Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Causality Hempel Wright I 27
Causality/Hempel/von Wright, G. H.: Hempel's deductive nomological model does not mention the terms 'cause' and 'effect'. The schema covers a broader area, causality is only a partial area. G. H. von WrightVsHempel: it is questionable whether all causal explanations actually correspond to Hempel's scheme. It is also questionable whether the scheme can really be considered an explanation if the general laws are not causal laws.

Hempel I
Carl Hempel
"On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Hempel II
Carl Hempel
Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950
German Edition:
Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums
In
Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982

Hempel II (b)
Carl Hempel
The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951
German Edition:
Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung
In
Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982


WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Covering Laws Hempel Wright I 23
Covering Laws/Hempel/von Wright, G. H.: the name for this approach by Hempel comes from a critic of this theory: William Dray(1).
I 24
Subsumption theory/terminology/von Wright, G. H.: I choose this expression instead of the term of Hempel's Covering Law theory. There are two options: a) deductive-nomological: in this variant, all subsequent events logically follow from the existence of a situation and from laws.
I 25
b) inductive-probabilistic: here there is a general law, the "bridge" or the "ribbon", which links the basis of the explanation to the subject matter. This is a probability hypothesis according to which, if events E1... Em (the base) are given, it is very likely that event E will take place(2). G. H. von WrightVsHempel: in what sense - if at all in one - can one speak of explanation?
I 155
Hempel's terminology fluctuated. He called non-eductive explanations alternately inductive, statistical, probabilistic and inductive-statistical explanations.
I 156
von Wright, G. H.: The arguments of Scriven and Dray are related to my criticism of the scheme, Sriven uses the successful wording that Hempel's approach "gives the individual case away". Scriven: an event can move freely within a network of statistical laws, but is located within the "normic network" and explained by this localization(3)(4).
I 26
Wright: the two schemes differ more than expected. WrightVsHempel: one should not speak of an explanation for the inductive-probabilistic model, but rather of the fact that certain expectations are justified.
I 28
Wright: a test on the Covering Law approach would be to ask whether the law scheme of the explanation also covers teleological explanations. Teleology/von Wright, G. H.: there are two sections:
a) the field of the term function, goal (purposefulness) and "organic wholeness" ("systems").
b) purposefulness and intentionality.
See also >Feedback/von Wright, G. H.


1. W. Dray: Laws and Explanation in History, 1957, p. 1.
2. C. G. Hempel: Aspects of Scientific Explanation, in: "Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science", New York 1965.
3. M. Scriven: Truisms as the Grounds for Historical Explanation, in: P. Gardiner (Ed.), 1959, p. 467.
4. W. Dray: The Historical Explanation of Actions Reconsidered, 1963.

Hempel I
Carl Hempel
"On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Hempel II
Carl Hempel
Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950
German Edition:
Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums
In
Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982

Hempel II (b)
Carl Hempel
The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951
German Edition:
Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung
In
Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982


WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Explanation Fraassen I 23
Explanation/FraassenVsReichenbach: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the demand of hidden variables. ---
I 25
Explanation: if mere regularity makes a macroscopic theory poor, then the same happens to a microscopic one - coincidence: also coincidence can have an explanation. ---
I 39
Explanation/FraassenVsAugustinus: the fleeing of the mouse from the cat must not be explained by perception - but with Darwin: the fleeing mice survive. There is no account by reason. Analogously it applies that the successful sciences survive - without this having to be explained. ---
I 86
Theory/Explanation: For example, one could have two types of mechanics, one for physiologies and one for astronomers - problem: one cannot explain a complex phenomenon with this - e.g. man who is walking on the moon - if both theories have no common models, a new theory on lunar gravitation must be established - empirical adequacy: requires the integration of these "mini-theories". ---
I 87
Explanation: if we consider some kind of questions to be more important, this is no reason to believe that the theory that explains them is more probable - however, the social situation of the researcher plays a role in the evaluation of theories. ---
I 93
Explanation/Ernest Nagel: explanation is the organization and classification of our knowledge - FraassenVsFeyerabend: he misunderstood the fact: that this is a function of interests - FraassenVsFeyerabend: then one can stop to research if one believes, what one says - naive view of scientific security - then the scientists ought to swear by an oath that they are looking for explanations -FraassVsFeyerabend: in reality one must always doubt the adequacy. ---
I 97f
Explanation/FraassenVsTradition: explanation does not have to be true! - a) "we have an explanation" (has to do with acceptance) - b) "the theory explains" (without acceptance) - e.g. Newton's theory was wrong nevertheless it explains much - ((s) then a theory cannot be a conjunction of sentences, for then no sentence may be false.) - Harman: Explanation leads to acceptance - explanation/Fraassen: something does not require that theory coincides with the world as a whole. ---
I 98
One cannot assert the truth of a theory before its explanatory power - Explanation: is not an additional property for empirical adequacy - e.g. "the computer computes" - no one would say "the hammer struck the nail". ---
I 106
Explanation/VsHempel/Morton Beckner: e.g. evolution is not deterministic - e.g. the giraffes's neck is not determined by dietary scarcity - only by the compatibility of genetic and natural selection mechanisms - Putnam: also Newton's explanation is no deduction, but a demonstration of compatibilities. ---
I 110
Definition Explanation/Friedman: S explains P iff P is a consequence S which is "relative" to K and S "reduces" or "unifies" the set of its own consequences relative to K. ---
I 111
Explanation: Problem: 1. Incompleteness: disease explains a rare secondary disease that is triggered by it - but not why this patient is affected - asymmetry: e.g. length of the shadow: is always in relation with a certain sun position. - Causation: only goes in one direction. ---
I 111
Why question: does not occur when the spectrum is explained by the atomic structure. ---
I 124
Explanation: has to do with "why" - to find prominent factors in the causal network - problem: the network as a whole does not explain typical cases - science, however, describes the network - ((s) therefore science does not equal an explanation. Explanation must at least say that there is a structure that can be described in principle - though never fully.) ---
I 146
Explanation: for evaluating a response to a why question as an explanation, it is not a matter of whether this is true - the evaluation uses only the part of the background information that provides the general theory about these phenomena plus additional information that does not include the facts to be explained - ((s) e.g. framework conditions). ---
I 155
Explanation/Description/Fractions: explanation and description do not differ in the information - but explanation: is a three-digit relation theory-fact-context - description: is two-digit: theory-fact - Explanation: is an applied science (not pure science). ---
I 205
Explanation/Thomas Aquinas/Fraassen: everything that is explained must be explained by something else. ---
I 206
The premises must contain more than the conclusion - in addition: generalization: e.g. that all magnets attract iron. ---
I 213
Explanation/Fraassen: only observable regularities require explanation.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Explanation Hempel Bigelow I 299
Explanation/tradition/laws/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Representatives: Hempel and Oppenheim 1948(1), Hempel 1965(2), Mill 1843/50(3), Jevons 1877(4), Ducasse 1925(5), Feigl 1945(6), Popper 1945(7), Hospers 1946(8)). Hempel/terminology/spelling/Bigelow/Pargetter:
O: result
L: laws
C: conditions (sets of sentences, as premises)
Then "O" could also be seen as a set of sentences. But we are talking about compound sentences.
Then we have:
L
C
O
Initial conditions/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: initial conditions are sometimes not needed at all. Sometimes, however, the laws alone do not explain the case: for example, Halley's comet comes back in 60 years, for this we need information about certain facts, it does not only follow from the laws. The facts are contingent, of course.
I 301
Non-statistical explanation/Hempel: thesis: if L and C explain O, then they must entail O logically. Otherwise, we have at best a sketch of the explanation that requires further assumptions. Bigelow/Pargetter: this does not yet fully express the idea of the explanation by "deriving from laws": the laws must be used and not only mentioned. In other words, there must be a reliance on laws.
BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: N.B.: but these are just apparant explanations!
I 302
Just as quackers and magicians often provide an explanation with reference to prestigious natural laws, which turns out to be circular on closer inspection. Solution/Hempel: to exclude this, Hempel demands that additionally the premises must be true and O would not have followed if C alone had been without the laws (L).
BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: there are still a lot of refinements to be made and special cases to consider. Lewis would call that the "one patch per hole" method.
Statistical explanation/probabilistic/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Hempel 1965) here it is impossible to find laws that predict the exact result. However, it may be very likely in certain cases. Or more likely if the law is true than if it was not true.
I 303
The statistical explanations are something like derivations from the thing to be explained. And indeed such derivatives, which originate from invalid conclusion (?). Logical form: the conclusion should be probable, given the premises.
Variants: one can demand a high probability from the outset. Or it should be higher than O's without the premises or weaker: that O only has to be made to a certain degree likely, etc. (Lit: Salmon 1982).
Bigelow/Pargetter: all this does not differ significantly from the non-statistical explanation. Statistical laws are also part of the set of laws.
Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: with Hempel's help, we can now broaden our concept of explanation.
I 304
If we get the probability of a result, we have explained the result a little bit as well. Statistical explanation/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the end, it is all about whether a result comes out or is likely. We can summarize both cases.
"Statistical"/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: "statistical" is only served to attenuate the requirement of logical validity.
Explanation/Hempel/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: an explanation is an open process. This is important. Both the initial conditions can be varied, as well as the laws derived from other laws.
Kepler's laws, for example, have been traced back by Newton to deeper ones. These then logically entail the Kepler ones.
I 305
Openness/Hempel: openness is that you may be able to find deeper and even deeper laws. Bigelow/Pargetter: that is one of the strengths of his theory.


