Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Assertibility Brandom
 
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I 197
VsJustified Assertibility: Assertibilty conditions do not contain the entire meaning. ---
Rorty I ~ 325
(According to Rorty): assertible/Brandom/Rorty: in addition to the term "assertible" for the pure philosophy of language we still need "true". Especially for understanding how the language works as opposed to understanding how it spreads to the world. (Semantics/epistemology). Also naive: distinguishing the assertibility conditions of a statement as "descriptive meaning" and the consequences as "evaluative" importance, and thus abandon any need for harmony. ---
Brandom II 238
Assertibility Theories/Brandom: Thesis semantics must be oriented towards pragmatics (Brandom pro). ---
II 240
Two tasks: 1. assertive force, i.e. declaring accuracy, i.e. making a distinction between traits at all 2. saying when those traits are allowed. ---
II 241
a) what are the reasons, evidence b) directly ask whether a statement is true - "semantic assertibility"/Sellars: assertibility under ideal conditions. ---
II 242
BrandomVsSellars: hopeless: you cannot specify ideality; either it remains circular with recourse to the notion of truth, or trivial. (Also BrandomVsHabermas). ---
II 243
Brandom's own approach: Thesis rule-governed language game that allows to combine propositional contents that are objective in the sense that they detach from the settings of the speaker with declarative sentences - which splits assertibility into two parts: determination and authorization (two normative statuses) - goes beyond Behth, because it allows the distinction between right and wrong use. - (> Dummett,> Chess Joke, Benefit). ---
II 254f
Semantic Theories/Assertibility/Brandom: Pro: Advantage: close connection to use - Problem: Dilemma: either a) linked to attitude or b) to the object - N.B.: Same assertibility conditions, but different truth conditions - the object could be red without me being able to say it. ---
II 259
Solution: Conditional: "If the pattern is red, it is red" - Tautology: this is correct because it codifies a definition preserving inference - but not: ---
II 260
"If I am entitled to the assertion that the pattern is red, it is red"- not definition preserving. ---
II 261
Distinction between authorization and definition does not need the notion of truth. ---
II 261
BrandomVsAssertibility: does not distinguish between the status of the definition/authorization without the aid of incompatibilities (negation). Distinction between sentences that share the assertibility conditions and those that share the truth condition is not possible without the notion of truth.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Communication Habermas
 
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Rorty II 32
Language/Communication/HabermasVsDerrida: Derrida denies both the existence of an "obstinate formally structured area of communicative everyday practice" and an "autonomous field of fiction". Because he denies both, he can analyze any discourse according to the pattern of poetic language. Thus, he does not need to determine language. ---
II 33
RortyVsHabermas: Derrida is neither compelled nor willing to let "any language" be "determined" by anything. Derrida could fully agree with Habermas that "the world-developing power of interpretive language must prove itself" before metaphors become literary used and socially useful tools. RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that X is a special case of Y in order to treat X as Y. As if you could not just treat X as Y to see what happens.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Communication Luhmann
 
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GLU 89
Communication/Luhmann/GLU: - specific operation of social systems: 1) Communication, 2) Information 3) Understanding the difference between communication and information. - Communication is not the same as information, it only happens when information is understood - information is a selection between what is said and unsaid - Understanding is selection between communication and information.
II 47
Society/Communication/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: Special case: only society operates with communication - there is no communication outside of society. - Therefore, it is necessary closed. - This is the only system for which this is true - ((s) I.e. communication in the animal kingdom is precluded?) - Then no observer can take an outside standpoint.
AU Kass 13
Communication/Language/Karl Bühler/Luhmann: instead of "transmission model": - unity of three components 1) Information, what it is about - 2) Communication - 3) Understanding - already existed in antiquity. - LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: is the idea that this triad could be dismantled into acts. - Karl Bühler: all of them are only functions - ((s) Function/(s): Is not an act.)
AU Kass 13
Communication/LuhmannVsHabermas: communication does not serve the creation of consensus. - If that does not work, it is simply declared the norm and claimed "it was supposed to be like that." But we should not turn an impossibility into a standard. SchelskyVsHabermas: Does communication stop when this goal is reached?
Solution/Luhmann: communication is not an act which would have to be brought under a standard - only communicating is action. - Communication is open when viewed without additions like truth. - We can also say "no" - On the other hand, we do not have the opportunity to start all over again - without any authority it is impossible. - "No" does not terminate communication - communication could only be terminated by misunderstanding. - Communication ensues when"yes" and "no" are not yet decided.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997

Communication Theory Habermas
 
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Bubner I 196
Habermas/Communication theory/Bubner: Thesis: Thinking of the functioning of the political system according to the model of dialogue. Clear formal conditions which should be transferred to the political system as a whole. 1. Equality of the partners, no relationship between the knowing and the ignorant.
2. This is not to take place, as in Hegel, by laboriously dealing with the relation of master and servant, but rather as a priori, without which there is no interaction at all.
2. Obligation to refrain from influencing, equal scope.
3. Authenticity postulate: obligation to truth. Since intentions are not to be examined, only the course of the dialogue itself can provide the proof.
BubnerVsHabermas: since one builds from the outset on truthfulness, it is obviously more a question of definition, which one wants to allow as a dialogue at all.
---
I 198
Communication theory/BubnerVsHabermas: it is claimed that the observance of the formal conditions is guaranteed for the first time in history, 1. in fact, political events are to be transformed structurally according to the paradigm of a philosophical ideal.
Idealization because the number of participants must be limited, and this is neither a historical coincidence nor a prejudice of undemocratic eliteism.
---
I 199
2. the planned entry into the dialogue is characterized by the breaking of previously unquestioned unanimity, yet the controversy must take place in the primary intention of returning to the community. However, efforts to reach consensus are not yet consensus, and consensus is the foundation of collective practice.
In a word: the dialogue is a means, but not the last content of politics.
3. It is not clear what is actually the content of the event.
   With the tendency to reformulate the flow of practice into a permanent dialogue, the contents that are derived from everyday political life are lost. The content becomes playful as long as they are removed from the practical consequences.
BubnerVsCommunication theory: shows that instead of a rationalization proposal for political processes in reality a new determination of the political is intended. The substantial content of the Aristotelianism which was in the community of action-orientated values is seen as historically overtaken or consumed.
The signum of modernism, subjectivity, no longer allows the focus on good life, for this reflexive structure of the practice structure does not take into account the particularity of the individual.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Communication Theory Bubner
 
