Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 21 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Being Nietzsche Ries II 28
Being/Nietzsche: not becoming anymore but "appearance" as the Apollonian sublimate of the world of becoming is the primary. (Taken from Schopenhauer): "pessimistic basic idea" from the "cruelty of being", but whose characteristics are only defined aesthetically. ---
Ries II 110
Being/Nietzsche: there is no being. ((s) NietzscheVsHeidegger). ---
Danto III 134
I/Serin/Nietzsche/Danto: (The Reason) believes in the "I", in the I as Being, in the I as Substance and projects the belief in the I-Substance on all things - it creates the term 'thing'... Being is thought of everywhere as cause, pushed underneath it; from the conception 'I' only follows, as derived, the concept 'being'... (F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI,3 p. 71.)

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Ries II
Wiebrecht Ries
Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Bourgeoisie Arendt Brocker I 366
Bourgeoisie/Acting/Politics/Maturity/Totalitarianism/ArendtVsHeidegger/Arendt: Arendt shared Heidegger's assumption that "the presumption of all unconditional", in whose shadow total rule had established itself, should be "left behind us" and wanted to examine how the idea of the human and life had to be shifted in order to develop a sensus communis for the space given to the human. But unlike Heidegger, she emphasises the citizens' capacity for action and creative ability.

Antonia Grunenberg, „Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Arendt I
H. Arendt
Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics. Civil Disobedience. On Violence. Thoughts on Politics and Revolution Boston 1972


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Conceptualism Tugendhat I 72f
Veritative being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p". - VsObject Theory (>objet theory) - VsConceptualism (concepts for objects) - immaterial - but also VsImagination - instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no structure) - TugendhatVsMiddle Ages: verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next to unum and aliquid - had Aristotle referred to the veritative existence, he could have created a semantics of assertion.
I 91
VsHeidegger: existence of facts instead of "all being is being of beings".
I 184f
Def Conceptualism/Tugendhat: the theory that predicate = concept (conceptus). The predicate stands for something, otherwise the use of the predicate would have no objective basis - I 185 Nominalism: denies that we actually always imagine something when we use a predicate sensibly. We can also understand the sentence about the red castle without having a concrete idea. NominalismVsConceptualism: misunderstanding: the imagination does not have to be sensual - NominalismVsConceptualism: there are no "general images" - or images of something general - characterization only exists since Wittgsteins Philosophical Inveistigations.-
I 189
VsConceptualism: object dispensable - Nominalism: 1) linguistic sign belongs to the intersubjective understanding-each-other - then intra-subjective understanding superfluous? - 2) results in positive explanation for inter-subjective meaning.
I 204
Conceptualism/Tugendhat: must postulate nonsensual imagination, because no sensual imagination corresponds to "every color".

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Consciousness Adorno Grenz I 213
Consciousness/Heidegger/AdornoVsHeidegger/Grenz: Heidegger, according to Adorno, tries to access a level of consciousness that was not even one in which the language (...) had not yet acquired imagery.

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974


A X
Friedemann Grenz
Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984
Empty Set Frege IV 13f
Nothing/FregeVsHeidegger: the nominalization of nothing leads to paradoxes, e.g. the fact that the empty set is included in every set, as well as the universal class. That does not mean that the universal class is identical with the zero class ("the nothing").
IV 98
Subset/element/Frege: subsets and elements must always be distinguished. FregeVsSchröder/FregeVsRegion Calculus: zero cannot be included as an element in each class, otherwise it would depend on the respective manifold. Sometimes it would have nothing, sometimes it would be something (e.g. negation of a). Solution: zero as s subset (empty set).
IV 100
Zero/0/empty set/FregeVsSchröder/Frege: zero must not be included as an element in another class (> Günter Patzig, Introduction to Frege IV), but only subordinate as a class. (+ IV 100/101). ((s) zero is only included as a subset in any other set, not as an element).
IV 102
Empty Class/empty set/unit class/unit set/FregeVsSchröder: it is not necessary to form a unit class - if a is an individual of the manifold, then a is also a class and it is not necessary to admit this class a as a new individual, it is already such. It is not necessary at all that a class should be given as an individual of a manifold. It is not about the subter-relation (sic), but about the sub-relation (sic). ((s) subset, not element.)
IV 108
Zero/Frege/(s): solution: zero corresponds to the class of objects that are unequal to themselves. Then the zero sign has a meaning. Logical form: "Either there are no self-dissimilar objects or they all coincide with P".

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Everyday Language Quine V 127
Ontology/QuineVsHeidegger: ontology does not take everyday language literally.
V 128
But you come up with something and then determine the language according to it - ((s) there is no primacy of language in the ontology)
VII (f) 103
Everyday language/Quine: is ultimately fundamental, but it does not decide in logical questions. >Ontology/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Existence Carnap Graeser I 42
Being/CarnapVsHeidegger: copula "is" is not identical with "there is"- a) property relationship: E.g. "Shakespeare is a poet" - b) identity relationship: E.g. "Shakespeare is the author of Hamlet".
I 43
Subtractive fallacy/QuineVsHeidegger: from the mere presence of a word we infer the existence of something that is meant by this word.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Hermeneutics Heidegger Gadamer I 259
Hermeneutics/Heidegger/Gadamer: Under the keyword of a "hermeneutics of factuality" Heidegger confronted Husserl's eidetic phenomenology and the distinction between fact and being on which it was based with a paradoxical demand. Cf. >Life/Husserl, >Consciousness/Husserl. Heidegger: The unjustifiable and inferable factuality of "Dasein", the existence, and not the pure cogito as a constitution of essence of typical generality, should be the ontological basis of the
phenomenological question (...).
Prehistory/Gadamer: The critical side of this idea was certainly not entirely new. It had already been thought of by the Young Hegelians in the way of a criticism of idealism, and in this respect it is no coincidence that Kierkegaard, who came from the spiritual crisis of Hegelianism, was taken up by Heidegger as by other critics of Neo-Kantian idealism. On the other hand, however, this criticism of idealism then as now faced the comprehensive claim of the transcendental question. Insofar as transcendental reflection did not want to leave unthought any possible motive of thought in the unfolding of the content of the mind - and this had been the claim of transcendental philosophy since Hegel - it had always included every possible objection in the total reflection of the mind.
HusserlVsHeidegger: (...) Husserl [could] recognize being in the world as a problem of the horizon intentionality of transcendental consciousness, because the absolute historicity of transcendental subjectivity had to be able to identify the meaning of factuality. For this reason, Husserl, in consistent adherence to his central idea of the primordial ego, had immediately objected to Heidegger that the sense of factuality itself is an eidos, i.e. that it essentially belongs to the eidetic sphere of the universal communities of beings(1).
Gadamer I 264
Understanding/HeideggerVsDilthey/HeideggerVsHusserl: Understanding (...) is the original form of existence ("Dasein"), the being in the world (...). >Historism/Heidegger.
Gadamer I 267
Hermeneutics/Heidegger/Gadamer: [the question is] whether something can be gained from the ontological radicalization brought by Heidegger for the construction of a historical hermeneutics. Heidegger's intention itself was certainly different, and one must be careful not to draw hasty conclusions from his existential analysis of the historicity of existence ("Dasein"). According to Heidegger, the existential analysis of existence ("Dasein") does not imply a specific historical ideal of existence. To that extent it even claims an a priori neutral validity for a theological statement about humans and their existence in faith.
Gadamer I 268
Through Heidegger's transcendental interpretation of understanding, the problem of hermeneutics gains a universal outline, indeed the addition of a new dimension. The interpreter's belonging to his or her subject, which could not find proper legitimation in the reflection of the historical school (>Hermeneutics/Dilthey), now acquires a concretely demonstrable sense, and it is the task of hermeneutics to provide the instruction of this sense. The fact that the structure of existence ("Dasein") is a cast design, that ">Dasein" is understanding according to its own consummation of being, must also apply to the understanding that takes place in the humanities. The general structure of understanding reaches its concretion in historical understanding, in that concrete ties of custom and tradition and the corresponding possibilities of one's own future become effective in understanding itself. The "Dasein" that is based on one's ability to be has always "been". That is the meaning of the existential ideal of the thrownness (German: "Geworfenheit"). That all free self-behaviour to his being cannot go back behind the factuality of this being was the point of the hermeneutics of factuality and its contrast to the transcendental
Gadamer I 269
constitutional research of Husserl's Phenomenology. (HeideggerVsHusserl, >Constitution/Husserl).

