Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Method Freud
 
Books on Amazon
Wright I 154
Methode/Marx/Freud/Wright, G. H.: Marx zeigt eine deutliche Ambivalenz zwischen einerseits einer „kausalistischen“, „szientistischen“ und andererseits einer „hermeneutisch-dialektischen“, „teleologischen“ Orientierung. Diese Ambivalenz gibt Anlass zu radikal verschiedenen Interpretationen seiner philosophischen Aussagen. In dieser Hinsicht lässt sich Marx interessanterweise mit Freud vergleichen, in dessen Werk eine explizite, naturwissenschaftlich orientierte Suche nach Kausalerklärungen häufig einer impliziten hermeneutischen und teleologischen Tendenz seines Denkens zuwiderläuft. Bei beiden Autoren hat man den Eindruck, dass ihr Denken zu einem gewissen Maß durch den damals sowohl in der Wissenschaft als auch in der Wissenschaftstheorie (dem Positivismus) vorherrschenden „Galileismus“ gehemmt und verzerrt wurde. (G.H. von WrightVsFreud.).

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011


Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WriGH I
G. H. von Wright
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Psychology Pinker
 
Books on Amazon
I 87
PinkerVsFreud: the brain is not functioning due to some pressure, but it will generate it as a tactic of dealing with issues.

Pi I
St. Pinker
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

Psychology Wittgenstein
 
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II 197
Psychology/Freud/Wittgenstein: E.g. correlation between the position of the fetus, and our sleep. - Although this looks like a causal connection, it is not, because here we cannot perform a psychological experiment. - Freud's explanation does the same as an aesthetic explanation: it brings two factors together. ---
II 197
Psychology/joke/WittgensteinVsFreud: confusion between reason and cause. - Laughter has a reason - otherwise consent to the analysis would be no way to find out the cause. - Cause/physics: is not about consent - also causes of laughter can be detected, but not by consent, but by experiment - for aesthetic investigation also consent is needed.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Terminology Adorno
 
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Grenz I 14
Adorno/Terminology/Grenz: Physiognomical: expressing
Negating: determined.
---
Grenz I 31
Sociology/Freud/Grenz: applied psychology AdornoVsFreud: "Society is not directly one of human beings, but the relations between the humans have become independent and are overpowering to all individuals.
(Gesammelte Schriften Bd. 8 p. 89).
---
Grenz I 39
Reification/Terminology/Lukàcs/Grenz: Lukàcs familiarizes a broad public with Marx's concept of abstraction in the exchange value under the name of the reification. ---
Grenz I 65
Innervate/Terminology/Adorno/Grenz: innervate means to react subjectively but physically mediated on history, to perceiev the historical state of rationality and subjectivity. > Aesthetic judgments. ---
I 65
Constellation/Terminology/Adorno/Grenz: the historical, which is innervated, is called social or aesthetic constellation in Adorno. ---
Grenz I 69
Tradition/Adorno/Grenz: Tradition is what, as a seemingly natural implication of the possible, projects into the present: the "present oblivion" (Philosophie der Neuen Musik, pp. 117f). ---
I Grenz 129
Positivity/Terminology/Adorno: positivity is conceived as a contradiction of claim and being. ---
Grenz I 195
Aura/Terminology/AdornoVsBenjamin/Grenz: Benjamin's criterion for aura is modified by Adorno. Not the immediate certainty of the authenticity of a single given but its content should make up the aura of a work. This is an extension of the concept. It is necessary because the concept of the subject which produces the real is inscribed in the concept of authenticity. ---
XII 118
World view/Adorno: ideas of the essence and of the connection of things, which measure themselves with the subjective need for unity, after explanation. In other words, the opinion raised to the system. ---
XII 119
While Kant never speaks of "my philosophy", this is done by Fichte, Schopenhauer, and, of course, Nietzsche.

