Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 34 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Analyticity/Syntheticity Strawson
 
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Wright I 198
Strawson/Grice: E.g. our daily talk of analyticity is a sociological fact and therefore has enough discipline to be considered minimally capable of truth. StrawsonVsQuine/GriceVsQuine: it is hopeless to deny that a distinction exists, if it is not used within linguistic practice in a pre-arranged way that is capable of mutual agreement.
QuineVsStrawson/QuineVsGrice: this is fully consistent with a cognitive psychology of the practical use of the distinction, which does not assume that we respond to exemplifications of the distinctions. (see Wright)


Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001
Attribution Peacocke
 
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Avr J 92
Beliefs/Desires/Attributions/Radical Interpretation/Peacocke/Avramidis: Suppose we could attribute beliefs and desires before the knowledge of the language. - In this case, simultaneous attribution of propositional attitudes would still be necessary. - But not particular propositional attitudes before language. - PeacockeVs "actual language relation": this supposedly needs no semantic vocabulary. - Peacocke later: Gricean intentions cannot be used as evidence for radical interpretation, but that's not VsGrice.
- - -
I 78f
Propositional Attitudes/Attribution/Peacocke: Problem: instead of one set of propositional attitudes another can also be attributed. - Solution/Peacocke: Relation of Closeness/Narrowness. - E.g. someone who rearranges something on the table usually does not respond to the compass direction. - The concepts may then have different expressiveness. - Point: if it is a rotating table, the space-relative concepts can change while the table-relative ones remain constant. - ((s) The concepts do not change, but their truth values.) - More expressive: the space-relative concepts. - Problem: if they are used here, there may be an explanatory gap. -> narrow statement.
I 83
We should not attribute any other concepts if there more narrow ones are available.

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Communication Black
 
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I 59
Communication/Black: gestures are not always already communication.
I 70
Communication/Speaker Meaning/BlackVsGrice: propositional attitudes induced in the listener are irrelevant for these concept - Black: Once I understood, my role as a listener and performer is at an end - Black Thesis: listener understanding and speaker meaning are two sides of a single process.
I 71
Understanding as grasping the speaker's intention is just as much in need of explanation as this - Reaction/Black: There is no standard reaction.
I 72
BlackVsGrice: his theory is unsuitable for idiosyncratic cases

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Communication Evans
 
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Gareth Evans
Avr I 16 f
Communication / Evans / McDowell / EMD / Avramides: EMDVSGrice: in communication, there is no "ratiocinatio" - Neither implicitly nor later in a rational reconstruction.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Competence Katz
 
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Cresswell I 12
Kompetenz/linguistische/Sprachkompetenz/Chomsky/Cresswell: (Chomsky 1965, 3 – 15): die Diskussion darüber hält bis heute an (1974). Def linguistische Kompetenz: ist eine Fähigkeit, die der sprachlichen Aktivität zugrunde liegt. Es geht um die Klasse der Sätze, die der Sprecher grammatisch akzeptabel findet.
Semantische Kompetenz/Cresswell: (darum geht es mir hier):dabei favorisiere ich eine wahrheits-konditionale Semantik (> Wahrheitsbedingungen). Diese möchte ich unterscheiden von zweierlei:
a) CresswellVsKatz/CresswellVsFodor/Terminologie/KF/Cresswell: „KF“ (Katz/Fodor-Semantik): ist unvollständig, wenn auch nicht unkorrekt.
b) CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsSearle/CresswellVsSprechakttheorie: ist eher eine Theorie der semantischen Performanz als der semantischen Kompetenz.
Cresswell I 12
Def Kompetenz/Sprachkompetenz/semantisch/Katz/Nagel/Cresswell: (Katz und Nagel, 1974): erklärt die Fähigkeit eines Sprechers, Urteile über folgende Eigenschaften abzugeben: Synonymie, Redundanz, Widersprüchlichkeit, Entailment (Beinhalten), Mehrdeutigkeit, semantische Anomalien, Antonymie und Übergeordnetheit (superordination).

Katz
J. J. Katz
The Metaphysics of Meaning


Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Conditional Jackson
 
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Frank C. Jackson
Lewis V 153
Conditional/Grice/Lewis: if P (A > C) is high because P (A) is low (> ex falso quodlibet), what is then the meaning of "If A, then B"? Why should one not say the strongest: that it is almost as likely as not A? JacksonVsGrice/JacksonVsLewis: we often claim things that are much weaker than we could actually claim, and this for a good reason.
I assume that your belief system is similar to mine, but not completely equal.
E.g. Suppose you know something what seems to me very unlikely today, but I would like to say something useful anyway. So I say something weaker, so you can take me at any rate at the word.
---
Lewis V 153
Definition robust/Jackson/Lewis: A is robust in relation to B, (with respect to one's subjective probability at a time) iff. the probability of A and the probability of A conditionally to B are close, and both are high,... ---
V 154
...so if one learns that B still considers A to be probable. Jackson: the weaker can then be more robust in terms of something that you think is more unlikely, but still do not want to ignore.
If it is useless to say the weaker, how useless it is then to assert the weaker and the stronger together! And yet we do it!
E.g. Lewis: "Bruce sleeps in the clothes box or elsewhere on the ground floor".
Jackson: Explanation: it has the purpose to assert the stronger and the same purpose to assert the more robust. If both are different, we assert both.
Robustness/indicative conditional/Lewis: an indicative conditional is a truth-functional conditional, which conventionally implies robustness with respect to the antecedent (conventional implicature).
Therefore the probability P (A > C) and P (A > C) must both be high.
This is the reason why the assertiveness of the indicative conditional is associated with the corresponding conditional probability.

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000


LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Deceptions Avramides
 
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I 51
Deception/Counter-Example/VsGrice: the pattern is always important - away from the speaker s intention to meaning-bearing property of the utterance. Always accept an intention more: Solution: pattern - (Distribution of intentions). - Problem: infiniteness - solution: something that forces the speaker's intention to the line of the utterance. - Ultimately to prevent the intent to deceive - ultimately communication is something ideal.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Deceptions Schiffer
 
Books on Amazon:
Stephen Schiffer
Avr I 57
Deception/HarmanVsGrice: we might need self-referential facts ((s) these are certainly true, because they are about themselves) - Problem: 1. why not from the start? - 2. If not possible, then the whole analysis gets problematic. - Solution/Harman: the speaker intends that the hearer responds for the proper reason: recognizing the speaker’s intention. Schiffer/Grice: they want to avoid self-referring facts. - Problem: the resulting complexity.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Folk Psychology Schiffer
 
Books on Amazon:
Stephen Schiffer
I 33f
SchifferVsFolk Psychology: problem: the theory will often provide the same functional role for different beliefs (belief) simultaneously - SchifferVsLoar: according to him from Bel T follows #(that snow is = white Bel T #(that grass is green) - then both have the same T# -correlated functional role. ---
I 276
N.B.: here the uniqueness condition is a very weak condition - it is not sufficient for that one is in a particular belief state that is linked to them: - E.g. -"if p is true, one believes that p" - N.B. -"p" exists inside and outside the belief context - Therefore, the theory will say something clear about p - Problem: in the uniqueness condition the variables for propositions only occur within belief contexts. Then all beliefs of the same logical form have the same functional role. ---
I 34
All that does not distinguish the belief that dinosaurs are extinct from the fact that fleas are mortal. - Problem: there are not enough input rules that are not based on perception. ---
I 38
BurgeVsFolk Psychology BurgeVsIntention based semantics/BurgeVsGrice/Schiffer: famous example: Alfred believes in w that he has arthritis in his thigh. - But he also covers all proper cases. - In w he has a correct use of "Arthritis"- then, he has in w not the believe that he has arthritis in his thigh - (because this belief is false). - N.B.: in w he is in exactly the same T* -correlated states (T* = folk psychology) as in w. - Therefore, he would have to express the same belief. - But he does not - hence the common sense functionalism must be false.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Folk Psychology Burge
 
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Tyler Burge
Shiffer I 37
BurgeVsFolk Psychology/Intention-Based Semantics//IBS/BurgeVsIBS/BurgeVsGrice/Schiffer: Burge's counter-examples are more interesting. They differ from the twin-earth examples in two points: (I) at first sight they also make a strong objection VsIBS by seemingly demonstrating that the content of belief is sometimes a function of the meaning of the word in the linguistic community.
I 38
(II) Def "Environment-Dependent"/Role/Terminology/Burge/Schiffer/: let's say: a functional role is dependent on the environment if we cannot know whether a system is in a state that has the role F without knowing what the environment looks like. Dependent on the Environment: e.g. "every token of x is caused in y when he sees a cat": this is environment-dependent. ((s)> Putnam: "cat-single-sign-trigger").
CSF: common-sense functionalism
Twin EarthVsCSF/Schiffer: the arguments work there, because they are environment-independent. This may spur a hope for a scientific functionalism, for a theory with T-correlated functional roles that are environment-dependent.
BurgeVsFunctionalism: (Burge 1979, example turned classic, also Burge 1982a, 1982b):
E.g. Alfred's use of "arthritis" involves more than the correct use limited to inflammation of the joints. He thinks it is similar to rheumatism and says "I have arthritis in the thigh".
Burge: Alfred has a wrong belief. Shiffer dito.
w: World where Alfred has the belief that he has arthritis in the thigh.

In w, Alfred has the belief that he has arthritis in the thigh

w' is a possible world that is different from the other only in that Alfred's use of "arthritis" is correct there. It is accepted by the language community. (s) The language community mistakenly believes that it is possible to have arthritis in the thigh. The community as a whole is wrong (except for the doctors)). Then, Alfred's belief there is also true.
Important Point/Burge:
In w', Alfred does not have the belief that he has arthritis in the thigh.

