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The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Causality Hempel
Books on Amazon
Wright I 27
Causality/Hempel/Wright, G. H.: Hempel's deductive nomological model does not mention the terms cause and effect. The schema covers a broader area, causality is only a partial area. G. H. von WrightVsHempel: it is questionable whether all causal explanations actually correspond to Hempel's scheme. It is also questionable whether the scheme can really be considered an explanation if the general laws are not causal laws.
C.G. Hempel
I Hempel Zur Wahrheitstheorie des logischen Positivismus aus Wahrheitsheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996

II Hempel Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums aus Sinnreich (Hg) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982

II (b) Hempel Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung (1951) aus Sinnreich (Hg) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Covering Laws Hempel
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Wright I 23
Covering Laws/Hempel/Wright, G. H.: the name for this approach by Hempel comes from a critic of this theory: William Dray. (W. Dray, Laws and Explanation in History, 1957, p. 1) ---
I 24
Subsumption theory/terminology/Wright, G. H.: I choose this expression instead of the term of Hempel's Covering Law theory. There are two options: a) deductive-nomological: in this variant, all subsequent events logically follow from the existence of a situation and from laws.
I 25
b) inductive-probabilistic: here there is a general law, the "bridge" or the "ribbon", which links the basis of the explanation to the subject matter. This is a probability hypothesis according to which, if events E1... Em (the base) are given, it is very likely that event E will take place. (C. G. Hempel, "Aspects of Scientific Explanation" in "Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science", New York 1965). G. H. von WrightVsHempel: in what sense - if at all in one - can one speak of explanation?
I 155
Hempel's terminology fluctuated. He called non-eductive explanations alternately inductive, statistical, probabilistic and inductive-statistical explanations. ---
I 156
DrayVsHempel: (W. Dray, "The Historical Explanation of Actions Reconsidered", 1963.) ScrivenVsHempel: (M. Scriven, "Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation" in P. Gardiner (Ed) 1959).
Wright, G. H.: The arguments of Scriven and Dray are related to my criticism of the scheme, Sriven uses the successful wording that Hempel's approach "gives the individual case away". (Scriven, p. 467). Scriven: an event can move freely within a network of statistical laws, but is located within the "normic network" and explained by this localization. (Scriven, p. 467).
I 26
Wright: the two schemes differ more than expected, WrightVsHempel: one should not speak of an explanation for the inductive-probabilistic model, but rather of the fact that certain expectations are justified.
I 28
Wright: a test on the Covering Law approach would be to ask whether the law scheme of the explanation also covers teleological explanations. Teleology/Wright, G. H.: two sections:
a) the field of the terms function, goal (purposefulness) and "organic wholeness" ("systems").
b) Purposefulness and intentionality.
See also Feedback/Wright, G. H.
C.G. Hempel
I Hempel Zur Wahrheitstheorie des logischen Positivismus aus Wahrheitsheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996

II Hempel Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums aus Sinnreich (Hg) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982

II (b) Hempel Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung (1951) aus Sinnreich (Hg) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Explanation Fraassen
Books on Amazon
I 23
Explanation/FraassenVsReichenbach: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the demand of hidden variables. ---
I 25
Explanation: if mere regularity makes a macroscopic theory poor, then the same happens to a microscopic one - coincidence: also coincidence can have an explanation. ---
I 39
Explanation/FraassenVsAugustinus: the fleeing of the mouse from the cat must not be explained by perception - but with Darwin: the fleeing mice survive. There is no account by reason. Analogously it applies that the successful sciences survive - without this having to be explained. ---
I 86
Theory/Explanation: For example, one could have two types of mechanics, one for physiologies and one for astronomers - problem: one cannot explain a complex phenomenon with this - e.g. man who is walking on the moon - if both theories have no common models, a new theory on lunar gravitation must be established - empirical adequacy: requires the integration of these "mini-theories". ---
I 87
Explanation: if we consider some kind of questions to be more important, this is no reason to believe that the theory that explains them is more probable - however, the social situation of the researcher plays a role in the evaluation of theories. ---
I 93
Explanation/Ernest Nagel: explanation is the organization and classification of our knowledge - FraassenVsFeyerabend: he misunderstood the fact: that this is a function of interests - FraassenVsFeyerabend: then one can stop to research if one believes, what one says - naive view of scientific security - then the scientists ought to swear by an oath that they are looking for explanations -FraassVsFeyerabend: in reality one must always doubt the adequacy. ---
I 97f
Explanation/FraassenVsTradition: explanation does not have to be true! - a) "we have an explanation" (has to do with acceptance) - b) "the theory explains" (without acceptance) - e.g. Newton's theory was wrong nevertheless it explains much - ((s) then a theory cannot be a conjunction of sentences, for then no sentence may be false.) - Harman: Explanation leads to acceptance - explanation/Fraassen: something does not require that theory coincides with the world as a whole. ---
I 98
One cannot assert the truth of a theory before its explanatory power - Explanation: is not an additional property for empirical adequacy - e.g. "the computer computes" - no one would say "the hammer struck the nail". ---
I 106
Explanation/VsHempel/Morton Beckner: e.g. evolution is not deterministic - e.g. the giraffes's neck is not determined by dietary scarcity - only by the compatibility of genetic and natural selection mechanisms - Putnam: also Newton's explanation is no deduction, but a demonstration of compatibilities. ---
I 110
Definition Explanation/Friedman: S explains P iff P is a consequence S which is "relative" to K and S "reduces" or "unifies" the set of its own consequences relative to K. ---
I 111
Explanation: Problem: 1. Incompleteness: disease explains a rare secondary disease that is triggered by it - but not why this patient is affected - asymmetry: e.g. length of the shadow: is always in relation with a certain sun position. - Causation: only goes in one direction. ---
I 111
Why question: does not occur when the spectrum is explained by the atomic structure. ---
I 124
Explanation: has to do with "why" - to find prominent factors in the causal network - problem: the network as a whole does not explain typical cases - science, however, describes the network - ((s) therefore science does not equal an explanation. Explanation must at least say that there is a structure that can be described in principle - though never fully.) ---
I 146
Explanation: for evaluating a response to a why question as an explanation, it is not a matter of whether this is true - the evaluation uses only the part of the background information that provides the general theory about these phenomena plus additional information that does not include the facts to be explained - ((s) e.g. framework conditions). ---
I 155
Explanation/Description/Fractions: explanation and description do not differ in the information - but explanation: is a three-digit relation theory-fact-context - description: is two-digit: theory-fact - Explanation: is an applied science (not pure science). ---
I 205
Explanation/Thomas Aquinas/Fraassen: everything that is explained must be explained by something else. ---
I 206
The premises must contain more than the conclusion - in addition: generalization: e.g. that all magnets attract iron. ---
I 213
Explanation/Fraassen: only observable regularities require explanation.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Explanation Hempel
Books on Amazon
Bigelow I 299
Explanation/Tradition/Laws/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Representative: Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, Hempel 1965, Mill 1843/50, Jevons 1877, Ducasse 1925, Feigl 1945, Popper 1945, Hospers 1946). Hempel/terminology/spelling/Bigelow/Pargetter:
O: Result
L: Laws
C: Conditions (sets of sentences, as premises.
Then "O" could also be seen as a set of sentences. But we are talking about compound sentences).
Then we have:
Initial conditions/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: are sometimes not needed at all. Sometimes, however, the laws alone do not explain the case: For example, Halley's comet comes back in 60 years, for this we need information about certain facts, it does not only follow from the laws. The facts are contingent, of course.
I 301
Non-statistical explanation/Hempel: Thesis: if L and C explain O, then they must entail O logically. Otherwise, we have at best a sketch of the explanation that requires further assumptions. Bigelow/Pargetter: this does not yet fully express the idea of the explanation by "deriving from laws": The laws must be used. Not only mentioned. In other words, there must be a reliance on laws.
BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: N.B.: but these are just apparant explanations!
I 302
Just as quackers and magicians often provide an explanation with reference to prestigious natural laws, which turns out to be circular on closer inspection. Solution/Hempel: to exclude this, he demands that additionally the premises must be true and O would not have followed if C alone had been without the laws (L).
BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: there are still a lot of refinements to be made and special cases to consider. Lewis would call that the "one patch per hole" method.
Statistical Explanation/Probabilistic/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Hempel 1965) here it is impossible to find laws that predict the exact result. However, it may be very likely in certain cases. Or more likely if the law is true than if it was not true.
I 303
The statistical explanations are something like derivations from the thing to be explained. And indeed such derivatives, which originate from invalid conclusions! (?). Logical form: the conclusion should be probable, given the premises.
Variants: one can demand a high probability from the outset. Or it should be higher than O's without the premises or weaker: that O only has to be made to a certain degree likely, etc. (Lit: Salmon 1982).
Bigelow/Pargetter: all this does not differ significantly from the non-statistical explanation. Statistical laws are also part of the set of laws.
Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: with Hempel's help, we can now broaden our concept of explanation:
I 304
If we get the probability of a result, we have explained the result a little bit as well. Statistical explanation/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the end, it is all about whether a result comes out or is likely. We can summarize both cases.
"Statistical"/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: only served to attenuate the requirement of logical validity.
Explanation/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis is an open process. This is important. Both the initial conditions can be varied, as well as the laws derived from other laws.
Kepler's laws, for example, have been traced back by Newton to deeper ones. These then logically entail the Kepler ones.
I 305
Openness/Hempel: is that you may be able to find deeper and deeper laws. Bigelow/Pargetter: that is one of the strengths of his theory.
C.G. Hempel
I Hempel Zur Wahrheitstheorie des logischen Positivismus aus Wahrheitsheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996