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974

Unconscious Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 192f
Unconscious/Searle: according to the model of consciousness (pro) - VsHeidegger: e.g. Hammering not unconsciously but not alert - 2 differences: conscious/unconscious. ---
I 160f
Peripherals/center SearleVsFreud: unconscious for him like fish deep down in the sea (wrong idea of mental constance) - they seem to have the same form - problem - false analogy: consciousness/perception (regress) - requires yet another level of description, which does not exist - unconscious on the model of consciousness - What is the ontology of the unconscious, as long as it is unconscious (= revolt? hatred of the father?) - If I take away the object (bicycle) from the perception, it is a hallucination, but that is what I cannot do in case of conscious thought, to obtain the unconscious.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

World Freud
 
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Rorty V 39
Freud/Rorty: belonged like Copernicus and Darwin to those who have decentered our worldview. Freud: "The I is not master in one's own home." > Mechanization of the worldview. ---
V 41
Freud/RortyVsHume: in contrast to Hume, Freud has actually redesigned our self-image! If the I is not master in its own home, it is because there is indeed another person! The unconscious of Freud is actually effective. ---
V 43
But it does not seem like a thing that we can claim, but as a person who claims us. The ego is populated by the counterparts of persons we must know in order to understand the behavior of a person. DavidsonVsFreud/Rorty: Splitting is always perceived by philosophers as disquieting. But: (pro Freud) there is no reason "you think subconsciously that p" instead of "there is something in you that causes you to act as if you believed that p".

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Freud, S. Luhmann Vs Freud, S.
 
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II 62
Sexuality: about 1760 important changes: the concept of nature and concept of reason, which make it possible to solve passionate love from the shackles of society. Love threesome, etc. is allowed. And reason can only prohibit what harms other. LuhmannVsFreud: Pseudo Scientific.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Freud, S. Pinker Vs Freud, S.
 
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I 88
VsFreud "hydraulic model" with overpressure, valve, etc. PinkerVsFreud: but even the strongest feelings do not produce more discharges in the brain. The brain does not work because of some kind of pressure, but it produces it as a strategy for solving problems.
- - -
I 552/553
PinkerVsFreud: Oedipus complex: there is indeed actually an explicable phenomenon: Freud makes the mistake of mixing two types of the parent-child conflict. Small children compete for their mother's attention, but not sexually: On the other hand, there may well be sexual rivalry among older children, but not both are fighting for the mother! In many cultures there is a fight for the same women. A father is always in the way of the career of the son.            Men do not want to marry women who may be pregnant by another man. That is where the father's interest in the sexuality of the daughters comes from. Not desire!
- - -
I 566
Incest/Pinker: it seems that humans (and many animals) have developed a revulsion in the course of evolution.
I 569
E.g. Unrelated children who grew up in kibbutzim in close contact had an aversion against marrying each other.            People who actually commit incest were often not raised together.
PinkerVsFreud: he reports to have been sexually attracted to his mother while getting dressed. Freud, however, had a wet nurse, which could declare the mother as more remote.