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I 198
Communication theory/BubnerVsHabermas: it is claimed that the observance of the formal conditions is guaranteed for the first time in history, 1. in truth, however, political events are to be transformed structurally according to the paradigm of a philosophical ideal.
Idealization because the number of participants must be limited, and this is neither a historical coincidence nor a prejudice of undemocratic eliteism.
---
I 199
2. The planned entry into the dialogue is characterized by the breaking of previously unquestioned unanimity, yet the controversy must take place in the primary intention of returning to the community.        However, efforts to reach consensus are not yet agreed, and especially consensus brings the foundation of collective practice about.
In a word: the dialogue is a means, but not the last content of politics.
3. It is not clear which are the contents of the event.
       With the tendency to reformulate the flow of practice into a permanent dialogue, the contents that are derived from everyday political life are lost. The contents become playful as long as they are removed from the practical consequences.
BubnerVsCommunication theory: shows that instead of a rationalization proposal for political processes in reality a new determination of the political is intended. The substantial content of the Aristotelianism which was made up of the commonality of action-orientated values was viewed as historically overtaken or consumed.
The signum of modernism, subjectivity, does not longer allow the focus on good life, since this reflexive structure of the practice structure does not take into account the particularity of the individual.
---
I 201
BubnerVsCommunication Theory/BubnerVsHabermas: seem to concentrate solely on the act of the conclusion of contract, which they reinterpret with linguistic means and declare it a permanent process. But they refrain from the stately state of tamed practice, which they suspect of the enforcement of governance.
       Instead of allowing politics through the contract, politics is an unceasing succession of contracts. Every trivial conflict takes the form of a fundamental problem.
The institutional skepticism of communication theory reaches so deeply that the avoidance of the structural determination of political order is in principle pursued in the form of the favoring of the dialogue. Procedural rules, official channels, decisionistic decisions, separation of powers, temporary governance. The whole system of the differentiated form of organization of the political is suspended, and can always be revised in conversation.
Other writers: the basic idealization has been lamented, the confusion of the modes of theoretical discussion with practice, the unhistorical neglect of the requirements of factual complexity of society, etc.
Bubner: the main objection, however, is that the prerequisite of all political speeches, the commonality of the objectives, is thwarted in favor of an abstract agreement between partners, whose joint action remains as long as they are discussing in the dialogue method. (See also subjectivity)

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992

Conceptual Realism Brandom
 
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Martin Seel criticism Die ZEIT April 01
HabermasVsBrandom: "conceptual realism" (conceptual realism: (HusserlVs) concedes the concepts real existence. The world is designed as our cpncepts require - turns the architecture of the post-Hegelian thinking upside down - instead of confrontation with the contingent world that must prove itself in the formation of adequate terms, a mere replica takes the place of in-themselves-existing contents - BrandomVsHabermas: discards the "positivist image" of a testing of our concepts in a concept-free outer world.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Conceptual Realism Habermas
 
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Seel III 149
Conceptual realism/HabermasVsBrandom: his "conceptual realism" misses the constructive nature of human knowledge - to the point of confrontation of a mere replica of selfcontained contents - SeelVsBrandom: more pragmatist than pragmatism - BrandomVsHabermas: Brandom rejects the "positivist image" of a testing of our concepts in a conceptual free outer world.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988


Se I
M. Seel
Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997

Se II
M. Seel
Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000

Se III
M. Seel
Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001
Forms of Thinking Rorty
 
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Richard Rorty
Examples of forms of thinking in Rorty's works
I 130
The 17th century "misunderstood" the mirror of nature or the inner eye as little as Aristotle the natural movement or Newton the gravitation. One could not misunderstand them, because one invented them. ---
I 135
"Rightly held to be true" is not the same as "true". ---
I 139
One can hardly say, "mental" means something in reality "that could turn out to be something physical", as well as one cannot say, e.g. "criminal behavior" means in reality something like "behavior that can turn out to be innocent". ---
I 258
Abstract/concrete: the distinction must also be relativized to a given data base, such as the distinction of the complex and the simple. ---
I 261
Doubling: Rorty: the action, that templates led as Lockean ideas to a doubling of the explanandum, is like the claim, the particles of the Bohr-atom would double the billiard balls whose behavior they help to explain. ((S) 1. inversion, 2. analogies are anyway no doubling.) However, it turns out that it is fruitful to postulate small billiard balls inside the big billiard balls. ---
I 273
The language of thought or any code, can have no honor status, (not even for Fodor) because a mere code is not a means to distinguish the truth from falsehood. ---
II 33
RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that one must first demonstrate X as a special case of Y to treat X as Y. As if one could not simply handle X as Y, to see what happens. ---
III 169 ff
Contingency: contingencies in literary narratives are meaningful only in retrospect.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Intersubjectivity Putnam
 
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III 167
PutnamVsHabermas: general consent is neither in philosophy nor anywhere else ever criterion for accuracy.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Language Habermas
 
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Rorty II 94
Language/Habermas/Rorty: Habermas distinguishes between a strategic and a genuinely communicative use of language. Scale of confidence levels. ---
II 94/95
Rorty: if we cease to interpret reason as a source of authority, the Platonic and Kantian dichotomy dissolves between reason and feeling. ---
II 96
RortyVsHabermas: the idea of the "better argument" is only useful if one can find a natural, transcultural relevance relation.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Metaphors Habermas
 
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Rorty III 117
Metaphor/HabermasVsRorty: considers Rorty's aestheticizing speech of metaphor, concept renewal and self-discovery as an unfortunate fascination of the idea of the "world-developing function of language", which, in contrast to the "problem-solving" function of language steps into "inner-worldly practice". ---
III 118
Habermas/Kuhn/Rorty: Habermas is ready to accept from Kuhn that "the languages of science and technology, law and morality, economics and politics live on the luminosity of metaphorical speeches." ---
III 119
RortyVsHabermas: Habermas is more afraid of a 'romantic upheaval' like Hitler and Mao have shown it before than of a suffocating effect that the encrusted societies can have. He is more afraid of autonomy than what Foucault called the "bio-power" of the experts. ---
III 120
Rorty VsHabermas: I am very suspicious of the idea of a "universal validity" (metaphysics). This claim is no longer credible if one is convinced of the "contingency of language".