1. Remarkably, in all previous Husserliana there is almost no mention of Heidegger by name. This certainly has not only biographical reasons. Rather, Husserl may have found himself repeatedly entangled in the ambiguity that made Heidegger's approach to "Being and Time" appear to him at times as a transcendental phenomenology and at others as a critique of the same. He could recognize his own thoughts in it, and yet they appeared in a completely different front position, in his eyes in polemical distortion.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993


Gadamer I
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010

Gadamer II
H. G. Gadamer
The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986
German Edition:
Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977
I, Ego, Self Heidegger Frank I 566f
I/Heidegger: the question "What am I?" is answered by itself: "I am the author of this question" Gabriel Marcel ditto - Kaplan ditto - EvansVs: that I am a physical entity, is not as safe as I think (Evans like Descartes, DescartesVsHeidegger) - Heidegger’s principle does not show the incoherence of the idea that I am different from my body - it can also not demonstrate that x in any instantiation is physical or not. >Body, >Identity/Evans, >Self-Consciousness/Evans, Subject.

Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell,
Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Identity Heidegger Adorno XIII 80
Identity/Heidegger/AdornoVsHeidegger: the absolute identity as stipulated by Heidegger today in his doctrine of being is identity thinking in one of its unconscious and therefore perishable, but very similar manner: in it the absolute primacy of the subject is claimed hidden, and its claim that it is something other than idealism must therefore necessarily go to protest.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993


A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974
Language Rorty I 16ff
Mirror: Language is a tool and not a mirror (Rorty like Wittgenstein).
I 206
Language: the particularity of the language is not that it "changes the quality of our experience" or "opens new perspectives to the consciousness". Its acquisition rather gives us access to a community whose members justify their assertions before each other.
I 228
Rorty: we can pursue Quine’s goals without useing his resources: we admit that the world can be fully described in a truth-functional language, but at the same time we also admit that parts of it can be described in an intensional language as well. If we were not able to refer to intentions, we would still be able to describe any section of the world.
III 25
Vocabularies: the world does not prefer one vocabulary over others. Newton’s vocabulary makes it easier for us to describe the world than that of Aristotle, but it does not prefer it! The human self is created by vocabularies.
III 41
Rorty’s thesis: seeing the history of the language and thus of the arts, sciences and the history of morality as a metaphor is to abolish the image in which consciousness or language are always better suited for purposes that God or nature have imposed. Consciousness just happened in evolution, it’s not something at which the whole process was aimed.
III 156
Language: people want to be described in their own terms.
III 190
Language/noise/sound/Heidegger/Rorty: for him, philosophical truth depended on the choice of phonemes, the sound of the words themselves.
III 197
Primordial words/RortyVsHeidegger: such words would be completely useless for people who do not share Heidegger’s associations.
III 190
Writing/speech/DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: Derrida puts Heidegger upside down: insists on the "priority of the written word". - Writing instead of sounds - Thought should become poet-like - the language speaks.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Metaphysics Habermas Rorty II 27
HabermasVsDerrida, HabermasVsHeidegger/Rorty: "Subject Philosophy": a failed metaphysical attempt to combine the public and the private. Mistake: to think that reflection and introspection could do what is really only possible through the extension of the discussion frame and the participants.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Metaphysics Bubner I 19
Metaphysics/Bubner: its climax in Hegel (after Kant's rejection) proclaimed the resumption of the ancient project. Renewal of metaphysics. Provocation: that it is not opposed to science, but as a necessary perfection.
---
I 134
Metaphysics/Heidegger: Where does it come from? (HeideggerVsMetaphysics). BubnerVsHeidegger: the question contradicts a philosophia perennis, which manages the eternal questions.
       Where does the need to deal with so obviously empty questions like those about being come from?
Metaphysics/Bubner: 1. Thesis: it was by no means an eternal companion of mankind, but has developed as a task of philosophy in the face of special experiences.
The oldest documents of philosophy, on the one hand, are so profound, on the other, so unspecific that the metaphysics label does not fit.
Metaphysics/Ancient: first mentioned by Plato. The pre-Socratics, in his opinion, fail before the task of real understanding. So metaphysics arises.
Metaphysics/Bubner: Crisis in Descartes and Kant.
---
I 136
Skepticism/antiquity/Bubner: originally meant only accurate examination and judgment abstention (> Epoché)! Metaphysics/Bubner: as the supreme knowledge of the powers of pure reason, it cannot proceed otherwise than dogmatically.
       Thus skepticism is the natural enemy of metaphysics.
---
I 144
Metaphysics/Bubner: 3. Thesis: The Transcendental Revolution of Kant does not arise from a genius idea, but from the experience of the failure of metaphysics in its history so far. It serves the elimination of this lack and the insight into the efficiency of reason itself. ---
I 149
Metaphysics/Bubner: 4. Thesis: also the beginning of metaphysics is lead by an experience that brings the new discipline on the way. This is certainly not an experience with metaphysics, but an original experience, which involves knowledge when it is in pursuit of its intention diagnosing its lacks. Thus, metaphysics realizes a primal interest of all knowledge.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

Natural Laws Heidegger Rorty VI 199f
Truth/man/reality/world/knowledge/existence/Heidegger/Rorty: before Newton Newton's laws were neither true nor false. - BrandomVsHeidegger: the truths existed before the emergence of the corresponding words. - Brandom: otherwise paradox.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Nominalism Rorty I 124
Def nominalism/Rorty: the thesis that all creatures are of nominal nature and all necessities de dicto. No object description applies to a greater measure to the true nature of an object than any other description.
NominalismVsPlato: nature cannot be dissected at its joints.
Materialistic MetaphysicsVsNominalism: these are representatives of a "language-bound idealism". The materialists believe that Dalton and Mendeleev actually cut nature at its joints. (Kripke also). Wittgenstein merely mesmerized by words.
II 125
Nominalism: protest against any kind of metaphysics. Hobbes mistakenly linked nominalism with materialism. Quine still links it to that. RortyVs: it is a contradiction to believe that words for the smallest particles of matter will dissect nature in a way in which is not possible with other words! A contradiction-free nominalism must emphasize that the prediction success of such a vocabulary is irrelevant for the "ontological rank". NominalismVsHeidegger: Words like "physique" or "essence" are not "more essential" than words such as "Brussels sprouts" or "football"
I 126
Nominalism: (like Gadamer): as far as we understand anything at all, we understand it with the help of a description, and privileged descriptions do not exist! Nominalism: what the approach to something fixed, hidden is to the metaphysicists, is the invention of a discourse to the nominalists.
Nominalism/RortyVsQuine: does not split the nature in a more secure way and does not create certainty about which is the true ontology - (Vs linking nominalism with materialism).

