Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 51 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Acts of Will Nietzsche
 
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Danto III 136
Wille/Nietzsche/Danto: Wenn es stimmt, dass Nietzsche versucht, der gebräuchlichen Unterscheidung zwischen Mentalem und Materiellem zu entgehen, dann muss der Wille zur Macht widersprüchlich erscheinen. Immerhin ist „Wille“ ja ein das Geistige betreffender Ausdruck. (Siehe Kausalität/Nietzsche, Ich/Nietzsche, Subjekte/Nietzsche). Danto: Das stimmt aber so nicht. Wie bei Schopenhauer müssen wird bei Nietzsche die gewöhnliche, das Geistige betreffenden Konnotationen mit dem Begriff des „Willens“ im metaphysischen Sinn verbinden. Der Wille zur Macht beschränkt sich nicht auf Mentale. Wenn weirt dies missachten, können wir Nietzsche nicht verstehen.
NietzscheVsWillensakte: Nietzsche attackiert die nicht nur von Philosophen angenommenen „Willensakte“.
Danto III 137
Willensakte/Danto: verhalten sich zu Handlungen wie Ursachen zu Wirkungen. Hume/Danto: Hume verwarf die Idee, dass wir eine Erfahrung haben könnten, der unsere Idee vom Kausalnexus entspricht, wie unser Wille über unsere Körperteile oder unsere Gedanken tätig wird.
Hume: wir haben absolut keine Vorstellung davon, wie der Wille tätig wird. Dennoch nimmt Hume Willensakte an.
NietzscheVsHume: ist radialer, es gibt schlichtweg nichts, dessen Verknüpfung mit unseren Handlungen nachzuweise wäre.
Danto III 138
Denken/Gewissheit/Subjekt/NietzscheVsDescartes: Nietzsche widerlegt den Cartesischen Gedanken, dass uns unsere eigenen mentalen Prozesse unmittelbar durchsichtig sind, dass wir über unsere Denkweise Bescheid wissen. Er widerlegt es, indem er eine Reihe miteinander verknüpfter Gedanken aufstellt und „einfrieren“ lässt: Wenn Descartes davon spricht, dass ihm sein Zweifle an der Realität zumindest als sein eigener Zweifel gewiss sei, so schleppt er hier sehr viele stillschweigende Annahmen mit.
NietzscheVsDescartes: wenn seine Argumentation auf ein „Es wird gedacht“ hinausläuft, wird schon unser Glaube an den Substanzbegriff vorausgesetzt und anschließen ein Subjekt dazu angenommen. (F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 577).


Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Association Hume
 
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I 13
Association/Hume: is a natural law. - Ideas: the effect of the association of ideas has three forms: 1. General idea(similarity)
2. Procedure/regularity (through idea of "substance" or "mode")
3. Relation: an idea draws another to itself - thereby ideas do not acquire new quality.
---
I 126f
Association/principle/Hume: Problem: 1. Association only explains the form of thought, not the content - 2. A. does not explain the individual contents of the individual - solution: the explanation lies in the circumstances of the perception - also substances, general ideas and modes require the circumstances ---
I 137f
Associations/KantVsHume/Deleuze: the "Law of Reproduction" (frequent consecutive ideas set a connection) assumes that the phenomena actually follow such a rule - (Kant pro). - There must be a reason a priori -> synthesis of the imagination - (not of the senses!). KantVsHume: his dualism (relations are outside of things ) forces him to grasp that as the accordance of subject with nature. - But this cannot be a priori, otherwise it would remain unnoticed.
---
I 154
Association/Hume: cannot Select - if the mind determined only by principles, there would be no morality.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Brain/Brain State Churchland
 
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Patricia Churchland
II Patricia Smith Churchland Die Neurobiologie des Bewusstseins - Was können wir von ihr lernen? In Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
II 484
Brain/Consciousness/Churchland: the brain will not produce consciousness until it has produced a representation of itself. ((s)> McGinn: Thesis: the brain produces a theory of the brain.)        Churchland: ... representation of himself ... KantVsHume would have expressed it in this way.
       It needs a representation that produces something similar to a "point of view".

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Causal Laws Cartwright
 
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I 10
Asymmetry: causal laws are asymmetrical: cause and effect cannot be interchanged. - By contrast, symmetrical: Laws of Association/Hume: E.g. length of the shadow/height of the mast. - Fraassen: Thesis: asymmetries by explanation are not real. - There is no fact about what explains what. - CartwrightVsFraassen - Association/CartwrightVsHume: not sufficient E.g. malaria control: for distinguishing effective from ineffective strategies.
I 30
Causal Law/Causal Explanation/Cartwright: causal laws are not transitive - i.e. the causal chain does not have to be determined by a single causal law.
I 32
Causal Law/Cartwright: something that is always the case ((s) universal occurrence, universal fact, "permanence") cannot be consequent of a causal law. - ((s) this is a convention). - Alternatively: universal fact: Alternatively, it could be said that everything is the cause of a universal fact. - ((s) Def Universal Fact/Cartwright/(s): probability = 1.).
I 36
Causal Laws/Cartwright: the reason why we need them for the characterization of effectiveness is that they pick out the right properties to which we apply our conditions.
I 43
Effective Strategy/Cartwright: can only be found with assumption of causal laws. - Partition: the right one is the one that is determined by which causal laws exist - without causal laws it is impossible to pick out the right factors.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

Causality Goodman
 
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II 113
Hume imagined the mind as leading us by observing regularities to corresponding predictions.   GoodmanVsHume: We, however, see the mind as an activity from the beginning. It corrects itself gradually.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Causality Kant
 
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Danto I 298
Causality/Kant/Danto: is not derived from experience - but condition or form of experience - idea of ​​causality not causality itself. ---
Kant I 26
Causality/Kant: things themselves are not subject to the time condition, so not causality. - (Solution of the third cosmological antinomy: namely, the antinomy of causality of freedom (that belongs to the things themselves) and causality according to nature (in the phenomenal world)). - KantVsHume: causality does not apply to things themselves. - VsKant: he does not stick to it himself - mind: has its own causality: the "spontaneity of terms". ---
I 32
Subjectivity arises not only from causality (of freedom) but from the spontaneity of the terms - therefore metaphysics begins in empirical science. ---
Vaihinger 280
Causality/Idea/God/Kant/Vaihinger: I only underlie the idea of ​​such a (highest) being to see the phenomena as systematically linked to each other according to the analogy of a causal determination. ---
Vollmer I 25
Causality/Kant: outside of causality we cannot experience.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Causality Searle
 
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John R. Searle
I 287/88 (Note)
Causality/Identity/PlaceVsSearle: causal dependency requires separate entities (>Armstrong) - SearleVsPlace: E.g. liquid state may be causally dependent on the behavior of molecules while being a feature of the system. ---
II 93
Causality/Searle: is no external instance, only more experiences. ---
II 101f
Causality: pressure cooker: inference from steam to pressure - Seeing: no inference on physical objects. - SearleVsHume: causality may well be experienced directly, but not independently, but causality is part of the experience. ---
II 152ff
Causality/SearleVsHume: is real and directly observable. ---
I 157
Logical causality: is not inference, but intentional content and experience condition - not two experiences, but causation = intentional content. ---
II 179
Causality: part of the experience, causation is part of the experience. ---
Danto I 299
Causality/Searle: causality only through interpretation.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Causality Strawson
 
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IV 152 f
Causality/Strawson: because of different possible descriptions in reality dependent on generality - Hume was right with that - but it's also not a selection of individual descriptions
IV 157
Causality/StrawsonVsHume: he overlooks the very obvious fact that objects exert physical force - (Dennett: and that is observable) - I 162 pro Hume: you can observe many reactions without knowing what forces are at work - IV 163 VsHume: regularity is time neutral, it could also be reversed - (s) because (type-type, not type-token) - IV 165 VsHume: we learn the regularity, because we already have the concept of causality - IV 172 Strawson: the utmost we can recognize are probability laws - Causality/Language: more in transitive verbs than in the word "cause" - IV 175 Common Causes: easily possible: E.g. malaria - cause: denotes relation that occurs in different modes of being

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Causality Bigelow
 
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I 264
Explanation/causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: because of impending circularity, we cannot explain causality by laws or counterfactual conditional or probability. Counterfactual Conditional/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Conversely, counterfactual conditionals are analyzed in terms of causality. Just as necessary.
Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Must be an unanalyzed basic concept. It is a structural universal. Fundamental forces play a major role.
Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: are vectors.
---
I 265
Causality/causation/explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: first we refute some common theories. Causation/Tradition/Bigelow/Pargetter: is often regarded as a kind of "necessary connection". Normally, this is expressed in such a way that either the cause is necessary for the effect or the effect is a necessary consequence of the cause. Then the cause is either a necessary or a sufficient condition or both.
Weaker: some authors: it is only unlikely to find a cause without effect (or vice versa). (Probabilistic theories of causation, Lewis 1979, Tooley 1987).
"Necessity Theories"/Bigelow/Pargetter: should explain on what kind of necessity they rely on.
Cause/Effect/BigelowVsTradition/BigelowVsLewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis that a cause does not have to be a sufficient or a necessary cause for an effect, the effect could have occurred without or by another cause, or without cause at all! One cannot always assume a high probability. A cause does not always have to increase the probability of an event.
---
I 266
Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: that's what we learned from him. (HumeVsLewis). Causality/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: his conception of it has a theological background (from Descartes and Malebranche): Thesis: it could not be that God was bound by any restrictions.
Therefore, it could not be that God would be compelled to allow the effect to follow. It would always have to come out of God's free choice and be a miracle every time.
Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter. His theory simply eliminates God. Hume simply asks us to imagine that the effect could not follow from the cause.
Bigelow/Pargetter: he's right! It is not only logically possible, but also empirically possible.
Presentation/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: is for Hume the guide to the possibility. He thus swings from a theological to a psychological argument.
Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: Causes are not sufficient conditions. They are not always necessary.
---
I 267
Solution/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: inner expectations of regularities. Cause/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to Hume "sufficient" cannot be considered modal. That is, that "sufficient" must not be considered realistic.
BigelowVsHume: went too far in his rejection of necessity in laws. But not far enough in his rejection of the necessity approach of causality.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Consciousness Millikan
 
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91
Consciousness/tradition: we experience our consciousness directly.
MillikanVsTradition: What kind of experience of intentionality is this? What kind of force should this argument have?
The force should be epistemic and rational.
Uncorrectability/MillikanVsTradition: the experience of consciousness (experience of intentionality) should have something infallible. We should also have an immediate understanding then. It should also assume the existence of intentionality and consciousness, otherwise the experience could not be "in" it.
Consciousness/Tradition: tradition assumes that consciousness is transparent. And therefore it cannot consist solely of external relations to the external world, and even if these are necessary.
MillikanVsVs: Suppose we reject this epistemically rationalist image, that is, we deny that there is "epistemically given". Then we could admit that people are sometimes aware of their thoughts. But we could maintain that this awareness is partly an external relation. The "inside" of this feeling (awareness)...
---
I 92
...does not guarantee that it is the inside of a true awareness relation. Consciousness/Millikan: self awareness of consciousness is not an immediate object. There is nothing transparent in consciousness.
N.B./Millikan: that is disturbing because it follows - negative thesis: that it is possible that we do not know what we think! ((s) DavidsonVsHume: dito). That is, from the act of consciousness itself nothing is guaranteed.
Rationalism/rationalistic/Intentionality/Consciousness/MillikanVsRationalism/Millikan: the traditional rationalist view of consciousness and intentionality leads to a cul-de-sac one after another.
---
I 246
Consciousness/Classical Realism/Millikan: an act of becoming aware of an object is momentary and never has any relation to past or future consciousness acts. Problem: how should a thing then be identified as the one from earlier. From this, classical realism makes a mystery.
Object/thing/classical realism: an object must then have no permanent existence.
Perception/Plato/Descartes/Locke/Millikan: Thesis: Nothing can be identified by perception alone, Recognition: is an act of pure thought in the reunion in the volatile flow of the things given to the senses.
Sense/Plato/Descartes/Locke: consisted then in the fact to direct the mind somehow to eternal objects.
Thinking/Plato/Descartes/Locke: then one could only have thoughts of eternal objects, or of the eternal nature of volatile objects.
Solution: qualities and species were assumed as the eternal objects of which one could directly think.
---
I 247
Problem: How should one explain that eternal objects (properties) are related to temporal states? How could involvement in the world be essential to it. Then one had to assume that there are properties and types that are not exemplified.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Empiricism James
 
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Diaz-Bone I 56
JamesVsEmpirism: "Nominalism": Empirists claim that there is a concept for every object. James: What about facts for which no concept exists? Even worse: ---
I 57
Language/James: language supports the nominalistic tendency to dismember the stream of consciousness. ---
I 57
Nevertheless, James develops a position of radical empiricism (VsRationalism, VsEmpirism, which is represented by Hume.). JamesVsHume: in order to be radical, empiricism must not contain elements which are not directly perceptible, nor exclude elements which are directly experienced.
Radical Empiricism/James:
1. Only such issues can be discussed, which are based on categories of observation.
2. The relations between objects of experience are as accessible as the objects themselves.
3. Context as a result of partial experience is itself the object of experience. The experience of this connection is the stream of consciousness.
4. No preliminary reconstruction of subjective consciousness.


James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Ethics Husserl
 
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I 115 ff
HusserlVsHume: no ethics of feelings- VsKant: Vs categorical imperative / HusserlvsKant: formal generalization is not sufficient to characterize ethical correctness - Husserl: fictitious observer must be able to understand my assessment - a) passively, by chance circumstances, b) purpose, acting, reasonable
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart
Existence Geach
 
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I 265
Existence / GeachVsHume / GeachVsGilson: the Hume-Brentano-Gilson thesis (that existence adds nothing conceptual) cannot be recognizably claimed if true - it treats existence as nonconceptual (not conceptualized) and tangible only in existence judgments, but this statement itself is not an existence statement and treats existence a conceptual. - Contradiction.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Experience James
 
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Suhr I 93
Experience/James: experience is a "double-barreled word": like "life" and "history". ---
Diaz-Bone I 55
Experience/Sensation/JamesVsHume, JamesVsMill: "Associationism": sees in conceptual ideas and experiences only reflections of perceptible impressions which produce ideas by acting on the organism. James: This "determinism" probably explains the sensations of details, but not the experiences of utterances of will, feelings, rationality, memories.
---
I 59
Pure Experience/James: Experience is the Reality! (> Berkeley: being is perceived, being of things is their being known.) JamesVsBerkeley: esse est percipere.


Dew I
Martin Suhr
John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 2016

James I
R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert
William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Explanation Mayr
 
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I 99
Biology: Questions: e.g. unique events: "Why are there no hummingbirds in the old world"? E.g. "Where did Homo sapiens begin?" This leads to historical representation as the only possible form. This approach is fundamentally different from the explanation by means of causal laws. One can never categorically prove that a historical representation is "true".
---
I 100
Reproducibility/Science: the uniqueness is not reserved for the living nature! E.g. each of the nine planets is unique. Every mountain range and stream has unique features on the earth. Hume/Science: cannot say anything satisfying about the cause of any unique phenomenon.
MayrVsHume: the historical representation can often explain unique events satisfactorily and sometimes even make verifiable predictions (> history).
---
I 101
History/Causation/Mayr: earlier events usually contribute causally to later ones. "Particularistic causality". ---
I 103
Biology/explanation/Mayr: here we often find more than a causal explanation. Perhaps one has to explain most of the phenomena of biology even with several theories! A theory of science that cannot cope with pluralism is unsuitable for biology. ---
I 166
Explanation/biology: by direct causes: molecular biology, functional morphology, developmental biology, physiological genetics Indirect: evolutionary biology, classical genetics, ethology, systematics, comparative morphology, ecology.
Problem: separation of morphology and genetics. Overlaps.

Ma
E. Mayr
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998

Forces Geach
 
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I 262
assertive force / assertoric force/ Geach: demonstrated by the fact that a sentence is not included in a longer one - assertion stroke adds no idea - so it should not be confudes with "it’s true that .." - ("true"can occur even in a not assertive sentence without changing its meaning) - error: to infer from this that "exist" adds no concept (GeachVsHume) - assertion stroke is a indefinable basic concept, cannot be explained - Vsattribution-theory: the predicate "poor" has no more claiming force than any other predicate, namely, none. (> judgement stroke, > content stroke).

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Generality Bigelow
 
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I 232
Natural Laws/Realism/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: a Humean theory of natural laws cannot be as realistic as ours. Generalisation/Regularity/Hume: the Humean can be realistic with regard to generalisations.
---
I 233
"Total generality"/"pure" generality/Hume/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: may not contain a reference to an individual: It is too weak and too strong.
a) too strong: for example, Kepler's laws refer to all planets but also to an individual, the sun.
b) too weak: it is still not a law. For example, that everything moves towards the center of the earth.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

I, Ego, Self Kant
 
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Horwich I 404 f
I/knowledge/Kant: representations (according to Putnam) - "empirical I"/Kant/Putnam: is the author "in the game", not the right author - this is the transcendental ego (out of game). - Internal realism/PutnamVsKant: 1. authors in the plural (social) - 2. the ones in the story are real!
PutnamVsSkepticism: N.B.: it would be "crazy" if these were only fictions because a fictional character cannot be a real author. - But these are true stories.
---
Stegmüller IV 322
I/Kant: "Empirical I": working as a cause and as effect - "Noumenal I": (metaphysical): superfluous, passive viewer - metaphysical I: addressee of the moral ought. ---
Strawson V 146
I/subject/Hume/Strawson: is obliged to explain the idea of ​​what "I" means - as anti-rationalist he must declare our fiction - KantVsHume: Kant does not need that, he needs empirical criteria for the subject's identity. ---
Bubner I 108
I/Kant/Bubner: there is not the I, to which representations adhere, but to speak of the different representations among themselves as mine means to create self-consciousness in the first place. ---
Adorno XIII 64
I/transcendental subject/KantVsHume/Adorno: precisely this I, which is denied by Hume per se, must in reality be presupposed to constitute something like experience. Kant, however, has seen that this transcendental subject, which is greatly independent of the content of experience, has in itself a dynamic which goes beyond experience. He has expressed this in the fact that reason, by going beyond its empirical use, is necessarily involved in contradictions, because thinking cannot be arbitrarily stopped once it comes into play.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
I, Ego, Self Shoemaker
 
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Frank I 50ff
ShoemakerVsHume: 1st shows no more than that, as I find myself, I can not know - the second premise is false: although there is no index-free description, that does not prove that I would need such - for identification the possibility of errors is necessary - but this is not given in the case of the self - anyway regress in self-identification - Hume did not deny self-consciousness / Shoemaker: no kind of perception! (Rorty ditto) - Pain: no (private) object, a person is not pain, and it is not painful, but one feels pain.