For this belief is false (because arthritis is only an inflammation of the joints. But the belief he has is true on its own!) ((s) He has the belief that he has a disease of which it is generally believed that he could have in the thigh. His word "arthritis" then has a different content than in w).
BurgeVsCSF: in w , Alfred is in exactly the same T* -correlated states as we are in w. Therefore, if CSF were correct, he would express the same belief in both. But he does not. Therefore, CSF must be incorrect. ((s) Alfred does not assert in w' to believe this (and does not believe it), but then there are two differences between w and w'?).

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010

Grice Avramides
 
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I 26
Grice/Avramidis: should be understood as a conceptual analysis, not as reductionism. - Not as physicalism ->philosophy of the mind - reconciliation with Frege and Davidson.
I 42f
Grice/Avramides: Thesis: the problem of sentence meaning (meaning the whole utterance) takes precedence over the meaning of partial statements - Statement/Grice: is understood broadly, also signals etc. - Important argument: thus, the analysis ranges in a situation before timeless! (of the standard meaning) - only so can he equate"x means something" with "S means something (in a situation) with x" - 1st Version; ... A response from the listener is induced ... - 2nd Version: ... in addition: the listener must recognize the intention of the speaker.
I 44
3rd Version: ... in addition: the recognition of the speaker's intention must act as a reason for the belief of the listener - Vs: there are still many counterexamples.
I 45
GriceVsGrice: counter-E.g. it is a difference whether I spontaneously frown in a situation or in order to express my displeasure to a person - Important argument: exactly the same information is transmitted, no matter if the speaker has the intention to communicate or not. - Then no reason to distinguish between natural and non-natural meaning - the difference has to do with what the frowning person can expect the listener to believe - but without intention no meaning - non-natural meaning (without intention) never sufficient for response.
I 46
E.g. thumbscrews mean nothing.
I 67
Grice/Avramides: so far, the analysis is not sufficient for timeless (linguistic meaning - only for speaker-meaning - Meaning/Grice: to be found both outside language and within.
I 68
Timeless Meaning/Grice: disjunction of findings and about what people want to achieve with x - also effect etc. but not practice (is not sufficient (may have second meaning), not necessary: (may have alternatives) - but " procedure in repertoire".
I 111
Reductionist Gricean/Loar: risks thinking without language.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

Grice Black
 
Books on Amazon
I 61f
BlackVsGrice: 1) too complicated - 2) does not cover self-talk (you do not intend to give yourself a reason...) - Speaker intention: cannot always be to produce belief in the other person: E.g. test candidate - liar: must always tell the truth according to Grice: he has to mean "yes" when he says "no".
I 64
Grice Thesis: S (speaker) means something when he intends to achieve a certain effect in L (listener), for example, that L believes that p.
I 65
BlackVsGrice: that requires modifications: negative conjunctions or corresponding positive disjunctions.
I 66
E.g. there is no need to explain all infinite chess moves, but to say: "he intended the consequences of chess" is not an explanation - E.g. "keeping the king from moving", in turn, does require an explanation - that is exactly Grice's problem - ((s) Because he assumes speaker intention which cannot be found in the rules) BlackVsSpeaker Intension - BlackVsIntended Effect.
I 67
BlackVsGrice: inadequate: 1) Relying on standard effects - 2) Trust that speaker intention brings about such effects.

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Grice Schiffer
 
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Stephen Schiffer
AVR 114 I
Grice/Schiffer: (= intention-based approach) is obliged to deny logical function of importance - instead: dependence on a (causal) fact (which is non-semantically specified). ---
Schiffer I 13
Grice/Schiffer: Problem: the meaning must not determine the content. - Because semantic vocabulary must be avoided - therefore VsRelation Theory. - The belief objects would have to be language independent. ---
I 241
Intention-based approach/Grice/Schiffer: works without Relation Theory and without compositional semantics. - extrinsic explanation is about non-semantically describable facts of use - SchifferVsGrice: has not enough to say about the semantic properties of linguistic units. ---
I 242
Grice/Schiffer: (Meaning, 1957): attempts to define semantic concepts of public language in terms of propositional attitudes (belief, wishing, wanting). With that nothing is assumed about the meaning itself. ---
I 242
Definition speaker-meaning/Grice: (1957) (1) Is non-circular definable as a kind of behavior with the intention to trigger a belief or an action in someone else - Definition expression meaning/Grice: (1957) (2) that means the semantic features of expressions of natural language. - Is non-circular definable as certain types of correlations between characters and types of exercise of speaker-meaning. - Statement/extended: every act, that means something. - Schiffer: thus questions of meaning are reduced to questions about propositional attitudes. ---
I 243
A character string has to have a particular feature, so that the intention is detected. ---
I 245
Grice/Schiffer: Problem: Falsifying evidence is not a (to) mean-problem. common knowledge is necessary, but always to refute by counter-examples - Solution: to define common knowledge by counterfactual conditions - Problem: not even two people have common knowledge. SchifferVsGrice: no one has set up a lot of reasonable conditions for speaker-meaning. - Problem: a person, can satisfy the conditions of (S) when he merely says that A intended to cause it, that A believes that p ((S) = lies) - SchifferVsGrice: hyper-intellectual, presupposes too much intentions and expectations, that will never be divided - the normal speaker knows too little to understand the expression-meaning by Grice.
---
I 247
E.g. I hope you believe me, but not on the basis of my intention - ((s) but because of the content, or the truth) - a necessary condition to tell something is not a necessary condition to mean it as well.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Grice Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
V 69
Meaning/SearleVsGrice: it is insufficient to bind meaning to intention and it is recognition: 1) it is uncertain how much meaning depends on rules or convention - 2) no distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Grice Tugendhat
 
Books on Amazon
I 269F
TugendhatVsGrice: the speaker does not want to cause that.., or he would say "I want to cause... - he does not mean anything, he claims something - 2. Vs: does not consider self-talk - absurd: that they would have other truth conditions - the communication function does not belong to the meaning, otherwise self-talk impossible.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Grice Millikan
 
Books on Amazon
I 52
Language/Millikan: in this chapter: what are the relations between 1. the stabilizing function of a speech pattern
2. their literal use
3. the speaker's intentions.
Stabilization function/Millikan: next chapter thesis: one aspect of the word meaning, the syntactic form is the focused stabilization function.
Literary use/Millikan: the literary use does not correspond to any stabilizing function (see below).
Gricean Intention/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: Thesis: the Gricean intentions are not at all what drives language usage and understanding.
Stabilization function/language/Millikan: if speech patterns such as words or syntactic forms have a stabilizing function, then these direct eigenfunctions of reproductively determined families (rfF) are 1st level, of which these patterns are also elements.
Functions: of words etc. are historically acquired by expressing both utterances and reactions of the listener.
Intention/Speaker's intention/N.B.: these functions do not depend on the speaker's intentions!
Direct eigenfunction: has a word token even when it is produced by a parrot. The token is an element of a reproductively determined family in that it has a direct eigenfunction.
Intention/purpose: the intention or purpose provides a derived eigenfunction.
Derived eigenfunction: however, lies above and beyond the direct or stabilizing function. It can be the same as the direct function, but it does not have to be. In any case, it is not its own function of the speech pattern, it is not its eigenfunction.
Stabilization Function/Language/Millikan: although the stabilization function is independent of purpose and speaker's intention, it is not independent of purposes that speakers can have in general.
---
I 53
Here again there will be a "critical mass" of cases of use. ---
I 63
Imperative/Millikan: now it is certainly the case that a listener, if asked if the speaker intended to obey the command, will surely immediately answer "yes". ---
I 64
But that does not mean that he used this belief in obedience. Gricean intentions/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: Gricean intentions are thus superfluous. And they also do not help to distinguish unnatural meaning from less interesting things.
In any case, we need not pay attention to Gricean intentions, which are subject only to potential and not actual modifications of the nervous system.
---
I 65
VsMillikan: you could object that you could have reasons for an action without these reasons being activated in the anatomy. Millikan: if I stop believing something, I will refrain from certain actions.
Gricean Intentions/Millikan: the only interesting question is whether they are realised actually inside while one is speaking.
E.g. Millikan: the Sergeant says: "When I say 'stop' the next time, do not stop!"
A similar example is given by Bennett.
Problem: the training was so effective that the soldier did not manage to stop.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Intentions Bennett
 
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Avr I 17
BennettVsGrice: instead of intentions (too complicated): simply "Plain Talk": speaker relies on thefaith of the listener whenever an utterance U is expressed a particular proposition p is true - GriceVsVs: instead: "background-fact" - eliminates troublesome propositional attitudes - Avramides: pro intentions - and why should they be easy?
Jonathan Bennett
I Bennett Die Strategie des Bedeutungs-Nominalismus aus Meggle (Hrsg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Frankf/M 1979
Intentions Black
 
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I 72
Intention / meaning / speaker intention / Grice: presupposes no act of intending - I 73 speaker intention / BlackVsGrice: can not be inferred by the hearer - otherwise the meaning would have to be already given

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Intentions Strawson
 
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Meg I 24ff
Intention/StrawsonVsGrice: may be hided complicatly by courtesy, nevertheless can hint at something etc. - modification: the n-th part-intention of S is that H should recognize that S has the (n-1)th part-intention. ---
I 30
Re-definition: 1. H shows R (reaction) 2. H believes that S (1) intends 3. Hs fulfillment of (1) is based on Hs' fulfilment of (2). ---
I 31
SearleVsGrice: (lemon example): the soldier did not mean ... (intention/meaning/meaning independent) - supplement: H should recognize that the uttered sentence is uttered conventionally to achieve a certain effect. ---
I 33
Grice E.g. Arab traders: "damned ...": one can say that the trader thinks the customer should come in, but the sentence does not mean it - lemon example: not the sentence but the situation is decisive.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Language Chomsky
 
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Noam Chomsky
I 279 (where?)
Language/Chomsky: apart from its mental representation, it has no objective existence. Therefore, we do not need to distinguish here between "systems of beliefs" and "knowledge". ---
I 319
Language/ChomskyVsQuine: must separate language and theory - otherwise, two speakers of the same language could have no disagreement. ---
I 330
Language/Chomsky/Quine: no frame of a tentative theory as in physics - several analytical hypotheses not only possible but necessary - ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the concepts of the language can be explained with physical dimensions - Aristotle: rather associated with actions - VsQuine: not evident that similarities can be localized in a room - principles, not "learned sentences". ---
I 333
VsQuine: cannot be dependent on "disposition for reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be essential. ---
I 343
Perhaps language does not have to be taught. ---
Graeser I 121f
Language/ChomskyVsGrice: Question: should the main aspect really be communication? - Searle: rather representation, but not as opposite - Meaning/VsGrice: most of the sentences of a language have never been uttered, so anyone can hardly ever have meant something by them - Meaning/VsGrice: We can only ever find out speaker meanings, because we know what the sentence means. - Students of Grice: Strawson and Searle. ---
Münch III 320
Language/Chomsky/Holenstein: no natural kind.

