to a producer and an interpreter. These two are cooperating units in this process. N.B.: then sentences are fundamentally intentional and have no derived intentionality. (MillikanVsTradition, MillikanVsSearle). ((s) Intentionality/Millikan/(s): must then no longer refer to the mental.) VsMillikan: one could argue that intentionality must be connected with the mental, because the analysis of the intentionality of thoughts or inner representations must at least take place in accordance with principles according to which consciousness and the mental itself must be analyzed. Relation/VsMillikan: the relations offered by Millikan are merely external. At best, they correlate changes in consciousness with changes in the external world. They themselves lie outside the mind and outside consciousness. Consciousness/Tradition: but be a consciousness of the world, not merely consciousness of the changes of itself. I 91 Tradition: we experience our consciousness directly. MillikanVsTradition: what kind of experience of intentionality should this be? What kind of power should this argument have? The force should be epistemic and rational. Uncorrectability/MillikanVsTradition: the experience of consciousness (experience of intentionality) should have something infallible. We would then also have to have an immediate understanding. It would also have to assume the existence of intentionality and consciousness, otherwise the experience could not be "in" it. Consciousness/Tradition: assumes that consciousness is transparent. And therefore it cannot only consist of external relations to the outer world, and these are necessary for nature. MillikanVsVs: suppose we reject this epistemic rationalistic picture, i.e. we deny that there is "something epistemically given". Then we could admit that sometimes people are aware of their thoughts. But we could maintain that this awareness is partly an external relation. The "inside" of this feeling (consciousness, awareness) I 92 does not guarantee that it is the inside of a true awareness relation. Consciousness/Millikan: even consciousness of consciousness is not an immediate object. There is nothing transparent about consciousness. N.B./Millikan: this is disturbing because it follows (negative thesis) that it is possible that we do not know what we think! ((s) DavidsonVsHume: ditto). I.e. nothing is guaranteed from the act of consciousness itself. Rationalism/rationalist/intentionality/consciousness/MillikanVsRationalism/Millikan: the traditional rationalist view of consciousness and intentionality leads to one dead end after the other. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Rationalism | James Vs Rationalism | I 57 Rationalism: James developed a position of radical empiricism (Vsrationalism, Vsempiricism as it is represented by Hume). >Empiricism/Hume. JamesVsHume: in order to be radical the empiricist must neither accept elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly. Horwich I 24 Truths/James: in the plural they have only one thing in common: they pay off. Truth/JamesVsRationalism: is produced. (1) 1. William James (1907) "Pragmatisms Conception of Truth“ (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 4 p. 141-55 and 396-406) in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Reid, Th. | Anscombe Vs Reid, Th. | Prior I 124 Thought Object/Anscombe: (like Reid, like Findlay): Intentionality should be treated as what it is "and not as another thing". AnscombeVsReid: sensory object, perceptual object: is closer to thinking than in Reid. I 126 Intentionality/Uncertainty/Mental Objects/Anscombe: 2. Property: their "indeterminacy": For example, I can think of a man without thinking of a man of a certain size, but I cannot hit a man without striking a man of a certain size. Because there is no man with indeterminate size (but as a thought object). 3. Property: (Like Findlay, VsReid): When I think of a certain man, it is possible that not every true description of him is one under which I think of him. (>DavidsonVsHume). (E.g. >Quine, Tullius, Cicero). Example Anscombe: someone thinks his father is a deer. Father: "material object" (of aiming!). For example, a tribe worships a god: material object: nothing but a piece of wood. Intentional object: God. N.B.: perhaps the "father" was only a dark spot in front of the foliage, but the dark spot was really there! Hallucination/Prior: does not provide identification! ((s) Not public). Intentionality/Thought Objects/Anscombe: gives a warning even here. Example: One cannot say: "They worship nothing"! That would imply that no sentence of the form: "They worship that so and so " (description) is true. But only: "What they worship is nothing". (de re, de dicto). |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Searle, J.R. | Mackie Vs Searle, J.R. | Stegmüller IV 188 Naturalistic Fallacy/SearleVsHume: one could formulate cautious assumptions to work around the problem: 1) Hans: "I hereby promise to pay you, Peter, 10 marks" 2. Hans promised, to pay 10 ... 3) Hans entered an obligation ... 