Shoem I
S. Shoemaker
Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Identity Quine
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
I 208ff
Identity/Davidson/Quine: we are unable to pick out the relationship that is constitutive for the knowledge of the identity of an object. The reason is that every property can be considered as relevant. If the mind can only think if it establishes a clear relationship to the object, then thought is impossible. (QuineVsRussell). Identity: does not work without conceptual scheme.
Identity: QuineVsHume, QuineVsLeibniz: Confusion of word and object: there is no relation between different objects but relationship between singular terms - a = b different names.
---
I 211
Copula forms indefinite singular term: no longer Fa but a = b = E.g. Agnes = a lamb - but: Agnes bleats: Fa. ---
I 211
Synonymy and analyticity is graded, identity is absolute. ---
I 365
Identity conditions strong/weak/(s):> E.g. Paul and Elmar. ---
II 23
Identity/absolutely distinguishable: open sentence only fulfilled by an object. - Relatively distinguishable: only fulfilled in the given order. - Identity: Objects that are not relatively distinguishable, not all objects that are not absolutely distinguishable. ---
I 397
Theseus ship: it is not about the term "the same" but the term "ship" - each general term has its own individuation principle. ---
II 156ff
Individuation: in our world moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - for objects at random (everything can be the object), for predicates crucial truth value. - Identification between possible worlds: is dependent on predicates - for body also from space displacement, composition, etc., therefore not cross-worlds- "The same object" is meaningless -> single Term, instead predicate. ---
Geach I 238
Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: identity is relative - if someone says x is identical to y, this is an incomplete expression - it is an abbreviation for "x is the same A as y" - (weird that Frege has not supported this) - Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single scheme: (1) l- Fa (x) (Fx ux = a) - in everyday language: whatever is always true of something that is identical to an object y, is true of a and vice versa - from which we derive the law of self-identity from: l- a = a if we take Fx for x unequal to a then scheme (1) provides us with: (2) l- (a unequal a) Vx (x unequal a u x = a) - the results in l a = a. ---
Geach I 240
But Geach pro relative identity. ---
Quine V 86
I/Quine: initially only means for extending the time pointing - then itself relative mass term: E.g. "the same dog as" - used for individuation of absolute general term E.g. "dog" - Geach: this is a reduction to a relative term - Quine. : that does not work when objects overlap. ---
V 89
Identity/Geach: only with respect to general terms, the same thing. ---
V 161
Identity: restricted: in terms of general term: "the same apple" - unrestricted: Learning: 1. anyone who agrees with the sentences [a = b] and [a is a g] also agrees to [b a g] ((s) transitivity) - 2. disposition, to agree on [a = b] , if it is recognized that one can agree [b is a g] due to [a is a g] for any g. - Relative identity: also these I. is relative, because the identity scale depends on words - [a = b] can get wrong when adding new terms. ---
I 162
Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: x = y as the statement y is element of every class, from which x is element - characterization of the identity by using all relative clauses. ---
V 162
Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: with quantification over classes is x = y defined as the statement y is a member of each class, from which x is element. - Language learning: here initially still substitutional quantification - then no class, but exhaustion of relative clauses. ---
VII 65 ~
Identity/Quine: important: the demand for processes or temporally extended objects - by assuming identity rather than flow kinship, one speaks of the flow instead of stages. ---
IX 24
Definition identity/Quine: we can now simplify: for y = z - y = z stands for x (x e y x e z) - because we have identified the individuals with their classes. ---
X 90
Definiton identity/Quine: then we define "x = y" as an abbreviation for:. Ax ↔ Ay (z) (bzx ↔ bzy. Bxz ↔ Byz .Czx ↔ Czy .Cxz ↔ Cyz (z') (Dzz'x ↔.... .. Dzz'y .Dzxz'↔ Dzyz' Dxzz '↔ Dyzz')) - i.e. that the objects u x. y are not distinguishable by the four predicates, not even in terms of the relation to other objects z and z'. ---
X 99
Identity/Quine: only defined (in our appearance theory of set theory) between variables, not defined between abstraction expressions or their schema letters. ---
XII 71
Relative identity/Quine: results from ontological relativity, because no entity without identity - only explicable in the frame theory. - E.g. distinguishability of income classes.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Imagination Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
V 57f
Imagination/tradition/Quine: problem: imagine the same odd and even numbers. - Solution: imagination as a hypothetical nervous state - Then you do not have to fix the number of spots on a chicken you are seeing. ---
V 178
Imagination/liveliness/Hume: liveliness: is differentiator for imagination: memory: attenuated sensation. - Fantasy: attenuated recollection. - QuineVsHume: imagination: event in the nervous system. - leads to dispositions.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Individual Causation Davidson
 
Books on Amazon
Armstrong III 94
Causality / DavidsonVsHume / Armstrong: individual causation: we often recognize that an individual case is causal, without having any idea to what regular sequence it belongs - Solution: differentiation knowledge-that: that there is a law / know-what: the law is - solution: there are a description, under which the event is lawlike - AnscombeVsDavidson: many characteristics are causally irrelevant, therefore causality is description dependent.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Individuals Nietzsche
 
Books on Amazon
Danto III 173
Individuum/Gruppe/Nietzsche/Danto: gegenüber Nietzsches Auffassung vom Individuum im Frühwerk der Geburt der Tragödie, wo er eine Vorstellung davon hatte, wie das Individuum durch die Musik in einer Art von Kommunion in der Gruppe aufgehen könnte,
Danto III 174
findet man im Spätwerk davon kaum noch etwas. Nietzsche war inzwischen zu der Überzeugung gelangt, dass es im Leben ausreichend Solidarität, nicht aber genug Individualität gab. Individuum/Tradition/Danto: Hobbes und Locke (ursprünglich Platon im Glaukon) waren versucht, die Menschen für uranfängliche Individuen zu halten, aus denen sich dann Gesellschaften derart gebildet haben sollten, wie sich chemische Verbindungen vermeintlich aus Elementen oder Atomen und Molekülen gebildet haben sollten.
Soziale Beziehungen wären dann bloß äußerlich, oder wie Hobbes sagt, „künstlich“.
NietzscheVsLocke/NietzscheVsHume Danto III 175
sodass die Einzelnen nur von denjenigen Vorstellungen ein Bewusstsein entwickeln, die jeder mit jedem gemein hat. So wie der Einzelne kaum ohne Gemeinschaft überleben könnten, kann er nur schwer eine Empfindung seiner selbst als unabhängige Einheit erlangen.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Induction Goodman
 
Books on Amazon
I 23
Definition induction/Goodman: requires that some classes are seen as relevant classes by excluding others. ---
II 82
The sharpest criticism VsHume/Goodman: his analysis relates at best to the origin of predictions, not to their entitlement. ---
II 86
Deduction/Goodman: accordance with accepted practice. ---
II 88
The problem of induction is not a problem of prove, but a problem of definition of the difference between justified and unjustified predictions. ---
II 89
Mutual adjustment between definition and language use. ---
II 101f
Grue/Goodman: Problem: same data support contrasting predictions - question: in what essential property hypotheses must be the same> law: not in connection with e.g. an object in my pocket. - "Grue" does not work as conventional non-law-like hypotheses (limited in space or time) - one can reverse the derivation: red and green from gred and reen. ---
II 109
Law-like or resumable hypotheses are not to characterize purely syntactically. ---
II 95
What confirm certain data, is not what is obtained by generalization of separate individual cases, but that which is obtained by generalization of the entire body of data material.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Knowledge Davidson
 
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McGinn I 179
McGinn: domesticative theories of knowledge: Newer Version: refers to the externalism with regard to the content of consciousness: the mind and the world can diverge, as far as the skeptic would like to accept. (Putnam, Davidson). - - -
Dav I 18
DavidsonVsHume: there are infinitely many properties, so the ignorance of imaginary objects is possible
I 18
Sense / feature / FregeVsDavidson / Frege per Hume: only what is relevant belongs to the comprehension of sense - therefore "hidden" features may not be part of the meaning - Dummett: these are the "internal characteristics".

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


McG I
C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McG II
C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Knowledge Hume
 
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Stroud I 105f
Knowledge/proof of existence/existence/Hume/Stroud: two principles: 1. No one knows of the existence of something when it is not perceived directly by someone> Apprehension: unordered) or he knows what he has perceived directly, is a sign of the existence of this thing.
2. No one can know that a thing is a sign of something else, if he has not perceived these two things (thing and sign) directly. (> Acquaintance)
MooreVsHume: both principles are wrong: E.g. I know that this pencil exists. - According to Hume I could not know that, so they are wrong. - This is a reductio ad absurdum.
StroudVsMoore: Hume's principles are valid. - Moore: for him it is relevant what is safe, the pencil or the principles. - Skepticism/Stroud/(s): but is not a question of safety.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Knowledge Stroud
 
Books on Amazon
I 30
Knowledge/Stroud: science and everyday life have the same standards for knowledge - True belief is still no knowledge. - Knowledge/Stroud thesis: we can know how things appear to us. - (Does not help against Descartes' skepticism) - Descartes: these are his "ideas". - Trying to get behind it, only leads to further representations. ---
I 34
There is no "real knowledge" in contrast to knowledge. ---
I 61
Knowledge/Stroud: I cannot be described as someone who knows that John will not get hit by a meteorite. - But when John turns up it is right to say I knew he was coming. -> Assertibility. ---
I 76
Skepticism/knowledge/Stroud: deep problem: if we realize that our concept of knowledge or of truth leads us to skepticism, we feel that it is incorrect. - Depth: it is not just about knowledge, but about our practice and reflection. (Self-knowledge). ---
I 110
Skepticism/Detective Example/crime case/Stroud: shows that it is not about greater security. - (As with MooreVsHume) - There is no competing hypothesis. - Rather, it shows a lack (incomplete list). - No misuse of the word "knowledge". - Skepticism: does not only consider documents (like the detective) but also questions reasons. ---
I 121
Wrong: Because I know that the butler was the perpetrator, I know that the list is complete. (analoge to Moore's hands). ---
I 239
Knowledge/belief/Stroud: difference: true belief can be random, then the fact of belief is not an explanation for knowledge, no theory of knowledge.

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Meaning Theory Fodor
 
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II 120
Meaning Theory/m.th. / Meaning / Essence / Idea / FodorVsLocke / FodorVsHume: m.th. that refer to beings or ideas, do not say anything because they do not show the cases in which two expressions express the same nature or the same idea.
IV 70
m.th. / Davidson / Fodor / Lepore: there can be several m.th. because of the semantic indeterminacy - RI: is about the problem of finding the correct m.th..

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Natural Laws Armstrong
 
Books on Amazon
III 137
Laws of Nature/LoN/Natural Law/Science/Form/Identification/Armstrong: theoretical identification of water and H2O not a law of nature - two all-quantifications on molecules and water - each law of nature must have double-digit form of premise-conclusion - Ontology: what entities exist is inextricably linked with law of nature - but also distinguishable from it.
III 158
LoN/Armstrong: contingent - but not because they are discovered - the distinction a priori/a posteriori an epistemic one.
II 17
LoN/Armstrong: not true statements of law, but truth-makers - VsHume: strong LoN: contain regularities, but cannot be reduced to them (because dispositions do not always show) - LoN: can be identified with relations between universals (properties) - Camp: realistic view - E.g. possession of a property leads to possession of another property - LoN/Armstrong: contingent! - But the regularity seems to be contained analytically.
II 25
LoN/Armstrong: Relation between categorical properties (not dispositional ones) - PlaceVs: smuggles modality in (because the relations then have to be intentional or modal).
III 44
LoN/Armstrong: no causal factors - exists only when instantiated - logical consequence (that three values ​​of volume, pressure, temperature always are connected) is not because of the law! (Boyle's law is no law of nature).

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Natural Laws Cartwright
 
Books on Amazon
I 3
Natural Laws/Truth// Cartwright: thesis: the truly explanatory (theoretical) laws of physics do not tell us the truth.
I 21
Laws of nature / Cartwright: two ways: a) Association / Hume: e.g. the equations of physics: whenever force acts on an object, the acceleration f / m - b) causal laws: E.g. Smoking causes cancer.
Hacking I 56
Laws of nature / Nancy Cartwright: deceptive, only phenomenological laws > possibility of truth - but it is possible that we know about causally effective communication. - I 70 laws do not reflect facts and do not evoke anything. - ((s) > Ryle). CartwrightVsHume: the regularities are features of the processes by which we theorize - per Entity -Realism VsTheory-Realism.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

Natural Laws Bigelow
 
Books on Amazon
I 113
Natural Laws/Counterfactual Conditional/Bigelow/Pargetter: are often formulated in terms of "ideal systems". To do this, they need the counterfactual conditionals. ---
I 114
Similarly, thought experiments need counterfactual conditionals. ---
I 214
Law/Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: For example,"What goes up must fall". Lucrez: what consists mainly of soil or water has to move downwards. "Down" was a marked direction.
Atomism: Representative: Lucrez. Little astronomical knowledge yet.
Aristotle/Ptolemaios: believed that everything that consists mainly of earth or water moves to the center of the cosmos, and since it moves to the center of the earth, it must be the center of the cosmos.
---
I 215
Antiquity/Bigelow/Pargetter: in one respect Aristotle is closer to the truth, in other respects it is Lucrez. He was right that the center of the earth is not marked. Natural Laws/Physics/Biology/Bigelow/Pargetter: a one-sided diet with examples from physics does not necessarily lead to a correct view of the natural laws.
Instead, here are some examples from biology:
Generalization/Biology: For example, a living being has father and mother of the same species as it itself. (Today we know that this has some exceptions).
---
I 216
It was a surprise to discover that this also applies to some plants. ---
I 217
Generalization: most of them have an exception. For example, without exception: perhaps the generalization "All mammals have a mother". Exceptions/counter-examples/Bigelow/Pargetter: one should not overestimate the threat posed by exceptions to laws.
Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: we are looking for two things:
a) something that is more than regularity, on the other hand
b) less than a regularity without exception.
It may be that we have discovered with a law an important property of the cases that are sufficient for it, even if not all cases satisfy it.
Modal/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: the commonalities that satisfy the law are modal.
Law/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not always need a law, for example to know that our cat is pregnant. > Generalization.
---
I 220
Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are improved: e.g. Aristotle - Copernicus - Newton. Copernicus: still thought that the material of the moon does not fall towards the earth, but towards the moon center. Therefore the moon is round.
Newton/(s): first explained the circular motion of the moon.
Aristotle: thesis: everything (earthly and watery) falls to a center and this is coincidentally the center of the earth.
N.B.: thus he fulfils the quasi-copernican theory!
---
I 221
VsAristotle: his theory was nevertheless wrong. But not because any movement would have been different, but because the reasoning was wrong: it is about gravity, Aristotle considered the center of the earth to be the center of the cosmos. Error: was not that Aristotle thought that no object would fall in a different direction, but because he thought that no object could fall in a different direction. (Necessity).
---
I 221
Law/Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: are generalizations (description of regularities) plus attribution of necessity. (Dretske 1977, Tooley 1977, Armstrong 1978,1983) Bigelow/Pargetter: if they are wrong, they must be strictly wrong or empty. (Cartwright 1983, Hacking 1983).
---
I 222
Definition Laws/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: are truths about Possibilia. Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: Actualia cannot be fully understood without understanding Possibilia. ((s) Here understanding is associated with objects, not sentences.)
Possible Worlds/Understanding/Bigelow/Pargetter: we understand the actual world only by locating it in the logical space of possible worlds.
Natural Law/NG/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: cannot be adequately described in a non-modal language. Because a natural law is not just a regularity.
Logical form: i.e. a natural law cannot be merely defined as
(x)(Fx > Gx).
Logical form: of a natural law will often be a universal generalization (UG). But it can also be another generalization or other form of sentence. We assume, however, that natural laws (UG) will be involved and therefore have the following form:
---
I 223
natN (x)(Fx > Gx). Natural necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: entails that natural laws involve counterfactual conditionals. Because they are about what would happen, not just what already happens. And even if things were different in certain respects.
I.e. in addition to regularity
(x)(Fx > Gx)
it will be true that every F would be a G ((s) Logic of 2nd level!)
Logical form/(s) counterfactual conditional instead of quantification of 2nd level:
(x) Fx would be > would be Gx)
we take this together as a truthmaker of the proposition
natN (x)(Fx > Gx). (see above)
Natural Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: this is the view of natural laws that we defend.
LewisVsBigelow: (1979) the theory is circular.
---
I 226
Non-modal Theory/Natural Laws/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: (instead of relative necessity:) most non-modal theories of natural law are derived from Hume. Then we can accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity, without falling into a circle. N.B.: then we can simply accept nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on independent access to laws!
Explanation: so it makes sense to use laws to explain nomic necessity rather than vice versa. And this is much less obscure than modal arguments.
---
I 227
BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Humean theories are not able to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Naturalistic Fallacy Black
 
Books on Amazon
III 81
naturalistic fallacy / BlackVsHume: there are quite sentences with "should", which can have a trith value - then there is no logical separation of scientific and moral principles.

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Naturalistic Fallacy Hume
 
Books on Amazon
Stegmüller IV 186
Being/Should/fallacy/Hume: Thesis: it is impossible to derive a should-sentence solely from is-sentences. - ((s)> Moore: naturalistic fallacy) - Stegmüller: when non-moral use there is no problem because of the hypothetical imperative: E.g. In chess, there is no problem of the transition from "is" to should. Reason: there is no expression of any new relationship! Implicit: what you want, you should. Solution/SearleVsHume: Attach premises with obligations.
Solution/Searle: institutional fact.
MackieVsSearle: confusion of inside/outside. - We cannot step outside of internalized rules.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Naturalistic Fallacy Nietzsche
 
Books on Amazon
Danto III 168
Naturalistischer Fehlschluss/NietzscheVsHume/Nietzsche/Danto: das Humesche Argument, dass aus dem Sein kein Sollen folgt, ist nur dann schlagend, wenn eine Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Urteilsordnungen eingeführt wird, zwischen moralischen Tatsachen und nicht moralischen Tatsachen. Für Nietzsche gibt es jedoch überhaupt keine Tatsachen. Stattdessen gibt es nur Interpretationen.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Norms Brandom
 
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I 83
Norms/standards/Brandom: not from collective action, that does not exist - Community must not be personalized - it is always about individual members. ---
I 84
Basic: I-You relationship - instead I-We-relationship. - Community: how much agreement is enough? - Brandom: there are always authorities and experts. ---
I 96
Normss/Brandom: from what we do, not part of the nature of things. ---
I ~ 105
Norms/standards/Brandom: depend on our community: they are our standards - concepts: irrespective of community, the facts decide about it - concepts are non-discoursive: Discussions do not decide about them. ---
I 867
Norms/standards/Brandom: normative attitudes prevail - definitions are not causally effective on their own - standards are not objects in the causal order - talking about status cannot replace talk about actually occupied positions - what follows from p cannot be identified with my actual accounting - A: phenomenalistic view the standards, but it is a normative phenomenalism. ---
I 898
Norms/Brandom: our own practices confront us already with internal standards - 1) in the guise of deontic status: definition and authorization - (in the eye of the beholder) - 2) The accuracies themselves are being reflected (account management). ---
II 52
Norms/HegelVsKant: not only noumenally but socially rooted. ---
II 54
Standards/Hume: attributed to wishes - BrandomVsHume: explanation by definition on patterns of practical inference - i.e. What is a desire and what is not?