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Rationality Habermas
 
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Rorty I I 92
RortyVsHabermas: his own attempt to put communicative reason in the place of "subject-centered reason", is in itself a step towards the replacement of the "what" by a "how".

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Rationality Luhmann
 
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I 129f
Definition rationality/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: the bid to respect the functional differentiations. Completely different to Habermas. - LuhmannVsHabermas: overall societal rationality can finally not exist in the generalization of what all the individual functional areas see as their rationality. - For this purpose, there can be no privileged place, no responsible organization, so no 'constitution'. ---
AU Kass 8
Rationality/Luhmann: question: how can rationality be understood under the realistic conditions of universal deceit at all? - Tradition: Thesis: action and circumstances are both natural - also the criteria for correctness.
---
AU Kass 8
Rationality/Habermas: distinction strategic/communicative rationality. - LuhmannVsHabermas: the rationality should be the same rationality on both sides. - Why are we talking about rationality then? - But what is the common component? - Neither Habermas nor Weber say that- Luhmann. Today: rationality of action: preferences - antonym: side-effects.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997

Reality Rorty
 
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II 40
RortyVsHabermas: we linguistic historicists believe that dependency relations can only be uncovered when someone proposes concrete alternatives. There is no "humanity" that would have to be guided from an era of "distorted communication" (relative term) to a new era. - We reject the notion that people have a "Interior" that resists "external conditioning".
II 101 ff
Description/Rorty: the nature described will always have some sort of order.
Thing itself/Rorty: just nature which is not described by any human language.
II 106f
Freud/Rorty: has no interest in a distinction between reality and appearance! It’s about new description.
IV 49
World: "Non-sentences". - - -
VI 169
Reality / statements / Wittgenstein / Rorty: we are unable to move back and forth between our statements about electrons and the electrons themselves - not even between our attributions of beliefs and the beliefs themselves - E.g. (Wittgenstein) that would be like trying to confirm what s in the newspaper by comparing what is in another copy of the same newspaper.
VI 170
Success / explanation / reality / RortyVsDennett: Success as an explanation helps us to waive "reality" - the success depends on the usefulness.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Reason Habermas
 
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Rorty II 82
Reason/Habermas/Rorty: Habermas draws a sharp boundary between reason and sensation. ---
II 90
Practical Reason/Habermas/Rorty: Habermas (according to Rorty) demands really heavy philosophical ammunition according to Kant's model: only transcendental presuppositions of any possible communicative practice can be sufficiently strong to fulfill the task. It needs a universally available human capability called practical reason that shows us what is an arbitrary distinction between people, and what is not. ---
II 91
Rorty: That cannot be Rawls' intention. No superordinate "source of authority", no independent kingdom of morality. For Rawls, practical reason is rather a procedural than a substantive question. ---
II 92
RortyVsHabermas: his own attempt to replace "communicative reason" in the place of "subject-centric reason" is itself a step towards the replacement of the "what" by a "how".

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Relativism Rorty
 
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Richard Rorty
I 304
Relativism: The assertion that truth and reference are "relative to a conceptual system" sounds as if it said more. But that is not the case as long as our system of concepts simply stands for the things which we currently believe.
II 36
RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism".
II 152
Cultural relativism: is not relativistic as long as relativism amounts to the assertion that every moral view is as good as any other. Rorty: our moral conception is much better than any competing view. It’s one thing to make the false assertion that there is no difference between us and the Nazis. A very different thing is to represent the correct assertion that there is no neutral common ground on which a Nazi and I can retreat to discuss.
III 87
Schumpeter: "the insight that the validity of one’s own beliefs is only relative, and yet stand up for them fearlessly, distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian" Berlin: one must not ask for more.
IV 11
Relativism/cultural relativism/RortyVsPutnam: false solution: a transcultural point of view. - That would be just another God point of view: ideal truth as limiting concept.
V 20
Cultures have no axiomatic structures. The fact that they have institutionalized norms actually says the same thing as Foucault’s thesis: that knowledge and power can never be separated. If you do not believe in certain things at a certain place at a certain time, you probably have to atone for it.
VI 74
Relativism/Realism/PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism/Rorty: both assume that one could simultaneously be both inside and outside language.
VI 77f
Fascism/relativism/truth/Sartre/Rorty: E.g. tomorrow, after my death, people can decide to introduce fascism - then fascism will be the human truth. - RortyVsSartre: not the truth - the truth would have been forgotten. - Putnam: Truth is a third instance between the camps. - RortyVsPutnam: correctness instead of truth - namely, according to our standards. - According to what other standards, teh ones of the fascists?.
VI 79
Justification of the standards/Rorty: from our self-improvement.
VI 246
Cultural relativism/Rorty: I am of the opinion that our Western culture is more than others. But this kind of relativism is not irrationalism. One does not have to be an irrationalist if one abstains from making one’s own network of beliefs as coherent and transparent as possible.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Sense Luhmann
 