4) Hans is obliged to ... 5) Hans shall ... IV 189 It is assumed that there are no competing claims or excuses. Searle: Solution by "institutional fact". institutional fact/MackieVsSearle: confused two perspectives on "institution": a) externally: Ex. in chess the rules are not internalized for the context of life. b) internally: here the rules are internalized, we cannot escape. 1. The five steps of Searle are only a description from the outside. Proposition (5) is nothing but a description of the institution of the promise from the outside. (Descriptive). IV 190 Nothing but the deduction of a statement of fact from other factual allegations. 2. Or, view it as a conclusion within the institution, then (5) is a normative statement. The difficulty then lies in the transition from (2) to (3). Then (3) would be better: "Hans made an attempt to commit to Peter ..." Yet, to get to (4) as a normative statement (3) would have would have to be available in the original version. The problem stems from the fact that we do not learn about promises externally, but always in concrete, lived situations. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Thomas Aquinas | Hume Vs Thomas Aquinas | Fraassen I 212 Proof of the Existence of God/HumeVsThomas Aquinas/Fraassen: our new view (modern analogy) is not exposed to criticism by Hume (HumeVsThomas Aquinas). Even though regress in causation or explanation must end. I 213 There is no reason to assume that this end (end point) should not be the universe (world) itself (instead of God). Problem: because if the world can only be understood by reference to the will of God, how are we to understand God's will? And if we cannot understand Him, why should we not halt at the universe? VsHume: all counterarguments seem to be based on the assumption that God is essentially different from the universe. God himself requires no explanation or justification. Fraassen: this may be true for God, yet there is a possible counterargument for our case: namely as follows: Explanation/Fraassen: in terms of explanation there is no difference between galvanometers and electrons. Instead: we assume a microstructure (MiSt). Microstructure/MiSt/VsFraassen: demanding a microstructure does not mean appealing to a cosmic coincidence, e.g. that cloud chambers and galvanometers behave like this, is even then surprising if there are theoretical entities such as electrons. Because it is surprising that there should be such a regularity in the behavior of the electrons. If we are not metaphysically minded, we should be glad that our relation to quantum mechanics has brought order in there. Because we do not understand the underlying (prior, not temporal) coincidence. If we then continue to ask what brings the micro-things of the same kind to behave in the same way in the past, present and future, we have a new exaggerated realism. FraassenVsVs: Explanation/regularity/Fraassen: thesis: there are regularities of observable phenomena that need to be explained! Theoretical Entities/Fraassen: the question of why they behave the way they do is a question on a different level than that of explanation. Because then there are two possibilities: a) there is another, still unexplained regularity or b) there is the presumption that our theory can still be improved by being simplified. In neither case the regularities behind the phenomena demand an explanation. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Tooley, M. | Armstrong Vs Tooley, M. | III 104 Tooley: if relations between universals are truthmakers, then these are "atomic facts". Then the standard principles could ascribe a probability of >0 to the confirmation theory. III 105 ArmstrongVsTooley: this is an initial possibility or logical possibility of a tautology. Empiricist should have doubts there. ForrestVsTooley: There could be infinitely many possible universals. Would the attributable initial probabilities not be infinitesimally small then? That would be no justification for the induction. VsInduction/VsBest Explanation: inductive skepticism could doubt that it really would be the best explanation, more fundamentally: why should the regularities in the world ever have an explanation (reg.)?. Regularity/Berkeley: through God. He could abolish the "laws of nature" tomorrow. Berkeley/Armstrong: Answering to this already means to concede the possibility. We have no guarantee that the best explanation is the best scheme. But it is informative. Arm III 120 Then all universals would only be substances in Hume’s sense: i.e. something that logically might have an independent existence. III 121 ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstronVsTooley: it is wrong to think of universals like that. Then there are problems regarding how universals are related with their particulars (part.). E.g. If a rel. between particulars a and b is something that is able to have an independent existence without a and b and any other particulars, would there not have to be at least one other relation to relate it to a and b?. And if this rel. can be uninstantiated itself (e.g. in a universe with monads!), then this rel. is just as questionable, etc. ad infinitum. (Bradley’s regress). One can avoid this only if universals are merely abstract factors of states of affairs (but real). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Tradition | Hume Vs Tradition | II 264 Theodicy/Hume: could we not say that in spite of all, happiness and well-being still predominate? It could then be concluded that the Creator does not have an infinite, but still a predominant degree of positive properties. Hume: an unbiased view of the world cannot cause us to consider it a creation of a very good, wise, and powerful, albeit not almighty being. HumeVsTradition: the notion of the limitations of the mind common among theologists does not help: the human must get an idea based on what he/she knows, and not based on what he/she has no knowledge of. II 264/265 Hume: the general reason lies deeper: causality: it is unacceptable to infer from an indefinite effect (mixture of happiness and unhappiness in the world) to a specific cause! It is unacceptable to attribute to a cause inferred from a particular effect other properties than those required for bringing forth that same effect. VsHume: is that not too restrictive, could scientific explanations enhance knowledge at all if you were not allowed to say anything about the causes of the phenomena, which is not already contained in the phenomena themselves?. HumeVsVs: Hume sees this problem and takes it into account. E.g. if we discover a single footprint on a beach, we imagine a two-legged human and not a one-legged one! So we do infer on something in the cause, which is not included in the effect. Solution/Hume: difference: e.g. in the case of the footprint we have prior knowledge of humans who leave footprints. Namely, from direct experience. But we have no experience with different creators who create universes. II 266 We know the world, however, solely from its effects. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Tradition | Searle Vs Tradition | II 28 Belief/conviction/SearleVsTradition: it is simply not a kind of image! It is simply a representation, that means it has a propositional content, which determines the fulfillment of conditions and a psychological mode, which defines the orientation. II 49 SearleVsTradition: Convictions and desires are not the basic intentional states. One can also ashamed of his desire or his convictions. II 160 Tradition: one never has a causation experience. SearleVsTradition: one not only often has causation experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such causation experience! SearleVsHume: he looked at a wrong spot, he looked for strength. II 190 Example skiing: traditional view: first: word on world causation direction. You follow the instruction to put the weight on the downhill ski. II 191 This changes with increasing dexterity. The instructions appear unconscious, but still as a representation. To make conscious will become a hindrance in the future as with the centipede. SearleVsTradition: the rules are not internalized, but they are less important! They are not unconsciously "hardwired" but they become ingrained. II 192 They might be realized as nerves and simply make the rules unnecessary. The rules can retreat into the background. The beginner is inflexible, the advanced flexible. This makes the causal role of representation superfluous! The advanced does not follow the rules better, he skis differently! The body takes command and the driver's intentionality is concentrated on the winning of the race. II 192/193 Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality, but pervades the whole network of intentional states. II 228 Name/subject/direct speech/quote/tradition/Searle: E.g. the sheriff spoke the words "Mr. Howard is an honest man. " II 231 According to the traditional view, the direct speech here includes no words! (But names.) II 232 SearleVsTradition: Of course we can talk about words with words. Also here no new names are created, the syntactic position often allows not even the setting up of a name. II 233 E.g. Gerald said he would Henry. (Ungrammatical). II 246 de dicto/intensional/SearleVsTradition: E.g. "Reagan is such that Bush thinks he is the president." Searle: the mistake was to conclude from the intensionality of de dicto reports to the intensionality of the reported states themselves. But from the presence of two different types of reports simply does not follow that there are two different kinds of states. III 165 Realism/tradition/Searle: the old dispute between realism and idealism was about the existence of matter or of objects in space and time. The traditional realism dealt with the question of how the world really is. Realism/SearleVsTradition: this is a profound misunderstanding! Realism is not a thesis about how the world actually is. We could be totally in error about how the world is in its details, and the realism could be still true! Def realism/Searle: realism has the view that there is a way of being of things that is