Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Existence Statements Armstrong
 
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II 182
Negative existential statements/Truthmaker/Lewis: E.g. "there are no penguins in the Arctic" is also true without truth makers - because there is no existing counter-E.g.- "deficiency" as truth maker or "lack of false makers" is just random idioms - MartinVs: a de-ontologization is superfluous - it is enough to know what we have to watch out for - instead of "how things are" better: "how the world is" - e.g. "search the hole" is completely understandable - VsHacking, Vs "manipulation" as a criterion of existence: does not work with celestial bodies.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

In
Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

AR III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Language Hacking
 
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I 228
Language / Hacking: (goes back to the Leakey family (?)) Thesis: language was invented out of boredom, to tell each other jokes around the campfire. Thesis: the first word that was needed was something to express: "real" e.g. "No, not this, but this here is real": (To the rest of you could point). - Even before the name (for absent objects) one needed logical constants. Instead of "Me Tarzan, you Jane" - "This real" Once a way of representing is found (e.g. pointing) followed by a second-order term in tow.
VsHacking: pointless to set up a theory that can not be confirmed.

Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Leibniz Principle Hacking
 
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Millikan I 261
Leibniz’ Gesetz/VsVs/Hacking/Millikan: (jüngste Verteidigung von Hacking): die Einwände gehen nicht darauf ein, dass es sich um gekrümmten Raum statt um eine Verdoppelung handeln könnte. Gekrümmter Raum/Hacking/Millikan: hier taucht ein und dasselbe Ding nochmals auf, es ist keine Verdoppelung wie in der Euklidischen Geometrie.
MillikanVsHacking: aber das würde eben die Frage nicht beantworten.
I 262
Es gibt aber immer noch zwei interessante Möglichkeiten: > Ununterscheidbarkeit. Leibniz’ Gesetz/Prinzip/Identität/Ununterscheidbarkeit/Millikan:
1. Symmetrische Welt: man könnte behaupten, dass hier einfach keine Tatsache gibt, die darüber entscheidet, ob der Raum gekrümmt ist oder verdoppelt. ((s) >Nonfaktualismus).
Pointe: das würde beinhalten, dass Leibniz Prinzip weder metaphysisch noch logisch notwendig ist, und dass seine Gültigkeit nur eine Frage der Konvention ist.
2. Symmetrische Welt: man könnte sagen, dass das Beispiel keine allgemeine Lösung anbietet, wohl aber die Annahme einer bestimmten gegebenen symmetrischen Welt: hier gäbe es dann sehr wohl einen Tatsache, ob der Raum gekrümmt ist oder nicht. Ein bestimmter gegebener Raum kann nämlich nicht beides sein!
Pointe: dann ist Leibniz Prinzip weder metaphysisch noch logisch notwendig.
Pointe: aber in diesem Fall ist das dann keine Frage der Konvention, sondern eine wirkliche Tatsache!


Hack I
I. Hacking
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Leibniz Principle Adams
 
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Millikan I, 261
VsLeibniz' Principle/Law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: Thesis: the principle that is used when such symmetrical worlds are constructed, the principle that an individual cannot be distinguished from itself, so the two world parts of the world cannot be the same half. Leibniz' law/VsVs/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): the objections do not consider the fact that this could be about a curved space instead of a doubling.
Curved Space/Hacking/Millikan: here one thing and the same thing emerges again, it is not a doubling as in the Euclidean geometry.
MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question.
---
I 262
But there are still two interesting possibilities: > indistinguishability. Leibniz' Law/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan:
1. symmetrical world: one could argue that there is simply no fact here that decides whether the space is curved or doubled. ((s)> nonfactualism).
N.B.: this would imply that Leibniz' principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention.
2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very well be a fact whether the space is curved or not. A certain given space cannot be both!
N.B.: then Leibniz' principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary.
N.B.: but in this case this is not a question of convention, but a real fact!
MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong take that into account.
Curved space/Millikan: here, what is identical is necessarily identical ((s) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if the one half had been different, then also the other. Here the space seems to be only doubled.
Doubling/Millikan: if the space (in Euclidean geometry) is mirrored, then the identity is random, but not necessary. Here one half could change without changing the other half. ((s) No counterfactual conditional).
Identity: is given if the objects are not indistinguishable because a law applies in situ, but a natural law, a natural necessity.
---
I 263
Then, in the second option, identity is derived from causality. (x)(y){[NN(F)Fx equi Fy] equi x = y}
NN/Notation: nature-necessary under necessary circumstances.