1.Hempel, C.G. and P. Oppenheim: Studies in the Logic of Explanation PS, 1984, p. 15.
2.Hempel, C. G.: Aspects of Scientific Explanation, in: Aspects of Scientific Explanation in the Philosophy of Science. New York 1965: The Free Press.
3. Mill, J. St.: A System of Logic, 1843.
4. Stevons W. J.: The Principle of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method, 2nd edition London 1877: Macmillan Press.
5. Ducasse, C. J.: Explanation, Mechanism and Teleology. Journal of Philosophy 22. pp. 150-5.
6. Feigl, H.: Operationism and Scientific Method. Psychological Review 52, 1945, pp. 250-9, 284-8
7. Popper, K. R.: The Open Society and Its Enemies. London 1945.
8. Hospers, J.: On Explanation. Journal of Philosophy 43, 1946, pp. 337-56.

Hempel I
Carl Hempel
"On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Hempel II
Carl Hempel
Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950
German Edition:
Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums
In
Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982

Hempel II (b)
Carl Hempel
The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951
German Edition:
Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung
In
Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982


Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Explanation Railton Lewis V 233
Probability/Explanation/covering law model/deductive-nomological/Peter Railton: According to Railton's model, an explanation has two parts: 1st. a D-N argument (deductively nomological argument), which satisfies some conditions of the non probabilistic case. Its premises can also include probability laws.
2nd (not part of the argument): The finding that the event has taken place.
If the premises say that certain events have taken place, then these are sufficiently given together the laws for the actual event or for probability.
Problem: a subset - given even only a part of the laws - can also be sufficient to explain parts of the events, and produce a number of remnants that are still sufficient under the original laws. Therefore, one must have two conditions when explaining:
1. that certain events together are sufficient for the Explanandum event (under the prevailing laws)
2. that only some of the laws are needed to guarantee the sufficiency of the conditions.
LewisVsRailton: if we had a covering law for causation, along with our covering law for explanation, that would reconcile my approach with the covering law approach.
But that is not available!
V 233/234
Often one element of the sufficient reason of the D-N set (deductive-nomological) will in reality be one of the causes itself. But that must not be! The counter-examples are well known: 1. to the sufficient subset can belong a completely irrelevant reason, the requirement of the minimalism does not help: we could produce an artificial minimalism, by taking weaker laws and leaving stronger laws unconsidered.
Example Salmon: A man takes the pill and does not get pregnant! The premise that nobody who takes the pill becomes pregnant must not be omitted!
2 An element of the sufficient subset could be something that is not an event:
For example, a premise can determine that something has an extrinsic or highly disjunctive property. that cannot specify any real events.
3. an effect may belong to the subset if the laws say that it can only be produced in a certain way. I.e. the quantity could be minimal in a suitable way, and also be one of events, but that would not be sufficient to make the effect the cause of its cause!
4. such an effect can also be sufficient subset for another effect, e.g. of a later, same cause. For example, that a commercial appears on my TV is caused by the same broadcast as the same commercial appears on your TV, but the one is not the cause of the other. Rather, they have a common cause.
5. a prevented potential cause could be part of the subset because nothing has overridden it.
LewisVsRailton: this shows that the common sufficient subset presented by D-N argument may not be a set of causes.
V 235
LewisVsRailton: if a D-N argument seems to show no causes, but still seems to be an explanation, this is a problem for my own theory. VsHempel: refractive index, VsRailton: in reality there are no non-causal cases. RailtonVsLewis: if the D-N model does not present causes, and therefore does not look like an explanation, then this is a problem for the D-N model.
Railton: therefore not every D-N model is a correct explanation.
V 236
Question: can any causal history be characterized by the information contained in a D-N argument (deductive-nomological argument)? This would be the case if each cause belongs to a sufficient subset - given the laws. Or in the probabilistic case: under probability laws. And is that so that the causes fall under it?
Lewis: That does not follow from the counterfactual analysis of causality! Nevertheless, it may be true. (It will be true in a possible world with sufficiently strict laws.
If explanatory information is information about causal history, then one way to deliver it is via D-N arguments.
But then there's still something wrong! The D-N arguments are presented as ideal. I.e. they have the right form. nothing too much and not too little.
But nobody thinks that everyday explaining fulfills this. Normally the best we can do is to make existential assumptions.
"Therefore" assertion/Morton White: we can take as existential assumptions.
LewisVsRailton: correct D-N arguments as existence assumptions are not yet a real explanation. Simply because of their form, they do not meet the standard of how much information is sufficient.
Lewis: There's always more to know, no matter how perfect the D N arguments are. The D N A always only give a cross-section of the causal history. Many causes may be omitted. And this could be the one we are looking for right now. Perhaps we would like to get to know the mechanisms involved in certain traces of causal history.
V 238
Explanation/Lewis/VsRailton: a D-N argument can also be of wrong form: not giving us enough too much at the same time. Explanation/Lewis: it is not that we have a different idea of the unity of the explanation. We should not demand unity at all: an explanation is not something you can have or miss, but something you can have more or less of.
Problem: the idea of having "enough" explanation: it nourishes doubts about the knowledge of our ancestors: they rarely or never had complete knowledge of the laws of nature.
LewisVsRailton: I.e. they rarely or never had complete D-N arguments. Did they therefore have incomplete explanatory knowledge? I think no! They knew a lot about how things were caused.
Solution/Railton: (similar to my picture): together with each Explanandum we have an extended and complex structure.
V 239
Lewis: For me these structures are connected by causal dependence Railton: for him they consist of an "ideal text" of D-N arguments (deductively nomological arguments) as in mathematical proofs.