II Hempel Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums aus Sinnreich (Hg) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982

II (b) Hempel Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung (1951) aus Sinnreich (Hg) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Facts Schlick
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 93
Tatsachen/HempelVsSchlick: wir können die Struktur von Tatsachen nicht feststellen. - Daher können wir nicht genau sagen, was ein Vergleich von ihnen mit Aussagen ist. SchlickVsHempel: Bsp Wenn ich die Türme der Kathedrale zähle, werde ich mit der Struktur einer Tatsache bekannt. - Wenn Hempel das leugnet, gebraucht er die Wörter in einem anderen Sinn.
Horwich I 98
Tatsache/Satz/Vergleich/Übereinstimmung/Korrespondenz/HempelVsSchlick: Bsp -žDie Proposition enthält mehr Teile, "Wörter" genannt" als die Kathedrale Türme hat". - Problem: das erlaubt uns nicht, die Proposition zu testen! Es gibt hier keine spezifische "Korrespondenz" zwischen diesen physikalischen Objekten. - ((s) Weil die Proposition (Satz) als bloße Zeichenkette keine Bedeutung hat. Woher nimmt er aber dann die Aussage über die Anzahl der Türme?)
Horwich I 99
"Struktur von Tatsachen"/Hempel: Bsp die alte Frage, ob man zur Beschreibung physikalischer Zustände nicht nur rationale, sondern auch irrationale Werte zulassen sollte. (Weil die "Natur keine Sprünge macht"). - Pseudoproblem: das ist deswegen ein Pseudoproblem, weil es gar kein vorstellbares Experiment gibt, das eine Entscheidung zwischen beiden Möglichkeiten liefert. Es ist eine Frage der syntaktischen Konvention.

Schli I
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
History Dray
Books on Amazon:
W. H. Dray
Wright I 34
History/Explanation/Laws/Dray/Wright, G. H.: William Dray (W. Dray: Laws and Explanation in History, 1957) pursues a completely different explanation than Popper and Hempel. DrayVsHempel/DrayVsPopper/Dray: The reason why historical explanations do not normally contain a reference to laws is not that the laws are so complex and unknown that we have to be satisfied with a mere sketch, not even that they are too trivial, but that historical explanations are not based at all on general laws.
For example, the statement that Louis XIV. was unpopular at the end of his life because he pursued a policy that was detrimental to France's national interests.
I 35
Historical Laws/Dray: The conditions for the equality of prerequisites would have to be specified. Only then would we have a real law. But the only case that falls under this law would be the one it is supposed to "explain". A recourse to this law would therefore only result in a renewed assertion of what has already been established.

Dray I
W. Dray
Laws and Explanation in History Westport 1979

Dray I
W. H. Dray
Perspectives on History Sydney 1980

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Relevance Scriven
Books on Amazon
Fraassen I 104
Relevance/explanation/ScrivenVsHempel/BrombergerVsHempel: Relevance provides neither sufficient nor necessary conditions that something is an explanation - not sufficient: good belief reasons are no explanation. - E.g. redshift cannot be a reason for the expansion. - Unnecessary: not every explanation gives good belief reasons. - E.g. rare disease as a result of a frequent disease: - So you advise for treatment - but it would not be rational to expect that the disease occurs. - E.g. a very small amount of uranium does probably not radiate - but when it radiates the correct explanation is, that it is uranium - E.g. a man that takes birth control pills and does not get pregnant. ---
I 109
Relevance insufficient: E.g. 90% of the plants are killed: then it is not an explanation for the plants that survived that they were sprayed.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Significance Hempel
Books on Amazon
II 110
Cognitive Significance / Hempel: false: that two statements hae the same c.s., if they are verified by the same set of observation sentences - then two laws would always have the same c.s.: because they are of verified by no set - this is something quite different from the positivist criterion of meaning / Russell: two statements, whose verified consequences are the same, have the same significance - all authors VsHempel.
II 143
Cognitive Significance / Hempel: no individual statements, but systems - ultimately a matter of judgment - clarity, accuracy, forecast capacity, simplicity, degree of confirmation.
C.G. Hempel
I Hempel Zur Wahrheitstheorie des logischen Positivismus aus Wahrheitsheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996

II Hempel Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums aus Sinnreich (Hg) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982

II (b) Hempel Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung (1951) aus Sinnreich (Hg) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982
Statements Schlick
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 91f
Facts/propositions/HempelVsSchlick: cannot be compared with each other - propositions can only be compared with propositions (> coherence theory) - SchlickVsHempel: statements (here = propositions) may well be compared with the reality - "E.g. this cathedral has two towers - with the cathedral".

Schli I
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Verification Hempel
Books on Amazon
I 99
Verification/Natural laws/Hempel: a general statement is checked by examining their singular consequences. - Problem: each general statement specifies an infinite class of singular statements - therefore there is never a final verification. - Conversely, no general law is derived formally from a finite set of singular statements. ---
Bubner I 125
Confirmation/Hempel/Science Theory/Bubner: Relationship of logical inclusion of sentences. This avoids a crucial problem of induction. Both hypothetically valid laws or general statements as well as individual statements from observation are subject of logical consideration as sentences.
Formal rules of derivation
Rehabilitation of deduction.
With P. Oppenheim: D N Model: deductive nomological explanation: scientific explanation as a logical operation with sentences, subsumption of sentences under sentences. The explanandum is subsumed under Explanas (explanation reasons). The Explanas disintegrates into antecedents conditions (C1, C2,... Ck) which describe an event and general law statements (L1, L2,... Lr)
I 127
Deduction schema/Hempel:
C1, C2,... Ck
L1, L2,... Lr
E (Description of the phenomenon) The laws are therefore subject to the premises. (Only significant innovation VsAristotle).
GoodmanVsHempel: law-like statements instead of laws!
Induction: the "new mystery of induction" does not concern the confirmation but the original creation of hypotheses.
C.G. Hempel
I Hempel Zur Wahrheitstheorie des logischen Positivismus aus Wahrheitsheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk Frankfurt/M 1996