logically independent of all human representations. It does not say how things are, but only that there is a mode of being of things. (Things are here not only material objects). V 176 Predicate/meaning/Searle: but is the meaning of the predicate expression a linguistic or non-linguistic entity? Searle: it is a linguistic entity in an ordinary sense. Can the existence of a non-linguistic entity follow from the existence of a linguistic entity? Existence/language/universals/SearleVsTradition: but the claim that any non-linguistic entities exist, can never constitute a tautology. IV 155 Background/Searle: what means "use" of background assumptions? The meaning concept shall perform certain tasks for us. Now the same object can at different times be understood relatively to various coordinate system of background assumptions without being ambiguous. ((s) It is unambiguous in the respective situation). IV 156 SearleVsTradition: here it is also not about the distinction performance/competence. IV 157 There is no sharp distinction between the competence of a speaker and his knowledge of the world. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Various Authors | Mackie Vs Various Authors | Stegmüller IV 399 "Kalam" argument: (common among Islamic scholars): operates with paradoxes of infinity to show that there can be no actual infinity. (> Al Ghassali). Infinity/MackieVsKalam argument: the possibility of an unlimited past cannot be ruled out on purely logical grounds! MackieVsKant: this prejudice can also be found in the thesis about the first antinomy. IV 400 Kalam argument/Al Ghassali: nothing that comes into existence in time, arises out of itself. ("Rational necessity"). Therefore, a creator is required. MackieVsAl Ghassali: 1. do we really know that from necessity of reason? 2. There is no reason why on one hand an uncaused thing should be impossible, but on the other hand the existence of a God with the power to create out of nothing, should be acceptable! God/Mackie/Islam: this concept of God raises difficult problems: 1. Has God simply emerged with the time? 2. Has he always existed in infinite time? Then the formerly rejected actual infinity would be reintroduced! 3. Does God have a non-temporal existence: that would be an incomprehensible mystery again. Mackie: additionally, one also has to assume: a) that God's existence and creative power explain themselves and b) that the unexplained existence of a material world would be incomprehensible and therefore unacceptable. IV 401 Existence/MackieVsLeibniz: there is no reason a priori to indicate that things do not just occur without causation! Cosmology/proof of the existence of God/existence/Mackie: problem: either the notion of "causa sui" makes sense or not. a) it does not make sense: then the cosmological assumption that a divine cause must be assumed for the beginning of material existence collapses. b) it makes sense: then it can even be awarded as a property to matter itself! Stegmüller IV 447 Def. God/Feuerbach: "God is the sense of self of human kind freed from all loathsomeness." Religion/Feuerbach: utopia of a better religion: God's freedom from all limitations of individuals that was imputed by traditional religions now recovered in humanity as a whole. MackieVsFeuerbach: humanity as a whole is undoubtedly not free from all limitations of individuals, it is not omnipotent, not omniscient, not all good. (vide supra: entirety as a wrong subject, cannot even act. IV 472 Theodicy/faith/Stegmüller: Argument: God has made the earth a vale of tears, so that people would develop a religious need. MackieVs: only a very human deity could want people so submissive. Theodicy/Gruner: insinuates to skeptics the demand for a world that is liberated from all evils. He rejects this demand as inconsistent. MackieVsGruner: shifts the burden of proof. The skeptic demands nothing at all. IV 271 Ethics/Education/Rousseau: Parents and teachers should refrain from any prerational teaching of children. MackieVsRousseau: understandable but unrealistic. Stegmüller IV 502 Religion/Faith/Wittgenstein: Ex. if one makes a choice, the image of retaliation always appears in their mind. Meaning/Mackie/Stegmüller: one possibility: the believer wants his pronouncements to be understood literally. S_he stands by a statement of fact. But notwithstanding, such pronouncements outwardly serve to support their sense of responsibility and to justify it. Then, according to Wittgenstein, their faith would be superstition! When asked for proof, they do not hold his pronouncements capable of truth. But then they change their position again and literally believe what they must believe. Other possibility: faith has a literal meaning, but comparable with the plot of a novel, fiction. One can accept that the corresponding values have a meaning for life. IV 503 Therefore we could accept that there is a God only in our practical moral reasoning. T. Z. Phillips: if the questions about God and immortality are undestood literally, as factual questions, then the skeptical response