Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 56 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absoluteness | Hegel | Bubner I 182 Absolute Mind/Hegel: the eternal and self-contained idea operates as an absolute mind, creates and enjoys. (According to Aristotle, who distinguishes the self-thought as the highest activity of reason.) >Absolute Spirit. I 183 Absolute/HegelVsAristoteles: for him, the Absolute fits in with the categories of a self-uniting unity that seamlessly fits into systematic philosophies. He goes beyond this, in that he does not reserve the theory of goodness to a sub-domain of metaphysics. Thus, the doctrine of God means philosophizing in an encyclopaedically comprehensive dimension. There is no longer a supreme object. >Aristotle. HegelVsAristotle: Furthermore: parting with the teleology of nature. >Teleology, >Nature/Aristotle, >Nature. Instead: subjectivity principle. Heartbeat of the whole. The energeia, which permeates all things, is attributed to thought activities. I 184 Absoluteness/Hegel/Bubner: Absoluteness of the idea presents itself as the method of logic, and fulfills the condition of self-reference with this typically modern trick. >Self-reference, >Idea, >Logic/Hegel. Adorno XII 115 Absoluteness/Consciousness/Hegel/Adorno: by adopting an absolute identity of being and mind, Hegel tried to save the ontological proof of God. This assumption is actually the content of his philosophy. >Absolute spirit, >Proof of God. KantVsHegel: denies such an identity between what is and our consciousness. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Aesthetics | Hegel | Gadamer I 65 Aesthetics/Hegel/GadamerVsHegel/Gadamer: As is well known, the perhoresis of the dogmatic schematism of the Hegel school in the middle of the 19th century led to the demand for a renewal of critique under the slogan "Back to Kant". The same applies to aesthetics. As great as the evaluation of art for a history of world views was, which Hegel gave in his aesthetics - the method of such an a priori construction of history, which was used in the Hegel school (Rosenkranz, Schasler and others), was quickly discredited. The demand for a return to Kant, however, which was raised against it, could not really mean a return and regaining the horizon that surrounded Kant's criticisms. Rather, the phenomenon of art and the concept of genius remained at the centre of aesthetics, and the problem of natural beauty, including the concept of taste, remained on the margins. >Natural Beauty/Hegel, >Aesthetics/Kant, >Genius/Kant, >Taste/Kant. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Alienation | Eco | Eco I 238 Alienation/MarxVsHegel/Eco: Hegel does not differentiate between externalization and alienation (voluntary/unvoluntary). Eco: Hegel could not do this because as soon as the human objectifies himself/herself in the world of the things he/she has created in nature which he/she has changed, a kind of inevitable tension arises, whose poles on the one hand are the control of the object and on the other hand the complete getting lost in it in a balance that can only be dialectical, i.e. in a permanent struggle. >G.W.F. Hegel, >Alienation/Hegel, >Object/Hegel, >Dialectic, >Contradiction, >Change. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Alienation | Hegel | Gadamer I 352 Alienation/Reconciliation/Hegel/Gadamer: The life of the spirit consists (...) in recognizing oneself in otherness. The spirit, directed towards its self-knowledge, sees itself divided with what is foreign and must learn to reconcile with it by recognising it as its own and home. By dissolving the hardness of positivity, he is reconciled with himself. Insofar as such reconciliation is the historical work of the spirit, the historical behaviour of the spirit is neither self-reflection nor the mere formal-dialectical suspension of the self-alienation that has happened to it, but an experience that experiences reality and is itself real. >Experience/Gadamer, >Mind/Hegel, >Subject/Hegel, >Subject-Object-Problem. Eco I 238 Alienation/MarxVsHegel/Eco: Hegel does not distinguish between externalization and alienation. (voluntary/unvoluntary). Eco: he could not, because as soon as the human objectifies himself in the world of the things he has created, in nature, which he has changed, a kind of inevitable tension arises, whose poles on the one hand are the control of the object and on the other hand the complete losing onself in it in a balance that can only be dialectical, i.e. in a permanent struggle. >G.W.F. Hegel, >Alienation/Hegel, >Object/Hegel, >Dialectic, >Contradiction, >Change. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
| Alienation | Marx | Eco I 238 Alienation/MarxVsHegel/Eco: Hegel does not distinguish between externalization and alienation(voluntary/involuntary). >Alienation/Hegel. Eco: he could not, because as soon as the human objectifies himself in the world of the things he has created, in nature, which he has changed, a kind of inevitable tension arises, whose poles on the one hand are the control of the object and on the other hand the complete losing oneself in it in a balance that can only be dialectical, i.e. consists in a permanent struggle. Habermas IV 501 Alienation/Marx/Habermas: in Marx and in the Marxist tradition, the concept of alienation has been applied above all to the way of life of wage workers. With the transition to value theory, however, Marx has already freed himself from the educational ideal determined by Herder and Romanticism(1). Value theory only retains the concept of exchange and thus a formal aspect of distributive justice. With the concept of transforming concrete labour into abstract labour, the concept of alienation loses its certainty. He no longer refers to the deviations from the model of an exemplary practice, but to the instrumentalization of a life presented as an end in itself. >Life/Marx. 1.Ch.Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge1975, S. 5-29; deutsch Frankfurt 1977. Höffe I 364 Alienation/Marx/Höffe: (...) the Paris manuscripts(1) [expand] the critique of national economy into a philosophical anthropology about the nature of the human and his/her work. >National Economy/Marx. Anthropology/Marx: The guiding concept is the concept of alienation known from Rousseau's social contract and Hegel's phenomenology of the mind: that the human becomes alien to his/her nature. Alienation/Hegel: For Hegel, the alienation that the slave experiences in confrontation with the master, nature and him- or herself is a necessary phase in the formation of consciousness. Marx: Marx, on the other hand, plays through Hegel's complex dialectic for the "material", basic economic relationship, for the "hostile struggle between capitalist and worker". Like Hegel, >Master/Slave/Hegel), Marx also ascribes to the first inferior, the slave, now the worker, the greater possibility of liberating him- or herself from alienation. In a captivating analysis, he blames the main obstacle to a better society, the private ownership of the means of production, for a fourfold alienation: alienation from the product of work, from the nature of work, from oneself as a worker and from society: 1) First, the worker -and in a modified form also the owner of capital- is alienated from his/her product, since the worker does not enjoy the commodity him- or herself; moreover, nature faces the worker as a hostile world. 2) Second, the laborers alienate themselves from themselves, from their life activity, for, since he/she does not affirm labor, he/she feels " with him- or herself when he/she is apart from labor and apart from him- or herself when he/she is working; his/her work is in essence forced labor. Höffe I 365 3) (...) Thirdly, (...) the human alienates him- or herself from his/her being generic, since he/she does not find himself in the work of the genus, the worked nature. 4) (...) he/she still alienates him- or herself from his/her fellow humans, since they do not meet him/her as a human, but merely as laborers, and thus as means for his/her own individual life. 1. K. Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (1844) (Pariser Manuskripte) |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Art | Hegel | Gadamer I 54 Art/Hegel/Gadamer: In itself, the essence of all art is, as Hegel formulated it, that it "brings man before himself"(1). Other objects of nature - not only the human form - can also express moral ideas in artistic representation. All artistic representation, be it of landscape, be it of nature morte, or even every inspiring contemplation of nature has this effect. KantVsHegel/Gadamer: But in this respect Kant is right: the expression of the moral is then a borrowed one. Man, on the other hand, expresses these ideas in his own being, and because he is what he is. E.g., A tree that atrophies due to unfortunate growing conditions may seem miserable to us, but this misery is not an expression of the tree feeling miserable, and from the ideal of the tree, atrophy is not miserable. Miserable man, on the other hand, is miserable, measured by the human moral ideal itself (and not in such a way that we expect him to have an ideal of humanity that is not valid for him at all, by which he expressed misery for us without being miserable). HegelVsVs: Hegel understood this in his lectures Gadamer I 55 to aesthetics perfectly well, when he uses the expression of the moral as "Appearances of spirituality"(2). Gadamer: Thus the formalism of "dry pleasing" [trockenen Wohlgefallens"] leads to the decisive dissolution not only of rationalism in aesthetics, but of any universal (cosmological) theory of beauty in general. >Art/Kant, >Aesthetics/Hegel. 1. G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, ed. Lasson, S. 57: "It is therefore the general need of the work of art to seek in the mind of man, by being a way of bringing before man what he is.« 2. Ebenda, S. 213. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Bourgeois/Citizen | Marx | Mause I 49 Bourgeois/citoyen/MarxVsHegel/Marx: The "political state" (Marx 1956b, p. 351), which historically helped the "bourgeois society" (1) to assert it, is the mere guarantor of this atomistic society of the selfish bourgeois pursuing its private interests, whose rights it protects in the form of liberal fundamental and human rights (2). In this way it preserves the bourgeois way of existence of (...) a human being alienated from his "species-being" (3), isolated individual, who sees in his peers not the communitarian opportunity for realization, but the barrier of his freedom. The citoyen is nothing more than the idealized projection of this alienated species-being, and the state, which according to this idealization presents itself as the Republican realizing space of this citoyen, actually proves to be an instrument for stabilizing bourgeois society and the competition of its members. Under the historical conditions of bourgeois society, therefore, the citoyen always remains subordinate to the bourgeois, and likewise the relationship between politics and economy appears in the form of a purpose-means reversal. Republicanism/MarxVsRousseau, MarxVsHegel: The republican goal planned by Rousseau and Hegel is therefore not achievable for Marx within the limits of the existing economic system. >Bourgeois/citizen//Hegel. >Bourgeois/citizen/Rousseau. 1. K. Marx, Zur Judenfrage. In Marx Engels Werke, Bd. 1 (MEW 1), Hrsg. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Berlin 1956, S. 354-356,366-370. 2. Ibid. p. 361-367 3. Ibid. p. 366,370. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Change | Wessel | I 365f Change/WesselVsHegel: not from "being" and "nothing", we need empirical givenness for introduction. >Logic/Hegel. Empirical imagination is already provided in the logic. >Logic, >Change. Time: introduced through relatively regular processes, e.g. Earth's rotation. Change can also be introduced without time. >Introduction. "Paradox of change": the body has the property and at the same time it does not. a) two-digit predicate: "something turns into something else" b) single-digit: "something changed", "something becomes true" - E.g. "the water is moving" - >event: from change predicate sA => sB: "s(sA => sB)" sA: "the fact that A". |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Contradictions | Feyerabend | II 74 Law of Contradiction/Method/Logic: (VsFeyerabend) a method which does not obey the principle of contradiction is not science but chaos. It follows that it is not possible to examine the freedom of contradiction in the same way as the relativistic invariance or the agreement with observations! >Method. FeyerabendVsLogic: The objection assumes that the class of consequences of a scientific proposition is determined independently of the treatment of the proposition, according to the rules of propositional logic. This assumption has never been substantiated. The propositional logic is only one among many logical systems, in there are also intuitionistic logics, without excluded middle. II 75 E.g. Suppose that in the theories a contradiction in fact implies every proposition. Then follows: if one introduces velocities greater than the speed of light into the theory of relativity, then one obtains imaginary velocities and masses. PopperVsHegel/Feyerabend: Popper shows very circumstantially that one gets nonsensical consequences when one combines propositional logic with Hegel. He concludes that Hegel must be eliminated. FeyerabendVsPopper: That is about as intelligent as demanding that the theory of relativity should be eliminated because simple computers are not up to it. Hegel + theorem logic gives nonsense. Why should Hegel, of all people, be blamed for this nonsense? Logic: is also incompatible with the older quantum theory or with the differential calculus of Newton's time. Contradiction/Feyerabend: Ex The differential calculus was contradictory and yet led to the greatest discoveries in the sciences. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Dialectic | Nietzsche | Ries II 100 Dialectic/NietzscheVsDialectic: instead of dialectic there are only "degrees of existence", "stages of apparant things, lighter and darker shadows of appearances" left. (NietzscheVsHegel). >Dialectic/Hegel, >Thinking/Nietzsche, >World/thinking/Nietzsche. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 |
| Equal Opportunities | Hegel | Rawls I 300 Equal Opportunity/Hegel/Rawls: Hegel believed that limitations of equal opportunities, e. g. the Primogeniture ((s) first-born successor, only the first-born receives the inheritance) were essential for securing the landowner class, which is suitable for rule. This enabled the class to fight for its independence from the state, its quest for profit and the fight against the adversities of civil society. (G. W. F. Hegel; Philosophy of Right, § 306, Oxford, 1942), p. 199. I 301 RawlsVsHegel: it is not enough to accept how Burke and Hegel did that these forms of inequality also benefited the poorer people. >Inequality, >Injustice, >Generational Justice. We would also have to accept as a condition that, by correcting these injustices, the prospects of those who are worse off would be further worsened. The argumentation that all would benefit would only apply if the lexical order of principles (processing in turn, See Principles/Rawls) were to be abolished. >Difference Principle. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Experience | Hegel | Gadamer I 359 Experience/Dialectic Experience/Hegel/Aristoteles: [In Hegel] the moment of historicity wins its right. He thinks of experience as the accomplishing skepticism. We saw (>Experience/Gadamer) that the experience that one makes changes his whole knowledge. Strictly speaking, one cannot have the same experience twice. Gadamer I 360 [Hegel] has shown in his "Phenomenology of the Spirit" how the consciousness, which wants to become certain of itself, makes its experiences. The object of consciousness is the "in itself", but what is "in itself" can only be known in the way it presents itself to the experiencing consciousness. Thus, the experiencing consciousness experiences this very thing: the appearance of the object is "for us" itself(1). Hegel: "The dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on itself, both on its knowledge and on its object, in so far as the new true object springs from it, is actually that which is called experience. Gadamer: We recall the above and ask ourselves what Hegel, who obviously wants to say something here about the general nature of experience, means. HeideggerVsHegel: It seems to me that Heidegger was right to point out that Hegel here does not interpret experience dialectically, but conversely, what is dialectical, thinks from the essence of experience.