Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Adolescence Freud Upton I 126
Adolescence/Anna Freud/Upton: (…) even when adolescents are physically mature enough to perform adult functions such as work and childbearing, they lack not only the psychological maturity, but also the social status and financial resources to perform those functions responsibly. This is because of the extended dependency brought about by social conventions such as the school-leaving age. Indeed, Anna Freud regarded any adolescent who did not experience emotional upheaval as ‘abnormal’ (Freud,
1958)(1).
VsFreud, Anna: However, this image of the troubled or delinquent teenager was challenged as early as 1928(3) by Margaret Mead, who presented an account of the coming of age for Samoan adolescents that showed a very gradual and smooth transition from childhood to adulthood. The debate about storm and stress in adolescents is frequently mentioned in the literature (e.g., Arnett, 1999)(2); however, it seems that very few developmental psychologists still support this view. >Adolescence/Psychological theories.

1. Freud, A (1958) Adolescence, in The Writings of Anna Freud, Vol. 5: Research at the Hampstead
Child-Therapy Clinic and other papers 1956—1965, New York: Indiana University of Pennsylvania.
2. Arnett. JJ (1999) Adolescent storm and stress reconsidered. American Psychologist, 54: 317-26.
3. Mead, M (1928). Coming of Age in Samoa. A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilization.

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011


Upton I
Penney Upton
Developmental Psychology 2011
Drives Bowlby Corr I 229
Drives/Bowlby/BowlbyVsFreud/ Shaver/Mikulincer: [The] new conception of motivation (>Motivation/Bowlby) rendered the Freudian notion of general drives (e.g., libido) unnecessary. Goal directed and goal corrected behaviours are activated not by an accumulation of psychic energy or a desire to reduce drive intensity, but by conditions within a person or the person’s environment that activated behaviour intended to achieve a certain goal state or to avoid threats and dangers.

Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Energy Bowlby Corr I 229
Energy/BowlbyVsFreud/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: Bowlby (1982/1969) rejected Freudian and object relations versions of psychoanalytic theory that conceptualize human motivation in terms of ‘drives’ and view the mind as powered by ‘psychic energy’. Instead, he created a >‘behavioural systems’ model of motivation, borrowed from ethology and cybernetic control theory, according to which human behaviour is organized and guided by species-universal, innate neural programmes (behavioural systems). >Motivation/Bowlby.

Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Justice Freud Rawls I 539
Justice/Envy/Jealousy/Freud/RawlsVsFreud/Rawls: in his explanation of the emergence of the sense of justice, Freud confuses envy and resentment (see Resentiment/Rawls). Sense of justice/Freud/Rawls: Freud notes that the sense of justice arises from envy and jealousy. While some members of a social group are jealously anxious to secure their advantages, the disadvantaged are tempted by envy to rob them of these advantages. In the end, everyone realizes that they cannot pursue each other with hostile feelings without damaging themselves. As a compromise, they agree on equal treatment. Thus, the formation of a sense of justice is a reaction; a transformation of envy and jealousy into a social feeling. Freud assumes that this is learned in kindergarten and other social circumstances.
RawlsVsFreud: this requires that the original settings are described correctly.
I 540
However, in the initial situation of a society to be established, we do not assume that the members are driven by jealousy and envy. When children show feelings of envy or jealousy, we can also assume that they are the result of resentment, i. e. the feeling that has been violated against a principle of justice. (See Resentment/Rawls). (Cf. J. N. Shklar, Men and Citizens, (Cambridge, 1969), p. 49.) Justice/Freud/Rawls: what Freud means is that the energy that leads to the formation of the sense of justice comes from the energy of jealousy and envy and that without this energy there would be no need to create justice.

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011


Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Method Freud Wright I 154
Method/Marx/Freud/Wright, G. H.: Marx shows a clear ambivalence between on the one hand a "causalist","scientistic" and on the other hand a "hermeneutic-dialectic","teleological" orientation. This ambivalence gives rise to radically different interpretations of his philosophical statements. In this respect, it is interesting to compare Marx with Freud, in whose work an explicit, scientifically oriented search for causal explanations often runs counter to an implicit hermeneutic and teleological tendency of his thinking. Both authors make the impression that their thinking was hindered and distorted to a certain extent by the "Galileoism" prevailing at that time in both science and science theory ( the positiveism). (G. H. of WrightVsFreud.).

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011


WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Method Marx Wright I 154
Method/Marx/Freud/Wright, G. H.: Marx shows a clear ambivalence between a "causalist", "scientistic" and on the other hand a "hermeneutic-dialectic","teleological" orientation. This ambivalence gives rise to radically different interpretations of his philosophical statements. In this respect, it is interesting to compare Marx with Freud, whose work often contravenes an explicit, scientifically oriented search for causal explanations with an implicit hermeneutic and teleological tendency of his thinking. Both authors make the impression that their thinking was hindered and distorted to a certain extent by the "Galileoism" prevailing at that time in both science and science theory (positivism). (G. H. von WrightVsFreud.).