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Object Davidson
 
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I 16 ff
Thought/Knowledge/DavidsonVsHume: there are infinitely many properties, so ignorance of the imagined objects is possible ... it is necessary to find objects for which mistakes are impossible. As objects that are necessary what they seem to be.
DavidsonVsDescartes: 1. such objects simply do not exist. Not even appearances are all what they seem to be. Also, the aspects of sense data cannot be protected against misidentification, insofar as they are real objects.
We must drop the idea that there are inner objects or mental images in the required sense.
No "internal objects", no "uninterpreted given", "no stream" within a schema (VsSchema/content).
---
Frank I 678
Objects/Putnam/Fodor: a) "true inward", "in front of the mind", "conceived" by him - b) those who identify thoughts in the usual way. (external) - Davidson: I agree that there are no objects that serve both purposes - ((s) not an excellent class). - Putnam: the two cannot coincide, because otherwise the mind could not be deceived. Ideas/impressions/Hume: "are as it seems and seem as it is" - DavidsonVsHume: such objects do not exist - neither abstract nor concrete, neither public nor private. Even propositions do not exist - there is no object that would satisfy the dual function to be in front of the mind and also to determine the content of the thought - otherwise one could not be deceived. - meaning depends on the types of objects and events which have caused the person acausally to take the words as applicable. But the agent cannot ask himself whether he regularly applies them correctly, because his regularity gives them importance. - Thus, authority of the first person and social character go hand in hand.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Rabbit-Duck-Head Putnam
 
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I 1787/9
Rabbit-duck-head/Wittgenstein: shows that the mental image is something other than the physical: while the physical picture can be seen in several aspects, this is not possible in case of the mental image - it can only clearly be rabbit or duck. - The interpretation is incorporated in the mental image. - The mental image is a construction. ---
I 179
Memory/KantVsHume: similar to Wittgenstein in relation to the rabbit-duck-head: the interpretation is incorporated.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Reason/Cause Brandom
 
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II 121
Reason/Hume/Brandom: must be accompanied by a desire to perform an action - KantVsHume: Desire (sensual inclination) can provide no basis for an action - in addition: recognition of an obligation. ---
II 122
Brandom: to have a reason is to be eligible to own practical commitment. ---
II 123
Recognition of a commitment can cause and can be caused.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Regularities Armstrong
 
Books on Amazon
II 42 ff
ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstrongVsRegularity: 1) impossible to distinguish regularity from coincidence because of laws of nature (LoN): E.g. every ball of uranium is smaller than 1 km, so is every ball of gold, but the latter by coincidence - 2) Laws of nature support counterfactual conditionals - regularities do not - 3) Regularity theory turns induction into an irrational procedure - 4) Probability: Problem: every connection of F"s and G"s can exist due to a merely probable law: although the distribution is manifestation of the law of nature, it is not identical with it - Solution: LoN: connection of types of states - Solution: ad 1: properties instead of regularities: properties of the gold/Uranium - ad 2: universals make number of instantiations irrelevant (unequal regularity) - ad 3: universals turn induction into abduction (conclusion to the best explanation) - ad 4: Relations between properties (universals) can occur in different strength, then deterministic laws of nature - borderline case.
II 45
Regularity/Tooley: molecular fact: conjunction: This F is a G and this...and...- contrast: law of nature as a link between properties (universals): atomic fact: number of instances irrelevant >Armstrong: solution for non-actual situation as truth maker of counterfactual conditionals.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Regularities Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
V 19
Regularity/QuineVsHume: you can also take unity classes - then fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Relations Hume
 
Books on Amazon
I 121/122
Relation/KantVsHume: relations are not externally to ideas. HumeVsKant: each relation is external in their terms - e.g. equality is not a property of the figures themselves - e.g. neighboring and distant figures do not explain what neighborhood and distance is - relation anticipates a synthesis - space/time: in mind only composition, bearing relation through fiction - E.g. association: creates relation, but does not explain that distance is a relation.
---
I 135
Relations/Hume: cannot be derived from experience, they are effects of association principles - external to the things (atomism). KantVsHume: not externally - Kant: therefore critical philosophy instead of empiricism.
---
I 139
KantVsHume: relations are so far dependent on the nature of things, as things presuppose a synthesis as phenomena that result from the same source as the synthesis of relations. - Therefore, the critical philosophy is not empiricism. - There is an a priori, that means, the imagination is productive. ---
I 145
Causality/Hume is the only relation, from which something can be concluded.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Seeing Ryle
 
Books on Amazon
I 336 f
Seeing / Vision / Ryle: we can only see lifelike something that we do not really see - RyleVsHume: he confuses: presentation (falsely) perception of ghosts - or echo of perception (shadowy).
I 366
Seeing and hearing is no activity - neither observable nor unobservable. - ((s) LuhmannVsRyle: observation of observation).

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Sensory Impressions Quine
 
Books on Amazon:
Willard V. O. Quine
II 57
QuineVsSensory Qualities - people do not talk and do not think about their stimuli - it is about stimulus and response. ---
XII 87
Body/Hume: simply equated with sensory impressions - volatile - every time a new apple. - QuineVsHume: Problem: thus no general statements are possible and no statements about the future. - (To date unsolved). - Solution/Bentham: translation of whole sentences by defining context. - No more word-word equivalents. - Sentences as the primary bearer of meaning. - Definition body/object/QuineVsHume: sets of sets of sensory data.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Sensory Impressions Sellars
 
Books on Amazon
Sensory Impressions/Sellars: distinguished from pieces of the given. No direct relationship with the knowledge.
Active receptivity. But the receptivity cannot cooperate itself in a rational manner with the spontaneity. (VsQuine). (Where?)
---
I IX
Sellars: no renunciation of sensations in toto. (Unlike Quine). ---
I XXIII
Sensory Impressions/Quine: manifolds, which are to be structured through various theory drafts. (SellarsVs). ---
I XXIII
Sellars: Physical and mental are not in a causal relationship, but belong to different world views. Only conveyed by structure of world views. (Vs above). The frames are related by their structure and not by content. It is simply a wrongly asked question how impressions and electromagnetic fields can tolerate each other. ---
I XXIX
Theory of sensory impressions does not speak of inner objects. ---
I XXXVII
Sellars: sensory impressions only have causal consequences of external physical objects. A red sensation can also occur if the external object only seems to be red. Both concepts explain why the speaker always speaks of something red. Only, the sensation is according to Sellars no object of knowledge, and even the category of the object is questioned by Sellars. ---
I XL
First, however, these states are states of a person. Not of a brain. In any case, they are imperceptible. Sensory Impressions: neither they have a color, nor do they have a shape. (> Perception).
Impressions: that these are theoretical entities, is shown to us by how to characterize them in an intrinsic way: not only as descriptions: "entity as such, that looking at a red and triangular object under such and such circumstances has the standard cause." But rather as predicates.
  These are no abbreviations for descriptions of properties. Example if one says that molecules have a mass, then the word "mass" is not an abbreviation of a description of the form "the property that ...".
---
I 101
"Impression of a red triangle" does not only mean "impression like he ... through red and triangular objects ...." although it is a truth, namely a logical truth about impressions of red triangles. ---
I 103
Impressions need to be inter-subjective, not completely dissolvable impressions in behavioral symptoms: states (but not physiological) - impressions are not objects. ---
I 106
Sellars: Rylean Language: actual explanation, is more than just a code: conceptual framework public objects in space and time - Language of impressions: embodies the discovery that there are such things, but it is not specifically tailored to them (individual things no antecedent objects of thinking). VsHume: because he does not clearly distinguish between thoughts and impressions, he can assume that a natural derivative corresponds not only to a logical but also a temporal sequence. His theory must be extended so that it also includes cases such as the above or backwards: Thunder now, before a moment of lightning.
---
II 328
Hume does not see that the perception of a configuration is also the configuration of perceptions.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sensory Impressions Leibniz
 
Books on Amazon
Holz I 43
Sensory impression/empiricism/Leibniz: what is given by the senses is unprovable. Impression/Sensory Impression/Identity/Leibniz: therefore Leibniz does not rely on the "impression" (terminology: Locke: "sensation", Hume: "impression").
LeibnizVsLocke/LeibnizVsHume: in the sensible givenness itself lies the identity relation.
---
Holz I 45/46
Sensory perception/proof/Leibniz: sensory perception is unprovable. Only what can be traced back to simple terms (by definition) from complex concepts can be proved. "Chain of definitions".

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Terminology Kant
 
Books on Amazon
I 33
Supersensible/Supernatural/Kant: E.g. the moral law. ---
I 38
The Unconditional/Kant: even unconditional condition ("Condition totality"). The system of all possibilities. Justification of a sentence by subsumption of something slightly below rules. ---
I 39
1. The unconditioned of the categorical condition unit of presentation relation belongs to the representational subject. 2. The unconditioned of the hypothetical condition unit of presentation relation relates to the objects of perception.
3. The unconditioned of the disjunctive synthesis applies to objects of thought.
---
I 41
Soul/Kant: the soul idea belongs to the idea of death. With it, the ego distances itself from its body - wrong: one cannot conclude from the I to the soul. - The logically underlying (subject) is made into a being-like (ontologically) underlying (substance). ---
I 42
Pure apperception/Kant: actually comes only to God. - Direct, intellectual intuition. - Intelligible objects (for example, "I") - through mere apperception - human: in actions and internal determinations, which the human does not perceive through the senses. ---
I 98
Apperception/KantVsHume: unity of apperception: I am making all ideas aware as my ideas. - So I stay in the unity of consciousness which can accompany all my ideas. - In addition, I have to keep in mind, how I add an idea to the other! Otherwise I will scatter myself. ---
I 129/130
The Sublime/Kant: the sublime is moral beauty - it resembles moral obligation, that it initially inhibits the life forces and accumulates, in order to let them pour even stronger in a kind of emotion and to lead to moral action. - But I should exceed the nature morally, so it is about my superiority to nature. - Sublime/Burke: "in the sublime we encounter the harbingers of this king of the horrors of death". ---
Adorno XII 177
Pure/Kant/Adorno: 1. all that is pure in the subject, is that which is thought of without admixture of empirical, without admixture of a sensual.
2. The pure will is that which is pure in the sense of the principle of reason, without getting dependent on any being which is itself not rationally understandingly.
---
Adorno XIII 66
Constitution/Idealism/Kant/Adorno: the concept of constitution (...) is characterized in Kant by the fact that this mind or consciousness is not conceived as a part of the world, as a piece of existence, like every other existence. They should differ as a constituent from everything else.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Thoughts Evans
 
Books on Amazon:
Gareth Evans
Frank I 487
Thoughts / EvansVsRussell / EvansVsHume: (with Davidson): it may be that you simply think you have a thought - even about yourself

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Thoughts Russell
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Frank I 487
Russell / Evans: Cartesians: Thought : we only have a thought if the object really exists - I 487 ~ Thoughts / EvansVsRussell / EvansVsHume: (with Davidson): it may be that you simply think you have a thought - even about yourself

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Understanding McDowell
 
Books on Amazon
I 98f
Understanding/McDowell: the distinction between two types of intelligibility distinguishes two kinds of terms, but not of objects. ---
I 123
Natural laws/Nature/Understanding/Hume: Nature cannot be understood in terms of meaning, nor in terms of a law. ---
I 123
Natural laws/Nature/Understanding/KantVsHume: regains the comprehensibility of the natural laws, but not the comprehensibility of the meaning. Nature is the domain of natural laws, and therefore without any meaning.
The empirical world, however, is not outside the concepts.
---
I 136
Natural laws/meaning: mandatory rules do not have to be known. Understanding/McDowell: must also play a role where it is a matter of grasping mere events without all meaning.
Understanding/comprehensibility/modernity/today/McDowell: the field of comprehensibility is the realm of natural laws - albeit without meaning.
We can, however, refuse to equate this area of comprehensibility with nature, and even more so with what is real.
---
I 140
Experience/Content/Understanding/McDowell: Empirical content is only understandable in a context that allows us to make the direct rational control of the mind through the world itself insightful. ---
I 140
It is impossible for a fact to exert an impression on a person that perceives. However, the image of openness to the world brings the idea of direct access to the facts. Only that we cannot be certain in any case that it is not a deception.
---
EMD II 55
Understanding/McDowell: understanding your own utterances: ability to know what a theoretical description of this ability would do - knowing truths conditions - not truth! - Even in sentences which are not decidable by means of evidence - but this does not mean that the truth condition for each sentence either exists or does not exist, even if we cannot say that it exists or does not exist.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001


EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Will Nietzsche
 
Books on Amazon
Danto III 136
Wille/Nietzsche/Danto: Wenn es stimmt, dass Nietzsche versucht, der gebräuchlichen Unterscheidung zwischen Mentalem und Materiellem zu entgehen, dann muss der Wille zur Macht widersprüchlich erscheinen. Immerhin ist „Wille“ ja ein das Geistige betreffender Ausdruck. (Siehe Kausalität/Nietzsche, Ich/Nietzsche, Subjekte/Nietzsche). Danto: Das stimmt aber so nicht. Wie bei Schopenhauer müssen wird bei Nietzsche die gewöhnliche, das Geistige betreffenden Konnotationen mit dem Begriff des „Willens“ im metaphysischen Sinn verbinden. Der Wille zur Macht beschränkt sich nicht auf Mentale. Wenn weirt dies missachten, können wir Nietzsche nicht verstehen.
NietzscheVsWillensakte: Nietzsche attackiert die nicht nur von Philosophen angenommenen „Willensakte“.
Danto III 137
Willensakte/Danto: verhalten sich zu Handlungen wie Ursachen zu Wirkungen. Hume/Danto: Hume verwarf die Idee, dass wir eine Erfahrung haben könnten, der unsere Idee vom Kausalnexus entspricht, wie unser Wille über unsere Körperteile oder unsere Gedanken tätig wird.
Hume: wir haben absolut keine Vorstellung davon, wie der Wille tätig wird. Dennoch nimmt Hume Willensakte an.
NietzscheVsHume: ist radialer, es gibt schlichtweg nichts, dessen Verknüpfung mit unseren Handlungen nachzuweise wäre.
Danto III 138
Denken/Gewissheit/Subjekt/NietzscheVsDescartes: Nietzsche widerlegt den Cartesischen Gedanken, dass uns unsere eigenen mentalen Prozesse unmittelbar durchsichtig sind, dass wir über unsere Denkweise Bescheid wissen. Er widerlegt es, indem er eine Reihe miteinander verknüpfter Gedanken aufstellt und „einfrieren“ lässt: Wenn Descartes davon spricht, dass ihm sein Zweifle an der Realität zumindest als sein eigener Zweifel gewiss sei, so schleppt er hier sehr viele stillschweigende Annahmen mit.
NietzscheVsDescartes: wenn seine Argumentation auf ein „Es wird gedacht“ hinausläuft, wird schon unser Glaube an den Substanzbegriff vorausgesetzt und anschließen ein Subjekt dazu angenommen. (F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 577).
Danto III 140
Wille/NietzscheVsSchopenhauer/Nietzsche/Danto: (F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 S.25): Die Philosophen pflegen vom Willen zu reden, wie als ob er die bekannteste Sache von der Welt sei; ja Schopenhauer gab zu verstehen, der Wille allein sei uns eigentlich bekannt. DantoVsSchoepenhauer: in Wirklichkeit ist dies nicht der Fall. Es gibt keine einfache, für sich identifizierbare mentale Operation, die als Willensakt erkannt und intuitiv erfasst würde.
Nietzsche: Es gibt keinen ‚Willen‘: das ist nur eine vereinfachende Konzeption des Verstandes. (F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 913).
Danto III 141
Wille/Nietzsche: Vielleicht ist der schlimmste unter all diesen Trugschlüssen die Folgerung, das ‚Wollen genüge zur Aktion‘.(F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 S.27).
Danto III 143
Wille/Nietzsche/Danto: (F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI,3 S. 85):Der Wille bewegt nichts mehr, erklärt folglich auch nichts mehr – er begleitet bloß Vorgänge, er kann auch fehlen. Danto: wenn es keinen Willen gibt, so auch keinen freien oder unfreien Willen. (Vgl. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, S. 913).
Willensfreiheit/Nietzsche/Danto: Diese Schlussfolgerung ist vorschnell: die Lehre vom freien Wille hängt keineswegs von einer psychologischen Theorie über den Willen als mentalem Phänomen ab; ‚frei‘ wird auf Handlungen, nicht aber auf den Willen angewandt.
Nietzsche legt die Auseinandersetzung über den freien Willen meist auf Eis, die Vorstellung vom freien Willen verdanke sich „logischer Notzucht“.


Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
World Freud
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty V 39
Freud/Rorty: belonged like Copernicus and Darwin to those who have decentered our worldview. Freud: "The I is not master in one's own home." > Mechanization of the worldview. ---
V 41
Freud/RortyVsHume: in contrast to Hume, Freud has actually redesigned our self-image! If the I is not master in its own home, it is because there is indeed another person! The unconscious of Freud is actually effective. ---
V 43
But it does not seem like a thing that we can claim, but as a person who claims us. The ego is populated by the counterparts of persons we must know in order to understand the behavior of a person. DavidsonVsFreud/Rorty: Splitting is always perceived by philosophers as disquieting. But: (pro Freud) there is no reason "you think subconsciously that p" instead of "there is something in you that causes you to act as if you believed that p".

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following 57 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Association Verschiedene Vs Association I 125
Association/Hume: nicht hinreichend, um die Beziehungen zu erklären, obwohl sie es allein ist, die die Beziehungen ermöglicht: Bsp sie erklärt die Beziehung zwischen zwei unmittelbar nebeneinander liegenden Blautönen, aber sie erklärt nicht die weiter entfernten. Man könnte sagen, sie erklärt A = B und B = C, aber sie erklärt nicht A = C.
I 125/126
Die Association erklärt nicht, dass die Entfernung selbst eine Beziehung ist. Def natürliche Beziehung (Relation)/Hume: durch Assoziation. (Lebendige Vorstellung).
Def philosophische Beziehung/Hume: das, was durch Assoziation allein nicht zu erklären ist. Durch Vermittlung verliert die Natur allerdings an Lebhaftigkeit.
Wie lassen sich dann die Vermittlungen rechtfertigen?
Ähnlichkeit begründet nicht immer die Verknüpfung! Und zwar, wenn die Eigenschaft sehr allgemein ist.
VsAssociation/VsHume: die meisten Einwände gegen die Assoziationslehre laufen darauf hinaus, dass sie allenfalls die Form des Denkens im allgemeinen, nicht aber die besonderen Inhalte erkläre.
I 127
BergsonVsHume: irgendeine Eigenschaft lässt sich immer finden, die eine Ähnlichkeit darstellt. In irgendeiner Hinsicht sind sich zwei Dinge immer ähnlich. Hume/Deleuze: das hat Hume alles gesehen.




Berkeley, G. Hume Vs Berkeley, G.
 
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Danto 2 I 213
Hume and Berkeley: if I do not assume an external object x, what better reasons do I actually have for assuming the existence of a self, or of a mind?
I 214
HumeVsBerkeley: Berkeley therefore had his hands full to assert that there is no idea of ​​the self since minds for themselves are no ideas, were not perceptible for themselves. That is why he had to allow something as abstruse as the object x which he had actually discarded. Hume: So he should either drop the idea of ​​the minds or allow the object existence. Hume: when I enter 'myself', I always stumble on perceptions of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself without any perception. 'Bundle of different perceptions, constantly on the move'. Hume: for him there is no object, of which the manifestations were manifestations, and no subject to which they would manifest themselves.
Berkeley I 221
HumeVsBerkeley: another mind cannot cause an idea in a mind anymore than a substance. VsHume: the objection fails to recognize that Berkeley sees a conceptual contradiction in the concept of 'material thing', which cannot be transmitted in the same way to the mental substances. (A not perceived thing would be a contradiction, like a not perceived perception).
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Berkeley, G. Russell Vs Berkeley, G.
 
Books on Amazon:
Bertrand Russell
Newen I 50
RussellVsBerkeley: his thesis must be wrong, because it has to accept God's existence and his perception to our own existence. ---
I 51
Russell: one direction of the biconditional is wrong: why should something exist because it is perceived? ---
Russell IV 84
Universals/quality/Russell: Suppose, we assume that someone would deny that there are even any universals. Then we would have to determine that we cannot prove that there are qualities, while we might well prove that there must be relations. ---
IV 85
E.g. "blackness": if we deny that there is an "abstract idea", at which all black things participate, then we still need something like similarity. And this similarity is again something universal: a relationship, relation. One cannot say that there is another similarity for each pair. Because then we would have to admit that these similarities look similar.
---
IV 86
RussellVsBerkeley, RussellVsHume: have overlooked counter objection against the denial of the "abstract ideas" because they, too, only thought of qualities as universals, and did not notice the relations (e.g. similarity).

R I
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986

R II
B. Russell
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989

R IV
B. Russell
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967

R VI
B. Russell
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
In
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993

R VII
B. Russell
Wahrheit und Falschheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Dennett, D. Brandom Vs Dennett, D.
 
Books on Amazon
I 113
Meaning / intentional systems / BrandomVsDennett: understanding belongs to meaning, and such systems do not understand.
II 54
BrandomVsDennett: if you have to distinguish derivative intentionality from the primordial intentionality of the interpreter then a regress threatens. BrandomVsHume, BrandomVsLocke: we should play down, with which they have struggled: the similarity with animals. (Also Dennett, as a naturalist).
We are cultural and not merely natural beings.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Descartes, R. Evans Vs Descartes, R.
 