Pi I
St. Pinker
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998
Freud, S. Searle Vs Freud, S.
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
I 175
SearleVsFreud: it is clear that we envision the unconscious along the lines of the subconscious. The unconscious in Freud is based on a fairly simple model of conscious states. Like fish deep down in the sea. The fish that we cannot see below the surface, have exactly the same shape when they come to the surface. They are like objects that are stored in the dark attic of the mind. Could there be unconscious pain?
I 188
Example Suppose we have a case in which we had use for terms "unconscious pain". Shall we say that during sleep actually no pain was present, that it rather only began at opening?
I 189
Or that it continued, was however unconscious during sleep? Searle: here it is not about a dispute with a tangible content. There is simply a different vocabulary to describe the same fact.
Freudians insist that there really are unconscious mental states. The other side says that conditions in which there really are mental states, then surely must be conscious.
I 190
But what facts in the world are to meet these two different statements? E.g. someone crawls under hypnosis around on the floor. After waking up, he turns a seemingly rational explanation: like, that he would have probably lost his watch somewhere.
Question: what is the ontology of the unconscious supposed to be exactly in this moment? What kind of a fact corresponds to the attribution?
Example The reason of the adolescent boy who revolted against the authority of the school is that he hates his father, so they say.
Nevertheless, we have to ask again: what is the ontology of the unconscious supposed to be as long as it is unconscious?
I 190/191
As with hypnosis, it must be also implied here that in neurophysiology the ability exists to produce a conscious thought with precisely this aspect figure. (SearleVsFreud). Then apparently the ontological question "do unconscious mental states really exist?" cannot have any factual substance.
The question can only mean: there are non-conscious neurophysiological states of the brain that are able to develop conscious thoughts and the corresponding behavior.
That was not a point of contention in ontological reality.
Def Awareness: manner of perception of states that are in their mode of existence unconsciously.
Freud thinks that our unconscious minds are at once both unconsciously and intrinsically intentional, even if they are unconscious, they are actually present. They are like furniture in the attic of the mind that we spotlight with the torches of our perception.
I 193
SearleVsFreud:
1. is not to reconcile with what we know about the brain. 2. can I not formulate the comparison between perception and consciousness so that it is coherent.
Regarding 1.: Suppose I go through a sequence of unconscious mental states without having any consciousness, then only neurophysiological processes are playing. What a fact is it now to make that they are unconscious mental states? If we consider what characteristics must have unconscious mental states as mental states: 1. an aspect shape, 2. they must be "subjectively" in any sense.
But how can the unconscious neurophysiology at the times during which it is unconscious have aspect shape and subjectivity?
Freud obviously means that there are also still some description level at which they invariably have all the features of conscious mental states, despite their complete unconsciousness (also intentionality and subjectivity).
I 194
The unconscious has everything the conscious has only minus consciousness. He has, however, not made to understand what might happen in the brain via the neurophysiological events out of events to form unconscious subjectivity and intentionality. Freud's evidence for the existence of the unconscious is always the patient's behavior, that it is as if he was in a certain state of mind. And because we know it independently, that the patient has no conscious mental state of this kind, Freud postulated an unconscious state of mind.
A verificationist would say that this postulate has only one meaning: the patient behaves in such and such a manner, and such behavior would usually be caused by a state of consciousness. But Freud is no verificationist.
It's hard for to find an interpretation which implies no dualism, since Freud does not postulate neurophysiological mental phenomena.
It looks as if this opinion has the consequence that consciousness is something completely externalistic. So nothing much what is linked to any state of consciousness. The analogy between consciousness and perception is an attempt to let the consciousness still fit into the picture.
I 195
We are forced to postulate that consciousness is a kind of perception of conditions and events that have their intrinsic nature unconsciously. However, this solution leads us from bad to worse. In the investigation of introspection we had seen that the model of perception based on the fact that there is a difference between perceived object and perceptual.
If I take away the bike, a perception remains to me that has no object (a hallucination, for example). But precisely this distinction we cannot do in the case of conscious thought.
There seems to be an infinite regress: what about the act of perception: is it a mental phenomenon? If so, it has to "per se" be unconscious, and then I would probably need some higher stage of act of perception of my act of perception to be aware of this act.
I 195/196
Recent problems with this analogy: perception works because the object perceived exerts causal effect on my nervous system. But how can this work in the case where the object perceived is an unconscious experience itself?

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Freud, S. Wittgenstein Vs Freud, S.
 