Cho I
N. Chomsky
Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978

Cho II
N. Chomsky
Language and Mind Cambridge 2006


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

Mü I
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Lemons Example
 
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SearleVsGrice: Searle invented an example: the phrase "Kennst Du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühn?" would mean "I am a German soldier" - if the context was appropriate. Therefore Grice s theory cannot be right. Searle 1969/1972 p.43/69

Lemons Example Bennett
 
Books on Amazon
I 190
Lemon-Example/Searle/Bennett: Grice: Conditional / intend p)> (mean p) - SearleVsGrice: it is possible (intend p) and not (mean p) - BennettVsSearle: he has not refuted Grice - the antecedent is not satisfied - S does not literally mean what it says.
Jonathan Bennett
I Bennett Die Strategie des Bedeutungs-Nominalismus aus Meggle (Hrsg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Frankf/M 1979
Meaning Black
 
Books on Amazon
I 58
Meaning / Grice : only by the effect on the listener - not only discover the primary speaker s intention , but the listener should also think of something specific - and intend it. - BlackVs : this is not sufficient and not necessary : it must not be true, even though the conditions are met, and may be true although they are not met
I 77
The background can not be understood if the core ( " it s snowing " ) is not understood (DF ) - Meaning / BlackVsGrice: Black thesis not detecting the speaker s intention to cause an effect on the listener, allowing the r to determine the meaning , but rather the reverse : the discovery of speaker meaning it allows the listener to infer the speaker s intention - intention / Black: surely there could be no understanding and speaker, without primitive situations in which a speaker s intention is recognized - but that is no proof of the correctness of an intentionalist analysis
II 58
Meaning / Black: must be located beyond language , for words to ever have a practical application - Example Determine whether there is a color - Differences between objects in the world recognized along the scale of our language categories
II 98
Meaning / Black: the "life of the words " is not in any "mental circumstances " , but rather in the ability to interact with symbolic actions in relationship and for it to serve as a starting point - meaning can not be fixed to any feature of mental actions - brain-o-scope/Black : would still remain the task of interpreting the images
II 211
Meaning / BlackVsPutnam : can not be the object ! e.g. "Titanic" would have no meaning - meaning need not be " in me " to be mine - (( s)> " meaning in the head" -

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Meaning Grice
 
Books on Amazon
I 2 ff
Meaning/drawing/photography: The photo with Mr. X in an obvious position with Mrs Y did not mean anything! - The drawing with the same object meant something. (>Intention). ---
I 4
Definition meanings/Grice: "natural meaning" measles, signs, natural signs are detected, not appointed, plumbable, no convention Definition meanings: non-natural meaning expression, character, appointment, convention, metaphors, unconscious regularities. ---
I 17
Meaning/Grice: does not follow from intention: E.g. perpetrator may leave false traces. ---
I 8
Intention needs idea about the effect - listener-meaning: what the other should do in my opinion, cannot deliver the meanings. - Deviation: needs good reasons. ---
I 36
Speaker-meaning: may be different for the same sentence. ---
I 85
Quotation marks are semantically important. ---
Avr I 2
Meaning/Grice: new: (Grice 1957) Avramides: the most remarkable thing about this "new approach" is the unconscious use of the terms intention and belief. - Circular: if you wanted to exclude the unwanted cases from the beginning. - prehistory: Stevenson: Meaning needs constance - otherwise only noise - Solution: habits of the speakers. ---
I 4
Grice/Avramidis: he is more interested in understanding how utterances come to their content. - Intentions need to be explained in terms of the content, not vice versa: that still leaves the question open how intentions and beliefs come to their content. ---
I 5
Grice: in the tradition of Austin/Searle, later Wittgenstein: language in the context of behavior. ---
Avr I 10
Meaning/Grice/Avramides: Thesis: We start with speaker-meaning in one situation and provide an analysis in terms of mental states of the speaker and the listener. ---
Avr I 11 fundamental: "S means in a situation that p" - thereby Grice has clarified the concept of "opining" sufficiently.
---
Grice I 90
Situations Meaning/Grice: can be expressed and meant but is still wrong. ---
I 95
Meaning/practice/Grice: the well-known practice of the speaker is not clear for the meaning: the sentence can have other meanings. - S may have other means. - We need a term like "S has in its repertoire ..." ---
Newen/Schrenk I 77
Meaning/Grice/Newen/Schrenk: crucial: speaker's intention - 5 steps: 1. behavior - 2. psychological theory of needs, etc. - 3. Theory of subjective utterance meanings - a) for listener - b) for speakers - 4. intersubjective meaning (conventional utterance meaning) -. VsGrice: has no theory of conventions - 5. compositionality. ---
N/S I 80
Natural meaning/Grice: E.g. "These spots mean measles": here, there can be no mistake! Otherwise there are other spots. - Communication: all meaning in communication is not natural meaning- not natural meaning: here there may be errors. ---
Schiffer I XIII
Meaning/Grice: (1957): Expression meaning in terms of speaker-meaning - ultimately purely psychological.

Gri I
H. Paul Grice
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Hg. Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1993

Meaning (Intending) Davidson
 
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I 101f
E.g. If I do not know the difference between a short-beaked echidna and a porcupine, it might be that I describe all the short-beaked echidnas which cross my path as porcupines. But since I have learned the word "porcupine" in a certain environment, my word "porcupine" does not refer to short-beaked echidnas, but to porcupins. It is the porcupine to which I am referring, and it is the porcupine, which I believe to have in front of me, when I sincerely assert, "This is a porcupine." My ignorance of the circumstances which determine what I mean is not the least to show that I do not know what I mean and think.
There is, indeed, no physical difference between my actual condition and the one I would be in if I had meant "short-beaked echdina or porcupine," but this does not mean that there is no psychological difference.
E.g. there may be no physical difference between high-suntan and suntan, but there is a difference, because the causation is different.
---
II, 164f
Someone does not mean that p, if he did not intend to be interpreted as if he would mean p. Well, this is not a humpty-dumpty theory. It would only be one, if it was thought sufficient, to intend to be interpreted as if one would mean p to mean p. This is, however, a necessary condition and not a sufficient condition and therefore it is not an Humpty-Dumpty theory. Humpty-Dumpty says, "You cannot know it!".
---
II, 164 f
Davidson: If he knows that she cannot know, then he cannot intend it, because one cannot intend what one does not consider possible. ---
McG I 111
Burge and Dummett mean what speakers mean with their words - it very strongly depends on how the community uses these words. DavidsonVsDummett, DavidsonVsBurge: that is nonsense, because it has nothing to do with successful communication. If you talk differently than the community and someone finds out, then you can communicate all day long. And this is happening all the time.
McGinn: Domestication theory: There is also another approach that refuses to answer the constitutional question regarding the meaning (to mean), and instead conceive the meant meaning as an essentially combination-conditioned phenomenon. (Davidson). In order to tame the intended meaning, we would have to show how semantic basic units connect according to determinable rules.
---
Dav II 169f
Meaning/to mean/intention/intent/Grice/DavidsonVsGrice: pro: Feedback is very important - Vs: nevertheless, intention is probably a necessary but not sufficient condition for meaning. - Intention is at least as difficult to explain as meaning.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Meaning (Intending) Searle
 
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John R. Searle
II 49
Meaning: is not primarily intentional, not without perceptible action. ---
II 203
Meaning/Searle: We define the meaning (and hence linguistic meaning) by intentional forms, which per se are not linguistic - philosophy of mind: analyzing semantic terms with deeper psychological terms > Grice. ---
II 204
Meaning/SearleVsGrice: Meaning shall be defined by action and intentional states - VsGrice: he used intent, belief and desire unanalyzedly - Searle: Meaning is a form of intentionality - like Grice: Meaning will be effective.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Meaning Theory Black
 
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I 73
Theory of meaning / meaning theory / Black: normal m.th. considers neither circumstances nor gestures (-> Gavagai) - I-75 e.g. a gesture of a hungry man / BlackVsGrice: I do not have first to decipher a "message" and then to make my interpretation on the basis of attribution of an intention - instead: "natural character" - not a "discovery" as an intermediary.