Books on Amazon:
Gareth Evans
Frank I 497
EvansVsDescartes/EvansVsHume/EvansVsLocke/EvansVsKant: the "I" of mental self-attribution refers neither to a Cartesian "Ego" now to a Lockean person, nor to a Humean bundle of perceptions, nor to a Kantian I, but rather to an object of flesh and blood! Consequence: the background element of self-identification must be the localization in space and time. I 517 EvansVsDescartes: strongest antidote: the fact that these ways to acquire knowledge about ourselves must be incoporated in the information component of a functional characterization of our "I" ideas.
I 522
Body Awareness/Descartes: not a way to achieve knowledge about oneself, but only about something that one has. EvansVsDescartes: It’s hard to make sense from this. (s) This is not an argument. Descartes: I have to admit defeat when Descartes says that this was a way to gain knowledge about myself, but one that uses my identification! Evans: I have to admit that. I 523 EvansVsDescartes: our "I" notions are notions of bearers of physical no less than mental properties. I 562 EvansVsDescartes: the use of "I" simply bridges the gap between the mental and the physical and is not more closely connected to one aspect than to the other.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Empiricism James Vs Empiricism
 
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I 57
JamesVsEmpiricism: "nominalism": empiricists assert that there is a term for any object. James: how about facts for which there is no concept?. - Worse: Language / James: supports the nominalist tendency to fragment the stream of consciousness.
Nevertheless, James developed a position of radical empiricism (VsRationalism, Vsempiricism that is represented by Hume.).
JamesVsHume: to be radical empiricism must neither accept elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly.
Radical empiricism / James:
1st Only those issues can be discussed, that are based on categories of observation.
2nd The relationships between the objects of experience are just as accessible as the objects themselves.
3rd connection as a result of the sequence of partial experience is itself an object of experience. The experience of this relationship is the power of consciousness.
4th No upfront construction of subjective consciousness.
Empiricism Wittgenstein Vs Empiricism
 
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Stegmüller IV 59
Imagination/Kripke WittgensteinVsHume: 1. Assuming that the meaning understanding or meaning (to mean) would be a kind of headache or toothache,
---
IV 60
and "+" meaning (to mean) would always be accompanied by a distinctive type of headache. How can the pain be a help for me to decide if the correct answer is "276" or "7"? (For a new task with which I did not previously face).
(WittgensteinVsEmpiricism).
There may be distinctive qualities, but this just does not help the VsSkepticism.
---
Wittgenstein II 100
Rationalism/empiricism: WittgensteinVsRationalism: is wrong with the assumption that there are a priori synthetic judgments. They think you can always sit so, and only use reason. Empirists/Wittgenstein: they realized that we can only describe the world. That's right.
WittgensteinVsEmpiricism: error: they were trying to make the philosophy empirically. Correct: the reason cannot decide everything.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Epiphenomenalism Lewis Vs Epiphenomenalism
 
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I 18
Epiphenomenalism: a variant of my argument seems to miss: Assumed experiences would non-physical epiphenomena, which would be correlated by some causal law exactly with simultaneous physical states, then the experiences and their physical correlates were causally equivalent.
I 19
Then these non-physical experiences would still have their explanations: namely the defining physical effects. LewisVs: that would only double the experience. (The non-physical in addition to the physical). Moreover, it is not true that they would be causally equivalent: this is an error in the regularity theory of the cause (LewisVsHume): we know from elsewhere that the theory must be corrected in order to distinguish between genuine causes and pseudo causes that are their epiphenomenal correlates.
E.g. the light does not cause the engine running, even though it is a legitimate perfect correlate of electrical current what actually causes the engine s running.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Freud, S. Verschiedene Vs Freud, S. Derrida I 101
Analogie/Artaud: sie kann uns nicht lehren, was ihr Pendant ist. (ArtaudVsFreud).
Derrida I 101
ArtaudVsFreud: die Deutung würde dem Theater seine Heiligkeit nehmen, die ihm zukommt, weil es Äußerung des Lebens in seinen elementaren Kräften ist. - - -
Lacan I 41
LacanVsFreud: gegen Herrschaft des (falschen) Ich. - nicht wo »Es« war, soll »Ich« werden, sondern das »Es« soll enthüllt und erschlossen werden, damit sich das Subjekt von dieser Exzentrizität her als ein Seiendes und Sagendes verstehen und erleben kann.
I 122
LacanVsFreud: nicht "Ich" statt "Es", sondern den Horizont des "Es spricht" neu öffnen und die Wahrheit hinter dem falschen Objektivismus hervortreten lassen. (BarthesVsLacan: es gibt kein "Dahinter". - - -
Rorty V 42
Freud/RortyVsHume: im Gegensatz zu Hume hat Freud unser Selbstbild tatsächlich umgestaltet! Wenn das Ich nicht Herr im eigenen Hause ist, so deshalb, weil es tatsächlich eine andere Person gibt! Das Unbewusste Freuds ist tatsächlich wirksam.
V 43
Es wirkt aber nicht wie ein Ding, das wir in Anspruch nehmen können, sondern wie eine Person, die uns in Anspruch nimmt. Das Ich ist von Gegenstücken von Personen bevölkert, die wir kennen müssen, um das Verhalten eines Menschen zu verstehen. DavidsonVsFreud/Rorty: Aufspaltung wird von Philosophen immer als beunruhigend empfunden. Aber: (pro Freud) es gibt keinen Grund »du glaubst unbewusst, dass p« anstelle von »es gibt etwas in dir, das bewirkt, dass du so handelst, als glaubtest du, dass p« anzunehmen.
(Unbewusstes/unbewusst/(s): „etwas in Dir...“ dann gibt es mehrere Gehirnbenutzer.)
V 62
Rorty: die größte Errungenschaft durch Freud ist der erfreuliche Charakter des ironischen, spielerischen Intellektuellen.
V 63
MacIntyreVsFreud/Rorty: die Preisgabe des aristotelischen »funktionalen Begriffs des Menschen« führt zum »Emotivismus«: zur Auslöschung jeder echten Unterscheidung zwischen manipulativen und nichtmanipulativen gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen. Rorty: er hatte recht, insofern moralische Begriffe wie »Vernunft«, »menschliche Natur« usw. nur aus aristotelischer Sicht Sinn haben.
Def Emotivismus/MacIntyre/Rorty: Werturteile nichts weiter als der Ausdruck von Vorlieben, Einstellungen oder Gefühlen.
V 64
»Vermögen«/Freud/Rorty: (laut Davidson): Freud lässt die Idee der »Vermögen« überhaupt fallen und ersetzt sie durch eine Vielzahl von Glaubens und Wunschmengen.
V 65
RortyVsMacIntyre: diese Kritik hat nur Sinn, wenn solche Urteile auch etwas anderes hätten sein können (z. B. Ausdruck einer rationalen Erkenntnis der Natur). Freud/Rorty: wenn wir uns ihn zu Herzen nehmen, brauchen wir nicht mehr zu entscheiden zwischen einem »funktionalen« aristotelischen Menschenbegriff, der in Sachen Moral maßgebend ist, und der »schrecklichen Freiheit« Sartres.
V 66
Wir können psychologische Erzählungen ohne Heldinnen oder Helden ausfindig machen. Wir erzählen die Geschichte der ganzen Maschine als Maschine, ohne zentrale, privilegierte Teile.
V 67
Würde/Maschine/Menschenwürde/Rorty: nur wenn wir glauben, Gründe haben zu müssen, um andere anständig zu behandeln, verlieren wir unsere Menschenwürde durch den Vorschlag, unsere Geschichten handelten von Mechanismen ohne Zentrum.
V 67/68
Rationalität/traditionelle Philosophie/Tradition/Rorty: glaubt tatsächlich, im tiefsten Innern (auch des Peinigers) gebe es einen Kern der Rationalität, an den ich immer appellieren könne. Freud: nennt das »die fromme Weltanschauung«.
V 69
Ethik/Moral/Psychologie/Rorty: aus einem solchen Streben ergibt sich nichts weiter als das fortgesetzte hin und her schwingende Pendel zwischen moralischem Dogmatismus und moralischem Skeptizismus.
V 70
Was die Metaphysik nicht zu leisten vermocht hat, das bringt die Psychologie (und sei sie noch so »tief«) ebenfalls nicht fertig. Man findet auch bei Freud keine Erklärung »moralischer Motive«.





De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Hume, D. Armstrong Vs Hume, D.
 
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Arm III 120
Then all universals would only be substances in Hume’s sense: i.e. something that logically might have an independent existence.
III 121
ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstronVsTooley: it is wrong to think of universals like that. Then there are problems regarding how universals are to relate to their particulars (P). E.g. If a rel between Pa and Pb is something that is able to have an independent existence without a and b and any other P, would there not have to be at least one other rel to relate it with a and b?.
And if this rel itself can be uninstantiated (e.g. in a universe with monads!), then this rel is just as questionable, etc. ad infinitum (Bradley’s regress).
This can only be avoided if universals are merely abstract factors of states (but real).
Arm II 46
Causality/Causation/ArmstrongVsHume: E.g. Inhaling a quantum of cyanide leads to the death of the person who inhales it. There seems to be a causal relation here, i.e. one between types: one type produces the other type.
II 47
Analytic philosophy/Armstrong: hastens to reassure that we are dealing only with the truth of a universal proposition. "Any person who inhales cyanide dies." Those who represent a singularistic theory of causation will say that each (unique event of) inhaling by a particular person causes their death. (Armstrong pro).
But that’s not the whole truth!.
Surface structure/Proposition/Armstrong: the proposition itself asserts a connection of universals on its surface, from which individual causal findings follow. Thesis: this surface structure reflects something more profound.
If the connection exists, then regularity is included at the level of universals, of course.
But this Entailment can probably not be grasped formally. Rather, it is something like Carnap’s "meaning postulate"!.
Arm II 64
Causality/Hume/Armstrong: ... From this follows that we can never have an empirical proof of the truth of a counterfactual conditional. Law statement/Place: (universal counterfactual conditional): what we can have, however, is empirical proof that supports the truth of a universal Counterfactual Conditional.
Proof/Hume/Armstrong: but the proof consists in nothing more than the observation of either regular following or coinciding with Type B and Type A. (Regularity).
II 65
Ceteris paribus/PlaceVsHume/PlaceVsArmstrong: Such regularities are no evidence of the truth of the counterfactual conditional if it is not ensured that all circumstances remain the same. C.p. must supplement regularity in order for it to become proof. But then Armstrong does not need to refute the regularity theory.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Hume, D. Black Vs Hume, D.
 
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III 80
Deduction/Hume/Naturalistic fallacy/Black: the core of the argument is that in a deduction nothing can follow that is not already contained in the premises. Naturalistic fallacy/BlackVsHume: but there is a way how new evaluative or normative material can appear in a valid conclusion:
E.g. premise: you cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs. (This can be seen as factual) But it follows now:
Conclusion: if you want to make an omelet, eggs should be broken.
Hume/Black: What he means is that no categorical or unconditional "should" follows.
BlackVsHume: that seems convincing at first glance. But:
Problem: the absence of the word "should" is not a reliable criterion. E.g. the fact that murder is a sin implies the conclusion that you should not kill. But how are we to judge based on the mere linguistic form that the premise is non-normative. Now one could say that the sentence about murder is unverifiable.
III 81
Behind this are difficult questions about how we are to understand the objectives and procedures of science. Science/Black: should we see it as a special way of approaching truth, or as a discipline that shares the objectives of the whole spectrum of activities which are after the truth?
BlackVsHume: his argument is circular: Thesis: I believe that certain categorical sentences with "should" have a truth value! I.e. they can be recognized as true without reference to hopes and wishes. Then Hume is mistaken if he assumes them to be different from scientific principles.
Knowledge/Values​​/Standards/Black: Thesis: in a broader sense (beyond the narrow sense of science) knowledge can be understood in a way that some normative and evaluative sentences can be known to be true. If that is the case, Hume’s argument caves in. Then moral and practical questions can no longer be easily separated logically from scientific truths.
Naturalistic fallacy/BlackVsHume/VsHume: many contemporary authors reject his argument (of the separation of science from moral sentences).
III 81
Ethics/Morals/Values​​/Standards/Black: Thesis: regardless of whether Hume’s criticism of the naturalistic fallacy is valid, we are entitled to assume that human beings can agree on certain fundamental ethical principles regardless of their religious background. We must assume that in order for a rational discourse becoming possible at all.
III 82
BlackVsNaturalistic fallacy: Then even in the case of a logical separation of factual and normative or evaluative sentences it is the introduction of certain generally acceptable non-factual premises that would enable the derivation of normative conclusions. In addition: (see below): every representation that regards scientific propositions as isolated, is one-sided. The biggest problems of neutrality are not affected by the assumed gap between the factual and the normative. If we look at science as something concrete, things look different.
BlackVsNaturalistic fallacy: is one of the great half-truths or popular mistakes of Western culture. We should be wary of the following syllogism:
1) Science is a good thing
2) Science is necessarily neutral
3) Therefore scientific neutrality is a good thing.
This might well be true for "bad" instead of "good".

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983
Hume, D. Brandom Vs Hume, D.
 
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II 54
BrandomVsHume, BrandomVsLocke: we should play down, with which they have struggled: the similarity with animals. (Also Dennett, as naturalist).   We are cultural and not merely natural beings.
II 58
Tradition (Hume): leads standards back to requests. Request / BrandomVsHume: is explained here by committing to certain patterns of practical inference, i.e. in terms of what is a desire for something, and not vice versa.
II 112
Justify /justification/ Hume: consider all possible aspects. BrandomVsHume.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Hume, D. Carnap Vs Hume, D.
 
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Newen I 113
Konstitution/Konstitutionssystem/Carnap/Newen: Thesis: unser Wissen soll Stufe für Stufe von einer Basis ausgehend in einem System angeordnet werden. Basis: Elementarerlebnisse (Erscheinungen, Eindrücke, Gefühle).
Stufen: Übergang: durch die Konstitutionsrelation. ((s) Eindrücke konstituieren auf einer höheren Stufe Gegenstände).
I 114
Hume/Carnap/Newen: beide nehmen Bewusstseinsphänomene als sichere Basis an. CarnapVsHume: gebraucht formale Logik.
Konstitution/Newen: könnte immer noch beibehalten werden, wenn sich die Elementarerlebnisse als nicht haltbar erweisen sollten.
Konstitution: Bsp aus natürlichen Zahlen als Basis lassen sich rationale und reelle Zahlen konstituieren.
Konstitution/Carnap: ist ontologisch neutral, d.h. damit ist keine Entscheidung getroffen zugunsten z.B. Idealismus oder Realismus.
Konstitution/Carnap: ist weder ein Erzeugen noch ein Erkennen von Gegenständen.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Hume, D. Danto Vs Hume, D.
 
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Arthur Danto
I 308
We are entering uncharted territory: in causal processes involving representation the mind moves forward on two rails, the logical and causal rail. Structural transformations. Logical transformations are those of sentences to sentences.
DantoVsHume: This second track is missing Hume s view of the mind. We have the concept of knowledge, if we need true representations, not any rep..
Causality / Danto: Causal processes include representation states as causes or effects.

II 325
Geschichte/Erklärung/Hume/Danto: nach Hume‘s Theorie wären Bsp der Mord von Sarajevo und der Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs zwei logisch voneinander unabhängige Größen. VsHume: Frage: sind Motive auch unabhängig von Handlungen? Dann kann eine Motiverklärung keine Ursachenerklärung sein!

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Hume, D. Davidson Vs Hume, D.
 
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Davidson I 18
In Hume: the impressions and ideas were "what they seemed to be, and they appeared to be what they actually were." I.e. objects that have all the properties and only the properties that they have in our opinion (ideas).
DavidsonVsHume: there are no such objects! Every object has infinitely many logically independent properties, (material objects), and that also applies to items whose entire "essential" properties (e.g. numbers) are given by us. (Hume thought since we are the producers of such objects, we have all properties "in our power" - DavidsonVs).
DavidsonVsHume: infinitely many properties, therefore ignorance fo imaginary objects possible.
- - -
Hume I 24
History/Causality/Hume: (I 172): the reports of wars, intrigues, factions and upheavals are as much collection of experimental facts ... in the same way as the physicist or naturalist gets to know the nature of plants and other external objects through the experimental facts that he collects for this purpose. Deleuze: so history is almost to be construed as physics of man (Hume). (DavidsonVsHume).
- - -
Quine IV 415
Def Naturalism/Quine: understanding of man, of history, culture, knowledge and morals by means of the categories that have been trained for the knowledge of nature (Blumenberg). Naturalists in this sense were already Bacon and Hume.
Hume (had the ambition of becoming the "Newton of Sciences"): it is necessary to review whether the science of man does not allow for the same as accuracy as that of nature. (HumeVsSupra-naturalism of the Middle Ages). (DavidsonVsHume: behavior not according to law).
- - -
Rorty V73
Universe/DavidsonVsHume/Rorty: convictions are not isolated. Even though, as Hume says, there can be a universe that consists only of one single sensation, we cannot make ourselves understand a universe that consists of only the one single thought that Caesar had crossed the Rubicon.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Hume, D. Evans Vs Hume, D.
 
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Gareth Evans
Frank I 531
EvansVsHume: We have discarded the background for the perception metaphor on which Hume founds his argument. We have nothing that could be construed as a "stumbling" over perceptions. The internal states are indeed no "objects". E.g. What we become aware of when we see the tree is nothing but the tree itself.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Hume, D. Frege Vs Hume, D.
 
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III 67
Number/Hobbes: presupposes in mathematics among themselves equal units, from which it is constituted. Number/Hume/Frege: the constituent parts of quantity and number he considers quite similar.
Number/FregeVsHobbes/FregeVsHume: just as one might view individuals as completely different!
  If one disregards the features by which things differ, it does not get as Lipschitz says: "the concept of the number of things considered", but
  Frege: a general term under that these things fall.


I 94
Number/Equality/Equality of Numbers/Numerical Equality/Frege: we have to explain the meaning of the sentence "The number (sic) which is belongs to the concept F is the same as that which belongs to the concept G"
in such a way that the expression:
"The number (sic) which belongs to the concept F"
does not occur. (Otherwise, circular).
Number Equality/Hume/Solution: assigning each unit of a number to a unit of another number. ((s)> unique representation).
I 95
FregeVsHume: this will result in logical difficulties which we may not pass by: Equality/Quantity/FregeVsHume/Frege: equality also occurs independent of numbers (sic), so that you might think it was already established before the quantity, and that from the concept of quantity (sic) and that of equality it would have to result when two quantities are equal, without need for a definition.
FregeVs: That would explain equality only for each individual case! (By always making an equation).

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Hume, D. Goodman Vs Hume, D.
 
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II 112
Hume imagined the mind in a way that it can be caused to make forecasts according to regularities in the observable. GoodmanVsHume: We, however, see the mind as being in activity from the beginning. He corrects gradually. (Like Dennett)
Sainsbury V 139
Grue/Goodman: "regularities are where we find them, and we find them everywhere." Grue/Goodman/Sainsbury: therefore, there are still many ramifications between confirmation and belief.
Grue/GoodmanVsHume: shows that the regularity defined by Hume is not the only one.
Problem: what is regularity after all (>regularity)? The connection of emeralds with "green" or the connection with "grue"?
 Problem: either we cannot explain what regularity is, then there is no induction, or we provide an explanation of regularity, which includes the unwanted connection with "grue".
 Regularity depends on description! This has led some people to extreme conventionalism according to which there is no separation of the world from the conventions.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Sai I
R.M. Sainsbury
Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993
Hume, D. Husserl Vs Hume, D.
 
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I 55
HusserlVsHume: the indubitable rest is the subjective performance of consciousness.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart
Hume, D. James Vs Hume, D.
 
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I 55
JamesVsHume, JamesVsMill: "associationism": sees in conceptual ideas and experiences only reflections of perceptual impressions that generate by acting on the organism ideas.   James: This "determinism" may explain the sensations of details, but not the experience of volition, moods, rationality, memories.
I 57
VsRationalism, VsEmpiricism as it is represented by Hume.). JamesVsHume: radical empiricism must neither take elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly.
Hume, D. Kant Vs Hume, D.
 
