Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 17 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beliefs | Millikan | I 5 Belief/Wishes/Intention/Millikan: can be explained without reference to language. I 13 Beliefs: to the extent that our meanings and our abilities to recognize things are correct and valid,... I 14 ...most of our beliefs and judgments are true. ((s) > Beliefs/Davidson). I 62 Belief/Millikan: 1. arises partly from the inner nature of the subject (nerves, interconnection, etc.). But not two people with the same interconnections must have the same beliefs. I 63 2. Not all the internal hardware is in use, if one believes something. Belief/Have/Use/Millikan: I can have a belief while I do not use it. For example, I hardly ever need the fact that Columbus discovered America, especially not when I brush my teeth. Discovery/Belief/Millikan: For example, a mathematician who is awake and is looking for a proof and finally finds it: one cannot say of him that he already believed it before! Imperative/Millikan: now it is certainly so that a listener, if asked whether the speaker intended that he obeys the command, will surely immediately answer "yes". I 64 But that does not mean that he used this belief while being obedient. I 67 Belief/Millikan: Thesis: if one believes something, one usually beliefs through observation judgments. Problem: background information that might deter one of the judgment is not necessary an infomation of which a denial would be used in the normal case to support the belief! I 68 I will use this principle MillikanVsQuine. Theory/Observation/Quine: Thesis: both are irreversibly connected to each other. MillikanVsHolism. Gricean Intentions/Millikan: these intentions should not be understood as a mechanism. Indeed: E.g. An engine: one can also regard an engine as a hierarchy, whereby higher levels can stop lower ones. As a user, I need to know little about how the lower levels work. I 127 Belief/Intention/Millikan: Beliefs are inner intentional icons, perhaps sentences in an inner language. >Intention, >Intentionality. I 300 Belief/Truth/World/Recognition/Millikan: the basic things we need to learn to distinguish when we want to acquire true beliefs about the world are properties and substances. Properties/Property/Millikan: this also includes actions (acts) like e.g. sitting. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Dispositions | Fodor | IV 120 Holism/Ryle/Fodor/Lepore: e.g. wish/desire/Ryle: thesis: desire requests are a kind of behavioral disposition. Fodor/LeporeVsHolism: if it is semantically necessary to execute the action that leads to it, then it is contingent. >Necessity, >Contingency, >Actions, >Semantics. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Holism | Bunge | Esfeld I 17 Mario BungeVsHolism: is explained by statements such as "The whole thing precedes its parts." "The whole thing has an effect on its parts." "Whole units cannot be explained by analysis, they are irrational." "The whole is better than its parts." Bunge: Holism is therefore unscientific. (Bunge, 1979)(1). >Wholes, >Parts, >Part-of-Relation, >Totality, >Explanation, >Dependence, >Analysis, >Science. 1. Bunge, Mario (1979): Treatise on Basic Philosophy, Volume 4: A World of Systems. Dordrecht: Reidel. |
Bung I M. Bunge Causality and Modern Science: Third Revised Edition New York 1979 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Holism | Dummett | Rorty I 289 DummettVsDavidson/Rorty: VsHolism: you cannot provide adequate philosophy of language without the two Kantian distinctions (fact/interpretation and necessity/contingency). >Facts, >Interpretation, >Necessity, >Contingency. III (b) 84/85 HolismVs distinction sense/reference, extreme holism: Basic Doctrine: meaning changes constantly - theory: believing-to-be-true - new sentences change language behavior (approval and rejection of other sentences) - later no identification of the new sentences anymore. - Extreme holism: Basic Doctrine: no concept of meaning, the concept of change in meaning useless - DummettVsHolism: our presentation would depend on where we happen to begin - still: determine dispositions only after believing-to-be-true - (first truth, then meaning.) - In every theory, new judgements change the dispositions, therefore dispositions are not determinant for the meaning! - It is wrong to think a sentence has no inherent meaning. - Theory: it is about new judgments, not new meanings. III (b) 85 Extreme Holism says, from the quantity of sentences believed to be true (without knowledge about the causal circumstances) future dispositions could be derived.- Vs: that is impossible. III (c) 125ff Holism/Deception/Dummett: has no criterion for specific speaker meaning in a particular case - only the tendency of believing-to-be-true - hence we have no concept of error. III (c) 130 Holism believes meaning theory to be impossible. - Dummett: maybe he is right. III (c) 150 Holism/DummettVsHolism: Problem: the set of all true sentences must then not contain any index-linked characteristics - HolismVs: solution: could propose instead a set of index-linked judgments. - DummettVsVs: then no speaker knows the meaning theory. >Meaning theory. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Holism | Hacking | I 318 HackingVsHolism/HackingVsDuhem: the physics of the microscope is irrelevant for biologists. The theory explains interference and blur, but you just have to turn the wheel to eliminate them. >Method, >Observation, >Science. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Holism | Millikan | I 11 Holism/MillikanVsHolism: Let's try to get around it. Then we will understand why, despite everything, we still know something about the world. Realism/Millikan: I remain close to Aristotelian realism. Properties/Kind/Millikan: properties exist only in the actual world (our real world). MillikanVsNominalism. > I 318 Holism/Theory/Observation/Term/Dependency/MillikanVsHolism/Millikan: the view that we observe most of the things we observe only by observing indirect effects is wrong. >Observation. In any case, we only observe effects of things, namely on our sensory organs. >Effects, >Causality. I 319 Difference: it is about the difference between information acquisition through knowledge of effects on other observed things and the information acquisition without such intermediary knowledge of other things. Problem: here a mistake easily arises: this knowledge does not have to be used at all. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Holism | Popper | Flor II 480 PopperVsHolism: it is not clear which parts of a theory are refuted or not refuted when a phrase is in contradiction to single sentences of the theory. >Description levels, >more authors VsHolism. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Holism | Putnam | II 480 PopperVsHolism: it is not clear which parts of a theory are refuted or not refuted when a phrase is in contradiction to single sentences of the theory. >Intuitionism, >Verification. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Holism | Quine | VI 22 Holism/Quine: holism simply combats the idea that a sentence has its own separate empirical content. ((s) This is moderate). VI 22 Theory/GrünbaumVsHolism: one can always save a hypothesis by revising one's theoretical reserves of accepted sentences so that these, together with the threatened hypothesis, imply the absence of the prognosis. Holism/QuineVsGrünbaum: such an assumption does not even occur in my work. It is all about mitigating the wrong implication. Holism merely fights the naive idea that each sentence has its own separate empirical content. Empirical Content/Quine: is rather something that sentences have in common and in which even mathematical sentences indirectly participate. >Empirical Content/Quine. VI 79 Quine: HolismVsAnalyticity. XII 95 Translation/Theory/Holism/Quine: "strange translation": of whole theories, but not of the parts - because the assignment of subordinate clauses cannot be justified - several translations of subordinate clauses can produce the same empirical implications. > Translation, > Indeterminacy. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Metaphysics | Kripke | Rorty VI 144 Kripke: metaphysical question: "could it have been?": is not epistemological and not physical. Kripke/Nagel: per Cartesianism: the distinction between metaphysics and epistemology is an unknowable essence. KripkeVsHolism. > |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Realism | Millikan | I 11 Realism/Millikan: I remain close to Aristotelian realism. Cf. >Nature/Aristotle. I 13 Realism/Millikan: correctly understood, realism does not demand that the world has to be "properly divided". Identity/Millikan: Realism must be able to explain only objective identity (sameness). This is something other than a "preferred classification" of nature. >Terminology/Millikan, >Identity/Millikan. MillikanVsHolism: It is about understanding without holism and without the myth of what is given, how we test our apparent abilities, to recognize things, and our apparent meanings. I 245 Classical Realism/Thinking/Millikan: for classical realism thinking was about a thing, to bring (thesis) this thing or its nature before the conscious mind. Plato/Aristotle/Husserl: the nature of the thing alone enters the mind. Early Russell/Moore/Phenomenalism: the thing alone comes before the mind, (without a "nature"). Locke/Hume: Thesis: instead of the thing we have to do with a representation that embodies its nature by being a copy of it. >Locke, >Hume. Descartes/Whitehead: a way or aspect of the thing embodies its nature. >Descartes. Knowledge/Thinking/Realism/Millikan: so we know ipso facto what we think. The following four things are not distinguished from classical realism: 1. it seems to you that you think of something 2. to really think 3. it seems to you that you know what you think 4. to really know what you think. I 248 Realism/Thinking/judgment/nature/thing/existence/Millikan: a solution: if it is rather nature than the object that comes before the mind, then the accidental object is not necessary for nature, it does not have to exist. Then the realization that the object really exists, corresponds rather to a judgment than to contemplation about its nature. Existence: that the thing existed became something additional that was added. Ontology/Millikan: Problem: that something "should exist in addition to its pre-existing nature". Thinking/Classical Realism/Millikan: applying a term was then equated with judging that a thing exists. So thinking-of = Identify. >Identifcation. I 249 Identification/Realism/Millikan: identification takes place only in a moment and involves only one encounter with the object. Then this is a kind of aesthetic experience, in which the consciousness bathes in a dwelling of the thing. Why should that be good? |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Recognition | Millikan | I 13 MillikanVsHolism: It is about understanding without holism and without the myth of what is given, how we test our apparent abilities, to recognize things, and our apparent meanings. >Holism/Millikan. I 299 Consistency/Millikan: the test of them is at the same time a test of our ability to identify something, as well as the test on the fact that our concepts map what they are supposed to map. >Consistency. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. This is not the problem of deciding how to split an exclusivity class. >Terminology/Millikan. I 300 E.g. to decide when red stops and orange starts. Instead it is about learning e.g. to recognize red under other circumstances. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Semantic Holism | Fodor | IV 41 Semantic Holism/Fodor/Lepore: the semantic holism comprises a combination of the Quine-Duhem thesis (no sentence individually verifiable) with verificationism. Quine-Duhem thesis: every sentence of a theory determines the level of verifiability of every other sentence of the theory. Verificationism: meaning corresponds to the verification method. >Quine-Duhem thesis. Holism: every sentence of the theory determines the meaning of every other sentence of the theory. Fodor/LeporeVsHolism: then only identical theories could have any common inferences and this cannot be true. >Holism. IV ~ 49 Fodor/Lepore VsSemantic Holism: natural semantic objects are linguistic: e.g. formulas of natural objects of confirmation. Trans-linguistically they are propositions. Verificationism and confirmation holism are both true, but of different things! Therefore, semantic holism does not follow. IV 54 Meaning holism/Fodor/Lepore: additional argument pro: according to Russell's incomplete symbol: this is defined in use. Use then represents the larger unit. Fodor/LeporeVs: 1) Definition in use does not guarantee meaning. 2) It is unclear whether they have the semantic properties from the relations of words to the sentences in which they occur. 3) It is also unclear whether the syntactic and semantic units match. IV 125 Meaning Holism/MH/Fodor/Lepore: we can avoid the inference from belief holism to meaning holism if we assume that the objects which have inherent semantic properties are initially neither propositional attributes nor speech acts, but representations. >Representations. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Theoretical Terms | Fodor | Schurz I 216 Theoretical Terms/FodorVsHolism: VsSemantic Theoreticalholism: The determination of the meaning of Theoretical Terms is circular. Def Semantic theoryholism/Schurz: thesis: the meaning of Theoretical Terms is determined by the meaning of the theory. Solution/Ramsey sentence/Carnap sentence/Schurz: Carnap-sentence,/Ramsey sentence /holism/meaning/circle/Schurz: The method of conjunction of Ramsey sentence and Carnap sentence is the solution to the charge of circularity of FodorVsHolism. >Carnap sentence/Schurz, >Ramsey-sentence/Schurz. a) on the one hand: because of compositionality the meaning of T(t1,...tn) is determined by the meaning of the Theoretical Terms (together with the meaning of the other terms of T), b) on the other hand: it follows from semantic theory holism that the meaning of the Theoretical Terms is determined by the meaning of the Theory. FodorVs: this is a circle RamseyVsFodor/CarnapVsFodor: solution: the Ramsey Theorem R(T) can be understood without presupposing an independent knowledge of the meaning of Theoretical Terms, and the Carnap Theorem or the Lewis Definitions add, the meaning of Theoretical Terms is to denote those entities which satisfy the assertion of the theory. Carnap sentence/Schurz/(s): states that the meaning of Theoretical Terms lies in denoting those entities that satisfy the theory. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Truth Theory | Dummett | III (c) 118 Truth Theory/Dummett: The truth theory presupposes an understanding of the metalanguage. >Metalanguage. Horwich I 459 Truth/Truth Theory/Truth Conditions/Dummett/Rorty: It could be that someone knows all truth conditions without knowing the contents of the right hand side of the T-sentence. ((s) T-sententce: E.g., "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white.) The T-sentence explains nothing, if the meta language contains the >object language - and then the same is true when meta language and object language are separated. Davidson: no single T-sentence says what understanding is, but the whole body. DummettVsDavidson/DummettVsHolism: with that he admits that the holism can not explain how the speaker comes to the understanding of individual sentences. - Davidson: Language use is not separable into sub-skills. - The T-sentence embodies no skills - or else we would have to assume mental entities.(1). Cf. >Objects of thought. 1. 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Two Dogmas | Millikan | I 321 Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: does not all knowledge depend on "collateral information" as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we then test individual concepts independently of the rest? >Holism, >Context. Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan: Thesis: Our statements on the external world do not stand alone before the tribunal of experience, but only as a corpus. It follows that no single belief is immune to correction. >Tribunal of experience. Test/Review/MillikanVsHolism/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs stand never before the tribunal of experience. I 322 It is therefore unlikely that such a belief will ever be supported or disproved by other beliefs. Confirmation: only confirmation: by my ability to recognize the objects that occur in my settings. From the fact that beliefs are related does not follow that the concepts must also be related. Identity/Identification/Millikan: The epistemology of identity is primarily precedent to that of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Verification | Millikan | I 297 Verification/Knowledge/Epistemology/Realism/Naturalism/Millikan: our problem of the recognition of identities is different from the ordinary recognition problem of the realists. With us, it is not about the existence of an inner test for the correct image of the world. We just need to show that there can be tests that... I 298 ...determine whether concepts, when applied under normal conditions, can produce mapped sentences. Correspondence/Coherence/Tradition/Millikan: for the tradition it must be coherence, if correspondence is not the right one. >Correspondence/Millican, >Correspondence theory/Millikan. Test/Millikan: E.g. the heart can only be tested together with kidneys. Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/image/Millikan: we are only trying to understand how there can be a test that has historically been applied to human concepts in this world, and whose results are correlated with the world for reasons, which we can specify. Problem: we are more handicapped here than the realism. I 299 It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all. Holism/MillikanVsHolism: epistemic holism is wrong. >Holism/Millikan. Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if applied only to a small set of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts. >Adequacy/Millikan. I 312 Concept/Law/Theory/Test/Review/Millikan: if a term occurs in a law it is necessary,... I 313 ...to test it together with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain conclusion rules. Concept/Millikan: since concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested. Test: does not mean that the occurrence of sense data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine). I 317 Theory/Review/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition: says that not only some, but most of our concepts are not of things we observe directly but from other things. Test/Logical Form/Millikan: if there is a thing A, that is identified by observing effects on B and C, is then the validity of the concepts of B and C together with the theory that traces back the observed effects on the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A? Millikan: No! From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts governing B and C is tested when the concept governing A is tested and vice versa. This is not the case if A is a definite description, for example, the "first president of the USA", and it does not follow if the explicit intension of A represents something causally dependent. For example, "the mercury in the thermometer rose to the mark 70" as an intension for "the temperature was 70 degrees". I 318 Concept/Millikan: Concepts are abilities - the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: e.g. my ability to make a good cake is quite independent of my ability to smash eggs, even if I have to smash eggs to make the cake. >Concept/Millikan. I 320 Test/review/theory/Millikan: That a test works can often be known regardless of knowing how it works. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behaviorism | Danto Vs Behaviorism | Behaviorism: according to it, our externally observable behavior can attract any number of descriptions. Which one is the right one remains completely uncertain. DantoVsHolism/Mind: this holistic dimension fails as a distinguishing feature for the structure of the mind, because it is analogous to the corresponding view that any statement about the world can be true as long as we are willing to make corrections somewhere else and to make concessions. I 154 VsBehaviorism: if we defined expressions such as anger or love absolutely and totally in terms of behavior, there would be no difference between these terms and those with which we describe people: blond, fat, tall, etc. I 264 Now, we do not apply those terms to ourselves on the same basis! The real differences are in how we ascribe such terms to ourselves and others, whereas in terms that relate to temperature or weight such differences are not a question. (Introspection). VsBehaviorism: its scheme of the stimulus-response pattern merely led to mutual attributions and did not explain the reactions of individuals in any way. ExperimentVsBehaviorism: subjects had to recognize turned figures. This brought the psychologists to distance themselves from behaviorism and to believe that there could indeed be something like "internal rotation" in the mind. This did not directly rehabilitate introspection, but the possibility of an internal representation. I 267 Functionalism/Behaviorism: where is room for exactly the kind of representation that makes up the two directions at all? I 277 |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Fodor, J. | Ramsey Vs Fodor, J. | Schurz I 215 Carnap-Sentence/Carnap-Conditional/CS/CK/strengthening/strengthened/Lewis/Schurz: (Lewis 1970, 83 85): Suggestion to strengthen the Carnap-Sentence: by assuming that the theory implicitly postulates that the reference of its theoretical terms (TT) in the actual world is unambiguously determined. N.B.: the analytical content of a theory is thus represented by the following local "definitions" with the help of certain descriptions of theoretical terms: Identification as Definition/Lewis: Example τi designates the i-th term of the unambiguous n-tuple of entities, which fulfils the claim T(X1,...Xn) in the actual world. (1970.87f) PapineauVsLewis: his thesis that scientific theories go hand in hand with existence and claims of uniqueness for the reference of the theoretical terms is doubtful even if it is interpreted realistically. Instrumentalistic: it is untenable. (Papineau, 1996, 6,Fn 5). Definition/SchurzVsLewis: Definition by description (description, designation) are not full-fledged, but only partial, because they determine the extension of theoretical terms only in those possible worlds in which the underlying existence or uniqueness assumption is fulfilled. I 216 Theoretical Terms/FodorVsHolism: Vs semantic theory holism: the determination of the meaning of theoretical terms is circular. Def semantic theories holism/abstract: Thesis: the meaning of theoretical terms is determined by the meaning of the theory. Solution/Ramsey-Sentence/RS/Carnap-Sentence/CS/Schurz: Ramsey-Sentence/Carnap-Sentence/Holism/Meaning/Circle/Schurz: the method of conjunction of Ramsey-Sentences and Carnap-Sentences is the solution for the accusation of circularity of FodorVsHolism. a) On the one hand: because of compositionality, the meaning of T(t1,...tn) is determined by the meaning of theoretical terms (in addition to the meaning of the other concepts of T), b) On the other hand: it follows from semantic theories holism that the meaning of theoretical terms is determined by the meaning of the theory. FodorVs: that is a circle RamseyVsFodor/CarnapVsFodor: Solution: the Ramsey-Sentence R(T) can be understood without assuming an independent knowledge of the meaning of theoretical terms, and the Carnap-Sentence or Lewis definitions add that the meaning of theoretical terms lies in designating those entities which fulfil the assertion of the theory. ((s) Carnap-Sentence/Schurz/(s): states that the meaning of theoretical terms lies in the designation of the entities which satisfy the theory. |