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Presence Heidegger Figal I 86
Ecstasy: three forms: past, present, future. They are the forms at present in the fact that they are directly interrelated, the future as such points to the essence and this to the present. ---
Figal I 98
"Presence": (horizontal scheme): both presence as well as absence. Absence is a special mode of something to be discovered (> Aristotle, "ousia" presence). Presence includes present and future. ---
I 98
FigalVsHeidegger: that suggests to see the future and the essence as modifications of the presence. Its threefold structure would have proved to be a peculiarity of everyday existence. With this the temporality that has been worked out in everyday existence would have had to be transcended. Difficulty: it is impossible, in accordance with the logic of the origin of his program, to make philosophy comprehensible analog to Aristotelian phronesis intended ordinariness of existence.
For this, the threefold structured temporality should have been interpreted as the time of philosophy (and not only as the ordinariness). Thus philosophy can no longer be explained by the structure of everyday life. The program of fundamental ontology has thus failed. (+ I 98.99)
---
Figal I 99
Heidegger now interprets philosophy in such a way that it is precisely understood in the structure of existence. Existence is essentially philosophical. And philosophy becomes historical.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993


Figal I
Günter Figal
Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016
Quotation Marks Tugendhat II 109
Quotation marks/TugendhatVsHeidegger: misleadingly omitted: what do you actually mean when you use the term "being". - Then ambiguous whether sense of the word or of being - Typical shift - when Heidegger now asks about the meaning of being, does he ask for the sense2 of a sense1 of the word. - He asks for the sense2 (which is not in any case the meaning of a word) of something what we mean when we speak of the being of a being - and what this something is, is left open. Insertion asterisk.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Terminology Tugendhat I 72f
Veritative Being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p". - VsObject theory - VsConzeptualism (terms for objects) - immaterial - but also VsImagination - instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no-structure) - TugendhatVsTradition (Middle Ages): verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next unum and aliquid - would Aristotle have referred to the veritative being, he could have formed a semantics of assertion. ---
I 91
VsHeidegger: Being of facts instead of "all being is being of any beings". ---
I 162f
Object theory/TugendhatVs: states of affairs regarded as objects - VsWittgenstein/VsTractatus: state of affairs as a combination of object, fact as existence of state of affairs - Wittgenstein, late: (self-criticism), "complex is not equal to fact". ---
I 217
Object Theory simply ignored the communicative function of language. ---
I 337
Singular Term/TugendhatVsObject theory: cannot make that "standing for" understandable. Not even his own basic notion, that of the object. ---
I 338
Frege: singular terms are dependent expressions. ---
I 246
Hysteron-proton/Tugendhat: the later earlier - fallacy of interchanging the implication relation - here: also a state of affairs can only be identified by phrases. ---
I 266
Definition expulsion game/Tugendhat: that the rule of use which is explained, is to be understood as a verification rule - (pro) - ((s) >use/Tugendhat, > truth conditions/Tugendhat, > meaning/Tugendhat. ---
I 276
The rules of the expulsion game are verification rules.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Unconscious Searle I 192f
Unconscious/Searle: according to the model of consciousness (pro, VsHeidegger) e.g. hammering is not done unconsciously but aware. There are two differences: conscious/unconscious, peripherals/center . Cf. >awareness.
I 160f
SearleVsFreud: unconscious for him is like fish deep down in the sea (wrong idea of mental constance). They seem to have the same form. Problem: there is a false analogy: consciousness/perception (regress) requires yet another level of description, which does not exist, unconscious on the model of consciousness. What is the ontology of the unconscious, as long as it is unconscious (revolt? hatred of the father?) If I take away the object (bicycle) from the perception, it is a hallucination, but that is what I cannot do in case of conscious thought, to obtain the unconscious.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Use Theory Rorty I 139
Language/Use theory/Rorty: no one would say that there is e.g. a "nature of crime" which could be found out by a study of our language - solution: it is about social practices, not just about language use.
II (c) 70
Rorty: Analytical philosophy VsUse theory (VsMeaning change). >Meaning change.
III 36
RortyVsWittgenstein: the analogy between vocabularies and tools has one drawback: craftsmen usually know what kind of work they need to do before they look for or invent the tools. This cannot be expected of poets. >Use, >vocabulary.
III 101
Use theory of meaning/Rorty: problem: that you know in advance for which purpose a tool is designed. This is not the case with language! As long as we are still trying to figure out how they can be used, we cannot consider Christianity, Newtonian physics, the romantic movement or political liberalism as tools!.
III 102
Use theory/Rorty: Problem: the purposes of language are not yet established - unlike tools.
III 194
SellarsVsHeidegger/SellarsVsUse theory: Physics prevail - HeideggerVsSellars - HeideggerVsWittgenstein: not physics but the poetry shows that the language game is inappropriate.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Words Heidegger Cardorff II 68
Words/Heidegger/Cardorff: Heidegger's etymological derivations are controversial (> TugendhatVsHeidegger). E.g. Originally, "place" means "the tip of the spear". .. "The place gathered together into the highest and the utmost, the gathering decomposes and permeates everything, the place, the gathering, brings in to itself.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993


Hei II
Peter Cardorff
Martin Heidegger Frankfurt/M. 1991

The author or concept searched is found in the following 18 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Carnap, R. Danto Vs Carnap, R. Danto I 80f
CarnapVsHeidegger: denied that a sentence like "Das Nichts nichtet" was verifiable. DantoVsCarnap: we all know a feeling of anxiety . Why should it be less empirical than seeing a table.