Railt
P. Railton
Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays toward a Morality of Consequence Cambridge 1999


Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Facts Schlick I 93
Facts/HempelVsSchlick: we cannot determine the structure of facts. Therefore, we cannot say exactly what a comparison of them with statements is. SchlickVsHempel: Example: if I count the towers of the cathedral, I become familiar with the structure of a fact. If Hempel denies this, he uses the words in a different sense.
I 98
Fact/Sentence/Comparison/Match/Correspondence/HempelVsSchlick: Example -The proposition contains more parts called "words" than the cathedral has "towers". Problem: this does not allow us to test the proposition! There is no specific "correspondence" between these physical objects here. - ((s) Because the proposition (sentence) as a mere string has no meaning. But where does he get the statement about the number of towers from?)
I 99
"Structure of Facts"/Hempel: for example the old question whether one should allow not only rational but also irrational values to describe physical states. (Because "nature does not make jumps"). - Pseudoproblem: this is a pseudoproblem because there is no imaginable experiment at all that provides a decision between both possibilities. It is a question of syntactic convention.

Schlick I
Moritz Schlick
"Facts and Propositions" Analysis 2 (1935) pp. 65-70
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich 1994

Schlick II
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985

History Dray Wright I 34
History/Explanation/Laws/Dray/Wright, G. H.: William Dray (W. Dray: Laws and Explanation in History, 1957) Dray pursues a completely different explanation than Popper and Hempel. DrayVsHempel/DrayVsPopper/Dray: The reason why historical explanations do not normally contain a reference to laws is not that the laws are so complex and unknown that we have to be satisfied with a mere sketch, not even that they are too trivial, but that historical explanations are not based at all on general laws.
For example, the statement that Louis XIV. was unpopular at the end of his life because he pursued a policy that was detrimental to France's national interests.
---
I 35
Historical Laws/Dray: The conditions for the equality of prerequisites would have to be specified. Only then would we have a real law. But the only case that falls under this law would be the one it is supposed to "explain". A recourse to this law would therefore only result in a renewed assertion of what has already been established.

Dray I
W. H. Dray
Perspectives on History Sydney 1980

Dray I
W. Dray
Laws and Explanation in History Westport 1979


WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Relevance Scriven Fraassen I 104
Relevance/explanation/ScrivenVsHempel/BrombergerVsHempel: Relevance provides neither sufficient nor necessary conditions that something is an explanation - not sufficient: good belief reasons are no explanation. - E.g. redshift cannot be a reason for the expansion. - Unnecessary: not every explanation gives good belief reasons. - E.g. rare disease as a result of a frequent disease: - So you advise for treatment - but it would not be rational to expect that the disease occurs. - E.g. a very small amount of uranium does probably not radiate - but when it radiates the correct explanation is, that it is uranium - E.g. a man that takes birth control pills and does not get pregnant. ---
I 109
Relevance insufficient: E.g. 90% of the plants are killed: then it is not an explanation for the plants that survived that they were sprayed.


Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Significance Hempel II 110
Cognitive Significance/Hempel: it is false to assume that two statements have the same cognitive significance, if they are verified by the same set of observation sentences. Then two laws would always have the same cognitive significance because they are verified by no set. This is something quite different from the positivist criterion of meaning. Positivist criterion of meaning/Russell: two statements, whose verified consequences are the same, have the same significance - all authorsVsHempel.
II 143
Cognitive Significance/Hempel: not individual statements, but systems are cognitive significant. Ultimately, the following aspects are a matter of judgment: clarity, accuracy, forecast capacity, simplicity, degree of confirmation.

Hempel I
Carl Hempel
"On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Hempel II
Carl Hempel
Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950
German Edition:
Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums
In
Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982

Hempel II (b)
Carl Hempel
The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951
German Edition:
Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung
In
Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982

Statements Schlick I 91f
Facts/propositions/HempelVsSchlick: cannot be compared with each other - propositions can only be compared with propositions (> coherence theory). - SchlickVsHempel: statements (here = propositions) may well be compared with the reality - "E.g. this cathedral has two towers - with the cathedral".

Schlick I
Moritz Schlick
"Facts and Propositions" Analysis 2 (1935) pp. 65-70
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich 1994

Schlick II
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985

Verification Hempel I 99
Verification/Natural Laws/Hempel: a general statement is checked by examining their singular consequences. Problem: each general statement specifies an infinite class of singular statements. Therefore, there is never a final verification. Conversely, no general law is derived formally from a finite set of singular statements. ---
Bubner I 125
Confirmation/Hempel/Science Theory/Bubner: The relationship of logical inclusion of sentences avoids a crucial problem of induction. Both hypothetically valid laws or general statements as well as individual statements from observation are subject of logical consideration as sentences.
Formal rules of derivation:
Rehabilitation of deduction.
With P. Oppenheim: D N Model: the deductive nomological explanation is a scientific explanation as a logical operation with sentences, i.e. the subsumption of sentences under sentences. The explanandum is subsumed under explanation reasons (explanas). The explanas disintegrates into antecedents conditions (C1, C2,... Ck) which describe an event and general law statements (L1, L2,... Lr)
I 127
Deduction schema/Hempel:
C1, C2,... Ck
L1, L2,... Lr
E (Description of the phenomenon) The laws are therefore subject to the premises. (Only significant innovation VsAristotle).
GoodmanVsHempel: we need law-like statements instead of laws.
Induction: the "new mystery of induction" does not concern the confirmation but the original creation of hypotheses.

Hempel I
Carl Hempel
"On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Hempel II
Carl Hempel
Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950
German Edition:
Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums
In
Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982

Hempel II (b)
Carl Hempel
The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951
German Edition:
Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung
In
Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