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Meaning Theory Schiffer
 
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Stephen Schiffer
I 12
Meaning Theory/M.Th./Schiffer: assuming compositionality, you can identify language with the system of conventions in P - then one has (with Davidson) the form of meaning theory .. - No one has ever done this. ---
I 182
Truth Theory/Schiffer: cannot be a meaning theory because its knowledge would not be sufficient for understanding the language. ---
I 220
Meaning Theory/Schiffer: not every language needs a correct meaning theory - because it has to do without the relation theory for belief. ---
I 222
The relation theory for belief is wrong when languages have no compositional truth-theoretical semantics - otherwise it would be true. ---
I 261
Meaning/Meaning Theory/language/Schiffer: Thesis: all theories of language and thought are based on false prerequisites - Error: to think that language comprehension would be a process of inferences - then every sentence must have a feature - and this could not merely consist in that the sentence has that and that meaning - because that would be semantic. We need a non-semantic description. Problem: E.g. "she gave it to him" has not even semantic features. - E.g. "snow is white" has its semantic properties only contingently. ---
I 264
SchifferVsGrice: we cannot formulate our semantic knowledge in non-semantic terms. ---
I 265
Meaning Theory/Meaning/SchifferVsMeaning Theory: all have failed - Thesis: there is no meaning theory. - (This is the no-Theory-Theory of mental representation) - Meaning is not an entity - therefore also no theory of this object. ---
I 269
Meaning is also determinable without meaning theory. ---
I 269
No-Theory-Theory of mental representation: there is no theory for intentionality, because having a concept does not mean that the quantifiable real would be entities. - The scheme - "x believes y iff __" cannot be supplemented. - The questions on our language processing are empirically, not philosophical.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Reduction Grice
 
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Avramides I 23
Grice: analytical biconditional: left hand side: semantical, right side psychological terms - (right hand side more complex than left) - reductive: in the end only psychological terms - if not, then reciprocal (Avramides pro) - reciprocal: the analysis must also be applied to the relations, that the meanings have to the mental states. SchifferVsGrice: speaker-meaning does not have a logical priority - otherwise circular. reciprocal analysis / Avramides: can show how psychological and semantic concepts fit together.

Gri I
H. Paul Grice
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Hg. Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1993


Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Seeing Lewis
 
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V 274
Perception/Seeing/Match/Lewis: certainly does not mean that the same is going on in the mind or the soul as before one’s eyes, rather it is about the informational content. - Visual experience: is best characterized by the typical causal role - the content is the content of the belief, which tends to be caused by it - Problem: the same visual experience can cause very different beliefs - but not all the content can be characterized by belief. - E.g. Rabbit-Duck-Head: the belief can be characterized by the disjunction rabbit or duck, but then results in the belief that there are ink and paper. ---
V 275
Hallucination/Lewis: not seeing, because the scene did not cause the experience. - E.g. If I hallucinated my brain and it just happens to be in accordance - it’s my brain that causes this, but it’s not the same as seeing. - (>Veridical). ---
V 280
Seeing/Grice: requires a causal standard process. ---
V 281
Hallucination: no real counterfactual dependence on the scene - if it changes, the hallucination does not necessarily have to change - the other way around: congruence with real seeing: not caused by the scene itself. ---
V 280
Seeing/Perception/Kripke/Lewis: (1972) LewisVsGrice: causal standard process would lead to the fact that no one knew enough about reflection in the past to be able to have had a concept about seeing. Solution/Kripke: descriptions made rigid. ---
V 283
Seeing/Lewis: is distinguishing - but: perfect match - e.g. in a dark scene - that would allow a wide range of alternatives - which is undesirable. - Seeing a dark scene is not seeing.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Speaker Meaning Millikan
 
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I 5
Eigenfunction/Language/Meaning/MillikanVsGrice: we do not take the speaker meaning as the basic concept.
---
I 77
Speaker meaning/truth/intention/truth/Millikan: that someone rather says the truth as something wrong does not depend on his intentions, but on the stabilization functions of the words he uses.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Speech Act Theory Cresswell
 
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I 12
CresswellVsGrice / CresswellVsSearle / CresswellVsSpeech Act Theory: is more of a theory of semantic performance than of semantic competence.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Terminology Millikan
 
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I 2
Definition Eigenfunction/Millikan: in contrast to
1. the current function
2. a "type of purpose", applicable on different occasions. (Generalization, "average" (see below.)
E.g. An organ has a certain function = eigenfunction.
Natural language/Millikan: natural language is not invented by someone for a purpose.
Eigenfunction/Millikan: analogy: e.g. to organs of the body: we can use our organs for purposes other than their own function, e.g. to row with one's arms.
---
I 3
Speech patterns/language device/terminology/Millikan: I mean words with this as well as, syntactic forms, stress, accents, punctuation, etc. Thesis: such patterns were only handed down because stable open and covert reactions of a cooperation partner are just as much handed down (have asserted themselves).
Standardization/Millikan: the (speech-) pattern only performs its eigenfunction with a co-operation partner, but with an arbitrary one. Therefore, it must be standardized.
Stabilization/Millikan/(s): (temporal) for recurring tokens a similarity must be given to previous tokens.
Stabilization/standardization/Millikan: stabilization and standardization are two sides of a medal.
---
I 5
Eigenfunction/Language/Meaning/MillikanVsGrice: we do not take the speaker meaning as the basic concept. Meaningfulness/Millikan: We do not explain meaningfulness with typical use.
Belief/wishes/Intention/Millikan: belief, wishes and attention can be explained without reference to language.
---
I 5
Normal/Terminology/Millikan: (spelling: capitalized): is understood here as a biological term, which is biologically normal. Not what average behavior is. ---
I 12
"Real value"/real value/terminology/Millikan: I call the basic partner of sense real value. The difference between real value and a speaker is at least as great as between sense and intension. Terminology/Millikan/(s): "sense" is to be reproduced from now on with "meaning", which is not Fregean sense.
Real value/Millikan: the real value is practically the truthmaker of sentences.
Part II: this is about Fregean sense.
Sense: is quasi intentionality.
Thought/sentence/Millikan: are patterns that show intentionality, perhaps they have the form of inner sentences ((s)> Mentalese).
Inner Sentences/Mentalese/Millikan: inner sentences and Mentalese are not determined by final rules. Therefore, intentionality is not equal to rationality.
Intentionality/Millikan: I describe naturalist, but not reductionist. (MillikanVsReductionism).
Intentionality/Millikan: their understanding is something quite different from the understanding of consciousness.
---
I 17f
Definition direct eigenfunction/Millikan: a thing (device, pattern, instrument) has a direct eigenfunction, if it has it as an element of a particular family of things that I call Definition reproductively established family/reF/Terminology/Millikan: things that are similar are similar here because there was a kind of copying process (> reproduction).
---
I 19
Reproductively established family/reF/Millikan: here there are two different ones: Reproductively established family 1st level: only elements of reproductively established families of 1st level are copies of each other.
Reproductively established family of higher level: their elements can only be defined by the concept of the eigenfunction of lower-level families and the concept of "normal explanation" (according to biological normality).
---
I 23
Definition reproductively established family 1st stage/reF/Millikan: Any set of entities having the same or reproductively established characters derived from repetitive reproductions of the same character of the same model form a reproductively established family of 1st level.
N.B.: i.e. that the elements can be reproduced in the same way, but they do not have to! e.g. Tokens of the written word "dog" can be copied in writing, photocopied, printed, etc. For example, the repetition of a word by a parrot.
Reproductively established family of higher level:
---
I 24
(1) Any set of similar units produced by elements of the same reproductively established families if it is a direct eigenfunction of this family to produce these units and if all are produced in accordance with normal explanations, form a higher level reproductively established family. (2) Any set of similar units produced by elements of the same pattern, if one of the eigenfunctions of this pattern is to make later units coincide with earlier ones, and this similarity is in accordance with a normal explanation of this function, form a reproductively established family of higher level.
---
I 127
Definition Hubot/Terminology/Millikan: Hubots are beings that are like us, except that they all think in the same inner language. (This is unlikely for humans). (Other classification, other opposites, other concept pairs > order). In addition, Hubots never develop new concepts.
N.B.: the example is to show that Fregean senses and intensions are not the same.
---
I 130
Definition Rubots/Rubot/Terminology/Millikan: Rubots are like Hubots, (sensitive to light, odors, temperature, touch) but in a different frequency spectrum than Hubots. Vocabulary: may still be perfectly coordinated with the environment with regard to the meaning (as with the Hubots).
---
I 130
Definition Rumans/Ruman/Terminology/Millikan: Rumans apply color concepts like Hubots. And they also live in a similar environment (but initially somewhere else). Color/Color concepts/Perception/Spectrum: unlike the Hubots, the Rumans live under a sun that emits much redder light.
Language/Stimulus Meaning/Hubots/Rumans/Millikan: Suppose the mechanisms that produce their sentences are identical. That is, the stimulus meanings of their expressions correspond perfectly!
---
I 151
Definition "fully-developed" Intension/Terminology/Millikan: the fully-developed intension is the intensions, which an inner term can have beyond the language-bound intentions. ---
I 289
Definition Subessence/Terminology/Millikan: e.g. Gold exists over space and time, without being instantiated in the same objects. It is an identity that the material has relative to its own properties. ---
I 332
Veil/Millikan: authors such as Wittgenstein and Quine have once again introduced a veil, like Descartes and Hume earlier.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Vocabulary Avramides
 
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I 92
Vocabulary / PeacockeVs "actual language relation". - Supposedly does not need semantic vocabulary. - Peacocke later: Gricean intentions can not be used as evidence for the radical interpretation, but that is not VsGrice.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989


The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Bennett, J. Avramides Vs Bennett, J.
 
