Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Good | Rawls | I 396 Good/The Good/Goodness/being good/Justice/Rawls: we must distinguish between two theories of good, since in the theory of justice as fairness the concept of law precedes that of good. In contrast to teleological theory, something is only good if it can be integrated into existing principles. On the other hand, you need a concept of good to establish the principles, because you have to take into account the motives of those involved. In order not to jeopardise the primacy of the concept of law, the concept of good can only be reduced to the essentials here. That's what I call the Thin Theory of the good. I 397 Rationality: does not require the disposition of all knowledge. I suppose that rational actors are more likely to choose more than less primary public goods. >Public Goods/Rawls, >Rationality. In the initial situation of a society to be established, the participants assume that their ideas of good have a certain structure. The concept of good is later used in connection with the moral value of persons. I 398 In a well-ordered, approximately fair society it will turn that it is good in itself to be a good person. For this, however, we need a theory of good that presupposes the principles of justice. If the sense of justice itself is a good one, then only in the sense of the Thin Theory. I 399 In this case, the sense of justice contributes to the stability of an orderly society. I call this accordance of goodness and justice congruence. Def Good/The Good/Rawls: I assume the following for a definition. 1. a thing A is a good X if it has a certain property to a greater extent than something else, average(1). 2. A is a good X for a person K exactly when A has the characteristics that make it rational for K to aim for X. 3. K's life plan has to be rational on the whole. I 400 See footnotes 2-15. I 423 Being Good/Goodness as Rationality/Rawls: (See Planning/Rawls): One might think that it is necessary for the individual to constantly raisonninate to explore whether his/her plans are rational. This is a misunderstanding. Ultimately, it's about finding a criterion for the value of a person. This is mainly defined by reference to a rational (hypothetical) plan. >Rationality. I 424 However, we cannot infer from the definition of a rational plan the content of objectives. There are human needs in general, plans have to take into account human skills and social dependencies, etc. I 426 Def Aristotelian Principle/Terminology/Rawls: that is what I call the following principle: ceteris paribus means that people enjoy the exercise of their abilities, and all the more so the more they realize these abilities and the more complex they are(16)(17)(18)(19). >ceteris paribus, >Aristotle. I 429 Rawls: The principle formulates a tendency and shows no pattern of how to make a choice. I 431 VsRawls: Why should the Aristotelian Principle be true - RawlsVsVs: we observe it on children and higher animals. It also seems to be possible to explain it with evolutionary theory. The selection will have selected the individuals to whom it applies(20)(21)(22). I 435 In order to make the Thin Theory a fully-fledged one that is about the value of a person, we ask how fellow citizens judge other fellow citizens who are in the same position. This involves average skills in an average position and in different roles, especially those that are considered more important. In addition, we assume broad characteristics that are normally sought by rational persons. (The indication of broad properties comes from T. M. Scanlon). >T.M. Scanlon. I 437 Def good person/Def moral value/Rawls: a person of moral value is then an individual with an above-average degree of broad moral qualities, so that it is rational for individuals in the initial situation of a society to be established to strive for this for themselves and for each other. N.B.: no additional ethical concepts are introduced. >Values, >Morals. Person/HareVsRawls: some authors have argued that a person qua person has no defined role or function if he/she is not treated as an instrument or object, so this definition of goodness or rationality would also have to fail(23). >R. M. Hare. I 438 RawlsVsHare/RawlsVsVs: we do not have to assume that people have a certain role and even less that they should serve as a means to higher purposes. We only refer to the initial situation of a society to be established. I 446 Good/The Good/The Right/Rightness/Rawls: how does the Good differ from the Right? 1. The principles of justice that are used for the purpose of determining the good are principles that are chosen in the initial situation of a society to be established. On the other hand, the principles of rational decision and rationality used to determine the right thing are not chosen. >Principles/Rawls. I 447 Another difference is that people differ in what is considered good, but not so in the case of determining the right thing. 1. See W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford 1930), p. 67. 2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. I, vk. III, ch. 1-63. 