(2) Hegel/Gadamer: According to Hegel, experience has the structure of a reversal of consciousness and therefore it is a dialectical movement. >Dialectic/Hegel, >Dialectic, >Consciousness. Hegel pretends that what would otherwise be understood by experience is something else, provided that we generally "make the experience of the untruth of this first concept on another object" (and not so that the object itself changes). But it's only apparently different. In truth, the philosophical consciousness sees through what the experiencing consciousness actually does when it goes from one to the other: it reverses itself. So Hegel claims that the true essence of experience itself is to reverse itself in this way. Hegel/Gadamer: (...) Experience [is] first always the experience of nothingness. Faced with the experience of another object, both our knowledge and its object change. One now knows it differently and better, and i.e. the object itself "does not endure". The new object contains the truth about the old one. Consciousness/Hegel: What Hegel describes as experience in this way is the experience that the consciousness makes with itself. "The principle of experience contains the infinitely important provision that for accepting and keeping for oneself a content, the person him- or herself must be present, more specifically, that he or she must find such content united with the certainty of him- or herself(3). Gadamer I 361 Reversal/Hegel/Gadamer: The concept of experience means just this, that such unity with oneself is only established. This is the reversal that happens to the consciousness of recognizing oneself in the stranger, the other person. >Subject-object problem, >Subject/Hegel, >Intersubjectivity. Absolute Knowledge/Hegel: According to Hegel, it is of course necessary that the path of experience of consciousness leads to a knowledge of oneself that no longer has any other, foreign, apart from oneself. For him, the completion of experience is the "science", the certainty of him- or herself in knowledge. The standard by which the person thinks experience is thus that of knowing oneself. Therefore, the dialectic of experience must end with the overcoming of all experience, which is achieved in absolute knowledge, that is, in the complete identity of consciousness and object. 1. Hegel, Phänomenologie, Einleitung (ed. Hoffmeister p. 73) 2. Heidegger, Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung (Holzwege p. 169). 3. Hegel, Enzyklopädie, § 7. Brandom I 156 Representation/Kant: involved in inferential relations between sentences - Hegel turns the order: resulting from experience as inferential activity. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Explanation | Hegel | Schurz I 224 Explanation/Hegel/Schurz: Thesis: Explanation goes in principle beyond description, it is a kind of "Wesensschau". DuhemVsHegel/WittgensteinVsHegel: Science can only describe at all! (WittgensteinVsExplanation). >L. Wittgenstein, >P. Duhem, >Description, >Explanation/Duhem, >Explanation/Wittgenstein. Law/laws of nature/solution/Hempel: also laws are descriptions - just general descriptions! Explanation/Hempel: goes beyond description in that it establishes a logical connection. >Explanation/Hempel. I 225 Last explanation/Schurz: does not exist in science for exactly this reason: every explanation must presuppose something unexplained. Example gravitation law, example the fact that there was a big bang. Nothing can explain itself, there is no "self-explanation". >Explanation/Schurz, >Explanation/Hempel, >Ultimate justification. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Facts | Brandom | I 466ff Def Deflationism: denies that content in concepts can be explained with truth conditions and compliance with the facts, properties and objects (VsCorrespondence theory). >Deflationism. Fact: "making true": misleading: it is not the fact that p makes true that p. >Truthmakers. I 469 E.g. It is not the fact that the Persians were defeated by the Greeks at Plataea, which makes that the Greeks defeated the Persians at Plataea. Facts: if facts are to be explained, the explanation does not need to refer back to something normative: The planetary orbits would also be elliptical without beings that set standards. --- Rorty VI 179 ff Whether a statement is true does not depend on whether somebody makes it. But our linguistic practices could not be what they are, if the facts were different. However, the non-linguistic facts could be essentially as they are, even if our linguistic practices were completely different. Form of thought. Definition Fact/Brandom, "something assertible" (neologism by Brandom: "claimable"). - There is the act of asserting and there is "the asserted" - facts are not the "true asserted" but the assertible. - Facts make assertions true. However, inferentially. RortyVsBrandom: It is as if I, like Moliere, refer to "the soporific power" as inferential in order to make it seem to be above suspicion. --- Brandom I 476 Fact/Brandom: no contrast between how things are and what we can say and think - Facts are (the content of) true assertions and thoughts - Wittgenstein: we don not stop opinionating when we are facing the facts. I 477 Wittgenstein: Facts are connected and structured by the objects and their properties. I 866 Negative Fact/Brandom: there is no mystery -> distinction between normative and non-normative expressions. - Also > conditional facts > modal facts - realm of facts and norms are not opposites - the normative is part of the factual. >Norms. --- Seel2 III 149 Def Fact/Brandom: Content of true assertions - Assertions/Brandom: obtain their content through the use of concepts in the context of the sentences uttered in each case. So the concept of fact can only be analysed together with the concept of assertion. However, this conceptual dependency is not genetic - the world is the epitome of all the facts, no matter when and with what success thoughts about the world are created. "There was a time when nobody used concepts, because there was no discursive practice - but there was never a time when there were no facts - Seel: therefore, neither concepts nor facts depend on the existence of thinking beings - at the same time, the theory of discursive practice appears to be a theory of the fundamental structure of the world - Seel: KantVsBrandom: Warns just of that - (in the case of Hegel in vain). KantVsBrandom/KantVsHegel: false: Conclusion from thinking to being. >Thinking, >Being. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Forces | Droysen | Gadamer I 218 Forces/History/Droysen/Gadamer: According to Droysen, too, it is (...) the concept of force in which the border of all speculative historical metaphysics becomes visible. DroysenVsHegel: In this sense Droysen criticizes Hegel's concept of development - much like Ranke - unless an embryonic plant unfolds itself in the course of history. But he defines more sharply what force means here: "With work the forces increase". The moral force of the individual becomes a historical power by being active in working for the great common purposes. It becomes a historical force in so far as the moral sphere is the permanent and powerful element in the course of things. Force is therefore no longer, as with Ranke, an original and immediate manifestation of All-Life (German: "All-Leben"), but is only in such mediation and only through such mediation does it attain historical reality. >History/Droysen, >Freedom/Droysen. |
Droys I J. G. Droysen Grundriss der Historik Paderborn 2011 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| God | Heidegger | Figal I 16 HeideggerVsHegel: the Absolute, God, is only accessible to the individual. Figal I 14ff God/Heidegger: "reservation" of the future. Gods/Heidegger: "Refusal of the Past." >Absoluteness, >Understanding, >World, >World/Thinking, >Religious belief, >Religion, >Existence/Heidegger. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Figal I Günter Figal Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016 |
| Hegel | Gadamer | I 349 Hegel/Dialectics/Gadamer: The criticism that has been made against [the] philosophy of absolute reason from the most diverse positions by Hegel's critics cannot assert itself before the consequence of total dialectical self-mediation, as Hegel described it in particular in his phenomenology, the science of appearing knowledge. Cf. >Reflection/Hegel. VsHegel/Gadamer: That the other must be experienced not as the other of myself, embraced by pure self-consciousness, but as the other, as "you", this prototype of all objections to the infinity of Hegelian dialectic, does not seriously affect him. See as an example: >Recognition/Hegel. HegelVsVs/Gadamer: The polemic against the absolute thinker is itself without position. The Archimedean point of unhinging Hegelian philosophy can never be found in reflection. >Absoluteness/Hegel. This is what makes the formal quality of the philosophy of reflection that there can be no position that is not included in the reflective movement of the consciousness coming to itself. The insistence on immediacy - be it that of bodily nature, be it that of the "you" making demands, be it that of the impenetrable reality of historical coincidence or that of the reality of the conditions of production - has always disproved itself, insofar as it is itself not an immediate behaviour but a reflective action. I 375 Hegel/Dialectics/Gadamer: But the originality of the conversation as the reference of question and answer still shows itself even in such an extreme case as Hegelian dialectic as a philosophical method. To unfold the totality of thought determinations, as it was the concern of Hegel's logic, is, as it were, the attempt in the great monologue of the modern "method" to embrace the continuum of meaning, the particular realization of which is provided by the conversation of the speakers. When Hegel sets himself the task of liquefying and putting spirit in (sic) the abstract determinations of thought, this means melting logic back into the consummative form of language, the concept back into the meaning of the word that asks and answers - a reminder, still in failure, of what dialectic actually was and is. Hegel's Dialectic is a monologue of thought that seeks to achieve in advance what gradually matures in each real conversation. >Dialektics, >Dialektics/Hegel, >G.W.F. Hegel. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Hegel | Heidegger | Gadamer I 274 Hegel/Heidegger/Gadamer: Heidegger's proof that in the concept of spirit in Hegel and of consciousness in Descartes, the Greek ontology of substance prevails, which interprets being as being present and in the present (... ) certainly goes beyond the self-understanding of modern metaphysics, but not arbitrarily, but from an "intention" (>Seinsfrage) that actually makes this tradition understandable by revealing the ontological premises of the concept of subjectivity. >Subjectivity, >Consciousness, >Spirit/Hegel, >Metaphysics. Understanding/Heidegger: So it is not at all a matter of securing oneself against the tradition that raises its voice from the text, but on the contrary, to keep away what can prevent one from understanding it from the point of view of its content. It is the obscure prejudices, whose dominion makes us deaf to the thing that speaks in tradition. >Prejudice. Kant/Heidegger: Conversely, Heidegger discovers in Kant's critique of "dogmatic" metaphysics the idea of a metaphysics of finiteness, against which his own ontological design has to prove itself. >Understanding/Heidegger, >I. Kant, >HeideggerVsHegel. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Hegel | Honneth | Brocker I 791 Hegel/Honneth: Hegel's Jena program (1) must be understood as a break with the social-philosophical mainstream of his time; this had been dominated in its understanding of social relations by the paradigm of the "struggle for self-preservation. (HegelVsMachiavelli, HegelVsHobbes). Honneth: In Hegel's work, on the other hand, a more complex logic of practice comes to the fore, namely that which unfolds out of the "struggle of subjects for mutual recognition of their identity". (2) The subjects are no longer concerned exclusively with scarce resources for their own survival, but with their own identity or the creation of a positive self-relationship. See Identity/Honneth. Brocker I 792 HonnethVsHegel: with his turn of consciousness philosophy (already raised in the Jena writings), he ultimately left the decisive suggestions of his concept of recognition theory unused. See Recognition/Honneth. 1. Vgl. G.W.F. Hegel, Jenaer Schriften 1808-1807 Frankfurt, 1986. 2. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p.11 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Honn I A. Honneth Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010 Honn II Axel Honneth Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Hermeneutics | Dilthey | Gadamer I 180 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: [On the theological, especially Lutheran interpretation of the Bible]: (...) Reformation theology does not seem (...) to be consistent. By finally using the Protestant formulas of faith as a guideline for the understanding of the unity of the Bible, it too abolishes the principle of the Scriptures in favour of an albeit short-term Reformation tradition. Not only the Counter-Reformation theology has argued against this but also Dilthey(1). He mocks these contradictions of Protestant hermeneutics from the standpoint of full self-confidence of the historical humanities. Development of Dilthey's hermeneutics: First of all the hermeneutics had to break free from all dogmatic limitations and free itself, in order to ascend to the universal significance of a historical organon. This happened in the 18th century, when men like Semler and Ernesti realized that an adequate understanding of Scripture was the recognition of the diversity of their authors, thus presupposing the abandonment of the dogmatic unity of the canon. With this "liberation of interpretation from "dogma" (Dilthey), the collection of the Holy Scriptures of Christanity moved into the role of a collection of historical sources, which as written works had to be subjected not only to a grammatical but also to a historical interpretation(2). DiltheyVsTradition: The old principle of interpretation, to understand the individual from the whole, was now no longer related and limited to the dogmatic unity of the canon, but went to the comprehensiveness of the historical Gadamer I 181 reality, to the wholeness of which the individual historical document belongs. Gadamer: (...) just as there is now no longer any difference between the interpretation of sacred or profane scriptures and thus only hermeneutics exists, so in the end this hermeneutics is not only a propaedeutic function of all historiography as the art of the correct interpretation of written sources, but also overlaps the whole business of historiography itself. For what is true of the written sources, that every sentence in them can only be understood from the context, is also true of the contents they report. Their meaning is also not clear in itself. The world-historical context in which the individual objects of historical research, large and small, show themselves in their true relative importance, is itself a whole, from which all individual things are first fully understood in their sense and which, conversely, can only be fully understood from these details. Gadamer I 182 Tradition: In itself, the history of understanding has been accompanied by theoretical reflection since the days of ancient philology. But these reflections have the character of an "art doctrine", i.e. they want to serve the art of understanding, such as the rhetoric of oratory, the poetics of poetry and its evaluation. In this sense, the theological hermeneutics of patristics and that of the Reformation was also an art doctrine. DiltheyVsTradition/Gadamer: But now understanding is made as such. ((s) VsDilthey: Cf. >Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher.) Gadamer I 202 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: Historical interpretation can serve as a means of understanding a given text, even if it sees in it a mere source that is integrated into the whole of historical tradition. In clear methodological reflection, however, we find this expressed neither by Ranke nor by the sharp methodologist Droysen, but only by Dilthey, who consciously takes up Romantic hermeneutics and expands it into a historical methodology, indeed into an epistemology of the humanities. Ditlhey: Not only do the sources encounter as texts, but historical reality itself is a text to be understood. With this transfer of hermeneutics to history, however, Dilthey is only the interpreter of the historical school. He formulates what Ranke and Droysen basically think. Historical School/Dilthey/HegelVsHistorism/Gadamer: We will see that Hegel's philosophy of world history, against which the historical school rebelled (DiltheyVsHegel), recognized the importance of history for the being of the mind and the knowledge of truth incomparably deeper than the great historians, who did not want to admit their dependence on it. Gadamer I 245 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: As we saw with Schleiermacher, the model of his hermeneutics is the congenial understanding that can be achieved in the relationship between the I and the You. The author's opinion can be seen directly from his text. The interpreter is absolutely simultaneous with his or her author. This is the triumph of the philological method to grasp past spirit as present, foreign as familiar. Dilthey: Dilthey is completely imbued with this triumph. He bases on it the equality of the humanities. Just as scientific knowledge always questions the present through a discovery within it, so the scholar of humanities questions texts. In this way Dilthey believed he was fulfilling the task which he felt was his own, to justify the humanities epistemologically by conceiving of the historical world as a text to be deciphered. >Text/Dilthey. 1. Cf. Dilthey II, 126 Anm. 3 the criticism of Flacius by Richard Simon. 2. Semler, who makes this demand, admittedly means with it still to serve the sense of salvation of the Bible, provided that the historically understanding "is now also able to speak of these objects in such a way now, as the changed time and other circumstances of the people beside us make it necessary" (quoted after G. Ebeling, RGG3 Hermeneutics), i.e. history in the service of the applicatio. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Historiography | Dilthey | Gadamer I 202 Historiography/Historical School/Historism/Dilthey/Gadamer: With [the] transfer of hermeneutics to history, Dilthey (...) is only the interpreter of the historical school. He formulates what Ranke and Droysen basically think. Thus, Romantic hermeneutics and its background, the pantheistic metaphysics of individuality, were decisive for the theoretical reflection of historical research in the 19th century. Gadamer: That has become fatal for the fate of the humanities and the world view of the historical school. Cf. >History/Hegel. SchleiermacherVsHegel/Gadamer: Schleiermacher's concept of individuality, which went so well with the concerns of theology, aesthetics and philology, was precisely a critical instance against the a priori construction of the philosophy of history, and at the same time offered the historical sciences a methodological orientation that referred them no less than the natural sciences to research, i.e. to the sole basis of progressive experience. Resistance to the philosophy of world history thus drove them into the path of philology. It was their pride and joy to conceive the context Gadamer I 203 of world history not teleologically, not in the style of the pre-Romantic or post-Romantic Enlightenment from an end state, which would be, as it were, the end of history, a recent day in world history. Rather, for them there is no end and outside of history. The understanding of the entire course of universal history can therefore only be gained from the historical tradition itself. But this is precisely the claim of philological hermeneutics that the meaning of a text can be understood from within itself. The basis of history is therefore hermeneutics. >Hermeneutics/Dilthey, >Universal History/Dilthey. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| History | Fukuyama | Brocker I 805 History/Fukuyama: Fukuyama's thesis of the "end of history" refers to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the East-West conflict or the Cold War. This endpoint is due to the victory of a liberal-market economical Brocker I 806 and democratic system of western character through alternative models of order. The title refers to both Hegel's and Marx' thesis of the same name. History/Hegel: Hegel saw the end of history in the establishment of a liberal state. History/MarxVsHegel/Marx: the end of history is only reached with the worldwide implementation of communism. FukuyamaVsMarx: The enforcement of democracy and capitalism is at the end of history. Democracy/Capitalism/Fukuyama: both have prevailed because they best meet two basic human needs: Capitalism/Fukuyama: is the economic system that best achieves an efficient allocation of goods under conditions of scarcity. Democracy/Fukuyama: is the model of order that relatively satisfies the human need for social recognition better than other systems. Fukuyama does not predict a quick victory for democracy. The struggle for them continues between a so-called post-historical world (in the industrialized countries of the Global North) and a historical world (in the industrializing countries of the Global South). See Democracy/Fukuyama. Brocker I 811 VsFukuyama: His theses were received as not particularly independent. It was pointed out that they already came up under Alexandre Kojève. (1) See also Master-Slave Dialectic/Kojève. Fukuyama's book seemed too pessimistic to many critics. VsFukuyama: 1. The empirical validity of his presentation of history has been called into question. Brocker I 812 FukuyamaVsVs: His thesis is not to be understood descriptive but normative . 2. Fukuyama's interpretation of the historical process as progress was criticized. 3. The same empiricism can also be interpreted differently than it was done by Fukuyama. 1. Shadia B. Drury, „The End of History and the New World Order“, in: International Journal 48/1, 1992/93, p. 80-99. Anja Jetschke, „Francis Fukuyama, Das Ende der Geschichte“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolFuku I Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man New York 1992 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| History | MacIntyre | Brocker I 660 History/MacIntyreVsHegel/MacIntyre/Goldstein: MacIntyre reverses Hegel's philosophy of history: instead of designing a teleology of the mind, whose endpoint is self-confident freedom, he presents the history of the erosion of virtue ethics. >History/Hegel, >World History/Hegel, >Historiography, >Teleology. MacIntyre thesis: "It could hardly have turned out otherwise".(1) Responsibility/MacIntyre: Thesis: In this process of moral erosion "no one is responsible or could be".(2) Our social order has got out of hand (...).(3) >Morals/MacIntyre. 1. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame, Ind. 1981. Dt: Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend. Zur moralischen Krise der Gegenwart. Erweiterte Neuausgabe, Frankfurt/M. 2006 (zuerst 1987), p. 301 2. Ibid. p. 147. 3. Ibid. Jürgen Goldstein, „Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| History | Marx | Höffe I 368 History/Marx/Höffe: [Marx](1) begins with the analysis of commodity and money as the factual preconditions and formal elements. He concedes to capital the world-historical task of developing all productive forces of labor. On the other hand, however, it prevents what is indispensable for a truly humane economy: that work or the worker becomes the subject of social processes. Determinism: Freely borrowing from Hegel's philosophy of history, Marx thinks deterministically. For in his view, the allegedly undeniable "impoverishment of the masses" follows a mechanism that inevitably leads to the self-absorption of capital. In his view, there is a growing concentration of capital, in the course of which more and more owners of capital are expropriated, which should have an obvious consequence: As misery grows, so does the indignation of an ever larger organized labor force. >History/Hegel, >World history/Hegel, >Weltgeist/Hegel. 1. K. Marx Das Kapital Vol. I 1867, Vol. II & II 1885 (= MEW 23-25) Gaus I 80 History/Marx/Levine, Andrew: Hegel’s philosophy of history was, of course, the immediate inspiration for Marx’s attempt to make sense of history as such. But Marx broke ranks with Hegel and the entire tradition that his work culminated in by rejecting teleology and, with it, the project of discovering what historical events mean. Marx retained Hegel’s sense of history’s intelligibility; he sought to provide an account of real historical structures and of the direction of historical change. >History/Hegel. MarxVsHegel: But, for Marx, history is as meaningless as nature is. Like nature too, it has properties that are independent of investigators’ interests and that are in principle capable of being known. The philosophers of history, Hegel especially, had grasped aspects of real history, but through the distorting lens of their own teleological convictions. Marx set them right, without succumbing to the atheoreticism of contemporary historians. History/MarxismVsMarx: Western Marxisms, for all their differences, were of one mind in distancing themselves from Marx’s theory of history. The historical materialist orthodoxy of the Second and Third Internationals was, in the eyes of Western Marxists, too fatalistic to pass muster. It failed to accord human agency its due. Its commitment to historical inevitability even seemed to render the very idea of politics otiose. If the end is already given, one can perhaps hasten its coming, but nothing can fundamentally change the ultimate outcome. This, it seemed to them, was a formula for quiescence, for passively awaiting the revolution. But the historical materialism Western Marxists faulted was not exactly the historical materialism Cohen defended. >History/Cohen. Levine, Andrew 2004. A future for Marxism?“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| History | Nietzsche | Höffe I 375 History/Nietzsche/Höffe: Nietzsche(1) gives a basic phenomenon of the political, the striving for power, a broader, yet deeper meaning. For he subjects the entire human culture, here exemplarily the consideration of history, to the principle of the enhancement of life: As the will to power, life must constantly overcome itself and productively grow beyond itself. With the principle: "Only as far as history serves life do we want to serve it" (Preface), Nietzsche introduces three kinds of a life-serving history: the "monumental history" (2. Chap.), which provides "models, teachers, comforters" to the "active and striving"; the "antiquarian history" (3. Chap.), which allows "the preserving and revering" to look back "with faithfulness and love" to his/her origins; finally, the "critical history", which gives "the suffering and the liberation of the needy" the strength to condemn a past after an embarrassing test at the end (ibid.). In terms of the tacit motive of the will to power Höffe I 376 Nietzsche warns against oversaturation with history, since it is harmful to life in five ways: (1) Through the contrast between inside and outside it weakens the personality; (2) it nourishes the illusion, the most rare virtue, justice, possesses the present to a greater degree than any other time; (3) it disturbs "the instincts of the people, whereby both the individual and the whole are "prevented from maturing"; (4) the harmful "belief to be late and epigone" is planted; and (5) implicitly NietzscheVsHegel: an epoch gets into the glorification of the present as the completion of world history. Höffe: Nietzsche does not deal with Kant's idea of history as a legal progress open to the future. >History/Hegel, >Philosophy of history/Kant. 1. F. Nietzsche, Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen II: «Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben» (1874) Ries II 36 History/NietzscheVs: VsHistorism VsTeleology, VsTeleological Meaning >Historism, >Teleology, >Historiography, >Philosophy of history. Ries II 38 History/NietzscheVsStrauß, Friedrich David: Strauss' "Life of Jesus" (1835) had once inspired the young Nietzsche. The first piece of outmoded consideration is directed against him. Ries II 39/40 History/outmoded considerations/Nietzsche: The second piece: "On the benefit and disadvantage of history for life": the immediacy of life is opposed "right inside" historical knowledge. That "immediacy" is guaranteed in oblivion. History/outmoded considerations/NietzscheVsHistorism: against the unreflected ideological implication of a philosophy whose scientific-theoretical postulate of a separation of theory and practice obscures adaptation to the actual. Ries II 42 It is impossible to prove a necessity of the event from history as the mere sequence of its events. The scientific claim to the recognition of a path must be abandoned. Also the thought of progress! Ries II 43 Historical construction tries to eliminate the senselessness of death. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 |
| Identity | Wessel | I 220 Identity/Wessel: identity statement: Abbreviation of a statement about the importance of equality of two terms: mutual meaning inclusion - ta tb = definition (ta > tb) and (tb> ta) - but that is only correct for individual subject termini. >Singular terms, >Statements, >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 220f Identity/Hegel: a = a: E.g. Socrates is Socrates: demands that Socrates does not undergo any changes in time. >G.W.F. Hegel. WesselVsHegel: confusion of word and object - identity and difference two-digit predicates (relation) - not one-digit predicate. - x = y is existentially charged. I 221 Identity/WesselVsLeibniz: suggests an incorrect comparison of separate objects. >Identity/Leibniz, >Leibniz Principle. I 227 Identity/logic/Wessel: x = x: existentially charged: only true if one thing x exists - not logically true, not a tautology, empirical fact. >Identity/Russell. I 335 Definition identity/Wessel: i1 = i2 = definition S(i1, ti2). (s) S: the fact that i1 is designated by the name i2? - That a is designated with the name b? b stands for a? Def diversity/Wessel: -i (i1 = i2) = def E(i1) u E(i2) ~ u (i1 = i2) ((s),Tthere are two expressions i1 and i2, which do not stand for the same object.). Identity/Wessel: we use the axiom: l- i1 = i2> ti 1 ti2. ((s) if the objects are identical, it follows that the corresponding expressions are equivalent in meaning.) I 379f Identity/Science Logic/Wessel: 1) at any time is the object a identical with the object b in any spatial order with respect to any method for determining the order 2) always, if one of a and b exists, the other also exists - structure must take into account the relations of objects - there is nothing in nature that justifies the preference for one or another relation (not a fact). Identity in time/Science Logic/Wessel: if t2 after t1, one can no longer speak of identity - T1 and t2 are then only representative of the same class of objects a, if the objects were defined using time. >Temporal identity. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Lebensphilosophie | Dilthey | Gadamer I 230 Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey/Gadamer: For [Dilthey], meaning is not a logical concept, but is understood as an expression of life. Life itself, this flowing temporality, is designed to create lasting units of meaning. Life itself lays itself out. It has a hermeneutic structure itself. Thus life forms the true basis of the humanities. Hermeneutics is not merely the romantic hereditary material in Dilthey's thinking, but results logically from the foundation of philosophy in "life". DiltheyVsHegel: Dilthey tinks of himself fundamentally superior to the "intellectualism" of Hegel precisely because of this. DiltheyVsLeibniz: Neither could the romantic-pantheistic concept of individuality coming from Leibniz be sufficient for him. The foundation of philosophy in life also resists a metaphysics of individuality and sees itself far away from the Leibnizian aspect of windowless monads that unfold their own law. For them, individuality is not an original idea rooted in appearance. Dilthey rather insists that all "mental vitality", is under certain circumstances(1). Force/Dilthey: There is no original force of individuality. It is only what it is by asserting itself. Limitation by the course of action belongs to the essence of individuality - as to all historical concepts. Also terms like purpose and meaning do not mean ideas in the sense of Platonism or Scholasticism for Dilthey. They are also historical terms, as far as they refer to the limitation by the course of action. They must be terms of energy. Dilthey refers for this to Fichte(2) who was also of decisive influence just as Ranke. In this respect his hermeneutics of life wants to remain on the ground of the historical view of the world(3). Philosophy provides him only with the conceptual possibilities to express the truth of this view. >Force/Dilthey. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften V, 266. 2. Vll, 157; 280; 333. 3. VII, 280. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Life | Dilthey | Gadamer I 71 Life/Dilthey/Gadamer: The meanings that we encounter in the humanities - as strange and incomprehensible to us as they may be - can be traced back to the last units of what is given in consciousness, which themselves no longer contain anything foreign, objective or in need of interpretation. They are the units of experience, which are themselves units of meaning. Gadamer: This is how a concept of life emerges in the epistemology of the humanities, which restricts the mechanistic model. This concept of life is conceived teleological: Dilthey: for him, life is productivity par excellence. As life objectifies itself in sense formations, all understanding of sense is "a retranslation of the objectivations of life into the spiritual vitality from which they have emerged". Thus the concept of experience forms the epistemological basis for all knowledge of the objective. >Experience/Dilthey, >Experience/Gadamer, >Experience/Husserl. Gadamer I 232 Life/Dilthey/Gadamer: As is well known, [Dilthey] speaks of the "thought-forming work of life"(1). What distinguishes this phrase from Hegel is not easy to say. Life, however much it may show an "unfathomable face"(2), Dilthey may mock the all too friendly view of life, which sees in it only progress of culture - as long as it is understood in terms of the thoughts it forms, it is subjected to a teleological interpretation scheme and is conceived as a spirit. Spirit/Hegel/Dilthey: It is true that Dilthey in his later years leaned more and more about Hegel and talked about spirit where he used to say "life". He is just repeating a conceptual development that Hegel himself had also taken. In the light of this fact that we owe Dilthey the knowledge of the so-called "theological" youth writings of Hegel seems remarkable. In these materials on the history of the development of Hegelian thought, it becomes quite clear that the Hegelian concept of the spirit is based on a pneumatic concept of life.(3) Dilthey himself has tried to account for what connects him to Hegel and what separates him from Hegel(4). But what does his criticism of Hegel's belief in reason say, of his speculative construction of world history, of his aprioristic derivation of all concepts from the dialectical self-development of the absolute, when he too gives the concept of the "objective mind" such a central position? DiltheyVsHegel: (...) Dilthey turns against the ideal construction of this Hegelian term. "Today we must start from the reality of life". He writes: "We seek to understand it and to present it in adequate terms. By thus separating the objective spirit from the one-sided reasoning in the general reason that expresses the essence of the world spirit, and also from the idealistic construction, a new concept of the same becomes possible. There are several things included in it: language, custom, every kind of way of life, every style of life, as well as family, civil society, state and Gadamer I 233 right. And now also that which Hegel distinguished as the absolute spirit from the objective one - art and religion and philosophy - falls under this term.