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GLU 170
Sense/Luhmann/GLU: allows the selective production of all social and psychological forms - the form of sense is the distinction "real"/"possible". - Sense is the simultaneous presentation of news and possible - sense determines connectivity to additional communication - ((s) Elsewhere: is the dimension that is presented in the negation.) - Material dimension: "this"/"other" - social dimension: "ego"/"old" - time dimension: past/future. ---
II 34
Sense/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: order form of human experience. - The experience needs to select - for this serves the sense. - Experience/action: is selection by sense criteria. ---
II 35
Definition sense/Luhmann: the meaning that has something for an observer - Futility: only possible with characters. ---
II 44
Sense/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: does not need a carrier - sense carries itself by allowing its own reproduction self-referential. ---
II 139
Sense/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: preverbal, language foundational category. Sense/HabermasVsLuhmann: principle linguistical - inconceivable without intersubjective validity. LuhmannVsHabermas: studies on marriage conflicts show that these cannot be solved with everyday language, because the everyday language holds both positive and negative expressions.
---
AU Cass 10
Sense/Sociology/Luhmann: Problem: if each individual produces sense, is there then a sphere of intersubjectivity? - Solution: we have to apply the sense category on two different system categories: 1. Mental systems, awareness systems that experience meaningfully. -
2. Communication systems that reproduce sense in that it is used in communication. Subject: lost. - The subject is not a carrier of meaning. - Sense gets formal. - Solution: extraction through the distinction between medium and form - that means, independent of a particular system.
---
AU Cass 10
Sense/Luhmann sense could be a constant invitation to a specific shape formation, which then is always characterized by the fact that they are formed in the medium by sense - but these forms do not represent sense as a category at all - The word "sense" is namely not the only thing what makes sense. ---
AU Cas 10
Sense/Luhmann: a) in the system of consciousness - E.g. references to other options: I have the key in the pocket to unlock the door later - but sense is also the location of that reference in everything we consider as an object - b) in the communication system : to information also belongs the failure area: what surprises me? - All items have only sense in the context of other options. ---
AU Cass 10
Sense is itself a medium - also negation takes place internally. - But sense itself is not negated. - We cannot get out. - A world in which only beetles exist would be one in which no more sense is processed - but we can imagine it only meaningfully. - We imagine the rest as rest - ( "as it would be for the human"). - ((S)> nail, bat) - Animal/Luhmann: it is impossible to distinguish whether there is sense for animals. - We depend on the assumption of sense. - No distinction of meaning such as "factual"/"temporal"/"social" are possible. ---
AU Cas 10
Sense/Luhmann: no sense needing system can be completely transparent to itself. - That, what we are as a result of a long chain of operations, which structures we have, we cannot reduce this to a formula. - But instead we can imagine who we are, or we can describe it. - We also encounter quickly meaningless - that means, something that does not fit into this description.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997

Speech Act Theory Luhmann
 
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AU Cass 12
Speech act Theory /Language /Communication / LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: Language use is not an act. - You always need understanding, so it goes on. - Action: would only be a release without understanding - LuhmannVsHabermas: therefore, no theory of communicative action. - Speech: here the receiver is initially excluded. - He comes only later as a disciplining moment in the theory. - And as a subject.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997

Systems Luhmann
 
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GLU 195
System/Environment/Luhmann/GLU/(s): basic concept of system theory - Outside: is always more complex than the inside. - System: helps to reduce complexity. - No system can operate outside its borders. - Each system is identified by its own operation. - Environment: is not surrounded by borders but by horizons. - It itself is not a system. - It has no own operations. - But it is not passive. ---
II 47
System/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: autopoietic systems have no other form of environmental contact than self contact. - Take only environmental impacts by transforming them into their own frequency. - E.g. social system has no use for consciousness. ---
AU Cas 3
System/closed systems/Luhmann: closed systems cannot be found in the world. - We only consider open systems: biology, social system etc. - So-called operational (closed) systems are only seemingly different.
---
AU Cass 4
System/Luhmann: a system can distinguish itself from the environment.
---
AU Kass 8
System/environment/complexity/Luhmann: the environment of a system is always more complex than the system. - Therefore, the system cannot establish a point-to-point relationship with the environment. - therefore complexity must be reduced or ignored . - For example, call different things by the same name.
---
AU Cas 8
System/Luhmann: has subdivisions - E.g. planning for the system - for them, the system is environment itself - Loosely coupled systems are more stable. - E.g. employees can be exchanged. - Fixed coupling is not found in nature. - In systems not everything is connected with everything! - Not like Newton.
---
AU Cass 11
System/Luhmann: a system is not an object but a difference. - I am in my environment. - I am not in society, otherwise others would think my thoughts, etc. - In this way, system theory allows individualism. - HabermasVsLuhmann: radical individualism is not sought. - LuhmannVsHabermas: the society does not have to strive for a "human aim". - ((S) This is an aim for humans, society is not a human.) ---
AU Cas 14
System/Luhmann: E.g. conflicts are systems - because it brings the other in a limited range of variation of responses. - Conflicts have an organizing force. - VsSystemtheorie/VsLuhmann: here conflicts would be underexposed. - LuhmannVsVs: not here. - Conflict: can lead to a too strong integration. - Conflicts are spreading more with a fixed coupling.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997

Texts Habermas
 
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Rorty III 231
Literature/Self/Appropriateness/RortyVsHabermas: for him the completely traditional image of the self with its three spheres is: the cognitive, the moral and the aesthetic of central importance. This classification leads him to regard literature as a "cause of the appropriate expression of feelings" and literary criticism as a "judgement of taste". ---
III 232
Rorty: when we give up this division, we will not ask more questions like: "Does this book want to promote truth or beauty?" "Will it promote proper behavior or pleasure?" And instead ask, "What is the purpose of the book?"

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Ultimate Justification Habermas
 
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Rorty V 8
Foundation/final justification/RortyVsHabermas: I am distrustful of the remaining fundamentalism, striving for "universality." Habermas celebrates democracy, but he does not justify it. When HabermasVsFoucault raised the accusation of relativism and asked him to expose his "normative standards", Rorty: here I stand on the side of Foucault, who shrugs his shoulders and is silent.
---
V 9
World/Language/RortyVsHabermas: VsClaim, that the world-developing (poetic) power of language (Heidegger, Foucault) must be subordinated to the practice of the inner world.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Understanding Luhmann
 
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AU Cas 12
Understanding/LuhmannVsHabermas: Understanding is already included in the communication. - Otherwise, you would need the recipient as a disciplinary authority. - LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: if understanding is part of the communication, you do not need to introduce different types of speech acts (e.g. strategic, communication-oriented, etc.). ---
AU Cas 13
Understanding/action/Communication/Luhmann: LuhmannVsAction Theory: we must always begin with understanding. - The communication generates in the first place in its component "understanding" the division of information and communication that makes it understanding. - Without understanding we only have behavior. - Understanding includes itself. - It understands that it will be understood - it understands that it is about the condition of participation in the communication, not just about a piece of world. - That sounds psychologically, but it is about the communication itself.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997


The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Assertibility Brandom Vs Assertibility
 