3. Kant, The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Acadmy Edition, vol. IV, pp. 425-419; The Critique of Practical Reason, ch. II, bk I of pt. I. 4. See H. J. Paton on Kant in: In Defense of Reason (London, 1951), pp. 157-177. 5. H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 7th Ed.(London, 1907), bk. I, ch. IX and bk. III, ch. XIV. 6. F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, 2nd Ed. (Oxford, 1926), ch. II. 7. Joshua Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (New York, 1908), lext II. 8. H. J. Paton, The Good Will (London, 1927), bk. II and III, esp. ch. VIII and IX. 9. W.D. Lamont, The Value Judgment (Edingurgh, 1955). 10. J. N. Findlay, Values and Intentions (London, 1961) ch. V, secs I and III; ch. VI. (11. For the naturalistic value theory see: John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York, 1922), pt. III. 12. See also R. B: Perry, General Theory of Value (New York, 1926), ch. XX-XXII. 13. As well as C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (Lasalle Ill. 1946), bk. III. 14. Rawls' own approach is based on: J. O. Urmson „On Grading“, Mind (1950), vol. 59, Paul Ziff, Semantic Analysis (Ithaca, NY, 1960), ch. VI. 15. Philippa Foot, „Goodness and Choice“, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 35 (1961). 16. Cf. Aristoteles, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. VIII, ch. 11-14, bk. X. ch. 1-5. 17. See W.F.R. Hardie, Aristote’s Ethical Theory, (Oxford, 1968), ch. XIV. 18. G.C. Field, Moral Theory (London, 1932), pp. 76-78. 19. R. W. White, „Ego and Reality in Psychoanalytic Theory“,Psychological Issues, vol. III (1963), ch. III and pp. 173-175, 180f. 20. See B. G. Campbell, Human Evolution (Chicago, 1966), pp. 49-53. 21. W. H. Thorpe, Science, Man and Morals, (London, 1965), pp. 87-92. 22. I. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Ethology (New York, 1970), pp. 217-248. 23. See R. M. Hare, Geach on Good an Evil, Analysis 17(5), p. 109ff. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Kant | Rawls | I 251 Kant/Justice/Principles/Categorical Imperative/Rawls: My interpretation of Kant focuses on the concept of autonomy. >Categorical Imperative, >I. Kant as Author, >About Kant. RawlsVsHare: We should not understand Kant primarily in terms of universality and generality. That would be too narrow a basis to construct a moral theory(1). Rawls: For a complete understanding of Kant's later writings, one has to consider Kant's later writings. Morals/Kant/Rawls: Kant begins with the rational choice of moral principles and their rational assessment. I 252 As legislation for an empire of ends, moral principles must not only be acceptable to everyone, but must also be publicly known. They must be accepted by free and equally rational individuals. >Autonomy/Kant/Rawls. Categorical imperative/Kant/Rawls: the veil of ignorance (in my theory) robs the persons in the initial situation of a society to be established of all information about their future position anyway, which at the same time guarantees that they decide as free and equally rational persons. >Veil of Ignorance. Rawls: this adds several things to Kant's concept: e. g. that the chosen principles are applied not only to individuals, but to society as a whole. Nevertheless, I think we'll stay close to Kant. I 255 RawlsVsKant: Kant did not show that our actions under moral law show our nature in a recognizable way, as acting according to contrary principles would not do. Solution/Rawls: our assumption of the initial situation with the veil of ignorance resolves this deficiency: we only have to show that our principles to be chosen are applicable. We accept the initial situation as one that is seen by the noumenal self in Kant's sense. Qua noumenale they have the free choice between principles. At the same time, however, they want to express their rationality in the world around them, i. e. their independence from contingent characteristics of nature and society. If the argument from contract theory is correct, precisely those principles define the moral law. >Contract Theory/Rawls, >Rationality. I 256 Our desire to behave justly then arises partly from the desire to express ourselves as free and equally rational beings. I think that is why Kant speaks of it as a reason for shame when we behave incorrectly and not as a reason for guilt. >Emotions/Rawls. I 257 Society/election/self/Kant/RawlsVsKant/Rawls: in two points I deviate particularly from Kant's conception ((s) as it is laid out in the categorical imperative): 1. the choice (of the principles) as noumenal self I assume to be the choice of a collective (self). This choice must be acceptable to other selfs. 2. I assume that the parties know that they are subject to the conditions of human life. In the light of these natural limitations, the principles are chosen. In Kant's case, it appears that he also includes the freedom of God or the freedom of pure intelligences, but these are not subject to the restrictions that demand that others be recognized as equally rational and free beings. >Intersubjectivity, >Freedom, >Community, >Society. 1. Cf. R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, Oxford, 1963, pp. 123f. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Morals | Hare | Singer I 78 Moral/Hare/Peter Singer: Hare(1) proposes to distinguish two levels of moral: a) the intuitive level of moral and b) the critical level of moral. >Cognitivism, >Emotivism. Singer I 79 In daily life we do not calculate the theoretical-ethical consequences of our actions. Therefore, we should establish broader moral norms for our everyday life. These should be those that have had the best consequences for centuries. For example, telling the truth, keeping promises, not hurting anyone else, etc. P. SingerVsHare: 1. That sounds like the advice of a trainer. Singer I 80 P. SingerVsHare: 2. For example, an utilitarian could argue that if the killing went completely unnoticed, it could have no consequences at all. >Utilitarianism, >Deontology, >Consequentialism, >Preference utilitarianism. 1. R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Oxford, 1981 |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Prescriptivism | Singer | I 7 Prescriptivism/P. SingerVsPrescriptivism/ SingerVsHare: it is not about how the rules are, but what the humans do. >Norms, >R. M. Hare, >Actions, >Ethics, >Morality. |
SingerP I Peter Singer Practical Ethics (Third Edition) Cambridge 2011 SingerP II P. Singer The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically. New Haven 2015 |
| Speech Act Theory | Hare | Searle V 207 SearleVsTraditional Speech Act Analysis: (SearleVsAustin, SearleVsHare): thesis: "good" and "true" mean the same in different acts. They are not taken into account by traditional speech act theory. Good/true/speech act theory/tradition: Hare: e.g. "Good" is used to recommend something. Strawson: "true" is used to reaffirm or acknowledge statements. >Strawson. Austin: "knowledge" is needed to give guarantees (SearleVs). >J.R. Searle. In principle: "the word W is used to perform the speech act A". >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Austin, John L. | Searle Vs Austin, John L. | SearleVs Traditional Speech act analysis. (SearleVsAustin,SearleVsHare) Thesis: "Good", "true" mean the same in different acts. Ignored by the traditional speech act theory) good/true/speech act theory/tradition: Hare: E.g. "Good" is used to recommend something. Strawson: "True" is used to confirm or acknowledge statements. Austin: "Knowledge" is used to provide guarantees. (SearleVs). In principle: "the word W is used to perform the speech act A". >Speech act theory. IV 17 illocutionary act/Austin: five categories: verdictive, expositive, exercitive, conductive, commissive) speech acts/SearleVsAustin: Distinction between illocutionary role and expression with propositional content: R(p). The various acts performed in different continua! There are at least 12 important dimensions. IV 18 1. Differences in joke (purpose) of the act. (However, not to every act a purpose has to belong). IV 19 The illocutionary joke is part of the role, but both are not the same. E.g. a request may have the same joke as a command. 2. Differences in orientation (word to the world or vice versa). Either, the world needs to match the words, or vice versa. IV 20 Example by Elizabeth Anscombe: Shopping list with goods, the same list is created by the store detective. IV 21 3. Differences in the expressed psychological states E.g. to hint, to regret, to swear, to threaten. (Even if the acts are insincere). Def sincerity condition/Searle: You cannot say, "I realize that p but I do not believe that p." "I promise that p but I do not intend that p" The mental state is the sincerity condition of the act. IV 22 These three dimensions: joke, orientation, sincerity condition are the most important. 4. Differences in the strength with which the illocutionary joke is raised. E.g. "I suggest", "I swear" 5. Differences in the position of speaker and listener E.g. the soldier will make not aware the general of the messy room. IV 23 6. Differences of in which the utterance relates to what is in the interest of speaker and listener. E.g. whining, congratulating 7. Difference in relation to the rest of the discourse E.g. to contradict, to reply, to conclude. 8. Differences in propositional content, resulting from the indicators of the illocutionary role E.g. report or forecasts IV 24 9. Differences between those acts that must always be speech acts, and those that can be carried out differently. E.g. you need not to say anything to classify something, or to diagnose 10. Differences between those acts, for which the extra-linguistic institutions are needed, and those for which they are not necessary E.g. wedding, blessing, excommunication IV 25 11. Differences between acts where the illocutionary verb has a performative use and those where this is not the case E.g. performative use: to state, to promise, to command no performative: "I hereby boast", "hereby I threaten". 