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Derrida, J. Habermas Vs Derrida, J. Derrida I 95
Derrida: no distinction between everyday language and specialist languages. (DerridaVsSearle).
I 196
HabermasVsDerrida: there are differences. Derrida over-generalizes poetic language. There has to be a language in which research results can be discussed and progress registered. HabermasVsDerrida: he does not wriggle out of the restrictions of the subject-philosophical paradigm. His attempt to outbid Heidegger does not escape the aporetic structure of the truth events stripped of truth validity.
I 211
Subject-Philosophy/Derrida: Habermas: he does not break with her at all. He falls back on it easily in the style of the original philosophy: it would require other names than those of the sign and the re-presentation to be able think about this age: the infinite derivation of the signs who wander about and change scenes. HabermasVsDerrida: not the history of being the first and last, but an optical illusion: the labyrinthine mirror effects of ancient texts without any hope of deciphering the original script.
I 213
HabermasVsDerrida: his deconstructions faithfully follow Heidegger. Involuntarily, he exposes the reverse fundamentalism of this way of thinking: the ontological difference and the being are once again outdone by the difference and put down one floor below.
I 214
Derrida inherits the weaknesses of the criticism of metaphysics. Extremely general summonings of an indefinite authority.
I 233
DerridaVsSearle: no distinction between ordinary and parasitic use - Searle, HabermasVsDerrida: there is a distinction: communication requires common understanding
I 240
Derrida’s thesis: in everyday language there are also poetic functions and structures, therefore no difference from literary texts, therefore equal analysability. HabermasVsDerrida: he is insensitive to the tension-filled polarity between the poetic-world-opening and the prosaic-innerworldly language function.
I 241
HabermasVsDerrida: for him, the language-mediated processes in the world are embedded in an all prejudicing, world-forming context. Derrida is blind to the fact that everyday communicative practice enables learning processes in the world thanks to the idealizations built into communicative action, against which the world-disclosing power of interpretive language has to prove itself. Experience and judgment are formed only in the light of criticizable validity claims! Derrida neglects the negation potential of communication-oriented action. He lets the problem-solving capacity disappear behind the world-generating capacity of language. (Similarly Rorty)
I 243
HabermasVsDerrida: through the over-generalization of the poetic language function he has no view of the complex relationships of a normal linguistic everyday practice anymore.
Rorty II 27
HabermasVsDerrida, HabermasVsHeidegger/Rorty: "subject philosophy": misguided metaphysical attempt to combine the public and the private. Error: thinking that reflection and introspection could achieve what can be actually only be effected by expanding the discussion frame and the participants.
II 30
Speaking/Writing/RortyVsDerrida: his complex argument ultimately amounts to a strengthening of the written word at the expense of the spoken.
II 32
Language/Communication/HabermasVsDerrida: Derrida denies both the existence of a "peculiarly structured domain of everyday communicative practice" and an "autonomous domain of fiction". Since he denies both, he can analyze any discourse on the model of poetic language. Thus, he does not need to determine language.
II 33
RortyVsHabermas: Derrida is neither obliged nor willing to let "language in general" be "determined" by anything. Derrida could agree fully with Habermas in that "the world-disclosing power of interpretive language must prove itself" before metaphors are literarily absorbed and become socially useful tools. RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that X must be demonstrated as a special case of Y first in order to treat X as Y. As if you could not simply treat X as Y, to see what happens!
Deconstruction/Rorty: language is something that can be effective, out of control or stab itself in the back, etc., under its own power.
II 35
RortyVsDeconstruktion: nothing suggests that language can do all of this other than an attempt to make Derrida a huge man with a huge topic. The result of such reading is not the grasping of contents, but the placement of texts in contexts, the interweaving of parts of various books. The result is a blurring of genre boundaries. That does not mean that genera "are not real". The interweaving of threads is something else than the assumption that philosophy has "proven" that colors really "are indeterminate and ambiguous."
Habermas/Rorty: asks why Heidegger and Derrida still nor advocate those "strong" concepts of theory, truth and system, which have been a thing of the past for more than 150 years.
II 36
Justice/Rawls Thesis: the "just thing" has priority over the "good thing". Rawls/Rorty: democratic societies do not have to deal with the question of "human nature" or "subject". Such issues are privatized here.
Foundation/Rorty Thesis: there is no Archimedean point from which you can criticize everything else. No resting point outside.
RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism".
Habermas: "the validity of transcendental spaces and times claimed for propositions and norms "erases space and time"."
HabermasVsDerrida: excludes interaction.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Derrida I
J. Derrida
De la grammatologie, Paris 1967
German Edition:
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Derrida, J. Rorty Vs Derrida, J. III 222
Deconstruction/RortyVsDerrida: not a new procedure. One can learn deconstruction just as one can learn to discover sexual symbols, bourgeois ideology etc. in texts. Reading did not become easier or harder, just as cycling does not become easier or harder if one makes discoveries about the nature of energy during it. Recontextualisation/RortyVsDerrida: has existed for a long time: Socrates recontextualised Homer, Augustine the pagan virtues, Hegel Socrates and Augustine, Proust himself, and Derrida all.
Why does it sound so frightening when Derrida does it as opposed to Hegel? Because Derrida uses the "accidental" material form of words while Hegel no longer wanted to abidy by the rule that the "opposition" relation applies only to sentences, and not to cconcepts, but nevertheless subjugated to the other rule that no weight has to be attached to the sound and form the words.
Derrida: in communicating with other people one has to comply to these rules, of course, but not when communicating with other philosophers.
IV 9
Metaphysics/RortyVsDerrida: too dramatic s presentation of the role played by metaphysics in our culture. He puts too much emphasis on the particular kind of centripetal thinking that ends in philosophizing that is oriented towards justification.
IV 118
Scripture/Derrida/Rorty: we should "think about a writing without presence and without absence, without history, cause
IV 119
arché telos which deranged the entire dialectic, theology and ontology (sic)." Such scripture would be literature, which no longer would be contradictory to philosophy. Scripture/Text/RortyVsDerrida: dilemma: either he can forget about philosophy
IV 120
and the What of scripture would lose its wit, or he must accept the dependence of the text of philosophy on its edges. When Derrida recounts such tragicomedy he shows himself at his best. His weakest points are the ones where he begins to imitate what he hates and claims he would offer "rigorous analyses".
IV 121
SearleVsDerrida/Rorty: his arguments are simply awful. Rorty: that's right! RortyVsSearle: underestimates Derrida; he does not even seek knowledge bases!
RortyVsSearle: the idea that there were such a thing as an "intellectual content" measurable by general and ahistorical standards links him with Plato and Husserl, but separates him from Derrida. The weakness of his arguments Derrida is that he believes that he would be pursuing amateurish philosophy of language. He did not notice that Derrida poses metaphilosophical questions about the value of such a philosophy.
IV 122
RortyVsDerrida: every new type of scripture that can do without arché and without telos is also left without object!
IV 123
RortyVsDerrida: Dilemma: another meta vocabulary is a) either prudocing a further philosophical seclusiveness or b) more openness than we can handle.
Derrida is aware of that. Therefore, he distances himself from Heidegger who has failed to write about philosophy unphilosophically.
DerridaVsHeidegger: "there will be no unique name, even not of existence".
IV 125
Heidegger never goes beyond a set of metaphors that he shares with Husserl. These metaphors suggest that deep down we all possess the "truth of being"! Calling and listening also do not escape the circle of mutually explicable concepts. (so.).
IV 126
Scripture/dialectic/RortyVsDerrida: "primacy of scripture" not much more than a cricket: not more than the assertion that certain features of discourse are more evident in the case of writing, as in the spoken language.
IV 127
This is no more than a stale dialectic of reversal that Hegel disproved already in his phenomenology and that Kierkegaard called "tricks of a dog".
IV 129
RortyVsDerrida: the distinction between relationships contitioned by conclusion and associations not conditioned by conclusion is just as unclear and blurred as the one between word and sentence or between the metaphorical and the literal.
IV 130
But Derrida has to do something with all these distinctions. He must ensure that they look distinct enough. He is concerned about being the first to turn to this issue, while all previous authors have done nothing more than to build the same old building again and again.
IV 129
sentence/Rorty: the distinction between sentence and non-sentence is blurred. ((s) But supra.
IV 49
World/Rorty: amount of non sentences. - This presupposes a clear distinction.).
IV 131
Text/scripture/RortyVsDerrida: it is simply not true that the text sequence that makes up the canon of tradition is trapped in a metaphor that has remained unchanged since the Greeks. The procedure to speak multiple languages at the same time and to write several texts at the same time is exactly what all important, revolutionary, original thinkers have practiced.
IV 135
Text/RortyVsDerrida: virtually all thinkers have written several texts simultaneously. Also "glass" is not new, but the realistic representation of a site on which we have lived for some time.
IV 136/137
RortyVsDerrida: he can not perform an argumentative confrontation without turning into a metaphysician. Being/DerridaVsHeidegger: Being has always only had "meaning" as something hidden in the being. The "differance" is in a certain and very strange way "older" than the ontological difference or than the truth of being.
IV 138
Trace/Derrida: neither a reason nor a justification nor an origin. (Claimed to have "proven" that. RortyVsDerrida: how can he prove it?
IV 139
"Differance"/Derrida: "neither a word nor a concept". RortyVsDerrida: First of all it was a typo. That it is not anymore is because it has actually become a word. Also, any word that has a use refers to a concept.
IV 140
Concept/Wittgenstein/Rorty: we have learned from Wittgenstein that every word is interwoven with others. RortyVsDerrida: Opposition: Derrida is trying to utilize the explanation of the language game of the concept of meaning and to grant some magic words privileges at the same time.
RortyVsDerrida: does nothing more than to avoid simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics.
IV 142
RortyVsDerrida: that all does not mean that the word games are not funny, but only that the accompanying sound of urgency is inappropriate.
VI 475
Order/Searle: a blurred distinction can still be useful. VsDerrida, who makes no distinctions in his opinion.)
VI 476
Sign/RortyVsDerrida: should not depict concepts as quasi People. ((s) that bring concepts mischief). Sign/Derrida: would have given us transcendental pseudo-problems. E.g. how intentionality were possible in a world of atoms and of empty space.
RortyVsDerrida: should not even ask the question "What is the Political?". Just as the "piety" of Euthyphro it presumes sime kind of being of which one would assume that it would only be of interest to Phallogozentristen!
Concept/Derrida: wants to write without concepts as "agents".
VI 477
RortyVsDerrida: one should not write about the adventures of concepts, but about the adventures of people. He should not argue frequently used words stood for incoherent concepts, because there is no better proof for the consistency than the use, that this language game is actually being played.
Derrida is itself quite transcendental, while he criticized others for ot.
VI 480
Shine/to seem/appearance/RortyVsDerrida: in accordance with Wittgenstein and Davidson we can do our work without even mentioning this dubious distinction (Being/appearance)!
VI 500
Text/Concept/RortyVsDerrida: if there really is a world in which concepts live and weave and exist regardless of the language behavior of word users, namely that world which is the transcendental condition of the possibility of transcendental philosophy, the question arises: Why can it also be an empirical fact that a concept is nothing more than the use we miserable existing individuals make of a word. If the world in which a concept is nothing more than this use is real, the question is: How is it possible that that other world is also real?

