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Intentionality | Brentano | Pauen I 22 Intentionality/Brentano/Pauen: this is not about ordinary language "intention"; but the necessary being "about" something. >Aboutness. I 23 Intentionality is inappropriate as an indication of the mental, since not all states of consciousness are intentional by character - E.g. pain. >Pain. --- Field II 69 Intentionality/Believe/Brentano/Lewis/Field: David Lewis compares the problem with the following about numbers. E.g. "Many apparent physical properties seem to combine physical and non-physical things - called numbers". For example, what kind of physical relation can a 7-gram heavy stone have to the number 7?". (Similar to Churchland 1979(1), Dennett 1982(2), Stalnaker 1984(3)). FieldVs: the comparison does not contribute much. Nominalism: is here a solution: literally there are no numbers, and then also no relations (Field 1980). This allows the use of numbers as a useful fiction. >Nominalism, >Fictions. FieldVs: so viewed, there is no pressure to solve Brentano's problem. Field II 71 Intentionality/Believe/Brentano/Horwich/FieldVsHorwich: (Horwich (1998)(4) shows how one can still miss the problem: thesis: according to him "means" and "believes" stand for real relations between people and propositions. Horwich: but there is no reason to suppose that a physical access receives this relational status: Definition fallacy of the constitution/Horwich/Field: the (false) assumption that what constitutes relational facts would itself be relational. Field II 72 Intentionality/Brentano's Problem/Field: his problem is reformulated in our context: how could the having of truth conditions (in representations) be explained naturalistic? II 259 Reference/indeterminacy/FieldVsBrentano: if reference is indeterminate, we can only accept one naturalistic response, not one of Brentano's of an irreducible mental connection. 1. Paul Churchland, Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind, Cambridge 1979 2. D. Dennett, "Beyond Belief" in: A: Woodfield (ed.), Truth and Object, Clarendon Press, 1-95 3. R. Stalnaker, Inquiry, Cambridge 1984 1. P. Horwich, Meaning, Oxford 1989 --- Prior I 123 Intentionality/Brentano: is a unique logical category. Similar to a relation, without being a real relation. |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
Quote/Disquotation | Wright | Horwich I 110 Horwich: "Snow is white" is true because snow is white. WrightVsHorwich: this is not a sentence about truth, but a sentence about physical laws, laws of nature, and it does not help us here. Cf. >Tarski-scheme. Wright I 85 Tarski/Disquotation scheme/semantic definition of truth, disquotation: it is well known that it is incompatible with it, to accept a failure of bivalence (true/false). >Bivalence. E.g. if "P" is neither true nor false, then the assertion that "P" is true will be probably wrong and its biconditional probably incorrect. Disquotation scheme (DS): is the producer platitude for all other: thus correspondence, negation, distinction between truth and assertibility. >Correspondence, >Truth, >Assertibility, >Negation. It itself is neutral in terms of stability and absoluteness. Wright I 27ff Disquotation/Tarski/Wright: one does not need to understand the content. >Content, >Understanding. I 33 The disquotation scheme does not exclude that there will be a divergence in the extension: the aiming on an object with the property F does not need not be the aiming on a property with G - they only coincide normatively in relation to practice. >Practice, >Norms, >Language community, >Community, >Convention. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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Horwich, P. | Field Vs Horwich, P. | I 175 Relationism/Field: Advantage: good technical conditions for the formulation of field theories and to avoid long-distance effect. Also: "Problem of Quantities": >acceleration. (see below) Def Monadicism/Horwich/Field: (Horwich, 1978): Thesis: denies just like Relationism that there is spacetime (sp.t.). ((s) empty, self-relying sp.t.). Sp.t. only logical construction! VsRelationalism: no aggregates of matter or relations between them. Instead: primitive monadic properties of sp.t. places. ((s) as the fundamental concept). SubstantivalismVsMonadicism/Field: according to substantivalism such monadic local properties are not primitive: they are gained from the two-digit relation "occupied", with an argument being instantiated with a sp.t. point. MonadicismVs: denies sp.t. in general. Instead, a piece of matter can either have or not have these primitive properties. FieldVsMonadicism/FieldVsHorwich: this is mainly based on a confusion of the "predicate interpretation" and the "interpretation of a higher level": Reduction/Field: when we say that we want to reduce the ontology by a stock of primitive properties, I 176 we mostly think in reality that we expand our stock of primitive predicates. This can often be very important in order to gain simplicity. Monadicism/M/Horwich: Substantivalism and M acknowledge a lot of properties that can be expressed by predicates of the form "appears at time t". Only difference: Substantivalism/S: double-digit predicates such as "Brother of John" or place occupied by a name or description of a moment. Monadicism: purely monadic predicates. FieldVsMonadicism/FieldVsHorwich: the "predicate monadicism" does not look attractive: it is unclear what analogues it has to the sp.t. points of S. Talk about regions or points cannot simply be replaced by talk about properties, because: M does not quantify at all on local properties, but it uses predicates. ((s) no existence assumptions). Then we have to assume a supply of uncountably many semantically primitive predicates. II 71 Def Fallacy of the Constitution/Horwich/Field: the (false) assumption that what constitutes relational facts would itself be relational. Representation/Horwich: instead we would have to find a monadic physical property that constitutes "believing that snow is white", etc. for each and every belief. E.g. that Pius X was the brother of Malcolm X!. These individual properties would not need to have anything in common. Important argument: above all, they do not need to involve a physical relation. Deflationism: Horwich pro, he needs his thesis for that. Field pro Deflationism. FieldVsHorwich: his resources are not fit for deflationism: because the "Fallacy of the Constitution" is not indeed a fallacy. His demands to a physicalist approach are too weak. E.g. a physical relation like "has the same temperature as". Surely you will not say that "having the same temperature as b" constituted another monadic property in the case of object b2, etc. through a monadic property in the case of b1, with these properties having nothing in common. II 72 If other requirements are to apply to the physical relation between people and propositions than for other physical relations, then you have to say why. FieldVsHorwich: it would not help him to say that other reduction standards apply if one of the sides is abstract. Because we also have this in the case of assigning numbers to objects, which preserves the relational character. But that may not be just transferred to intentional relations, as we have seen. ((s) FieldVsDavidson?). But as long as we cannot specify a reason for weaker standards, it is not shown that we do not need a genuinely relational approach, only that it is more difficult here. 2) On the other hand: some of the mental relations for which Horwich tries to avoid a relational approach exist between physical entities: E.g. "x has a belief about the person p". II 243 Nonfactualism/Value/Assessment/Ethics/Evaluative/Horwich/Field: (Horwich 1990): the deflationism that is attached to the ENT (Horwich pro) can still make sense of emotivism. Emotivism/Horwich: ...can say that the meaning of "x is good" sometimes is given by the rule that a person is in the position to express it if he is aware that he assesses X as good... (p. 88). FieldVsHorwich: this is the same problem as with Horwichs handling of vagueness: it boils down to him denying vagueness! Vagueness/Horwich/Field: he says that we cannot know if Jones is bald, because we can only know his physical description and baldness is not determinable from it. Assessment/Horwich/Field: here his remarks are compatible with the fact that "good" denotes a completely factual (evidence-based) property, but one with the special characteristic that our own assessment gives us the evidence that a thing instantiates this property - ((s) circularly) - and/or that our belief that something has this property, somehow to brings us to evaluate it ((s) just as circularl Unlike >Euthyphro). FieldVsHorwich: it is completely unclear now what nonfactualism actually is. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Horwich, P. | Wright Vs Horwich, P. | I 111 CP (Correspondence Platitude)/Wright: "P" is true if and only if things are the way "P" says they are. Can be easily resolved to DS. CP+ /Horwich: "Snow is white" is true because snow is white. WrightVsHorwich: That is not a sentence about truth, it is a sentence about physical laws, natural laws, and it does not help us here at all! It is not useful for our purposes. Subject missed! It has nothing to do with representation, which we worry about here. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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Relation Theory | Horwich, P. | Field II 71 Intentionality/Belief/Brentano/Horwich/FieldVsHorwich: (Horwich (1998)) shows how the problem can be missed even further: Thesis: According to him "means" and "believes" stand for real relations between persons and propositions. Horwich: but there is no reason to assume that a physicalistic approach receives this relational status: Def False conclusion of constitution/Horwich/Field: the (false) assumption that what constitutes relational facts must itself be relational. |
Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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