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I 198
VsJustified assertibility: assertibility conditions do not contain the whole meaning! Just as naïve: distinguishing the assertibility conditions of a statement as "descriptive meaning" and the consequences as "evaluative" meaning", and thus giving up any desire for harmony.
II 90
Assertibility/Brandom: its representatives also treat the aspect of the conditions (circumstances) as exhaustive and neglect the consequences of the use of the terms.
II 91
BrandomVs: assertions can have the same conditions but different consequences. E.g. "I’ll write a book about Hegel" - "I predict that I will write a book about Hegel": same circumstances, different consequences or determination. Meaning/Use/Dummett: if we have learned only the circumstances (conditions) for the use of a predicate, it may be that we have not seen through all connections with other terms.
II 242
A philosophical analysis of the concept of truth is therefore not necessarily made by a definition of the word "true". "Semantic assertibility"/Sellars: assertibility under ideal conditions.
II 262 ++
BrandomVsSellars: hopeless: you cannot specify ideality, either it remains circular with recourse to the concept of truth, or trivial. (also BrandomVsHabermas). Alternative/BrandomVsSellars: support with truth conditions. Disadvantage: we are no longer able to explain the correlation of the so defined semantic contents with linguistic expressions based on a direct alignment with the execution of moves, as does the alternative language game theory.
BrandomVsAssertibility: does not distinguish between the status of the determination/authorization without the auxiliary means of incompatibilities (negation).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Derrida, J. Habermas Vs Derrida, J.
 
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Derrida I 95
Derrida: no distinction between everyday language and specialist languages. (DerridaVsSearle).
I 196
HabermasVsDerrida: there are differences. Derrida over-generalizes poetic language. There has to be a language in which research results can be discussed and progress registered. HabermasVsDerrida: he does not wriggle out of the restrictions of the subject-philosophical paradigm. His attempt to outbid Heidegger does not escape the aporetic structure of the truth events stripped of truth validity.
I 211
Subject-Philosophy/Derrida: Habermas: he does not break with her at all. He falls back on it easily in the style of the original philosophy: it would require other names than those of the sign and the re-presentation to be able think about this age: the infinite derivation of the signs who wander about and change scenes. HabermasVsDerrida: not the history of being the first and last, but an optical illusion: the labyrinthine mirror effects of ancient texts without any hope of deciphering the original script.
I 213
HabermasVsDerrida: his deconstructions faithfully follow Heidegger. Involuntarily, he exposes the reverse fundamentalism of this way of thinking: the ontological difference and the being are once again outdone by the difference and put down one floor below.
I 214
Derrida inherits the weaknesses of the criticism of metaphysics. Extremely general summonings of an indefinite authority.
I 233
DerridaVsSearle: no distinction between ordinary and parasitic use - Searle, HabermasVsDerrida: there is a distinction: communication requires common understanding
I 240
Derrida’s thesis: in everyday language there are also poetic functions and structures, therefore no difference from literary texts, therefore equal analysability. HabermasVsDerrida: he is insensitive to the tension-filled polarity between the poetic-world-opening and the prosaic-innerworldly language function.
I 241
HabermasVsDerrida: for him, the language-mediated processes in the world are embedded in an all prejudicing, world-forming context. Derrida is blind to the fact that everyday communicative practice enables learning processes in the world thanks to the idealizations built into communicative action, against which the world-disclosing power of interpretive language has to prove itself. Experience and judgment are formed only in the light of criticizable validity claims! Derrida neglects the negation potential of communication-oriented action. He lets the problem-solving capacity disappear behind the world-generating capacity of language. (Similarly Rorty)
I 243
HabermasVsDerrida: through the over-generalization of the poetic language function he has no view of the complex relationships of a normal linguistic everyday practice anymore. - - -
Rorty II 27
HabermasVsDerrida, HabermasVsHeidegger/Rorty: "subject philosophy": misguided metaphysical attempt to combine the public and the private. Error: thinking that reflection and introspection could achieve what can be actually only be effected by expanding the discussion frame and the participants.
II 30
Speaking/Writing/RortyVsDerrida: his complex argument ultimately amounts to a strengthening of the written word at the expense of the spoken.
II 32
Language/Communication/HabermasVsDerrida: Derrida denies both the existence of a "peculiarly structured domain of everyday communicative practice" and an "autonomous domain of fiction". Since he denies both, he can analyze any discourse on the model of poetic language. Thus, he does not need to determine language.
II 33
RortyVsHabermas: Derrida is neither obliged nor willing to let "language in general" be "determined" by anything. Derrida could agree fully with Habermas in that "the world-disclosing power of interpretive language must prove itself" before metaphors are literarily absorbed and become socially useful tools. RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that X must be demonstrated as a special case of Y first in order to treat X as Y. As if you could not simply treat X as Y, to see what happens!
Deconstruction/Rorty: language is something that can be effective, out of control or stab itself in the back, etc., under its own power.
II 35
RortyVsDeconstruktion: nothing suggests that language can do all of this other than an attempt to make Derrida a huge man with a huge topic. The result of such reading is not the grasping of contents, but the placement of texts in contexts, the interweaving of parts of various books. The result is a blurring of genre boundaries. That does not mean that genera "are not real". The interweaving of threads is something else than the assumption that philosophy has "proven" that colors really "are indeterminate and ambiguous."
Habermas/Rorty: asks why Heidegger and Derrida still nor advocate those "strong" concepts of theory, truth and system, which have been a thing of the past for more than 150 years.
II 36
Justice/Rawls Thesis: the "just thing" has priority over the "good thing". Rawls/Rorty: democratic societies do not have to deal with the question of "human nature" or "subject". Such issues are privatized here.
Foundation/Rorty Thesis: there is no Archimedean point from which you can criticize everything else. No resting point outside.
RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism".
Habermas: "the validity of transcendental spaces and times claimed for propositions and norms "erases space and time"."
HabermasVsDerrida: excludes interaction.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Foucault, M. Rorty Vs Foucault, M.
 
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Richard Rorty
Rorty III 142
HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsFoucault: their polemics against enlightenment turns the back on social hopes of liberal societies.
III 143
Habermas shares with the Marxists belief that the true meaning of a philosophical opinion consists in its political implications.
V 8
Foundation/Final Justification/RortyVsHabermas: I distrust the remaining fundamentalism, striving for "universality". Habermas celebrates democracy, but he does not justify it. If HabermasVsFoucault alleges relativism and challenges him to disclose its "normative standards", Rorty: here I stand on the side of Foucault, who shrugs and says nothing.
RortyVsFoucault: distrust him when he projects his desire for private Nietzschean autonomy in the public sphere. In this mood he rejects the democratic institutions.
V 20
Cultures/Rorty: have no axiomatic structures. That they have institutionalized norms, actually means the same as Foucault's thesis that knowledge and power can never be separated. If at a certain time at a certain place you do not believe in certain things, you'll probably have to pay for it.
V 21
RortyVsFoucault: but these standards are not "rules of language" or "criteria of rationality". They have the look of officials and policemen. Whoever disagrees, commits the
Def Cartesian fallacy/Rorty: he sees axioms where nothing but shared habits reign.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Habermas, J. Brandom Vs Habermas, J.
 