The author or concept searched is found in the following 20 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Aristotle Hempel. Vs Aristotle Bubner I 127
Deduction Scheme/HempelVsAristotle/Hempel: C1,C2,...Ck
L1,L2,....Lr
E (description of the phenomenon) The laws therefore fall under the premises. (The only significant innovation VsAristotle). GoodmanVsHempel: lawlike statements instead of laws! Induction: the "new puzzle of induction" does not affect the confirmation, but the original formation of hypotheses.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Bridge Laws Hempel. Vs Bridge Laws Cartwright I131
Bridge Principles/Cartwright: Tradition (Hempel, Grünbaum, Ernest Nagel): the propositions of a theory consist of two types:
I 132
a) internal principles: content of the theory, laws about the behavior of the objects. b) bridge principles: link the theory to more accessible aspects of reality ("groomed description").
early: connection to observation reports.
Vs: that will not do because of the theory ladenness of observation.
new: connecting theory with already understood vocabulary.
Hempel/Late: (1979) this kind of explanation is not really deductive.
HempelVsBridge Principles: Problem: they are anything but invariably valid.
E.g. a large iron rod attracts iron filings, even if it is non-magnetic. So is it magnetic? Bridge principles are not universal laws.
CartwrightVsHempel: the situation is simultaneously not as bad and even worse than Hempel says: if the right type of description is given,
I 133
We know what equations we have to apply, and the principles which tell us this are necessary and valid without exception. Problem: such a "right kind of description" is extremely rare! And there are few formal principles for it. Only rules of thumb.
Carnap, R. Stroud Vs Carnap, R. I 182
External/internal/Carnap/Quine/Stroud: Quine seems to interpret Carnap this way. That the distinction between "category questions" and "subsets questions" corresponds to the distinction. External/QuineVsCarnap: this is nothing more than two ways of formalizing the language. If we have only one kind of bound variable for all things, it will be an external question: "Is there such and such?" if the variable goes over the whole range. (This is a question of category).
Internally: if there is a variable for every kind of thing, it will be a subset question. Then the question does not refer to all the things that can exist.
I 183
Philosophy/QuineVsCarnap: differs from the sciences only in the range of its categories. (Quine, Word and Object, p. 275). External/internal/QuineVsCarnap: Category questions differ from internal questions only in their generality from subset questions. We can get to the generality by letting some kind of variable go over all things.
I 191
StroudVsCarnap: this introduces a "we", and something that happens to us, called "experience". That we exist and have experience cannot simply be seen as an "internal" truth of the thing language.
One cannot then see the meaning of experience as the common goal of all "real alternatives", because then it is assumed that there are external things.
Problem: the question of the common goal of all genuine alternatives cannot be regarded as an external question of all reference systems either, because then it becomes meaningless.
But if it were "internal", what would be the difference if one were to switch from one reference system to another that does not even contain this goal?
Carnap does not answer that.
I 192
This makes it difficult to grasp his positive approach. CarnapVsSkepticism: misunderstands the relation between linguistic frame of expression about external objects and the truths expressed within this system of reference.
StroudVsCarnap: but what exactly is his own non-sceptical approach to this relation?
1. To which system does Carnap's thesis belong that assertions of existence in the language of things are neither true nor false?
2. What does the thesis express at all then?
Knowledge/internal/Carnap: for example the geometer in Africa really comes to knowledge about the mountain.
StroudVsCarnap: but what does it mean in addition to the fact that this is not a truth that is independent of a reference system?
Suppose for some reason we did not have the thing language and could freely choose another language. Does it follow from this that, for example, the sentence about the mountain in Africa would no longer be true?
Surely we would express something completely different in a completely different language without thing expressions. But would the sentence we can make now not be true in this other language?
I 193
And could it never be true if we had never accidentally adopted the thing language. Existence/Language/Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: that cannot be right and it leads to an extreme idealism that Carnap just rejects. It is absurd because we already know enough about mountains to see that they are not influenced by a chosen language.
Language/object/Stroud: things were there long before language came into being in the world. And that again is something we know "internally" in the thing language.
StroudVsCarnap: then his thesis, understood as "internal" to the language, is wrong. It contradicts what we already assume it as knowledge about ourselves and external things.
Empirically speaking, it leads to idealism that contradicts the known facts.
CarnapVsVs: would say that of course one must not understand his thesis "empirically" and not the thing language "internally".
StroudVsCarnap: but within some reference system it must be internal, otherwise it is meaningless.
Problem: but this is a statement about the relation between a chosen framework and the internal statements within that framework. And if that implies that these internal statements would have been neither true nor false, if a different frame of reference had been chosen, it is still idealism, whether empirical or non empirical idealism.
Truth Value/tr.v./Convention/StroudVsCarnap: the truth value of the internal sentences would depend on the choice of language (of the reference system).
I 194
StroudVsCarnap: it is important to see that if this did not follow, Carnap's thesis would not be different from traditional skepticism! There would then be room for the possibility that statements about things would remain true, even if we abandoned the thing language and truth would again be independent of language. Problem: that would again lead to our choice of a linguistic framework being necessary only to formulate or recognize something that would be true anyway ((s) > metaphysical realism) independently of that framework.
Theoretically: according to Carnap this would then be a "theoretical" question about the acceptability of the thing language as a whole. But in terms of objectivity, which we then presuppose.
CarnapVsTradition: it is precisely the incomprehensibility of such theoretical questions that is important in Carnap. Because
Problem: then it could be that even if we carefully apply our best procedures (> Best explanation), things could still be different from what we think they are. This is equivalent to skepticism.
"Conditional Correctness"/Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: Carnap accepts what I have called the "conditional correctness" of skepticism: if the skeptic could ask a meaningful question, he would prevail.
StroudVsCarnap: if he now would not deny that the "internal" sentences remain true or false when changing the reference system, his approach would be just as tolerant of skepticism as tradition. ((s) So both denial and non-denial would become a problem.)
Kant/Stroud: he also accepts the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If Descartes' description of experience and its relation to external things were correct, we could never know anything about these things.
Carnap/Stroud: his thesis is a version of Kant's "Copernican Turn". And he obtains it for the same reasons as Kant: without it we would have no explanation, how is it possible that we know anything at all?
Reference system/frame/StroudVsCarnap: a gap opens up between the frame and what is true independently of it. ((s) If a choice between different frames is to be possible).
StroudVsCarnap: in this respect, Carnap's approach is entirely Kantian.
I 196
And he also inherits all the obscurity and idealism of Kant. There are parallels everywhere: for both there can be a kind of distancing from our belief. We can do a philosophical study of everyday life (as far as the conditions of knowledge are concerned).
I 197
Reference system/framework/StroudVsCarnap: to which framework does Carnap's thesis belong that no propositions about external objects are true or false regardless of the choice of a reference system (language)? And is this thesis - analytical or not - itself "internal" in any framework? And whether it is or not, is it not merely an expression of Kantian Transcendental Idealism? Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: the basic mistake is to develop any competing theory at all to tradition.
I 198
A purely negative approach or deflationary use of the verification principle would simply eliminate skepticism as pointless. If that were possible, scepticism would no longer need to be undermined. But: Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: Problem: the status of the verification principle itself, or its acceptability. We can only use it to refute Descartes if we have a good reason to accept it as necessary. But that depends on how it is introduced.
It should serve to prevent the excesses of senseless philosophical speculation.
StroudVsCarnap: 1. Then we can only watch and see how far the principle can lead to a distinction that we have already made before! The only test would be sentences, which we would have recognized as senseless before!
2. But even assuming that the principle would be adequately proven as extensional and descriptive, i.e. it would distinguish between meaningful and senseless, as we do,
I 199
it would not allow us to eliminate something as senseless that we had not already recognized as senseless by other means. Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: was incorrectly introduced ((s) with the ulterior motive of producing a result that was already fully known). Early Carnap sketches show that general laws of nature were initially wrongly excluded.
Verification principle/VP/StroudVsCarnap: a correct introduction would provide a strong destructive tool that Kant was already looking for: it would have to explain why the verfication principle is correct. This would probably be identical to an explanation of how knowledge of external things is possible.
Verification Principle/Hempel/Carnap/Stroud: the early representatives had in mind that
1. a sentence is meaningful only if it expresses an "actual content",
2. that understanding a sentence means knowing what would happen if the sentence were true.
Verificationism/Stroud: There is nothing particularly original about this approach. What gives it the verificationist twist is the idea that we cannot even understand anything that cannot be known as true or false, or
weaker: at least to believe as more rational than its opposite.
StroudVsCarnap: that failed, even as an attempt to extract empirically verifiable sentences.
I 205
SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: even if verificationism is true, we still need an explanation of how and why traditional philosophical ((s) non-empirical) inquiry fails. ((s) should correspond here to skepticism). (>Why-question).
I 207
StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap/StroudVsHempel: it is more plausible to reject the verification principle ((s) > empiricist sense criterion) than to claim that Descartes never said anything meaningful. StroudVsVerification Principle: it will remain implausible as long as it is not understood why the traditional distinction internal/external should not be correct.
I 214
Formal manner of speaking: ""Wombat" applies to (is true of) some living beings in Tasmania". QuineVsCarnap: misunderstands the semantic ascent when he speaks of external issues. But this does not reject Carnap's pragmatic approach to simplicity and fertility of theories.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
ceteris paribus Schiffer Vs ceteris paribus I 287
ceteris paribus/SchifferVsceteris paribus-condition: it is simply nonsense to speak of p.c., if at all it is not clear what these "other things" should be or what it is for them "to be "equal".
I 160
E.g. the baseball hits the window and "ceteris paribus" it would break. This leads to completions that let the phrase seamlessly pass into laws. The interesting question is why anybody would expect a completion here. Probably because the commonsense explanations for belief would otherwise not be valid. Blame it on the covering laws by Hempel.
SchifferVscovering law/SchifferVsHempel/SchifferVsFolk psychology: 2. reason, why the folk psychology is wrong that the covering laws are wrong.
E.g. Al is flying to Key West, Bob asks why and Carla explains that he wants to visit his sister there.
covering law: Carla knows a general psychological law and a conjunction of individual facts which make up a complete explanans and contain the fact that is to be explained.
Schiffer: it is clear that Carla does not need to know it! And certainly not as a child. This also does not need to be polished with "probabilisations" or "maximum specification"(Hempel 1965). Or by subdoxatic representation of complete laws. We don’t need any of this.
I 161
For sure Carla does not know any "probalistic completion". There is also no reason to assume that the whole story contains the terms "belief" and "desire"! But that does not mean that one should conclude that there is no belief and desires! "because"/explanation/Schiffer: E.g. Carla. Al went to Key West, because he wants to visit his sister. This true statement works in these circumstances as a declaration because of interests and assumptions that Bob had when he asked. Still one could wonder if such "because"-statements are analyzable. Probably no analysis has ever been given. That does not mean, however, that nothing has been said.
Solution: Counterfactual conditional: Al would not have gone, if he had not had the desire... etc.
"because"/Schiffer: I especially doubt that the knowing of such "because" facts is calling for law-like generalizations.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Covering Law Cartwright Vs Covering Law I 11
Explanation/Physics/Cartwright: two different types of activity: 1) causal explanation: when we explain a phenomenon, we find its causes.
2) theoretical explanation: we adapt the phenomenon to a broader theoretical framework
Covering law/Cartwright: this approach tries to combine both strategies in one.
CartwrightVsCovering law: the function of the laws is different in the two strategies, and also their claim on truth. And the difference is more than merely philosophical, we find it in scientific practice.
Equations/Science/Physics/Cartwright: thesis: it is wrong to ask: "What are the correct equations?". Various models bring different aspects to the fore, some equations give a rougher estimate, but are easier to solve. No single model meets all purposes. We sometimes use this and someties the other equation.
I 16
CartwrightVsCovering law: Individual case causation/Cartwright: although I think you can give a causal explanation of isolated events, I will confine myself here to the normal cases, which are described by phenomenological laws. (> Wesley Salmon Scientific Exspl. and A causal Structure of the World)).
AllVsCovering law: does not describe the causes correctly. (> Scriven). But can it adapt the phenomena to the right frame?.
I 17
CartwrightVsCovering law: instead: "Simulacrum" view. Def Simulacrum/Oxford Dictionary/Cartwright: "something that has merely the form or the appearance of a certain thing without possessing its substance or real qualities".
Cartwright: that describes it very well! First, we construct a model that adapts the phenomenon to a theory.
Covering law: thesis: there is one single correct explanation for each phenomenon.
CartwrightVsCovering law: there are always several possible explanations. Theories are always redundant. That is what the deductively nomological approach misunderstands.
I 45
VsCovering law model/VsHempel/Explanation/Cartwright: most object that Hempel allowed too much. E.g. the fact that Henry is not pregnant is by this approach due to him taking birth control pills if he does. Or e.g. it is possible that the barometer explains the storm. CartwrightVsCovering law/CarwrightVsHempel: one criticism is just the other way round: Hempel allows too little! With a covering law model we can explain almost nothing, not even the rainbow. Because we do not have enough LoN to explain it in detail ((s) not the general, but the individual rainbow).
Explanation/Cartwright: many phenomena that have a perfect scientific explanation are not covered by any laws. That means, not by true laws. But at most by ceteris paribus laws/CPL).