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Avra I 17
Avramidis Bennett: Bennett/Avramidis: (Griceans, modified): Proposes a community of speakers who use a communication system that does not rely on Grice’ intentions and beliefs: the "Plain Talk" ("direct speech", "simple speech", "candid speech"). Def Plain Talk/Bennett: the speakers rely on the listener, they believe in the form of a generalization: whenever an utterance U is uttered, a particular proposition p is true. This is how they can do without a speaker’s intention. BennettVsGrice: if this simpler analysis is true, we do not need the more complicated one. (65). BennettVsVs: but Bennett himself believes that the Gricean is capable of withstanding this: GriceVsVs: Solution: "Background fact": if the speaker did not want to transmit p, the utterance U would have been inappropriate under the generalization that whenever U is uttered, p is true. (Bennett 1976 p.172).
I 18
This saves the introduction of complex propositional attitudes in the analysis. Modification: the audience is presented with "intention dependent evidence for the proposition". AvramidesVsBennett: the modification is not necessary, it is already covered by Grice’ original analysis.
Avra I 18
Communication/LoarVsBennett: Not only is this kind economy unnecessary, the elimination of the intentions removes something essential. The fact that intentions, expectations and beliefs should be simple in ordinary communication and personal relationships, seems to me so improbable that it surprises me why this should be a more realistic view. (70).
I 121
Def Register/Bennett: A theoretical expression that stands for whatever in relation to an animal, and that validates predictions about its behavior (evaluates it, rates it yes/no) based on facts about its environment. (Bennett 1976, p.52). Avramides: Registering is necessary but not sufficient for belief. E.g. cruise missiles with thermal infrared equipment: can be described as reacting but not as learning. Belief/Bennett: We achieve sufficient conditions, if we add the ability to learn to registering. (see Bennett 1976, p 84). DavidsonVsBennett: Instead distinction subjective state/objective world. AvramidesVsDavidson: one could argue that the awareness of this distinction is the possession of the concept of belief. Davidson: this awareness is belief about a belief. Scaring/Davidson: only reaction to a stimulus. AvramidesVsDavidson: then there is certainly still room between the act of being surprised and the possession of the concept of belief. This allows, for example: the ability to learn that Bennett propagates. DavidsonVsBennett: rejects his approach, because his (Davidson’s) concept of awareness (of the distinction subjective / objective) is very strong.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Geach, P. Wiggins Vs Geach, P.
 
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Simons I 213
"Relative Identity"-view der Superposition: a) (Vertreter: Geach): "sortal theory" der relativen Identität: bekannt als "Theorie R": für Sortale F und G ist es möglich zwei Objekte a und b zu finden, so dass a und b beides Fs und Gs sind , a ist dasselbe F wie b, aber nicht dasselbe G.
Nicholas Griffin: pro.
WigginsVsGeach: das verletzt Leibniz’ Gesetz. Und weil dieses notwendig gilt, ist die Theorie notwendig falsch.
DoepkeVsGeach: "relative Identity" ist nur ein falscher Name für Ähnlichkeit.
b) Grice/George Myro: (beide unpubliziert): VsWiggins’ Thesis, dass Dinge, die jemals (ever) verschieden sind, immer (always) verschieden sind.
GriceVsWiggins: die Annahme hängt davon ab, dass man Eigenschaften findet, in denen die Objekte in den Zeiten differieren, wo sie nicht superponiert sind. Dann ist Identität relativ zur Zeit. D.h.
TI a = t b ↔ (F)[Ft a ↔ Ft b]
Wo der Quantor nur über Eigenschaften läuft, deren Instantiation nicht die Instantiation irgendeiner anderen Eigenschaft zu irgendeiner anderen Zeit beinhaltet.
Das schließt aus: die Eigenschaft,
Bsp zwei Jahre alt zu sein,
Bsp Expräsident zu sein
Bsp Braut-in-spe zu sein.
Simons: das können wir die Relation der "zeitlichen Ununterscheidbarkeit" nennen. Sie ist charakterisiert durch eine Beschränkung des Leibnizschen Gesetzes.
I 214
SimonsVsGrice: wenn wir diese Ähnlichkeit "identity" nennen, dann kommt auch jede andere Art von Ähnlichkeit dafür in Frage, so wie Bsp "surface identity" eines Körpers mit seiner Oberfläche. Ununterscheidbarkeit/zeitliche/Simons: wird sich unten (bei Konstitution) als wichtig herausstellen.
System CT/Simons: (s.o.) mit ihm haben wir "zeitliche Identität" schon verworfen.
Ad (3): dichrone Sicht der Superposition: Thesis: superponierte Objekte müssen nicht zur selben Zeit existieren. Bsp das Gold formt sich zum Ring. Wenn der Ring geschmolzen wird, wird er durch das Gold "replaced". D.h. sie existieren zu verschiedenen Zeiten.
Bsp eine Person koinzidiert nicht mit ihrem Körper, sie verwandelt sich in ihren Körper (die Leiche. (Nur wenn "body" als "corpse" verstanden wird, wie es oft, aber nicht immer der Fall ist).
Dichrone Sicht: Thesis: es gibt kein Substrat das den Wechsel überlebt.
Wandel/dichrone Sicht: These: ist immer ein Ersetzen eines Objekts durch ein anderes.
SimonsVsdichrone Sicht: erklärt nicht, wieso so viele Eigenschaften vom ursprünglichen auf das spätere Objekte übertragen werden.
Lösung: ein (angenommenes) Substrat würde das erklären.

Wigg I
D. Wiggins
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987
Grice, P.H. Bennett Vs Grice, P.H.
 
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I 187
BennettVsGrice: according to Grice, it looks as though every sentence uttered could have any meaning, depending on the circumstances and intentions. That would equalize the conventions to the circumstances. ((s) conventions must emancipate themselves from circumstances).
Jonathan Bennett
I Bennett Die Strategie des Bedeutungs-Nominalismus aus Meggle (Hrsg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Frankf/M 1979
Grice, P.H. Black Vs Grice, P.H.
 
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I 52
Max Black: Causal theory (also Stevenson, Morris) - BlackVsIntentionality theories (Grice, Searle, Strawson?).
I 58
BlackVsGrice: The conditions of Grice are neither necessary nor sufficient. a) Not sufficient: there are situations in which it is not true that someone "says that...", although the conditions are met, b) not necessary: ​​someone says something, although the conditions are not met.
I 60
The whole theory becomes suspicious when it is so complicated.
I 65
BlackVsGrice: he must constantly make modifications (negative conjunctions or corresponding positive disjunctions). This defensive strategy is too flexible on the one hand, while being too rigid on the other hand. (Sticking to the intended effect).
I 67
BlackVsGrice: Insufficient: 1) His reference to standard effects - 2) his confidence that the speaker’s intention brings about such effects.
I 68
BlackVsGrice: Every concrete manifestation usually has numerous effects. One would have to be "semantically relevant". The one that is necessary and sufficient to be communicated successfully. ((s) VsBlack: this is trivial and does not explain what is going on in successful communication or what is meant by an utterance).
I 70
BlackVsGrice: a belief of the listener or a prop. att. induced in the listener are apparently perlocutionary. They are of practical importance, but irrelevant for a philosophical analysis of the concept of communication or the derived concept of speaker meaning.
I 74
This applies mutatis mutandis also to the imperative case. When I have understood the request, my role as a listener and interpreter ends!. BlackVsGrice: he does not discuss how according to the principles of the basic model it can be expected of the listener that he discovers the speaker meaning. E.g. a beggar in a foreign country gestures to me that he is hungry.
I 76
BlackVsGrice: no interposition of "discovering". - (The theory must cover as many cases as possible.) BlackVsGrice Thesis: not detecting the speaker’s intention to elicit an effect in the listener allows the listener to determine the meaning, but rather the reverse: the discovery of the speaker meaning allows the listener to infer the speaker’s intention.

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983
Grice, P.H. Davidson Vs Grice, P.H.
 
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II 169/170
Davidson: Grice has understood some of the relationships between meaning and intention, e.g. Feedback. You intend to be interpreted not only in a particular way, but rather that one understands what is meant by faithfully recognize the intention. Very subtle thought. It must be part of your intention that people realize that they want to issue a statement. DavidsonVsGrice: But I do not think you can explain the concept of linguistic meaning on the basis of intentions. It is a necessary condition but not sufficient. Furthermore, intentions are at least as difficult to clarify as meanings.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Grice, P.H. Harman Vs Grice, P.H.
 
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Avramidis I 63
HarmanVsGrice: has designed a counter E.g. that leads us back to Grice’s c". Personal dignity S says: "The earth does move" not in order to convince his listeners, of which he knows that they are not to be convinced. He would not even try to convince them. Avramides: I.e. this is not about activated belief. ((s) Activated belief: i.e. not the test situation of examination or repetition of knowledge). I 64 Avramides: the speaker does not speak to an audience at all. I 66 Solution/Schiffer: in these cases (self-talk, etc.) the speaker himself is the audience. That in turn means that these are not cases in which there is no audience!. SchifferVsHarman: (ad 10 "personal dignity", I 63): the misleading aspect in Harman’s example is that it seems like there is an audience, but there is not. The solution with the speaker as audience allows us to solve all the cases 1 - 10 together.

Harm I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995
Grice, P.H. Lewis Vs Grice, P.H.
 