Books on Amazon
Seel III 149
HabermasVsBrandom: "turns the architecture of the post-Hegelian thinking upside down". His "conceptual realism" misses the constructive nature of human insight. The place of confrontation is taken by a mere replica of in-themselves-existing contents BrandomVsHabermas: Brandom refutes the "positivist image" of a testing of our concepts in a concept-free outer world.

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Se I
M. Seel
Die Kunst der Entzweiung Frankfurt 1997

Se II
M. Seel
Ästhetik des Erscheinens München 2000

Se III
M. Seel
Vom Handwerk der Philosophie München 2001
Habermas, J. Bubner Vs Habermas, J.
 
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BubnerVsHabermas: da man aber von vornherein auf Wahrhaftigkeit baut, handelt es sich offenbar mehr um eine Definitionsfrage, was man als Dialog überhaupt zulassen will. I 196
KommunikationstheorieBubnerVsHabermas: es wird behauptet, die Einhaltung der Formalbedingungen sei so zum erstenmal in der Geschichte gewährleistet,
1. in Wahrheit soll aber das politische Geschehen strukturell verwandelt werden gemäß dem Paradigma einer philosophischen Idealvorstellung. I 198 Idealisierung, weil die Teilnehmerzahl begrenzt bleiben muß, und das ist weder ein historischer Zufall noch ein Vorurteil undemokratischer Elitegesinnung. I 199 2. ist der planmäßige Eintritt in den Dialog durch das Zerbrechen vorgängig unbefragter Einmütigkeit gekennzeichnet, trotzdem muß die Kontroverse in der primären Absicht erfolgen, wieder zur Gemeinsamkeit zurückzufinden. Doch Bemühung um Konsensfindung ist noch nicht Konsens, und erst Konsens stiftet Gemeinsamkeit kollektiver Praxis.
Mit einem Wort: der Dialog ist ein Mittel, aber nicht der letzte Inhalt von Politik.
3. es ist nicht klar, welches eigentlich die Inhalte sind, um die sich die Veranstaltung dreht. Mit der Tendenz, den Fluß der Praxis zum permanenten Dialog umzuformulieren, gehen die Inhalte verloren, die aus dem politischen Alltag stammen. Die Inhalte werden spielerisch, solange sie den praktischen Folgen entzogen sind. - I 201 Die Voraussetzung allen politischen Redens, die Gemeinsamkeit der Zielsetzungen, wird durchgestrichen zugunsten einer abstrakten Einigung von Partnern, deren gemeinsames Handeln solange dahinsteht, wie sie im Zeichen der Dialogmethode diskutieren.
Andere AutorenVs: man hat die zugrundeliegende Idealisierung beklagt, die Verwechslung der Modi theoretischer Erörterung mit Praxis, die unhistorische Vernachlässigung der Erfordernisse faktischer Komplexität von Gesellschaft usw.

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Habermas, J. Derrida Vs Habermas, J.
 
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I 32
VsHabermas: he fails to recognize that Derrida no longer interprets the language in the light of the theory of signs. He does not understand writing as signs.

De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993
Habermas, J. Luhmann Vs Habermas, J.
 
Books on Amazon
II 109
Ethik/Habermas: Kognitive Ethik, mit der Dimension richtig/falsch. LuhmannVs.
II 112
LuhmannVsHabermas: "politischer Moralist" (in Luhmanns Augen scharfe Kritik.) Die Ethik sollte vielmehr fragen, ob Moral umstandslos für gut gehalten werden kann. Sie soll nicht selber Moral betreiben, sondern Übersetzungsleistung in beiden Richtungen vollbringen.
II 140
LuhmannVsHabermas: Studien über Ehekonflikte zeigen, daß diese Konflikte umgangssprachlich nicht zu lösen sind, weil die Umgangssprache jeweils positive und negative Ausdrücke bereithält. Es gibt keine Gesetzmäßigkeit, daß Kommunikation zum Konsens führt. Man sollte daher Diskussionen selber als Systeme begreifen und analysieren. - Gerade Diskussionen geben kaum Chancen, die eigene Subjektivität einzubringen. - den Diskussionen werden Sprachsymbole wie Gott, Reform, gerecht sei, Liebe, Wahrheit, Demokratie usw. moralisiert. Dadurch wird die Anknüpfbarkeit limitiert. Das heißt, wer Gegenargumente verwendet, muß sich selbst verteidigen.
II 141
LuhmannVsHabermas: es gibt keine logische Hierarchie von Gründen. Daher auch keine Hoffnung auf ein Ende der Diskussion. Sie hört irgendwann nur auf. Für ihre Beendigung muss es soziale, nicht logische oder semantische Regeln geben.
Cass 8
VsHabermas: Problem: der Begriff müsste eigentlich auf beiden Seiten der selbe sein, denn wieso sprechen wir von Rationalität, wenn beides Rationalität ist. Was ist die gemeinsame Komponente? - HabermasVsLuhmann: bei Luhmann habe nur das System Rationalität, aber das System sei doch nicht alles! LuhmannVsHabermas: aber das gilt eben auch für Habermas" Verständigungsrationalität, denn wenn man sich verständigt hat, gibt es auch noch Dinge, über die man sich noch nicht verständigt hat und Menschen, mit denen man sich noch nicht verständigt hat und die Bedingungen ändern sich schneller als die Bereitschaft, sich neu zu verständigen. So spielt der Bereich des Jenseits in jedem Modell eine Rolle. Die ST ist aber besser gerüstet, damit umzugehen. Bei Habermas ist dieses Jenseits übrigens nicht die Lebenswelt.