Leibniz Principle Millikan
 
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I 259
Leibniz Principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Leibniz/Millikan: Thesis: I treat his principle so that it is an implicit assertion about grammatical categories. (x)(y)[(F)(Fx equi Fy) > x = y]
Problem: what is the domain of the quantifier "(F)"? ((s) > second level logic).
Here, there cannot simply elements of the domain be paired with grammatical predicates. The set of grammatical predicates may not be of ontological interest. E.g. neither "... exists" nor "... = A" nor "... means red" is paired with something which has the same meaning as "... is green" paired with a variant of a world state.
Quantification/properties/2nd level logic/Millikan: perhaps we can say that the quantifier (F) is about all properties, but we must characterize this set differently than by pairing with grammatical predicates.
False: For example, the attempt of Baruch Brody's thesis: "to be identical with x" should be understood as a property of x "in the domain of the quantifier (F)" is quite wrong! ((s) "be identical with oneself" as a property).
If so, then every thing that has all the properties of x would be identical with x. ((s) Even if it had additional properties).
Problem: under this interpretation, property is not a coherent ontological category.
How can we treat the Leibniz principle, and keep the notion of "property" so that it is ontologically coherent?
---
I 260
Leibniz principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan: the Leibniz principle is usually regarded as a claim about the identity of individual substances. Substances in which it is useful to attribute to them place and time. That is, "x" and "y" go over individuals. Quantifier: (F) is generally understood in the way that it only goes via "general properties". Or via "purely qualitative properties".
Purely qualitative properties: i.e. that they are not defined with regard to certain individuals: e.g. the property "to be higher than Mt. Washington"
N.B.: but: "the property of being higher than something that has these and these properties and which are the properties of Mt. Washington".
Individual related properties/Millikan: are normally excluded because they would allow properties like "to be identical to x". That would lead to an empty reading of the Leibniz principle.
MillikanVs: but it is not at all the case that "is identical to x" would not correspond to any reasonable property.
Leibniz principle/Millikan: however, the principle is mostly examined in the context of the domain of general properties in relation to...
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I 261
...the domain of things that have these properties. Thus question: do we have to postulate a domain of such things beyond the domain of these general properties, or can we define the self-identity of an individual in purely qualitative expressions? Leibniz principle/Millikan: in this context, the relation to a particular individual ((s) and thus of the thing to itself) appears to be an impure or mixed ontological category.
VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe could be perfectly symmetrical, whereby then a perfectly identical (indistinguishable) individual would be in another place.
((s) That is, there is something of x that is indistinguishable, which nevertheless is not identical with x, against the Leibniz principle). (See also Adams).
Variants: For example, a temporal repetitive universe, etc. e.g. two identical water drops, two identical billiard balls at different locations. ((s) Why then identical? Because the location (the coordinates) does not have influence on the identity!)
Property/Leibniz: Thesis: a relation to space and time leads to a property which is not purely qualitative.
Millikan: if one ignores such "impure" properties ((s) thus does not refer to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties!
VsLeibniz Principle/Law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: Thesis: the principle that is used when such symmetrical worlds are constructed, is the principle that an individual cannot be distinguished (separated) from itself, so the two world halfs of the world cannot be one and the same half.
Leibniz principle/VsVs/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of hacking): the objections do not consider that this could be a curved space instead of a doubling.
Curved Space/Hacking/Millikan: here the same thing emerges again, it is not a doubling as in the Euclidean geometry.
MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question.
---
I 262
But there are still two interesting possibilities: > indistinguishability. Leibniz Principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan:
1. symmetrical world: one could argue that there is simply no fact here that decides whether the space is curved or doubled. ((s) > nonfactualism).
N.B.: this would imply that the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention.
2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very well be a fact whether the space is curved or not. A certain given space cannot be both!
N.B.: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary.
N.B.: but in this case this is not a question of convention, but a real fact!
MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong take that into account.
Curved space/Millikan: here, what is identical is necessarily identical ((s) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if the one half were different, then also the other. Here the space seems to be only double.
Doubling/Millikan: if the space (in Euclidean geometry) is mirrored, the identity is a random, not a necessary one. Here one half could change without changing the other half. ((s) No counterfactual conditional).
Identity: is then given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law applies in situ, but a natural law, a natural necessity.
---
I 263
Then, in the second option, identity from causality applies. (x) (y) {[NN (F) Fx equi Fy] equi x = y}
Natural necessary/Notation: natural necessary under natural possible circumstances.
Millikan: this is quite an extreme view, for it asserts that if there were two sets of equivalent laws that explain all events, one of these sets, but not the other, would be true, even if there was no possibility to find out which of the two sets it is that would be true.
This would correspond to the fact that a seemingly symmetrical world was inhabited. Either the one or the other would be true, but one would never find out which one.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987


The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Hacking, I. Putnam Vs Hacking, I.
 
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I 87
Connectives/meaning/PutnamVsHacking: We can expand that on quantifiers. Derivation Rules: p u q p; p u q q; p p v q; ~ P ~ q ~ (p v q) This shows that the derivation rules do not specify the meaning of the connectives.
Someone can accept all these rules and still use the connectives in the non-traditional sense. In a sense, which is not truth functional.


Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Leibniz, G.W. Millikan Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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I 261
VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz' law/principle/identity/indistinguishability/the indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe might be perfectly symmetrical, in which case there would be a perfectly identical ((S) indistinguishable) individual at another place. ((S) That is, there would be something indistinguishable from x, which would still not be identical to x, against Leibniz principle). Variants: Ex a time-repetitive universe etc. Ex two identical drops of water, two identical billiard balls at various locations.
Property/Leibniz: thesis: a reference to space and time leads to a property that is not purely qualitative.
Millikan: if one disregards such "impure" properties ((S) does not make a reference to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties!
VsLeibniz' principle/law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: thesis: the principle that is used when constructing such symmetrical worlds, is the principle that an individual can not be distinguished (separated) from themselves, therefore, the two halves of the world can not be one and the same half.
Leibniz' law/VSVS/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): The objections do not respond to the fact that there could be a curved space instead of a duplication.
Curved space/Hacking/Millikan: here emerges one and the same thing again, there is no duplication as in Euclidean geometry.
MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question.
I 262
But there are still two interesting options: Leibniz' law/principle/identity/ indistinguishability/Millikan:
1. symmetrical world: it could be argued that there is simply no fact here, which determines whether space is curved or doubled. ((S)> Nonfaktualismus).
Pointe: this would imply that Leibniz's principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention.
2. symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but rather the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very much be a fact, whether the space is curved or not. Because a certain given space can not be both!
Pointe: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary.
Pointe: but in this case this is then no matter of convention, but a real fact!
MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong consider that.
Curved space/Millikan: what is identical is then necessarily identical ((S) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if one half would have been different, then the other one, too. Here space generally seems to be double.
Duplication/Millikan: when the space is mirrored (in Euclidean geometry) the identity is random, not necessary. Here one half could change without the other half changing. ((S) No counterfactual conditional).
Identity: is given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law in situ applies, but a law of nature, a naturally necessary agreement.
I 263
Then identity of causality applies in the second option. (X) (y) {[NN (F) ⇔ Fx Fy] ⇔ x = y}
Natural necessity/notation: naturally necessary under naturally possible circumstances.
MillikanVsVerifikationismus: if my theory is correct, it must be wrong.
Truth/world/relationship/Millikan: thesis: ultimately, meaningfulness and truth lie in relations between thought and the world.
I 264
Therefore, they can not be in the head, we can not internalize them.
I 268
Properties/Millikan: thesis: Properties (of one or more parts) that fall into the same area, are properties that are opposites of each other. Certainly, an area can contain another area. Ex "red" includes "scarlet" instead of excluding it and Ex "being two centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" includes "being 2.05 centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" rather than excluding this property.
The assumption that two properties may be the same only if the complete opposite regions from which they come coincide, implies that the identity of a property or property area is linked to the identity of a wider range from which it comes, and therefore is bound to the identity of their opposites. Now we compare Leibniz' view with that of Aristotle:
Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: all single properties are intrinsically comparable. However, perhaps not comparable in nature, because God has just created the best of all possible worlds - but they would be metaphysically comparable.
complex properties/Leibniz/Millikan: that would be properties that are not comparable. They also include absences or negations of properties. They have the general form "A and not B".
((S) Comparison/comparability/comparable/Millikan/(S): composite properties are not comparable Ex "A and not B".)
Of course, it is incompatible with the property "A and B".
Pointe: thus the metaphysical incompatibility rests on the logical incompatibility. That is, on the contradiction.
I 269
Necessity/Leibniz/Millikan: then God has first created logical necessity and later natural necessity. ("In the beginning…"). opposite properties/opposite/property/Leibniz/Millikan: according to Leibniz opposite properties are of two kinds:
1. to attribute both contradictory properties to one thing then would be to contradict oneself ((S) logically) or
2. the contradiction between the properties would lie in their own nature. But that would not lie in their respective nature individually but would be established by God, which prevented the properties from ever coming together.
MillikanVsLeibniz.
Identity/Properties/Aristotle/Millikan: opposite properties: for Aristotle, they serve to explain that nothing can be created from nothing. Def opposite property/Aristotle: are those which defy each others foundation, make each other impossible. The prevention of another property is this property!
Alteration/transformation/change/Aristotle/Millikan: when a change occurs, substances acquire new properties, which are the opposites of the previous properties.
Opposite/Aristotle is the potentiality (possibility) of the other property. Then, these opposites are bound at the most fundamental level (in nature) to each other.
Millikan pro Aristotle: he was right about the latter. In Aristotle there is no "beginning" as in Leibniz.
Properties/Opposite/Leibniz/Millikan pro Leibniz: was right about the assertion that two opposite properties that apply to the same substance is a contradiction. But this is about an indefinite negation, not the assertion of a specific absence. Or: the absence is the existence of an inconsistency.
Ex Zero/0/modern science/mathematics: is not the assertion of nothing: Ex zero acceleration, zero temperature, empty space, etc. Zero represents a quantity.
Non-contradiction/law of non-contradiction/Millikan: then, is a template of an abstract world structure or something that is sufficient for such a template.
Epistemology/epistemic/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle appears again at the level of epistemology:
I 270
Ex the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the statement "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions". Problem: from "x is red" follows that "x does not look red for ... under ...".
ontologically/ontology: equally: not-being-red would be an emptiness, an absence of red - rather than an opposite of red.
But it is about "x is non-red" being equivalent to "x does not look red under standard conditions" is either empty or incorrect.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987