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Kant I 27
KantVsHume: Causality: Limited to the range of experience. It does not apply to the domain of things themselves.
Kant I 98
Hume: Imagination compounds are principally created by association. KantVsHume: Unity of apperception. I’m being conscious that all ideas are my ideas. Therefore, I stick to the unity of consciousness that accompany all my ideas. In addition, I need to bear in mind how I am adding an idea to another one, otherwise I will scatter myself.
McD. I 123
McDowell: Laws of nature/natural/understanding/KantVsHume: wins the intelligibility of natural laws again, but not the clarity of meaning. Nature is the realm of natural laws, and therefore of no importance. However, the empirical world is not outside the terms.
Hume I 37
Moral/action/ethics/Hume: A in this way (avoiding wrong) created obligation is artificial however, contrary to the natural obligation arising from the natural interest as the driving force of every action. Moral obligation.
It’s in my best interest to let the other have his property, provided that the other acts in the same vein towards me. (KantVsHume:> categorical imperative).
- - -
Hume I 122
KantVsHume: The latter erroneously presented mathematics as a system of analytic judgments.
DeleuzeVsKant.
Relation / HumeVsKant: Every relationship is external in its terms: the equality is not a property of the characters themselves, but only comes through comparison.
Hume I 133
Associations / KantVsHume: Although it is merely an empirical law, according to which ideas, which often followed each other, thereby produce a link. This law of reproduction requires that the appearances themselves are indeed subjected to such a rule. Because without this our empirical imagination would never get to do something it is able to, so would lay like dead unknown wealth within us. If a word would be applied one time to this thing, another time to another one, no empirical synthesis of reproduction could happen.
So there must be something that makes even this reproduction of phenomenons possible because it is the fact that it is the a priori reason of a necessary synthetic unity of itself.
I 138
If we can now show that even our a priori purest intuitions do not provide knowledge, except if they contain such a connection that makes a continuous synthesis possible, this synthesis of imagination is also established on a priori principles prior to all experience. KantVsHume: His dualism forces him to understand the relationship between what is given and the subject as a match of the subject with nature.
I 139
But if the given would not align itself and a priori, in accordance with those same principles, which the link of ideas also aligns itself, the subject would only notice this concordance by chance. Therefore, it must be reversed:
The given is to refer to the subject, as a concordance of given and subject. Why? Because what is given is not a thing in itself, but an overall context of phenomena that can be only represented by an a priori synthesis.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Hume, D. Kripke Vs Hume, D.
 
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Apriori: Some philosophers modify the modalities in this characterization somehow from "may" to "shall". They think that if something belongs to the realm of a priori knowledge it is impossible to recognize it empirically.(Hume). This is wrong! (KripkeVsHume).
E.g. The computer can give an answer to the question of whether particular numbers are primes. Nobody has calculated or proved this, but the computer gave the answer. I 45
A posteriori: A mathematical truth can be known a posteriori by looking at a computer or by asking a mathematician (e.g. naturally a posteriori). The philosophical analysis tells us that it could not be contingent and therefore all empirical knowledge of its truth is automatically an empirical knowledge of its necessity.(KripkeVsHume, KripkeVsKant) I 181

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
Hume, D. Leibniz Vs Hume, D.
 
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I 43
Impression/Sensory impression/Identität/Leibniz: Therefore, Leibniz does not use the "impression" ["Eindruck"](Terminology: Locke: "sensation", Hume: "impression"). LeibnizVsLocke/LeibnizVsHume: The identity is in the sensory reality.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Hume, D. Mayr Vs Hume, D.
 
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V 100
MayrVsHume: the historical representation can often satisfactorily explain unique events and sometimes even make testable predictions (> history).

Ma
E. Mayr
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998
Hume, D. Moore Vs Hume, D.
 
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I 104
Wissen/Existenzbeweis/Existenz/Hume/Stroud: zwei Prinzipien: 1. Niemand weiß von der Existenz von etwas, wenn er es nicht direkt wahrgenommen (apprehended, >Apprehension: ungeordnet) hat oder dass er weiß, dass etwas, was er direkt wahrgenommen hat, ein Zeichen der Existenz dieses Dings ist.
2. Niemand kann wissen, dass ein Ding ein Zeichen von etwas anderem ist, wenn er diese beiden Dinge (Ding und Zeichen) nicht
I 106
direkt wahrgenommen hat. (>Bekanntschaft). Moore: daraus folgt, dass man nicht von materiellen Dingen wissen kann, wenn sie nicht direkt wahrgenommen werden. Dazu brauchen wir Bewusstseinsakte, Sinnesdaten und direkt wahrgenommene Bilder.
StroudVsMoore: ich verstehe nicht, warum er das (MooreVsDescartes) akzeptiert. Ich verstehe auch nicht, wieso er die Konsequenzen der Sinnesdaten-Theorie übersieht.
MooreVsHume: die beiden Prinzipien sind falsch: Bsp ich weiß, dass dieser Stift existiert, aber wenn Humes Prinzipien wahr wären, könnte ich das nicht. Daher sind sie, eins oder beide, falsch.
Moore/Stroud: akzeptiert, dass wenn man von Humes Position ausgeht, dann folgt, dass er nicht weiß, dass da ein Stift ist.
StroudVsMoore: beide Argumente sind gültig. Und sie haben eine gemeinsame Prämisse. Für Moore läuft die Frage, welche Konklusion man akzeptieren sollte darauf hinaus, ob es sicherer ist, dass er weiß, dass dies ein Stift ist oder sicherer, dass Humes Prinzipien wahr sind.
I 107
MooreVsHume: Bsp Stift: ist sogar das stärkste Argument um zu beweisen, dass seine Prinzipien falsch sind.
Hume, D. Nietzsche Vs Hume, D.
 
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Danto I 203
Hume: idea: a copy of a sensory impression. - Berkeley for him an idea was perhaps somewhat of a synonymous impression.
I 204
Idea: according to Hume and Berkeley This term was hidden for almost any content of our mind, which was a sensory impression is not itself used. So the object is dissolved into the class of its appearances.
NietzscheVs: Later Nietzsche considered it grammatical superstition.

- - -
Hume I 12
Cause/Hume: can always be thought of as something that is in itself and goes beyond all allegories through which one indeed gives something a content. (NietzscheVsHume).

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014
Hume, D. Nozick Vs Hume, D.
 
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Brendel I 254
Skepticism/Dretske/Nozick/Brendel: both. Thesis: the truth of the skeptical hypothesis is, however, not to be excluded. But it does not follow the impossibility of any knowledge. DretskeVsHume/NozickVsHume/Brendel: knowledge and the possibility of skepticism can coexist peacefully.
- - -
Nozick II 111
I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (self) as a property. I.e. not as an object. The solves the problem e.g. of localization and other problems: 1) Hume: "I cannot perceive myself independent of any other perception."
NozickVsHume: perhaps he did not search thoroughly. He has done nothing specific to search for the self, has he?
2) Advantage: the approach explains why it is difficult to imagine the self without embodiment.
3) It is difficult to imagine how the self should be identical with any particular stuff.
II 112
A property is never the identical with the object. The difficulty of specifying the relationsh of a property with an object is the general reason why we have such trouble locating the self, but that is not a particular problem of the relation between self and body. Property/Nozick: there are at least two ways how a person can be identified with a property:
1) with a non-indexical, non-reflexive property: E.g. "being Robert Nozick"
2) an identification whose definition uses a reflexive pronoun of the first person: E.g. "being me". This introduces reflexivity. Right into the nature of the self at that.
I Problem: it is obscure, because it introduces the reflexivity in the nature of the self, but it explains why all public or physicalist descriptions leave me out, because they are not reflective.
Unit/Merger/I/Self/Tradition: the I merges with the "one", but does not disappear in the process. The I is a property of the one, I am not separate from it.
Reflexivity/Property: E.g. reflexive property: "being me". Problem:
1) P is the ability to be reflexively self-referring.
People have P, tables do not. I have the property P and so do you,
II 113
but you have it by virtue of the fact that you are you, I have it by virtue of the other fact that I am I. We both have the property of being me, but the property is indexical. I.e. the properties differ!
Point: they both arise from the same non-indexical property P: being reflexively self-referring!

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Hume, D. Putnam Vs Hume, D.
 
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Hume I 26
Reason/Hume: can always be applied, but to a world that was already there before. ("Finished world" PutnamVsHume). It presupposes a reason superordinate to morality. Practice and morality are indifferent according to the reason (Not according to the circumstances).
Thus, the reason, because it is denied by the outside, can be skepticism.

Forces - may well be observed (for example, felt: pressure) PutnamVsHume


Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Hume, D. Quine Vs Hume, D.
 
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Hume I 115
Time/Hume was structure of the mind, now the subject turns out to be a synthesis of the time. Memory/Hume: the re-emergence of an impression in the form of a still vivid imagination. ((s) QuineVsHume).
Memory itself does not cause a synthesis of time. It does not overcome the structure.
I 178
The achievement of memory does not consist in holding on to individual imaginations, but in retaining their order. - - -
Quine V 19
Cause/Regularity/QuineVsHume: Problem: you can just take the two single classes in regularity consisting of a and b. Then one succumbs to the fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc. Dispositions: here there is the same problem.
- - -
V 88
Identity/Identity Predicate/Language Learning/Quine: it seems as though we have recognized the emergence of the identity predicate: it is nothing but a common constituent of various relative observation terms for substances such as
V 89
e.g. "the same dog as" or even less: a word for the temporal extension of referencing (pointing). Identity/Locke/Hume: only useful for appearances of the same object at different times.
QuineVsLocke/QuineVsHume: that fits very well with our present purpose of the individuation of things. However, identity goes beyond that.
- - -
V 177
Past/Observation/Quine: but there are also reports of earlier observations, where the term was learned by definition instead of by conditioning. Since you can replace a defined term by its definiendum this amounts to a composite observation term. Example "I have seen a black rabbit": Learning situation: one for black, one for rabbits, as well as attributive composition.
Imagination/Memory/Quine: in the language of mental images we can say that these are caused, even if the corresponding object does not exist.
But now we must go further and assume even more skills: the child has to distinguish between two types of mental images:
a) Fantasies
b) Memories.
V 178
QuineVsHume: referred unconvincingly to liveliness as a differentiator. Def Memory/Hume: attenuated sensation
Def Fantasy/Hume: attenuated memory.
Def Mental Image/QuineVsHume: is an event in the nervous system that leads to a state of readiness for a corresponding stimulus. This ostensive nervous process is perceived by the subject, i.e. it must be able to react specifically to it in two different ways:
a) Summary of previously learned items e.g. "black" and "rabbit"
b) strengthened by acquaintance: i.e. real earlier encounter with a black rabbit. Basis for affirmation.
V 179
Observation Sentence/Complete Thought/Reference/Quine: refers to the object and the calendar clock and, where appropriate, to a location. Complex observation term. >Protocol Sentence: timeless sentence (forever-lasting) if location and times complete.
- - -
Quine VII 65
Objects/Individual Things/Thing/Hume: the notion of ​​physical objects arises from a mistake in identification. In reality, we invent a new item every minute!
QuineVsHume: we do not need to share it.
- - -
Quine XI 112
Causality/QuineVsRegularity/QuineVsHume/Lauener: E.g. to what type of events does the cry of the geese heard on Capitol Hill belong and to which the fact that Rome is saved?

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Hume, D. Ryle Vs Hume, D.
 
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I 341
Impressions/Ideas/Notion/Emotion/Hume/Ryle: Hume is known to have believed that there were both "impressions" and "ideas", both sensations and notions. He looked in vain for a demarcation line. "Ideas"/Hume/Ryle: he thought they were generally paler than impressions and later in their formation, as they are traces, references and reproductions of impressions.
Yet he realized that impressions may have any degree of pallor or weakness. And that ideas, although they are representations, do not appear with the stamp "copy", just as impressions do not appear as "original". According to Hume, therefore, an inspection cannot determine whether a perception is an impression or an idea.
I 342
RyleVsHume: Hume's mistake was to confuse "seeing" and seeing and "perception" and perception. And to assume that "perception" is a genus of which there are two types, namely impressions and ghosts or echoes of impressions. E.g. Ghosts: There are no such ghosts, and if they did exist, they themselves would only be impressions. And they would belong to seeing, not to "seeing".
Hume's attempt to distinguish between impressions and ideas as between things that are "living" and less "alive", was one of two serious errors. Suppose first that "alive" means "agile" in Hume. Someone can vividly imagine something, but he cannot vividly see.
 Idea/Ryle: can be "more vivid" than a different idea, but
Impressions/Ryle: cannot be described as vivid, just like babies are not more lifelike than dolls.
Someone who does not play is neither convincing, nor not convincing, and can therefore not be more convincing than an actor.
RyleVsHume: let us assume then, that Hume understood "alive" to mean "intensive", "strong". Then he was in error in another respect. For while emotions can be compared in terms of their strength and intensity, so they cannot be compared with ideas in this regard.
E.g. if I imagine to hear a huge noise, I hear neither a loud nor a soft noise. I have no auditory sensation at all.
E.g. a scream that I imagine is not deafening, but on the other hand it is not a soft murmur either. Neither does it drown an actual murmur, nor will it be drowned by it.
I 370
Fantasy/Notion/Ryle: in imaginary landscapes it is pointless to ask whether they are properly imagined, like with melodies that are not yet complete. E.g. Nevertheless, the actor pretends to give a convincing representation of a Martian.
I 372
"Seeing"/RyleVsHume: now we see Hume's other mistake: in the mistaken belief that "seeing" and "hearing" consists in the having of shadow sensations (which includes the other error that such a thing exists), he championed the causal theory that you cannot have a particular idea, without previously having had the corresponding sensation. The only thing that is true about this theory, is: what I see in my mind's eye, is in some way linked to what I have seen before. But the nature of this link does not correspond to Hume's idea in any way.
I 373
Memory/Notion/RyleVsTrace Theory: its followers should try to imagine the case where someone has a melody going through his head over and over again. Is that a reactivated trace of an auditory sensation, or a number of reactivated traces a series of auditory sensations?

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Hume, D. Searle Vs Hume, D.
 
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II 101
Perception/cause/SearleVsHume: my knowledge that my car has caused my visual experience, is because I know that I see the car, and not vice versa. I do not conclude that there is a car, but I just can see it.
II 102
Perception: the experience is not literally yellow, but it is caused literally. Moreover, it is experienced as caused, whether it is satisfied or not. But it is not experienced as yellow, but as of something yellow.
II 103
Causality: I may very well experience directly! However, not independent but the being caused belongs to the experience. (This does not mean that the experience confirms itself).
II 104
Causality: also for things characteristic, which are not directly observable such as ultraviolet and infrared.. If they could not have an impact on our measuring instruments, then we might not know about their existence. ((s) Infrared cannot be hallucination! But one can imagine a sunburn.)
- - -
II 156
Causality/SearleVsHume: I believe that "to cause" describes a real relationship in the real world, but it does not follow a universal correlation of similar cases.
II 160
Tradition: one never has a causing experience. SearleVsTradition: you have not often a causing experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such a causing experience!
SearleVsHume: he looked for a wrong spot, he looked for a power.
- - -
II 170
Regularity/SearleVsHume: not all regularities are causal. It is wrong to think that we can have in addition of an experience of cause and effect a hypothesis about regularities in the world.
II 171
I have not the hypothesis, but I have the ability to distinguish regularity from irregularity. Regularity becomes the background.
II 173
SearleVsCausal Law/SearleVsHume: does not need to be derived from the existence of causation. After 300 years of unsuccessful attempts with the regularity you have to see that the concept of to make something happening differs from the concept of regularity.
II 174
There are not two types of causation: "Regularity causation" and "intentional causation". There is exactly one way: this is the action-causation.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Hume, D. Sellars Vs Hume, D.
 
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I 9
Imagination/Hume: the accumulation of ideas is imagination, it is not a fortune, but a reservoir, a collection without Scrapbook, a theater without a stage, a "river of perceptions". (SellarsVsHume).
The place is not different from the action in which it takes place, the idea is not given in a subject.
I 10
The imagination is not a factor, not a mediator, no decisive determination. Nothing happens by, everything happens in the imagination. - - -
Sellars II 327
Hume/Sellars: our "perceptions" are "images" of facts in a general spatiotemporal world. The uniformities of natural events tend to be reflected in our "ideas" as uniformities. The difference between acts of thinking and lightning obliterates.
SellarsVsHume: he has difficulties in explaining the reference relation between a present idea and an earlier event.
II 328
He notes the propositional form of his "ideas" not sufficiently and spoils himself thus the way to an explicit explanation of the difference between the conclusions Lightning now, so soon thunder and: Yesterday at 10:00 lightning, so yesterday at 10:01 thunder.
SellarsVsHume: because it does not clearly distinguish between thoughts and impressions, it can be assumed that a natural derivative corresponds not only a logical but also a temporal sequence. His theory must be extended so that it also includes cases such as the above or backwards:
Now thunder, therefore a moment ago lightning.
Perception/complex/SellarsVsHume: he does not explicitly state that the perception of a configuration itself is a configuration of perceptions! Although this is true in the core, in principle, the previously troubles if you understand "perceptions" in the sense of "sensation or impression".

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999
Hume, D. Strawson Vs Hume, D.
 
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IV 157
Causality/StrawsonVsHume: he overlooks the very obvious fact that objects exert physical forces. (>Dennett: and they are observable). ---
IV 160
Theory/Strawson: I do not want to draw a too sharp line between observation and theory. ---
IV 162
Causality/Hume/Strawson: we can actually observe many actions and reactions without knowing what effects were actually working. ---
IV 163
Regularity/causality/regularity/StrawsonVsHume: Regularity (happening according to rules) is time neutral. The regularity does not prohibit reversing the order. ---
IV 165
KantVsHume: We learn a lot about rule-like sequences in the world by observing, but only because we already have the concept of causality. ---
IV 166
Causality/Strawson: to understand it we are consciously or unconsciously using the model of our human behavior and experience, what forces we must exert ourselves and to what forces we are exposed to.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Hume, D. Wittgenstein Vs Hume, D.
 
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Stegmüller IV 63
Impressions/experience/sensation/introspection/WittgensteinVsHume/WittgensteinVsLocke: those "inner impressions" do not exist. This is not a behaviorist criticism Witt's, but happens on a genuinely introspective basis.
Introspection/Wittgenstein: provide us with an image that completely differs from that of the empiricists. "capturing meaning" does not exist as a state.
The so-called "aha-moment" cannot be it: two people can fully agree in their inner experiences, however, one could mean "plus" and the other "quus".