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954
Deduction Duhem Vs Deduction Cartwright I 103
CartwrightVsDeductive-Nomological Model/CartwrighVsDeduction/CartwrightVsHempel: Explanations are rarely ever really deductive. Therefore, the generic-specific point of view receives little support from our practice. Many philosophers still follow the DN-model even today. This is because the explanations only set in after extensive scientific work. CartwrightVs: This overlooks the fact that physics itself already begins with (arbitrarily chosen) models. I 127 Facts/Physics/Laws/Cartwright: even if the fundamental laws remain in their original form, the steps of deriving from them are not dictated by any facts. That’s a problem: CartwrightVsDeductive-Nomological Model, CartwrightVsHempel, CartwrightVsGrünbaum. Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: therefore are not simply "better".
I 151 CartwrightVsDeductive-Nomological View: instead: the approach by Duhem: Science as organization (order) of knowledge.
I 162
CartwrightVsDeductive-Nomological Approach/VsD-N/CartwrightVsHempel: causality is not the only problem. This fails to explain even Humean facts of association. 1) because the fundamental laws are corrected during the derivation. (Essay 6) 2) often laws from different areas are pieced together. (Essay 3)

Duh I
P. Duhem
La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906
German Edition:
Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954
Deduction Cartwright Vs Deduction I 103
CartwrightVsDeductively nomological model/CartwrighVsDeduction/CartwrightVsHempel: statements are rarely actually deductive. Therefore, the generic-specific point of view obtains little support from our practice. Many philosophers still follow the DN model today. This is because the statements only set in after extensive scientific work. CartwrightVs: that overlooks the fact that physics itself already begins with (arbitrary) models. I 127 Facts/Physics/Laws/Cartwright: even if the fundamental laws remain in their original form, the steps of derivation from them are not dictated by any facts. That’s a problem: CartwrightVsDeductively nomological model, CartwrightVsHempel, CartwrightVsGrünbaum. Fundamental laws/Cartwright: are not simply "better" because of this.
I 151 CartwrightVsDeductive-nomological view: instead: the approach of Duhem: Science as an organization (order) of knowledge.
I 162
CartwrightVsDeductively nomological approach/VsD N/CartwrightVsHempel: causality is not the only problem. Humean facts of the association are not explained by this, either. 1) because the fundamental laws are corrected during the derivation. (Essay 6) 2) often laws from different areas are pieced together. (Essay 3)

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983
Hempel, C. Danto Vs Hempel, C. Lübcke II 328
Beschreibung/Sprache/Erklärung/Danto: der Ausdruck »der amerikanischen Bürgerkriegs« ist ein hinweisender Ausdruck. Er ist als solches weder war noch falsch. DantoVsHempel: hinweisender Ausdrücke können nicht in Konklusionen auftreten.
Als Konklusion können Sie nur auftreten, wenn über den von Ihnen bezeichneten Gegenstand eine bestimmte Aussage gemacht würde.
Da aber jedes Phänomen auf viele Arten beschrieben werden kann, steht keineswegs fest, daß das Phänomen unter jeder möglichen Beschreibung unter ein allgemeines Gesetz fällt. (Bsp die Hochzeit der amerikanische Schauspielerin Grace Kelly in Monaco führte dazu, daß bestimmte Flaggen an der Straße hingen. Das könnte aber auch mit einem bestimmten Feiertag erklärt werden.)