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II 197
Joke/Freud/Wittgenstein: theory of the joke: the unconscious is the unsatisfactory witht that, the hypothetical. When we laugh, without knowing why, we can find out by psychoanalysis, why that is. WittgensteinVsFreud: I see here a confusion of cause and reason. If one knows why he is laughing, he does not know about a cause. Otherwise, the consent to an analysis of the joke that should explain why we laugh, would be no means to find out. The success of the analysis should precisely show that the concerned person agrees. In physics, there is nothing which corresponds to that.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Freud, S. Verschiedene Vs Freud, S. Derrida I 101
Analogie/Artaud: sie kann uns nicht lehren, was ihr Pendant ist. (ArtaudVsFreud).
Derrida I 101
ArtaudVsFreud: die Deutung würde dem Theater seine Heiligkeit nehmen, die ihm zukommt, weil es Äußerung des Lebens in seinen elementaren Kräften ist. - - -
Lacan I 41
LacanVsFreud: gegen Herrschaft des (falschen) Ich. - nicht wo »Es« war, soll »Ich« werden, sondern das »Es« soll enthüllt und erschlossen werden, damit sich das Subjekt von dieser Exzentrizität her als ein Seiendes und Sagendes verstehen und erleben kann.
I 122
LacanVsFreud: nicht "Ich" statt "Es", sondern den Horizont des "Es spricht" neu öffnen und die Wahrheit hinter dem falschen Objektivismus hervortreten lassen. (BarthesVsLacan: es gibt kein "Dahinter". - - -
Rorty V 42
Freud/RortyVsHume: im Gegensatz zu Hume hat Freud unser Selbstbild tatsächlich umgestaltet! Wenn das Ich nicht Herr im eigenen Hause ist, so deshalb, weil es tatsächlich eine andere Person gibt! Das Unbewusste Freuds ist tatsächlich wirksam.
V 43
Es wirkt aber nicht wie ein Ding, das wir in Anspruch nehmen können, sondern wie eine Person, die uns in Anspruch nimmt. Das Ich ist von Gegenstücken von Personen bevölkert, die wir kennen müssen, um das Verhalten eines Menschen zu verstehen. DavidsonVsFreud/Rorty: Aufspaltung wird von Philosophen immer als beunruhigend empfunden. Aber: (pro Freud) es gibt keinen Grund »du glaubst unbewusst, dass p« anstelle von »es gibt etwas in dir, das bewirkt, dass du so handelst, als glaubtest du, dass p« anzunehmen.
(Unbewusstes/unbewusst/(s): „etwas in Dir...“ dann gibt es mehrere Gehirnbenutzer.)
V 62
Rorty: die größte Errungenschaft durch Freud ist der erfreuliche Charakter des ironischen, spielerischen Intellektuellen.
V 63
MacIntyreVsFreud/Rorty: die Preisgabe des aristotelischen »funktionalen Begriffs des Menschen« führt zum »Emotivismus«: zur Auslöschung jeder echten Unterscheidung zwischen manipulativen und nichtmanipulativen gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen. Rorty: er hatte recht, insofern moralische Begriffe wie »Vernunft«, »menschliche Natur« usw. nur aus aristotelischer Sicht Sinn haben.
Def Emotivismus/MacIntyre/Rorty: Werturteile nichts weiter als der Ausdruck von Vorlieben, Einstellungen oder Gefühlen.
V 64
»Vermögen«/Freud/Rorty: (laut Davidson): Freud lässt die Idee der »Vermögen« überhaupt fallen und ersetzt sie durch eine Vielzahl von Glaubens und Wunschmengen.
V 65
RortyVsMacIntyre: diese Kritik hat nur Sinn, wenn solche Urteile auch etwas anderes hätten sein können (z. B. Ausdruck einer rationalen Erkenntnis der Natur). Freud/Rorty: wenn wir uns ihn zu Herzen nehmen, brauchen wir nicht mehr zu entscheiden zwischen einem »funktionalen« aristotelischen Menschenbegriff, der in Sachen Moral maßgebend ist, und der »schrecklichen Freiheit« Sartres.
V 66
Wir können psychologische Erzählungen ohne Heldinnen oder Helden ausfindig machen. Wir erzählen die Geschichte der ganzen Maschine als Maschine, ohne zentrale, privilegierte Teile.
V 67
Würde/Maschine/Menschenwürde/Rorty: nur wenn wir glauben, Gründe haben zu müssen, um andere anständig zu behandeln, verlieren wir unsere Menschenwürde durch den Vorschlag, unsere Geschichten handelten von Mechanismen ohne Zentrum.
V 67/68
Rationalität/traditionelle Philosophie/Tradition/Rorty: glaubt tatsächlich, im tiefsten Innern (auch des Peinigers) gebe es einen Kern der Rationalität, an den ich immer appellieren könne. Freud: nennt das »die fromme Weltanschauung«.
V 69
Ethik/Moral/Psychologie/Rorty: aus einem solchen Streben ergibt sich nichts weiter als das fortgesetzte hin und her schwingende Pendel zwischen moralischem Dogmatismus und moralischem Skeptizismus.
V 70
Was die Metaphysik nicht zu leisten vermocht hat, das bringt die Psychologie (und sei sie noch so »tief«) ebenfalls nicht fertig. Man findet auch bei Freud keine Erklärung »moralischer Motive«.





De I
J. Derrida
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000