II Hempel Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums aus Sinnreich (Hg) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982

II (b) Hempel Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung (1951) aus Sinnreich (Hg) Philosophie der idealen Sprache, München 1982

The author or concept searched is found in the following 20 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Aristotle Hempel. Vs Aristotle
Books on Amazon
Bubner I 127
Deduction Scheme/HempelVsAristotle/Hempel: C1,C2,...Ck
E (description of the phenomenon) The laws therefore fall under the premises. (The only significant innovation VsAristotle). GoodmanVsHempel: lawlike statements instead of laws! Induction: the "new puzzle of induction" does not affect the confirmation, but the original formation of hypotheses.
Bridge Laws Hempel. Vs Bridge Laws
Books on Amazon
Cartwright I131
Bridge Principles/Cartwright: Tradition (Hempel, Grünbaum, Ernest Nagel): the propositions of a theory consist of two types: I 132 a) internal principles: content of the theory, laws about the behavior of the objects.
b) bridge principles: link the theory to more accessible aspects of reality (>"groomed description").
early: connection to observation reports.
Vs: that will not do because of the theory ladenness of observation.
new: connecting theory with already understood vocabulary.
Hempel/Late: (1979) this kind of explanation is not really deductive.
HempelVsBridge Principles: Problem: they are anything but invariably valid.
E.g. a large iron rod attracts iron filings, even if it is non-magnetic. So is it magnetic? Bridge principles are not universal laws.
CartwrightVsHempel: the situation is simultaneously not as bad and even worse than Hempel says: if the right type of description is given,
I 133
We know what equations we have to apply, and the principles which tell us this are necessary and valid without exception. Problem: such a "right kind of description" is extremely rare! And there are few formal principles for it. Only rules of thumb.
Carnap, R. Stroud Vs Carnap, R.
Books on Amazon
I 182
Extern/intern/Carnap/Quine/Stroud: Quine scheint Carnap so zu interpretieren. Dass der Unterscheidung die zwischen "Kategorien-Fragen" und "Teilmengen-Fragen" entspricht. Extern/QuineVsCarnap: das ist nichts anderes als zwei Weisen der Formalisierung der Sprache. Wenn wir nur eine Art gebundene Variable für alle Dinge haben, wird es eine externe Frage sein: "gibt es so und so?" wenn die Variable über den ganzen Bereich geht. (Kategorien-Frage).
Intern: wenn es für jede Art Ding eine Variable gibt, wird es eine Teilmengen-Frage sein. Dann bezieht sich die Frage nicht auf alle Dinge, die es geben kann.
I 183
Philosophie/QuineVsCarnap: unterscheidet sich von den Wissenschaften nur in der Breite ihrer Kategorien. (W+O, S 275). Extern/intern/QuineVsCarnap: Kategorien-Fragen unterscheiden sich von internen Fragen nur in ihrer Allgemeinheit von Teilmengen-Fragen. Wir können zur Allgemeinheit kommen, indem wir eine Art Variable über alle Dinge gehen lassen.
I 191
StroudVsCarnap: das führt ein "wir" ein, und etwas, das uns zustößt, das "Erfahrung" genannt wird. Dass wir existieren und Erfahrungen haben, kann nicht einfach als eine "interne" Wahrheit der Dingsprache angesehen werden.
Man kann die Sinngebung der Erfahrung dann auch nicht als gemeinsames Ziel aller "echten Alternativen" ansehen, weil dann vorausgesetzt wird, dass es äußere Dinge gibt.
Problem: die Frage des gemeinsamen Ziels aller echten Alternativen kann auch nicht als externe Frage aller Bezugssysteme angesehen werden, weil sie dann sinnlos wird.
Wenn sie aber "intern" wäre, was wäre dann der Unterschied, wenn man von einem Bezugssystem in ein anderes wechselt, das dieses Ziel gar nicht enthält?
Das beantwortet Carnap nicht.
I 192
Das macht es schwer, seinen positiven Ansatz zu erfassen. CarnapVsSkepticism: missversteht die Relation zwischen linguistischem Rahmen der Ausdrucksweise über äußere Gegenstände und den Wahrheiten, die innerhalb dieses Bezugssystems ausgedrückt werden.
StroudVsCarnap: aber was ist genau sein eigener nicht-skeptischer Zugang zu dieser Relation?
1. zu welchem System gehört Carnaps These, dass Existenzbehauptungen in der Dingsprache weder wahr noch falsch sind?
2. was drückt die These dann überhaupt aus?
Wissen/intern/Carnap: Bsp der Geometer in Afrika kommt wirklich zu Wissen über den Berg.
StroudVsCarnap: aber was bedeutet es zusätzlich dazu, dass dies keine Wahrheit ist, die unabhängig von einem Bezugssystem gilt?
Angenommen, wir hätten aus irgendeinem Grund nicht die Dingsprache und könnten eine andere Sprache frei wählen. Folgt daraus, dass Bsp der Satz über den Berg in Afrika nicht mehr wahr wäre?
Sicher würden wir in einer völlig anderen Sprache ohne Ding-Ausdrücke etwas ganz anderes ausdrücken. Aber wäre der Satz, den wir jetzt bilden können, in dieser anderen Sprache nicht mehr wahr?
I 193
Und könnte er niemals wahr sein, wenn wir zufällig die Dingsprache niemals angenommen hätten. Existenz/Sprache/Skeptizismus/StroudVsCarnap: das kann nicht richtig sein und es führt zu einem extremen Idealismus, den Carnap gerade ablehnt. Es ist deswegen absurd, weil wir schon genug über Berge wissen, um zu sehen, dass sie nicht durch eine gewählte Sprache beeinflusst werden.
Sprache/Gegenstand/Stroud: die Dinge waren schon lange da, bevor Sprache in der Welt entstand. Und das ist wiederum etwas, was wir "intern" in der Dingsprache wissen.
StroudVsCarnap: dann ist seine These, verstanden als der Sprache "intern", falsch. Sie widerspricht dem, was wir schon als Wissen über uns und die äußeren Dinge annehmen.
Empirisch genommen, führt sie zum Idealismus, der den gewussten Tatsachen widerspricht.
CarnapVsVs: würde sagen, dass man seine These natürlich nicht "empirisch" und nicht der Dingsprache "intern" auffassen darf.
StroudVsCarnap: aber innerhalb irgendeines Bezugssystems muss sie intern sein, sonst ist sie sinnlos.
Problem: das ist aber eine Aussage über die Relation zwischen einem gewählten Rahmen und den internen Aussagen innerhalb dieses Rahmens. Und wenn das impliziert, dass diese internen Aussagen weder wahr noch falsch gewesen wären, wenn ein anderes Bezugssystem gewählt worden wäre, ist das immer noch Idealismus, ob empirischer oder nichtempirischer Idealismus.