Pia Lübcke,"Geschichte als Problem" aus: A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20 Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Hempel, C. Fraassen Vs Hempel, C. I 106
Verifiability/Theory/Criteria/FraassenVsHempel: verifiability is fulfilled by all scientific theories - therefore it cannot be a criterion.

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Hempel, C. Goodman Vs Hempel, C. Bubner I 128
Deduction schema / Hempel:
  C1, C2, ... Ck
  L1, L2, .... Lr
  E (description of the phenomenon)   Thus, the laws fall under the premises. (The only major change VsAristoteles).
GoodmanVsHempel: law-like statements instead of laws!
       Induction: the "new riddle of induction" does not affect the confirmation but the original formation of hypotheses.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Hempel, C. Harman Vs Hempel, C. Schiffer I 162
HarmanVsHempel/HarmanVsCovering Law/Non-Deterministic Automaton/Action/Schiffer: (Harman 1973, 52). (non-deterministic automaton: is one in which input and current internal state is not sufficient to determine the subsequent behavior. Not even covering laws help with that. Even if it looks like a complete description...

Harman I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995

Harman II
Gilbert Harman
"Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Hempel, C. Lewis Vs Hempel, C. V 232
Probability/Explanation/Hempel/Lewis: is also offered by him for the probabilistic case; but this is different from his deductive-nomological model. LewisVsHempel: two unwelcome consequences:
1. an improbable case cannot be explained at all
2. a necessity of a correct explanation: "maximal specificity" : relative to our knowledge, i.e. not knowing (a case of probability) makes an explanation, which is actually true, not true. Truth is only that not knowing makes the explanation look untrue.
I prefer Peter Railton's model:
Probability/Explanation/Peter Railton/Lewis: "deductive-nomological model" "probabilistic explanation" (d.n.m.).
We must distinguish this model from Fetzer's model: for both
covering law/Raiton/Fetzer: universal generalizations about a single case are chances.
Explanation/Probability/FetzerVsRailton: as for Hempel: inductive, not deductive. Explanation: as an argument! LewisVsFetzer: but: a good explanation is not necessarily a good argument!
LewisVsFetzer/LewisVsRailton: both want an explanation even if the event is very improbable. But in this case a good explanation is a very bad argument.
V 233
Probability/Explanation/Covering Law Model/Railton:two parts: 1. one deductive-nomological argument which fulfills some conditions of the non-probabilistic case. Laws of probability may also be a part of its premises.
2. does not belong to the argument: The finding that the event took place.
If the premises say that certain events took place, then those are sufficient if taken together - given the laws - for the actual event or for the probability.
Problem: a subset - given only a part of the laws- can be sufficient as well in explaining parts of the events, and in creating a number of remains which are still sufficient under the original laws. This is why there must be two conditions for the explanation:
1. certain events are sufficient when taken together for the event of the explanandum (under the prevailing laws)
2. only some of the laws are used to guarantee that the conditions are sufficient
LewisVsRailton: If we had covering law for causation, and our covering law for explanation, my approach would be reconciled with the c1-approach.
But this cannot be achieved!
V 233/234
An element of the d.n.m.'s sufficient reasons will in reality often be one of the causes. But this cannot be! The counterexamples are well-known: 1. an irrelevant reason can be a part of the sufficient subset, the requirement of minimality is not helping: We can create artificial minimality by taking weaker laws and disregarding stronger ones.
e.g. Salmon: A man takes the (birth control) pill, and does not end up pregnant! The premise that nobody who takes the pill will not become pregnant cannot be disregarded!
2. An element of sufficient subset could be something that is not an event:
e.g. a premise can assess that something as an extrinsic or highly disjunctive characteristic. But no true events can be specified.
3. An effect can be part of the subset if laws state that the effect can only be made to happen in a particular way. I.e.: the set could be conveniently minimal, and also be one of the events, but it would not be sufficient to make the effect the cause of its cause.
4. Such an effect can also be the sufficient subset for another effect, e.g. of a later effect of the same cause.
E.g. an ad appearing on my TV is caused because of the same broadcast, like the same appearing on your TV. But one appearance is not the cause of the other ad, rather they happened due to the same cause.
5. an impeded potential cause may belong to a subset because nothing has overridden it.
LewisVsRailton: This shows that the combined sufficient subset, presented by d.n.-arguments, is possibly not a set of causes.
V 235
LewisVsRailton: It is a problem for my own theory if a d.n. argument does not seem to show causes, but still seems to be an explanation. (see above, paragraph III,I. Three examples VsHempel: refractive index, VsRailton: no non-causal cases in reality. RailtonVsLewis: If the d.n. model presents no causes, and thereby does not look like an explanation, then it makes it a problem for said model.
Railton: This is why not every d.n. model is a correct explanation.
V 236
Question: Can every causal narration be characterized by the information which is part of a deductive-nomological argument? It would be the case if each cause belongs to a sufficient subset, given the laws. Or for the probabilistic case: given the laws of probability. And is it that causes are included in them?
Lewis: It does not follow from the counterfactual analysis of causality. But it could be true. (It will be true in a possible world with sufficiently strict laws.)
If explanatory information is information about causal narration, then the informaation is given by deductive-nomological arguments.
But there will still be something wrong! The deductive-nomological arguments are presented as being ideal, i.e. they have the right form, neither too much nor not enough.
But nobody thinks that daily explanation fulfills this. Normally, the best we can do is to make existence assumptions.
"Deshalb" Behauptung/Morton White: We can take it as existence assumptions.
LewisVsRailton: correct deductive-nomological arguments as existence assumptions are still not a true explanation. They do not meet the standard on how much information is sufficient, simply because of their form.
Lewis: There is always more to know if we collect deductive-nomological arguments, as perfect as they are. Deductive-nomological arguments only offer a profile of the causal narration. Many causes may be omitted. They could be the ones we are currently looking for. Maybe we would like to acquaint ourselves with the mechanism which were involved in particular traces of causal narration.
V 238
Explanation/Lewis/VsRailton: a deductive-nomological argument can also be in the wrong form: to not give us enough of too much at the same moment. Explanation/Lewis: But we cannot actually say that we have a different conception of the explanation's unity. We should not demand a unity: An explanation is not a thing that one can have or fail at creating one, but something that one can have to a higher or lesser degree.
Problem: The conception to have "enough" of an explanation: It makes us doubt our ancestors' knowledge. They never or rarely had complete knowledge about laws of nature.
LewisVsRailton: i.e. so, they never or rarely had complete deductive-nomological arguments. Did they therefore have incomplete explanatory knowledge. I do not think so! They know much about the causes of things.
Solution/Railton: (similarly to my picture): together with each explanandum we have a wide and complex structure.
V 239
Lewis: For me those structures are linked because of causal dependence. Railton: For him they consist of an "ideal text" of arguments, like in mathematical proofs.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Hempel, C. Nozick Vs Hempel, C. II 301
Explanation/Probability/Nozick: if a fundamental probability law finds that the probability that something has P - given it also has Q - is 95%, we cannot deduce this fact from the having of the property P plus the probability law! ((s) We need to know if it also has Q). Probability Law/Hempel: thought that events that have high probabilities are explained by subsuming under a probability law. As an approximation to deduction.
NozickVsHempel: what about improbable events? If we find P without Q, how do we explain that? Hempel cannot explain this .
II 302
Hempel: can only explain that one or the other P occurs without Q, but not why! Nozick: but we do know that there is some kind of system that produces some Ps that are not Qs. And we explain why this thing is so through the mechanism of random operation.
Nozick: the alternative would be to say that events with low probability are inexplicable. (NozickVs).
Explanation/Probability/Nozick: Thesis: we have an understanding and an explanation of why something happens, even if we do not know the reasons why it happened at the time. Even if it is random, it need not be inexplicable. It may be an event of a type.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Hempel, C. Quine Vs Hempel, C. XI 108
Projectability/Goodman/QuineVsHempel/Lauener: the complement of a projectable predicate need not be projectable. E.g. "Non-grazers" and e.g. "Non-cow" are not projectable. (>bleen-grue, authors on >Grueness).