12. differences in style E.g. announcing, entrustment. IV 27 SearleVsAustin: the list does not refer to acts but to verbs. One must distinguish between verb and act! E.g. one can proclaim commands, promises, reports but that is something else, as to command, to announce or to report. A proclamation is never merely a proclamation, it also needs to be a determination, a command or the like. IV 30 Searle: E.g.iIf I make you chairman, I do not advocate that you chairman IV 36 Def Declaration/Searle: the successful performance guarantees that the propositional content of the world corresponds. (Later terminology: "institutional facts) Orientation: by the success of the declaration word and world match to each other () No sincerity. Overlapping with assertive:... The referee's decisions. SearleVsAustin: Vs Distinction constative/performative. VII 86 Cavell: "Must we mean what we say?" defends Austin and adds: The deviation can be "really or allegedly" present. Austin: it is neither true nor false that I write this article voluntarily, because if there is no deviation, the concept of free will is not applicable. SearleVsAustin: that's amazing. VII 88 SearleVsAustin: Five theses to see Austin in a different light: 1. Austin exemplifies an analysis pattern that is common today as it is also used at Ryles' analysis of "voluntarily". Ryle thesis of "voluntary" and "involuntary" can be applied only to acts, "you should not have done." Again, it is absurd to use it in an ordinary use. VII 89 Neither true nor false: Wittgenstein: e.g. that I "know that I am in pain" E.g. that Moore knows he has two hands. etc. (> certainty). Austin: E.g. it is neither true nor false, that I went out of free will to the session. VII 90 The use of "voluntary" required certain conditions are not met here. Words in which they are not met, we can call "A-words", the conditions "A-Conditions". We can create a list. 2. the conditions that are exemplified by the slogan "No modification without deviation", penetrate the whole language and are not limited to certain words. E.g. The President is sober today. Hans breathes. etc. VII 91 3. Negation/Searle: the negation of an A-word is not in turn an A-word! E.g. I bought my car not voluntarily, I was forced to. I did not volunteer, I was dragged here. He does not know whether the object in front of him is a tree. Considerable asymmetry between A-words and their opposite or negation. VII 92 SearleVsAustin: according to him, in both cases a deviation is required. 4. A deviation is generally a reason to believe that the claim that is made by the statement to the contrary is true, or could have been, or at least could have been held by someone as true. An A-condition is simply a reason to believe that the remark could have been false. SearleVsAustin: his presentation is misleading because it suggests that any deviation justifies a modification. E.g. if I buy a car while strumming with bare toes on a guitar, which is indeed a different way to buy a car, but it does not justify the remark "He bought his car voluntarily." VII 93 SearleVsAustin: we can come to any list of A-words, because if word requires a deviation, will depend on the rest of the sentence and on the context. Then Austin's thesis is not about words but about propositions. VII 94 Standard situation/circumstances/SearleVsAustin: notice that there is a standard situation, is to suggest that this fact is remarkable and that there is reason to believe that it could also be a non-standard situation. VII 95 SearleVsAustin: his thesis even is not on propositions: to make an assertion means to specify that something is the case. If the possibility that the situation does not exist, is excluded, it is meaningless. Austin's slogan should be formulated to: "No comment, which is not remarkable" or "No assertion that is not worth to be claimed". VII 96 SearleVsAustin: this one has seen it wrong. This is connected with the concept of intention: Intention/Searle: Thesis: the oddity or deviation which is a condition for the utterance "X was deliberately done" represents, at the same time provides a reason for the truth of the statement by "X was not done intentionally". assertion condition/utterance condition: it is the utterance condition of an assertion precisely because it is one reason for the truth of the other. SearleVsAustin: the data must be explained in terms of the applicability of certain terms. So my view is simple and plausible. (VII 98): In Austin's slogan "No modification without deviation" it is not about the applicability of these terms, but rather about conditions for putting up claims generally. Negation/SearleVsAustin: then the negations of the above, are not neither true nor false, but simply false! E.g. I did not go voluntarily to the meeting (I was dragged). etc. VII 98 Example The ability to remember ones name is one of the basic conditions ... |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Hare, R.M. | Prior Vs Hare, R.M. | I 65 Command/Prior: giving a command is different from the command and the imperative sentence is yet something else (because a command can be expressed differently). And yet another thing is what the command is about. (For example, about the window that is to be closed). Ontology/Command: should we then say that the equipment of the universe contains something else, "objective commands", apart from command expressions and windows, imperative sentences? Objective Command/Prior: two things can be said about this: a) that someone explains it, i.e. they are the object of commanding, they constitute what is being commanded b) that they are not forming or binding c) that they are obeyed. (Ad c) see below) I 66 Command/Relation/Brackets/Prior: ad a) the common notion that a command is a relation between a commanding person and something that is commanded can be eliminated through proper brackets. Instead of "X commands us/to close the door" ""X commands us to"/"close door". Here, "commands us to" is not a two-digit predicate, but rather an operator that forms a sentence from a name on the one hand, and from an imperative sentence on the other. Facts/Ramsey: "There are facts": logical form: "for some p, ". (Special character) Standards/Prior: analog we could write if there are any standards at all "for some ". Problem: as far as this is at all comprehensible, it would be a command and not a sentence! Namely the most general command: "Do something." And so general that even doing nothing would be a case of doing something. (?). But that does not yet destroy the analogy. Unlike facts: here it would be impossible that there was any fact, because at least this finding would correspond to a fact, it would then be a fact that there are no facts and that would be a fact, i.e. there must be at least one fact. I 68 Command/Prior: analog, the command to do something is binding, if any command is binding, even the command to do nothing! It follows that doing nothing could not be binding (in the broad sense of "doing"). But while the command to do something is a necessary command in the sense that it is a command which is binding, if any command is binding, it is therefore also a trivial command like necessary truths as when it rains, it rains or the truth that there is truth. This is trivial. That is certainly not what people think who insist on "absolute moral standards". Command/Existence/Indicative/Imperative/Objectivity/Prior: Problem: E.g. "There are commands that have never been expressed and will never be expressed." Analog: indicative sentence: "There are facts (true propositions) that were never asserted and will never be asserted. Ramsey: "For some p, p, although it was never asserted and never will be." analog: imperative sentence: "For some a ("do a"), even though a was never commanded, not will be". Contradiction: This command has the particularity of being unspecifianble! Indicative sentence: E.g. "537 + 86251 = 86788 has never been asserted": This does not diminish the truth or plausibility of the sentence. Is that also true for the (binding) command? I 69 E.g. "The command to close the door, was binding before anyone expressed it" or "You should have closed the door before someone told you" according to common translation principles that would have to be translated as: ""I closed the door before..." i.e. it is a command to already have done something. (Absurd). Commands should always refer to the future. ((s) Christian commandments are maxims, not commands.) Prior: but: "you should have closed the door before someone told you does not sound so absurd at all! And it does not means that you now have an obligation with regard to the past. Nevertheless, it is not clear how the past tense should be introduced in a command. Problem: the past tense was precisely supposed to affect the commands here, and not the content. Reducing the objectivity of commands on the objectivity of propositions Command/Requirement/Objectivity/Existence/Prior: A similar problem exists with requirements (non-binding commands). Falsity/Ramsey: "There are falsities": logical form: "for some p, it is not the case that p". Analog: can you say "For some a, not a"? E.g. "Not (close the door)". Is this simply the command to leave the door open? But that would not be equivalent to the fact that the command to close the door was not binding, but that the opposite, to leave the door open, is binding. I.e. it would not be a translation of "There are requirements". But rather of "There are binding prohibitions". Prior: this is again about commanding and not about the content. I 70 It looks as if we needed something like Hare's neusticon and phrasticon. PriorVsHare: but I see no reason why the phrasticon could not simply be replaced by indicative sentences. Notation/McKinsey Hofstadter: "!p" ("shriek"): "Let it be the case that p". Or "See to it that p". "Bring forth p". Prohibition/Negation/Command/Prior: there are two possibilities here: a) "!not p": see to it that p does not happen" b) "not (!p)" as: "you need not worry about it". Past/Command: if the exclamation mark (shriek) can be modified like this by negation, then perhaps also by past operators? E.g. "Previously: !p". You should ensured p. Such forms could be called "imperatives" rather than commands. But this is a radical change to our original program. Our variables are now just those of the old propositions, and the formulas look very different. E.g. "Do something" can have two forms: a) "for some p see to it that p" b) See to it that (for some p, p). And these two are probably not equivalent! I 71 Furthermore, none of these is a parallel of the assertion "For some p, p". I.e. "There are facts" so that it is no longer plausible now, to identify this form with "There are standards". With this seems the hope for "objective commands" to have fallen into disrepute. The objective part of the command is our old friend, the proposition. If we want to be realists in ethics, only the old way remains. Introducing "It should be the case that __" as an operator for forming indicative sentences. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Hare, R.M. | Searle Vs Hare, R.M. | V 207 SearleVsTraditional speech act analysis: (SearleVsAustin,SearleVsHare) Thesis: "Good" and "true" means the same in different acts. This was ignored by the traditional speech act theory). good/true/speech act theory/tradition: Hare: E.g. "Good" is used to recommend something. Cf. >statements/Hare. Strawson: "True" is used to confirm or acknowledge statements. Cf. >speech ac theory/Strawson. Austin: "Knowledge" is used to provide guarantees. (SearleVsSpeech act theory). |
Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Hare, R.M. | Mackie Vs Hare, R.M. | Stegmüller IV 171 HareVs Objectivist ethics: incomprehensible, what is even meant by "objectivity of values". MackieVsHare: relapse into positivism of the 30's. At that time the question of >other minds was called pointless, as was the one of the difference between the world of phenomenalists and the world of realists. IV 172 If Hare cannot imagine anything, he should not assume futility, but make arguments against objective values. Objectivity/ethics/Mackie: however, the question of generally recognized measures of value bears a certain level of objectivity. IV 173 This corresponds to a subjectivism of 2nd order. This is supported by: 1. Relativity argument: we encounter different moral regulatory systems in the world. Objectivism would have to consider all of them wrong but one. IV 175 2. peculiarity argument (Absonderlichkeitsargument): whoever believes in objective values and norms, must take this belief seriously. This leads to strange entities like "Should Be Done", "Should Be Refrained From" etc. Supporter: Moore: values are "non-natural qualities". They require a special ability of insight. (>Detectivism, >Euthyphro, >Intuitionism). |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Hare, R.M. | Newen Vs Hare, R.M. | NSI 155 "Good"/"Should"/Prescriptivism/Hare: Thesis: these words have even primarily prescriptive meaning. E.g. speaking about a good book, a good exhibition is to recommend these things. (s) VsHare: then it would be conceptually contradictory, e.g. to say of a finished exhibition that it was good. Or e.g. to praise for a sold-out book) Def Secondary Prescriptive/Hare: e.g. "proper", "hardworking". Universalizability/Moral/Hare/Newen/Schrenk: every should-statement contains a principle that this statement is applicable to all exactly similar cases. E.g. Dagmar is pregnant, you should carry the groceries into her apartment for her. And that is what every healthy person should do who has nothing better to do at the moment. This universalizability is reminiscent of Kant's categorical imperative which is, however, not linguistically motivated. NS I 156 HareVsKant: it is the logic of language that imposes the categorical imperative on us. Moral/Logic/Hare: Thesis: someone who acts contrary to a moral statement does not understand the meaning. Hare: e.g. in a train compartment it says: "Please do not smoke, there are children on board." If the smoker then says, well, I'll smoke next door where there are also children, he did not understand the meaning. On the other hand: e.g. "No smoking!" Such signs were distributed at random in otherwise identical compartments. Point: there is no universalizable principle. Therefore, the sign expresses no moral should-sentence. Moral Principles/Principle/Moral/Hare/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: how to generate moral principles. Problem: how to recognize the essential in a situation. E.g. Dagmar is pregnant. Is it necessary for the principle that she could swap roles with her husband? Is imaginability sufficient? VsHare: some authors see a fundamental impossibility when comparing such situations. Universalizability: must also accommodate subjective desires and dislikes. This makes the objective description of situations very difficult. NS I 157 Utilitarianism/Hare/Newen/Schrenk: Hare is close to utilitarianism in as far as a theory instructs to ensure the fulfillment of the preferences of the greatest number of parties. Universalizability/Generalizability/Moral/Descriptivism/Hare: moral judgments possess their descriptiveness because of their universalizability. Newen/Schrenk: the descriptive portion then consists of the should-portion along with the situation in which it is expressed. So moral statements can certainly be assessed as correct or incorrect. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Deontology | Pro | III 71 Ethics / Nagel:. Per deontology: restricts what is allowed to do in the service of both neutral and autonomous values - NagelVs consequentialism / NagelVsHare - consequentialism: only the results are important. |
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