Alvin Goldman/Knowledge/BrandomVsGoldman: his theory paved the way for the reliability theories, but it is a two-edged sword with regard to naturalized epistemology. For his example, it is important that we assume that the causal chain is an ideal one.
For example barn facades: one can imagine the facades of the province as embedded in a country with real barns, this in turn embedded in a state with facades, embedded in a continent with real, these on a planet with facades, this in turn embedded in a planet system with real barns and so on. Whether it is about knowledge when seeing a real barn, is then completely dependent on the choice of the reference class! The closest reference class is then highly reliable.
Much is against genuine knowledge. This reveals the inadequacy of classical internalism of justification.
But E.g. twin earth/Brandom: a modern internalist could claim that the "internal states" are the same. All they have in common is that the subject cannot keep them apart. McDowell: but this fact does not have to be considered as sufficient to identify their contents!
Goldman/Brandom: Overall, the presence of barn façades in the area is causally irrelevant.
Barn facades/Goldman: the candidate is not a reliable perpetrator of barns. Brandom: the special thing about this case is that the circumstances are external.
BrandomVsGoldman: "Goldman's insight", however, does not support the naturalized epistemology because the knowledge is completely dependent on the choice of the reference class. An argument place therefore remains empty.
It depends on how we describe the convinced: as a member of the country, of the federal state, etc. And that would be precisely the naturalistically formulated facts. They then lead to different judgments about the reliability of the observer.
Brandom: Situations like those of the example can quite possibly arise. From this follows the:
definition "blind spot" of the reliability theories/Brandom: whether or not an observer is reliable is dependent on the choice of reference classes (barn province), and thus on external circumstances which have nothing to do with the observed object.
Alvin I. Goldman
Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays Oxford 2015
|Disputed term/author/ism||Author Vs Author
|Goldman, A.||Brandom Vs Goldman, A.||II 151-155
BrandomVsGoldman: his theory paved the way for theories of reliability, but it is a double-edged sword in terms of naturalized epistemology. For his example it is important that we assume that the causal chain is an ideal one.
E.g. barn facades / Brandom: you can think of the province as embedded in a country with real barns, this in turn embedded in a state with facades, embedded it in a continent with real ... But e.g. Twin Earth: a modern internalist could claim that the "internal states" be the same. All they have in common is that the subject can not tell them apart. McDowell: this fact has not to be considered as sufficient for the identification of their contents!
Goldman / Brandom: it shows that the presence of barn facades in the area is causally irrelevant.
BrandomVsGoldman: "Goldman s insight,"does not support the naturalized epistemology, because the knowledge is totally dependent on the choice of the reference class. An argument position therefore remains blank.
It depends on how we describe the convinced person: as an inhabitant of the country, the state, etc. And that would be just the naturalistic formulable facts.
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
|Goldman, A.||Chisholm Vs Goldman, A.||III 194
Knowledge/Causal theory/Goldman: (1967, pp.357) Thesis: if S knows a contingent proposition h, then S has a justified true belief in the sense that h is causally linked with the acceptance of h. But this should be no analysis or definition of knowledge. ChisholmVsGoldman: it could not be a definition, because we also know non-contingent propositions, and it may be that we know nothing about the causal link.
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
|Reliability Theory||Field Vs Reliability Theory||II 381
FieldVsReliability Theory: I prefer an alternative to it that is more compatible with non-factualism: Thesis: rationality is not a "de facto property". Solution: We value those rules higher that lead to the truth in the circumstances in which we apply them. ((s) "value rather than fact").
Accordingly, we value a rule higher of which we believe that it is reliable. Belief/Necessity/Field: we must inevitably believe that our most basic rules are reliable. Equally inevitably, we assign a high value to them. Externalism/Field: Is this an externalist point of view? (The term was coined by Goldman 1980).
FieldVsGoldman: the distinction externalism/internalism is based on a false premise: that epistemic properties like rationality are factual. If this is so, then it makes sense to ask whether the factual property contains external elements.
EvaluationismVsGoldman: when measured by the evaluation of rules rather than facts about rules, the distinction externalism/internalism is obsolete.
What is internalistic about our point of view is that we simply value our own rules more highly. Problem: this might lead to extreme relativism.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994