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Hempel, C. Bigelow Vs Hempel, C. I 301
Non-statistical explanation/Hempel: thesis: if L (legislation) and C (conditions) explain O (results), then they must logically entail O. Otherwise, we have at best an explanation sketch that requires further assumptions. Bigelow/Pargetter: that does not quite express the idea of explanation by "derivation from laws": The laws must be used. Not just mentioned. That means there must be a reliance on laws. BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: Important argument: these are only pseudo-explanations! I 302 Just as quacks and magicians often provide an explanation, citing respected laws of nature, which turns out to be circular on closer inspection. Solution/Hempel: in order to the exclude that, he demands that, in addition, the premises have to be true and O would not have followed if C had been alone without the laws (L). BigelowVsHempel/BigelowVsTradition: very many refinements must be made with that and special cases must be considered. That is what Lewis would call the "One patch per hole" method.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Hempel, C. Schiffer Vs Hempel, C. I 160
SchifferVscovering law/SchifferVsHempel/SchifferVsFolk psychology: 2. Reason why the folk psychology is wrong that the covering laws are wrong. E.g. Al flies to Key West, Bob asks why and Carla explains that he wants to visit his sister there.
covering law: Carla knows a general psychological law and a conjunction of individual facts that add up to the full explanans and contain to explanatory fact.
Schiffer: it is clear that the Carla did not need to know! And certainly not as a child. This also does not need to be refined with "probabilisations" or "maximum specification" (Hempel 1965). Or by subdoxastic representation of complete laws. We do not need any of this.
I 161
Surely Carla does not know any "probabilistic completion". There is also no reason to assume that the whole story uses the terms "belief" and "desire"! But that does not mean that one should conclude that there is no faith and desires! "Because"/Explanation/Schiffer: E.g. Carla. Al went to Key West, because he wants to visit his sister. This true statement works in these circumstances as an explanation because of the interests and assumptions that Bob had when he asked. Nevertheless, one can ask whether such "because"-statements are analyzable at all. Probably no analysis was ever given. This does not mean that nothing has been said.
Solution: counterfactual conditional: Al would not have gone if he had not had the desire ... etc.
"Because"/Schiffer: I doubt above all that the knowledge of such "because"-facts requires law-like generalizations.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Hempel, C. Salmon Vs Hempel, C. Fraassen I 106
Relevanz/Wschk/W. SalmonVsHempel: Bsp jemand erholt sich wahrscheinlich innerhalb einer Woche von seiner Erkältung, schließlich hat er Vitamin C genommen.
Problem: er würde sich auch ohne Vitamin C innerhalb einer Woche wahrscheinlich erholen.
Bsp Jones wird nicht schwanger. Schließlich hat er regelmäßig die Antibabypillen seiner Frau genommen und jeder Mensch der sie nimmt, verhindert damit eine Schwangerschaft.
Problem: ganz sicher wird er auch sonst nicht schwanger.
Erklärung:/W. Salmon: also muss etwas mit diesen Erklärungen falsch sein: es fehlt die Relevanz.
Problem/VsHempel: das zweite Kriterium, Überprüfbarkeit, wird von allen wissenschaftlichen Theorien erfüllt, also kann es hier nicht helfen.
I 107
Def Erklärung/W.Salmon: ist kein Argument, sondern eine Ansammlung statistisch relevanter Faktoren. Def statistisch relevant/W. Salmon: ist ein Faktor, wenn die Wschk der Wirkung E gegeben A verschieden ist, von der von E allein:
P(E I A) ungleich P(E).
Relevanz/Hempel: sein Kriterium erforderte, dass die Wschk groß sei (wenigstens größer als ½)
SalmonVsHempel: es ist nicht einmal erforderlich, dass die Information A die Wschk von E erhöht ((s) sie kann sie auch vermindern, (negative Korrelation), nur soll sie nicht gleich sein).
SalmonVsHempel: dass seine Forderung zu stark war, zeigt Bspo Parese und Bsp Uran.
Salmon: Bsp eine Mischung von Uran-238 und Polonium –214 zu gleichen Teilen. Wenn der Geigerzähler klickt (in dem Intervall zwischen t und t+m), so deshalb, weil ein Uranatom zerfiel. Pointe: die Wschk ist viel höher relativ zu der Information, dass das Uranatom zu der Mischung gehört. (FN 12).
Problem: nach Salmons Kriterium können wir nicht nur erklären, dass es einen Zerfall gab, sondern auch warum er z.B. genau in der Mitte zwischen t und t+m geschah.
I 108
Denn die Information ist statistisch relevant für das Ereignis. Dennoch würden wir sagen, dass es eine Tatsache der Art ist, die die Atomphysik unerklärt läßt ((s) Weil das einzelne Zerfallsereignis indeterministisch ist). Pointe: die Information ist wohl statistisch relevant für das Ereignis zu (t + t+m/2) aber nicht, indem es andere Ereignisse ausschließt!
Erklärung/FraassenVsHempel: allgemeinere Kritik: es scheint dass, wenn entweder Hempel oder Salmon recht hätte, dann könnte Erklärungskraft nur aus empirischer Adäquatheit und empirischern Stärke bestehen. D.h. Erklärung wäre ununterscheidbar davon einfach zu zeigen, dass das Vorkommnis
I 109
kein Argument gegen die Behauptung der empirischen Adäquatheit der Theorie darstellt und außerdem eine wichtige Information liefert, die von der Theorie beinhaltet wird, die für das Vorkommnis relevant ist. Erklärung/W. Salmon/Fraassen: dieser scheint der Meinung zu sein, dass an Erklärung nicht mehr dran sein kann: „...wir kennen jetzt alle Regularitäten (universell oder statistisch) die für unsere Frage wichtig waren, was mehr soll man von einer Erklärung verlangen?“ (FN 14).
Fraassen: aber Salmon selbst und andere entwickelten Theorien, bei denen „mehr dran ist“

Sal I
Wesley C. Salmon
Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973
German Edition:
Logik Stuttgart 1983