Cass 11
System/Gesellschaft/Individuum/ Luhmann: das System ist kein Objekt, sondern eine Differenz (S/U). Bsp für den Körper gehören die Bewusstseinsoperationen zur Umwelt! ((s) Kein Grenzübertritt). Luhmann: das ist gar nicht so erschreckend: Bsp ich selbst fühle mit in der "Umwelt" meiner Gesellschaft wohler, als ich mich "in der Gesellschaft" fühlen würde, wo andere meine Gedanken denken oder meine chemischen Reaktionen bewirken. LuhmannVsHabermas: die Systemtheorie erlaubt daher, einen radikalen Individualismus zu denken, der nicht möglich wäre, wenn man den humanistischen Standpunkt des Menschen als Teil der Gesellschaft einnimmt.
HabermasVsLuhmann: radikaler Individualismus wird gar nicht angestrebt. Gesellschaft/LuhmannVsHabermas: es wäre ein Irrtum zu fordern, die Gesellschaft müsse auf ein "menschliches Ziel" zulaufen! LuhmannVsHabermas: Verstehen ist schon in der Kommunikation enthalten. - sonst braucht man den Empfänger eine disziplinierende Instanz. Wenn man Verstehen in der Kommunikation beläßt, bekommt man eine von Normen und Rationalitätsforderungen entlastete Theorie.
Cass 13
Kommunikation: Tradition wie Habermas: Konsenssuche. Luhmann: was macht man denn, wenn der Konsens erreicht ist, gibt es dann keine Kommunikation mehr?-Hab.: es gibt genug Konflikte. Luh.: was soll denn dann die Forderung nach Konsens? Dann machen wir aus einer Unmöglichkeit eine Norm! - Das Ergebnis der Kommunikation muß schon offen sein! Wozu haben wir denn das Nein in der Sprache?!

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Habermas, J. Rorty Vs Habermas, J.
 
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Richard Rorty
Brendel I 133
Justification/Rorty/Brendel: Thesis: truth is not its goal. That would suppose a false separation of truth and justification. There is also not the one scientific method that leads to the truth. Epistemic justification: can have many goals.
I 134
Correspondence/RortyVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty/Brendel: therefore there is no correspondence between statements and independent reality. Truth/RortyVsPutnam: is not idealized rational acceptability either.
Reality/PutnamVsRorty: there is a consciousness independent reality.
Truth/Peirce/Rorty/Brendel: Both: Thesis: there are no in principle unknowable truths.
Reality/PeirceVsRorty: there is a reality that is independent of consciousness.
Truth/Peirce/Brendel: obtained by the consensus of an ideal research community.
Convergence/Peirce/Brendel: Thesis: there is a convergence of research. The corresponding true conviction expresses actually existing SV. (Habermas ditto).
Convergence/RortyVsPeirce: does not exist and therefore no universally valid convictions of an ideal research community.
I 135
RortyVsHabermas: ditto. Communication/RortyVsHabermas/Rorty/Brendel: is not a pursuit of universally valid statements. Thesis: there is no difference in principle between a cooperative search for truth and the pursuit of group interests.
- - -
Rorty II 50
RortyVsHabermas: sounds as if he took over the metaphysical position, as if all the alternative candidates for belief and desire already exist and the only thing that must be ensured is that they can be freely discussed. Ahistorical universalist "transcendentalism".
II 29
French Philosophy/HabermasVsFrench: "the vexatious game of these duplications: a symptom of exhaustion." RortyVsHabermas: Rather signs of vitality. I read Heidegger and Nietzsche as good private philosophers,
Habermas reads them as poor public ones. He treats them as if they targeted what he calls "universal validity."
II 43
Principle/Validity/Application/RortyVsHabermas: the question of the "internal validity" of the principles is not relevant. Especially not if it these are "universally valid". The only thing that keeps a society from having considering the institutionalized humiliation of the weak as norma, of course, is a detailed description of these humiliations. Such descriptions are given by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, playwrights, filmmakers and painters.
II 94
Habermas/Rorty distinguishes between a strategic and a genuinely communicative use of language. Scale of degrees of confidence.
II 94/95
Rorty: if we stop to interpret reason as a source of authority, the Platonic and Kantian dichotomy between reason and emotion dissolves.
II 96
RortyVsHabermas: the idea of ​​the "better argument" only makes sense if you can find a natural, transcultural relevance relationship.
III 113
Foucault/Rorty: Society denies the space for self-creation and private projects. (VsHabermas).
III 119
RortyVsHabermas: Habermas is more afraid of a "romantic revolution" like Hitler and Mao have brought about than of the stifling effect that encrusted societies may have. He is more afraid of autonomy than what Foucault calls the "biopower" of experts.
III 120
RortyVsHabermas: I am very suspicious of the idea of ​​'universal validity' (metaphysics). This claim is no longer credible if we are convinced of the "contingency of language".
III 231
Self/Literature/Appropriateness/RortyVsHabermas: for him the very traditional image of the self with its three spheres, the cognitive, the moral and the aesthetic, is of central importance. This classification means that he sees literature as a "matter for the appropriate expression of feelings" and literary criticism as a "matter of taste".
III 232
Rorty: if we give up this classification, we will no longer ask questions like "Does this book promote truth or beauty?" "Does it promote proper behavior or pleasure?" and instead we will ask: "What is the purpose the book?"
- - -
V 9
World/Language/RortyVsHabermas: Vsdemand that the world-disclosing (poetic) power of language (Heidegger, Foucault) should be subordinated to the inner-worldly practice.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Habermas, J. Tugendhat Vs Habermas, J.
 
Books on Amazon
II 16
TugendhatVsHabermas/Apel: "gut" bzw. die gesamte Ethik ist nicht sprachlich zu begründen. Nur voluntativ.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Habermas, J. Verschiedene Vs Habermas, J. Rorty II 172
LyotardVsHabermas/Rorty: dieser kenne bloß eine schöne, aber keine erhabene Politik. RortyVsLyotard: dieser hat unrecht. Es geht in der Politik um Kompromisse. Diese können schön sein, aber nicht erhaben.





Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Luhmann, N. Habermas Vs Luhmann, N.
 