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Hume, D. Verschiedene Vs Hume, D. Hacking I 68
Kausalität/W.C.BroadVsHume: VsRegularity: Bsp wir können feststellen, dass die Sirene von Manchester jeden Tag um die gleiche Zeit heult, woraufhin die Arbeiter von Leeds die Arbeit für eine Stunde ruhen lassen. Aber keine Verursachung.
Hacking I 70
CartwrightVsHume: die Regelmäßigkeiten sind Merkmale der Verfahren, mit denen wir Theorien aufstellen. (>Putnam). - - -
Hume I 131
Def Atomismus/Hume/Deleuze: ist die These, dass die Relationen den Vorstellungen äußerlich sind. (KantVs). VsHume: Kritiker werfen ihm vor, das Gegebene "atomisiert" zu haben.
Theorie/DeleuzeVsVs: damit glaubt man, ein ganzes System an den Pranger gestellt zu haben. . Als wäre es eine Marotte Humes. Was ein Philosoph sagt wird so dargestellt, als würde es von ihm getan oder gewollt.
I 132
Was glaubt man damit erklären zu können? Eine Theorie muss von ihren begrifflichen Grundlagen her verstanden werden. Eine philosophische Theorie ist eine entfaltete Frage. Frage und Kritik der Frage sind eins.
I 133
Es geht nicht darum zu wissen, ob die Dinge so oder so sind, sondern ob die Frage eine gute Frage ist oder nicht. - - -
Schurz I 238
Lawlikeness/lawlike/Schurz: b) im engeren Sinn: = physikalische Notwendigkeit (um der Vagheit bzw. Gradualität des weiten Begriffs zu entgehen). Problem: nicht alle raumzeitlich unbeschränkten Gesetze sind gesetzesartig im engeren Sinn.
Universell, aber nicht physikalisch notwendig: Bsp "Kein Klumpen Gold hat einen Durchmesser von mehr als einem Kilometer".
Universality: ist also keine hinreichende, aber eine notwendige Bedingung für Gesetzesartigkeit. Bsp der universal statement "Alle Äpfel in diesem Korb sind rot" ist nicht universell, auch dann nicht, wenn man ihn durch seine Kontraposition ersetzt: Bsp "Alle nichtroten Gegenstände sind keine Äpfel in diesem Korb". (Hempel 1965, 341).
Strong Hume-Thesis/Hume/Schurz: Universality ist eine hinreichende Bedingung für lawlikeness. SchurzVs: das ist falsch.
Weak Hume-Thesis/Schurz: Universalität ist eine notwendige Bedingung für Gesetzesartigkeit.
((s) stärker/schwächer/(s): die Behauptung, dass eine Bedingung hinreichend ist, ist stärker als die, dass sie notwendig ist.) BhaskarVs Weak Hume-Thesis. BhaskarVsHume.
Lösung/Carnap/Hempel:
Def Maxwell condition/lawlikeness: Naturgesetze bzw. nomologische Prädikate dürfen keinen analytischen Bezug auf bestimmte individuals oder spacetime points enthalten. Das ist viel stärker als die universality condition. (stärker/schwächer).
Bsp "Alle Smaragde sind grue": ist zwar raumzeitlich universell, aber erfüllt nicht die Maxwell condition. ((s) Weil beobachtete Smaragde konkrete Individuen sind?).
I 239
Naturgesetz/LoN/Armstrong: sind relations of implication zwischen universals. Daher kein Bezug auf Individuen. (1983,) Maxwell condition/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): sie stelle ein physikalisches Symmetrieprinzip dar: d.h. LoN müssen invariant sein unter Translation ihrer Zeitkoordinaten und Translation bzw. Rotation ihrer Raumkoordinaten. Daraus lassen sich Erhaltungssätze gewinnen.
Symmetrieprinzipien/Prinzip/Prinzipien/Schurz: physikalische Symmetrieprinzipien sind jedoch nicht a priori, sondern erfahrungsabhängig!
Maxwell condition/Schurz: ist für lawlikeness zu schwach: Bsp "Kein Klumpen Gold..." auch dieser universal statement erfüllt sie.
- - -
Stegmüller IV 243
StegmüllerVsHume: geht meist unsystematisch vor und mischt kontingente Eigenschaften der Welt mit zufälligen Eigenschaften der Menschen. Ethik/Moral/Hume: 1. angesichts knapper Ressourcen müssen die Menschen kooperieren um überleben zu können.
2. HumeVsHobbes: allen Menschen ist Sympathie eigen. Wäre freilich alles im Überfluss vorhanden, wäre die Respektierung fremden Eigentums überflüssig:
IV 244
Die Menschen würden freiwillig die Bedürfnisse im allseitigen Interesse gemäß ihrer Dringlichkeit befriedigen. Moral/Ethik/Shaftesbury/ShaftesburyVsHume: will die gesamte Moral auf menschlicher Sympathie, Altruismus und Nächstenlieben aufbauen. (>Positionen).
HumeVsShaftesbury: illusionäres Ideal.
Ethik/Moral/Hume: 3. menschliche Einsichtsfähigkeit und Willensstärke sind begrenzt, daher sind Sanktionen notwendig.
4. Vorteilhafter Zug: die Intelligenz befähigt den Menschen, langfristige Interessen zu berechnen.
IV 245
Die entscheidende Triebkraft ist das Eigeninteresse. Es ist sinnlos zu fragen, ob der Mensch "von Natur aus gut" oder "von Natur aus schlecht" sei.
es geht um die Unterscheidung von Klugheit und Narrheit.
5. Der Mensch ist verwundbar.
6. Die Menschen sind annähernd gleich.




Hume, D. Martin Vs Hume, D.
 
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Arm II 94
logische Verbindung/Hume: zwischen getrennten Entitäten wie Ursache und Wirkung kann es keine logische Verbindung geben. (Armstrong pro). II 95 Armstrong: dieses Prinzip ergibt sich umgekehrt aus der Idee, daß absolute Notwendigkeit nur aus Identität entspringt (II 95).
MartinVs: da muß man aber die Reichweite der Beispiele genau betrachten!
Martin: Analogie: die Dispositionalität und Qualitativität jeder intrinsischen Eig sind analog zu Größe und Form von ausgedehnten Gegenständen: das eine kann nicht ohne das andere existieren, aber das eine kann ohne das andere variieren! (Asymmetrie, Abhängigkeit).
MartinVsArmstrong/VsHume: sie sind verschieden, aber nicht getrennt!
Unterschiedenheit/MartinVsArmstrong: es gibt sogar Fälle von Unterschiedenheit, die nicht separierbar sind. Bsp gleichseitig/gleichwinklig.
Grenzsicht/Martin: nach ihr muß man Separabilität logisch ausschließen und die Notwendigkeit der Ko-Existenz von Dispositionalität und Qualitativität für jede Eig, aber dann ist man frei, in jedem Einzelfall zu entscheiden, ob die Kovarianz notwendig oder kontingent ist.

Mart I
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Hume, D. Bigelow Vs Hume, D.
 
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I 226
Non-modal theory/Laws of Nature/LoN/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: most non-modal theories of the LON descended from Hume. Then we can assume nomic necessity to be a relative necessity without falling into a circle. Important argument: then we can just assume nomic necessity as a relative necessity and rely on it being based on an independent approach to laws! Explanation: So it makes sense to make use of laws to explain nomic necessity, rather than vice versa. And that’s much less obscure than modal arguments.
I 227
BigelowVsVs: modal explanations are not so mysterious. BigelowVsHume: Hume’s theories are unable to explain these non-modal properties of the laws, they have less explanatory power.
I 233
"Full generality"/"Pure" generality/Hume/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: may not contain any reference to an individual: This is too weak and too strong: a) too strong: E.g. Kepler’s laws relate to all the planets, but therefore also to an individual, the sun. b) too weak: it is still no law. E.g. that everything moves towards the earth’s center.
I 235
LoN/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: in our opinion, it has nothing to do with them, E.g. whether they are useful, or whether they contradict our intuitions. Counterfactual conditional/Co.co/LoN/Hume/Bigelow/Pargetter: for the Humean, Counterfactual Conditional are circular, if they are to represent LoN. We ourselves only use a Counterfactual Conditional when we have recognized something as a law! When we ask ourselves whether something is a law, we ask ourselves not whether it fulfils a Counterfactual Conditional.
I 236
HumeVsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: our modal approach for LoN is circular. BigelowVsVs: it is not! BigelowVsHume: most of Hume’s theories of the LON are circular themselves, with one exception: the theory that Lewis reads out of Ramsey. Ramsey/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: this theory is based on the logical relations of laws among each other (coherence). (Ramsey 1929, 1931, Lewis 1973a, Mellor 1980).
I 237
BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsHume/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: if theories are sets of propositions, propositions must not be sets of possible worlds! For then the best theory for a possible worlds would have to be an axiom: the one-class of this possible worlds All facts of the world are then theorems of the axiom. There would be only one law for each world. No two possible worlds would have a law in common.
I 267
BigelowVsHume: went too far in his rejection of necessity in laws. But not far enough in his rejection of the necessity approach to causality.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Hume, D. Mackie Vs Hume, D.
 
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Armstrong III 57
MackieVsHume: (1979) (Stove, et al.): overlooked the possibility that observational premises, while they do not contain any conclusion about the unobserved, still can yield a logical possibility, e.g. 99% of Fs are Gs. Then it is obviously rational to conclude that a is a G. So one can say that the observed cases provide a logical opportunity for unobserved cases. Purely mathematical argument about distribution. VsTheory of Regularity: yet there is a coherent reason why the principles of logical possibility alone cannot solve the problem of the theory of regularity. The issue with logical possibility is that it cannot distinguish between natural and non-natural classes. Ex.: glau as an unnatural predicate cannot readily be ruled out.
III 58
That all emeralds are glau, has the same logical possibility (the same percentage as the green ones). - - -
Stegmüller IV 238
Virtue/Hume: distinction: natural virtue: is part of biological provisions. Moral philosophers before Hume exclusively referred to these virtues. Ex: generosity, forbearance, charitableness, altruism, moderation, impartiality. (Basis: human sympathy).
artificial virtue: nothing but human inventions. Ex: respect for property; rules of transfer of property, promise, commitment to adhere to contracts, loyalty towards the government.
IV 239
Artificial virtues have no natural origin. Ex: respecting other's property: 1. cannot originate from benevolence towards others: for then the respectation would depend on whether the property serves the welfare of all.
2. also, it cannot depend on whether the person concerned seems sympathetic or not.
3. sympathy is imaginable in gradations, respect for property is not.
This applies mutatis mutandis to all artificial virtues.
IV 240
Morality/Hume: I cannot base my duties on whether someone seems sympathetic or not. natural virtue/MackieVsHume/Stegmüller: to begin with, one would expect that the discussion of the natural virtues is much easier, since the first step (about the genesis) does not apply.
Problem: (also recognized by Hume) if the natural virtues were an effluence of sympathy, they would have to run parallel. But this is not the case.
Our sympathies are self-centered! We have more sympathy for people who are closest to us.
IV 241
But we expect from moral judgments that they are impersonal and impartial. Thus, the seemingly absolute difference between natural and artificial virtues must partially be abandoned. The "natural" virtues, too, thus form a system of conventions. They are supposed to serve the "long-term interests" of all.
The natural virtues then are such artificial virtues in which we find instinctive inclination to act accordingly.
In the artificial virtues, we find no such basis. They are merely socialized.
- - -
Stegmüller IV 355
Miracle/probability/Hume/Stegmüller: probability is always to be qualified by the level of information. But Hume's argument would even be valid if credibility of witnesses were a law of nature! Even then it would not be rational to believe in miracles. Miracle/Mackie: difference:
a) question: on grounds of the reports, which hypotheses about laws should be assumed?
b) the weight of the evidence itself.
Miracle/MackieVsHume: also the reporter himself requires the notion of a well-founded natural law in order to classify the event as a miracle.
IV 356
Hume does not anywhere considere the strengthening by several independent witnesses. - - -
IV 412
Teleological proof of God's existence/MackieVsHume: (by and large pro Hume): but one can interpret the conclusion by analogy in a way that God is introduced as that which caused the natural world and explains it.
IV 413
But also here Hume would be proved to be correct that no further consequences arise therefrom. In particular, the relationship between God and the world remains unexplained. Science/theory/Mackie: Darwinian theory of evolution, too, does not facilitate any predictions!
IV 414
Order/theory of evolution/Mackie/Stegmüller: in Darwinism order is not explained by the proposition, that God created the world for us, but that we have adapted to it.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Hume, D. Cartwright Vs Hume, D.
 
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I 10
Causation/Causal explanation/CartwrightVsHume: the laws of association are not sufficient to explain the difference between effective strategies (e.g. fight against malaria) and ineffective ones. Causal laws: are needed just as well. Simpson’s Paradox/Probability//Statistics/Causal explanation/Cartwright: was used by many authors as a counter-E.g. to probabilistic models of causation.
I 42
Humeean world/Cartwright: this type of example (Figure 1) brings comfort to the representatives of the Humeean world. HumeVsCausal laws: the representatives reject them, because they have no independent access to them. They consider themselves able to determine laws of association, but they think that they will never have the causal initial information to apply condition C. If they are lucky, they do not need this initial knowledge: Perhaps they live in a world that is not a Humean world. ((s) because then this knowledge would be irrelevant). CartwrightVsHume: but a Humean world might still be one in which causal laws could be inferred from the laws of association.
I 61
Force//Hume: it is wrong to distinguish between a force and its exercise. (Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford 1978, p 311). CartwrightVsHume: we need exactly this apparent distinction here. Causal force/Law of gravity/Cartwright: says that two bodies have the power to produce a force Gm m’/r², but they do not manage to exercise it. (Because other forces are at play). So the law does not speak of the behavior of the bodies, but of the powers they have. Problem: the facts-view cannot be given up so easily.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983
Hume, D. Salmon Vs Hume, D.
 
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Fraassen I 119
Kausalität/W. Salmon: früh: Kausal-Relation, es geht um inferentielle Fähigkeit zur Vorhersage und Retrodiktion durch Kenntnis der Mechanismen. spät: Kausalprozeß statt Kausalrelation. Was ist ein Prozeß und was ist kausale Interaktion? Dabei modifiziert
Def Prozeß/Kausalprozeß/W. Salmon/Fraassen: ist eine raumzeitlich kontinuierliche Folge von Ereignissen.
SalmonVsHume: eine Folge von Ereignissen im Kausalprozeß ist eben nicht diskret sondern kontinuierlich. Bsp ein Auto fährt die Straße entlang. Dabei macht es keine Sprünge.
Pseudo-Prozeß: Bsp der Schatten des Autos begleitet das Auto, aber die frühere Position des Schattens ist keine Ursache für die spätere Position des Schattens und auch nicht des Autos!
Lösung/Reichenbach: probabilistische Relationen: (FN 27)
(1) die Wschk von A r+s gegeben Ar ist größer oder gleich der Wschk von Ar+s gegeben A r-t, die wiederum größer ist als die Wschk von Ar+s allein.
Problem: das schließt noch keine Pseudoprozesse aus.
(2) die Wschk von Ar+s gegeben beides, Ar und Ar-t ist gleich der Wschk von Ar+s gegeben Ar
I 120
Und außerdem : „es gibt keine andere Folge von Ereignissen B, die Ar+s von Ar abschirmt für alle r. Vs: 1. (1) erinnert an eine wohlbekannte Eigenschaft stochastischer Prozesse: die Markov-Eigenschaft. Das ist zur stark für die Definition von Kausalprozessen. Warum sollte die ganze Vorgeschichte des Prozesses von Zeitpunkt r mehr Information darüber liefern was später geschieht, als r selbst?
Markov-Eigenschaft: gesamte Vorgeschichte wichtig.
Vs: 2. zusätzlich zu (2) müßten wir sagen, dass Br ein echter Kausalprozeß ist. Sonst ist die Bewegung des Autos selbst keiner, denn die Bewegung des Schattens wird die aufeinanderfolgenden Positionen des Autos voneinander abschirmen.
Problem: wenn wir sagen, dass Br ein echter Kausalprozeß sein muss, haben wir einen Regreß!
Lösung/Reichenbach: „Methode der Markierung“: stoppt den Regreß. Daher wird sie auch von W. Salmon bevorzugt:
Bsp wenn ein Kotflügel einen Kratzer aus einem Zusammenstoß mit einer Mauer hat, wird diese Markierung von dem Auto noch lange Zeit später transportiert. Aber der Schatten als Pseudoprozeß transportiert den Kratzer nicht. (FN28). ((s)Vs: Problem: eine große Beule würde auch vom Schatten „transportiert“).

Sal I
W. Salmon
Logik Stuttgart 1983

Sal II
W. Salmon
The Foundations Of Scientific Inference 1967

SalN I
N. Salmon
Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II 2007

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Hume, D. Castaneda Vs Hume, D.
 
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Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 214
Subject/Object/Reflexivity/Castaneda: Tradition: Problem: how can a self be both subject and object of its own experience at the same time? CastanedaVs: this is a fictitious problem emanating from a monolithic self. There is no such self.
CastanedaVsHume: this does, however, not justify Hume’s conclusion that there is no experience of the self!
VsHume: wrong identification of the external ITself with the internal itSELF.
There is no external self but there is an internal self.
The internal self is what one refers to when one says "I".
Then we can say that although there is no problem with the self, there is a serious problem with the Is!
We can concentrate on the internal reflexivity without loss.
Self-consciousness/SC/Castaneda: takes places in episodes of thinking about oneself qua oneself. The thinker appears to HIMself as himSELF, i.e. as I.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Hume, D. Freud Vs Hume, D.
 
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I 128
BergsonVsHume/FreudVsHume: die Assoziation der Vorstellungen erklärt nur das Oberflächliche. Deleuze: Hume hat nie etwas anderes gesagt. Er war jedoch der Meinung, dass das Formale auch erklärt werden müsse.
Umstände/Hume: er beruft sich oft auf sie, sie bezeichnet stets Affektivität. Auch Substanzen und Modi sowie allgemeine Vorstellungen bedürfen der Umstände.

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011
Hume, D. Vollmer Vs Hume, D.
 
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I 103
Kausalität/VollmerVsHume: kein Laie, aber auch kein Wissenschaftler fühlt sich bei Humes Feststellung wohl. Kausalität/Hume: führt Kausalität auf einen Instinkt zurück, den wir mit den Tieren gemeinsam haben.
Kausalität/KantVsHume: Instinkte können versagen, das Kausalgesetz scheint nicht zu versagen.
I 105
Kausalität/Regularität/VsHume: Bsp obwohl Tag und Nacht regelmäßig aufeinander folgen, sagen wir nicht, dass der Tag die Ursache für die Nacht ist. VollmerVsHume: hat kein überzeugendes Argument dafür!
Vollmer: kein Energieübertrag vom Tag zur Nacht, daher kann das eine auch keine Ursache für das andere sein!
I 106
Kausalität/Energieübertragung/VollmerVsHume: die Häufigkeit ist nicht entscheidend, wie sonst könnten wir die Expansion des Universums (die ja per definitionem einmalig ist) durch den Urknall erklären? Die Energieerhaltung ist für unsere ontologische Interpretation der Kausalität relevant, nicht die Häufigkeit. Sie ist wesentlich für die Möglichkeit eines wirksamen Energieübertrages.
I 107
Allerdings könnte es im Prinzip auch kausale Prozesse geben, bei denen nur die Hälfte der abgegebenen Energie übertragen wird, während die andere Hälfte unter Verletzung des Erhaltungssatzes verschwindet! Umgekehrt braucht die "Ursache" nicht die Gesamtenergie für die Wirkung zu liefern. (Schmetterlingseffekt).
Vollmer: kleine Ursache - große Wirkung? - Ja, aber ohne ein Minimum von Energieübertragung keine Wirkung, keine Kausalität.
II 47
Naturgesetz/Gesetz/allgemeiner Satz/Vollmer: drei Klassen von wahren, allgemeinen Sätzen: 1. zufällig wahre - Bsp alle Kugeln in dieser Kiste sind rot
2. gesetzmäßig wahre ohne Energieübertragung:
Bsp Schwingungsdauer = 2π √(Pendellänge mal Erdbeschleunigung).
3. Kausalgesetze (mit Energieübertragung)
Bsp Erwärmung führt zu Ausdehnung
Damit ist nicht behauptet, diese kausale "Notwendigkeit" verleihe Kausalbehauptungen irgendeinen unangreifbaren Status. Auch hier bleibt es beim hypothetischen Charakter aller unserer Erkenntnis.
Kausalität/VollmerVsHume: dennoch besagen Kausalbehauptungen mehr als bloße Folgebehauptungen: ihr empirischer Gehalt ist größer. Damit sind sie freilich auch leichter zu widerlegen.

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Kant, I. Kripke Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 135Kant: "All analytic judgments are based entirely on the principle of contradiction and by their nature are a priori knowledge, the definitions on which they are based on may be empirical or not. Since the predicate has been thought of in terms of the subject, it cannot be negated by the first."
I 181
That is precisely why all analytic propositions are a priori judgments even though their terms are empirical. E.g. gold is a yellow metal. In order to know this, I need no further experience beyond my definition of gold. If that makes up my definition, I am only able to segment my definition, I cannot look anywhere else for it. Kripke: Kant seems to say that gold means simply yellow metal.
KripkeVsKant: Is Kant right? According to scientists, it is very difficult to define what a metal is. We also need to know the periodic table. One might think that there are actually two definitions, a phenomenological and a scientific one, where the latter replaces the former. Phenomenological: Stretchable, deformable, scientific: Periodic table. (KripkeVs).
A posteriori: one can learn a mathematical truth a posteriori by looking at a computer or by asking a mathematician. (e.g. naturally a posteriori). The philosophical analysis tells us that it could not be contingent, and therefore any empirical knowledge of its truth is automatically an empirical knowledge of its necessity.(KripkeVsHume, KripkeVsKant)

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
Kant, I. Nozick Vs Kant, I.
 