Marx I
Karl Marx
Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957


WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Motivation Bowlby Corr I 228
Motivation/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: BowlbyVsFreud: In explaining the motivational bases of personality development, Bowlby (1982/1969)(1) rejected Freudian and object relations versions of psychoanalytic theory that conceptualize human motivation in terms of ‘drives’ and view the mind as powered by ‘psychic energy’. Instead, he created a ‘behavioural systems’ model of motivation, borrowed from ethology and cybernetic control theory, according to which human behaviour is organized and guided by species-universal, innate neural programmes (>behavioural systems). These attachment, care-giving, exploration and sexual systems facilitate the satisfaction of fundamental human needs and thereby increase the likelihood of survival, adjustment and reproduction. Motivation: Bowlby (1982/1969)(1) viewed the systems as ‘goal directed’ and ‘goal corrected’ (i.e., corrected by changing sub-goals based on feedback about goal non-attainment). Each system was conceptualized as a servomechanism that could be turned on, or ‘activated’, by certain stimuli or situations and ‘deactivated’ or ‘terminated’ by other stimuli and situations (basically, by the attainment of what Bowlby called ‘set-goals’, which in the case of the attachment system include escape from and avoidance of threats and dangers).
Corr I 229
BowlbyVsFreud: This new conception of motivation rendered the Freudian notion of general drives (e.g., libido) unnecessary. Goal directed and goal corrected behaviours are activated not by an accumulation of psychic energy or a desire to reduce drive intensity, but by conditions within a person or the person’s environment that activated behaviour intended to achieve a certain goal state or to avoid threats and dangers.

1. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969)


Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Psychoanalysis Beauvoir Brocker I 298
Psychoanalysis/Beauvoir: The fact that the human body is fundamentally embedded in a culturally symbolic context leads to an examination of classical psychoanalysis and the gender model, as Freud derives this from the positioning of the male and female individual in the Oedipus complex. BeauvoirVsFreud: What Freud describes as a universal psychological mechanism, is understood by Beauvoir as a theory of socialization that traces a historically specific inculturation of the sexes. The superiority of the Father and the value of the phallus are social facts in a patriarchal society. Thus, the psychoanalytic approach shifts "inwards", as it were, what "outwards" is; it maps social relationships to psychic structures and derives a regularity from a description.
Brocker I 299
Beauvoir: (Context: the anatomical difference of the human sexes): Of course, anatomy is not already destiny, for "only within the situation grasped in its totality, anatomical privilege establishes a human one. Psychoanalysis can only find its truth in a historical context" (1). See BeauvoirVsEngels.

1. Simone de Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe, Paris 1949. Dt.: Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht. Sitte und Sexus der Frau, Reinbek 2005 (zuerst 1951), S. 73.


Friederike Kuster, „Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht (1949)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Psychology Pinker I 87
PinkerVsFreud: the brain is not functioning due to some pressure, but it will generate it as a tactic of dealing with issues.

Pi I
St. Pinker
How the Mind Works, New York 1997
German Edition:
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

Psychology Wittgenstein II 194
Art/Beauty/Wittgenstein: in what sense is the aesthetic investigation a matter of psychology? Pain and joy do not belong on the same scale! The scale from "boiling hot" to "ice-cold" is also not a degree scale. These are differences of the kind.
II 195
Psychology/Aesthetics/Wittgenstein: while we are interested in causal connections in psychology, in aesthetic examination they are precisely what we are not interested in! This is the main difference. Causality/Terminology/Wittgenstein/(s): Wittgenstein gives reasons here, not cause causally.
II 196
Cause/Psychology/Wittgenstein: the reasons for satisfaction you give have nothing to do with psychology. It is a juxtaposition of things like in court. Psychological reasons would not be aesthetic reasons. It would not be reasons, it would be causes. One reason to claim that would be to make a hypothesis.
As far as the means to make a door that is too bulky on the upper end more pleasant resembles a means against headaches, it is not a question of aesthetics.
II 197
Psychology/Freud/Wittgenstein: E.g. correlation between the position of the fetus, and our sleep. Although this looks like a causal connection, it is not, because here we cannot perform a psychological experiment. Freud's explanation does the same as an aesthetic explanation: it brings two factors together.
II 197
Psychology/Joke/WittgensteinVsFreud: confusion between reason and cause. Laughter has a reason - otherwise consent to the analysis would be no way to find out the cause. Cause/Physics: is not about consent - also causes of laughter can be detected, but not by consent, but by experiment. for aesthetic investigation consent is also needed.
II 200
Psychology/Wittgenstein: my examination is not psychological, although a sentence is dead in a certain sense until it is understood. If there was no understanding of the signs, we would not call the signs language.
II 30
Colours/Wittgenstein: the colour octahedron is used in psychology. In reality, however, it does not belong to psychology, but to grammar. We can speak of a greenish blue, but not of a greenish red, etc.
VI 203
Psychology/Wittgenstein/Schulte: (1945 49): attempts to classify psychological terms: experiences, emotions, beliefs.
VI 205
They are terms of everyday life
IV 41
Def Epistemology/Tractatus: 4.1121 is the philosophy of psychology.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Stages of Development Erikson Upton I 14
Stages of development/Erikson/Upton: EriksonVsFreud: thesis: development continued across the lifespan, rather than our childhood experiences determining our adult psychological health. Eight stages of development from infancy to late adulthood, the “Eight Ages of Man” (Erikson 1963(1): 1. Infancy; 2. Early childhood; 3.Preschool; 4. School age; 5.Adolescence; 6. Young adulthood; 7. Middle adulthood; 8. Maturity.
In each stage the person confronts, and hopefully masters, new challenges. Each stage builds on the successful completion of earlier stages. As with Freud’s theory, the challenges of stages not successfully completed are likely to reappear as problems in the future.


