Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 41 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Action Theory | Habermas | III 369 Action Theory/Analytical Philosophy/Habermas: the analytical action theory ((s) following Grice, Austin) is limited to the atomistic action model of a solitary actor and neglects mechanisms of action coordination through which interpersonal relationships are formed. >P. Grice, >J.L. Austin. III 370 Therefore, it finds hardly any connection to the formation of social scientific concepts. The philosophical problems it creates are too non-specific for the purposes of social theory. >Sociology, >Method. HabermasVsAnalytical Philosophy/HabermasVsAnalytical Theory of Action: it goes back to Kant by asking about causality, intentionality and the logical status of explanations without penetrating into the basic questions of a sociological theory of action. >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Explanation. Instead, questions of coordination of action should be taken as a starting point.(1) >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas. III 371 HabermasVsGrice/HabermasVsBennett/HabermasVsLewis, David/HabermasVsSchiffer: the intentional semantics developed by these authors are not suitable for clarifying the coordination mechanism of linguistically mediated interactions, because it analyses the act of communication itself according to the model of consequence-oriented action. >Intentional Semantics, >St. Schiffer, >D. Lewis, >J. Bennett. Intentional Semantics/HabermasVsGrice: Intentional semantics is based on the contraintuitive idea that understanding the meaning of a symbolic expression can be traced back to the speaker's intention to give the listener something to understand. III 373 Solution/Habermas: Karl Bühler's organon model (see Language/Bühler), ((s) which distinguishes between symbol, signal and symptom and refers to sender and receiver) leads in its theoretical meaning to the concept of an interaction of subjects capable of speech and action mediated by acts of communication. >Interaction, >Subjects. III 384 Action Theory/Habermas: HabermasVsWeber: unlike Weber, who assumes a monological action model, Habermas considers a model that takes into account the coordination of several action subjects. He differentiates between action types according to situation and orientation: Action Orientation: success-oriented - or communication-oriented Action Situation: social - or non-social Instrumental Action/Habermas: is then success-oriented and non-social Strategic action: success-oriented and social (it takes into account the actions and interests of others). >Interest. Communicative Action: is social and communication-oriented (without being success-oriented). >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas, >Agreement, >Success. 1.S. Kanngiesser, Sprachliche Universalien und diachrone Prozesse, in: K. O. Apel (1976), 273ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Strawson | Wright I 198 Strawson/Grice: E.g. our daily talk of analyticity is a sociological fact and therefore has enough discipline to be considered minimally capable of truth. >Minimalism, >Convention. StrawsonVsQuine/GriceVsQuine: it is hopeless to deny that a distinction exists, if it is not used within linguistic practice in a pre-arranged way that is capable of mutual agreement. >Analyticity/Quine, >Language use, >Language behavior, >Language community. QuineVsStrawson/QuineVsGrice: this is fully consistent with a cognitive psychology of the practical use of the distinction, which does not assume that we respond to exemplifications of the distinctions. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Attribution | Peacocke | Avramides I 92 Beliefs/Desires/Attributions/Radical Interpretation/Peacocke/Avramidis: Suppose we could attribute beliefs and desires before the knowledge of the language. In this case, simultaneous attribution of propositional attitudes would still be necessary. >Propositional attitudes, >Thinking without language, >Desires, >Beliefs. But not particular propositional attitudes before language. >Language, >Understanding, >Language use. PeacockeVs "actual language relation": this supposedly needs no semantic vocabulary. >Reference, cf. >Primitive reference, >Semantics. Peacocke later: Gricean intentions cannot be used as evidence for radical interpretation, but that's not VsGrice. >Intentions/Grice, >P. Grice. Peacocke I 78f Propositional Attitudes/Attribution/Peacocke: Problem: instead of one set of propositional attitudes another can also be attributed. Solution/Peacocke: Relation of Closeness/Narrowness. E.g. someone who rearranges something on the table usually does not respond to the compass direction. - The concepts may then have different expressiveness. Important point: if it is a rotating table, the space-relative concepts can change while the table-relative ones remain constant. ((s) The concepts do not change, but their truth values.) More expressive: the space-relative concepts. - Problem: if they are used here, there may be an explanatory gap. >narrow concepts. I 83 We should not attribute any wider concepts if there more narrow ones are available. >Narrow/wide. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Communication | Black | I 59 Communication/Black: gestures are not always already communication. >Gestures. I 70 Communication/Speaker Meaning/BlackVsGrice: propositional attitudes induced in the listener are irrelevant for these concept - Black: Once I understood, my role as a listener and performer is at an end - Black Thesis: listener understanding and speaker meaning are two sides of a single process. >Speaker meaning, >Utterance meaning. I 71 Understanding as grasping the speaker's intention is just as much in need of explanation as this - Reaction/Black: There is no standard reaction. >Understanding. I 72 BlackVsGrice: his theory is unsuitable for idiosyncratic cases |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Communication | Evans | Avramides I 16 f Communication/Evans/McDowell/Avramides: EvansVsGrice/McDowellVsGrice: in communication, there is no "ratiocinatio" - Neither implicitly nor later in a rational reconstruction. Evans I 324 Speaker's reference/Evans: Communication may succeed even if the speaker is misrepresenting because the listeners have formed an opinion about him. >Reference. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Competence | Katz | Cresswell I 12 Competency/linguistic/linguistic competence/Chomsky/Cresswell: (Chomsky 1965, 3 - 15): the discussion continues to this day (1974). Definition linguistic competency: is an ability underlying the linguistic activity. It is about the class of sentences that the speaker finds grammatically acceptable. Semantic competency/Cresswell: (that is what I am concerned with here): I prefer a truth-conditional semantics (> truth conditions). I would like to distinguish between two things: A) CresswellVsKatz/CresswellVsFodor/Terminology/KF/Cresswell: "KF" (Katz/Fodor semantics): is incomplete, if not incorrect. B) CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsSearle/CresswellVsTactual Theory: is rather a theory of semantic performance than of semantic competence. --- Cresswell I 12 Definition Competence/linguistic competence/Katz/Nagel/Cresswell: (Katz and Nagel, 1974): explains the ability of a speaker to make judgments about the following properties: synonymy, redundancy, contradictoryness, entailment, ambiguity, semantic anomalies, antonymy and superordination. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Conditional | Jackson | Lewis V 153 Conditional/Grice/Lewis: if P (A > C) is high because P (A) is low (> ex falso quodlibet), what is then the meaning of "If A, then B"? Why should one not say the strongest: that it is almost as likely as not A? JacksonVsGrice/JacksonVsLewis: we often claim things that are much weaker than we could actually claim, and this for a good reason. I assume that your belief system is similar to mine, but not completely equal. E.g. Suppose you know something what seems to me very unlikely today, but I would like to say something useful anyway. So I say something weaker, so you can take me at any rate at the word. >Assertions, >Stronger/weaker. --- Lewis V 153 Definition robust/Jackson/Lewis: A is robust in relation to B, (with respect to one's subjective probability at a time) iff. the probability of A and the probability of A conditionally to B are close, and both are high,... >Probability, >Subjective probability, >Objective probability. --- V 154 ...so if one learns that B still considers A to be probable. Jackson: the weaker can then be more robust in terms of something that you think is more unlikely, but still do not want to ignore. If it is useless to say the weaker, how useless it is then to assert the weaker and the stronger together! And yet we do it! E.g. Lewis: "Bruce sleeps in the clothes box or elsewhere on the ground floor". Jackson: Explanation: it has the purpose to assert the stronger and the same purpose to assert the more robust. If both are different, we assert both. Robustness/indicative conditional/Lewis: an indicative conditional is a truth-functional conditional, which conventionally implies robustness with respect to the antecedent (conventional implicature). Therefore the probability P (A > C) and P (A > C) must both be high. This is the reason why the assertiveness of the indicative conditional is associated with the corresponding conditional probability. >Conditional probability, >Conditionals, >Truth functions. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Conditional | Logic Texts | II 112 Conditional/Hoyningen-Huene: belongs to the object language Conclusion: (logical implication): belongs to the meta level Conditional: is also called (material) implication. - It is a linking of statements. >>Conclusion, >Implication, >Meta language, >Object language. Read III 79 Given that Edmund is a coward, it follows that he is either a coward or - whatever you want. But just from the fact that he is a coward it does not follow that if he is not a coward - whatever you want. III 86f Conditional Clause/Conditional/Truth-Functional/Read: if a conditional clause is treated as truth-functional, there are problems. >paradox of implication. Then the whole sentence is true if the antecedent is false. Conversationalist Defense: such a sentence should not be asserted. >Assertibility. III 92 Jackson: in conditional clauses, the modus ponens comes into play. >modus ponens. III 93 Conditional clauses are not robust (insensitive to additional knowledge) with regard to the falsity of their rear parts. III 94 Assertibility: is applied to the sub-sentences, not only to the whole conditional clause! - If assertibility counts, conditional clauses are no longer truth functional. III 103 The analysis of the possible world deviates from the truth-functional one when the if-clause is false. The fact that Edmund is a coward did not automatically mean that the conditional clause is true. III 105 Similarity analysis: a number of logical principles that are classically valid fails here. E.g., the (Def) Counter-position: that "If B, then not-A" follows from "if A, then not-B". (inter alia IV 41) The similar world in which it rains may very well be one in which it rains only slightly. But the most similar world where it rains heavily cannot be one in which it does not rain. III 220 Conditional clauses: are statements. (Grice) No statements: Stalnaker's question: conditional clause truth-functional? Def truth-functional: 1 counter-example invalidates. >Truth function. Grice: Conditional clauses are statements. StalnakerVsGrice: conditional clauses are not statements. (Pretty radical). - The camps are about equally strong. III 220/21 Conditional Clauses/Conditional/Read: the assertion that they are truth-functional says that a counter-example for the falsity of the conditional clause is not only sufficient but also necessary. - If there is no counter-example, then it is true. - This leads us to believe in sharp cuts in Sorites. >Sorites. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Deceptions | Avramides | I 51 Deception/Counter-Example/VsGrice: patterns are always important. - We move away from the speaker's intention to the meaning-bearing property of the utterance. >Utterance meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker meaning, >Context, >Situation. We should always accept an intention more. Solution: patterns - (Distribution of intentions). Problem: infiniteness: tjere are always infiniteley many possible intentions. Solution: something that forces the speaker's intention to the line of the utterance. To prevent the intent to deceive. Ultimately communication is something ideal. >Communication, cf. >Ideal speech community/Habermas. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Deceptions | Schiffer | Avr I 57 Deception/HarmanVsGrice: we might need self-referential facts ((s) these are certainly true, because they are about themselves). Problem: 1) why not from the start? 2) If not possible, then the whole analysis gets problematic. Solution/Harman: the speaker intends that the hearer responds for the proper reason: recognizing the speaker’s intention. >Speaker intention, >Paul Grice. Schiffer/Grice: Grice wants to avoid self-referring facts. Problem: the resulting complexity. >Self-reference, >Facts, >Complexity. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Folk Psychology | Burge | Shiffer I 37 BurgeVsFolk Psychology/Intention-Based Semantics//IBS/BurgeVsIBS/BurgeVsGrice/Schiffer: Burge's counter-examples are more interesting. They differ from the twin-earth examples in two points: (I) at first sight they also make a strong objection VsIBS by seemingly demonstrating that the content of belief is sometimes a function of the meaning of the word in the linguistic community. >Intentions. I 38 (II) Def "Environment-Dependent"/Role/Terminology/Burge/Schiffer/: let's say: a functional role is dependent on the environment if we cannot know whether a system is in a state that has the role F without knowing what the environment looks like. >Circumstances, >Environment. Dependent on the Environment: e.g. "every token of x is caused in y when he sees a cat": this is environment-dependent. ((s)> Putnam: "cat-single-sign-trigger"). CSF: common-sense functionalism Twin EarthVsCSF/Schiffer: the arguments work there, because they are environment-independent. This may spur a hope for a scientific functionalism, for a theory with T-correlated functional roles that are environment-dependent. BurgeVsFunctionalism: (Burge 1979(3), example turned classic, also Burge 1982a(1), 1982b(2)): E.g. Alfred's use of "arthritis" involves more than the correct use limited to inflammation of the joints. He thinks it is similar to rheumatism and says "I have arthritis in the thigh". Burge: Alfred has a wrong belief. Shiffer dito. w: World where Alfred has the belief that he has arthritis in the thigh. In w, Alfred has the belief that he has arthritis in the thigh w' is a possible world that is different from the other only in that Alfred's use of "arthritis" is correct there. It is accepted by the language community. (s) The language community mistakenly believes that it is possible to have arthritis in the thigh. The community as a whole is wrong (except for the doctors)). Then, Alfred's belief there is also true. Important Point/Burge: In w', Alfred does not have the belief that he has arthritis in the thigh. For this belief is false (because arthritis is only an inflammation of the joints. But the belief he has is true on its own!) ((s) He has the belief that he has a disease of which it is generally believed that he could have in the thigh. His word "arthritis" then has a different content than in w). BurgeVsCSF: in w , Alfred is in exactly the same T* -correlated states as we are in w. Therefore, if CSF were correct, he would express the same belief in both. But he does not. Therefore, CSF must be incorrect. ((s) Alfred does not assert in w' to believe this (and does not believe it), but then there are two differences between w and w'?). >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought. 1. Tyler Burge: 1982a. “Two Thought Experiments Reviewed.” In: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23.2 : 284–293. 2. Tyler Burge: 1982b. "Other Bodies" In: Andrew Woodfield (Hg.): Thought and Object. New York: Oxford. 3. Tyler Burge: 1979. Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–121. |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Folk Psychology | Schiffer | I 33f SchifferVsFolk Psychology: problem: the theory will often provide the same functional role for different beliefs simultaneously. >Functional role, >Belief. SchifferVsLoar: according to him from Bel T follows #(that snow is = white Bel T #(that grass is green). Then both have the same T#-correlated functional role. (T* = folk psychology). >Meaning theory/Loar, cf. >Homophony. I 276 Here the uniqueness condition is a very weak condition. >Uniqueness condition. It is not sufficient for that one is in a particular belief state that is linked to them: - E.g. "If p is true, one believes that p". N.b. "p" exists inside and outside the belief context. Therefore, the theory will say something clear about p. Problem: in the uniqueness condition the variables for propositions only occur within belief contexts. Then all beliefs of the same logical form have the same functional role. >Opaque context. I 34 All that does not distinguish the belief that dinosaurs are extinct from the fact that fleas are mortal. ((s) Related problem: equivalence in the disquotation scheme: "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green.) >Equivalence, >Disquotation scheme. Schiffer: Problem: there are not enough input rules that are not based on perception. I 38 BurgeVsFolk Psychology/BurgeVsIntention based semantics/BurgeVsGrice/Schiffer: famous example: Alfred believes in w that he has arthritis in his thigh. - But he also covers all proper cases. In w he has a correct use of "Arthrite". Then he has in w not the believe that he has arthrite in his thigh - (because this belief is false). N.b.: in w he is in exactly the same T*-correlated states (T* = folk psychology) as in w. Therefore, he would have to express the same belief. But he does not - hence the common sense functionalism must be false. >Functionalism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Grice | Avramides | I 26 Grice/Avramidis: Grice view should be understood as a conceptual analysis, not as reductionism. - Not as physicalism. - Grice wants a reconciliation with Frege and Davidson. >Philosophy of mind, >Gottlob Frege, >Donald Davidson, >Paul Grice. I 42f Grice/Avramides: Thesis: the problem of sentence meaning (meaning of the whole utterance) takes precedence over the meaning of partial statements. >Sentence meaning, >Word meaning, >Clauses, >Compositionality, >Frege-Principle, >Subsententials. Statement/Grice: is understood broadly, also signals etc. Important argument: thus, the analysis ranges in a situation meaning before the timeless meaning (the standard meaning). >Situation, >Situation/Psychology, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. Only so can he equate"x means something" with "S means something (in a situation) with x". 1st Version; ... A response from the listener is induced ... 2nd Version: ... in addition: the listener must recognize the intention of the speaker. I 44 3rd Version: in addition: the recognition of the speaker's intention must act as a reason for the belief of the listener. Vs: there are still many counterexamples. I 45 GriceVsGrice: counter-E.g. it is a difference whether I spontaneously frown in a situation or in order to express my displeasure to a person. Important argument: exactly the same information is transmitted, no matter if the speaker has the intention to communicate or not. Then there is no reason to distinguish between natural and non-natural meaning. >Natural meaning/non-natural meaning. The difference has to do with what the frowning person can expect the listener to believe - but without intention no meaning - non-natural meaning (without intention) never sufficient for response. I 46 E.g. thumbscrews mean nothing. I 67 Grice/Avramides: so far, the analysis is not sufficient for timeless (linguistic meaning. - Only for speaker-meaning. Meaning/Grice: meaning is to be found both outside language and within. I 68 Timeless meaning/Grice: disjunction of findings and about what people want to achieve with x. - This is also an effect etc. but not a practice. It is not sufficient (because it may have a second meaning), and not necessary (it may have alternatives). - But it is a "procedure in the repertoire". >Practise, >Language behavior, >Language community, >Convention. I 111 Reductionist Gricean/Loar: This position risks to accept thinking without language. >Thinking without language. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Grice | Black | I 61f BlackVsGrice: Grice's theory is 1) too complicated - 2) does not cover self-talk (you do not intend to give yourself a reason...). Speaker's intention: cannot always be to produce belief in the other person: E.g. test candidate. >Knowledge paradox. Liar paradox: the liar must always tell the truth according to Grice: he has to mean "yes" when he says "no". >Paradoxes. I 64 Grice Thesis: S (speaker) means something when he intends to achieve a certain effect in L (listener), for example, that L believes that p. I 65 BlackVsGrice: that requires modifications: negative conjunctions or corresponding positive disjunctions. I 66 E.g,. there is no need to explain all infinite chess moves, but to say: "he intended the consequences of chess" is not an explanation - E.g. "keeping the king from moving", in turn, does require an explanation - that is exactly Grice's problem. - ((s) Because he assumes speaker intention which cannot be found in the rules) BlackVsSpeaker's intention - BlackVsIntended Effect. I 67 BlackVsGrice: his theory is inadequate: 1) Relying on standard effects - 2) Trust that speaker's intention brings about such effects. >Speaker's meaning, >Utterance meaning. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Grice | Millikan | I 52 Language/Millikan: in this chapter: what are the relations between 1. the stabilizing function of a speech pattern 2. their literal use 3. the speaker's intentions. Stabilization function/Millikan: next chapter thesis: one aspect of the word meaning, the syntactic form is the focused stabilization function. >Terminology/Millikan. Literary use/Millikan: the literary use does not correspond to any stabilizing function (see below). Gricean Intention/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: Thesis: the Gricean intentions are not at all what drives language usage and understanding. >Grice. Stabilization function/language/Millikan: if speech patterns such as words or syntactic forms have a stabilizing function, then these direct eigenfunctions of reproductively determined families (rfF) are 1st level, of which these patterns are also elements. Functions: of words etc. are historically acquired by expressing both utterances and reactions of the listener. Intention/Speaker's intention/N.B.: these functions do not depend on the speaker's intentions! Direct eigenfunction: has a word token even when it is produced by a parrot. The token is an element of a reproductively determined family in that it has a direct eigenfunction. >Speaker intention. Intention/purpose: the intention or purpose provides a derived eigenfunction. Derived eigenfunction: however, lies above and beyond the direct or stabilizing function. It can be the same as the direct function, but it does not have to be. In any case, it is not its own function of the speech pattern, it is not its eigenfunction. Stabilization Function/Language/Millikan: although the stabilization function is independent of purpose and speaker's intention, it is not independent of purposes that speakers can have in general. I 53 Here again there will be a "critical mass" of cases of use. I 63 Imperative/Millikan: now it is certainly the case that a listener, if asked if the speaker intended to obey the command, will surely immediately answer "yes". I 64 But that does not mean that he used this belief in obedience. Gricean intentions/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: Gricean intentions are thus superfluous. And they also do not help to distinguish unnatural meaning from less interesting things. In any case, we need not pay attention to Gricean intentions, which are subject only to potential and not actual modifications of the nervous system. >Intention/Grice, >Intentionality/Grice. I 65 VsMillikan: one could object that you could have reasons for an action without these reasons being activated in the anatomy. Millikan: if I stop believing something, I will refrain from certain actions. Gricean Intentions/Millikan: the only interesting question is whether they are realised actually inside while one is speaking. E.g. Millikan: the Sergeant says: "When I say 'stop' the next time, do not stop!" A similar example is given by Bennett. Problem: the training was so effective that the soldier did not manage to stop. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Grice | Schiffer | Avramides I 114 Grice/Schiffer: (= intention-based approach) Grice is obliged to deny logical functions of meanings. - Instead: dependence on a (causal) fact (which is non-semantically specified). >Intention-based semantics, >Facts, >Situations, cf. >Situation semantics. --- Schiffer I 13 Grice/Schiffer: Problem: the meaning must not determine the content. - Because semantic vocabulary must be avoided - therefore VsRelation Theory. The belief objects would have to be language independent. >Relation theory, >Objects of belief. I 241 Intention-based approach/Grice/Schiffer: works without Relation Theory and without compositional semantics. - Extrinsic explanation is about non-semantically describable facts of use. SchifferVsGrice: his theory has not enough to say about the semantic properties of linguistic units. I 242 Grice/Schiffer: (Grice 1957)(1): attempts to define semantic concepts of public language in terms of propositional attitudes (belief, wishing, wanting). With that nothing is assumed about the meaning itself. Def speaker-meaning/Grice: (1957)(1) Is non-circular definable as a kind of behavior with the intention to trigger a belief or an action in someone else. Def expression meaning/Grice: (1957)(1) that means the semantic features of expressions of natural language. - Is non-circular definable as certain types of correlations between characters and types of exercise of speaker-meaning. - Statement/extended: every act, that means something. >Speaker intention, >Speaker meaning. Schiffer: thus questions of meaning are reduced to questions about propositional attitudes. I 243 A character string has to have a particular feature, so that the intention is detected. >Intentions. I 245 Grice/Schiffer: Problem: Falsifying evidence is not a meaning-problem. Common knowledge is necessary, but always to refute by counter-examples. >Language community. Solution: to define common knowledge by counterfactual conditions. >Counterfactual conditional. Problem: not even two people have common knowledge. SchifferVsGrice: no one has set up a lot of reasonable conditions for speaker-meaning. Problem: a person can satisfy the conditions of (S) when he merely says that A intended to cause it, that A believes that p ((S) = lies). SchifferVsGrice: this approach is hyper-intellectual, presupposes too much intentions and expectations, that will never be divided. - The normal speaker knows too little to understand the expression-meaning by Grice. >Utterance meaning. I 247 E.g. I hope you believe me, but not on the basis of my intention. - A necessary condition to tell something is not a necessary condition to mean it as well. >Meaning/Intending. 1. H. Paul Grice (1957). Meaning. Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388 |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Grice | Searle | V 69 Meaning/SearleVsGrice: it is insufficient to bind meaning to intention and its recognition: 1) It is uncertain how much meaning depends on rules or convention. 2) There is no distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Cf- >Illocutionary acts, >perlocutionary acts, >rules, >conventions. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Grice | Tugendhat | I 269f TugendhatVsGrice: the speaker does not want to cause that.., or he would say "I want to cause... - He does not mean anything, he claims something. Vs: Grice does not consider self-talk. - Absurd: that self talk would have other truth conditions. - The communication function does not belong to the meaning, otherwise self-talk impossible. >Paul Grice, >Meaning, >Self-talk, >Communication. Meaning/TugendhatVsGrice: two possibilities: (a) correlative to understanding: then it is false that what a speaker wants to say with "p" is that he wants to effect...etc. that would rather want to say if he said "I want to effect etc." what he wants to say with "p" is assert that p. b) if you give Grice his terminology, so to speak, then you have to say that the function of an assertoric sentence, or the intention with which it is used, is not to mean something, but to assert something. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Assertions, >Intention, >Intentionality, >Speaking. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Implication | Jackson | Read III 92 Implication/Jackson/Def Robustness: (Jackson) a statement is robust if its assertiveness remains unaffected by the acquisition of information. III 93 The punch line for Jackson: the modus ponens comes into play for conditional sentences. Condition sets are not robust with respect to the falsity of their consequents. >modus ponens, >Conditional, >Implication paradox. III 94 Jackson: Assertiveness is measured by conditional probability. There is a specific convention about conditional propositions: namely, that they are robust with respect to their antecedents, and therefore cannot be claimed in circumstances where it is known that their antecedents are false. ReadVsJackson/ReadVsGrice: both are untenable. The problematic conditional sentences occur in embedded contexts. Example: Either if I was right, you were right, or if you were right, I was right. Assertion and assertiveness: are terms that are applied to complete statements, not to their parts! Conditional sentences are not truth functional. >Truth functions. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Intention-Based Semantics | Habermas | III 369 Intention-Based Semantics/Action Theory/Habermas: the analytical action theory ((s) following Grice, Austin) is limited to the atomistic action model of a solitary actor and neglects mechanisms of action coordination through which interpersonal relationships are formed. >P. Grice, >J.L. Austin. III 370 Therefore, it finds hardly any connection to the formation of social scientific concepts. The philosophical problems it creates are too non-specific for the purposes of social theory. HabermasVsAnalytical Philosophy/HabermasVsAnalytical Theory of Action: it goes back to Kant by asking about causality, intentionality and the logical status of explanations without penetrating into the basic questions of a sociological theory of action. Instead, questions of coordination of action should be taken as a starting point.(1) >Causality, >Intentionality, >Explanation, >Causal explanation. III 371 HabermasVsGrice/HabermasVsBennett/HabermasVsLewis, David/HabermasVsSchiffer: the intentional semantics developed by these authors is not suitable for clarifying the coordination mechanism of linguistically mediated interactions, because it analyses the act of communication itself according to the model of consequence-oriented action. >St. Schiffer, >D. Lewis, >Semantics. Intentional Semantics/HabermasVsGrice: Intentional semantics is based on the contraintuitive idea that understanding the meaning of a symbolic expression can be traced back to the speaker's intention to give the listener something to understand. III 373 Solution/Habermas: Karl Bühler's organon model (see Language/Bühler), ((s) which distinguishes between symbol, signal and symptom and refers to sender and receiver) leads in its theoretical meaning to the concept of an interaction of subjects capable of speech and action mediated by acts of communication. 1.S. Kanngiesser, Sprachliche Universalien und diachrone Prozesse, in: K. O. Apel (1976), 273ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Intentions | Bennett | Avramides I 17 BennettVsGrice: instead of intentions (these are too complicated): simply assume "Plain Talk": the speaker relies on the faith of the listener whenever an utterance U is expressed a particular proposition p is true. >Intentionality, >Utterances, >Statements, >Sentences, >Truth, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. GriceVsVs: instead: "background-fact" - the assuption of a background eliminates troublesome propositional attitudes. >Background, >Propositional attitudes. Avramides: pro intentions - and why should they be easy? >Intentions, >Content, >Thought, >Thinking, >Simplicity, >Complexity. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Intentions | Black | I 72 Intention/meaning/speaker intention/Grice: Grice presupposes no act of intending. >Acts of Will. I 73 Speaker's intention/BlackVsGrice: the speaker's intention cannot be inferred by the hearer. - Otherwise the meaning would have to be already given. >Speaker's meaning |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Intentions | Donnellan | Bennett I 195 Intention/to mean something/Donnellan: It is not about what someone was going to say - otherwise you could take every description. (DonnellanVsGrice). Nevertheless the intention decides about referential or attributive use. >Attributive/referential, >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference, >Speaker meaning, >Meaning/Grice, >Meaning (Intending). |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Intentions | Strawson | Meggle I 24ff Intention/StrawsonVsGrice: may be hided complicatly by courtesy, nevertheless can hint at something etc. - modification: the n-th part-intention of S is that H should recognize that S has the (n-1)th part-intention. Meggle I 30 Re-definition: 1. H shows R (reaction) 2. H believes that S (1) intends 3. Hs fulfillment of (1) is based on Hs' fulfilment of (2). Meggle I 31 SearleVsGrice: (> >Convention. Meggle I 33 Grice E.g.: An Arab trader invites a tourist who doesn't speak Arab to enter his shop: "You damned ...": one can say that the trader thinks the customer should come in, but the sentence does not mean it. Lemon example: not the sentence but the situation is decisive. >Situation, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Intentions. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
| Language | Chomsky | I 279ff Language/Chomsky: apart from its mental representation, it has no objective existence. Therefore, we do not need to distinguish here between "systems of beliefs" and "knowledge". >Belief, >Knowledge. --- II 319 Language/ChomskyVsQuine: must separate language and theory - otherwise, two speakers of the same language could have no disagreement. >Theory. II 330 Language/Chomsky/Quine: no frame of a tentative theory as in physics. - Several analytical hypotheses are not only possible but necessary. >Analytical hypotheses. ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the concepts of the language can be explained with physical dimensions. Aristotle: language is rather associated with actions. VsQuine: it is not evident that similarities can be localized in a room. - Principles, not "learned sentences". >Principles, >Similarity, >Reference. II 333 VsQuine: language cannot be dependent on "disposition for reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be essential. II 343 Perhaps language does not have to be taught. --- Graeser I 121f Language/ChomskyVsGrice: Question: should the main aspect really be communication? Searle: rather representation, but not as opposite. >Communication, >Representation. Meaning/VsGrice: most of the sentences of a language have never been uttered, so anyone can hardly ever have meant something by them. Meaning/VsGrice: we can only ever find out speaker meanings, because we know what the sentence means. - Students of Grice: Strawson and Searle. --- Münch III 320 Language/Chomsky/Holenstein: language is not a natural kind. >Natural kinds. Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992 |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
| Lemons Example | SearleVsGrice: Searle invented an example: the phrase "Kennst Du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühn?" would mean "I am a German soldier" - if the context was appropriate. Therefore Grice s theory cannot be right. Searle 1969/1972 p.43/69 |