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V 280
See/Grice: (1961) Demands a causal standard process. This explains why e.g. cases 3.,4. and 5. are not examples of seeing. LewisVsGrice: Dilemma: If the standard process is defined as involving the reflection of light, this should mean
[wenn der Standardprozess als die Reflexion von Licht involvierend definiert ist, scheint zu folgen,]
a) that today some of us (but nobody in the past) know enough to have a term of seeing (because some of us know sufficiently enough to have a term/an idea of seeing (since there was insufficient knowledge about optics in the past). Or
b) if it needs to be a daily practical term, truthful hallucination is also included. Both would be absurd. [wenn es der alltäglich praktische Begriff sein soll, scheint auch wahrheitsgemäße Halluzination einbezogen zu sein. Beides wäre absurd.]
V 279
Solution/Kripke: to refer to fixed [starrgemacht] designators (descriptions). (Was very new in the days, 1972). Unfortunately, the standard process would disqualify both good and bad cases.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Grice, P.H. Quine Vs Grice, P.H.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
Wright I 198
Disputational Supervenience/Wright: a discourse supervenes another one if disagreements in one depend on disagreements in the other. StrawsonVsQuine/GriceVsQuine: it is hopeless to deny that a discrimination exists when it is used not in a prearranged but in a mutually unifiable way within linguistic practice.
QuineVsStrawson/QuineVsGrice: this is fully consistent with a cognitive psychology of the practical use of the distinction, which does not assume that we are responding to instantiations of distinctions.
Strawson/Grice: E.g. our daily talk of analyticity is a sociological fact and therefore has enough discipline to be considered as minimally capable of truth.
QuineVsGrice/QuineVsStrawson: this is far from proving that a sort of intuitive realism can be seen in it. Obstacle: it remains to be explained how modal judgments generally exert cognitive coercion.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001
Grice, P.H. Searle Vs Grice, P.H.
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
Bennett I 186
SearleVsGrice: Convention not the same as circumstances!
Grice I 31
Searle E.g. An American Soldier in World War II is captured by Italian troops. He wants to believe the Italians do it was a German officer and expresses the single German sentence which he has kept from school yet, "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühn?" ((s) Do you know the land where the lemon trees bloom?, Goethe). - His captors do not understand any German at all.  Searle: It would nevertheless be wrong to say that he meant by "Do you know the land...": "I ​​am a German officer."
SearleVsGrice: wants to show with by this example that something missing in Grice s explication: H should recognize that the uttered sentence is expressed conventionally to bring about a certain effect.
- - -
Searle II 204
Grice : a speaker intends with an utterance, to achieve certain effects. SearleVsGrice: he then uses intention, wish and conviction unanalyzed.
- - -
Searle V 68
Meaning/Grice: connects meaning to intention and recognizing the intention.
V 69
SearleVsGrice: insufficient: 1., it is not determined to what extent the meaning depends on rules or conventions. 2. does not differentiate this definition between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.
E.g. Searle. Lemons Example V 70 ... + ... An American soldier gets into Italian war captivity...
- - -
Searle IV 53
SearleVsConversational postulates/SearleVsGrice. A shared background is sufficient.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Gri I
H. Paul Grice
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Hg. Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1993
Grice, P.H. Strawson Vs Grice, P.H.
 
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I 24
StrawsonVsGrice: E.g. An employee plays Brigde with his boss. He is superior but he lets the boss win it. He smiles so that the boss realizes that he let him win, but not so obtrusive that he considers it to be outrageous. The smile looks a spontaneous smile very similar, but deliberately not completely similar. We would not want to say that he meant with the smile that he has had good cards. He intended that the boss thinks he has good cards, but not that he intended that the boss thinks that! - Additional condition: H to think that S has a certain intention.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Grice, P.H. Tugendhat Vs Grice, P.H.
 
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I 233
Grice/Tugendhat: Mitteilung ist ein spezieller Fall des Meinens, aber nicht immer ist es eine Mitteilung, wenn wir beabsichtigen, zu bewirken, dass der Partner etwas glaubt. Man kann ihn auch in eine bestimmte Wahrnehmungssituation bringen. Wir können ihn auffordern, zu schnuppern. Bedingungen, damit man von einer Mitteilung oder einem Meinen sprechen kann:
1. Dass der Partner die Absicht erkennt und
2. Dass das Erkennen der Absicht für ihn der Grund für die Bildung der Meinung ist.
TugendhatVsGrice: Bsp ein Schüler antwortet nicht, um den Lehrer zu informieren. Grice hat seine Theorie später zurückgezogen. Er blieb jedoch dabei, dass die Verwendungsregel darin besteht, dass der Satz dazu dient, zu bewirken, dass ein Partner etwas meint.
Präzise: A beabsichtigt, dass B meint, dass A meint, dass p. (Das gilt auch für die Lüge.)
Lüge/(s): die Bedeutung liegt nicht in der Funktion.
I 234
TugendhatVsGrice: das ist richtig, daraus folgt aber nicht, dass das die Primärabsicht ist. Vor allem folgt nicht daraus, dass in der Funktion die Bedeutung enthalten ist. Wenn man nun Wittgensteins Satz zugrundelegt, dann müsste man sagen, dass man die Bedeutung eines Satzes "p" mittels eines längeren Satzes "q" erklärt, der den Satz "p" als Teil enthält.
Vs: 1. "q" ist offenkundig nicht synonym mit "p".
2. Man kann eine solche Erklärung nicht verstehen, wenn man nicht schon die Bedeutung von "dass p" versteht.
3. Müsste man eine Metasprache (dass der andere schon weiß, was es heißt zu meinen,) voraussetzen (TugendhatVsMetasprache).
I 235
Grice/Tugendhat: das Wesentliche ist daran, dass er den umfassenden Begriff des Meinens (im Sinne von vouloire dire) präzisiert hat, der über das Meinen in Sätzen hinausreicht: er umfasst auch Signale, die nicht kausal zu verstehen sind. - - -
I 269
Meinen/TugendhatVsGrice: zwei Möglichkeiten:a) Korrelativ zum Verstehen: dann ist es falsch, dass das, was ein Sprecher mit "p" sagen will ist, dass er bewirken möchte...usw. das würde vielmehr sagen wollen, wenn er sagte "Ich möchte bewirken" usw. was er mit "p" sagen will, ist behaupten, dass p. b) Wenn man Grice sozusagen seine Terminologie schenkt, dann muss man sagen, dass die Funktion eines assertorischen Satzes bzw. die Absicht, mit der er verwendet wird, nicht die ist, etwas zu meinen, sondern etwas zu behaupten!
I 270
TugendhatVsGrice: sein Modell berücksichtigt überhaupt nicht die Möglichkeit des Selbstgesprächs. Das hat zur Folge, dass für das Selbstgespräch tatsächlich andere Wahrheitsbedingungen und andere Bedeutungen gelten müssen! Das wäre völlig absurd. Als ob wir intern eine andere Sprache sprächen als im Gespräch.
Tugendhat These: die Mitteilungsfunktion gehört nicht zur Bedeutung des Satzes (sonst wäre ein Selbstgespräch nicht möglich).

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Grice, P.H. Verschiedene Vs Grice, P.H. Meg I 21
Absicht/Bedeutung/Grice: Bsp Ärger: kann z.T. daraus resultieren, daß H (Hörer) glaubt, daß S (Sprecher) intendierte, den anderen zu ärgern! Glaube an Absicht: Teil-Ursache für Ärger.Grice: Aber nicht Teil-Grund!
VsGrice:a) zu schwach, schließt zu wenig aus
b) zu stark, schließt klare Fälle von Sprecher.-Situations-Bedeutung aus. Bsp (Urmson):Zeigen der Daumenschrauben: Erkenntnis des Gefangenen soll Teil des Grundes sein, die erwähnte Reaktion zu zeigen.Grice
VsGrice: a) zu schwach, schließt zu wenig aus.
Meg I 25
SchifferVsGrice: Bsp Jemand wirft einen 20-Mark-Schein aus dem Fenster um seinen Besuch, den er für geldgeil hält, zum Rausrennen zu bringen. Der Besuch will dokumentieren, daß er nicht am Geld hängt... schließlich geht er und weiß Bescheid um die Absicht, gleichzeitig geht er aber aus einem anderen Grund: nicht wegen des Geldes, sondern weil er merkt, daß man ihn loswerden will.
Meg I 28
Bsp (Schiffer) jemand singt mit rauher Stimme "Tipparary" um den Besuch loszuwerden. Der denkt "Komisch, er kann mich doch nicht loswerden wollen, weiß er doch, daß mir sein Gesinge nichts ausmacht"... Man kann Sachverhalten nur dann herbeifzuführen beabsichtigen, wenn man auch eine gewisse Chance sieht. Daher auch kein Regreß.




Grice, P.H. Avramides Vs Grice, P.H.
 
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Avramidis I 15
Understanding/Grice/Avramides: according to Grice understanding is an inference from noise chains I 16 on the intentions of the speaker and from there on a piece of knowledge about the world. VsGrice: this brings too much psychology into play.
Avra I 93
VsGrice/Avramides: it was criticized that his approach requires the listener to distinguish some speaker’s intentions before he understands utterances. (Platts 1979 pp. 91). GriceVsVs: could respond that this is simply not necessary. Because it is not important to find out how communication occurs. I 94 What Grice is actually interested in: what constitutes meaning is to be separated from any method of interpretation (translation?). (> Biro).

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Grice, P.H. Schiffer Vs Grice, P.H.
 