Sal II
W. Salmon
The Foundations Of Scientific Inference 1967

SalN I
N. Salmon
Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II 2007

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Hempel, C. Schlick Vs Hempel, C. I 91
Context: Schlick: The foundation of knowledge" (1934) HempelVsSchlick). HempelVsSchlick: he was a "metaphysician and poet".
Proposition/reality/HempelVsSchlick: you cannot compare statements with facts!
SchlickVsHempel: you can without being a metaphysician.
I 92
E.g. I compare this sentence in my Baedeker "This cathedral has two towers" with reality: namely simply by looking at the cathedral. If someone has something against it, it may just be that he understands "Proposition" in another sense.
Coherence theory/HempelVsSchlick/HempelVscorrespondence theorie: you can only compare propositions with each other. ((s) Not propositions with reality).
Schlick: we can distinguish between cases where a written, printed or spoken proposition is compared with another written, printed or spoken proposition.
Schlick: and I call that the comparison a proposition with a fact.
HempelVsSchlick: statements can only be compared with other statements. ((s)> coherence, > coherence theory).
SchlickVsHempel: Why? I take out the modest freedom to compare everything with everything. If propositions and facts are to be too far from each other? Too different? Should it be a mysterious property of propositions that they cannot be compared with anything?
Fact/statement/Hempel: the gap between them is only a metaphysical.
SchlickVsHempel: that may be so, but who believes because in such a gap?
I 93
Def Proposition/Schlick: is a string along with the logical rules for their use. ((s) So almost a proposition, along with the importance of rules). Proposition meaning/Schlick: these rules culminate in "deictic" definitions that make up the meaning of the proposition.
Verification/compliance/correspondence/SchlickVsHempel: to verify the proposition, I have to find out if the (meaning-) rules were followed. Why should it be impossible? E.g. I look at the cathedral and then at the proposition and realize that the symbol "two" is used in the proposition in connection with the symbol "towers" and so I will get to the same icon when applying the rules of counting the cathedral towers.
Coherence theory/fact/proposition/Compare/Schlick: sometimes it is said that "in a logical sense" propositions can be compared only with other propositions. That may be so, but I do not know what is meant by a "comparison in a logical way".
Comparison/HempelVsSchlick: we cannot say exactly what a comparison of statements and facts is,
I 94
Because we cannot determine the structure of facts. Fact/structure/SchlickVsHempel: that we cannot determine the "structure of a fact" reminds me of the metaphysics of "things in themselves". If one does not deny the existence of facts, then why deny the possibility to determine their structure?
Structure of a fact: E.g. if I count the towers of a cathedral, I become familiar with the structure of a certain fact. If you wanted to say that it is meaningless to speak of "structures of facts" at all that would be merely a question of terminology. One proposition is also not per se meaningful, but only in conjunction with the rules for its use.
Fact/propositions/Compare/Vscorrespondence theory/SchlickVsHempel: that is what the whole controversy is about, if it should be impossible to compare propositions and facts, Hempel uses the words simply in a different sense. The easiest way to deny that you can compare them would be to say that there are simply no facts! (In formal speech: the rule of the word "fact" is such that it should not be used).
Or maybe the comparison is simply never applied in the sciences? I think this is true for purely logical sciences such as mathematics, but not in experimental sciences.
I 95
SchlickVsHempel: here is the psychological motivation of his criticism: it is about a vision that completely settles within the sciences. Science as a system of propositions. This should be a substitute for reality. Then "protocol statements" are used as a material, without subjecting them to an empirical test. Science/Schlick: But science is not the world! The universe of discourse is not the universe.
It's one thing to ask how their whole system is constructed and why it is generally regarded as true, and another, why I even look at them as true. This is a psychological question. But none of the "cultural subordination". My trust in science and colleagues is that I found them trustful, every time I checked their allegations.
I 96
Def confirmation/Schlick: the final step in the comparison between a statement and a fact. But one should not attach too much importance to the concept.
I 97
Fact/proposition/compare/match/correspondence/HempelVsSchlick: his example for comparison is not quite adequate. (E.g. "The cathedral has two towers"). Hempel: I agree that one can consider propositions as empirical objects that can be compared with any other empirical object. But if we take that literally it leads to something like:
I 98
E.g. "The proposition contains more parts, "the words" referred to" than the cathedral has towers". Correspondence/SchlickVsHempel: There is a different kind of comparison between proposition and fact: Comparison of symbols "two" in the sentence and the counting by looking at the cathedral.
HempelVsSchlick: so by that he compares a proposition in Baedeker with the result of an action by himself.
Coherence theory/Pointe: this result of the action is determined in a second proposition. And these two are compared! That is what I meant with "logical point".
Revision/verification/coherence theory/HempelVsSchlick: it's about whether the propositions contradict each other. This goes even without knowing the meanings of the propositions! (> Carnap: "The logical syntax of the language", "Philosophy and logical syntax"). Example, the above two propositions, both contain an icon that is shaped like "two".

Schlick I
Moritz Schlick
"Facts and Propositions" Analysis 2 (1935) pp. 65-70
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich 1994

Schlick II
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985
Hempel, C. Nagel, E. Vs Hempel, C. Schurz I 93
Law of Nature/LoN/Schurz: strict spatio-temporally unlimited universal sentences are candidates for LoN. If they were true, they would express real LoN. They are called lawlike. I 94 Lawlike/Schurz: spatio-temporally unlimited E.g. All objects attract each other ((s) only true if protons, electrons, etc., are not objects.) E.g. All living things must die spatio-temporally limited: E.g. mammals in polar regions have - compared with their counterparts in warmer areas - a more rounded shape (Germann's law). Scientific/Schurz: depends on the size of the area in this case. Universal Sentence/Schurz: to avoid differences of degree they were called fundamental and derived universal sentences Def Fundamental Universal Sentence/Carnap/Hempel: does not contain any individual constants and no spatio-temporal limitations. Def Derived Universal Sentence/Carnap/Hempel: can be derived from background knowledge from other universal sentences together with singular starting conditions. I 95 Ernest NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsHempel: according to this, no accidental universal sentence can be a derived law: E.g. "All screws on Smith's car are rusty". Solution/Nagel: only fundamental universal sentences can be laws. Hempel: admitted this, thus the lawlikeness remains gradual! Lawlike/Statistics/Schurz: even here there is lawlikeness: E.g. 50% of all cesium-137 atoms have decayed after 30 years. E.g. 80% of all lung cancer patients used to be heavy smokers.

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Hempel, C. Schurz Vs Hempel, C. I 224
Erklärung/Gesetz/Hempel: die Gesetzesprämissen können oft weggelassen werden! Geisteswissenschaften/Hempel/Schurz: beanspruchte, auch für sie Erklärungen liefern zu können, indem er annahm, dass auch hier Gesetze herrschen.
VsHempel: diese Gesetze sind aber nicht strikt.
Hempel: spät: dafür probabilistische Erklärung.
I 234
Wahrscheinlichkeit/Erklärung/Schurz: es gibt zwei Lager: Hempel (1965) fordert, dass zu einer Erklärung die conditional probability nahe 1 liegen sollte. VsHempel: (Stegmüller, Tuomela: statt dessen Minimalforderung:
Def "Leibniz-Bedingung"/Schurz: Minimalanforderung an den Wert der conditional probability
p(Ex I Ax): er muss größer als ½ sein.
Schurz: für probabilistische Begründungen und Voraussagen ist sie sicherlich zutreffend, aber gilt sie auch für Erklärungen? Dann nicht, wenn ihr Wesen darin liegen soll, positiv relevante Kausalfaktoren zu zitieren.

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Explanation Salmon, W. Fraassen I 100
These Erklärung ist nicht eine zusätzliche Eigenschaft jenseits von empirischer Adäquatheit.
I 107
Def Erklärung/W. Salmon: These ist kein Argument, sondern eine Ansammlung statistisch relevanter Faktoren. Def statistisch relevant/W. Salmon: ist ein Faktor, wenn die Wschk der Wirkung E gegeben A verschieden ist, von der von E allein:
P(E I A) ungleich P(E).
Relevanz/Hempel: sein Kriterium erforderte, daß die Wschk groß sei (wenigstens größer als ½)
SalmonVsHempel

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980