given by Hume is correct. Thesis: one can and must interpret religious convictions and statements in a way that the criticism of Hume is irrelevant! It is true that logical and teleological proof of the existence of God cannot be upheld. The reality of God must not be interpreted as the reality of an object, "God" isn't the name of a single being, it refers to nothing. IV 504 According to Phillips metaphysicians misunderstand the everyday meanings of words. MackieVs: one doesn't dissolve the real problems of skepticism by pointing to normal parlance. Just as ordinary language philosophers couldn't prevail VsHume. Faith/Religion/Phillips: magical and religious language should be interpreted in the sense of performative actions. Mackie pro, but: it is wrong to say that an expressive language could not at the same time be descriptive in a literal sense. IV 504/505 Actions of faith are both: ways to address happiness and misery in the world as well as to explain them. Religion/faith/R. B. Braithwaite: thesis: the core of the Christian faith is the determination to live by the principles of morality. The "Christian stories" are accompanied by that, although the Christian is not required to believe them literally! They are religious attitudes! PhillipsVsBraithwaite: the grammar of "believing" and "being true" in religious convictions is not the same as in empirical statements. MackieVs: thereby we lose any firm ground under your feet! Braithwaite rightly used the usual notions of truth and falsehood! IV 506 MackieVsPhillips: there is no alternative to that which is discarded by Phillips, namely to continue in superstitions or to reduce religion such as that the "basic characteristics of faith are lost". MackieVsBraithwaite: certainly, numerous religious statements can be interpreted as moral attitudes, but this does not apply to the central statements of theism. Faith/Mackie: needs an object of reference! |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cognitivism | Black, Max | III 81 BlackVsHume: his argument is circular: Thesis: I believe certain categorical sentences with "should have a truth value"! I.e. they can be recognized as true, without reference to hopes and desires. Then Hume is wrong when he assumes them to be different from scientific propositions. Knowledge/Values/Norms/Black: Thesis: in a broader sense (further than the narrower sense of science) knowledge can be understood in such a way that some normative and evaluative propositions can be known as true. Ethics/Morality/Values/Norms/Black: Thesis: regardless of whether Hume's critique of the naturalistic fallacy is correct, we are entitled to assume that human beings can agree on certain fundamental ethical principles regardless of their religious background. We must assume this in order for a rational discourse to become possible at all. |
|
| Laws | Cartwright, N. | Cartwright: I have three connected arguments. Thesis 1: The obvious explanatory power of fundamental laws does not speak for their truth. Thesis 2: The way in which fundamental laws are used in explanations speaks for their falsity. We explain by ceteris paribus laws by merging causes by approximations that exceed what the fundamental laws dictate. Thesis 3: The appearance of truth comes from a bad explanatory model, I 4 that connects laws directly to reality. Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum-View"/Cartwright: from explanation: Thesis: the path from theory to reality goes like this: theory > model > phenomenological law. Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are true only of the objects in the model. I 10 Asymmetry: Causal laws are asymmetric: Effect and cause cannot be interchanged. - On the other hand symmetrical: Laws of Association/Hume: e.g. length of shadow/height of mast. - Fraassen: Thesis: The explanatory asymmetries are not real. There is no fact about what explains what. CartwrightVsFraassen - Association/CartwrightVsHume: Association is not sufficient to distinguish between effective and ineffective strategies to fight malaria. I 51 Laws of Nature/Science/Cartwright: Thesis: There are no laws for cases where theories overlap. |
|
| Self | Evans, G. | Fra I 485f Self/I/Evans: 1. no criteria, 2. limited access (not everyone, anytime) - 3. way of givenness is dependent on existence: I have to be at the place to say "here", but changing is possible ("new sense, old meaning"). I 488 "Self": thoughts are de re - (need information) -(VsHume?) Peacock I 175 Self/I/Evans: thesis: the reference of "I" can fail! Peacocke: how is this compatible with the absolute immunity of "I have pain"? |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Existence | Geach, P. | I 265 GeachVsHume / VsGilson: the Hume-Brentano Gilson s thesis (that existence adds nothing conceptual) can not be recognizable claimed if true - it treats existence as nonconceptually (impossible to conceptualize) and as tangible only in existence judgments, but this claim itself is not a existential claim and treats existence as a concept! Contradiction. |
|
| |||