History of ideas/Foucault: It is now possible to reverse the procedure (after examining the discourse). One can walk downhill. The general theory is sketched, now we can reach the possible fields of application. It is about separating oneself from it. Instead: archeology. FoucaultVsHistory of ideas: indefinite object, ill-drawn boundaries, history of secondary positions. Rather, the history of alchemy than of chemistry. Analysis of the opinions more than knowledge, the errors more than the truth, not the thought forms, but the mentality types.
Also analysis of the silent origin, the distant correspondences, the permanences.
Archeology/Foucault: the attempt to write a completely different history: four differences:
1. With regard to the determination of novelty
2. Analysis of contradictions
3. The comparative descriptions
4. Finding the Transformations.
Archeology: 1. Does not try to define thoughts, ideas, images, themes that are hidden or manifest in discourses. But those discourses themselves. Discourse not as a sign for something else but as a monument. No interpretative discipline, it does not seek a "different discourse." It is not "allegorical".
2. Archeology does not seek to find a continuous transition.
3. It is not ordered according to the sovereign form of the work. The authority of the creative subject as a principle of its unity is alien to it.
4. It is not looking for the restoration of what people have thought, wanted, felt, desired. It does not seek that volatile core.
Archeology: creates the tribe of a discourse.
E.g. the natural history:
1. As leading statements, it will set the statements concerning the definition of the observable structures and the field of possible objects.
2. Those who prescribe the forms of the description.
3. Those who make the most general characterization possibilities appear, and thus open up a whole range of terms.
4. Those who, by making a strategic choice, leave room for a very large number of later options.
This is not a deduction from axioms. Nor is it a general idea or a philosophical core.
Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970
Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994
l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969
Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981
|History||Rorty, R.||VI 355
History of Philosophy/interpretation/past/change of meaning/change of concepts/Rorty: Dilemma: either, a) we impose on the dead, in an anachronistic manner, sufficient problems and vocabulary of our time to make them interlocutors, or
b) we limit our interpretive activity to making their false sentences less foolish
by placing them in the context of the backward times in which these sentences were uttered.
This is not a dilemma at all: we can do both, but we must strictly separate them! >Interpretation/Bennett
Interpretation/Rorty: Thesis: with such attempts at approximation, of course, anachronistic methods are used. But if this happens consciously, there is nothing wrong with it.
Interpretation/Reconstruction/History/Philosophy/Rorty/RortyVsCanon: Thesis: RortyVsHistory of Philosophy as Doxography: triggers despair in us. There is no possibility to carry out a real rational reconstruction through hierarchy and the eternally same "important philosophers" and "important problems". The thinkers are being robbed of their salaries. Problems are imposed.
Mistakes: to present Leibniz and Hegel, Mill and Nietzsche, Descartes and Carnap as if they were talking about the same topics.
Mistakes: half-hearted attempt to tell development only from today's perspective.
Jonathan Rée/Rorty: Thesis: "No convincing reasons have been given for the importance of a historical consciousness for the philosopher".
Margaret Wilson/Rorty: Thesis: "It could well be that the real opinions of the great philosophers, if one compares them with those they have in mind, turn out to be rather meager." Rorty pro.