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Derrida, J. Verschiedene Vs Derrida, J. Derrida I 88
»Lichtung des Seins«/"Clearing of being," etc. RicoeurVsHeidegger: That is a return of the metaphor in a way of thinking that no longer sees itself as metaphysical. DerridaVsRicoeur: turns this criticism. The metaphor wears. It returns in a different form.
VsDerrida: he overlooks the fact that "wear" is a metaphor again. - Thinking in terms of its relation to the metaphor is not to determine or identify!





Derrida I
J. Derrida
De la grammatologie, Paris 1967
German Edition:
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993
Gadamer, G. Habermas Vs Gadamer, G. Rorty II 127
Gadamer/Rorty: helps us to wipe out both the concept of "inner nature" and the concept of "identifying description" Gadamer/Rorty: helps us to replace metaphors of depth with metaphors of width, the more descriptions are available, the better.
II 129
VsGadamer/Rorty: many times he was blamed of having invented a language-bound variety of idealism.
V 24
HabermasVsGadamer/Rorty: relativism and potential repressiveness.
VI 415/416
RortyVsKrüger/Rorty: his propagating of the "scientific and technological world" has lead authors such as C.P. Snow, Habermas and Popper to think that Heidegger and Gadamer were on the wrong political side, (representing the more "literary culture") and were enemies of human freedom. (HabermasVsGadamer, PopperVsHeidegger, SnowVsLiterature).

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Heidegger, M. Bubner Vs Heidegger, M. I 28
Good / goodness / Heidegger: suitability. BubnerVsHeidegger: impoverishment: the idea as something common to all. Practice disappears from view. Truth / BubnerVsHeidegger: shortened truth in his interpretation of the cave allegory on unconcealment (Uverborgenheit) and thus spoils the accuracy of the reference to objects.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Heidegger, M. Carnap Vs Heidegger, M. Danto I 89
CarnapVsHeidegger: Carnap denied, that a sentence like "Das Nichts nichtet" ((s) "Nothingness destroys") be verifiable. DantoVsCarnap: we all know a feeling of anxiety. Why should it be less empirical than seeing a table?

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Heidegger, M. Derrida Vs Heidegger, M. I 29
DerridaVsHeidegger: La verité en peinture: VsHeidegger's Van Gogh interpretation. Heidegger: sees reliability in the strength and robustness of build shoes. Derrida wants to go further: he sees a cipher for the reliability of being. But he can only do this by thinking about the reliability of the farmer's wife at the same time.
I 43
DerridaVsHeidegger: is not consistent on his way to leave metaphysics. He remains arrested because he demands of thinking to be cruel to the "voice of being". This seems to presuppose an instance that speaks. The Christian God is associated. On the other hand, for Heidegger the "voice of being" is naturally silent, silent and wordless.
I 124
DerridaVsHeidegger: does not pay enough attention to the difference between man and animal. Heidegger emphasizes the hand as the organ of showing as the property of humans. Heidegger: "what is world ?": "1. the stone is worldless 2. the animal is world poor 3. the human is world forming".
Rorty III 202
Language/Primordial Words/DerridaVsHeidegger: his litany is only his own, by no means that of Europe. There is also no "universal name".
III 203
Vs Myth of a "hidden language". (Vs superpersonal power, the gives certain words power)
III 207
DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: one can escape Heidegger's "we" and the trap into which he ran - when he wanted to lean on something greater than himself through affiliation - through avoiding by what Gasché (his biographer) calls "wild private thought games".
III 208
Metaphysics/Heidegger/Rorty: degrades language to a language game, degrades wave to sign, thinking to metaphysics. DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: the problem is not to touch the essence of language without hurting it, but how to create one's own style that makes it impossible to compare oneself with one's predecessors.
Language/DerridaVsHeidegger/Rorty: has as little a "nature" as a "human" or "being".
III 213
Primordial Language/DerridaVsHeidegger: the day on which a most elementary word would be found, through which there would be only one possible reading of the "Map of Oxford", would be a tragedy! The end of the story!
Rorty IV 124
DerridaVsHeidegger: "There will be no unique name, even that of being".
IV 125
Heidegger never goes beyond a group of metaphors that he and Husserl have in common. These metaphors indicate that we all have the "truth of being" deep within us! Calling and listening do not escape the circle of mutually explicable concepts.
IV 137
Being/DerridaVsHeidegger: being has always had only "meaning"; it is always thought only as hidden in being. The "differance" is in a certain and extremely strange way "older" than the ontological difference or as the truth of being.