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I 426
Luhmann stands less in the tradition of Comte to Parsons than in the problem history from Kant to Husserl. He inherits the basic concepts and problems of the philosophy of consciousness. HabermasVsLuhmann: He undertakes a change of perspective which makes the self-criticism of a modernity crumbling with itself obsolete. The system theory of society applied to itself cannot help responding affirmatively to the increasing complexity of modern societies.
I 430
HabermasVsLuhmann: thought movements from metaphysics to metabiology! Departs from the "as such" of organic life, a basic phenomenon of self-assertion of self-referential systems facing an over-complex environment.
I 431
Undefraudable: the difference to the environment. Self-preservation replaces reason. Reason/HabermasVsLuhmann: thus he also replaced the criticism of reason with system rationality: the ensemble of enabling conditions for system preservation. Reason shrinks to complexity reduction. It is not outbid like in the communicative reason. Reason once again becomes the superstructure of life.
Meaning/System Theory: the functionalist concept of meaning dissolves the relationship between meaning and validity. (As in Foucault: when it comes to truth (and validity as such) we are only interested in the effects of the considering-as-true).
I 434
HabermasVsLuhmann: no central perspective, no criticism of reason, no position anymore. HabermasVsLuhmann: but we lack a social subsystem for perceiving environmental interdependences. That cannot exist with functional differentiation, because that would mean that the society occurred again in society itself.
I 435
Intersubjectivity/Luhmann: language-generated intersubjectivity is not available for Luhmann. Instead, inclusion model of the parts in the whole. He considers this figure of thought to be "humanist". And he distances himself from that!
I 437
HabermasVsLuhmann: Contradiction: Social Systems: previously, persons or "consciousness carriers" have to be postulated which are capable of judgment before all participation in social systems. On the other hand, both system types (psycho/social) cannot stand on different steps of the ladder if they are to be distinguished as equally emergent achievements of sense processing against organic systems. So Luhmann speaks of co-evolution.
I 438
HabermasVsLuhmann: suffers from the lack of appropriate basic concepts of linguistic theory: sense must be neutral with regard to consciousness and communication. - Language/HabermasVsLuhmann: a subordinate status is assigned to the linguistic expression against the phenomenologically introduced concept of sense. Language only serves the purpose of the symbolic generalization of previous sense events.
I 441
 LuhmannVsHumanism: "cardinal sin" amalgamation of social and material dimension.
Luhmann II 136
Living Environment/Luhmann: Luhmann does not know a living environment! (HabermasVs). Thus, person, culture and society are no longer cramped. HabermasVsLuhmann: "unacknowledged commitment of the theory to rule-compliant issues", "the apology of the status quo for the sake of its preservation", and "uncritical submission of the theory of society under the constraints of the reproduction of society." "High form of a technocratic consciousness."
II 141
HabermasVsLuhmann: contradiction: that systems have a kind of relief function, while at the same time, the environment of social systems is a more complex world. Lu II 137 - HabermasVsLuhmann: Vs Functionalization of the Concept of Truth. Even the system theory itself can make no special claim to the validity of its statements. It’s only one way of acting among others. Theory is action. This, in turn, can only be said if you ultimately assume a theoretical point of view outside of the practice.
II 165
System Theory/HabermasVsLuhmann: its claim to universality encounters a limit at that point at which it would have to be more than mere observation, namely a scientifically based recommendation for action.
AU Cass.12
HabermasVsLuh: (in correspondence): Luhmann did not consider linguistics! LuhmannVsHabermas: that is indeed the case! I do not use the terminology. E.g. the normative binding of actors. It would have to be re-introduced in some other way, but not in communication.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Peirce, Ch.S. Brandom Vs Peirce, Ch.S.
 
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Rorty VI 193
Wahrheit/BrandomVsPutnam/BrandomVsPeirce/BrandomVsHabermas: Brandom ist nicht darauf festgelegt, "wahr" epistemisch zu definieren. Also nicht das, was "von allen Mitgliedern der Gemeinschaft oder den Sachverständigen für wahr gehalten wird (oder unter idealen Bedingungen)" . Vielmehr gibt es gar keine Vogelperspektive.

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Sellars, W. Brandom Vs Sellars, W.
 
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I 322
BrandomVsSellars: Two problems: 1) Sellars assumes that the reporter has to justify his assertions. This implies that general facts of the form to "X is a reliable symptom of Y" are known. I 323 But invoking something contains an implicit assertion of reliability (to avoid regress?) 2) Error: construe the authority of non-inferential reports as the act of invoking a piece of evidence. (Regress: On what is the authority of the evidence based, etc.).
The authority of inferential reports is rather sui generis.
"Semantic assertibility"/Sellars: assertibility under ideal conditions.
II 242
BrandomVsSellars: hopeless: you cannot specify ideality, either it remains circular with recourse to the concept of truth, or trivial. (also BrandomVsHabermas). Alternative/BrandomVsSellars: support with truth conditions. Disadvantage: we are no longer able to explain the correlation of so understood semantic contents with linguistic expressions based on a direct alignment with the execution of moves, as the alternative language game theory does.

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Speech Act Theory Luhmann Vs Speech Act Theory
 
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AU Kass 12
LuhmannVsSprechakttheorie, LuhmannVsSearle, LuhmannVsHabermas: Vs Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns: Frage, ob man in die Einheit einer Kommunikation das Verstehen einschießt oder nicht.
Wenn man einen Handlungsbegriff von Kommunikation hat, also nur die Mitteilung, also nur das, was ich jetzt hier tue einbezieht, dann lässt man das Verstehen außen vor.
Dann muss man in der Theorie Korrekturmaßnahmen ergreifen: der Handelnde richtet sich, wenn er vernünftig agiert nach den Verstehensvoraussetzungen. Er sagt nicht etwas, wovon er weiß, dass es nicht verstanden werden kann.
Das würde aber bedeuten, daß der Empfänger aus dem Sprechakt (Luhmann: Sprachakt) oder der Kommunikation zunächst ausgeschlossen ist. Und nur als disziplinierendes Moment in die Theorie rückgeführt wird. Und zwar als Subjekt!
LuhmannVsSprechakttheorie: wenn Verstehen Teil der Kommunikation ist, braucht man auch keine verschiedenen Typen Sprechakten einzuführen (Bsp strategisch, kommunikationsorientiert usw)

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Various Authors Habermas Vs Various Authors
 
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Die ZEIT 5/02
Genetic Engineering/Hubert MarklVsHabermas: "human dignity" is a historical construct. The self-understanding of the human must change. HabermasVsMarkl: I do not like the "must". Cultural life forms are certainly constructions, but they do not change arbitrarily, but are imaginative, more or less productive responses to the challenge of problems that require solutions.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988