(5) >Spirit/Dilthey, >Comparison/Dilthey. Gadamer I 239 Understanding/Historical Consciousness/Dilthey/Gadamer: Dilthey starts from life. Life itself is designed for contemplation. [Dilthey's life philosophical tendency] (...) is based on that very thing, that in life itself there is knowledge. >Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey. Already the inner being, which characterizes the experience, contains a kind of turning back of life to itself. "Knowledge is there, it is connected with experience without reflection" (V Il, 18). But the same immanent reflexivity of life also determines the way in which, according to Dilthey, meaning is absorbed in the context of life. For meaning is only experienced by stepping out of the "hunt for goals". >Meaning/Dilthey. It is a distance, a distance from the context of our own actions that makes such reflection possible. Gadamer I 240 In both directions, contemplation and practical contemplation, the same tendency of life, a striving for firmness(6), shows itself according to Dilthey. From there it is understood that he could consider the objectivity of scientific knowledge and philosophical self-reflection as the completion of the natural tendency of life. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften Vll, 136. 2. Ges. Schriften Vlll, 224. 3. Dilthey's fundamental treatise: "Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels", first published in 1906 and multiplied in the 4th volume of the Collected Writings (1921) by estate manuscripts, opened a new epoch of Hegel studies, less by its results than by its task. It was soon (1911) accompanied by the publication of the "Theologische Jugendschriften" by Hermann Nohl, which were opened up by the vivid commentary of Theodor Haering (Hegel 1928). Cf. from the author: "Hegel und der geschichtliche Geist" and Hegels Dialektik IGes. Werke Bd. 31 and Herbert Marcuse, Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit, 1932, who proved the model-forming function of the concept of life for the "Phenomenology of the Spirit". 4. in detail in the records of the bequests on the "youth history of Hegel" (IV, 217-258), more deeply in the 3rd chapter of the "Aufbau" (146ff.). 5. Dilthey, Ges. Schr. Vll, 150. 6. Ges. Schriften Vll, 347. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Logic | Frege | II 49 Grammar/Logic: subject/predicate are always a thought without a truth value, there is no extension. >Subject, >Predicate, >Extension. Tugendhat II 54 Hegel: logic is composed of concepts. FregeVsHegel: logic is not composed of concepts, but of sentences. Important: not objects can be negated, but only sentences. >Concept, >Object, >Sentence, >Negation. Thiel I 335 Logic/Frege/Thiel: Frege's concept of logic, on which he wanted to trace back the entire non-geometric mathematics, was a more broadly formulated one than that of today. For Frege, the formation of sets is a logical process, so that the transition from the statement that exactly the same objects fall under two terms A and B to the statement of equality of the conceptual scopes of A and B is a law of logic for Frege. I 335/336 Today's view: conceptual scopes are nothing more than sets, therefore the law does not belong to logic, but to set theory. >Term scope. In traditional logic, the doctrine of conceptual extents was part of logic. Today it is part of set theory, while the doctrine of "conceptual content" remains in logic. That is rather weird. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Master-Slave Dialectic | Kojève | Brocker I 814 Governance/Slavehood/Kojève/Drury: Unlike Hegel, Kojève shifts the relationship between Governance and Slavehood to the world-historical last instances Stalin and the communist world state. He sees the latter better able to satisfy the basic social needs of all people than the Prussian state envisaged by Hegel. (KojèveVsHegel). Later, Kojève transferred this goal to the American Way of Life. (1) KojèveVsHegel: in Kojève, unlike at Hegel, in the end the slave and thus the masses, win over the master. But since the slave embodies the weak, the cowardly, the small and the animalistic, the victory of the slave over the master ends in a rule of mediocrity or in the driving of a reanimalized humanity into undesirably happy consumption. ((s) According to Drury, Kojève does not carry out Hegel's dialectical movement, according to which master and slave converge.) See also History/Fukuyama. DruryVsKojève: this is a "fascist interpretation" of the struggle for recognition. (2) >Hegel, >Master/Slave/Hegel. 1. Shadia B. Drury, „The End of History and the New World Order“, in: International Journal 48/1, 1992/93, p. 80-99. 2. Ibid. p. 80 Anja Jetschke, „Francis Fukuyama, Das Ende der Geschichte“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Meaning | Dilthey | Gadamer I 230 Meaning/Dilthey/Gadamer: (...) Dilthey [thought of] Husserl's logical investigations as to be epoch-making(1) because concepts such as structure and meaning were legitimized, although they could not be derived from elements. They were now proven to be more original than these alleged elements from which and on which they were supposed to be based. Of course, Husserl's proof of the ideality of meaning was the result of purely logical investigations. DiltheyVsHusserl: What Dilthey makes of it is something completely different. For him, meaning is not a logical concept, but is understood as an expression of life. Life itself, this flowing temporality, is designed to create lasting units of meaning. Life itself lays itself out. It has a hermeneutic structure itself. Thus life forms the true basis of the humanities. Hermeneutics is not merely the romantic hereditary material in Dilthey's thinking, but results logically from the foundation of philosophy in "life". DiltheyVsHegel: Dilthey thinks of himself fundamentally superior to the "intellectualism" of Hegel precisely because of this. >Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften VIl, 13a. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Metaphysics | Leibniz | Holz I 13 Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: the inner unity of Leibniz's work can only be understood from metaphysics. His position lies between Kant and Hegel: he shows LeibnizVsKant: the alternative of metaphysics as a science, by showing his method. >Metaphysics/Kant. LeibnizVsHegel: he shows the possibility of metaphysics, which is not based on an absolutely idealistic way. I 24 Metaphysics/Holz: with Leibniz, it receives the scientific theory form of a non-empirically verifiable theory of the general connexion of the world. They are no longer "ideas" of the whole, but trans-empirical construction of the most plausible and most explanatory form. I 81 Metaphysics/Leibniz: since that looks like a circle, Descartes, for example, sought a justification in God. But metaphysically, the circle cannot be dissolved, for metaphysics rests precisely on an unbroken link! >Chain/Leibniz. The circle is also preserved logically. The system has to be interrupted somewhere: Solution/Leibniz: an ineluctable function of sensory perception - not as a "first reason," but as an extra-logical material beginning of the reflexion ratio, as a quasi "Archimedean point" (outside). >Sensory impresssion/Leibniz. Leibniz is well aware of this break. For its part, the metaphysical necessity can no longer be deduced from reasons. I 82 Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: in the realm of reasons of truths (for example, mathematics) the reduction is real possible to the identity principle. >Identity/Leibniz. I 119 Leibniz thesis: the structural character of the monad causes that something is happening. The structure guarantees the unity of being and is the being of unity. Metaphysics/Unity/World/Ultimate justification/Leibniz: the concept of the individual is a world concept. For this reason, the inner-world scientific justification given to the particular in its particularity is dependent on a metaphysical (underlying) principle which makes the being of the world intelligible. >Unity/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz, >Ultimate justification/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Negation | Adorno | Grenz I 50 Negation/AdornoVsHegel/Grenz: Adorno separates, against Hegel, the subjective from the objective positivity of negated negation.(1) >Subjectivity/Adorno, >G.W.F. Hegel. I 50 Dialectic/double negation/PopperVsDialectic/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno agrees with Popper's dialectic criticism: the equation of the negation of the negation with the positivity is the quintessence of the identification and thus of the reification. I 50 Negation/Adorno/Grenz: The consciousness of the absence of something or of falsehood; this moment of the particular negation as the subjective for its part, cannot and must not be credited to objective logic and even to metaphysics.(2) >Objectivity. Grenz I 51 The definite negation does not alter the circumstances. It is only their consciousness. I Grenz 80 Certain negation/MarxVsHegel/Grenz: e.g. the bourgeois revolution against the feudal society: N.B.: here, certain negation as a method was lost. Feudalism is abolished in the double sense: the rule of less over many is liquidated, the social character of the society is preserved. Grenz I 83 Certain negation/AdornoVsHegel/AdornoVsMarx/Grenz: Adorno resolves the antinomy of the ambiguity of cancelling and incorporating of the practical element of history into the particular negation. >History/Adorno. Grenz I 91 Certain negation/Adorno/Grenz: New conception as immanent criticism: a) As a cancellation conceptualized inner-worldly - so it escapes the immanence critique of Hegel. I 92 b) Reveals the concept of purposive rationality as irrational.(3) Thus the necessity arises to eradicate the something-characteristic of the particular nothing history-philosophical.(4) c) This necessity is supported by the pushing trough of nature-history antagonism. Accordingly, the certain negation consists in the fact that the factual is opposed to its potentiality "which cannot suffice".(5) Grenz I 106 Certain negation/art/Adorno/Grenz: Revealing the image content of a cultural phenomenon is only possible as a certain negation of its social content, or, what is the same, as gaining the truth of its untruth. >Art/Adorno, >Works of art/Adorno, >Truth/Adorno, >Truth content/Adorno. Grenz I 113 Double Negation/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno understands the negation of negation as negative: full of content, but without something-character.(6) Grenz I 116 Negation/Adorno/Grenz: certain negation and something-character of the particular nothing are separated by the transformation of the certain negation into the physiognomical analysis and of the determined nothing into a category of experience which is based on being and is only polemically related. This is the performance of Adorno's negative dialectic, with which it brings historical and dialectical materialism to itself. >Materialism/Adorno. Grenz I 180 Negation/Adorno/Grenz: Results of physiognomic negations are artworks or hermetic texts. They thus fail as negations, inasmuch as they negatively negate the negativity of their neganda in practice, but do so without meaning, and thus undefined and diffusely. Theory: on the other hand, the theory-performed determination of beings as negative is merely theoretical, but determined. 1. Th. W. Adorno. Negative Dialektik, In: Gesammelte Schriften, Band 6: Negative Dialektik. Jargon der Eigentlichkeit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1970.p. 159, FN 2. Ebenda. 3. Negative Dialektik, p. 8 4. Th. W. Adorno. Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente. Amsterdam 1947. p 126. 5. Th. W. Adorno. Ästhetische Theorie, In: Gesammelte Schriften 7, Rolf Tiedemann (Hg.), Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. 1970. p. 205. 6. Negative Dialektik, p. 159f |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Planning | Hegel | Gadamer I 377 Plan/Hegel/Gadamer: Gadamer: [one has] to reconstruct (...) two different questions in (...) the case [of history](...), which also find two different answers: The question of meaning in the course of a great event and the question of the regularity of this course. (...) the interpreter of history [is] always in danger (...) of hypostasizing the context in which he or she recognizes a meaning as that meant by people who really act and plan. >Action, >History/Hegel, >World History/Hegel, >World/Hegel, >Progress/Hegel. Plan/History/Hegel/Gadamer: This is only legitimate under the preconditions of Hegel, provided that the philosophy of history is initiated into the plans of the world spirit and from this initiated knowledge can distinguish certain individuals as world-historical individuals for whom there would be a real agreement between their particular thoughts and the world-historical meaning of the events. >World spirit/Hegel. Gadamer: However, a hermeneutic principle for the knowledge of history cannot be derived from these cases, which are characterized by the agreement of the subjective and objective in history. >Hermeneutics, >Hermeneutics/Hegel, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer. GadamerVsHegel: Compared with the historical tradition Hegel's teaching obviously has only a particular truth. The infinite web of motivations that makes up history only occasionally and over a short period of time gains the brightness of what is planned in a single individual. What Hegel describes as an excellent case thus rests on the general basis of the disparity that exists between the subjective thoughts of an individual and the meaning of the whole of the course of history. In general, we experience the course of events as something that constantly changes our plans and expectations. Those who rigidly try to hold on to their plans are made aware of the powerlessness of their reason. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Reality | Putnam | I (k) 264 World/reality/PutnamVsHegel/PutnamVsFichte: both Hegel and Fichte would have asked us to describe the world, regardless of our language, but that is not possible. How could one assume that that would work? >Language independent, >Description independent. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Recognition | Hegel | Gadamer I 349 Recognition/Hegel/Gadamer: (...) the dialectical course of the "phenomenology of the spirit" [is] perhaps determined by nothing as decisively as by the problem of the recognition of the "you". To name but a few mile stones in this story: according to Hegel, one's own self-consciousness reaches the truth of one's self-consciousness only through fighting for recognition in the other. The direct relationship between man and woman is the natural recognition of mutual recognition (p. 325)(1). Furthermore, conscience is the spiritual element of recognition, and only through confession and forgiveness can mutual recognition, in which the spirit is absolute, be achieved. >I-Thou relationship, >Subject-Object problem, >Intersubjectivity, >Subject/Hegel, >Self-consciousness/Hegel. Gadamer: It cannot be denied that the interjections of Feuerbach and Kierkegaard are already thought out in these figures of the spirit described by Hegel. 1. A precise interpretation of the dialectics of recognition (Phänomenologie des Geistes IV, A. Selbständigkeit und Unselbständigkeit des Selbstbewusstseins. Herrschaft und Knechtschaft) I have meanwhile published in "Hegels Dialektik. Sechs hermeneutische Studien, Tübingen 1980 (Vol. 3 of the Ges. Werke), Chapter III. Bubner I 184 Recognition/Hegel: in the middle between a life saturated with reality and a transparent method lies the "Idea of Recognition", which in its turn disintegrates in the "Idea of Truth" and the "Idea of the Good". Here, however, there is only the second step, instead of the usual three steps of Hegelian dialectic, because of the elementary subject/object relationship. The subjective, theoretical concept of the good, in knowledge, is faced with the "Idea of the Good" in practical action. Brocker I 793 Recognition/Hegel/HonnethVsHegel/Honneth: Hegel's criticism of Hobbes (see >Hobbes/Hegel, >Intersubjectivity/Hegel) lacks the final step: Hegel criticizes Hobbes' individualistic view of individuals struggling for scarce resources that neglects the simultaneous struggle for intersubjective recognition. Hegel, however, fails to take the decisive step: Hegel's claim to self-realization, which goes beyond the sphere of law, refers to the "moral relationship of the state"(1) as the place of its realization. But this step usually remains stuck in an external representation of the "institutional transformation of the law from an informal to a state-organized relationship (...)".(2) Brocker I 794 HonnethVsHegel: his interpretation thus lacks the theoretical component of recognition. According to Honneth, the reason for this is Hegel's turn to questions of consciousness theory. Since his real philosophy in Jena, at the latest, Hegel's concept of the state has therefore followed the philosophical logic of consciousness, which increasingly comes to the fore in later writings. >State/Hegel. 1. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) S. 94 2. Ebenda S. 92f. Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I 329 Recognition/Phenomenology/Hegel/Höffe: In competition with his or her peers, the human does not first depend on self-assertion, but already on the constitution of a self. Hegel expands the often merely social, legal, or state theoretical debate on three further topics: a) confrontation of humans with themselves, b) confrontation with nature c) and the three dimensions belonging to the concept of work. Höffe I 330 Self-consciousness: Self-consciousness appears at first as a simple striving for self-preservation, but encounters the competing striving of another (...) and, since one self-preservation contradicts the other, leads to a "fight to life and death. The core of this struggle for recognition consists in a "self-knowledge in the other". a) personal: One recognizes oneself first and only in a second person. b) apersonal: Self-knowledge is not achieved by social recognition alone. It also requires the examination of the pre- and extra-personal world, which is mediated through work, i.e. economic action. Social Dimension/Höffe: Mutual recognition, which only succeeds after painful experiences, has an invaluable advantage as soon as it takes on a legal character. (...) the legal mutual recognition does not suffer from scarcity. The status of a legal entity and a citizen is not a scarce commodity; it can be granted to anyone. 1. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Recognition | Honneth | Brocker I 789 Recognition/Honneth: Honneth thesis: a certain form of relationship Brocker I 790 between individuals has a constitutive meaning for social reality. The intersubjective practice, in which people mutually recognize each other as needy, equal and unique subjects (or refuse to recognize each other), forms the basic building block of social life. It is the basis of the identity of individuals, an essential object of social interactions and disputes and the most important motor of social development. The practical logic of social processes therefore follows a "moral grammar" resulting from individuals' claims to social recognition of their identity and from social struggles for these claims. See Identity/Honneth, Recognition/Hegel, Intersubjectivity/Hegel. Brocker I 796 HonnethVsMead/HonnethVsHegel: as negative equivalents of the positive aspects love, law and solidarity, the phenomena of rape, deprivation of rights and degradation must also be considered in an empirical theory of recognition. It is such experiences of disregard that make "the fact of withheld recognition for social actors socially tangible" in the first place. (1) Three basic forms of recognition/Honneth: Stage 1: elementary intersubjective basic pattern of love and friendship: this is exemplary in Hegel's relationship between parents and children. (2) Here individuals recognize each other in their concrete nature of needs and affects and their interdependence in this respect. Brocker I 797 The elementary form of recognition is formed in the relationship of love (see Love/Honneth). However, this form "cannot be applied arbitrarily to a larger number of interaction partners". (3) Brocker I 798 Stage 2 Socialization, See Law/Honneth, Law/Hegel, Socialization/Honneth. Stage 3: Solidarity: see Self-Respect/Honneth. Brocker I 800 On the problems: here it concerns the demanded integration of the acknowledgment problem into an overall social moral orientation horizon. HonnethVsMead, HonnethVsMarx, HonnethVsSartre, HonnethVsSorel: see (4). See Politics/Honneth. 1. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 150. 2. Ibid. p. 34. 3. Ibid. p. 174 4. Ibid. p. 237, 241, 247f, 253f. Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Honn I A. Honneth Das Ich im Wir: Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie Frankfurt/M. 2010 Honn II Axel Honneth Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte Frankfurt 2014 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Reflection | Gadamer | I 347 Reflection/History of Effects/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Our whole presentation about horizon formation and horizon fusion should (...) describe the full extent of the consciousness of the history of effects. >History of Effect/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer, >Understanding/Gadamer. But what kind of consciousness is this? Here lies the crucial problem. No matter how much one emphasizes that the consciousness of the history of effects is, as it were, inserted into the effect itself. As consciousness it seems to be essentially in the possibility to rise above what it is consciousness of. The structure of reflexivity is basically given with all consciousness. It must therefore also apply to the awareness of the history of effects. Doesn't this force us to agree with Hegel, and doesn't the absolute mediation of history and truth, as Hegel thinks, appear to be the foundation of hermeneutics? Ultimately, it is Hegel's position that legitimizes [19th century historism], even if the historians who were inspired by the pathos of experience preferred to refer to Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humboldt instead. GadamerVsSchleiermacher/GadamerVsHumboldt: Neither Schleiermacher nor Humboldt have really thought their position through. They may emphasize the individuality, the barrier of strangeness that our understanding has to overcome, but in the end only in an infinite consciousness the understanding finds its completion and the thought of individuality its justification. Hegel/Gadamer: It is the pantheistic enclosure of all individuality in the Absolute that makes the miracle of understanding possible. Thus, here too, being and knowledge permeate each other in I 348 the Absolute. Neither Schleiermacher's nor Humboldt's Kantianism is thus an independent systematic affirmation of the speculative completion of idealism in Hegel's absolute dialectic. The criticism of the philosophy of reflection(1) that Hegel meets, meets with them. VsHegel/Gadamer: For us it is about thinking of the historical consciousness of the effect in such a way that in the consciousness of the effect the immediacy and superiority of the work does not dissolve again into a mere reflexion reality, thus to think of a reality where the omnipotence of reflection is limited. This was precisely the point against which the criticism of Hegel was directed, and at which in truth the principle of the philosophy of reflection proved to be superior to all his critics. >Reflection/Hegel. I 350 VsReflection Philosophy/Gadamer: [The] question arises how far the dialectical superiority of reflection philosophy corresponds to a factual truth and how far it merely creates a formal appearance. The fact that the criticism of speculative thinking, which is practiced from the standpoint of finite human consciousness, contains something true, cannot be obscured by the argumentation of the philosophy of reflection in the end. >Young Hegelians/Gadamer. Examples for reflection/Gadamer: That the thesis of scepticism or relativism wants to be true itself and in this respect cancels itself out is an irrefutable argument. But does it achieve anything? The argument of reflection, which proves to be so victorious, rather strikes back at the arguing party by making the truth value of reflection appear suspicious. It is not the reality of skepticism or relativism that is affected by this, but the truth claim of formal argumentation in general. 1. The expression philosophy of reflection has been coined by Hegel against Jacobi, Kant and Fichte. Already in the title of "Glauben und Wissen" but as a "philosophy of reflection of subjectivity". Hegel himself counters it with the reflection of reason. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Social Contract | Hegel | Höffe I 333 Social Contract/Hegel/Höffe: Within the considerations of the contract, Hegel rejects the modern patterns of state legitimation, such as the theory of the social contract advocated by Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke and Rousseau, and also by Kant. >Social contract/Hobbes, >Social contract/Locke, >Social contract/Rousseau. HegelVsSpinoza/HegelVsHobbes/HegelVsLocke/HegelVsRousseau/HegelVsKant: For whether one accepts a contract of all with all or a contract "of all with the prince or the government" - the state is subjected to the arbitrariness of the individual(1). In truth, everyone has always lived in a state that has the rank of an end in Höfe I 334 itself. >State/Hegel, >Society/Hegel. VsHegel/Höffe: Contract theorists such as Kant would not contradict the character of an end in itself, but would probably emphasize the legitimizing and critical task of the social contract. Social Contract/Kant: As an "original contract" and as a "mere idea of reason" he submits the "touchstone of legality of every public law": The legislator may (...) give his laws only in such a way "as they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people."(2) 1. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820, § 75 2. Kant, Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis. 1793, II. Folgerung |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Spirit | Dilthey | Gadamer I 232 Spirit/Dilthey/DiltheyVsHegel/Gadamer: Dilthey opposes the idealistic construction of [the Hegelian concept of the absolute spirit]: "Today we must start from the reality of life". He writes: "We seek to understand it and to present it in adequate terms. By thus separating the objective spirit from the one-sided foundation in the general reason that expresses the essence of the world spirit, and also from the ideal construction, a new concept of it becomes possible. Several things are included in it: language, custom, every kind of way of life, every style of life, as well as family, civil society, state and Gadamer I 233 right. And now, what Hegel distinguished as the absolute spirit from the objective spirit: art and religion and philosophy, also fall under this term. Spirit/DiltheyVsHegel: Undoubtedly this is a reshaping of the Hegelian concept. What does it mean? To what extent does it reflect the reality of life? Most significant is apparently the extension of the concept of the objective spirit to art, religion and philosophy. Because this means that Dilthey does not see in them immediate truth but expressions of life. By equating art and religion with philosophy, he also rejects the claim of the speculative concept. In doing so, Dilthey does not deny at all that these figures take precedence over the other figures of the objective spirit, provided that "precisely in their powerful forms" the spirit is objectified and recognized. Now, it was this primacy of a completed self-knowledge of the spirit that led Hegel to conceive of these figures as those of the absolute spirit. There was nothing foreign in them and the spirit was therefore completely at home with itself. For Dilthey too, as we saw, the objectivations of art represented the real triumph of hermeneutics. Gadamer: So the contrast to Hegel is reduced to this one thing: according to Hegel, the return of the spirit is completed in the philosophical concept, whereas for Dilthey the philosophical concept has not a meaning of recognition but of expression. Absolute Spirit/Dilthey/Gadamer: is there an absolute spirit for Dilthey too? (...) [i.e.] a complete self-transparency, complete erasure of all strangeness (...)? For Dilthey it is not a question that there is and that it is the historical consciousness that corresponds to this ideal and not speculative philosophy. It sees all phenomena of the human-historical world only as objects by which the spirit recognizes itself more deeply. Insofar as it understands them as objectivations of the spirit, it translates them back "into the spiritual vitality from which they came"(2). The formations of the objective mind are thus objects of self-knowledge of that mind for the historical consciousness. Historical consciousness extends itself into the universal, insofar as it understands all the circumstances of history as an expression of the life from which they originate; "life grasps life here"(3). 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schr. Vll, 150. 2. Ges. Schr. Vll V, 265 3. Ges. Schr. Vll VII, 136 |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| State (Polity) | Hegel | Mause I 47 State/society/Hegel: Hegel reconstructs the relationship between the social order of the market and the political order of the constitutional-monarchical state within the framework of a theory of modern "morality" (1), which he describes on the basis of the three institutionalized spheres of socialization and action of "family", "bourgeois society" and "state"(2). I 48 Bourgeois society/Hegel: Hegel describes this as the "state of need and understanding"(3), which he distinguishes from the "state" as the "reality of the moral idea"(4), that is, from the "state" of the third section of morality.(5) HegelVsRousseau: Hegel reconstructs the monarchical-constitutional state as a supraindividual moral communication and meaning context and thus reconstructs the Republican primacy of politics over the economy. MarxVsHegel, State/Marx. Brocker I 794 State/Hegel/HonnethVsHegel/Honneth: instead of understanding the moral sphere of the state as an intersubjective relationship of reciprocal acts of recognition, Hegel treats the state in his later writings as if it were always an existing entity before all interaction. >Intersubjectivity/Hegel. Consequently, it is only the vertically conceived relationships that the individuals maintain "to the higher authority of the state" as "the embodiment of the mental", "which in its approach suddenly assume the role that certain, highly demanding forms of mutual recognition should have played in a concept of moral recognition theory".(6) Solution/HonnethVsHegel: this results in the task of replacing Hegel's speculative categories with concepts of empirical science and thus making them Brocker I 795 "empirically controllable". (7) 1. G. W. F. Hegel Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Werke 7, Hrsg. Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, p. 292. 2. Ibid. p. 307. 3. Ibid. p. 340 4. Ibid. p. 389 5. Cf. K. Löwith, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche. Der revolutionäre Bruch im Denken des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, Hamburg 1986, S 261-264. 6. Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte, mit einem neuen Nachwort, Frankfurt/M. 2014 (zuerst 1992) p. 98 7. Ibid. p. 150 Hans-Jörg Sigwart, „Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung“, in: Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I 331 State/Hegel/Höffe: Hegel develops his system of political thought, the philosophy of law and state, against the background of his now expanded philosophical system(1). HegelVsKant: Against the - allegedly threatening in Kant - the danger of a purely through thought Höffe I 332 conceived construction of normative claims, the subject area of the philosophy of law and state is considerably expanded. Instead of being content with a normative theory, an a priori theory of law and justice, Hegel also focuses on motivational, social, and above all institutional factors (...). Philosophical Philosophy of Law/Hegel: "(...) the idea of the law, (...) the concept of the law and its realization becomes the object"(2). State: (...) [is the] "moral universe," [which] is to be understood as something reasonable. Freedom: The guiding principle in legal and state theory is free will. From it Hegel wants to show how, under the condition of modernity, an epoch of alienation, he gradually attains his full, alienation-absorbing reality. >Freedom/Hegel, >Morals/Hegel, >Customs/Morality/Hegel. Höffe I 336 The culmination of morality, its synthesis, at the same time the summit of Hegel's entire philosophy of law, is the state as a "mediated by itself", which is now far more than just a state of necessity and understanding. As a community in the literal sense it is the public institution responsible for the common good, the "reality of the moral idea". Because in it freedom attains its perfect form, it is not "something arbitrary" but "supreme duty," i.e. again a categorical imperative, for man to be a member of a State. [This is a] modern, namely no longer eudaimony-based, but freedom-based way (...). Only in the living together of free and equal people can [the human] complete both his/her rational nature and his/her nature based on right and justice. >Society/Hegel. Höffe I 337 From abstract law to morality, the "idea of free will in and for itself" finally develops into the unity and truth of both moments. In it, in morality, Hegel in turn advances from the natural spirit, the "family," through the stage of separation, the "bourgeois society," to objective freedom, the "State. Within the section "the State," however, there is surprisingly, instead of a further stage, now a regression. For the opposition to free will, the full legal relations and the moral whole, is achieved already at the first stage, the "internal constitutional law". On the second stage, however, the "external constitutional law," the moral whole is exposed to chance. And the last stage is determined ambivalently with respect to free will. 1. G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss, 1820 2. Ibid. § 1 |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| State (Polity) | Marx | Mause I 49/50 State/MarxVsHegel/Marx: Hegel's state seems incapable of asserting its claimed primacy of politics over the economy; it is a powerless idealization and doubling of its real counterpart in social reality, which due to its actual dependence on bourgeois society does not offer an emancipatory perspective in the sense of the republican project that goes beyond the implementation of this social formation. (1) The "political state" (2), which historically helped the "bourgeois society" (3) to assert itself, is the mere guarantor of this atomistic society of the selfish bourgeois pursuing its private interests, whose rights it protects in the form of liberal fundamental and human rights (4). >State/Hegel. 