Derrida I
J. Derrida
De la grammatologie, Paris 1967
German Edition:
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Heidegger, M. Habermas Vs Heidegger, M. I 165
Subject Philosophy: Hegel and Marx had got caught in their own basic concepts while trying to overcome it. This objection cannot be raised against Heidegger, but similarly serious one. It distances himself so little from the problem specifications of transcendental consciousness that he can only overcome its concepts by means of abstract negation. But his "Letter on Humanism" (result of ten years of Nietzsche interpretation) relies essentially on Husserl’s phenomenology.
I 178
HabermasVsHeidegger: does certainly not embark on the path to a communication-theoretical answer. Namely, he devalues the structures of the normal-life background from the outset as structures of an average everyday existence, the inauthentic existence. Therefore, he cannot make the analysis of "co-existence" fruitful. He only starts dealing with the analysis of language after he had steered his analyzes in a different direction. "Who?" of the existence: no subject, but a neuter, the one.
I 179
HabermasVsHeidegger: World: when it comes to making the world intelligible as a process of its own, he falls back into the subject philosophical concept constraints. Because the solipsistically designed existence once more takes the place of transcendental subjectivity. The authorship for designing the world is expected of existence.
I 180
 The classical demand of the philosophy of origins for ultimate justification and self-justification is not rejected, but answered in the sense of a Fichtean action modified to a world design. The existence justifies itself on its own. I.e. Heidegger, in turn, conceives the world as a process only from the subjectivity of the will to self-assertion. This is the dead-end of the philosophy of the subject. It does not matter whether primacy is given to epistemological questions or question of existence.  The monologue-like execution of intentions,i.e. purpose activity is considered as the primary form of action. (VsCommunication). The objective world remains the point of reference. (Model of the knowledge relation).
I 182
HeideggerVsNietzsche "revolution of Platonism": HabermasVsHeidegger: Heidegger now used precisely this as a solution. He turns the philosophy of origin around without departing from its problem specifications. HabermasVsHeidegger: Downright world-historical significance of the turn: temporalization of existence. Uprooting of the propositional truth and devaluation of discursive thought. This is the only way it can make it appear as if it escaped the paradoxes of any self-referential criticism of reason.
I 183
HabermasVsHeidegger: fails to recognize that the horizon of understanding the meaning borne to the being is not ahead of the question of truth, but, in turn, is subject to it. Whether the validity conditions are actually fulfilled, so that sentences can work does not depend on the language, but on the innerworldly success of practice. HabermasVsHeidegger: even the ultimate control authority of an how ever objective world is lost through the turnover: the prior dimension of unconcealment is an anonymous, submission-seeking, contingent, the course of the concrete history preempting fate of being.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Heidegger, M. Luhmann Vs Heidegger, M. AU Cass 8
Other distinction: Reason / Life - (not life / death). Life romantically understood as irrational, direct - not conveyed through legislation. This runs through to Heidegger. (Immediacy / indirectness as a characterization of the relation to the world).
AU Cass 9
LuhmannVstradition: against the notion of ontology that time was "something there" ((s) "Es gibt Zeit"). (VsHeidegger?).