Books on Amazon:
Stephen Schiffer
Avramides I 56
Deception/SchifferVsGrice: the recognition of the speaker's intention by the listener must at least partly be the reason for the reaction - Problem: distinguishing primary intention, "with" which something is expressed - secondary: "in" which something is expressed - primary intention to cause the reaction is important - secondary: E.g. "by expressing a, he means b" - primary/(s): "with a he means x".
Avramides I 60
VsGrice: Counter-E.g.:examination, learning, memory, inference, reckless speech, indifference with respect to the listener reaction, accusation - solution / Grice: "active belief" or belief that the speaker believes .. "(= activated belief, not querying learning material) - SchifferVs: problem: speaker often intend no belief in the listener - problem: then the analysis is no longer enough - solution: for real communication is necessary that belief is not caused but justified. - - -
Schiffer I XIX
Expression meaning/intention based semantics (IBS)/SchifferVsIBS/SchifferVsIntention based semantics/intention supported: not only requires compositionality and relation theory, but also implies that Understanding/IBS: Thesis: is an inferential process (conclusions)
SchifferVs: that's dubious. This in turn requires propositional knowledge that one clearly does not have! ((s) in relation to or as a "belief objects").
SchifferVsGrice: so by that the whole project is brought into disrepute.
I 248
Speaker Meaning/SchifferVsGrice: depends also from the fact that the speaker himself is willing to describe himself accordingly. And the complex conditions of (S) are just not realistic. They make each utterance to a falsehood when you replace "to mean" in each pattern by "to say". Paradox of the Analysis/Schiffer: revenges here: IBS can maybe say what meaning is but by that it does cover nobody's notion of meaning. The IBS-analysis cannot replaced its analysandum by a that-proposition on a propositional attitude.
IBS/Schiffer: of course it is about an analysis of "S believes that p" and not of "x believes that S means that p". Nevertheless, this can be seen as an obstacle to a reductive analysis.
E.g. "It is snowing": is irreducible semantically.
Point: in the end we can omit all speaker intentions here! It is not of interest, if it does not help to deliver the base
I 249
For the semantic features of the expressions of natural language. Expression Meaning/SchifferVsIBS/SchifferVsGrice: IBS has much to say about speaker-meaning, but too little (surprisingly little) about expression meaning. And for good reason, as we shall see.
- - -
I 264
Schiffer: Thesis: ultimately it is the way in which we use signs and sounds - described non-semantic and non-psychological - which explains our semantic knowledge (given the conceptual roles of our neural terms). SchifferVsGrice: Problem: the fact remains that we cannot formulate this semantic knowledge in non-semantic terms.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Grice, P.H. Loar Vs Grice, P.H.
 
Books on Amazon
I 1
Sprache/Alltagssprache/Begriffe/Theorie/Erklärung/pragmatisch/Loar: alle pragmatischen Begriffe gehen hier letztlich auf Glauben zurück.

Loar: These: mein Ansatz (Kapitel 9) ist reduktionistisch:
1. Grundlage semantischen Eigenschaften sind Glauben und Wünsche. (Ähnlich wie Grice).
LoarVsGrice: mein Ansatz ist nicht nur kommunikationstheoretisch:
LoarVsalle: die Theorien der Überzeugungen kann als Basis für die semantische Theorie der „Gedankensprache“ dienen (die meisten Autoren: andersherum!)
2. meine Erklärung von Glauben und Wünschen stützt sich nicht auf
I 2
Propositionen oder semantische Begriffe. Bedeutung/Loar: daher können propositionale Einstellungen nicht-zirkulär als Basis von Bedeutung dienen.
Glauben/Überzeugung/Wunsch/Wünsche/Loar: These können ohne alltagssprachliche Semantik vorauszusetzen, erklärt werden.
Denken/Sprache/Loar: das soll aber nicht Denken ohne Sprache annehmen, also Sprache als bloßes Vehikel der Kommunikation:
Glauben/Loar: These: ist kein sprachlicher Zustand.
Inhalt/Loar. Selbst wenn Glauben ein linguistischer Zustand wäre, könnte sein Inhalt unabhängig von seinen sprachlichen Aspekten analysiert werden.
Lösung/Loar: Erklärung durch Verhalten und Wahrnehmung.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981
Grice, P.H. Cartwright Vs Grice, P.H.
 
Books on Amazon
I 129
As if/Physics/Cartwright: (from a seminar by Grice): Is there an "as-if-operator" in physics? Grice: E.g. a) helium gas behaves as if it were a collection of molecules that interact only in case of collision.
b) ... helium gas is composed of molecules that behave as if they only interacted in case of collisions.
CartwrightVsGrice: early: at the time I made objections that only apparently contradicted this: There are well known cases with the "as-if" operator. E.g. the radiating molecules in an ammonium-Maser behave as if they were normal electronic oscillators.
As if/False realism: realistic question: how densely are the oscillators packed?
VsRealism: this question is absurd, normal electron oscillators themselves are a mere theoretical construct, a fiction! The behavior of atoms is amazingly similar to a normal electron oscillator.
Helium-neon laser/Cartwright: (...) behaves as if it were a collection of 3-level atoms(...).
I 130
As if/Behavior/Existence/Ontology/Explanation/Theory/Cartwright: early: but by saying "as if", I do not deny the existence of 3-level atoms in this situation! I recognize these existential facts, and yet put the "as-if operator" in front of them! CartwrightVsCartwright: later: back then I confused two functions that the as-if the operator may have:
as-if-operator/Cartwright: a) writing things left from the as-if-operator means to enter into an existential commitment. E.g. ... molecules as if ...
b) things to the right of the as-if operator: have a different function: what is at the right side (a description) is what we need to know in order to be able to apply a mathematical formulation.
Description/Equation/Law/Physics/Cartwright: the description on the right side is the kind of description for which the theory provides an equation. E.g. we say a "real quantum atom" behaves like a normal electron oscillator. The theory tells us beforehand which equation this oscillator obeys.
I 131
Description/Equation/Theory/Cartwright: it might be assumed: in order to obtain a description according to which we can establish it, we must depart from what we assume to exist. (to be the case). CartwrightVs: it but does not work like that:
Principles/Theory/Cartwright: the theory has only few principles to get from descriptions of equations. And these principles certainly demand structured information. And the "descriptions" on the right side must satisfy many mathematical requirements.
Description/Theory/Equations/Cartwright: thesis: the descriptions that best describe are just not the ones which best apply to the equations.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983
Grice, P.H. Jackson Vs Grice, P.H.
 
Books on Amazon:
Frank C. Jackson
Lewis V 153
Implicature/Conversational Implicature/Grice/Lewis: E.g. "This time you are right" Implicature: "Otherwise you are usually wrong."
Conventional Implicature/Jackson: E.g. "She votes liberal, but she's not an idiot" - "Most liberals are idiots".
Conditional/Grice/Lewis: if P(A>C) is high mainly because P(A) is low (E.g. falso quodlibet), then what sense does it make to say "If A, then B"? Why should you not say the stronger one: that it is almost as likely non-A?.
JacksonVsGrice/JacksonVsLewis: we often assert things that are much weaker than we could actually assert, and for good reason.
Hereby I suppose this that your belief system is similar to mine, but not identical.
E.g. Assuming you know something that strikes me as highly unlikely today, but I still want to say something useful. So I say something weaker, so that you can definitely take my word.
Def Robust/Jackson/Lewis: A is robust relative to B (in terms of one's subjective probability at a time), iff. the probability of A and probability of A conditional to B are close to each other and are both high.
V 154
so that if one learns that B, they still consider A probable. Jackson: the weaker thing can then be more robust with respect to something that you think is more unlikely, but that you do not want to ignore.
If it is now useless, the to say weaker thing, how useless is it then to say the weaker thing and the stronger thing together! And yet we do it!
E.g. Lewis: "Bruce sleeps in the clothes chest, or elsewhere on the ground floor".
Jackson: Explanation: it makes sense to assert the stronger thing, and just as much sense to assert the more robust thing. If they differ, we assert both.
Robustness/Indicative Conditional/IC/Lewis: an IC is a truth functional conditional, that conventionally implies robustness (convention implicature) with respect to the antecedent.
Therefore, the probabilities P(A>C) and P(A>C) must both be high.
That is the reason why the BH of the IC comes with the corresponding conditional probability.

Jack I
F. C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000
Grice, P.H. Millikan Vs Grice, P.H.
 
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I 3
Speech patterns/language device/terminology/Millikan: by that I mean words, syntactic forms, accentuation, accents, punctuation, etc.
Thesis: such patterns have survived only because stable overt and covert responses of a cooperative partner are also handed down (have prevailed).
Standardization/Millikan: the (voice) pattern exerts its own function only with a partner, but with anyone. Therefore, it must be standardized.
Stabilization/Millikan/(S): (in time) with recurring token resemblance to earlier ones must be given.
Stabilization/standardization/Millikan: two sides of a coin.
Speech patterns/Millikan: can often be used in a parasitic way (diverted use).
I 4
Ex metaphor, sarcasm, lying, irony. Standard: even if they are not being used in a deviating way the pattern may yet fail in use.
Standardization/stabilization: therefore, they are not an "average function", but have to do with a "critical mass" of cases; they form a "center of gravity".
Solution: can not be found by forming an "average" of idiolects.
I 5
Characteristic function/language/meaning/MillikanVsGrice: we therefore do not take the meaning of the speaker as the fundamental concept. Meaningfulness/Millikan: we do not it explain with typical use.
belief/wishes/intention/Millikan: thesis: can be explained without reference to language.
- - -
I 51
quotation from Stevenson's "Kidnapped".
I 52
Literature/Millikan: there are more ((S) fine) differences within the literature as many philosophers have opened up. Language/Millikan: in this chapter: what are there relations between
1. the stabilizing function of a speech pattern
2. its literal use
3. the speaker's intentions.
Stabilizing function/Millikan: thesis of next chapter: an aspect of the meaning of words, of the syntactic form is the focused stabilizing function.
literal use/Millikan: corresponds to no stabilizing function (see below).
Intention according to Grice/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: thesis: Grice's intentions are not what drives usage and understanding.
- - -
I 61
Understanding/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: thesis: is a direct perception of what a speech is about (aboutness), not a conclusion from the clauses heard! And certainly not a conclusion on speaker intentions.
I 62
Conviction/Millikan: 1. arises partly from the internal composition of the subject (nerves, interconnection, etc.) but two people with the same interconnections need not have the same beliefs.
I 63
2. not all the internal hardware is in use if you believe something. Belief/having/use/Millikan: I may have a conviction but not use is, Ex I almost never need the conviction that Columbus discovered America, especially not when I'm brushing my teeth.
Discovery/Conviction/Millikan: Ex a mathematician who is awake and looking for a proof and finally finds it: one can not say of him_her that he_she has previously believed it!
Imperative/Millikan: now, it is certainly the case that a listener when asked if the speaker had intended that s_he obeys the command, certainly will immediately answer "yes".
I 64
But that does not mean that s_he has used this belief during obedience. Intentions according to Grice/MillikanVsGrice/Millikan: are therefore superfluous. And they also can not help to distinguish non-natural meaning from less interesting things.
Anyway, we do not need to consider Grice's intentions that are subject the only potential and not actual modifications of the nervous system.
I 65
VsMillikan: it could be argued that one might have reasons for an act without these reasons being activated in the anatomy. Millikan: when I stop to believe in something, I'll refrain from the corresponding actions.
Intentions according to Grice/Millikan: the only interesting question is whether they are actually realized inside while speaking.
Ex Millikan: the sergeant says, "the next time I say 'stop' do not stop!"
There is a similar Ex by Bennett.
Problem: the training was so effective that the soldier is not able not to stop.
I 66
Bennett: the conclusion is made in a non-Grice manner. Rationality/Bennett/Millikan: it seems that as a rational person one should not choose "shortcuts". That is, one must not only take account of positive evidence, but also of negative.
((S) The idea is that what has been rationally learned covers what is rationally demanded. But both times it is about speaker intentions, one time past ones, another time present ones).
generally/formally: Ex Suppose John believes
"Usually: if A then B" and also:
"Non- (usually: if A-and-not-C, then B)"
rational: then would follow that John had to believe.
a) "usual: if A then C" and
b) if A and C, then B. Then there are the following possible cases.
1. the only evidence of C comes from the fact that John knows that usually, if A then C. Then he should just move from A to B.
2. John has independent ways to believe C on the basis of evidence. And he encounters A, while he already has evidence of non-C.
I 67
Then, rationally, he should also believe that non-C and not conclude from A to B. 3. John has independent evidence according to which he could know C, but this time he does not know beforehand, whether C.
Question: to be rational, does he have to check beforehand whether C?
Millikan: we assume that he has to.
Problem: if again, that only depends on him believing:
"Usually, if D, then C" etc.
Rationality/Millikan: Problem: the more knowledge one then acquires, the more of an effort one must make to be rational at all. Would it not be better to omit all this verifying?