Truth Value/tr.v./Konvention/StroudVsCarnap: die WW der internen Sätzen wären abhängig von der Wahl der Sprache (des Bezugssystems).
I 194
StroudVsCarnap: es ist wichtig zu sehen, dass wenn das nicht folgen würde, Carnaps These nicht vom traditionellen Skeptizismus unterschieden wäre! Es wäre dann Raum für die Möglichkeit, dass Aussagen über Dinge wahr blieben, selbst wenn wir die Dingsprache aufgeben und Wahrheit wiederum sprachunabhängig wäre. Problem: das würde wieder dazu führen, dass unsere Wahl eines linguistischen Rahmens nur deshalb notwendig wäre, um etwas zu formulieren oder zu erkennen, das unabhängig von diesem Rahmen sowieso wahr wäre ((s) > metaphysischer Realismus).
theoretisch: das wäre nach Carnap dann eine "theoretische" Frage über die Akzeptabilität der Dingsprache als Ganzes. Aber in Bezug auf eine Objektivität, die wir dann voraussetzen.
CarnapVsTradition: es ist gerade die Unverständlichkeit solcher theoretischer Fragen, die wichtig bei Carnap ist. Denn
Problem: dann könnte es sein, dass selbst wenn wir unsere besten Prozeduren (> Beste Erklärung) sorgfältig anwenden, die Dinge immer noch anders sein könnten als wir denken, sie wären". Das entspricht dem Skeptizismus.
"Konditionale Korrektheit"/Skeptizismus/Carnap/Stroud: Carnap akzeptiert, was ich die "konditionale Korrektheit" des Skeptizismus genannt haben: wenn der Skeptiker eine bedeutungsvolle Frage stellen könnte, würde er sich durchsetzen.
StroudVsCarnap: wenn er nun nicht leugnen würde, dass die „internen“ Sätze wahr oder falsch bleiben, beim Wechsel des Bezugssystems, würde sein Ansatz genauso tolerant gegenüber dem Skeptizismus wie die Tradition. ((s) Sowohl das Leugnen als auch das Nichtleugnen würde also zum Problem.)
Kant/Stroud: auch er akzeptiert die "konditionale Korrektheit" des Skeptizismus. Wenn Descartes Beschreibung der Erfahrung und ihrer Relation zu den äußeren Dingen richtig wäre, könnten wir nie etwas über diese Dinge wissen.
Carnap/Stroud: seine Thesis ist eine Version der „Kopernikanischen Wende“ von Kant. Und er erlangt sie aus denselben Gründen wie Kant: ohne sie hätten wir keine Erklärung, wie ist’s möglich, dass wir überhaupt etwas wissen.
Bezugssystem/Rahmen/StroudVsCarnap: es öffnet sich eine Lücke zwischen dem Rahmen und dem, was unabhängig von ihm wahr ist. ((s) Wenn eine Wahl zwischen verschiedenen Rahmen möglich sein soll).
StroudVsCarnap: in dieser Hinsicht ist Carnaps Ansatz ganz Kantianisch.
I 196
Und er erbt auch die ganze Obskurität und den Idealismus von Kant. Es gibt überall Parallelen: für beide kann es eine Art Distanzierung von unserem Glauben geben. Wir können eine philosophische Untersuchung des Alltagslebens durchführen, (was die Bedingungen des Wissens betrifft).
I 197
Bezugssystem/Rahmen/StroudVsCarnap: zu welchem Rahmen gehört Carnaps These, dass keine Sätze über äußere Gegenstände wahr oder falsch unabhängig von der Wahl eines Bezugssystems (Sprache) sind? Und ist diese These - analytisch oder nicht – selbst „intern“ in irgendeinem Rahmen? Und ob sie es ist oder nicht, ist sie nicht bloß ein Ausdruck des Kantianischen Transzendentalen Idealismus? Skeptizismus/StroudVsCarnap: der Grundfehler ist, überhaupt eine konkurrierende Theorie zur Tradition zu entwickeln.
I 198
Ein rein negativer Ansatz oder deflationärer Gebrauch des Verifikationsprinzips würde den Skeptizismus einfach als sinnlos eliminieren. Wenn das ginge, brauchte man den Skeptizismus gar nicht mehr zu unterminieren. Aber: Verifikationsprinzip/StroudVsCarnap: Problem: der Status des Verifikationsprinzips selbst, bzw. seine Akzeptabilität. Wir können es nur dann gebrauchen um Descartes zu widerlegen, wenn wir einen guten Grund haben, es als notwendig anzunehmen. Aber das hängt davon ab, wie es eingeführt wird.
Es sollte dazu dienen, die Auswüchse sinnloser philosophischer Spekulation zu verhindern.
StroudVsCarnap: 1. Dann können wir nur noch zuschauen und sehen, wie weit das Prinzip zu einer Unterscheidung taugt, die wir vorher schon getroffen haben! Der einzige Test wären Sätze, die wir schon vorher als sinnlos erkannt hätten!
2. Aber selbst angenommen, das Prinzip wäre als extensional und deskriptiv adäquat erwiesen, d.h. es würde so zwischen sinnvoll und sinnlos unterscheiden, wie wir das tun,
I 199
es würde uns nicht ermöglichen, etwas als sinnlos auszuscheiden, das wir nicht auf anderem Wege schon als sinnlos erkannt hätten. Verification principle/StroudVsCarnap: wurde falsch eingeführt ((s) mit dem Hintergedanken, ein Resultat zu liefern, das vorher schon in Gänze bekannt war). Frühe Skizzen Carnaps zeigen, dass zunächst auch fälschlicherweise allgemeine Naturgesetze ausgeschlossen worden wären.
Verification principle/VP//StroudVsCarnap: eine richtige Einführung würde ein starkes destruktives Instrument liefern, das schon Kant suchte: sie müsste erklären, warum das VP korrekt ist. Das wäre wahrscheinlich identisch mit einer Erklärung, wie Wissen von äußeren Dingen möglich ist.
Verification principle/Hempel/Carnap/Stroud: die frühen Vertreter hatten im Sinn, dass
1. Ein Satz nur dann bedeutungsvoll ist, wenn er einen "tatsächlichen Inhalt" ausdrückt,
2. Dass Verstehen eines Satzes bedeutet zu wissen, was der Fall wäre, wenn der Satz wahr wäre.
Verificationism/Stroud: an diesem Ansatz ist zunächst nichts besonders originelles. Was ihm den verifikationistischen Dreh gibt ist die Idee, dass wir nichts auch nur verstehen können, das nicht als wahr oder falsch gewusst werden kann oder
schwächer: zumindest als rationaler zu glauben als sein Gegenteil.
StroudVsCarnap: das schlug fehl, sogar als Versuch, die empirisch überprüfbaren Sätze herauszugreifen.
I 205
SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: selbst wenn der verificationism wahr ist, brauchen wir immer noch eine Erklärung, wie und warum die traditionelle philosophische ((s) nicht-empirische) Untersuchung scheitert. ((s) soll hier dem Skeptizismus entsprechen). (>Warum-Frage).
I 207
StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap/StroudVsHempel: es ist plausibler, das Verifikationsprinzip ((s) > empiristisches Sinnkriterium) zurückzuweisen, als zu behaupten, dass Descartes niemals etwas sinnvolles gesagt hätte. StroudVsVerification principle: es wird solange unplausibel bleiben, wie nicht verstanden ist, warum die traditionelle Unterscheidung innen/außen nicht korrekt sein soll.