1.K.Marx, Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts (§ § 261– 313). In Marx Engels Werke, Bd. 1 (MEW 1), Hrsg. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, Berlin 1956, S. 275– 287 2. K. Marx, Zur Judenfrage. In Marx Engels Werke, Bd. 1 (MEW 1), Hrsg. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED, 1. Berlin 1956, S. 351 3. Ibid. p. 354-356, 366-370. 4. Ibid. p. 361-367 |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Statements | Ayer | I 281 Statement/world/Ayer: anything in the world must be distinguished from the statement. I 289 Statements/Ayer: 3 conditions: a) they must be checked directly b) be simply c) absolutely specific - then "fact" is definable: I 290 "Great statement"/Hegel/Ayer: (paraphrased): "the whole truth". AyerVsHegel/AyerVsIdealism/AyerVsBradley: then all normal statements are wrong. Wrong solution: "partially true." AyerVs: that makes all statements indistinguishable - (> indistinguishability). >Statements, >Perception, >World, >Judgments, >Facts, >Indistinguishability. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Thinking | Hegel | Gadamer I 472 Thinking/Hegel/Gadamer: The abolition of the difference between speculative and dialectical, which we find in Hegel's speculative science of the term, shows how much he knows himself to be the perfecter of Greek logos philosophy. >Speculation/Hegel, >Dialectic/Hegel. Dialectic: What he calls dialectic and what Plato called dialectic is based on the subjugation of language to the "statement". Statement: But the concept of statement, the dialectical intensification of the contradiction, is now in extreme contrast to the nature of hermeneutic experience and the linguistic nature of human experience of the world in general. Admittedly, Hegel's dialectic also actually follows the speculative spirit of language. But according to Hegel's self-understanding, he only wants to listen to language's reflective play of its thought determinations and raise thinking to the self-consciousness of the concept by means of dialectical mediation in the totality of known knowledge. >Speculation/Hegel, >Concept/Hegel. GadamerVsHegel: Thus it remains in the dimension of what has been said and does not reach the dimension of linguistic world experience. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Totality | Adorno | Grenz I 19 Totality/Adorno: totality expresses itself in the fact that one cannot ward off the comprehensive, all-managing world in any other way than through means which are similar to it. (Impromptus(1), p.22). >List of Reason, >Dialectics of Enlightenment, >Enlightenment/Adorno. Grenz I 113 Totality/Hegel/Adorno/AdornoVsHegel/Grenz: the negativity of the whole is expressed by Hegel as a positive totality according to Adorno. In this, Hegel's philosophy is an image, but a broken one. >G.W.F. Hegel. The structure of the blindness context is illustrated into that: 'mirror-inverted'. Grenz I 158 Totality/Adorno/Grenz: the concept of totality is ambivalent - on the one hand, it is a description of the real but false totality, on the other hand the idea of the correct one. >Negation/Adorno. Grenz I 130 Whole/Adorno/Grenz: ... the force effective in any single determination of the whole is not only its negation, but also the negative, untruth. >Truth/Adorno, >Truth content/Adorno. 1. Th. W. Adorno. Impromptus. Zweite Folge neu gedruckter musikalischer Aufsätze. Frankfurt am Main 1968. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Truth | Adorno | Grenz I 57 Truth/Adorno/Grenz: the relationship between truth and untruth is linked to the relationship between necessary and superfluous reign in society. >Governance, >Totality/Adorno. Grenz I 61 Truth/Adorno/Grenz: In Adorno's thinking only facts are true, namely a narrowly delimited sector of facts: true would be the state of society in which the full measure of possible freedom of reign would be realized. Grenz I 64 Truth/subjective/objective/Hegel/Adorno/Grenz: the residual theory of truth, according to which objective is what is left after striking out the so-called subjective factors, is hit by Hegel's critique into the empty center. >Subject/Hegel. The recognition is fruitful not by the elimination of the subject, but by virtue of its supreme effort... (1). Grenz I 70 Truth/Adorno/Grenz: three spheres of the historicity of truth: 1. Ideology 2. Idea of the possibility of the better to the true 3. Level of rationality or subjectivity. >Ideology/Adorno, >Rationality/Adorno, >Subjectivity/Adorno. I Grenz 73 Truth/Adorno/Grenz: Genesis of truth from the false appearance. Truth and appearance are identified openly: the "best dialectical truth" of art... I 74 ...and philosophy is that "which exists in appearance."(2) Grenz I 94 Hegel/AdornoVsHegel/Grenz: You cannot choose in Hegel what suits you and reject what annoys you. His truth is in the Skandalon. Not renewal, only salvation suits him. To save Hegel, therefore, is to face his philosophy where it evokes the most pain; where its untruth is obvious, to snatch the truth from it.(3) I 95 Hegel/Truth/AdornoVsHegel/Grenz: The affirmation registers, mirror-inverted, the experience of overpowering compulsion, which is inherent in all beings through its amalgamation under the reign. This is the truth of Hegel's untruth.(4) 1. Th.W. Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften Bd. 5, p. 256 2. Th.W. Adorno. Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen. In: In: Gesammelte Schriften 2, Rolf Tiedemann (Hg.), Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. 1979, p. 234. 3. Th.W. Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften Bd. 5, p.320 4. Ibid. p. 324 |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Truth | Russell | Horwich I 4 Truth/Russell: There are objective truths as objects of judgments, but not objective falsehoods a) false: Judgment as relation to a simple object: E.g. that Charles I died on the scaffold - does not work in the case of false judgments. b) for a complex: (Russell pro): Horwich I 9 Truth: exists if the objects have the relation to each other which is claimed in the judgment. >Complex, >Judgment. Horwich I 11 The fact that a judgment is made does not alter the objects - this is how falsehood becomes possible. (1) ((s) explanation: Thus, one can also explain the separation of metalanguage and object language: if there were only object language and judgments were made in the object language, they would change the judged facts. Then no predictions would be possible either.) >Object language, >Metalanguage, >Prediction. 1. B. Russell, "On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood", in: Philosophical Essays, New York 1996, pp. 170-185 - reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 Russell VII 64 Truth/Russell: can only exist if there are also opinions - but it does not depend on the opinions. IV 127 RussellVsHegel: a truth about a thing is not part of the thing itself, although it has to belong to his "essence". - If the nature of a thing should be all truths, then we cannot recognize the "essence" before we know all its relations with all other things in the universe. - But if we use the word "essence" in this sense, we have to assert that a thing can be recognized, even if its "essence" is unknown - or incompletely known. Contradiction: this confuses knowledge of things and knowledge of truth - acquaintance does not imply knowledge of the essence. (> Naturalistic fallacy). Therefore we cannot prove that the universe is a harmonious whole. Tugendhat III 214 Truth/Russell: early: a matter of belief and this one reaction dispo to react near B with "B". Cf. >Stimulus meaning/Quine, >Reliable reactions/Brandom. TugendhatVsRussell: neither reaction nor triggering signs are true/false. This is because there is no assumption that something is this way or that. Therefore no mistake is possible. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Ultimate Justification | Leibniz | Holz I 50 Definition evidence/certainty/a priori/Leibniz: the certainty (the necessity of identical propositions A = B) is based neither on empiricism nor on deduction, but on an a priori insight. I 50 Rationalism/HolzVsLeibniz: Problem for a philosophy that understands itself "scientifically": this "immediate insight" of so-called final foundations leads to another epistemological level. Danger of irrationalistic change. I 51 Thus the certainty of the axioms is no longer assured. Leibniz, however, insists on proofing them from the "evidence of identity" (with itself). Final justification/proof/axioms/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: here the validity of the identity theorem (A = B or A = A) is taken as an empirical value. It is not a matter of the fact that the predicates are inherent in the subject. This assumption can no longer be deduced in itself. Evidence is not a logical category. Thus, the validity of the identity theorem must not be justified purely logically. It has a pre-predicative origin. Logic/Husserl: Husserl has strongly rejected the abstinence of logic from its cognitive content. >Content/Husserl. I 52 Final justification/proof/axiom/evidence/Leibniz/Holz: Finally, we need a different type of proposition than the open or virtually identical. I 75 Reason/Leibniz: reason can only be found by traversing the whole series rerum. It is not, however, to be found outside the series rerum, but completely within, but not at the beginning, but as the series as a whole! >Reason/Leibniz. Difference: while the infinite mind must stand outside the whole (as an imitator) (perhaps also an "unmoved mover", etc.), the reason (as totality of the series) must be within the series. Reason/Leibniz: the universal ultimate reason (the totality of the series of things, the world, ultima ratio) is also necessary for the finite mind because otherwise there would be nothing at all I 83 Final Justification/LeibnizVsKant: the final justification does not take part in the subject-philosophical radicalism. Like Spinoza before him and Hegel after him, he had wanted to find from the, since Descartes' indispensable subject reflexion, a non-subjective reason of being, expressed in the truths of reason. Two principles are sufficient: 1. Principle of contradiction 2. The principle of sufficient reason. (Can be traced back to the principle of contradiction). Moreover, since the principle of identity is viewed from sensory perception, we can attribute to the principles of the things themselves (that is, their ontic reality) the reason (their logic) presupposed in our thinking. >Principles/Leibniz. HolzVsLeibniz/HolzVsHegel: This is just as illogical as the system by Hegel. I 84 In the universe and its parts, logic is thus suppressed and embodied. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: therefore, all relations between realities, phenomenal and metaphysical ones, can be expressed in logical form. Final justification/LeibnizVsKant: the world does not appear logical because the subject conceives it in the logic form of its thinking, but the logic form of thinking is compelling because the world is shown as a logically constituted. Leibniz: the world does not show itself to the subject as a world but as an additive series, as an aggregate. I 123 Final justification/existence/Leibniz: to justify why there is anything at all means, therefore, to indicate in the essence of possibilities the principle which counteracts the minimization of the tendencies of realization. Now it turns out that the two principles: 1. Identity principle (Everything is identical with itself) 2. Variety principle ("various things are perceived by me) are logical, but not ontological sufficient, to justify the existence of the world at all. One can in this way deduce from the individual something different and a certain connection, and therefore explain why there is something definite (and not something else in its place). I 124 But it remains unfounded why there is anything at all. The missing ontological intermediate member is found by Leibniz in a third axiom, which he counts to the absolute first truths: Thesis: Everything possible strives for existence and therefore exists, if not something else, which also strives for existence and prevents it from being incompatible with the first. According to Leibniz, this is provable under the assumption of the truth of fact that we perceive something at all. >Possibility/Leibniz, >Possible world/Leibniz, >Existence/Leibniz, >Order/Leibniz. In addition, we make the experience of change that something begins to exist that was not there before. (But was previously possible). A priori, however, no reason can be given for why something is strives more than another, so the reason must therefore be sought in the system of co-ordination (of mutual inhibitions). From this, it follows that there always exists the connection of the things in which there exists the most. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Understanding | Dilthey | Gadamer I 235 Understanding/Finiteness/Infinfinity/History/Dilthey/Gadamer: Must not the historical conditionality of consciousness be an insurmountable barrier to its completion in historical knowledge? Gadamer I 236 The foundation of history in a psychology of understanding, as Dilthey envisioned it, places the historian in precisely that idealistic simultaneity with his or her object that we call aesthetic and admire in Ranke. Of course, the decisive question remains, how the finite human nature should be able to achieve such infinite understanding. Can this really have been Dilthey's opinion? DiltheyVsHegel: Didn't Dilthey insist towards Hegel that one has to hold on to the consciousness of one's own finiteness? Here alone one has to look more closely. His criticism of Hegel's rational idealism meant only the apriorism of his concept speculation - the inner infinity of the spirit had no fundamental gravity for him but was positively fulfilled in the ideal of a historically enlightened reason, which would have matured into the genius of "understanding everything" (German: "Allesverstehen"). Infinity/Dilthey: For Dilthey, the consciousness of finiteness did not mean an infinity of consciousness and no limitation. Rather, it testifies to life's ability to rise above all barriers in energy and activity. In this respect, the potential infinity of the spirit is represented in him. Certainly not speculation, but historical reason is the way in which this infinity is actualized. Historical understanding spreads out over all historical circumstances and is truly universal because it has its firm ground in the totality and infinity of the spirit. For this, Dilthey follows the old teaching, which derives the possibility of understanding from the sameness of human nature. The limits set to the universality of understanding by the historical finiteness of our being are thus only of a subjective nature to him. Certainly, he can nevertheless recognize something positive in them that will be fruitful for knowledge; thus he assures that only sympathy makes real understanding possible.(1) >Sympathy/Dilthey. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften V, 277 Wright I 153 Understanding/Dilthey/Wright, G. H.: Dilthey's Concept of Understanding (W. Dilthey: Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, 1883; W. Dilthey: Ideen über eine beschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie, 1894) was originally strongly "psychologistic" and "subjectivistic". Later he emphasized - obviously under Hegel's influence - the "objective character of the achievements of the method of understanding. (especially W. Dilthey: Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik , 1900, Appendix S. 332-338.) |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Unity | Historism | Gadamer I 212 Unity/History/Historicism/Gadamer: If the reality of history is conceived as a game of forces, this thought is obviously not enough to make its unity necessary. Even what Herder and Humboldt were led by - the ideal of the richness of phenomena of the human, does not as such establish true unity. It must be something that, in the continuity of events, turns out to be a guiding goal. In fact, the place occupied in the historical-philosophical eschatologies of religious origin and in their secularized variations is here at first empty(1). No pre-opinion about the meaning of history is to be formed before the exploration of it. Nevertheless, the self-evident precondition of its exploration is that it forms a unity. Thus Droysen can explicitly recognize the idea of the unity of world history itself - even if it is not a substantive idea of Providence's plan - as a regulative idea. Meanwhile there is a further precondition included in this postulate, which determines its content. The idea of the unity of world history includes the uninterrupted continuity of the development of world history. This idea of continuity is also initially formal in nature and does not imply any concrete content. It too is like an a priori of research, inviting us to delve deeper and deeper into the intertwining of the world-historical context. In this respect it is only to be judged as a methodological naivety of Ranke when he speaks of the "admirable continuity" of historical development(2). What he really means by this is not at all this structure of continuity itself, but rather the content-related things that are formed in this continuous development. >Unity/Ranke, >Continuity/Ranke. Gadamer I 214 HistoricismVsHegel: (...) the historical school was not able to accept Hegel's justification of the unity of world history by the concept of the spirit. That in the completed self-consciousness of the historical present the path of the spirit to itself is completed, which constitutes the meaning of history - that is an eschatological self-interpretation, which basically abolishes history in the speculative concept. Instead, the historical school saw itself forced into a theological understanding of itself. If it did not want to suspend its own nature of thinking of itself as progressive research, it had to relate its own finite and limited knowledge to a divine spirit, to whom things are known in their perfection. Ranke/Gadamer: It is the old ideal of infinite understanding, which is still applied here even to the knowledge of history. Thus Ranke writes: "The God - if I may dare to make this remark - I think to myself in such a way that, since no time lies ahead of him, he overlooks the entire historical humanity in its entirety and finds it equally worthy everywhere"(3). Gadamer: Here the idea of the infinite mind (intellectus infinitus), for whom everything is at once (omnia simul) transformed into the archetype of historical justice. The historian who knows all epochs and all historical phenomena equally before God comes close to him. Thus the consciousness of the historian represents the perfection of human self-consciousness. The more he succeeds in recognizing the own indestructible value of every phenomenon, and that is to say: to think historically, the more godlike he thinks(4). For this very reason Ranke has compared the office of a historian with that of a priest. "Directness to God" is for the Lutheran Ranke the actual content of the Christian message. 