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
Introspection Read Vs Introspection
 
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Read III 92
Def Robustheit: (Jackson) eine Aussage ist robust, wenn ihre Behauptbarkeit von dem Erwerb von Informationen unberührt bleibt. Die Pointe für Jackson: bei Bedingungssätzen kommt der modus ponens ins Spiel.
Bedingungssätze sind nicht robust im Hinblick auf die Falschheit ihrer Hinterglieder.
III 93
Jackson: Behauptbarkeit wird durch bedingte Wahrscheinlichkeit gemessen. Es gibt eine spezifische Konvention über Bedingungssätze: nämlich, dass sie robust im Hinblick auf ihre Vorderglieder sind, und deshalb nicht unter Umständen behauptet werden können, wo bekannt ist, dass ihre Vorderglieder falsch sind. ReadVsJackson/ ReadVsGrice: beides ist unhaltbar. Die problematischen Bedingungssätze treten bei eingebetteten Kontexten auf. Bsp Entweder, wenn ich recht hatte, hattest du auch recht, oder, wenn du recht hattest, hatte auch ich recht.
III 94
Behauptung und Behauptbarkeit: sind Begriffe, die auf vollständige Aussagen angewendet werden, nicht auf deren Teile! Bedingungssätze sind nicht wahrheitsfunktional.

Re III
St. Read
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Re IV
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic 1st Edition Oxford 1995
Physicalism Cresswell Vs Physicalism
 
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II 163
CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsReductionism: I do not see how principles of semantics could somehow be traced back to principles of physics or psychology - CresswellVsFodor/CresswellVsToken physicalism.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
Platts, M. Avramides Vs Platts, M.
 
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Avra I 91
DavidsoniansVsGrice/Avramidis: E.g. Mark Platts: thinks that he can discredit the entire program of Grice with Davidson’s doubt: Platts: Consider the following two statements: (1) The term of sentence meaning can be defined in terms of the speaker’s intentions
(2) The meaning of each sentence in a language can be determined by reference to the intentions with which it was expressed. (Platts 1979 p.92) AvramidesVsPlatts: he relies the mistakes of superficial epistemic asymmetry (that psychological concepts are more fundamental than semantic ones) in order to discredit (2). Then he connects the weakened assertion (2) with (1). Platts: if (1) is to have any meaning at all, it must have implications for the determination of the meaning of individual sentences. But what else could these implications be than what we have already seen to be inadequate? ((s) the fact that the RI cannot explain language by intentions). Platts: therefore (1) is either uninteresting or wrong. (1979, p.92) AvramidesVsPlatts: he does not distinguish between reductive and non-reductive interpretations of Grice’ analysis. He simply decides that the entire analysis by Grice was wrong or uninteresting, namely on the basis of superficial epistemic asymmetry. AvramidesVsPlatts: he overreacted. 1) It is not clear why a non-reductive Gricean should be committed to (2). 2) Platts assumes that (2) is important without explaining why. Reductionism/Avramides: no reductive Gricean known to me really relies on the superficial epistemic asymmetry.

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Various Authors Grice Vs Various Authors
 
Books on Amazon
I 21
Intention/Meaning/Grice: E.g. anger: can partially result from L (listener) believing that S (speaker) intended to annoy the other person! Belief in intention: partial cause of anger. Grice: But not partial reason!.
VsGrice: a) too weak, excludes too little.
b) too strong, excludes clear cases of speaker-situation meaning. E.g. (Urmson): Showing of the thumbscrews: Recognition of the prisoner should be part of the reason to show the mentioned reaction.
I 23
VsGrice: a) too weak, excludes too little. GriceVsUrmson: E.g. In the smoke shop it is enough for me to throw the exact amount of cash on the counter to get my favorite cigarettes.
Avramides I 2
Causal Theory of Meaning/C.L. Stevenson: Thesis: We should identify the word meaning with a dispositional property of a word: the disposition of a sign to trigger certain responses (reaction) in the listener. Grice/Avramides: but not everything that has the tendency to trigger a reaction is a case of meaning. E.g. Grice: stepping on a cat’s tail.
GriceVsStevenson: Problem: you can only exclude undesirable cases at the cost of circularity: it is precisely access that we want to what exactly makes something a communicative use of a sign.

Gri I
H. Paul Grice
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Hg. Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1993

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Grice Versus Avramides I 91
PlattsVsGrice (with Davidson).

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Grice Pro Avramides I 9~
Griceans: Armstrong, Bennett, Loar, Avramides VsGrice: Dummett, Davidson, Evans/McDowell (EMD)

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Reductionism Versus Cresswell II 163
CresswellVsGrice/CresswellVsReduktionismus: ich sehe nicht, wie Prinzipien der Semantik irgendwie auf Prinzipien der Physik oder der Psychologie zurückgeführt werden könnte -" CresswellVsFodor/ CresswellVsTokenphysikalismus -"

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Speaker Meaning Black, Max
 
Books on Amazon
I 77
BlackVsGrice thesis: not detecting the speaker s intention to cause an effect in the hearer allows the hearer to determine the meaning, but rather the reverse: the discovery of speaker meaning allows the lhearer, to recontruct the speaker s intention.
Sentence Meaning Pinker, St.
 
Books on Amazon
Avramides I 91
DavidsonianerVsGrice/Avramides: z.B. Mark Platts: These denkt, daß er das ganze Gricesche Programm durch den Davidsonschen Zweifel in Mißkredit bringen kann: Platts: man bedenke folgende zwei Behauptungen:
(1) Der Begriff der Satzbedeutung kann in Begriffen der Sprecher-Intentionen definiert werden
(2) Die Bedeutung jedes einzelnen Satzes in einer Sprache kann durch Referenz auf die Intentionen, mit der er geäußert wurde, bestimmt werden. (Platts 1979,S.92)
I 91
Lager: PlattsVsGrice (mit Davidson) - (s) Dann ist (2) Voraussetzung für (1).

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Meaning Schiffer, St.
 
Books on Amazon
Field II 65
Def Bedeutung/Satzbedeutung/Schiffer/Field: (Schiffer früh, 1972): These Satzbedeutung in gesprochener und geschriebener Sprache ist durch Begriffe des Glaubens (und Wünschens) erklärbar, nämlich solchen, die konventionell mit diesen Sätzen korreliert sind. - II 66 - Repräsentation/Bedeutung/FieldVsSchiffer: These Teil dessen, was es ausmacht, daß ein Symbol in meinem Repräsentationssystem für Cäsar steht, ist, daß es seine Rolle dort erworben hat als Ergebnis meiner Aneignung eines Namens, der in der öffentlichen Sprache für Cäsar steht. - II 66 Bedeutung/Repräsentation/VsSchiffer/Field: ein zu Schiffers These umgekehrter Ansatz würde die Semantik des Repräsentationssystems auf die Semantik der öffentlichen Sprache reduzieren.
Graeser I 116
Bedeutung/Stephen Schiffer: ("The Remnants of Meanig, 1987): provokatives Buch: These 1. es gibt keine korrekte Bedeutungstheorie (BT)
These 2. die Fragen, die die gegenwärtige Sprachphilosophie bestimmen, basieren auf falschen Annahmen.
Schi passim
Bedeutung/Schiffer/Bio: in den 60ern war ich Student in Oxford. SchifferVsGrice: Darstellung der Sprecher-Bedeutung inadäquat (unvollständig), aber pro
These Reduktion der Semantik auf Psychologie (wie Grice) + Reduktion auf Physikalismus. >
1972 -žMeaning-œ.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002