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II 12
Hypothesis/How-is-it-possible questions/Nozick: a hypothesis that is false does not explain how something is possible. But maybe it increases understanding. Hypothesis: must not even be plausible.
How-is-it-possible question: can go so deep that the only answers that are sufficient, are implausible.
One should not exclude that the p with which the question began is excluded at the end. (VsKant).
- - -
II 110
Synthesis/Self/I/Nozick: VsKant: VsSynthesis: against the perspective of self-synthesizing self could be argued that it does not localize itself as an entity, it is not a "part of the equipment of the universe". possible solution:
II 111
I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (self) as a property. I.e. not as an object. That solves, for example, the problem of the localization and other problems: 1) Hume: "I cannot perceive myself independent of any other perception."
NozickVsHume: perhaps he has not searched thoroughly. He has done nothing specific to search for the self, has he?
2) Advantage: the approach explains why it is difficult to imagine the self without embodiment.
3) It is difficult to imagine how the self should be identical with any particular stuff.
II 112
A property is never identical with the object. The difficulty to specify the relation of a property to the object is the general reason why we can only locate the self with difficulty, but it is not a specific problem of the relation between self and body. Property/Nozick: there are at least two ways to identify a person with a property:
1) with a non-indexical, non-reflexive property: E.g. "being Robert Nozick"
2) an identification whose definition uses a reflexive pronoun of the first person: E.g. "being me". This introduces reflexivity. Right into the nature of the self at that.
I Problem: it is obscure, because it introduces the reflexivity in the nature of the self, but it explains why all public or physicalist descriptions leave me out, because they are not reflective.
Unit/Merger/I/Self/Tradition: the I merges with the "one", but does not disappear in the process. The I is a property of the one, I am not separate from it.
Reflexivity/Property: E.g. reflexive property: "being me". Problem:
1) P is the ability to be reflexively self-referring.
People have P, tables do not. I have the property P and so do you,
II 113
but you have it by virtue of the fact that you are you, I have it by virtue of the other fact that I am I. We both have the property of being me, but the property is indexical. I.e. the properties differ!
Point: they both arise from the same non-indexical property P: being reflexively self-referring!
- - -
II 318
Action/Decision/Free Will/Knowledge/Belief/Nozick: Is there a parallel between belief and action, according to the model by which we have established conditions for belief and knowledge in the previous chapter? Belief is in connection with facts (covariance).
What are actions to be connected to?
Just like beliefs should respond to facts, actions should respond to correctness or quality ("bestness", optimum, "optimal desirability", "the best").
Then we need to know the relevant facts as well.
II 319
Our actions must be sensitive to accuracy or "the best". Conditions:
(1) Action A is correct
(2) S does A on purpose (intentionally)
(III) if A were not right, S would not do A intentionally.
(IV) if A were correct, S would intentionally do A.
Distinction: "Allowed"/"the best" (nothing better). Similar:
"Maximum": several maximums possible: even if there is nothing bigger.
Maximum: only one possible. "bigger than all the others".
then:
correctness:
(3) if A was not allowed, S would not do A
(4) if A were mandatory, S would do A.
"the best":
(1) A is the best (at least maximum, perhaps maximum)
(2) S does A intentionally
(3) if A were not as good as a possible other thing, S would not do A
(4) if A were better than anything else, S would do A.
II 320
So here we can also introduce a reference to a motif M in accordance with conditions (3) and (4). Moral/Kant/Nozick: when we happen to do something moral, immoral motives may be present.
Problem: it could be that if the act is immoral, other non-moral (neutral) motives move the person to carry out the action anyway.
NozickVsKant: he would be better served with our conditions (3) and (4).
In addition, we need the inclusion of methodologies (see above, example grandmother: would still believe, even if the facts were different.
E.g. Theater/Nuclear Reactor: if it were not a play, the person would still believe it via other methods).
Action: similar: E.g. someone carries out a mandatory action after careful consideration. If it were not right, its moral quality would never have come to his attention, but he could still have chosen it. Only this time without reflection on its correctness.
Method/Action/Nozick: like with belief, methods can also be weighed against each other even with actions:
A person meets the Kantian requirements if there is a motive M for which he does a, which satisfies the conditions (3) and (4), and outweighs any other motive M' that does not satisfy (3) and (4).
- - -
II 352
Self-Choice/Action/Morality/Ethics/Free Will/Nozick: the concept of a free action as in connection with accuracy (or "the best") is defined in terms of the result. And not so much as a process. Tradition: Thinks that a free action emerges from a process of choice that could also have had an incorrect result.
How close can we get to the process of choice in a simulation?
II 353
Anyway, we will not get out of a causal nexus. 1) Locke/Hume/Tradition/Nozick: we are not free if our actions are caused.
2) Kant: we are free if our actions are in harmony with reason
3) Free actions must not be caused by any independent source,
II 354
but must come forth from our nature. (Spinoza: only God is free). Hegel: combines 2) and 3): (with Aristotle) ​​Reason and thought are the essence of man. We are free when we are limited by a law of reason in a way conscious of ourselves, which is a constitutive principle of our nature.
Nozick: is that enough? Although our actions come forth from our nature, would we then not be unfree in the extent that we are bound by our nature?
Could external sources not be as binding for us?
Why should I want to be moral?
Do I have to wish to be happy?
Why should I want to be rational?
"Your being is rationality, do what is rational to realize your nature".
Why should I realize my nature? It's bad enough that it is so difficult.
"Your nature, that is you."
If I am not really me, do I have to wish to be me? Could I not wish to be the Messiah?
"But you have no choice, you had to be what you are."
So, that is what you offer me as freedom.
Objective morality seems to be something inevitable.
Categorical Imperative/Nozick: some read it as follows:
"Do this if you wish to be rational"
"Do this if you want to be free" (absurd: command).
Freedom/Nozick: has to be something that does not bind us.
II 355
Then there can be no free will with objective morality. Law/Kant/Nozick: the law that does not bind us is the one that we give ourselves, that is not borrowed from nature, but is set by reason itself as a necessity of its own nature.
Nozick: but does that not bind us, too?
Could we not act as autonomously out of very different motives?
NozickVsKant: the status of morality in his theory is unclear.
Example: Suppose someone finds out what the categorical imperative wants and then does the opposite. "But what motive could he have for that?"
Perhaps he just wants autonomy? The chances are not good.
Morality/Freedom/Nozick: Thesis: must not only be chosen by ourselves, it must also be given by something that is in turn chosen for its part!
Only something that arises from a chosen nature will not bind us. But if the nature is chosen, how should then it be inevitable? (>self-choice).

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Kant, I. Vollmer Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 25
VollmerVsKant: heute glaubt man nicht mehr, dass seine Kategorien notwendig sind. Auch die Naturgesetze haben nicht die allgemeine und notwendige Geltung!
I 84
Theorie/Vollmer: reicht weiter als unser Mesokosmos: Das verstehen aber viele Philosophen nicht:
VsKant,
VsAnalytic Philosphy: Alltagssprache
VsPositivism
VsPhenomenalism: z.B. Mach: Sinnesempfindung ist alles. VsOperationalism: jeder Begriff müsse in mesokosmischen operationalen Termini definiert werden.
Vollmer: dennoch kommen wir nicht umhin, jedes Objekt, jede Struktur der empirischen Wissenschaft mit menschlichen (also mesokosmischen) Erfahrungen zu verbinden.
- - -
I 103
Kausalität/KantVsHume: Instinkte können versagen, das Kausalgesetz scheint nicht zu versagen. Kausalität/VollmerVsKant: was Kant beschreibt, ist bestenfalls ein normaler erwachsener Kulturmensch.
Evolutionary epistemology: Biologie statt synthetisches Apriori. Lediglich mesokosmisch angemessen.
I 173
Epistemology/VollmerVsKant: dieser sieht nicht, dass das Gebiet seiner traditionellen Erkenntnistheorie viel zu eng ist. Er bemerkt nicht den Unterschied zwischen mesokosmischer und theoretischer Erkenntnis
Er kann folgende Fragen nicht beantworten:
Wie entstehen unsere Kategorien?
Warum haben wir gerade diese Anschauungsformen und Kategorien?
Warum sind wir gerade an diese apriorischen Urteile gebunden und nicht an andere?
Kant gibt falsche Lösungen für folgende Probleme:
Sollten wir die Idee einer organismischen Evolution akzeptieren?
Warum können wir einander verstehen?
Wie ist intersubjektives Wissen möglich?
Können die Kategorien als vollständig erwiesen werden? (Vollmer: Nein!)
Können sie wissenschaftlich gerechtfertigt werden?
- - -
I 193
synthetische Urteile a priori/VollmerVsKant: bis heute hat noch niemand ein einziges Exemplar solcher Urteile geliefert. Obwohl sie logisch möglich erscheinen.
I 196
Deduktion/Kategorien/Kant/Vollmer: man muss sich klarmachen, dass Kant mit seiner "Deduktion" nicht einmal beabsichtigt, eine Rechtfertigung für spezielle Kategorien zu geben. Er zeigt lediglich, wie sie benutzt werden. Kategorien/Kant/Vollmer: als Begriffe können sie nicht wahr oder falsch sein (w/f).
Zu jeder Kategorie gibt es aber ein Prinzip des Verstandes, das aufgrund seines transzendentalen Charakters ein Naturgesetz liefert. Deshalb kann eine Diskussion (und mögliche Rechtfertigung) der Kategorien durch eine der zugehörigen Gesetze ersetzt werden.
I 197
Prinzipien des reinen Verstandes/Kant/Vollmer: vier Gruppen: 1. Axiome der Anschauung Anwendbarkeit der euklidischen Geometrie auf
a. Objekte, - b. Zustände, und - c. Prozesse.
2. Antizipationen der Wahrnehmung
a. Stetigkeit des Raums, - b. Stetigkeit der Zeit, - c. Stetigkeit physikalischer Prozesse
3. Analogien der Erfahrung
a. Beharrung der Substanz, b. universelle Kausalität, c. universelle Wechselwirkung der Substanzen.
4. Postulate des empirischen Denkens überhaupt.(hier nicht Prinzipien, sondern Definitionen) .
I 199
VollmerVsKant: zeigt nirgends, dass seine Rekonstruktion die einzig mögliche ist. Seine Darstellung der Newtonschen Physik ist wohl nicht angemessen. Physik/Kant/VollmerVsKant/Vollmer: Materie: hält er für unendlich teilbar (NewtonVs).
Trägheitsprinzip: hat er nicht verstanden, denkt fälschlich, jede Zustandsänderung bedürfe einer äußeren Ursache. Gleichförmige Bewegung braucht jedoch keine Ursache!
Dachte fälschlich, Gewehrkugeln erreichten ihre höchste Geschwindigkeit erst einige Zeit nach Verlassen des Laufs. (TrägheitsprinzipVs).
Hat Infinitesimalrechnung nie beherrscht
Hat das Wesen der experimentellen Methode nie ganz verstanden. hat die Rolle der Erfahrung unterschätzt.
I 202
Intersubjectivity/Kant/Vollmer: mit Tieren sollte Intersubjektivität unmöglich sein. Es sollte unmöglich sein, mit Schimpansen zu kommunizieren. Schlimmer noch: eigentlich sollten wir uns gegenseitig nicht verstehen. Denn es gibt nach Kant keinen Grund, warum die kognitiven Strukturen der anderen Menschen mit meinen identisch sein sollten.
Grund: Erkennen und Wissen sind für Kant an die transzendentalen kognitiven Strukturen jedes einzelnen gebunden und darauf beschränkt. Daher könnte sie auch völlig idiosynkratisch sein.
Intersubjectivity/Vollmer: glücklicherweise gibt es sie auf der Erde. Der Transzendentalphilosoph kann das als Faktum registrieren. Erklären kann er sie nicht.
VollmerVsKant: der Ursprung der Intersubjektivität bleibt für Kant rätselhaft, unerklärlich, eine überraschende empirische Tatsache.
Vollmer: Intersubjektivität wird natürlich von der EE erklärt.
EE/Vollmer: unsere Raumanschauung ist dreidimensional, weil der Raum es ist. Sie ist zeitlich gerichtet, weil reale Prozesse es sind. (PutnamVs).
I 208
Erkenntnis/VollmerVsKant: offensichtlich müssen wir zwei Erkenntnisstufen unterscheiden: 1. Wahrnehmung und Erfahrung sind auf evolutionären Erfolg hin ausgerichtet und daher hinreichend korrekt.
2. Wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis ist nicht auf evolutionären Erfolg ausgerichtet.
Kant trifft diese Unterscheidung nicht.
I 210
VollmerVsKant: aus der Tatsache, dass jede faktische Erkenntnis mit mesokosmischen Mitteln getestet wird, schließt er fälschlich, dass sie auch auf den Mesokosmos beschränkt sei. - - -
I 304
Ding an sich/Messen/Vollmer: wir messen zwar die Länge eines Körpers mit irgendeinem Maßstab, trotzdem sprechen wir von der Länge des Körpers. (sic: Referenz auf „Ding an sich“ durch Vollmer).
I 305
Wissen/VollmerVsKant: unser Wissen ist zwar nie absolut sicher, aber es unterscheidet sich doch ganz erheblich vom Wissen über Erscheinungen.
I 306
Zwar mag vieles unbekannt sein, aber es gibt kein Motiv, hinter der Welt noch eine unerkennbare Wirklichkeit an sich zu postulieren.
I 307
VollmerVsKant: die "nackte Wirklichkeit" kann von uns zwar nicht gesehen, wohl aber erkannt werden! - - -
II 48
Def Natur/Kant: das Dasein der Dinge, sofern es nach allgemeinen Gesetzen bestimmt ist. Natur/VollmerVsKant: unnötig eng und petitio principii: weil die Allgemeingültigkeit der Kategorien dadurch zu einer analytischen Konsequenz dieser Definition wird. (Zirkulär).

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Locke, J. Brandom Vs Locke, J.
 
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II 54
BrandomVsHume, BrandomVsLocke: we should downplay, what they have struggled with: the similarity with animals. (Also Dennett, as a naturalist).   We are cultural and not merely natural beings.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Mill, J. St. James Vs Mill, J. St.
 
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I 55
JamesVsHume, JamesVsMill: "associationism": sees in intellectual ideas and experiences only reflections of perceptible impressions that generate ideas by acting on the organism.   James: This "determinism" explains well the feelings of the details, but not the experience of wills, emotional states, rationality, memories.
Millikan, R. Verschiedene Vs Millikan, R. Millikan I 90
Satz/Überzeugung/Sprache/Denken/Millikan: es scheint klar, dass wenn wir keine Überzeugungen hätten, wir aufhören würden, zu sprechen bzw. Sätze mit Bedeutung zu äußern. Aber warum ist das klar? Wir brauchen eine andere Erklärung (s.u.).
Satz/Intentionalität/Millikan: These: ein Satz (und jedes andere typisch intentionale Muster) ist intentional wegen Eigenfunktionen und Normalen Relationen, die dieses Muster zu einem Produzenten und einem Interpreten hat. Diese beiden sind kooperierende Einheiten in diesem Prozess.
Pointe: dann sind Sätze doch grundlegend intentional und haben keine abgeleitete Intentionalität. (MillikanVsTradition, MillikanVsSearle).
((s) Intentionalität/Millikan/(s): muss sich dann nicht mehr auf das Mentale berufen. )
VsMIllikan: man könnte einwenden, dass Intentionalität doch mit dem Mentalen verbunden sein muss, weil die Analyse der Intentionalität von Gedanken oder innerer Repräsentationen wenigstens im Einklang mit Prinzipien geschehen müsste, nach denen Bewusstsein und das Mentale selbst analysiert werden muss.
Relation/VsMillikan: die von Millikan angebotenen Relationen seien bloß externe. Bestenfalls korrelieren sie Veränderungen des Bewusstseins mit Veränderungen in der externen Welt. Sie liegen selbst außerhalb des Geistes und außerhalb des Bewusstseins.
Bewusstsein/Tradition: sei aber ein Bewusstsein der Welt, nicht bloß Bewusstsein der Veränderungen seiner selbst.
I 91
Tradition: wir erfahren unser Bewusstsein direkt. MillikanVsTradition: was soll das für eine Erfahrung der Intentionalität sein? Was für eine Kraft soll dieses Argument haben?
Die Kraft müsste epistemisch und rational sein.
Unkorrigierbarkeit/MillikanVsTradition: die Erfahrung des Bewusstseins (Erfahrung der Intentionalität) müsste etwas Unfehlbares haben. Wir müssten dann auch ein unmittelbares Verstehen haben. Es müsste auch die Existenz von Intentionalität und Bewusstsein annehmen, denn sonst könnte die Erfahrung ja nicht „in“ ihr sein.
Bewusstsein/Tradition: nimmt an, dass das Bewusstsein durchsichtig (transparent) sei. Und daher könne sie nicht allein aus externen Relationen zur äußeren Welt bestehen, und seien diese naturnotwendig.
MillikanVsVs: Angenommen, wir lehnen dieses epistemisch rationalistische Bild ab, d.h. wir leugnen, dass es „epistemisch Gegebenes“ gibt. Dann könnten wir zugeben, dass sich Leute manchmal ihrer Gedanken bewusst sind. Aber wir könnten aufrechterhalten, dass dieses Bewusstsein (awareness) teilweise eine externe Relation ist. Die „Innenseite“ dieses Gefühls (Bewusstsein, awareness)
I 92
gibt keine Garantie dafür, dass es die Innenseite einer echten Bewusstseinsrelation (awareness Relation) ist. Bewusstsein/Millikan: selbst Bewusstsein von Bewusstsein ist kein unmittelbares Objekt. Es gibt nichts durchsichtiges am Bewusstsein.
Pointe/Millikan: das ist beunruhigend, weil daraus folgt (negative These), dass es möglich ist, dass wir nicht wissen, was wir denken! ((s) DavidsonVsHume: dito). D.h. aus dem Akte des Bewusstseins selbst heraus ist nichts garantiert.
Rationalismus/rationalistisch/Intentionalität/Bewusstsein/MillikanVsRationalismus/Millikan: die traditionelle rationalistische Sicht des Bewusstseins und der Intentionalität führt ein eine Sackgasse nach der anderen.




Rationalism James Vs Rationalism
 
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I 57
Nevertheless, James developed a position of radical empiricism (Vsrationalism, Vsempiricism as it is represented by Hume.). JamesVsHume: in order to be radical the empiricist must neither accept elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly.
Reid, Th. Anscombe Vs Reid, Th.
 
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Prior I 124
Gedankenobjekt/Anscombe: (wie Reid, wie Findlay): Intentionalität sollte behandelt werden, als das, was sie ist "und nicht ein ander Ding". AnscombeVsReid: Empfindungsobjekt, Wahrnehmungsobjekt: näher am Denken, als bei Reid.
I 126
Intentionalität/Unbestimmtheit/Gedankenobjekte/Anscombe: 2. Eigenschaft: ihre "Unbestimmtheit".: Bsp ich kann einen Mann denken, ohne an einen Mann mit bestimmter Größe zu denken, aber ich kann keinen Mann schlagen, ohne einen Mann mit bestimmter Größe zu schlagen.
Denn es gibt keinen Mann mit unbestimmter Größe (wohl aber als Gedankenobjekt).
3. Eigenschaft: (Wie Findlay, VsReid):
wenn ich an einen bestimmten Mann denke, ist es möglich, dass nicht jede wahre Kennzeichnung (Beschreibung) von ihm eine ist, unter der ich an ihn denke. (>DavidsonVsHume).
(Bsp >Quine. Tullius, Cicero).
Bsp Anscombe: jemand hält seinen Vater für einen Hirsch.
Vater: "materielles Objekt" (des Zielens!).
Bsp ein Stamm verehrt einen Gott: materielles Objekt: nichts als ein Stück Holz. Intentionales Objekt: Gott.
Pointe: vielleicht war der "Vater" nur ein dunkler Fleck vor dem Laubwerk, aber der dunkle Fleck war wirklich da!
Halluzination/Prior: liefert keine Kennzeichnung! ((s) Nicht öffentlich).
Intentionalität/Gedankenobjekte/Anscombe: gibt selbst hier eine Warnung.
Bsp Man kann nicht sagen: "Sie verehren nichts"!
Das würde implizieren, dass kein Satz der Form:
"Sie verehren das soundso " (Kennzeichnung) wahr ist.
sondern nur: "Das, was sie verehren, ist nichts". (de re, de dicto).