Ramsey I F. P. Ramsey The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays 2013 Ramsey II Frank P. Ramsey A contribution to the theory of taxation 1927 Ramsey III Frank P. Ramsey "The Nature of Truth", Episteme 16 (1991) pp. 6-16 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Holism | Danto Vs Holism | I 153 Behaviorismus/Danto: ihm zufolge kann unser äußerlich beobachtbares Verhalten eine beliebige Zahl von Beschreibungen auf sich ziehen. Welche die Richtige ist, bleibt völlig ungewiß. ((s) >Quine, >Radikale Interpretation. DantoVsHolismus/Geist: als Unterscheidungsmerkmal für die Struktur des Geistes versagt diese holistische Dimension, denn sie ist analog zur entsprechenden Anschauung, daß jegliche Aussage bezüglich der Welt zutreffen kann, sofern wir bereit sind, irgendwo anders Korrekturen vorzunehmen und Konzessionen zu machen. |
Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Holism | Dennett Vs Holism | Rorty VI 146 Holism/DennettVsHolism/Rorty: if you take holism seriously, even the idea that one can "inspect the phenomena exactly" includes a petitio principii. It presupposes the (false) idea of intrinsic, non-relational features. VI 147 Thus the question is already decided in advance whether the behavior identified by Searle as a result of the inspection is best explained by the assertion that this inspection really takes place, or whether the pretense of inspecting is as deceptive as the pretense of the phenomenological. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Holism | Dummett Vs Holism | Fodor/Lepore IV 8 Analytic/Synthetic/(a/s)/Holism/Fodor/Lepore: there is an argument that anatomical features are also holistic, which presupposes that the distinction anal/synth (a/s) is suspended. E.g. DummettVsHolism: shows neither how communication should function nor language acquisition or language proficiency. (If you have to know all propositions at the same time, which is impossible). ((s) This therefore expects that even anatomical properties are holistic. (or that there are no analytical propositions). Due to this extreme position learning only becomes impossible). Dummett/(s)VsDummett: Departs from the extreme assumption that anatomical properties (which only a second similar thing can have) are also holistic, i.e. are shared by many similar things. So almost a bugbear. Dummett: nor does holism show how a whole theory can be significant at all: if in turn its internal structure cannot be broken down into significant parts, then it has no internal structure. Fodor/Lepore: Dummett argues from the following analogy: Sentences are interpersonally understandable, because their meanings are formed from the meanings of their components and the speaker and hearer are privy to these meanings. Dummett/Fodor/Lepore: this explanation assumes that the speaker and hearer mean the same thing. Fodor/Lepore IV 9 And it assumes that the constituents have meaning at all. If holism were true, this would be false. Fodor/Lepore IV 10 Holism/Fodor/Lepore: is also a revisionism: he could reply HolismVsDummett: "so much the worse for our conventional understanding of how languages and theories learned and taught". Quine, Dennett, Stich, the Churchlands and many others are strongly tempted by this revisionist direction. Horwich I 459 Meaning Theory/M.Th./DummettVsDavidson: we need more than he gives us: it could be that someone knows all truth conditions without knowing the content of the (metalinguistic) right side of the T sentence. T sentence/Dummett: explains nothing if the metalanguage contains the object language. And because this is so, the same applies if meta language and object language are separated (terminology/Dummett: "M sentence". T-sentence/Davidson: "neutral, snow-bound triviality" No single T-sentence says what it means to understand the words on the left side, but the whole corpus of sentences says that this is everything you can know about it ((s) no theory "beyond", "about"). DummettVsDavidson: thus Davidson admits defeat: then it cannot be answered how the speaker came to his own understanding of the words he used. ((s)> DummettVsHolism) DummettVsDavidson: The ability for language use cannot be split into separate skills Language/Use/Wittgenstein/Davidson/SellarsVsDummett/Rorty: such partial skills do not exist. If "tertia" such as "special meaning ", "response to stimuli", etc. are abolished, there are no components anymore, in which the capacity for language use could be divided (>competence?). E.g. "How do you know that this is red?" Wittgenstein: "I speak German." T-sentence/Davidson: does not double any internal structures. They do not even exist, otherwise the "Tertia" would be introduced again. Meaning theory/DummettVsDavidson/Rorty: he makes a virtue of necessity. But we can expect more from a MT. And that is that it retains the traditional concepts of the empiricist epistemology. Such a theory must explain the ability to use language through knowledge of the truth conditions. Dummett: Contrast: E.g. "this is red" and E.g. "there are transfinite cardinal numbers". Holism/Wittgenstein/VsDummett/DavidsonVsDummett: There is no contrast!. Understanding/Grasping/Wittgenstein/Davidson/Rorty: for Davidson and Wittgenstein grasping in all these cases is acquiring the inferential relations between the sentences and other sentences of the language. Meaning/Wittgenstein: accepting some inferential principle helps to determine the meaning of words. (Davidson ditto). DummettVsWittgenstein/DummettVsHolism: This leads us to the attitude that no systematic MT is at all possible. RortyVsDummett: does not show, however, how it is possible.(1) 1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty I 289 Philosophy/Dummett/Rorty: (VsDavidson) (like Putnam): only task of philosophy is the analysis of meaning. (It is the foundation, and not Descartes’ epistemology). DummettVsDavidson/DummettVsHolismus/Rorty: you cannot provide adequate philosophy of language without the two Kantian distinctions (Givenness/Interpretation and Necessity/Contingency). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Holism | Popper Vs Holism | Esfeld I 37 PopperVsHolism: E.g. swarm of mosquitoes or e.g. family picnicking. (("Über Wolken und Uhren", 1989, 217ff). >Description levels; >more authors VsHolism. Flor II 480 PopperVsHolism:it is not clear which parts of a theory are refuted or not refuted when a phrase is in contradiction to single sentences of the theory. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Holism | Rorty Vs Holism | I 190 Holism/Rorty: exmambple: Sellars: it may turn put that there are no colored objects at all. RortyVsHolism/RortyVsQuine/RortyVsSellars: these holistic statements sound pointless and paradoxical, because the accuracy in question requires a theory privileged representations. Pro: justification is not a function of particular relations between ideas (or words) and objects, but a function of social practice. The justification of a conversation is holistic by nature, as it were. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Holism | Verschiedene Vs Holism | Davidson II 60 Glüer: if one restricts the meaning holism, one can develop a dynamic model of understanding. We assume that malapropisms, idiolects and T-theories develop. A significant portion remains invariant from theory to theory. A holistic T-theory for one speaker does not exist. Fodor/Lepore IV 10 Language/language acquisition/communication/Fodor/Lepore: the standard view VsHolism is that linguistic and theoretical determinations of speaker and listener can overlap partially at will. You can understand a part of my language without having learned the rest. Dummett/Fodor/Lepore: if we understand him correctly, then he says that this image of language only makes sense to the extent that partial conformity in use does not require perfect conformity in use. I.e. only to the extent that Semantic Holism is rejected. Quine VI 20/21 Necessity/Laws/Mathematics/Science/Quine: why is mathematics spared? Many scientists may answer that their laws are necessarily true. However, I take the opposite view: it is precisely an explanation of mathematical necessity itself: it is inherent in our unspoken practice to shield mathematics and make use of our freedom instead of abandoning other suitable beliefs. Holism/Quine: we do well not to make the boat swing too much. Simplicity of theory is an important criterion. Adolf GrünbaumVsHolismus/Quine: He had a stronger holism in mind than ours. Quine VI 22 Theory/GrünbaumVsHolism: one can always save a hypothesis by revising one's theoretical reserves of accepted sentences in such a way that these, together with the threatened hypothesis, imply the absence of the prognosis. Holism/QuineVsGrünbaum: Such an assumption does not occur to me in the first place. It is all about defusing the false implication Holism only combats the naive notion that each sentence has its own separate empirical content. Empirical Content/Quine: is rather something that is common to sentences, and in which even mathematical sentences indirectly participate. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Holism | Avramides Vs Holism | Avra I 87 VsHolism: although the class of connected proprositions is very large why does it have to be all-encompassing? I 88 HolismVsVs: we cannot be sure beforehand that sentences are not connected. Therefore there seem to be reasons to favor the stronger interpretation holism. Avramides: in any case, both holisms conflict with a gradual approach in the case of radical interpretation. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Holism | Neurath Vs Holism | Brendel I125 Definitional Coherence Theory/Truth/Neurath/Brendel: Representatives: Neurath. (Neurath did not explicitly refer to himself as a coherence theorist NeurathVsCoherence Theory/NeurathVsHolism). I 126 Neurath: pro empiricism. Truth/Neurath: Thesis, the truth definition must be exhausted in a empiricist truth criterion. Log Sentence/Schlick: foundation, unrevisable. "purely observational sentences". Log Sentence/NeurathVsSchlick: revisable. Since they are selected on the basis of decisions. Reality/Neurath/Brendel: Thesis: talking about it is sheer metaphysics. Truth/Neurath/Brendel: Therefore, can only be understood relative to a system of sentences (>coherence theory). NeurathVsCorrespondence Theory: "correspondence with reality": is rejected. "True World": pointless. I 127 Selection/Neurath: from several consistent statement sets: without truth criterion, by extralogical moments. |
Neur I O. Neurath Philosophical Papers 1913-1946: With a Bibliography of Neurath in English (Vienna Circle Collection, Volume 16) 1983 |
| Holism | Bunge Vs Holism | Esfeld I 17 Mario BungeVsHolismus: this is characterized through statements like "the whole precedes its parts", "the whole affects its parts", "whole things cannot be explained by analysis, they are irrational", "the whole is better than its parts". Bunge: Holism is therefore unscientific. Bunge: Holism is therefore unscientific. (1979). |
Bung I M. Bunge Causality and Modern Science: Third Revised Edition New York 1979 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Holism | Millikan Vs Holism | I 10 Subject/predicate/coherence/language/world/Millikan: subject-predicate structure: I try to show how the law of non-contradiction (the essence of consistency) fits into nature. For that I need Fregean meaning as the main concept. As one can err when it comes to knowledge, so one can err when it comes to meaning. I 11 Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: we are trying to avoid it. Then we will understand why we still can know something of the world, despite everything. Realism/Millikan: I stay close to the Aristotelian realism. properties/kind/Millikan: exists only in the actual world. MillikanVsNominalismus. I 13 MillikanVsHolismus: it is about understanding without holism and without the myth of the given how to test our apparent skills to recognize things and our apparent meanings. Observational concepts/Millikan: we have a lot more of then than is commonly supposed. For them, there are good - albeit fallible - tests that are independent of our theories. Convictions: insofar as our meanings and our ability to recognize things are correct and valid, I 14 most of our Convictions and judgments are true. ((s) >Beliefs/Davidson). Appropriateness/Millikan: by bringing our judgments to interact iwth those of others in a community, we have additional evidence that they are reasonable. That's also how new concepts are developed which may be tested independently of theories, or not. I 67 conviction/Millikan: (see chapter 18, 19): Thesis: if one believes something, then normally on grounds of observational judgments. Problem: Background information that could prevent one from the judgment is not necessarily information, the denial of which would normally be used to support the conviction! I 68 I will use this principle MillikanVsQuine. Theory/observation/Quine: thesis: both are insolubly twisted with each other. MillikanVsHolismus. Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: should not be regarded as a mechanism. However: Engine: may also be regarded as a hierarchy, where higher levels can stop the lower ones. And I as a user must know little about the functioning of the lower levels. I 298 Test/Millikan: Ex the heart can only be tested together with the kidneys. Language/meaning/reference/world/reality/projection/Millikan: We're just trying to understand how there can be a test that can historically be applied to human concepts in this world of ours, and the results of which are correlated with the world for reasons we can specify. Problem: we are here more handicapped than realism. I 299 It is about the possibility of meaningfulness and intentionality at all ("How is it possible?"). Holism/MillikanVsHolismus: epistemic holism is wrong. Instead, a test for non-contradiction, if it is applied only to a small group of concepts, would be a relatively effective test for the adequacy of concepts. concepts/adequacy/Millikan: if they are adequate, concepts exercise their own function in accordance with a normal explanation. Their own function is to correspond to a variant of the world. An adequate concept produces correct acts of identification of the references of its tokens. I 318 Holism/theory/observation/concept/dependency/MillikanVsHolismus/Millikan: the view that we observe most of the things we observe just by observing indirect effects is wrong. Anyway, we observe effects of things, namely, on our senses. I 319 Difference: it is about the difference between information acquisition through knowledge of effects on other observed things and the acquisition of information without such an intermediary knowledge of other things. Problem: here arises a mistake very easily: this knowledge does not have to be used. I 321 Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: our findings about the outside world are not individually brought before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body. Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our convictions are never brought before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other convictions. Affirmation: only affirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my preferences. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Poincaré, H. | Duhem Vs Poincaré, H. | XVI VsPoincaré: it is not the definitional status of the fundamental laws which escapes the revision. Such revisions, even of the fundamental laws may be necessary and useful, they just cannot be enforced by experiment! I 290 Poincaré: "The experiment can establish the principles of mechanics, but it cannot destroy them". HadamardVs: "Duhem has shown that it is not about isolated hypotheses, but the totality of hypotheses of mechanics, whose experimental confirmation you can try. ((s) PoincaréVsholism?). |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 215 descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is." I 216 Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand: "The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning. "Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential. Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua." MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context. referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension. Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used. Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name? Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy. a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy. I 217 b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat. Quine: In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach. c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy. Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b). Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same. d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy. Now this is just wrong. Question: but what about e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of). Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain. I 218 She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens. Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt. Millikan: Description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ". Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph). referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential. referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her). MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent! Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions. Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally: I 219 Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But: Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity). Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts. Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you. I 299 Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up. I 300 Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances. Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction? Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree. Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same. Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted. One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" as a sentence. He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer. Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra). Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree to a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in nature (natural necessity). I 309 Thesis: lack of Contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. agreement/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they fail to recognize the importance of the agreement in the judgment. agreement: this is not about two people getting together, but that they get together with the world. agreement/mismatch/Millikan: are not two equally likely possibilities ((s) > inegalitarian theory/Nozick.) There are many more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong, than for the same sentence to be true. Now, if an entire pattern (system) of coinciding judgments appears that represent the same area (for example color) the probability that each participant reflects an area in the world outside is stupendous. ((s) yes - but not that they mean the same thing). Ex only because my judgments about the passage of time almost always matches with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to classify my memories correctly in the passage of time. Objectivity/time/perspective/mediuma/communication/Millikan: thesis: the medium that other people form by their remarks is the most accessible perspective for me that I can have in terms of time. I 312 Concept/law/theory/test/verification/Millikan: when a concept appears in a law, it is necessary I 313 to test it along with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain rules of inference. Concept/Millikan: because concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested. Test: does not mean, however, that the occurrence of sensual data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine). Theory of sensual data/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be, thesis: that neither an internal nor an external language actually describes sensual data, except that the language depends on the previous concepts of external things that usually causes the sensual data. I 314 Forecast/prediction/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we project the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, at least not from experiences in our nerve endings. Confirmation/prediction/Millikan: A perceptual judgment implies mainly itself Ex if I want to verify that this container holds one liter, I don't have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.That is I need not be able to predict any particular sensual data. I 317 Theory/Verification/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition says that not just a few, but most of our concepts are not of things that we observe directly, but of other things. Test/logical form/Millikan: if there is one thing A, which is identified by observing effects on B and C, isn't then the validity of the concepts of B and C tested together with the theory that ascribes the observed effects onto the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A? Millikan. No! From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts, that govern B and C, is tested when the concept that governs A is tested and vice versa. Namely, it does not follow, if A is a specific denotation Ex "the first President of the United States" and it also does not follow, if the explicit intention of A represents something causally dependent. Ex "the mercury in the thermometer rose to mark 70" as intension of "the temperature was 70 degrees." I 318 Concept/Millikan: concepts are abilities - namely the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: Ex my ability to make a good cake is completely independent of my ability to break up eggs, even if I have to break up eggs to make the cake. Objectivity/objective reality/world/method/knowledge/Millikan: we obtain a knowledge of the outside world by applying different methods to obtain a result. Ex different methods of temperature measurement: So we come to the conclusion that temperature is something real. I 321 Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: doesn't all knowledge depend on "collateral information", as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we test individual concepts independently from the rest? Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: ~ "Our findings about the outside world do not stand individually before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body." Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs never stand before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other beliefs. Confirmation: single confirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my attitudes. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Holism | Versus | Davidson II 60 What exactly does it mean that a theory is only valid for singular utterances? Passing theories can obviously be arbitrarily different. For the holist any change has universal implications. (FodorVsHolism, but with arguments that are impossible to discover in Davidson). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Holism | Versus | Horwich I 465 building block theory VsHolism: Russell / Husserl / Kripke / Searle;: per block-building - DavidsonVs: per holism: not the intentionality (the directedness of thought to objects) is responsible for the relation of language to reality - Block theory: piece-by-piece relation of words to parts of reality (Kripke: reference has to do with causation). |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Theoretical Terms | Fodor, J. | Schurz I 216 Theoretical terms / FodorVsHolism: VsSemantic Theory Holism: the determination of the significance of the theoretical terms is circular. Def Semantic Theory Holism / Schurz: the meaning of the theoretical terms is determined by the meaning of the theory. Solution / Ramsey sentence / Carnap sentence / Schurz. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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