I 214
formalen Redeweise: ""Wombat" trifft zu (ist wahr-von) einigen Lebewesen in Tasmanien". QuineVsCarnap: missversteht den semantischen Aufstieg, wenn er von externen Fragen spricht. Damit wird aber nicht Carnaps pragmatischer Ansatz zurückgewiesen, der sich auf Einfachheit und Fruchtbarkeit von Theorien bezieht.

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
ceteris paribus Schiffer Vs ceteris paribus
Books on Amazon:
Stephen Schiffer
I 287
ceteris paribus/SchifferVsceteris paribus-condition: it is simply nonsense to speak of p.c., if at all it is not clear what these "other things" should be or what it is for them "to be "equal".
I 160
E.g. the baseball hits the window and "ceteris paribus" it would break. This leads to completions that let the phrase seamlessly pass into laws. The interesting question is why anybody would expect a completion here. Probably because the commonsense explanations for belief would otherwise not be valid. Blame it on the covering laws by Hempel.
SchifferVscovering law/SchifferVsHempel/SchifferVsFolk psychology: 2. reason, why the folk psychology is wrong that the covering laws are wrong.
E.g. Al is flying to Key West, Bob asks why and Carla explains that he wants to visit his sister there.
covering law: Carla knows a general psychological law and a conjunction of individual facts which make up a complete explanans and contain the fact that is to be explained.
Schiffer: it is clear that Carla does not need to know it! And certainly not as a child. This also does not need to be polished with "probabilisations" or "maximum specification"(Hempel 1965). Or by subdoxatic representation of complete laws. We don’t need any of this.
I 161
For sure Carla does not know any "probalistic completion". There is also no reason to assume that the whole story contains the terms "belief" and "desire"! But that does not mean that one should conclude that there is no belief and desires! "because"/explanation/Schiffer: E.g. Carla. Al went to Key West, because he wants to visit his sister. This true statement works in these circumstances as a declaration because of interests and assumptions that Bob had when he asked. Still one could wonder if such "because"-statements are analyzable. Probably no analysis has ever been given. That does not mean, however, that nothing has been said.
Solution: Counterfactual conditional: Al would not have gone, if he had not had the desire... etc.
"because"/Schiffer: I especially doubt that the knowing of such "because" facts is calling for law-like generalizations.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Covering Law Cartwright Vs Covering Law
Books on Amazon
I 11
Explanation/Physics/Cartwright: two different types of activity: 1) causal explanation: when we explain a phenomenon, we find its causes.
2) theoretical explanation: we adapt the phenomenon to a broader theoretical framework
Covering law/Cartwright: this approach tries to combine both strategies in one.
CartwrightVsCovering law: the function of the laws is different in the two strategies, and also their claim on truth. And the difference is more than merely philosophical, we find it in scientific practice.
Equations/Science/Physics/Cartwright: thesis: it is wrong to ask: "What are the correct equations?". Various models bring different aspects to the fore, some equations give a rougher estimate, but are easier to solve. No single model meets all purposes. We sometimes use this and someties the other equation.
I 16
CartwrightVsCovering law: Individual case causation/Cartwright: although I think you can give a causal explanation of isolated events, I will confine myself here to the normal cases, which are described by phenomenological laws. (> Wesley Salmon Scientific Exspl. and A causal Structure of the World)).
AllVsCovering law: does not describe the causes correctly. (> Scriven). But can it adapt the phenomena to the right frame?.
I 17
CartwrightVsCovering law: instead: "Simulacrum" view. Def Simulacrum/Oxford Dictionary/Cartwright: "something that has merely the form or the appearance of a certain thing without possessing its substance or real qualities".
Cartwright: that describes it very well! First, we construct a model that adapts the phenomenon to a theory.
Covering law: thesis: there is one single correct explanation for each phenomenon.
CartwrightVsCovering law: there are always several possible explanations. Theories are always redundant. That is what the deductively nomological approach misunderstands.
I 45
VsCovering law model/VsHempel/Explanation/Cartwright: most object that Hempel allowed too much. E.g. the fact that Henry is not pregnant is by this approach due to him taking birth control pills if he does. Or e.g. it is possible that the barometer explains the storm. CartwrightVsCovering law/CarwrightVsHempel: one criticism is just the other way round: Hempel allows too little! With a covering law model we can explain almost nothing, not even the rainbow. Because we do not have enough LoN to explain it in detail ((s) not the general, but the individual rainbow).
Explanation/Cartwright: many phenomena that have a perfect scientific explanation are not covered by any laws. That means, not by true laws. But at most by ceteris paribus laws/CPL).

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983
Deduction Duhem Vs Deduction
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Cartwright I 103
CartwrightVsDeductive-Nomological Model/CartwrighVsDeduction/CartwrightVsHempel: Explanations are rarely ever really deductive. Therefore, the generic-specific point of view receives little support from our practice. Many philosophers still follow the DN-model even today. This is because the explanations only set in after extensive scientific work. CartwrightVs: This overlooks the fact that physics itself already begins with (arbitrarily chosen) models. I 127 Facts/Physics/Laws/Cartwright: even if the fundamental laws remain in their original form, the steps of deriving from them are not dictated by any facts. That’s a problem: CartwrightVsDeductive-Nomological Model, CartwrightVsHempel, CartwrightVsGrünbaum. Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: therefore are not simply "better".
I 151 CartwrightVsDeductive-Nomological View: instead: the approach by Duhem: Science as organization (order) of knowledge.
I 162
CartwrightVsDeductive-Nomological Approach/VsD-N/CartwrightVsHempel: causality is not the only problem. This fails to explain even Humean facts of association. 1) because the fundamental laws are corrected during the derivation. (Essay 6) 2) often laws from different areas are pieced together. (Essay 3)

Duh I
P. Duhem
Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983
Deduction Cartwright Vs Deduction
Books on Amazon
I 103
CartwrightVsDeductively nomological model/CartwrighVsDeduction/CartwrightVsHempel: statements are rarely actually deductive. Therefore, the generic-specific point of view obtains little support from our practice. Many philosophers still follow the DN model today. This is because the statements only set in after extensive scientific work. CartwrightVs: that overlooks the fact that physics itself already begins with (arbitrary) models. I 127 Facts/Physics/Laws/Cartwright: even if the fundamental laws remain in their original form, the steps of derivation from them are not dictated by any facts. That’s a problem: CartwrightVsDeductively nomological model, CartwrightVsHempel, CartwrightVsGrünbaum. Fundamental laws/Cartwright: are not simply "better" because of this.
I 151 CartwrightVsDeductive-nomological view: instead: the approach of Duhem: Science as an organization (order) of knowledge.
I 162
CartwrightVsDeductively nomological approach/VsD N/CartwrightVsHempel: causality is not the only problem. Humean facts of the association are not explained by this, either. 1) because the fundamental laws are corrected during the derivation. (Essay 6) 2) often laws from different areas are pieced together. (Essay 3)

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983
Hempel, C. Danto Vs Hempel, C.
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Arthur Danto
II 328
Beschreibung/Sprache/Erklärung/Danto: der Ausdruck »der amerikanischen Bürgerkriegs« ist ein hinweisender Ausdruck. Er ist als solches weder war noch falsch. DantoVsHempel: hinweisender Ausdrücke können nicht in Konklusionen auftreten.
Als Konklusion können Sie nur auftreten, wenn über den von Ihnen bezeichneten Gegenstand eine bestimmte Aussage gemacht würde.
Da aber jedes Phänomen auf viele Arten beschrieben werden kann, steht keineswegs fest, daß das Phänomen unter jeder möglichen Beschreibung unter ein allgemeines Gesetz fällt. (Bsp die Hochzeit der amerikanische Schauspielerin Grace Kelly in Monaco führte dazu, daß bestimmte Flaggen an der Straße hingen. Das könnte aber auch mit einem bestimmten Feiertag erklärt werden.)

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Hempel, C. Fraassen Vs Hempel, C.
Books on Amazon
I 106
Verifiability/Theory/Criteria/FraassenVsHempel: verifiability is fulfilled by all scientific theories - therefore it cannot be a criterion.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Hempel, C. Goodman Vs Hempel, C.
Books on Amazon
Bubner I 128
Deduction schema / Hempel:
  C1, C2, ... Ck
  L1, L2, .... Lr
  E (description of the phenomenon)   Thus, the laws fall under the premises. (The only major change VsAristoteles).
GoodmanVsHempel: law-like statements instead of laws!
       Induction: the "new riddle of induction" does not affect the confirmation but the original formation of hypotheses.

N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989
Hempel, C. Harman Vs Hempel, C.
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Schiffer I 162
HarmanVsHempel/HarmanVsCovering Law/Non-Deterministic Automaton/Action/Schiffer: (Harman 1973, 52). (non-deterministic automaton: is one in which input and current internal state is not sufficient to determine the subsequent behavior. Not even covering laws help with that. Even if it looks like a complete description...