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003
Searle, J.R. Mackie Vs Searle, J.R.
 
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Stegmüller IV 188
Naturalistic Fallacy/SearleVsHume: one could formulate cautious assumptions to work around the problem: 1) Hans: "I hereby promise to pay you, Peter, 10 marks"
2. Hans promised, to pay 10 ...
3) Hans entered an obligation ...
4) Hans is obliged to ...
5) Hans shall ...
IV 189
It is assumed that there are no competing claims or excuses. Searle: Solution by "institutional fact".
institutional fact/MackieVsSearle: confused two perspectives on "institution":
a) externally: Ex. in chess the rules are not internalized for the context of life.
b) internally: here the rules are internalized, we cannot escape.
1. The five steps of Searle are only a description from the outside.
Proposition (5) is nothing but a description of the institution of the promise from the outside. (Descriptive).
IV 190
Nothing but the deduction of a statement of fact from other factual allegations. 2. Or, view it as a conclusion within the institution, then (5) is a normative statement. The difficulty then lies in the transition from (2) to (3).
Then (3) would be better: "Hans made an attempt to commit to Peter ..."
Yet, to get to (4) as a normative statement (3) would have would have to be available in the original version.
The problem stems from the fact that we do not learn about promises externally, but always in concrete, lived situations.


Stegmüller IV 188
Naturalistic Fallacy/SearleVsHume: man könnte vorsichtige Prämissen formulieren, die das Problem umgehen: 1) Hans: "Hiermit verspreche ich dir, Peter, 10 Mark zu zahlen"
2. Hans versprach, Peter 10...
3) Hans ging die Verpflichtung ein...
4) Hans ist verpflichtet...
5) Hans soll...
IV 189
Dabei ist vorausgesetzt, dass es keine konkurrierenden Ansprüche oder Entschuldigungen gibt. Searle: Lösung durch "institutionelle Tatsache".
institutionelle Tatsache/MackieVsSearle: verwechselt zwei Betrachtungsweisen von "Institution":
a) von außen. Bsp beim Schach sind die Regeln nicht verinnerlicht für den Lebenszusammenhang.
b) innerhalb der Institution: hier sind die Regeln verinnerlicht, wir können nicht heraustreten.
1. Die fünf Schritte von Searle sind nur eine Beschreibung von außen.
Satz (5) ist nichts als eine Beschreibung der Institution des Versprechens von außen. (deskriptiv).
IV 190
Nichts als Ableitung einer Tatsachenaussage aus anderen Tatsachenbehauptungen. 2. Oder man spricht von einer Konklusion innerhalb der Institution, dann ist (5) eine normative Aussage. Die Schwierigkeit liegt dann im Übergang von (2) nach (3).
Dann wäre (3) besser : "Hans machte den Versuch, sich Peter gegenüber zu verpflichten..."
Um zu (4) als einer normativen Aussage zu kommen, müsste (3) aber in der ursprünglichen Fassung zur Verfügung stehen.
Das Problem rührt daher, dass wir Versprechen nicht von außen lernen, sondern immer in Lebenssituationen.

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977
Thomas Aquinas Hume Vs Thomas Aquinas
 
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Fraassen I 212
Proof of the Existence of God/HumeVsThomas Aquinas/Fraassen: Our new view (modern analogy) is not exposed to criticism by Hume. HumeVsThomas Aquinas. Even though regress in causation or explanation must end.
I 213
There is no reason to assume that this end (end point) should not be the universe (world) itself (instead of God). Problem: because if the world can only be understood by reference to the will of God, how are we to understand God's will? And if we cannot understand Him, why should we not halt at the universe? VsHume: all counterarguments seem to be based on the assumption that God is essentially different from the universe. God himself requires no explanation or justification. Fraassen: this may be true for God, yet there is a possible counter-argument for our case: namely as follows: Explanation/Fraassen: in terms of explanation there is no difference between galvanometers and electrons. Instead: microstructure (MiSt).
MiSt/VsFraassen: demanding it does not mean appealing to a cosmic coincidence. E.g. That cloud chambers and galvanometers behave like this, is even then surprising if there are theoretical entities such as electrons. Because it is surprising that there should be such a regularity in the behavior of the electrons. If we are not metaphysically minded, we should be glad that our relation to the QM has brought order in there. Because we do not understand the underlying (prior, not temporal) coincidence. If we then continue to ask what brings the micro-things of the same kind to behave in the same way in the past, present and future, we have a new exaggerated realism.
FraassenVsVs:
Explanation/Regularity/Fraassen: Thesis: there are regularities of observable phenomena that need to be explained!. Theoretical Entities/Fraassen: the question of why they behave the way they do is a question on a different level than that of explanation. Because then there are two possibilities:
a) there is another, still unexplained regularity or.
b) there is the presumption that our theory can still be improved by being simplified.
In neither case the regularities behind the phenomena demand an explanation.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Tooley, M. Armstrong Vs Tooley, M.
 
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III 104
Tooley: if relations between universals are truthmakers, then these are "atomic facts". Then the standard principles could ascribe a probability of >0 to the confirmation theory.
III 105
ArmstrongVsTooley: this is an initial possibility or logical possibility of a tautology. Empiricist should have doubts there. ForrestVsTooley: There could be infinitely many possible universals. Would the attributable initial probabilities not be infinitesimally small then? That would be no justification for the induction.
VsInduction/VsBest Explanation: inductive skepticism could doubt that it really would be the best explanation, more fundamentally: why should the regularities in the world ever have an explanation (reg.)?.
Regularity/Berkeley: through God. He could abolish the "laws of nature" tomorrow.
Berkeley/Armstrong: Answering to this already means to concede the possibility. We have no guarantee that the best explanation is the best scheme. But it is informative.
Arm III 120
Then all universals would only be substances in Hume’s sense: i.e. something that logically might have an independent existence.
III 121
ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstronVsTooley: it is wrong to think of universals like that. Then there are problems regarding how universals are related with their particulars (part.). E.g. If a rel. between particulars a and b is something that is able to have an independent existence without a and b and any other particulars, would there not have to be at least one other relation to relate it to a and b?.
And if this rel. can be uninstantiated itself (e.g. in a universe with monads!), then this rel. is just as questionable, etc. ad infinitum. (Bradley’s regress).
One can avoid this only if universals are merely abstract factors of states of affairs (but real).

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Tradition Hume Vs Tradition
 
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II 264
Theodicy/Hume: could we not say that in spite of all happiness and well-being, still predominate? It could then be concluded that the Creator does not have an infinite, but still a predominant degree of positive properties. Hume: an unbiased view of the world cannot cause us to consider it the creation of a very good, wise, and powerful, albeit not almighty being.
HumeVsTradition: the notion of the limitations of the mind common among theologists does not help: man must get an idea based on what he knows, and not based on what he has no knowledge of.
II 264/265
Hume: general reason lies deeper: causality: it is unacceptable to infer from an indefinite effect (mixture of happiness and unhappiness in the world) to a specific cause!. It is unacceptable to attribute to a cause inferred from a particular effect other properties than those required for bringing forth that same effect.
VsHume: is that not too restrictive, could scientific explanations enhance knowledge at all if you were not allowed to say anything about the causes of the phenomena, which is not already contained in the phenomena themselves?.
HumeVsVs: sees this problem and takes it into account. E.g. if we discover a single footprint on a beach, we infer on a two-legged human and not on a one-legged one!.
So we do infer on something in the cause, which is not included in the effect.
Solution/Hume: Difference: E.g. in the case of the footprint we have prior knowledge of humans who leave footprints. Namely, from direct experience. But we have no experience with different creators who create universes.
II 266
We know the world, however, solely from its effects!.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Tradition Searle Vs Tradition
 
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John R. Searle
II 28
Belief/conviction/SearleVsTradition: it is simply not a kind of image! It is simply a representation, that means it has a propositional content, which determines the fulfillment of conditions and a psychological mode, which defines the orientation. - - -
II 49
SearleVsTradition: Convictions and desires are not the basic intentional states. One can also ashamed of his desire or his convictions. - - -
II 160
Tradition: one never has a causation experience. SearleVsTradition: one not only often has causation experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such causation experience!
SearleVsHume: he looked at a wrong spot, he looked for strength.
- - -
II 190
Example skiing: traditional view: first: word on world causation direction. You follow the instruction to put the weight on the downhill ski.
II 191
This changes with increasing dexterity. The instructions appear unconscious, but still as a representation. To make conscious will become a hindrance in the future as with the centipede. SearleVsTradition: the rules are not internalized, but they are less important! They are not unconsciously "hardwired" but they become ingrained.
II 192
They might be realized as nerves and simply make the rules unnecessary. The rules can retreat into the background. The beginner is inflexible, the advanced flexible. This makes the causal role of representation superfluous! The advanced does not follow the rules better, he skis differently!
The body takes command and the driver's intentionality is concentrated on the winning of the race.
II 192/193
Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality, but pervades the whole network of intentional states. - - -
II 228
Name/subject/direct speech/quote/tradition/Searle: E.g. the sheriff spoke the words "Mr. Howard is an honest man. "
II 231
According to the traditional view, the direct speech here includes no words! (But names.)
II 232
SearleVsTradition: Of course we can talk about words with words. Also here no new names are created, the syntactic position often allows not even the setting up of a name.
II 233
E.g. Gerald said he would Henry. (Ungrammatical). - - -
II 246
de dicto/intensional/SearleVsTradition: E.g. "Reagan is such that Bush thinks he is the president." Searle: the mistake was to conclude from the intensionality of de dicto reports to the intensionality of the reported states themselves. But from the presence of two different types of reports simply does not follow that there are two different kinds of states.
- - -
III 165
Realism/tradition/Searle: the old dispute between realism and idealism was about the existence of matter or of objects in space and time. The traditional realism dealt with the question of how the world really is. Realism/SearleVsTradition: this is a profound misunderstanding! Realism is not a thesis about how the world actually is. We could be totally in error about how the world is in its details, and the realism could be still true!
Def realism/Searle: realism has the view that there is a way of being of things that is logically independent of all human representations. It does not say how things are, but only that there is a mode of being of things. (Things are here not only material objects).
- - -
V 176
Predicate/meaning/Searle: but is the meaning of the predicate expression a linguistic or non-linguistic entity? Searle: it is a linguistic entity in an ordinary sense. Can the existence of a non-linguistic entity follow from the existence of a linguistic entity?
Existence/language/universals/SearleVsTradition: but the claim that any non-linguistic entities exist, can never constitute a tautology.
- - -
IV 155
Background/Searle: what means "use" of background assumptions? The meaning concept shall perform certain tasks for us. Now the same object can at different times be understood relatively to various coordinate system of background assumptions without being ambiguous.
((s) It is unambiguous in the respective situation).
IV 156
SearleVsTradition: here it is also not about the distinction performance/competence.
VI 157
There is no sharp distinction between the competence of a speaker and his knowledge of the world.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Various Authors Mackie Vs Various Authors
 
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Stegmüller IV 399
"Kalam" argument: (common among Islamic scholars): operates with paradoxes of infinity to show that there can be no actual infinity. (> Al Ghassali). Infinity/MackieVsKalam argument: the possibility of an unlimited past cannot be ruled out on purely logical grounds!
MackieVsKant: this prejudice can also be found in the thesis about the first antinomy.
IV 400
Kalam argument/Al Ghassali: nothing that comes into existence in time, arises out of itself. ("Rational necessity"). Therefore, a creator is required. MackieVsAl Ghassali: 1. do we really know that from necessity of reason?
2. There is no reason why on one hand an uncaused thing should be impossible, but on the other hand the existence of a God with the power to create out of nothing, should be acceptable!
God/Mackie/Islam: this concept of God raises difficult problems:
1. Has God simply emerged with the time?
2. Has he always existed in infinite time? Then the formerly rejected actual infinity would be reintroduced!
3. Does God have a non-temporal existence: that would be an incomprehensible mystery again.
Mackie: additionally, one also has to assume:
a) that God's existence and creative power explain themselves and
b) that the unexplained existence of a material world would be incomprehensible and therefore unacceptable.

IV 401
Existence/MackieVsLeibniz: there is no reason a priori to indicate that things do not just occur without causation! Cosmology/proof of the existence of God/existence/Mackie: problem: either the notion of "causa sui" makes sense or not.
a) it does not make sense: then the cosmological assumption that a divine cause must be assumed for the beginning of material existence collapses.
b) it makes sense: then it can even be awarded as a property to matter itself!
- - -
Stegmüller
IV 447
Def. God/Feuerbach: "God is the sense of self of human kind freed from all loathsomeness." Religion/Feuerbach: utopia of a better religion: God's freedom from all limitations of individuals that was imputed by traditional religions now recovered in humanity as a whole.
MackieVsFeuerbach: humanity as a whole is undoubtedly not free from all limitations of individuals, it is not omnipotent, not omniscient, not all good. (vide supra: entirety as a wrong subject, cannot even act.
- - -
IV 472
Theodicy/faith/Stegmüller: Argument: God has made the earth a vale of tears, so that people would develop a religious need. MackieVs: only a very human deity could want people so submissive.
Theodicy/Gruner: insinuates to skeptics the demand for a world that is liberated from all evils. He rejects this demand as inconsistent.
MackieVsGruner: shifts the burden of proof. The skeptic demands nothing at all.
- - -
IV 271
Ethics/Education/Rousseau: Parents and teachers should refrain from any prerational teaching of children. MackieVsRousseau: understandable but unrealistic.
- - -
Stegmüller IV 502
Religion/Faith/Wittgenstein: Ex. if one makes a choice, the image of retaliation always appears in their mind. Meaning/Mackie/Stegmüller: one possibility: the believer wants his pronouncements to be understood literally. S_he stands by a statement of fact. But notwithstanding, such pronouncements outwardly serve to support their sense of responsibility and to justify it. Then, according to Wittgenstein, their faith would be superstition!
When asked for proof, they do not hold his pronouncements capable of truth. But then they change their position again and literally believe what they must believe.
Other possibility: faith has a literal meaning, but comparable with the plot of a novel, fiction. One can accept that the corresponding values have a meaning for life.
IV 503
Therefore we could accept that there is a God only in our practical moral reasoning. T. Z. Phillips: if the questions about God and immortality are undestood literally, as factual questions, then the skeptical response given by Hume is correct.
Thesis: one can and must interpret religious convictions and statements in a way that the criticism of Hume is irrelevant! It is true that logical and teleological proof of the existence of God cannot be upheld.
The reality of God must not be interpreted as the reality of an object, "God" isn't the name of a single being, it refers to nothing.
IV 504
According to Phillips metaphysicians misunderstand the everyday meanings of words. MackieVs: one doesn't dissolve the real problems of skepticism by pointing to normal parlance. Just as ordinary language philosophers couldn't prevail VsHume.
Faith/Religion/Phillips: magical and religious language should be interpreted in the sense of performative actions.
Mackie pro, but: it is wrong to say that an expressive language could not at the same time be descriptive in a literal sense.
IV 504/505
Actions of faith are both: ways to address happiness and misery in the world as well as to explain them. Religion/faith/R. B. Braithwaite: thesis: the core of the Christian faith is the determination to live by the principles of morality. The "Christian stories" are accompanied by that, although the Christian is not required to believe them literally! They are religious attitudes!
PhillipsVsBraithwaite: the grammar of "believing" and "being true" in religious convictions is not the same as in empirical statements. (> Wittgenstein).
MackieVs: thereby we lose any firm ground under your feet! Braithwaite rightly used the usual notions of truth and falsehood!
IV 506
MackieVsPhillips: there is no alternative to that which is discarded by Phillips, namely to continue in superstitions or to reduce religion such as that the "basic characteristics of faith are lost". MackieVsBraithwaite: certainly, numerous religious statements can be interpreted as moral attitudes, but this does not apply to the central statements of theism.
Faith/Mackie: needs an object of reference!

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Cognitivism Black, Max
 
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III 81
BlackVsHume: sein Argument ist zirkulär: These ich glaube, daß gewisse kategorische Sätze mit -žsollte-œ einen WW haben! D.h. sie können als wahr erkannt werden, ohne Bezug auf Hoffnungen und Wünsche. Dann irrt sich Hume wenn er diese als von wissenschaftlichen Sätzen verschieden annimmt. Wissen/Werte/Normen/Black: These in einem weiteren Sinn (weiter als dem engeren Sinn der Wissenschaft) kann Wissen so verstanden werden, daß einige normative und evaluative Sätze als wahr gewußt werden können.
Ethik/Moral/Werte/Normen/Black. These unabhängig davon ob Humes Kritik des naturalistischen Fehlschlusses in Ordnung ist, sind wir berechtigt anzunehmen, daß menschliche Wesen unabhängig von ihrem religiösen Hintergrund über bestimmte fundamentale ethische Prinzipien übereinstimmen können. Das müssen wir annehmen, damit überhaupt ein rationaler Diskus möglich wird.
Laws Cartwright, N.
 
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Cartwright: ich habe drei verbundene Argumente
1. These die offensichtliche Erklärungskraft fundamentaler Gesetze spricht nicht für ihre Wahrheit.
2. These die Weise wie fundamentale Gesetze in Erklärungen gebraucht werden, spricht für ihre Falschheit. Wir erklären durch ceteris paribus-Gesetze durch Zusammenfügungen von Ursachen durch Annäherungen die das übertreffen, was die fundamentalen Gesetze diktieren.
3. These der Anschein von Wahrheit kommt aus einem schlechten Erklärungsmodell,
I 4
das Gesetze direkt mit Realität verbindet. Cartwright statt dessen:
Def -žSimulacrum-œ-Sicht/Cartwright: von Erklärung: These der Weg von der Theorie zur Realität geht so. Theorie > Modell > phänomenologisches Gesetz.
phänomenologische Gesetze/Cartwright: sind wahr von den Objekten der Realität (oder können es sein).
fundamentale Gesetze/Cartwright: sind nur von den Objekten im Modell wahr.
I 10
Asymmetrie: Kausalgesetze sind asymmetrisch: Wirkung und Ursache können nicht vertauscht werden -" dagegen symmetrisch: Assoziationsgesetze/Hume: Bsp Länge des Schattens/Höhe des Masts -" Fraassen: These die erklärungsmäßigen Asymmetrien sind nicht echt -" es gibt keine Tatsache darüber, was was erklärt - CartwrightVsFraassen -" Assoziation/CartwrightVsHume: nicht hinreichend, um Bsp Malariabekämpfung: effektive von uneffektiven Strategien zu unterscheiden -"
I 51
Gesetz/NG/Wissenschaft/Cartwright: These es gibt keine Gesetze für Fälle, wo Theorien sich überschneiden.
Self Evans, G.
 
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Fra I 485f
ich/Evans: 1. kriterienlos, 2. begrenzt zugänglich (nicht jedermann, jederzeit) - 3. Gegebenheitsweise existenzabhängig: ich muss am Ort sein, um "hier" zu sagen, aber Wechseln ist möglich ("neuer Sinn, alte Bedeutung") - I 488 Ichï·"Gedanken sind de re - (brauchen Information) -(VsHume?)
Peacocke I 175
Ich/Evans: These die Referenz von "Ich" kann fehlschlagen! Peacocke: wie ist das mit der absoluten Immunität von "ich habe Schmerzen" verträglich?

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983
Existence Geach, P.
 
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I 265
GeachVsHume / VsGilson: the Hume-Brentano Gilson s thesis (that existence adds nothing conceptual) can not be recognizable claimed if true - it treats existence as nonconceptually (impossible to conceptualize) and as tangible only in existence judgments, but this claim itself is not a existential claim and treats existence as a concept! Contradiction.