1. Cf. K. Löwith, Weltgeschichte und Heilsgeschehen (Stuttgart 1953), and my article „Geschichtsphilosophie“ in RGG3. 2. Ranke, Weltgeschichte IX, 2 Xlll. 3. Ranke, Weltgeschichte IX, 2, p. 5, p. 7. 4. »Denn das ist gleichsam ein Teil des göttlichen Wissens« (Ranke, ed. Rothacker p. 43, similar to p. 52). |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Value Theory | Marx | Habermas IV 302 Value Theory/Marx/Habermas: Question: How do the two forms of integration of contexts of action relate to each other, one that takes place in the consciousness of the actors as it were (>action theory) and the other that silently reaches through the actors' orientations (>system theory)? Solution/Hegel: in legal philosophy, Hegel solves this problem in the sense of an idealistic transition from the subjective to the objective mind. Solution/Marx: Marx introduces value theory in order to connect political-economic statements about the anonymous connections of a system with sociological-historical statements about the action connections, structured in the lifeworld, of actors, individuals or Habermas IV 303 collectives. HabermasVsMarx/HabermasVsHegel: these solution strategies have now lost their plausibility. Action and system theory can be understood as remaining parts of these approaches. Mause I 69 Labor theory of value/Marx: Karl Marx (1818-1883) can in some respects be described as a classical economist: Like the representatives of the classical school, he concentrated on production and supply conditions and economic growth and its determinants; Marx' labor theory of values is essentially the same as that of Ricardo. >D. Ricardo. |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Variables | Deleuze | Sokal I 183 Variables/Deleuze/Guattari/Bricmont/Sokal: (G. Deleuze, F. Guattari,1991(1): "The respective independence of the variables appears in mathematics if they have a higher potency than the first one. Hegel therefore shows that the variability in the function is not limited to values that can be changed (2/3 and 4/6) or left undetermined (a = 2b), but requires that one of the variables assumes a higher potency (y²/x = P). (Deleuze/Guattari 1991/1996(1), p. 141.) SokalVsDeleuze/SokalVsGuattari/SokalVsHegel: this sentence repeats a confusion by Hegel who saw fractions like y²/x as something fundamentally different than fractions like a/b.(2)(3) 1. G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, Qu' est-ce que la philosophie?, Paris 1991 - German: Was ist Philosophie, Frankfurt/M. 1996: page numbers here stem from the German edition. 2. J. Desanti, La Philosophie silencieuse, ou critique des philosophies de la science, Paris 1975. p. 43. 3. G. W. F. Hegel Wissenschaft der Logik. In. Sämtliche Werke vol. 4, 4th edition Stuttgart 1964, p. 354ff. |
Deleuze I Gilles Deleuze Felix Guattari Qu’est-ce que la philosophie, Paris 1991 German Edition: Was ist Philosophie? Frankfurt/M. 2000 Hum I G. Deleuze David Hume , Frankfurt 1997 Sokal I Alan Sokal Jean Bricmont Fashionabel Nonsense. Postmodern Intellectuals Abuse of Science, New York 1998 German Edition: Eleganter Unsinn. Wie die Denker der Postmoderne die Wissenschaften missbrauchen München 1999 Sokal II Alan Sokal Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science New York 1999 |
| Vocabulary | Rorty | III 60ff Nietzsche - Rorty - Derrida: we must be able to decide autonomously about our vocabulary and our speaking. >Nietzsche, >Derrida. III 127 Def final vocabulary/Rorty: we use it to tell our life story, sometimes with hindsight, sometimes looking forward - "Final": because there is no standpoint outside of it from which it can be justified - only circular justification possible - III 135 Def "dialectics"/Hegel/Rorty: attempt to play vocabularies against one another, rather than merely derive sentences from each other. >Dialectic/Hegel, >Hegel. RortyVsHegel: constantly changed his vocabulary and changed the subject while doing so - he did not criticize his predecessors as misguided, but for using an outdated language. VI 125 Vocabulary/correspondence/reality/world/language/Rorty: the assertion that some vocabularies work better than others is perfectly fine - but not that they represent reality more adequately. - ((s)> detatching language from reality.) >Correspondence, >Correspondence theory, >>World/thinking. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| World | Nietzsche | Ries II 17 World/Redemption/Nietzsche: Claim of a redemption of the world to the "dance floor for divine coincidences". --- Danto III 45 World/Values/Nietzsche/Danto: to describe the world as worthless does not necessarily mean to give it a low value within the framework of a value scheme (...), therefore, it does not have to make sense to give it a value at all. Values are not better applicable to the world than weight measurements on numbers. There is nothing that our beliefs can correspond to, not purpose or order, neither things nor facts. And so all our beliefs are wrong. Nietzsche regards this as the most extreme form of nihilism.(1) >Nihilism/Nietzsche. Danto III 46 According to Nietzsche's own experience, the knowledge that the world is without all form and meaning is intoxicating; and if this knowledge should suggest anything, then a "Dionysian saying yes to the world as it is, without deduction, exception and selection".(2) >Terminology/Nietzsche. Danto III 159 World/NietzscheVsHegel/Nietzsche/Danto: The world has no sensible figure besides the one we have given it. But then we do not represent any more sensible beings than the world itself is a reasonable place. This does not mean that we are irrational, but merely that the distinction between rationality and irrationality cannot be taken into account. That all truth is wrong, that knowledge equals ignorance - to say this and the like means nothing more than twisting and exaggerating words. That does not mean that we should flee from these pipe dreams. Danto III 274 World/Nietzsche/Danto: According to Nietzsche, the world is something we have done and always do. It has no other form or meaning than that which we impose on it. >World/thinking/Nietzsche, >Reality/Nietzsche. Nietzsche: The belief that the world that should be, really exists, is a belief of the unproductive who do not want to create a world, as it should be. They put it as existing, they search for means and ways to get to it. 'Will to Truth' - as powerlessness of the will to create.(3) ((s) See Putnam: "Why there isn't a ready-made world, Synthese Vol. 51, No. 2, Realism, Part I (May, 1982), pp. 141-167 ). 1. F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 555. 2. Ibid. p. 834. 3. Ibid. p. 549. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Young Hegelians | Gadamer | I 349 Left Hegelian/Young Hegelian/Recognition/VsHegel/Gadamer: The insistence on immediacy - whether it be that of bodily nature, whether it be that of the "you" making claims, whether it be that of the impenetrable reality of historical coincidence or that of the reality of production relations - has always been self-refuting, insofar as it is itself not an immediate behaviour but a reflective action. The left-wing Hegelian criticism of a mere reconciliation in thought, which is guilty of the real change of the world, the whole I 350 teaching of the transformation of philosophy into politics, must be the same as a self-extinction on the ground of philosophy(1). 1. This is still clear in Marxist literature today. Cf. the energetic elaboration of this point in J. Habermas, Zur philosophischen Diskussion um Marx und den Marxismus (Phil. Rundschau V, 3/4, 1957, p. 183ff.) |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Zeno | Hegel | Bubner I 72 Zeno/Hegel/Bubner: his peculiarity is dialectic. Reason makes the beginning (Hegel pro). >Dialectic/Hegel, >Method/Hegel. The advantage over Parmenides is that assertions are not made in such a way, which presuppose an abstraction and are therefore not at all suitable for an actual beginning. >Beginning/Hegel. The zenonian reason does not intervene when something is developed when something is posed, because it allows the impossibility of opposite conception on the thing itself. Impossibility: because the one gets into contradictions who attributes the many, rather than the one being of Parmenides. >Zeno as an author, >About Zeno, >Parmenides. Paradoxes/Movement/Zeno/Hegel/Bubner: Hegel takes over Aristotle's solution: the introduced distinction of two aspects in space and time, namely, continuity and discretion. Bubner: this is unhistorical, because Zenon could not be yet aware of it. Solution: the continuum introduced by Aristotle makes the infinite divisibility of space and time compatible with its unity. Hegel: "the self-equality, continuity is absolute connexion, the dissolution of all distinction, all negativity, of being-for-itself. >Mediation/Hegel. The point, on the other hand, is the pure being-for-itself, the absolute self-differentiation, and the abolition of all equality and connexion with others. But these two are placed in space and time in one, space and time the contradiction (!). It is closest to show it in the movement: For the movement also places something opposite for the presentation. >Motion, >Paradoxes. BubnerVsHegel: Here, Hegel discovers more than the translation can give. It is anachronistic to raise Zenon to the dialectician. Anachronisms, however, are the price of structural comparisons that are philosophically illuminating. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Bubner Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | I 44 BubnerVsHegel: shortens the concrete liveliness of Platonic dialogues to external reflection, because of his own strong understanding of methods. Plato's dialogues do not permit a clean separation of the philosophical statement from the pictorial decoration. To leave their mysteriousness standing demands the active cooperation of the conscious participant. I 47 At no point does the exact knowledge of the method correspond in a way with its practice that no rest would remain. Plato's method never represents the goal, but serves the better knowledge. I 49 Otherness/Hegel: the other is to be taken as isolated, in relation to itself, abstract as the other. not of something, but as the other of itself. BubnerVsHegel: the fascination of recognizing a basic form of one's own science of logic carries Hegel's interpretation far beyond Plato. He reads into Plato an identity of identity and difference that only German idealism has fully articulated. I 72 Paradoxes/Movement/Zenon/Hegel: Hegel adopts Aristotle's solution: the introduced distinction of two aspects in space and time, namely continuity and discretion. Bubner: but this is unhistorical, because Zenon could not yet have been aware of it. Solution: the continuum introduced by Aristotle makes the infinite divisibility of space and time compatible with its unity. Hegel: "the equality of oneself, continuity is the absolute connection, the extinction of all differences, all negatives, of being-by-oneself. The point, on the other hand, is the pure being-by-oneself, the absolute discriminating and abolishing of all equality and connection with others. These two, however, are set in space and time in one, space and time thus the contradiction (!). It is closest to showing it by movement: For in movement, the opposite is also set for the imagination. BubnerVsHegel: here Hegel discovers more than the translation gives. It is anachronistic to elevate Zenon to a dialectician. But anachronisms are the price of structural comparisons that are philosophically illuminating. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Derrida Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | I 55 Hegel rates the spoken word higher than the written characters (DerridaVs). I 64 Mind / Hegel: he finds himself by executing its nature. DerridaVsHegel: here a "Holocaust" takes place. The deleted residue also remains. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Frege Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | Tugendhat II 55 FregeVsHegel: his logic is based on certain concepts, but words have a sense (= meaning) only in complete sentences. Tugendhat II 51 Being/Hegel/Logic: "the pure being", "the indeterminate immediate", it cannot have a determination against other things. That with which the beginning of science must be made. II 52 Borderline case of quality as result of an abstraction. II 53 Since being is not part of the verbal system, there is no "being thing". Thus the "contemplation of being" as a "void" is in itself already nothing more than the contemplation of "nothing". II 54 But still immediate. No opposition, abstract immediate negation. II 55 FregeVsHegel/Tugendhat: only sentences can be negated! (Frege). This crashes Hegel’s entire logic from the start. II 56 Tugendhat: this discussion (if being and nothingness are the same thing and the same time different) starts at a far too high level: It is assumed that nothing is already something provable. TugendhatVsHegel: he remained rooted in the prejudices of formal logic of his time: that judgments are consist of concepts. FregeVsHegel: the primary logical and ontological unit is the sentence! |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Goodman Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | II 62 Error: to involve the "entire history of the object". It would lead to conclusion that the most rigid object would be called flexible if it is never subjected to a suitable power (VsHegel). A disposition predicate can apply to an object, if the manifest predicate is not true at all. A flammable object never needs to go up in flames. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Heidegger Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | I 16 HeideggerVsHegel: the Absolute, God, is accessible only for the individual . II 87 VsHegel: destroyed the last remnants of the concealment of the absolute self-knowledge of the absolute spirit. Rorty III 196 HeideggerVsNietzsche/HeideggerVsHegel: understood the difficulty of throwing away the ladder at the end of a story very well. He himself did not want to give a narrative, but a litany. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Leibniz Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | I 13 Leibniz/Holz: the inner unity of his work can only be comprehended from the point of view of metaphysics. He can be positioned between Kant and Hegel: He shows the alternative of a scientific metaphysics to LeibnizVsKant by showing its method, LeibnizVsHegel: shows the possibility of a metaphysics which is not based on an absolute idealistic method. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Luhmann Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | Reese-Schäfer II 30 Reflection: no hierarchy of reflexivity. 