Harm I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Hempel, C. Lewis Vs Hempel, C.
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V 232
Probability/Explanation/Hempel/Lewis: is also offered by him for the probabilistic case; but this is different from his deductive-nomological model. LewisVsHempel: two unwelcome consequences:
1. an improbable case cannot be explained at all
2. a necessity of a correct explanation: "maximal specificity" : relative to our knowledge, i.e. not knowing (a case of probability) makes an explanation, which is actually true, not true. Truth is only that not knowing makes the explanation look untrue. [Wahr ist nur, dass sie sie unwahr erscheinen lässt.]
I prefer Peter Railton's model:
Probability/Explanation/Peter Railton/Lewis: "deductive-nomological model" "probabilistic explanation" (d.n.m.).
We must distinguish this model from Fetzer's model: for both
covering law/Raiton/Fetzer: universal generalizations about a single case are chances.
Explanation/Probability/FetzerVsRailton: as for Hempel: inductive, not deductive. Explanation: as an argument! LewisVsFetzer: but: a good explanation is not necessarily a good argument!
LewisVsFetzer/LewisVsRailton: both want an explanation even if the event is very improbable. But in this case a good explanation is a very bad argument.
V 233
Probability/Explanation/Covering Law Model/Railton:two parts: 1. one deductive-nomological argument which fulfills some conditions of the non-probabilistic case. Laws of probability may also be a part of its premises.
2. does not belong to the argument: The finding that the event took place.
If the premises say that certain events took place, then those are sufficient if taken together - given the laws - for the actual event or for the probability.[Wenn die Prämissen sagen, dass gewisse Ereignisse stattgefunden haben, dann sind diese zusammen hinreichend - gegeben die Gesetze - für das eigentliche Ereignis oder für die Wschk.]
Problem: a subset - given only a part of the laws- can be sufficient as well in explaining parts of the events, and in creating a number of remains which are still sufficient under the original laws. [eine Teilmenge - gegeben auch nur ein Teil der Gesetze - kann ebenfalls hinreichend sein, Teile der Ereignisse zu erklären, und eine Anzahl Überbleibsel hervorbringen, die immer noch hinreichend unter den Originalgesetzen sind.] THis is why there must be two conditions for the explanation:
1. certain events are sufficient when taken together for the event of the explanandum (under the prevailing laws)
[dass gewisse Ereignisse zusammen hinreichend sind für das Explanandum Ereignis (unter den herrschenden Gesetzen)]
2. only some of the laws are used to guarantee that the conditions are sufficient
LewisVsRailton: If we had covering law [Begleitgesetz] for causation, and our covering law for explanation, my approach would be reconciled with the c1-approach.
But this cannot be achieved!
V 233/234
An element of the d.n.m.'s sufficient reasons will in reality often be one of the causes. But this cannot be! The counterexamples are well-known: 1. an irrelevant reason can be a part of the sufficient subset, the requirement of minimality is not helping: We can create artificial minimality by taking weaker laws and disregarding stronger ones.
e.g. Salmon: A man takes the (birth control) pill, and does not end up pregnant! The premise that nobody who takes the pill will not become pregnant cannot be disregarded!
2. An element of sufficient subset could be something that is not an event:
e.g. a premise can assess that something as an extrinsic or highly disjunctive characteristic. But no true events can be specified.
3. An effect can be part of the subset if laws state that the effect can only be made to happen in a particular way. I.e.: the set could be conveniently minimal, and also be one of the events, but it would not be sufficient to make the effect the cause of its cause!
[Ein Effekt kann zur Teilmenge gehören, wenn die Gesetze sagen, dass er nur in bestimmter Weise hervorgebracht werden kann. D.h. die Menge könnte in geeigneter Weise minimal sein, und auch eine von Ereignissen sei, aber das wäre nicht hinreichend, den Effekt zur Ursache seiner Ursache zu machen!]
4. Such an effect can also be the sufficient subset for another effect, e.g. of a later effect of the same cause.[Ein solcher Effekt kann auch zur hinreichenden Teilmenge für einen anderen Effekt sein, z.B. eines späteren, derselben Ursache.]
E.g. an ad appearing on my TV is caused because of the same broadcast, like the same appearing on your TV. But one appearance is not the cause of the other ad, rather they happened due to the same cause. [Bsp dass ein Werbespot auf meinem Fernseher erscheint wird durch dieselbe Ausstrahlung verursacht, wie das Erscheinen desselben Spots auf Ihrem Fernseher, aber das eine ist nicht Ursache des anderen. Eher haben sie eine gemeinsame Ursache.]
5. an impeded potential cause may belong to a subset because nothing has overridden it. [eine verhinderte potentielle Ursache könnte zur Teilmenge gehören, weil nichts sie außer Kraft gesetzt hat.]
LewisVsRailton: This shows that the combined sufficient subset, presented by d.n.-arguments, is possibly not a set of causes.
V 235
LewisVsRailton: It is a problem for my own theory if a d.n. argument does not seem to show causes, but still seems to be an explanation. (see above, paragraph III,I. Three examples VsHempel: refractive index, VsRailton: no non-causal cases in reality. RailtonVsLewis: If the d.n. model presents no causes, and thereby does not look like an explanation, then it makes it a problem for said model.
Railton: This is why not every d.n. model is a correct explanation.
V 236
Question: Can every causal narration [Kausalgeschichte] be characterized by the information which is part of a deductive-nomological argument? It would be the case if each cause belongs to a sufficient subset, given the laws. Or for the probabilistic case: given the laws of probability. And is it that causes are included in them?[ Und ist das so, dass die Ursachen darunter fallen?]
Lewis: It does not follow from the counterfactual analysis of causality. But it could be true. (It will be true in a possible world with sufficiently strict laws.)
If explanatory information is information about causal narration, then the informaation is given by deductive-nomological arguments.
But there will still be something wrong! The deductive-nomological arguments are presented as being ideal, i.e. they have the right form, neither too much nor not enough.
But nobody thinks that daily explanation fulfills this. Normally, the best we can do is to make existence assumptions.
"Deshalb" Behauptung/Morton White: We can take it as existence assumptions.
LewisVsRailton: correct deductive-nomological arguments as existence assumptions are still not a true explanation. They do not meet the standard on how much information is sufficient, simply because of their form.
Lewis: There is always more to know if we collect deductive-nomological arguments, as perfect as they are. [es gibt immer noch mehr zu wissen, wenn wir noch so perfekte deductive-nomological arguments aufhäufen.] Deductive-nomological arguments only offer a profile of the causal narration. Many causes may be omitted. They could be the ones we are currently looking for. Maybe we would like to acquaint ourselves with the mechanism which were involved in particular traces of causal narration.
[geben immer nur einen Querschnitt der Kausalgeschichte. Viele Ursachen mögen weggelassen sein. Und diese könnte diejenigen sein, die wir gerade suchen. Vielleicht möchten wir gerade die Mechanismen kennen lernen, die in bestimmten Spuren der Kausalgeschichte involviert sind.]
V 238
Explanation/Lewis/VsRailton: a deductive-nomological argument can also be in the wrong form: to not give us enough of too much at the same moment. Explanation/Lewis: But we cannot actually say that we have a different conception of the explanation's unity. We should not demand a unity: An explanation is not a thing that one can have or fail at creating one, but something that one can have to a higher or lesser degree.
[dabei ist es nicht so, dass wir eine verschiedene Vorstellung von der Einheit der Erklärung haben. Wir sollten gar keine Einheit fordern: eine Erklärung ist kein Ding, das man haben kann oder verfehlen, sondern etwas, von dem man mehr oder weniger haben kann.]
Problem: The conception to have "enough" of an explanation: It makes us doubt our ancestors' knowledge. They never or rarely had complete knowledge about laws of nature.
LewisVsRailton: i.e. so, they never or rarely had complete deductive-nomological arguments. Did they therefore have incomplete explanatory knowledge. I do not think so! They know much about the causes of things.
Solution/Railton: (similarly to my picture): together with each explanandum we have a wide and complex structure.
V 239
Lewis: For me those structures are linked because of causal dependence. Railton: For him they consist of an "ideal text" of arguments, like in mathematical proofs.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Hempel, C. Nozick Vs Hempel, C.
Books on Amazon
II 301
Explanation/Probability/Nozick: if a fundamental probability law finds that the probability that something has P - given it also has Q - is 95%, we cannot deduce this fact from the having of the property P plus the probability law! ((s) We need to know if it also has Q). Probability Law/Hempel: thought that events that have high probabilities are explained by subsuming under a probability law. As an approximation to deduction.
NozickVsHempel: what about improbable events? If we find P without Q, how do we explain that? Hempel cannot explain this .
II 302
Hempel: can only explain that one or the other P occurs without Q, but not why! Nozick: but we do know that there is some kind of system that produces some Ps that are not Qs. And we explain why this thing is so through the mechanism of random operation.
Nozick: the alternative would be to say that events with low probability are inexplicable. (NozickVs).
Explanation/Probability/Nozick: Thesis: we have an understanding and an explanation of why something happens, even if we do not know the reasons why it happened at the time. Even if it is random, it need not be inexplicable. It may be an event of a type.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Hempel, C. Quine Vs Hempel, C.
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Willard V. O. Quine
XI 108
Projectability/Goodman/QuineVsHempel/Lauener: the complement of a projectable predicate need not be projectable. E.g. "Non-grazers" and e.g. "Non-cow" are not projectable. (>green-blue).