AU I
N. Luhmann
Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992
German Edition:
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Heidegger, M. Quine Vs Heidegger, M. V 127
Identity/Everyday Language/Individuation/Reference/Quine: also identity is part of our referential apparatus, but it is obscure in everyday language, because we use it without clear individuation principle. E.g. Do two editions of a novel have the same hero? How unlike may the heroes be? Or e.g. how unlike may the editions be to still be considered as versions of the same novel?
E.g. Was Baal the devil? E.g. Did the Indians rever God by worshiping the Great Spirit?
Identity/Possible Worlds/PoWo/Quine: all these examples fall under the issue of cross-world identity. Identity in various possible worlds.
Differently:
Attributes/Identity/Quine: E.g. when attributes are coextensive, they are not necessarily the same attribute. But when are they anyway?
Wrong solution: some say in case of "necessary co-extensivity" the two attributes are identical.
QuineVs: that only shifts the problem.
Ontology/QuineVsHeidegger: we do not clarify ontological ambiguities by taking everyday language literally and sifting through it. (>Existence, >value of a bound variable).
((s) primacy of language not in ontology).
V 128
Solution/Quine: it is the other way round: one comes up with something and gears language towards it! Existence/Ontology/Language Learning/Quine: the existing things are genetically nothing but an interplay of grammatical analogies that cover up the differences in the forms of learning. In the center is talk of objects. Ontology begins with the generalization of object study. (see above: e.g. color words, which, as you learn, do indeed not refer to individual things).
Grammar is thus simplified, ontology is multiplied.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Heidegger, M. Rorty Vs Heidegger, M. III 195
Poetry/Philosophy/RortyVsHeidegger: could as philosopher not become a poet, because he himself could not bear to be provisional. He wanted to make a final point.
III 197
Language/Heidegger: he believed he knew words that do or should ring a bell for all here in modern Europe. >Langauge/Heidegger. RortyVsHeidegger: it must be realized that those words do not exist and not at any time. They would be completely useless for people who do not share his associations or have different experiences.
History/Continuity/Rorty: the notion of a crisis in history presupposes what it wants to destroy: the notion of continuity. (VsHeidegger).
III 198
Poetry/Language/RortyVsHeidegger: he is right in saying that poetry shows what language can be if it is no longer a means to an end, but he was wrong when he thought that there could be a universal poem. Language/Sound/Speech Sound/RortyVsHeidegger: phonemes are important, but no a single phoneme is important for many people over a long time.
III 199
Fate/Destiny/RortyVsHeidegger: neither Europe nor people in general have a fate.
III 204
RortyVsHeidegger: Nietzsche fills wine in Kantian hoses in Being and Time. (Too discursive, contrary to his own intentions). He says things that come from Nietzsche in a university style.
IV 79
HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: tries to understand him by reading him as the last of the metaphysicians. RortyVsHeidegger: one of those who Nietzsche referred to as "ascetic priests".
IV 80
Heidegger tries to encapsulate the West, to turn to something completely different. Not unlike Plato, when he tries to create a spiritual world, from which he can look down on Athens.
IV 142
RortyVsHeidegger: wrong longing for Greekness. Pointless desire for elementary Greek words. We must create our own words.
VI 140
Knowledge/RortyVsHeidegger: contributes to that we hold on to the notion that our knowledge was somehow "based" on our non-linguistic causal interactions with the rest of the universe, rather than simply to say that these interactions are among the causes of our knowledge. Available/Present/RortyVsHeidegger: (with Brandom and Mark Okrent): what exists is merely a special case of the available, like words are a special case of tools.
I 390
RortyVsHeidegger: its selection of the philosophers with whom he furnished the "history of Being" stems from the doctoral regulations of the time! It's a bit suspicious that Being should have geared itself so much towards the curriculum.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Heidegger, M. Tugendhat Vs Heidegger, M. Habermas I 182
TugendhatVsHeidegger: by making the word of truth to a basic concept, he just avoids the problem of truth.
Tugendhat I 88
TugendhatVsHeidegger: Being: ambiguous in all languages. Heidegger was completely naive not to investigate this beforehand. Def veritative being: e.g. "It is the case that", "It is so, as you say, Socrates..."
I 90
Disclosure: all disclosure that is articulated in statements is in this respect a disclosure of (veritative) being.
I 91
Heidegger/Tugendhat: did not give an account of it. It seemed natural to him to say with the figurative tradition that all to be is a to be of being, although this does not fit at all to the veritative being ("If something is the case, it is also true"), let alone to the expanded concept. (TugendhatVsHeidegger).
I 92
Disclosure/Heidegger: original development is not at all related to objects. By "objectivity" in being and time he meant "existence", not only that which singular terms stand for, but the entire ontological perspective that results from the orientation towards a statement. Pre-linguistically.
I 104
TugendhatVsHeidegger: this contradicts the central importance that Heidegger attached to language ("Language is the house of being"). Heidegger fell back to the level of the most primitive theories of language by emphasizing the meaning of the word for the resoluteness of being.
II 65
Being/Heidegger: the content of that universal proposition of existence as enabling all "is"-saying is quasi the epitome of being. TugendhatVsHeidegger: this sense remains unclear. Ambiguity: "being and nothingness" in its formulations has finally changed into "being and non-being".
Through this ambiguity he also failed to make clear the difference between his position and the traditional ontology.
II 109
Quotation Marks/Heidegger: its use of quotation marks is not uniform. Being/Plato: "...what you mean when you use the expression "being"..."
TugendhatVsHeidegger: he omits the quotation marks! Falsification! One can now argue about whether he means the meaning of the word or the meaning of being.
TugendhatVsHeidegger: typical: he makes inconspicuous shifts from harmless starting positions with considerable consequences.
II 110
Sense of the Being/Heidegger/Tugendhat: no other way out than to speak of two different kinds of meaning: Sense1 and Sense2. When Heidegger now asks for the sense of being, he asks for the sense2 of a sense1 of the word. He asks for the sense2 (which in any case is not the sense of a word) of something that we mean when we speak of the being of an existing being. And what this something is, is left open. TugendhatVsHeidegger: he was even content to leave the words unclear that should be the most important to him and to us.
II 111
Def Sense/Heidegger: "The result of the design, from which something becomes understandable as something." Only existence has meaning if it is disclosed. Def World/Heidegger: The "Whereupon" of Understanding
Def "Worumwillen" (what for) of the Being/Heidegger: its own being that is designed in one way or another.
TugendhatVsHeidegger: Question: to what extent is anything we can refer to meaningless? Heidegger had used another meaning of "sense" here, something like the purpose of words. Thus one can speak of the meaning of the human, but not of the meaning of being.
Sense of Sense/Heidegger: nothing behind being, but in existence.
TugendhatVsHeidegger: suggests that the same being can once be opened up and once not.
II 112
Tugendhat: isn't something that we can refer to always accessible? Sense of Sense/Heidegger: Time. Like what was understood by "being" since the Greeks: "attendence", "present", "presence".
TugendhatVsHeidegger: Presence is not only made accessible by being seen in the horizon of time, it is from the beginning in this horizon. This could only be overlooked by someone who is completely immersed in "presence". And that is exactly what Heidegger accused ancient philosophy of of!
II 113
But there are simple words (like "present", "time") that we understand only in connection with other words.
II 115
Understanding/Heidegger: all human understanding is primarily an understanding of being. It goes beyond language. TugendhatVsHeidegger: he has not seen the following tension: on the one hand his being should be of being, on the other hand he is oriented towards the "is" and connects this with the thesis that all understanding is understanding of being.
II 116
For example "It is so that it rains" here one can say that the "is" refers to the state of affairs, and that is also a being. But that is not possible with unicorns. Tugendhat: Why should one deform oneself so?
Example (from Heidegger): "The sky is blue". Question: To which being does the "is" refer to the sky, or to what is meant by "blue", or to both?
So it makes sense to omit the orientation towards the existing and to speak only of being.
II 121
TugendhatVsHeidegger: his will to clearly think through what he had seen once was weak. Heidegger has seen quite a few new things, two themes seem worth preserving.
II 123
Mood/Heidegger: the primary way in which we are related to the world "as a whole". Being has no intentional content (!), it is directionless. ("fear", "withdrawal") focus on the "being in the whole". TugenhatVsHeidegger: here a substantiated "nothing" appears again, so to speak: an (impossible) negative proposition of existence: "There is nothing I can hold on to".
II 124
Being/later Heidegger: the "one who differs from all that exists", "absolutely other to all that exists". This could not have been formulated in such a way in "Being and Time" yet. "Being" is now the "world". It no longer stands for "is" but for "there is".
TugendhatVsHeidegger: I see no clue for the vibrating thesis that all understanding can be understood from this being. Everything but clear.
II 129
Greek concept of being/TugendhatVsHeidegger: Heidegger uses a sleight of hand: one must ask whether he was actually aware of the swindle. "Ousia" belongs to the tribe of "einai". Ousia = "being" pre-philosophically: "property", "house", "yard". Heidegger translates it as "estate" and projects back. In being and time he claims: "pareinai" = "being by" and could be translated as "estate", but the equation of ousia with parousia is simply wrong!
II 130
Time/Heidegger: the temporality of existence is more original than Heidegger's so-called "vulgar" time. (With a ratio of "sooner" and "later"). Future/Heidegger: one must see the self-behaviour to one's own being as a reference to the future.
II 131
Play on words: "Future" (German: "Zu-kunft") as that which is already fixed for being, in contrast to the indefinite future. TugendhatVsHeidegger: but this vulgar time must still be assumed. Of course, in every waking moment of my life I refer to the time ahead.
II 131
Time as meaning of being/time/future/Heidegger: he tried to construct a peculiar "movement" of existence, unlike the rest of being. This had to fail.
II 132
TugendhatVsHeidegger: the transfer of a structure, which is essentially conscious or present, to something else - even being - makes no sense!
II 132
Turn/Heidegger: can be understood as an attempt to project the "movement", which lies in the temporality of existence, into being itself or to settle it now on both sides. Here the terms "world" and the supposedly original concept of truth of "unconcealment" or "discovery" play a role.
II 133
Existence has its motion only from the motion of being, from the time thus understood as meaning of being. Oblivion of Being: HeideggerVsMetaphysics: which supposedly has forgotten the actual being and sees only the being of the existing.
II 134
TugendhatVsHeidegger: the new "movement of being" (understood from the movement of existence) is the crux of the "turn". Tugendhat: this fails: the reference to existence is a phenomenon sui generis. It is an extension of Husserl's intentionality (from Heidegger's point of view) both in the direction of the world and in the direction of temporality.
TugendhatVsHeidegger: but we have no possibility to consider a somewhat mirror image correspondence on the part of being. All words stand for the very process that takes place in the "vulgar" time!
Heidegger: wants existence to be temporal and yet not processual. That is contradictory. An emergence that is not an emergence in the "vulgar" time does not exist.
Heidegger's reaction to these contradictions was a quasi-religious attitude whose practical counterpart was "serenity".