2. order observation has no hierarchically higher position. Whoever observes an observer, however, uses a different distinction than himself. (LuhmannVsHegel).LuhmannVsSubject Theory. Subject/Object/Luhmann: difficult problem. First of all: who is the observer? He is the last figure, who in turn has a need for explication about certain distinctions. LuhmannVsSubject Tradition: here you have continuities and discontinuities that allow you to decide whether you want to apply the concept of the subject by location. ((s) Not actually Hegel is the opponent here). AU Cass. 7 Luhmann: Maybe we should better take off on differentiation. But there is no final decision in this matter. ...classical subject who always knew it was a subject. Against it speaks the fact that one easily loses sight of the fact that social systems are also subjects! For example, this lecture is its own subject! For example, society is a subject. But no analogy to consciousness! That would give known problems. Best of all, we do not use the concept of the subject. Another reason: our two-page distinction, in which the world is divided into two sides (S/U). Then the question is: Where does the observer actually occur? In the system or in the environment? Time/Hegel/(Encyclopedia): § 258: "Time as the negative unity of being outside is (also?) a bad ideal par excellence. It is being in that it is not, and in that it is, is not. Luhmann: Why is the distinction being/not being introduced here? AU Cass. 9 Movement/Luhmann: according to Hegel and Aristotle, this is something that connects non-being with being. Time/Movement/Luhmann: but movement is not sufficient for the definition of time, because time does not move past us. Aristotle also sees this. Time depends from the beginning on a distinction. Central question: who is the observer? This is immediately followed by the question: who asks this question? |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Russell Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | IV 127 RussellVsHegel: Hegel makes many unfounded assumptions. A truth about a thing is not part of the thing itself, although it must be part of its "nature". If the nature of a thing should be all truth, then we cannot recognize the "nature", before we know all its relations with all other things in the universe. But when we use the word "nature" in this sense, we must claim that a thing can be recognized, even if its "nature" is unknown, or is imperfectly known. Contradiction: this confuses knowledge of things and knowledge of truth. IV 128 Acquaintance/Russell: does not imply a recognition of the "nature". From the fact that a thing is what it is, we cannot infer that it must have the various relations which it has factually. This follows only apparently, because we already know it. (> Naturalistic fallacy). RussellVsHegel: we therefore cannot prove that the universe, as a whole, forms a harmonious system. If we cannot prove this, we also cannot prove the unreality of space, time and matter and the non-existence of evil. Because Hegel concludes its unreality from the fragmentary and relational character of these things. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Ryle Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | I 204 Knowledge/Recognition/RyleVsHegel: The distinction betw Trial and Done verbs (tasks and services) frees us from another theoretical nuisance: "know", "realize", "solve" cannot be used with adverbs such as "mistakenly" and falsely or "incorrectly", you cannot know something wrong, it is a different grammar. ((s) HegelVsRyle: Phenomenology, Preface - Hegel there: we can definitely know something wrong E.g. imperfect geometric drawings.) |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Wittgenstein Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | Schurz I 224 Explanation/Hegel/Schurz: Thesis: is in principle beyond description, it is a kind of "showing nature". DuhemVsHegel/WittgensteinVsHegel: science can only ever describe. ((s) WittgensteinVsExplanation/WittgensteinVsHegel). Law/Law of nature/NG/solution/Hempel: even laws are descriptions - simply general descriptions. Explanation/Hempel: goes beyond description in it, that it sets up a logical connection. --- I 225 Last clarification/Schurz: does not exist in science for this very reason: any explanation must presuppose something unexplained. E.g. law of gravity, e.g. the fact that there was a big bang. Nothing can explain itself, there is no "self-explnation". |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Verschiedene Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | Kierkegaard I 109 Necessity: Question: has the past greater necessity than the future? KierkegaardVsHegel: The Necessary can not be changed, it will not be, but it is. |
Kier I S. Kierkegaard Philosophical Fragments 2009 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Vollmer Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | I 220 Knowledge/Criterion/Recognition/Vollmer: we need a criterion for when knowledge is valid. Such a criterion would now itself be a piece of knowledge and would again need a criterion of recourse. On the other hand, the criterion could not be a simple convention, since a convention cannot justify knowledge. At most by further conventions. Recourse. That is approximate: SchellingVsKant: we need recognition of recognition. And that is circular. HegelVsKant: Investigation of cognition: cannot be carried out other than cognition. As if one wanted to learn to swim before going into the water. Vollmer: the argument was developed by Leonard Nelson and is therefore called "double Nelson". I 221 VollmerVsHegel: the argument is logically correct, but it does not claim that recognition as a whole would be impossible, but only in the aforementioned sense. If we make ourselves the principle of doubting the validity of all knowledge, we come to skepticism, which (according to Russell) cannot be refuted either. Epistemology does not prove the existence of recognition, it presupposes recognition. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Wessel Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | I 221 Identity/Hegel: rejected the sentence "a = a". "No object remains the same to itself". WesselVsHegel: Error: confusion of word and object. I 222 ...+... Z. Numbers/Wessel: In mathematics numbers are objects which are introduced by definition. They exist only if one introduces signs for them. A distinction is made between digits and numbers, but without designations (digits) numbers do not exist as abstract objects either. As a result, numbers and number terms are often indistinguishable. Identity/Hegel: for example "The tree is the tree" expresses "not the view of it", because it "does not represent it as something reflected in itself". (WesselVs). Identity/WesselVsHegel: 3. Error by Hegel: to not regard identity and difference as two-digit predicates (relation) but on the one hand as a subject term and on the other as a one-digit predicate. Diversity is simply the negation of identity! WesselVsHegel: is also wrong in limiting himself to the trivial identity a = a in his discussion. This identity would be the only one really superfluous. We cannot draw any conclusions from it or describe any change. I 365 Being/Nothing/Hegel: tries to define the concept of "becoming" through the words "being" and "nothing". WesselVsHegel: that is doomed to failure: without any recourse to the empirically given, terms of change cannot be introduced. (>Change/Hegel). I 365/366 Similar to the existential predicate, change terms cannot be introduced purely logically. Empirical conception of change is already assumed to be known in logic. For example, concepts of time are defined by change. I 366 Change/Wessel: can be introduced in two ways, 1. using time terms - 2. without using time terms. I 367 Problem: two possibilities: properties on an object can modify themselves, disappear completely or emerge anew. Accordingly, one can also distinguish between transition states or static states. s(s~E(a) => sE(a)) an emergence of a s(sE(a) => s~E(a)) a vanishing of a s(S~A => sA) an emergence of sA s(sP(a) => s -i P(a) a loss of the property P. Paradox of change/Wessel: "a changing body possesses a property p and does not possess it at the same time". Dialectical Identity/Hegel/Wessel: logical form: there is a property P such that P(a1) u P(a2) applies, and there is a property Q such that Q(a1) u -i Q(a2) or -i Q(a1) u Q(a2) applies. ((s) Something remains and something changes). Change/Predicate/Wessel: so far we have considered the two-digit predicate =>: something becomes something else. But there is also the one-digit predicate llv (arrow down) "something changes", "something becomes true" or untrue. Example: "The water is moved". WesselVsHegel: this makes it clear how unfounded the opposition of being and becoming terms is. Change/event/predicate/Wessel: with the change predicate sA => sB subject terms can now be formed: s(SA => sB). This is what events are called! (s) Event: singular term, which is formed from a predicate for change. Wessel: for such predicates, however, it must be proved in each case whether they may link with subject terms of this type. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Popper, K. | Feyerabend Vs Popper, K. | I 74 Einstein/Popper/Feigl: FeyerabendVsPopper: Popper and Feigl have tried to make Einstein a naive falsificationist. In reality, Einstein puts "the reason of the thing" above the "verification by small effects". "... If no light deflection or perihelion were known, the theory would be convincing, because it avoids the inertial system. I 236 Falsification/FeyerabendVsPopper: that new observations disproved old ones and thus forced the establishment of a new astronomy is certainly not right for Copernicus. A process as complex as the "Copernican Revolution" cannot be traced back to a single principle. I 356 FeyerabendVsPopper: Popper considers science as a problem solution. This overlooks the fact that problems can be formulated incorrectly. II 82 PopperVsHegel: shows very laboriously that nonsensical consequences are obtained if the propositional logic is combined with Hegel. He concludes that Hegel must be eliminated. FeyerabendVsPopper: E.g. This is about as smart as calling for the theory of relativity to be eliminated, just because simple computers are no match for it. Hegel + propositional logic are nonsense. Why should precisely Hegel be blamed for this nonsense? Logic: incompatible also with the earlier quantum theory and with the differential calculus at the times of Newton... Explanation/Popper: explains "that the world of each of our theories can be explained by other worlds which are described by other theories." The doctrine of an ultimate reality collapses. II 119 FeyerabendVsPopper: but only because it does not correspond to his favorite methodology. But if it turns out that the world is finite, then we have an "ultimate reality." FeyerabendVsPopper: Vs "third world": it is populated with just as many different (and often incommensurate) entities as there are beliefs in the "Second World". Does not solve the problem of relativism, but conceals it. II 201 FeyerabendVsPopper: "mere propagandist." (His former teacher). |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Subject Philosophy | Habermas Vs Subject Philosophy | I 119 Philosophy of the Subject: (HabermasVs, NietzscheVs,) ... the nihilistic domination of subject-centered reason is conceived as result and expression of a perverseness of the will to power. I 180 ...the existence is justified out of itself. Thus, Heidegger conceives the world as a process again only from the subjectivity of the will self-assertion. This is the dead-end of the philosophy of the subject. It does not matter whether primacy is given to epistemological questions or the question of being. The monological execution of intentions, i.e. purpose activity is considered as the primary form of action. (VsCommunication). The objective world remains the point of reference. (Model of the cognitive relation). I 309 HabermasVsSubject Philosophy: the attempt to escape the unfortunate alternatives always ends in the entanglements of self-deifying subject consuming itself in acts of futile self-transcendence. Since Kant, the I simultaneously takes the position of an empirical subject in the world where it finds itself as an object among others. In the position of a transcendental subject it faces is a world as a whole which its constitutes itself as the totality of the objects of possible experiences. The attempts to understand these irreconcilable alternatives as self-generation of the mind or of the genus range from Hegel to Merleau-Ponty. HabermasVsHegel: because these hybrid undertakings pursue the utopia of complete self-knowledge, they keep turning into positivism. (Today: the body-soul problem). I 435 LuhmannVsSubject Philosophy: "Simple minds want to counter this with ethics." (Habermas: not without scorn.). HabermasVsSubject Philosophy: overall social awareness as a superordinate subject, it creates a zero-sum game in which the room for maneuver of individuals cannot be accommodated properly. ((s) Every social conflict would appear as schizophrenia.) Habermas: Solution: alternative concept strategy: public communities can be understood as a higher-level intersubjectivities. In this aggregated public there is also an overall social consciousness. This no longer needs to fulfill the precision requirements of the philosophy of the subject to the self-consciousness! Luhmann II 136 Subject Philosophy/Habermas: Problem: in philosophical discussions, ideological criticism not even survives the simplest self-application. At most, it can explain why someone is wrong, but it cannot show that there is a mistake. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Various Authors | James Vs Various Authors | I 17 JamesVsHegel. I 29 JamesVsPhysiological Psychology (Lotze/JamesVsLotze). I 52 Monism / James: (terminology): label for neo-Hegelian: existence of an omniscient mind is a prerequisite for knowledge and experience (JamesVsMonism/JamesVsNeo-Hegelianism). Stegmüller IV 494 W. K. Clifford: Thesis: it's wrong to believe anything at all! JamesVsClifford: our mind-like nature is not only allowed to, it must make a choice between alternatives. Our extra-reasonable nature influences our beliefs. What hypotheses do for us are almost always acts of will. (Mackie pro). Most of what one believes, is believed because of authority! (Mackie pro). IV 495 It makes a difference whether you want to recognize truth or avoid error. Moral/James: is objective (MackieVs), but we cannot wait for empirical evidence. IV 495/496 Moral/James: asserts two things. 1) the best things are the more permanent ones that reach into the afterlife. 2) we are already feeling better now if we believe the first statement. Religion/James: the more perfect and more permanent part of the universe is understood personally. The only practical way to assume the religious hypothesis is to meet it halfway. >Morals; social interaction, trust. Facts/Belief/James: even with fact questions the mind may well be the deciding factor. MackieVs: that is too close to Pascal. IV 497 James: where speculative reason does not provide results, self-interest should make the difference. MackieVs: we should not welcome this, it should make us even more critical! MackieVsClifford: we must not only be willing to come up with hypotheses and test them, we also have to be able to carefully agree with them. IV 498 James: the only way to test a hypothesis is to enter into a relation with the (corresponding) person. Theism/James: "meet halfway", get involved in it! We will be better off in the end when we have at least tried to commit ourselves to it. IV 499 James/Mackie/Stegmüller: of all criticized authors, James has the best stand with him. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Various Authors | Kripke Vs Various Authors | I 57 Kripke: It would be interesting to compare Lewis’ notions with the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics by Wheeler and Everett. I believe that this notion of physics could suffer from analog philosophical problems. KripkeVsEverett. I 77 KripkeVsBundle theory: prevalent, one version would be, e.g.: (1) for every name "X" there is a corresponding batch of "phi" properties, so that the speaker A means: "phi X". I 78 This thesis is true because it can easily be a definition! The following theses are, however, all wrong I believe. (2) A believes that one of the characteristics or some together pick out a particular individual object and only one. KripkeVs: That just means that A thinks that they are doing it. Whether he is right is a different thesis.That he is right, is another thesis. (3) When the majority or a decisive set of properties from the batch are fulfilled, then y is the referent of "X". KripkeVs: that would therefore mean that certain characteristics are more important than others. However, a theory must specify how this weighting is done.+ I 117 Ruth Barcan-Markus: Identities between names are necessary. If somebody thinks that Cicero and Tullius are identical, and actually uses the two as a name, then it is thereby bound to the thesis that his opinion is a necessary truth. Mark speaks of a "mere tag". QuineVsMarkus: One beautiful evening, we could give the proper name "Hesperus" to planet Venus. One day before dawn, we could give a new proper name to the same planet, this time "Phosphorus". If we discover that it was the same planet twice, then our discovery is an empirical one. And not because the proper names were descriptions. III 413 Ontology/Kripke: thanks to Tarski and the difficult convention T our discourse is committed to the existence of ships and molecules, buildings and even lemons! KierkegaardVsHegel: His philosophy is bizarre (peculiar, funny). KripkeVsWallace: dito! Why should an astronomer who found a new planet be informed that he does not have any "ontological commitments" according to the sQ? |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Explanation | Hempel, C. | Schurz I 224 Explanation/Hegel/Schurz: Thesis: in principle, the thesis goes beyond description, it is a kind of "show of nature" DuhemVsHegel/WittgensteinVsHegel: Science can only describe at all - Hempel: Explanation goes beyond description by establishing a logical connection - Schurz: precisely for this reason there is no final justification, no final explanation. I 226 Structural Equality/Prediction/Explanation/Hempel/Schurz: (Early and Middle Hempel): Thesis: Explanation and prediction are structurally equal. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Explanation | Hegel, G.W. F. | Schurz I 224 Explanation / Hegel / Schurz: goes in principle beyond description, it is a kind of "essences" - DuhemVsHegel / WittgensteinVsHegel: science can ever only describe - Hempel: explanation goes beyond description, by establishing a logical connection - Schurz: that’s why there is no ultimate justification, no last clarification. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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