W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Hempel, C. Bigelow Vs Hempel, C.
Books on Amazon
I 301
Non-statistical explanation/Hempel: thesis: if L (legislation) and C (conditions) explain O (results), then they must logically entail O. Otherwise, we have at best an explanation sketch that requires further assumptions. Bigelow/Pargetter: that does not quite express the idea of explanation by "derivation from laws": The laws must be used. Not just mentioned. That means there must be a reliance on laws. BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: Important argument: these are only pseudo-explanations! I 302 Just as quacks and magicians often provide an explanation, citing respected laws of nature, which turns out to be circular on closer inspection. Solution/Hempel: in order to the exclude that, he demands that, in addition, the premises have to be true and O would not have followed if C had been alone without the laws (L). BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: very many refinements must be made with that and special cases must be considered. That is what Lewis would call the "One patch per hole" method.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Hempel, C. Schiffer Vs Hempel, C.
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Stephen Schiffer
I 160
SchifferVscovering law/SchifferVsHempel/SchifferVsFolk psychology: 2. Reason why the folk psychology is wrong that the covering laws are wrong. E.g. Al flies to Key West, Bob asks why and Carla explains that he wants to visit his sister there.
covering law: Carla knows a general psychological law and a conjunction of individual facts that add up to the full explanans and contain to explanatory fact.
Schiffer: it is clear that the Carla did not need to know! And certainly not as a child. This also does not need to be refined with "probabilisations" or "maximum specification" (Hempel 1965). Or by subdoxastic representation of complete laws. We do not need any of this.
I 161
Surely Carla does not know any "probabilistic completion". There is also no reason to assume that the whole story uses the terms "belief" and "desire"! But that does not mean that one should conclude that there is no faith and desires! "Because"/Explanation/Schiffer: E.g. Carla. Al went to Key West, because he wants to visit his sister. This true statement works in these circumstances as an explanation because of the interests and assumptions that Bob had when he asked. Nevertheless, one can ask whether such "because"-statements are analyzable at all. Probably no analysis was ever given. This does not mean that nothing has been said.
Solution: counterfactual conditional: Al would not have gone if he had not had the desire ... etc.
"Because"/Schiffer: I doubt above all that the knowledge of such "because"-facts requires law-like generalizations.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Hempel, C. Salmon Vs Hempel, C.
Books on Amazon
Fraassen I 106
Relevanz/Wschk/W. SalmonVsHempel: Bsp jemand erholt sich wahrscheinlich innerhalb einer Woche von seiner Erkältung, schließlich hat er Vitamin C genommen.
Problem: er würde sich auch ohne Vitamin C innerhalb einer Woche wahrscheinlich erholen.
Bsp Jones wird nicht schwanger. Schließlich hat er regelmäßig die Antibabypillen seiner Frau genommen und jeder Mensch der sie nimmt, verhindert damit eine Schwangerschaft.
Problem: ganz sicher wird er auch sonst nicht schwanger.
Erklärung:/W. Salmon: also muss etwas mit diesen Erklärungen falsch sein: es fehlt die Relevanz.
Problem/VsHempel: das zweite Kriterium, Überprüfbarkeit, wird von allen wissenschaftlichen Theorien erfüllt, also kann es hier nicht helfen.
I 107
Def Erklärung/W.Salmon: ist kein Argument, sondern eine Ansammlung statistisch relevanter Faktoren. Def statistisch relevant/W. Salmon: ist ein Faktor, wenn die Wschk der Wirkung E gegeben A verschieden ist, von der von E allein:
P(E I A) ungleich P(E).
Relevanz/Hempel: sein Kriterium erforderte, dass die Wschk groß sei (wenigstens größer als ½)
SalmonVsHempel: es ist nicht einmal erforderlich, dass die Information A die Wschk von E erhöht ((s) sie kann sie auch vermindern, (negative Korrelation), nur soll sie nicht gleich sein).
SalmonVsHempel: dass seine Forderung zu stark war, zeigt Bspo Parese und Bsp Uran.
Salmon: Bsp eine Mischung von Uran-238 und Polonium –214 zu gleichen Teilen. Wenn der Geigerzähler klickt (in dem Intervall zwischen t und t+m), so deshalb, weil ein Uranatom zerfiel. Pointe: die Wschk ist viel höher relativ zu der Information, dass das Uranatom zu der Mischung gehört. (FN 12).
Problem: nach Salmons Kriterium können wir nicht nur erklären, dass es einen Zerfall gab, sondern auch warum er z.B. genau in der Mitte zwischen t und t+m geschah.
I 108
Denn die Information ist statistisch relevant für das Ereignis. Dennoch würden wir sagen, dass es eine Tatsache der Art ist, die die Atomphysik unerklärt läßt ((s) Weil das einzelne Zerfallsereignis indeterministisch ist). Pointe: die Information ist wohl statistisch relevant für das Ereignis zu (t + t+m/2) aber nicht, indem es andere Ereignisse ausschließt!
Erklärung/FraassenVsHempel: allgemeinere Kritik: es scheint dass, wenn entweder Hempel oder Salmon recht hätte, dann könnte Erklärungskraft nur aus empirischer Adäquatheit und empirischern Stärke bestehen. D.h. Erklärung wäre ununterscheidbar davon einfach zu zeigen, dass das Vorkommnis
I 109
kein Argument gegen die Behauptung der empirischen Adäquatheit der Theorie darstellt und außerdem eine wichtige Information liefert, die von der Theorie beinhaltet wird, die für das Vorkommnis relevant ist. Erklärung/W. Salmon/Fraassen: dieser scheint der Meinung zu sein, dass an Erklärung nicht mehr dran sein kann: „...wir kennen jetzt alle Regularitäten (universell oder statistisch) die für unsere Frage wichtig waren, was mehr soll man von einer Erklärung verlangen?“ (FN 14).
Fraassen: aber Salmon selbst und andere entwickelten Theorien, bei denen „mehr dran ist“