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Heidegger, M. Verschiedene Vs Heidegger, M. Derrida I 44
Paul de ManVsHeidegger: Heidegger quotes Hölderlin "as a believer quotes the Holy Bible".
Derrida I 87
"Clearing of being" etc. RicoeurVsHeidegger: this is a return of the metaphor in a thinking that no longer understands itself as metaphysical.
(+ I 98,99)
Heidegger: Presence encompasses present and future. FigalVsHeidegger: this suggests that future and entity can be understood as modifications of presence. Its threefold structure would have proved to be a peculiarity of everyday existence. Thus the temporality worked out in everyday existence itself would have had to be exceeded. Difficulty: it is impossible, according to the original logic of its program, to make philosophy understandable from the everydayness of existence, which is analogous to Aristotelian phronesis.
For this purpose, the temporality divided into three parts should also have been interpreted as the time of philosophy (and not only of everyday life). Thus philosophy can no longer be explained by the structure of everyday existence. Thus the program of fundamental ontology has failed.
II 101
JaspersVsHeidegger: Heidegger's philosophy is "inherently unfree, dictatorial, communicationless.
II 127
VsHeidegger: Existence: the human is not subject, degraded consciousness. Antihumanism.
II 161
Death as a possibility: the possibility of the impossibility of any behavior to...-- offers no clue to be curious about anything. VsHeidegger: mere semantic trick.
Spiegel Interview with R. Augstein Heidegger 1966/1976
Art/Augstein: "the modern art often sees itself as experimental art, their works are experiments..."
Art/Heidegger: "I like to be taught". The big question is, where does art stand? What place does it have? Art/AugsteinVsHeidegger: fine, but then they demand something from art, which they no longer demand from thinking. Heidegger: I do not demand anything from art, I am just saying, it is a question of which place it occupies.
AugsteinVsHeidegger: because art does not know its place, is it therefore destructive? Art/Heidegger: Well, paint it. But I would like to state that I do not see the pioneer of modern art, especially since it remains dark, where it sees or at least seeks the very essence of art.
AdornoVsHeidegger: ~there is no such thing as "life itself," and no one, like Heidegger, may confuse its remnants with the "absolute".





Derrida I
J. Derrida
De la grammatologie, Paris 1967
German Edition:
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993
Heidegger, M. Nominalism Vs Heidegger, M. Rorty II 125
NominalismVsHeidegger/Rorty: Words such as "physique" or "nature" are not more "elementary" than words like "Brussels sprouts" or "football".

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Nietzsche, Fr. Heidegger Vs Nietzsche, Fr. Habermas I 180
HeideggerVsNietzsche "Revolution of Platonism": HabermasVsHeidegger: exactly this applied Heidegger now himself as a solution to it! He turns the origin of philosophy upside down, without departing from the problem specifications.
Habermas II 87
VsNietzsche: increases the subjectivity by turning the subject as the absolute will to power into a totally mundane phenomenon.
Rorty III 68
HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: inverted Platonism: romantic attempt to elevate the flesh above the spirit, the heart above the head, mythical "will" above equally mythical "reason".
Rorty III 179
HeideggerVsNietzsche/Rorty: "Reverse Platonist". Urge to join a higher one.

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Ordinary Language Dummett Vs Ordinary Language Dummett (e) III 185
Oxford Philosophy/Dummett: strongest influence: by Ryle. RyleVsCarnap: false methodology VsHeidegger: Laughing stock - Ryle: influence of Husserl.
III (e) 196
Particularism/Utility Theory/Oxford/Dummett: supposedly, the UT could only explain each sentence. The philosopher should not want to discover a pattern where there is none. DummettVs: we do not learn language sentence by sentence, either!
However, right: It is the sentences and not the words which have a "use" in the general sense.
III (e) 196/197
Everyday language: here the Oxford philosophy could not contribute anything (because of their anti systematic approach) to the better understanding of those principles on the basis of which we obviously learn the language so quickly. (> Chomsky). DummettVsOxford: continuously used psychological and semantic terms that a theory of meaning must not assume but explain! E.g. "Express an attitude" "reject a question", etc. (DummettVsAustin).
Likewise "truth" and "falsehood" were constantly used unexplained.
III (e) 198
DummettVsParticularism: disregarded the distinction semantic/pragmatic. Anyone who is not in the claws of theory would initially tend to distinguish what a sentence literally says from what one might try to communicate with it in special circumstances.
According to the "philosophy of everyday language" only the latter term is considered to be legitimate. "literal meaning" was considered an illegitimate byproduct.
III (e) 199
DummettVsOxford, DummettVsStrawson: artificially introduced new concepts such as "presupposition" or "conversation implicature" or DummettvsAustin: the distinction between "illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" acts (DummettVsSpeech act theory) took the place of the general semantic concepts, and without anyone noticing the "normal language" (everyday language) ceased to exist.

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Various Authors Derrida Vs Various Authors Derrida I 50
DerridaVsLogocentrism: conflict between the "will to say" and the unintentional by the nature of the description given. Derrida tries to find a point outside: the "exorbitant". "Clearing of being" etc. RicoeurVsHeidegger: this is a return of the metaphor in a thinking that no longer understands itself as metaphysical.
DerridaVsRicoeur: turns this critique around. By wearing out the metaphor, it withdraws. Return in a changed form.
Derrida I 88 (?)
Vs Derrida: he overlooks that "wearing out" is again a metaphor. The thinking in its relation to the metaphor cannot be determined or identified!
I 139
DerridaVsMarx: is too dependent on enlightenment. Derrida deconstructs Marx and introduces the term "messianic" in contrast to messianism.
I 150
DerridaVsMauss: does not notice the contradiction between gift and exchange, because there is a delay between gift and exchange. Therefore Mauss does not speak of the gift but in reality of the circular exchange.
Habermas I 194
Derrida: criticizes the rule of the Logos, which is always inherent in the spoken word. DerridaVsPhonocentrism: is a disguised figure of the logo centrism of the Occident. The metaphor of the Book of Nature is a manuscript hard to decipher.
Habermas I 203
Jaspers: "The world is the handwriting of another, never completely readable world; existence alone deciphers it. DerridaVsPlatonization of meaning.
Habermas I 234
DerridaVsNew Criticism (Formalism), Vs Structuralist Aesthetics.

Derrida I
J. Derrida
De la grammatologie, Paris 1967
German Edition:
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981