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| Lemons Example | Bennett | I 190 Lemon-Example/Searle/Bennett: Grice: Conditional (intend p) > (mean p) SearleVsGrice: it is possible to (intend p) and ~(mean p). BennettVsSearle: Searle has not refuted Grice. - The antecedent is not satisfied. - S does not literally mean what he/she says. >Meaning, >Literal meaning, >Meaning/intending, >Reference, >Sense, >Utterances, >Speech acts, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Meaning | Black | I 58 Meaning/Grice: according to Grice there is a meaning only by the effect on the listener. - We have not only to discover the primary speaker's intention, but the listener should also think of something specific and intend it. BlackVs: this is not sufficient and not necessary: it does not have to be true, even though the conditions are met, and may be true although they are not met. I 77 The background can not be understood if the core ("it's snowing") is not understood. Meaning/BlackVsGrice: Black thesis: it is not the detecting of the speaker's intention what causes an effect on the listener, allowing the hearer to determine the meaning, but rather the reverse: the discovery of the speaker meaning allows the listener to infer the speaker's intention. >Speaker's meaning, >Intentions, >Understanding. Intention/Black: surely there could be no understanding without primitive situations in which a speaker's intention is recognized. - But that is no proof of the correctness of an intentionalist analysis. II 58 Meaning/Black: Meaning must be located beyond language for words to ever have a practical application. - E.g., Determine whether there is a color. - Differences between objects in the world are recognized along the scale of our language categories. >Classification, >Categories. II 98 Meaning/Black: the "life of the words " is not in any "mental circumstances", but rather in the ability to interact with symbolic actions in relationship and for it to serve as a starting point. - Meaning can not be fixed to any feature of mental actions. Brain-o-scope/Black: if we had such an instrument there would still remain the task of interpreting the images. >Interpretation. II 211 Meaning/Putnam/Black: Meaning cannot be the object; e.g. "Titanic" would have no meaning any more. >Reference, >Non-existence. Meaning need not be "in me" to be mine. - (( s)> Putnam:"meanings ain't in the head"). >Meaning/Putnam. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Meaning | Grice | I 2 ff Meaning/drawing/photography: the photo with Mr. X in an obvious position with Mrs Y did not mean anything! The drawing with the same object meant something. (>Intention). I 4 Definition meanings/Grice: "natural meaning": measles, signs and natural signs are detected, not appointed, ther are not plumbable and there is no convention. Definition meanings: meaning are non-natural. Meaning is an expression, a character, an appointment, a convention, a metaphor or unconscious regularities. >Conventions, >Metaphors, >Regularities, >Signs, >Utterances. II 17 Meaning/Grice: meaning does not follow from intention: e.g. a perpetrator may leave false traces. I 8 Intention needs an idea about the effect. Listener-meaning: what the other should do in my opinion, cannot deliver the meanings. Deviation needs good reasons. II 36 Speaker meaning: the speaker meaning may be different for the same sentence. >Speaker meaning. III 85 Quotation marks are semantically important. Avramides I 2 Meaning/Grice (1957): new: Avramides: the most remarkable thing about this "new approach" is the unconscious use of the terms intention and belief. Circular: if you wanted to exclude the unwanted cases from the beginning. Prehistory: Stevenson: meaning needs constance - otherwise there is only noise. Solution: the solution are the habits of the speakers. I 4 Grice/Avramidis: Grice is more interested in understanding how utterances come to their content. Intentions need to be explained in terms of the content, not vice versa: that still leaves the question open how intentions and beliefs come to their content. I 5 Grice: in the tradition of Austin/Searle, later Wittgenstein: language must be seen in the context of behavior. I 10 Meaning/Grice/Avramides: thesis: we start with speaker meaning in one situation and provide an analysis in terms of mental states of the speaker and the listener. I 11 Fundamental: "S means in a situation that p" - thereby Grice has clarified the concept of "meaning" (to mean) sufficiently. Grice III 90 Situation Meaning/Grice: the situation meaning can be expressed and meant but is still wrong. III 95 Meaning/practice/Grice: the well-known practice of the speaker is not clear for the meaning: the sentence can have other meanings. S may have other means. We need a term like "S has in its repertoire ..." Newen I 77 Meaning/Grice/Newen/Schrenk: the speaker's intention is crucial. There are five steps: 1. behavior, 2. the psychological theory of needs, etc., 3. the theory of subjective utterance meanings: a) for the listener and b) for speakers, 4. the intersubjective meaning (conventional utterance meaning, VsGrice): has no theory of conventions, and 5. compositionality. >Compositionality. Newen I 80 Natural meaning/Grice: e.g. "These spots mean measles": here, there can be no mistake! Otherwise there are other spots. Communication: all meaning in communication is not natural meaning - not natural meaning: here there may be errors. Schiffer I XIII Meaning/Grice: (1957)(1): expression meaning in terms of speaker-meaning is ultimately purely psychological. 1. H. P. Grice Meaning. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 66, No. 3. (Jul., 1957), pp. 377-388 |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Davidson | I (e) 101f E.g. If I do not know the difference between a short-beaked echidna and a porcupine, it might be that I describe all the short-beaked echidnas which cross my path as porcupines. But since I have learned the word "porcupine" in a certain environment, my word "porcupine" does not refer to short-beaked echidnas, but to porcupins. It is the porcupine to which I am referring, and it is the porcupine, which I believe to have in front of me, when I sincerely assert, "This is a porcupine." My ignorance of the circumstances which determine what I mean is not the least to show that I do not know what I mean and think. There is, indeed, no physical difference between my actual condition and the one I would be in if I had meant "short-beaked echdina or porcupine," but this does not mean that there is no psychological difference. E.g. there may be no physical difference between mountain-sunburn and sunburn, but there is a difference, because the causation is different. Glüer II 164f Someone does not mean that p, if he did not intend to be interpreted as if he would mean p. Well, this is not a Humpty-Dumpty theory. It would only be one, if it was thought sufficient, to intend to be interpreted as if one would mean p to mean p. This is, however, a necessary condition and not a sufficient condition and therefore it is not a Humpty-Dumpty theory. Humpty-Dumpty says, "You cannot know it!". II 164 f Davidson: If he knows that she cannot know, then he cannot intend it, because one cannot intend what one does not consider possible. McGinn I 111 Burge and Dummett mean what speakers mean with their words - it very strongly depends on how the community uses these words. DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsBurge: that is nonsense, because it has nothing to do with successful communication. If you talk differently than the community or someone else finds out, then you can communicate all day long. And this is happening all the time. McGinn: Domestication theory: There is also another approach that refuses to answer the constitutional question regarding the meaning (to mean), and instead conceive the meant meaning as an essentially combination-conditioned phenomenon. (Davidson). In order to tame the intended meaning, we would have to show how semantic basic units connect according to determinable rules. Glüer II 169f Meaning/to mean/intention/intent/Grice/DavidsonVsGrice: pro: Feedback is very important - Vs: nevertheless, intention is probably a necessary but not sufficient condition for meaning. - Intention is at least as difficult to explain as meaning. >Intention, >Meaning, >Communication. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Meaning (Intending) | Searle | II 49 Meaning: meaning is not primarily intentional, not without perceptible action. II 203 Meaning/Searle: we define the meaning (and hence linguistic meaning) by intentional forms, which per se are not linguistic. Philosophy of mind: the philosophy of mind analyzes semantic terms with deeper psychological terms > Meaning/Grice, Intending/Grice. II 204 Meaning/SearleVsGrice: meaning shall be defined by action and intentional states. VsGrice: he used intent, belief and desire unanalyzed. >Intention, >Desire, >Belief. Searle: meaning is a form of intentionality. >Intentionality. Like Grice: meaning will be effective. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Meaning Theory | Avramides | I 7ff Theory of meaning/meaning theory/Davidson/Dummett/Avramides : Davidson and Dummett represented a "pessimistic" approach: Instead of asking directly what is meaning, we can only wonder how a theory of meaning must look. Meaning theory/Dummett: "meaning is what meaning theory explains". Avramides: Dummett stands in stark contrast to Grice. DummettVsGrice. Avramides: Dummett's approach is too pessimistic. Meaning theory/Davidson: what form must a meaning theory have? 1st Theorems must be comprehensible to speakers and hearers 2nd We will have to explain potentially infinitely many sentences 3rd We will have to explain compositionality. Solution/Davidson: a semantic notion of truth (Tarski) will have to understand the language. DummettVsDavidson: verification. Conditions of verification instead of truth conditions. >Verification conditions, >Truth conditions. I 94 Meaning theory/Grice/John Biro/Avramides: it is about the theory, not about how to find out the meaning but what it constitutes. - Not what reveals the significance, but what does it mean that an expression has a meaning. Biro: "Constitution of meaning is one thing - to tell you is another". |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Meaning Theory | Black | I 73 Theory of meaning/meaning theory/Black: a normal meaning theory considers neither circumstances nor gestures (Cf. >Gavagai, >Gestures, >Circumstances.) I 75 E.g. Gesture of a hungry man/BlackVsGrice: I do not have first to decipher a "message" and then to make my interpretation on the basis of attribution of an intention. - Instead: "natural sign" - not a "discovery" as an intermediary. >Signs/Armstrong. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Meaning Theory | Schiffer | I 12 Meaning theory/Schiffer: assuming compositionality, you can identify language with the system of conventions in P. - Then one has (with Davidson) the form of meaning theory. - No one has ever done this. >Compositionality, >Meaning theory/Davidson. I 182 Truth Theory/Schiffer: a truth theory cannot be a meaning theory because its knowledge would not be sufficient for understanding the language. >Truth theory, >Understanding. I 220 Meaning theory/Schiffer: not every language needs a correct meaning theory - because it has to do without the relation theory for belief. >Relation theory. I 222 The relation theory for belief is wrong when languages have no compositional truth-theoretical semantics - otherwise it would be true. I 261 Meaning/Meaning Theory/language/Schiffer: Thesis: all theories of language and thought are based on false prerequisites. Error: to think that language comprehension would be a process of inferences. Then every sentence must have a feature, and this could not merely consist in that the sentence has that and that meaning. Because that would be semantic. We need a non-semantic description. Problem: E.g. "she gave it to him" has not even semantic properties. E.g. "snow is white" has its semantic properties only contingently. >Semantic properties. I 264 SchifferVsGrice: we cannot formulate our semantic knowledge in non-semantic terms. >Intentions/Grice. I 265 Meaning theory/meaning/SchifferVsMeaning theory: all theories have failed. Thesis: there is no meaning theory. - (This is the no-Theory-Theory of mental representation). Schiffer:Meaning is not an entity - therefore there is also no theory of this object. I 269 Schiffer: Meaning is also determinable without meaning theory. I 269 No-Theory-Theory of mental representation: there is no theory for intentionality, because having a concept does not mean that the quantifiable real would be entities. The scheme "x believes y iff __" cannot be supplemented. The questions on our language processing are empirically, not philosophical. >Language use, >Language behavior. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Reduction | Grice | Avramides I 23 Grice: the analytical biconditional has semantical terms on the left hand side and psychological terms on the right (the right hand side is more complex than the left). Reductive: in the end, we only have psychological terms. If not, then it is reciprocal (Avramides pro). Reciprocal: the analysis must also be applied to the relations, that the meanings have to the mental states. SchifferVsGrice: speaker meaning does not have a logical priority - otherwise it is circular. Reciprocal analysis/Avramides: the reciprocal analysis can show how psychological and semantic concepts fit together. >Avramides on Grice, >Speaker meaning. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Seeing | Lewis | V 274 Perception/Seeing/Match/Lewis: certainly does not mean that the same is going on in the mind or the soul as before one’s eyes, rather it is about the informational content. Visual experience: is best characterized by the typical causal role. >Causal role/Lewis. The content is the content of the belief, which tends to be caused by it. >Content/Lewis. Problem: the same visual experience can cause very different beliefs - but not all the content can be characterized by belief. E.g. Rabbit-Duck-Head: the belief can be characterized by the disjunction rabbit or duck, but then results in the belief that there are ink and paper. >Experience/Lewis, >Belief/Lewis, >Rabbit-duck-head/Lewis. V 275 Hallucination/Lewis: not seeing, because the scene did not cause the experience. - E.g. If I hallucinated my brain and it just happens to be in accordance. t’s my brain that causes this, but it’s not the same as seeing. - (>veridical). V 280 Seeing/Grice: requires a causal standard process. V 281 Hallucination: no real counterfactual dependence on the scene - if it changes, the hallucination does not necessarily have to change - the other way around: congruence with real seeing: not caused by the scene itself. V 280 Seeing/Perception/Kripke/Lewis: (Kripke 1972)(1) LewisVsGrice: causal standard process would lead to the fact that no one knew enough about reflection in the past to be able to have had a concept about seeing. Solution/Kripke: descriptions made rigid. >Description/Kripke, >Rigidity/Kripke. V 283 Seeing/Lewis: is distinguishing - but: perfect match - e.g. in a dark scene - that would allow a wide range of alternatives - which is undesirable. - Seeing a dark scene is not seeing. 1.Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), 253-355 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Social Theory | Habermas | III 460 Social Theory/Habermas: their main problems are: 1. the extension of the teleological concept of action, 2. the relativization of the purpose activity to a model of understanding that not only presupposes the transition from consciousness to the philosophy of language, but the communication-theoretical development and radicalization of language analysis itself. >Speech Act Theory, >HabermasVsSpeech Act Theory, HabermasVsGrice, HabermasVsBennett, HabermasVsAustin, HabermasVsLewis. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Speaker Meaning | Millikan | I 5 Eigenfunction/Language/Meaning/MillikanVsGrice: we do not take the speaker meaning as the basic concept. I 77 Speaker meaning/truth/intention/truth/Millikan: that someone rather says the truth as something wrong does not depend on his intentions, but on the stabilization functions of the words he uses. >Terminology/Millikan. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Speech Act Theory | Cresswell | I 12 CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsSearle/CresswellVsSpeech Act Theory: Speech Act Theory is more of a theory of semantic performance than of semantic competence. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Terminology | Millikan | I 2 Def Eigenfunction/Millikan: in contrast to 1. the current function 2. a "type of purpose", applicable on different occasions. (Generalization, "average" (see below.) E.g. An organ has a certain function = eigenfunction. Natural language/Millikan: natural language is not invented by someone for a purpose. Eigenfunction/Millikan: analogy: e.g. to organs of the body: we can use our organs for purposes other than their own function, e.g. to row with one's arms. I 3 Speech patterns/language device/terminology/Millikan: I mean words with this as well as, syntactic forms, stress, accents, punctuation, etc. Thesis: such patterns were only handed down because stable open and covert reactions of a cooperation partner are just as much handed down (have asserted themselves). Standardization/Millikan: the (speech-) pattern only performs its eigenfunction with a co-operation partner, but with an arbitrary one. Therefore, it must be standardized. Stabilization/Millikan/(s): (temporal) for recurring tokens a similarity must be given to previous tokens. Stabilization/standardization/Millikan: stabilization and standardization are two sides of a medal. I 5 Eigenfunction/Language/Meaning/MillikanVsGrice: we do not take the speaker meaning as the basic concept. Meaningfulness/Millikan: We do not explain meaningfulness with typical use. Belief/wishes/Intention/Millikan: belief, wishes and attention can be explained without reference to language. I 5 NORMAL/Terminology/Millikan: (spelling: capitalized): is understood here as a biological term, which is biologically normal. Not what average behavior is. I 12 "Real value"/real value/terminology/Millikan: I call the basic partner of sense real value. The difference between real value and a speaker is at least as great as between sense and intension. Terminology/Millikan/(s): "sense" is to be reproduced from now on with "meaning", which is not Fregean sense. Real value/Millikan: the real value is practically the truthmaker of sentences. Part II: this is about Fregean sense. Sense: is quasi intentionality. Thought/sentence/Millikan: are patterns that show intentionality, perhaps they have the form of inner sentences ((s) > Mentalese). Inner Sentences/Mentalese/Millikan: inner sentences and Mentalese are not determined by final rules. Therefore, intentionality is not equal to rationality. Intentionality/Millikan: I describe naturalist, but not reductionist. (MillikanVsReductionism). Intentionality/Millikan: their understanding is something quite different from the understanding of consciousness. I 17f Def direct eigenfunction/Millikan: a thing (device, pattern, instrument) has a direct eigenfunction, if it has it as an element of a particular family of things that I call Definition reproductively established family/reF/Terminology/Millikan: things that are similar are similar here because there was a kind of copying process (> reproduction). I 19 Reproductively established family/reF/Millikan: here there are two different ones: Reproductively established family 1st level: only elements of reproductively established families of 1st level are copies of each other. Reproductively established family of higher level: their elements can only be defined by the concept of the eigenfunction of lower-level families and the concept of "normal explanation" (according to biological normality). I 23 Def reproductively established family 1st stage/reF/Millikan: Any set of entities having the same or reproductively established characters derived from repetitive reproductions of the same character of the same model form a reproductively established family of 1st level. N.B.: i.e. that the elements can be reproduced in the same way, but they do not have to! e.g. Tokens of the written word "dog" can be copied in writing, photocopied, printed, etc. For example, the repetition of a word by a parrot. Reproductively established family of higher level: I 24 (1) Any set of similar units produced by elements of the same reproductively established families if it is a direct eigenfunction of this family to produce these units and if all are produced in accordance with normal explanations, form a higher level reproductively established family. (2) Any set of similar units produced by elements of the same pattern, if one of the eigenfunctions of this pattern is to make later units coincide with earlier ones, and this similarity is in accordance with a normal explanation of this function, form a reproductively established family of higher level. I 27 Def method of difference/Mill/Millikan: trial and error, but with only one trial and one observation. I 109 Substance/Properties/Millikan: Thesis: "Substance" and "properties" are categories that are cut off relative to each other and relative to the operation of the negation. They do not mutually exclude one another. Properties/Millikan: properties are varied elements of facts, receptive to negation. Substances/Millikan: substances are also variable, but relative to other transformations. I 127 Def Hubot/Terminology/Millikan: Hubots are beings that are like us, except that they all think in the same inner language. (This is unlikely for humans). (Other classification, other opposites, other concept pairs > order). In addition, Hubots never develop new concepts. N.B.: the example is to show that Fregean senses and intensions are not the same. I 130 Def Rubots/Rubot/Terminology/Millikan: Rubots are like Hubots, (sensitive to light, odors, temperature, touch) but in a different frequency spectrum than Hubots. Vocabulary: may still be perfectly coordinated with the environment with regard to the meaning (as with the Hubots). I 130 Def Rumans/Ruman/Terminology/Millikan: Rumans apply color concepts like Hubots. And they also live in a similar environment (but initially somewhere else). Color/Color concepts/Perception/Spectrum: unlike the Hubots, the Rumans live under a sun that emits much redder light. Language/Stimulus Meaning/Hubots/Rumans/Millikan: Suppose the mechanisms that produce their sentences are identical. That is, the stimulus meanings of their expressions correspond perfectly! I 151 Def "fully-developed" Intension/Terminology/Millikan: the fully-developed intension is the intensions, which an inner term can have beyond the language-bound intentions. I 277 Complete concept/Millikan: to have a complete concept, one needs time concepts. Accessibility: complete concepts for durable objects are not as accessible as concepts for substances such as e.g. domestic cat or e.g. gold. I 281 Summary/substance/property/identity/self-identity/Millikan: Perfect Secondary Substance: e.g. gold: has an identity that is formally the same as that of an individual in relation to its properties. Imperfect secondary substance: e.g. 69s Plymouth (contradiction to above) e.g. domestic cat: have a kind of identity that is formally analogous to the identity of perfect substances. For example, in accordance with laws in situ, instead of under all natural conditions. I 289 Def Subessence/Terminology/Millikan: e.g. Gold exists over space and time, without being instantiated in the same objects. It is an identity that the material has relative to its own properties. I 332 Veil/Millikan: authors such as Wittgenstein and Quine have once again introduced a veil, like Descartes and Hume earlier. I 325 Def "Meaning-rationalism"/Millikan: Thesis: the knowledge that a proposition has meaning is not empirical, but a priori. Unlike knowledge about judgments, this is empirical. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Vocabulary | Avramides | I 92 Vocabulary/PeacockeVs "actual language relation". Supposedly this approach does not need semantic vocabulary. Peacocke later: Gricean intentions cannot be used as evidence for the radical interpretation, but that is not VsGrice. >Christopher Peacocke, >Intentions/Grice, >Radical Interpretation, >Speaker intention. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bennett, J. | Avramides Vs Bennett, J. | Avra I 17 Avramidis Bennett: Bennett/Avramidis: (Griceans, modified): Proposes a community of speakers who use a communication system that does not rely on Grice’ intentions and beliefs: the "Plain Talk" ("direct speech", "simple speech", "candid speech"). Def Plain Talk/Bennett: the speakers rely on the listener, they believe in the form of a generalization: whenever an utterance U is uttered, a particular proposition p is true. This is how they can do without a speaker’s intention. BennettVsGrice: if this simpler analysis is true, we do not need the more complicated one. (65). BennettVsVs: but Bennett himself believes that the Gricean is capable of withstanding this: GriceVsVs: Solution: "Background fact": if the speaker did not want to transmit p, the utterance U would have been inappropriate under the generalization that whenever U is uttered, p is true. (Bennett 1976 p.172). I 18 This saves the introduction of complex propositional attitudes in the analysis. Modification: the audience is presented with "intention dependent evidence for the proposition". AvramidesVsBennett: the modification is not necessary, it is already covered by Grice’ original analysis. Avra I 18 Communication/LoarVsBennett: Not only is this kind economy unnecessary, the elimination of the intentions removes something essential. The fact that intentions, expectations and beliefs should be simple in ordinary communication and personal relationships, seems to me so improbable that it surprises me why this should be a more realistic view. (70). I 121 Def Register/Bennett: A theoretical expression that stands for whatever in relation to an animal, and that validates predictions about its behavior (evaluates it, rates it yes/no) based on facts about its environment. (Bennett 1976, p.52). Avramides: Registering is necessary but not sufficient for belief. E.g. cruise missiles with thermal infrared equipment: can be described as reacting but not as learning. Belief/Bennett: We achieve sufficient conditions, if we add the ability to learn to registering. (see Bennett 1976, p 84). DavidsonVsBennett: Instead distinction subjective state/objective world. AvramidesVsDavidson: one could argue that the awareness of this distinction is the possession of the concept of belief. Davidson: this awareness is belief about a belief. Scaring/Davidson: only reaction to a stimulus. AvramidesVsDavidson: then there is certainly still room between the act of being surprised and the possession of the concept of belief. This allows, for example: the ability to learn that Bennett propagates. DavidsonVsBennett: rejects his approach, because his (Davidson’s) concept of awareness (of the distinction subjective / objective) is very strong. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Geach, P. | Wiggins Vs Geach, P. | Simons I 213 "Relative Identity"-view of super position: a) (Representative: Geach): "Sortal Theory" of relative identity: known as "theory R": for Sortals F and G it is possible to find two objects a and b, so that a and b are both Fs and Gs, a is the same F as b, but not the same G. Nicholas Griffin: pro. WigginsVsGeach: that violates Leibniz' law. And because this applies necessarily, the theory is necessarily wrong. DoepkeVsGeach: "relative identity" is only a false name for similarity. b) Grice/George Myro: (both unpublished): VsWiggins' thesis that things that are ever different are always different. GriceVsWiggins: the assumption depends on finding properties in which the objects differ in the times when they are not superposed. Then identity is relative to time. I.e. TI a = t b ↔ (F)[Ft a ↔ Ft b] Where the quantifier runs only over properties whose instantiation does not include the instantiation of any other property at any other time. This excludes: the property, e.g. to be two years old, e.g. to be ex-president e.g. to be bride-in-spe. Simons: we can call this the relation of "temporal indistinguishability". It is characterized by a limitation of Leibniz's law. I 214 SimonsVsGrice: if we call this similarity "identity", then any other kind of similarity is possible, like for example "surface identity" of a body with its surface. Indistinguishability/Time/Simons: will turn out to be important below (in constitution). System CT/Simons: (see above) with him, we have already rejected "temporal identity". Ad (3): dichrone view of super position: Thesis: superposed objects do not have to exist at the same time. For example, the gold forms into a ring. When the ring is melted, it is replaced by the gold. I.e. they exist at different times. For example, a person does not coincide with its body, it transforms into its body (the corpse). (Only if "body" is understood as "corpse", as is often, but not always the case). Dichrone view: Thesis: there is no substrate that survives the change. Change/Diachronic View: Thesis: is always a replacement of one object by another. SimonsVsDiachronic View: does not explain why so many properties are transferred from the original to the later object. Solution: an (assumed) substrate would explain this. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Grice, P.H. | Bennett Vs Grice, P.H. | I 187 BennettVsGrice: according to Grice, it looks as though every sentence uttered could have any meaning, depending on the circumstances and intentions. That would equalize the conventions to the circumstances. ((s) conventions must emancipate themselves from circumstances). |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Grice, P.H. | Black Vs Grice, P.H. | I 52 Max Black: Causal theory (also Stevenson, Morris) - BlackVsIntentionality theories (Grice, Searle, Strawson?). I 58 BlackVsGrice: The conditions of Grice are neither necessary nor sufficient. a) Not sufficient: there are situations in which it is not true that someone "says that...", although the conditions are met, b) not necessary: someone says something, although the conditions are not met. I 60 The whole theory becomes suspicious when it is so complicated. I 65 BlackVsGrice: he must constantly make modifications (negative conjunctions or corresponding positive disjunctions). This defensive strategy is too flexible on the one hand, while being too rigid on the other hand. (Sticking to the intended effect). I 67 BlackVsGrice: Insufficient: 1) His reference to standard effects - 2) his confidence that the speaker’s intention brings about such effects. I 68 BlackVsGrice: Every concrete manifestation usually has numerous effects. One would have to be "semantically relevant". The one that is necessary and sufficient to be communicated successfully. ((s) VsBlack: this is trivial and does not explain what is going on in successful communication or what is meant by an utterance). I 70 BlackVsGrice: a belief of the listener or a prop. att. induced in the listener are apparently perlocutionary. They are of practical importance, but irrelevant for a philosophical analysis of the concept of communication or the derived concept of speaker meaning. I 74 This applies mutatis mutandis also to the imperative case. When I have understood the request, my role as a listener and interpreter ends!. BlackVsGrice: he does not discuss how according to the principles of the basic model it can be expected of the listener that he discovers the speaker meaning. E.g. a beggar in a foreign country gestures to me that he is hungry. I 76 BlackVsGrice: no interposition of "discovering". - (The theory must cover as many cases as possible.) BlackVsGrice Thesis: not detecting the speaker’s intention to elicit an effect in the listener allows the listener to determine the meaning, but rather the reverse: the discovery of the speaker meaning allows the listener to infer the speaker’s intention. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Grice, P.H. | Davidson Vs Grice, P.H. | Glüer II 169/170 Davidson: Grice has understood some of the relationships between meaning and intention, e.g. Feedback. You intend to be interpreted not only in a particular way, but rather that one understands what is meant by faithfully recognize the intention. Very subtle thought. It must be part of your intention that people realize that they want to issue a statement. DavidsonVsGrice: But I do not think you can explain the concept of linguistic meaning on the basis of intentions. It is a necessary condition but not sufficient. Furthermore, intentions are at least as difficult to clarify as meanings. >Meaning/Grice, >meaning(intending)/Grice. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Grice, P.H. | Harman Vs Grice, P.H. | Avramidis I 63 HarmanVsGrice: has designed a counter E.g. that leads us back to Grice’s c". Personal dignity S says: "The earth does move" not in order to convince his listeners, of which he knows that they are not to be convinced. He would not even try to convince them. Avramides: I.e. this is not about activated belief. ((s) Activated belief: i.e. not the test situation of examination or repetition of knowledge). I 64 Avramides: the speaker does not speak to an audience at all. I 66 Solution/Schiffer: in these cases (self-talk, etc.) the speaker himself is the audience. That in turn means that these are not cases in which there is no audience!. SchifferVsHarman: (ad 10 "personal dignity", I 63): the misleading aspect in Harman’s example is that it seems like there is an audience, but there is not. The solution with the speaker as audience allows us to solve all the cases 1 - 10 together. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Grice, P.H. | Lewis Vs Grice, P.H. | V 280 Seeing/Grice: (1961) Demands a causal standard process. This explains why e.g. cases 3.,4. and 5. are not examples of seeing: 3. the brain in front of the eyes: this time it is the brain in front of the eyes that causes the experience: (connected by wires). 4. the sorcerer: performs a spell and causes me to hallucinate accidentally. 5) Light measurement: I am blind, but electrodes are implanted in my brain, V 278 so that I have the impression of a certain landscape. By chance there is a landscape in front of my eyes that corresponds exactly to this landscape. LewisVsGrice: Dilemma: If the standard process is defined as involving the reflection of light, this should mean a) that today some of us (but nobody in the past) know enough to have a term of seeing (because some of us know sufficiently enough to have a term/an idea of seeing (since there was insufficient knowledge about optics in the past). Or b) if it needs to be a daily practical term, truthful hallucination is also included. Both would be absurd. V 279 Solution/Kripke: to refer to rigidized designators (descriptions). (Was very new in the days, 1972). Unfortunately, the standard process would disqualify both good and bad cases. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Grice, P.H. | Quine Vs Grice, P.H. | Wright I 198 Disputational Supervenience/Wright: a discourse supervenes another one if disagreements in one depend on disagreements in the other. StrawsonVsQuine/GriceVsQuine: it is hopeless to deny that a discrimination exists when it is used not in a prearranged but in a mutually unifiable way within linguistic practice. QuineVsStrawson/QuineVsGrice: this is fully consistent with a cognitive psychology of the practical use of the distinction, which does not assume that we are responding to instantiations of distinctions. Strawson/Grice: E.g. our daily talk of analyticity is a sociological fact and therefore has enough discipline to be considered as minimally capable of truth. QuineVsGrice/QuineVsStrawson: this is far from proving that a sort of intuitive realism can be seen in it. Obstacle: it remains to be explained how modal judgments generally exert cognitive coercion. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Grice, P.H. | Searle Vs Grice, P.H. | Bennett I 186 SearleVsGrice: Convention not the same as circumstances! Grice I 31 Searle E.g. An American Soldier in World War II is captured by Italian troops. He wants to believe the Italians do it was a German officer and expresses the single German sentence which he has kept from school yet, "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühn?" ((s) Do you know the land where the lemon trees bloom?, Goethe). - His captors do not understand any German at all. Searle: It would nevertheless be wrong to say that he meant by "Do you know the land...": "I am a German officer." SearleVsGrice: wants to show with by this example that something missing in Grice s explication: H should recognize that the uttered sentence is expressed conventionally to bring about a certain effect. Searle II 204 Grice : a speaker intends with an utterance, to achieve certain effects. SearleVsGrice: he then uses intention, wish and conviction unanalyzed. Searle V 68 Meaning/Grice: connects meaning to intention and recognizing the intention. V 69 SearleVsGrice: insufficient: 1., it is not determined to what extent the meaning depends on rules or conventions. 2. does not differentiate this definition between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. E.g. Searle. Lemons Example V 70 ... + ... An American soldier gets into Italian war captivity... Searle IV 53 SearleVsConversational postulates/SearleVsGrice. A shared background is sufficient. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Grice, P.H. | Strawson Vs Grice, P.H. | I 24 StrawsonVsGrice: E.g. An employee plays Brigde with his boss. He is superior but he lets the boss win it. He smiles so that the boss realizes that he let him win, but not so obtrusive that he considers it to be outrageous. The smile looks a spontaneous smile very similar, but deliberately not completely similar. We would not want to say that he meant with the smile that he has had good cards. He intended that the boss thinks he has good cards, but not that he intended that the boss thinks that! - Additional condition: H to think that S has a certain intention. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Grice, P.H. | Tugendhat Vs Grice, P.H. | I 233 Grice/Tugendhat: Notification is a special case of meaning, but it is not always a notification when we intend to effect that the partner believes something. One can also bring him into a certain perceptual situation. We can ask him to sniff. Conditions so that one can speak of a message or a mine: 1. that the partner recognizes the intention and 2. that the recognition of the intention is for him the reason for the formation of the opinion. TugendhatVsGrice: For example, a student does not answer to inform the teacher. Grice later withdrew his theory. However, he maintained that the rule of use is that the sentence is to make a partner mean something. Precise: A intends that B means that A means that p. (This also applies to the lie.) Lie(s): the meaning does not lie in the function. I 234 TugendhatVsGrice: that is correct, but it does not follow that this is the primary intention. Above all, it does not follow that the meaning is contained in the function. If one now takes Wittgenstein's proposition as a basis, then one would have to say that one explains the meaning of a proposition "p" by means of a longer proposition "q", which contains the proposition "p" as part. Vs: 1. "q" is obviously not synonymous with "p". 2. One cannot understand such an explanation if one does not already understand the meaning of "that p". 3. One would have to assume a meta language (that the other already knows what it means to mean) (TugendhatVsMeta Language). I 235 Grice/Tugendhat: the essential thing is that he has specified the comprehensive concept of meaning (in the sense of vouloire dire), which goes beyond meaning in sentences: it also includes signals that are not to be understood causally. I 269 To mean/TugendhatVsGrice: two possibilities:a) Correlative to understanding: then it is wrong that what a speaker wants to say with "p" is that he wants to effect...etc. that would rather want to say when he said "I want to effect" etc. What he wants to say with "p" is to claim that p. b) If one gives Grice, so to speak, his terminology, then one must say that the function of an assertoric proposition or the intention with which it is used is not to mean something, but to claim something! I 270 TugendhatVsGrice: his model does not consider the possibility of self-talk at all. As a result, different truth conditions and different meanings must indeed apply to self-talk! That would be completely absurd. As if we spoke a different language internally than in conversation. Tugendhat Thesis: the function of communication does not belong to the meaning of the sentence (otherwise a self-talk would not be possible). |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Grice, P.H. | Verschiedene Vs Grice, P.H. | Meg I 21 Intention/Meaning/Grice: for example anger: can result partly from the fact that H (listener) believes that S (speaker) intended to annoy the other! Belief in intention: partial cause of anger. Grice: But not partial reason! VsGrice: a) too weak, excludes too little b) too strong, excludes clear cases of speaker-situational significance. Example (Urmson): Showing the thumbscrews: cognition of the prisoner should be part of the reason to show the mentioned reaction. Grice VsGrice: a) too weak, excludes too little. Meg I 25 SchifferVsGrice: For example: Someone throws a 20 dollar note out of the window in order to make his visitor, which he thinks is obsessed with money, run out. The visitor wants to document that he is not obsessed with money... Finally he leaves and knows about the intention, but at the same time he leaves for another reason: not because of the money, but because he notices that they want to get rid of him. Meg I 28 Example (Schiffer) someone sings "Tipparary" in a rough voice to get rid of the visitor. He thinks "funny, he can't get rid of me, he knows that I don't mind his singing"... One can only intend to bring about state of affairs if one also sees a certain chance. Hence also no recourse. |
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| Grice, P.H. | Avramides Vs Grice, P.H. | Avramidis I 15 Understanding/Grice/Avramides: according to Grice understanding is an inference from noise chains I 16 on the intentions of the speaker and from there on a piece of knowledge about the world. VsGrice: this brings too much psychology into play. Avra I 93 VsGrice/Avramides: it was criticized that his approach requires the listener to distinguish some speaker’s intentions before he understands utterances. (Platts 1979 pp. 91). GriceVsVs: could respond that this is simply not necessary. Because it is not important to find out how communication occurs. I 94 What Grice is actually interested in: what constitutes meaning is to be separated from any method of interpretation (translation?). (> Biro). |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Grice, P.H. | Schiffer Vs Grice, P.H. | Avramides I 56 Deception/SchifferVsGrice: the recognition of the speaker's intention by the listener must at least partly be the reason for the reaction - Problem: distinguishing primary intention, "with" which something is expressed - secondary: "in" which something is expressed - primary intention to cause the reaction is important - secondary: E.g. "by expressing a, he means b" - primary/(s): "with a he means x". Avramides I 60 VsGrice: Counter-E.g.:examination, learning, memory, inference, reckless speech, indifference with respect to the listener reaction, accusation - solution / Grice: "active belief" or belief that the speaker believes .. "(= activated belief, not querying learning material) - SchifferVs: problem: speaker often intend no belief in the listener - problem: then the analysis is no longer enough - solution: for real communication is necessary that belief is not caused but justified. Schiffer I XIX Expression meaning/intention based semantics (IBS)/SchifferVsIBS/SchifferVsIntention based semantics/intention supported: not only requires compositionality and relation theory, but also implies that Understanding/IBS: Thesis: is an inferential process (conclusions) SchifferVs: that's dubious. This in turn requires propositional knowledge that one clearly does not have! ((s) in relation to or as a "belief objects"). SchifferVsGrice: so by that the whole project is brought into disrepute. I 248 Speaker Meaning/SchifferVsGrice: depends also from the fact that the speaker himself is willing to describe himself accordingly. And the complex conditions of (S) are just not realistic. They make each utterance to a falsehood when you replace "to mean" in each pattern by "to say". Paradox of the Analysis/Schiffer: revenges here: IBS can maybe say what meaning is but by that it does cover nobody's notion of meaning. The IBS-analysis cannot replaced its analysandum by a that-proposition on a propositional attitude. IBS/Schiffer: of course it is about an analysis of "S believes that p" and not of "x believes that S means that p". Nevertheless, this can be seen as an obstacle to a reductive analysis. E.g. "It is snowing": is irreducible semantically. Point: in the end we can omit all speaker intentions here! It is not of interest, if it does not help to deliver the base I 249 For the semantic features of the expressions of natural language. Expression Meaning/SchifferVsIBS/SchifferVsGrice: IBS has much to say about speaker-meaning, but too little (surprisingly little) about expression meaning. And for good reason, as we shall see. I 264 Schiffer: Thesis: ultimately it is the way in which we use signs and sounds - described non-semantic and non-psychological - which explains our semantic knowledge (given the conceptual roles of our neural terms). SchifferVsGrice: Problem: the fact remains that we cannot formulate this semantic knowledge in non-semantic terms. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Grice, P.H. | Loar Vs Grice, P.H. | I 1 Language/everyday language/concept/theory/explanation/pragmatic/Loar: all pragmatic concepts are ultimately based on belief. Loar: Thesis: my approach (chapter 9) is reductionist: 1. Semantic characteristics are based on beliefs and desires. (Similar to Grice). LoarVsGrice: my approach is not only communication theoretical: LoarVsAll: the theories of beliefs can serve as a basis for the semantic theory of "language of thought" (most authors: the other way around!) 2. My explanation of belief and desires is not based on I 2 Propositions or semantic concepts. Meaning/Loar: propositional attitudes can therefore serve non-circularly as a basis for meaning. Belief/Conviction/Wish/Desire/Loar: Thesis: can be explained without assuming everyday semantics. Thinking/Language/Loar: but this should not assume thinking without language, i.e. language as a mere vehicle of communication: Belief/Loar: Thesis: is not a linguistic state. Content/Loar: even if belief were a linguistic state, its content could be analyzed independently of its linguistic aspects. Solution/Loar: explanation through behaviour and perception. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Grice, P.H. | Cartwright Vs Grice, P.H. | I 129 As if/Physics/Cartwright: (from a seminar by Grice): Is there an "as-if-operator" in physics? Grice: E.g. a) helium gas behaves as if it were a collection of molecules that interact only in case of collision. b) ... helium gas is composed of molecules that behave as if they only interacted in case of collisions. CartwrightVsGrice: early: at the time I made objections that only apparently contradicted this: There are well known cases with the "as-if" operator. E.g. the radiating molecules in an ammonium-Maser behave as if they were normal electronic oscillators. As if/False realism: realistic question: how densely are the oscillators packed? VsRealism: this question is absurd, normal electron oscillators themselves are a mere theoretical construct, a fiction! The behavior of atoms is amazingly similar to a normal electron oscillator. Helium-neon laser/Cartwright: (...) behaves as if it were a collection of 3-level atoms(...). I 130 As if/Behavior/Existence/Ontology/Explanation/Theory/Cartwright: early: but by saying "as if", I do not deny the existence of 3-level atoms in this situation! I recognize these existential facts, and yet put the "as-if operator" in front of them! CartwrightVsCartwright: later: back then I confused two functions that the as-if the operator may have: as-if-operator/Cartwright: a) writing things left from the as-if-operator means to enter into an existential commitment. E.g. ... molecules as if ... b) things to the right of the as-if operator: have a different function: what is at the right side (a description) is what we need to know in order to be able to apply a mathematical formulation. Description/Equation/Law/Physics/Cartwright: the description on the right side is the kind of description for which the theory provides an equation. E.g. we say a "real quantum atom" behaves like a normal electron oscillator. The theory tells us beforehand which equation this oscillator obeys. I 131 Description/Equation/Theory/Cartwright: it might be assumed: in order to obtain a description according to which we can establish it, we must depart from what we assume to exist. (to be the case). CartwrightVs: it but does not work like that: Principles/Theory/Cartwright: the theory has only few principles to get from descriptions of equations. And these principles certainly demand structured information. And the "descriptions" on the right side must satisfy many mathematical requirements. Description/Theory/Equations/Cartwright: thesis: the descriptions that best describe are just not the ones which best apply to the equations. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Grice, P.H. | Jackson Vs Grice, P.H. | Lewis V 153 Implicature/Conversational Implicature/Grice/Lewis: E.g. "This time you are right" Implicature: "Otherwise you are usually wrong." Conventional Implicature/Jackson: E.g. "She votes liberal, but she's not an idiot" - "Most liberals are idiots". Conditional/Grice/Lewis: if P(A>C) is high mainly because P(A) is low (E.g. falso quodlibet), then what sense does it make to say "If A, then B"? Why should you not say the stronger one: that it is almost as likely non-A?. JacksonVsGrice/JacksonVsLewis: we often assert things that are much weaker than we could actually assert, and for good reason. Hereby I suppose this that your belief system is similar to mine, but not identical. E.g. Assuming you know something that strikes me as highly unlikely today, but I still want to say something useful. So I say something weaker, so that you can definitely take my word. Def Robust/Jackson/Lewis: A is robust relative to B (in terms of one's subjective probability at a time), iff. the probability of A and probability of A conditional to B are close to each other and are both high. V 154 so that if one learns that B, they still consider A probable. Jackson: the weaker thing can then be more robust with respect to something that you think is more unlikely, but that you do not want to ignore. If it is now useless, the to say weaker thing, how useless is it then to say the weaker thing and the stronger thing together! And yet we do it! E.g. Lewis: "Bruce sleeps in the clothes chest, or elsewhere on the ground floor". Jackson: Explanation: it makes sense to assert the stronger thing, and just as much sense to assert the more robust thing. If they differ, we assert both. Robustness/Indicative Conditional/IC/Lewis: an IC is a truth functional conditional, that conventionally implies robustness (convention implicature) with respect to the antecedent. Therefore, the probabilities P(A>C) and P(A>C) must both be high. That is the reason why the BH of the IC comes with the corresponding conditional probability. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Grice, P.H. | Millikan Vs Grice, P.H. | I 3 Speech patterns/language device/terminology/Millikan: by that I mean words, syntactic forms, accentuation, accents, punctuation, etc. Thesis: such patterns have survived only because stable overt and covert responses of a cooperative partner are also handed down (have prevailed). Standardization/Millikan: the (voice) pattern exerts its own function only with a partner, but with anyone. Therefore, it must be standardized. Stabilization/Millikan/(S): (in time) with recurring token resemblance to earlier ones must be given. Stabilization/standardization/Millikan: two sides of a coin. Speech patterns/Millikan: can often be used in a parasitic way (diverted use). I 4 Ex metaphor, sarcasm, lying, irony. Standard: even if they are not being used in a deviating way the pattern may yet fail in use. Standardization/stabilization: therefore, they are not an "average function", but have to do with a "critical mass" of cases; they form a "center of gravity". Solution: can not be found by forming an "average" of idiolects. I 5 Characteristic function/language/meaning/MillikanVsGrice: we therefore do not take the meaning of the speaker as the fundamental concept. Meaningfulness/Millikan: we do not it explain with typical use. belief/wishes/intention/Millikan: thesis: can be explained without reference to language. I 51 quotation from Stevenson's "Kidnapped". I 52 Literature/Millikan: there are more ((S) fine) differences within the literature as many philosophers have opened up. Language/Millikan: in this chapter: what are there relations between 1. the stabilizing function of a speech pattern 2. its literal use 3. the speaker's intentions. Stabilizing function/Millikan: thesis of next chapter: an aspect of the meaning of words, of the syntactic form is the focused stabilizing function. literal use/Millikan: corresponds to no stabilizing function (see below). Intention according to Grice/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: thesis: Grice's intentions are not what drives usage and understanding. I 61 Understanding/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: thesis: is a direct perception of what a speech is about (aboutness), not a conclusion from the clauses heard! And certainly not a conclusion on speaker intentions. I 62 Conviction/Millikan: 1. arises partly from the internal composition of the subject (nerves, interconnection, etc.) but two people with the same interconnections need not have the same beliefs. I 63 2. not all the internal hardware is in use if you believe something. Belief/having/use/Millikan: I may have a conviction but not use is, Ex I almost never need the conviction that Columbus discovered America, especially not when I'm brushing my teeth. Discovery/Conviction/Millikan: Ex a mathematician who is awake and looking for a proof and finally finds it: one can not say of him_her that he_she has previously believed it! Imperative/Millikan: now, it is certainly the case that a listener when asked if the speaker had intended that s_he obeys the command, certainly will immediately answer "yes". I 64 But that does not mean that s_he has used this belief during obedience. Intentions according to Grice/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: are therefore superfluous. And they also can not help to distinguish non-natural meaning from less interesting things. Anyway, we do not need to consider Grice's intentions that are subject the only potential and not actual modifications of the nervous system. I 65 VsMillikan: it could be argued that one might have reasons for an act without these reasons being activated in the anatomy. Millikan: when I stop to believe in something, I'll refrain from the corresponding actions. Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: the only interesting question is whether they are actually realized inside while speaking. Ex Millikan: the sergeant says, "the next time I say 'stop' do not stop!" There is a similar Ex by Bennett. Problem: the training was so effective that the soldier is not able not to stop. I 66 Bennett: the conclusion is made in a non-Grice manner. Rationality/Bennett/Millikan: it seems that as a rational person one should not choose "shortcuts". That is, one must not only take account of positive evidence, but also of negative. ((S) The idea is that what has been rationally learned covers what is rationally demanded. But both times it is about speaker intentions, one time past ones, another time present ones). generally/formally: Ex Suppose John believes "Usually: if A then B" and also: "Non- (usually: if A-and-not-C, then B)" rational: then would follow that John had to believe. a) "usual: if A then C" and b) if A and C, then B. Then there are the following possible cases. 1. the only evidence of C comes from the fact that John knows that usually, if A then C. Then he should just move from A to B. 2. John has independent ways to believe C on the basis of evidence. And he encounters A, while he already has evidence of non-C. I 67 Then, rationally, he should also believe that non-C and not conclude from A to B. 3. John has independent evidence according to which he could know C, but this time he does not know beforehand, whether C. Question: to be rational, does he have to check beforehand whether C? Millikan: we assume that he has to. Problem: if again, that only depends on him believing: "Usually, if D, then C" etc. Rationality/Millikan: Problem: the more knowledge one then acquires, the more of an effort one must make to be rational at all. Would it not be better to omit all this verifying? |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Physicalism | Cresswell Vs Physicalism | II 163 CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsReductionism: I do not see how principles of semantics could somehow be traced back to principles of physics or psychology - CresswellVsFodor/CresswellVsToken physicalism. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Platts, M. | Avramides Vs Platts, M. | Avramides I 91 DavidsoniansVsGrice/Avramidis: E.g. Mark Platts: thinks that he can discredit the entire program of Grice with Davidson’s doubt: Platts: Consider the following two statements: (1) The term of sentence meaning can be defined in terms of the speaker’s intentions (2) The meaning of each sentence in a language can be determined by reference to the intentions with which it was expressed. (Platts 1979 p.92)(1). AvramidesVsPlatts: he relies the mistakes of superficial epistemic asymmetry (that psychological concepts are more fundamental than semantic ones) in order to discredit (2). Then he connects the weakened assertion (2) with (1). Platts: if (1) is to have any meaning at all, it must have implications for the determination of the meaning of individual sentences. But what else could these implications be than what we have already seen to be inadequate? ((s) the fact that the RI cannot explain language by intentions). Platts: therefore (1) is either uninteresting or wrong. (1979, p.92.)(1) AvramidesVsPlatts: he does not distinguish between reductive and non-reductive interpretations of Grice’ analysis. He simply decides that the entire analysis by Grice was wrong or uninteresting, namely on the basis of superficial epistemic asymmetry. AvramidesVsPlatts: he overreacted. 1) It is not clear why a non-reductive Gricean should be committed to (2). 2) Platts assumes that (2) is important without explaining why. Reductionism/Avramides: no reductive Gricean known to me really relies on the superficial epistemic asymmetry. 1. M. Platts, Ways of Meaning: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Language, 1979, p. 92 |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Various Authors | Grice Vs Various Authors | II 21 Intention/Meaning/Grice: E.g. anger: can partially result from L (listener) believing that S (speaker) intended to annoy the other person! Belief in intention: partial cause of anger. Grice: But not partial reason!. VsGrice: a) too weak, excludes too little. b) too strong, excludes clear cases of speaker-situation meaning. E.g. (Urmson): Showing of the thumbscrews: Recognition of the prisoner should be part of the reason to show the mentioned reaction. II 23 VsGrice: a) too weak, excludes too little. GriceVsUrmson: E.g. In the smoke shop it is enough for me to throw the exact amount of cash on the counter to get my favorite cigarettes. Avramides I 2 Causal Theory of Meaning/C.L. Stevenson: Thesis: We should identify the word meaning with a dispositional property of a word: the disposition of a sign to trigger certain responses (reaction) in the listener. Grice/Avramides: but not everything that has the tendency to trigger a reaction is a case of meaning. E.g. Grice: stepping on a cat’s tail. GriceVsStevenson: Problem: you can only exclude undesirable cases at the cost of circularity: it is precisely access that we want to what exactly makes something a communicative use of a sign. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Grice | Versus | Avramides I 91 PlattsVsGrice (with Davidson). |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Grice | Pro | Avramides I 9~ Griceans: Armstrong, Bennett, Loar, Avramides VsGrice: Dummett, Davidson, Evans/McDowell (EMD) |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Reductionism | Versus | Cresswell II 163 CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsReduktionismus: ich sehe nicht, wie Prinzipien der Semantik irgendwie auf Prinzipien der Physik oder der Psychologie zurückgeführt werden könnte. - CresswellVsFodor/ CresswellVsTokenphysikalismus. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Speaker Meaning | Black, Max | I 77 BlackVsGrice thesis: not detecting the speaker s intention to cause an effect in the hearer allows the hearer to determine the meaning, but rather the reverse: the discovery of speaker meaning allows the lhearer, to recontruct the speaker s intention. |
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| Sentence Meaning | Pinker, St. | Avramides I 91 DavidsonianerVsGrice/Avramides: z.B. Mark Platts: These denkt, daß er das ganze Gricesche Programm durch den Davidsonschen Zweifel in Mißkredit bringen kann: Platts: man bedenke folgende zwei Behauptungen: (1) Der Begriff der Satzbedeutung kann in Begriffen der Sprecher-Intentionen definiert werden (2) Die Bedeutung jedes einzelnen Satzes in einer Sprache kann durch Referenz auf die Intentionen, mit der er geäußert wurde, bestimmt werden. (Platts 1979,S.92) I 91 Lager: PlattsVsGrice (mit Davidson) - (s) Dann ist (2) Voraussetzung für (1). |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Meaning | Schiffer, St. | Field II 65 Def Meaning/Sentence Meaning/Schiffer/Field: (Schiffer early, 1972): the meaning of sentences in spoken and written language can be explained by concepts of belief (and desire), namely those that are conventionally correlated with these sentences. II 66 Representation Meaning/FieldVsSchiffer: Thesis: part of what it is that a symbol in my representation system stands for Caesar is that it has acquired its role there as a result of my appropriation of a name that stands for Caesar in public language. II 66 Meaning/Representation/VsSchiffer/Field: a reverse approach to Schiffer's thesis would reduce the semantics of the representation system to the semantics of the public language. Graeser I 116 Meaning/Stephen Schiffer: ("The Remnants of Meanig, 1987): provocative book: Thesis 1. There is no correct theory of meaning Thesis 2. The questions that determine the current philosophy of language are based on false assumptions. Schi passim Meaning/Schiffer/Bio: I was a student at Oxford in the 60s. SchifferVsGrice: Representation of the speaker meaning is inadequate (incomplete), but pro Thesis: Reduction of semantics to psychology (like Grice) + reduction to physicalism. > 1972 "Meaning". |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
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