Sal I
W. Salmon
Logik Stuttgart 1983

Sal II
W. Salmon
The Foundations Of Scientific Inference 1967

SalN I
N. Salmon
Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II 2007

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Hempel, C. Schlick Vs Hempel, C.
Books on Amazon
Horwich I 91
Context: Schlick: The foundation of knowledge" (1934) HempelVsSchlick). HempelVsSchlick: he was a "metaphysician and poet".
Proposition/reality/HempelVsSchlick: you cannot compare statements with facts!
SchlickVsHempel: you can without being a metaphysician.
I 92
E.g. I compare this sentence in my Baedeker "This cathedral has two towers" with reality: namely simply by looking at the cathedral. If someone has something against it, it may just be that he understands "Proposition" in another sense.
Coherence theory/HempelVsSchlick/HempelVscorrespondence theorie: you can only compare propositions with each other. ((s) Not propositions with reality).
Schlick: we can distinguish between cases where a written, printed or spoken proposition is compared with another written, printed or spoken proposition.
Schlick: and I call that the comparison a proposition with a fact.
HempelVsSchlick: statements can only be compared with other statements. ((s)> coherence).
SchlickVsHempel: Why? I take out the modest freedom to compare everything with everything. If propositions and facts are to be too far from each other? Too different? Should it be a mysterious property of propositions that they cannot be compared with anything?
Fact/statement/Hempel: the gap between them is only a metaphysical.
SchlickVsHempel: that may be so, but who believes because in such a gap?
I 93
Def Proposition/Schlick: is a string along with the logical rules for their use. ((s) So almost a proposition, along with the importance of rules). Proposition meaning/Schlick: these rules culminate in "deictic" definitions that make up the meaning of the proposition.
Verification/compliance/correspondence/SchlickVsHempel: to verify the proposition, I have to find out if the (meaning-) rules were followed. Why should it be impossible? E.g. I look at the cathedral and then at the proposition and realize that the symbol "two" is used in the proposition in connection with the symbol "towers" and so I will get to the same icon when applying the rules of counting the cathedral towers.
Coherence theory/fact/proposition/Compare/Schlick: sometimes it is said that "in a logical sense" propositions can be compared only with other propositions. That may be so, but I do not know what is meant by a "comparison in a logical way".
Comparison/HempelVsSchlick: we cannot say exactly what a comparison of statements and facts is,
I 94
Because we cannot determine the structure of facts. Fact/structure/SchlickVsHempel: that we cannot determine the "structure of a fact" reminds me of the metaphysics of "things in themselves". If one does not deny the existence of facts, then why deny the possibility to determine their structure?
Structure of a fact: E.g. if I count the towers of a cathedral, I become familiar with the structure of a certain fact. If you wanted to say that it is meaningless to speak of "structures of facts" at all that would be merely a question of terminology. One proposition is also not per se meaningful, but only in conjunction with the rules for its use.
Fact/propositions/Compare/Vscorrespondence theory/SchlickVsHempel: that is what the whole controversy is about, if it should be impossible to compare propositions and facts, Hempel uses the words simply in a different sense. The easiest way to deny that you can compare them would be to say that there are simply no facts! (In formal speech: the rule of the word "fact" is such that it should not be used).
Or maybe the comparison is simply never applied in the sciences? I think this is true for purely logical sciences such as mathematics, but not in experimental sciences.
I 95
SchlickVsHempel: here is the psychological motivation of his criticism: it is about a vision that completely settles within the sciences. Science as a system of propositions. This should be a substitute for reality. Then "protocol statements" are used as a material, without subjecting them to an empirical test. Science/Schlick: But science is not the world! The universe of discourse is not the universe.
It's one thing to ask how their whole system is constructed and why it is generally regarded as true, and another, why I even look at them as true. This is a psychological question. But none of the "cultural subordination". My trust in science and colleagues is that I found them trustful, every time I checked their allegations.
I 96
Def confirmation/Schlick: the final step in the comparison between a statement and a fact. But one should not attach too much importance to the concept.
I 97
Fact/proposition/compare/match/correspondence/HempelVsSchlick: his example for comparison is not quite adequate. (E.g. "The cathedral has two towers"). Hempel: I agree that one can consider propositions as empirical objects that can be compared with any other empirical object. But if we take that literally it leads to something like:
I 98
E.g. "The proposition contains more parts, "the words" referred to" than the cathedral has towers". Correspondence/SchlickVsHempel: There is a different kind of comparison between proposition and fact: Comparison of symbols "two" in the sentence and the counting by looking at the cathedral.
HempelVsSchlick: so by that he compares a proposition in Baedeker with the result of an action by himself.
Coherence theory/Pointe: this result of the action is determined in a second proposition. And these two are compared! That is what I meant with "logical point".
Revision/verification/coherence theory/HempelVsSchlick: it's about whether the propositions contradict each other. This goes even without knowing the meanings of the propositions! (> Carnap: "The logical syntax of the language", "Philosophy and logical syntax"). Example, the above two propositions, both contain an icon that is shaped like "two".

Schli I
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985

Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Hempel, C. Nagel, E. Vs Hempel, C.
Books on Amazon
Schurz I 93
Law of Nature/LoN/Schurz: strict spatio-temporally unlimited universal sentences are candidates for LoN. If they were true, they would express real LoN. They are called lawlike. I 94 Lawlike/Schurz: spatio-temporally unlimited E.g. All objects attract each other ((s) only true if protons, electrons, etc., are not objects.) E.g. All living things must die spatio-temporally limited: E.g. mammals in polar regions have - compared with their counterparts in warmer areas - a more rounded shape (Germann's law). Scientific/Schurz: depends on the size of the area in this case. Universal Sentence/Schurz: to avoid differences of degree they were called fundamental and derived universal sentences Def Fundamental Universal Sentence/Carnap/Hempel: does not contain any individual constants and no spatio-temporal limitations. Def Derived Universal Sentence/Carnap/Hempel: can be derived from background knowledge from other universal sentences together with singular starting conditions. I 95 Ernest NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsHempel: according to this, no accidental universal sentence can be a derived law: E.g. "All screws on Smith's car are rusty". Solution/Nagel: only fundamental universal sentences can be laws. Hempel: admitted this, thus the lawlikeness remains gradual! Lawlike/Statistics/Schurz: even here there is lawlikeness: E.g. 50% of all cesium-137 atoms have decayed after 30 years. E.g. 80% of all lung cancer patients used to be heavy smokers.

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Hempel, C. Schurz Vs Hempel, C.
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Gerhard Schurz
I 224
Erklärung/Gesetz/Hempel: die Gesetzesprämissen können oft weggelassen werden! Geisteswissenschaften/Hempel/Schurz: beanspruchte, auch für sie Erklärungen liefern zu können, indem er annahm, dass auch hier Gesetze herrschen.
VsHempel: diese Gesetze sind aber nicht strikt.
Hempel: spät: dafür probabilistische Erklärung.
I 234
Wahrscheinlichkeit/Erklärung/Schurz: es gibt zwei Lager: Hempel (1965) fordert, dass zu einer Erklärung die conditional probability nahe 1 liegen sollte. VsHempel: (Stegmüller, Tuomela: statt dessen Minimalforderung:
Def "Leibniz-Bedingung"/Schurz: Minimalanforderung an den Wert der conditional probability
p(Ex I Ax): er muss größer als ½ sein.
Schurz: für probabilistische Begründungen und Voraussagen ist sie sicherlich zutreffend, aber gilt sie auch für Erklärungen? Dann nicht, wenn ihr Wesen darin liegen soll, positiv relevante Kausalfaktoren zu zitieren.

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Explanation Salmon, W.
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Fraassen I 100
These Erklärung ist nicht eine zusätzliche Eigenschaft jenseits von empirischer Adäquatheit.
I 107
Def Erklärung/W. Salmon: These ist kein Argument, sondern eine Ansammlung statistisch relevanter Faktoren. Def statistisch relevant/W. Salmon: ist ein Faktor, wenn die Wschk der Wirkung E gegeben A verschieden ist, von der von E allein:
P(E I A) ungleich P(E).
Relevanz/Hempel: sein Kriterium erforderte, daß die Wschk groß sei (wenigstens größer als ½)

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980