1. Erikson, EH (1963) Childhood and Society (2nd edn). New York: Norton.


Upton I
Penney Upton
Developmental Psychology 2011
Stimuli Bowlby Corr I 229
Stimuli/Bowlby/BowlbyVsFreud/Shaver/Mikulincer: reproduction. Bowlby (1982/1969)(1) viewed the systems as ‘goal directed’ and ‘goal corrected’ (i.e., corrected by changing sub-goals based on feedback about goal non-attainment). Each system was conceptualized as a servomechanism that could be turned on, or ‘activated’, by certain stimuli or situations and ‘deactivated’ or ‘terminated’ by other stimuli and situations (basically, by the attainment of what Bowlby called ‘set-goals’, which in the case of the attachment system include escape from and avoidance of threats and dangers).

1. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969)


Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Terminology Adorno Grenz I 14
Adorno/Terminology/Grenz: Physiognomical: expressing
Negating: determined.
---
Grenz I 31
Sociology/Freud/Grenz: applied psychology AdornoVsFreud: "Society is not directly one of human beings, but the relations between the humans have become independent and are overpowering to all individuals.
(Gesammelte Schriften Bd. 8 p. 89).
---
Grenz I 39
Reification/Terminology/Lukàcs/Grenz: Lukàcs familiarizes a broad public with Marx's concept of abstraction in the exchange value under the name of the reification. ---
Grenz I 65
Innervate/Terminology/Adorno/Grenz: innervate means to react subjectively but physically mediated on history, to perceiev the historical state of rationality and subjectivity. > Aesthetic judgments. ---
I 65
Constellation/Terminology/Adorno/Grenz: the historical, which is innervated, is called social or aesthetic constellation in Adorno. ---
Grenz I 69
Tradition/Adorno/Grenz: Tradition is what, as a seemingly natural implication of the possible, projects into the present: the "present oblivion" (Philosophie der Neuen Musik, pp. 117f). ---
I Grenz 129
Positivity/Terminology/Adorno: positivity is conceived as a contradiction of claim and being. ---
Grenz I 195
Aura/Terminology/AdornoVsBenjamin/Grenz: Benjamin's criterion for aura is modified by Adorno. Not the immediate certainty of the authenticity of a single given but its content should make up the aura of a work. This is an extension of the concept. It is necessary because the concept of the subject which produces the real is inscribed in the concept of authenticity. ---
XII 118
World view/Adorno: ideas of the essence and of the connection of things, which measure themselves with the subjective need for unity, after explanation. In other words, the opinion raised to the system. ---
XII 119
While Kant never speaks of "my philosophy", this is done by Fichte, Schopenhauer, and, of course, Nietzsche.

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974


A X
Friedemann Grenz
Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984
Unconscious Searle I 192f
Unconscious/Searle: according to the model of consciousness (pro, VsHeidegger) e.g. hammering is not done unconsciously but aware. There are two differences: conscious/unconscious, peripherals/center . Cf. >awareness.
I 160f
SearleVsFreud: unconscious for him is like fish deep down in the sea (wrong idea of mental constance). They seem to have the same form. Problem: there is a false analogy: consciousness/perception (regress) requires yet another level of description, which does not exist, unconscious on the model of consciousness. What is the ontology of the unconscious, as long as it is unconscious (revolt? hatred of the father?) If I take away the object (bicycle) from the perception, it is a hallucination, but that is what I cannot do in case of conscious thought, to obtain the unconscious.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

World Freud Rorty V 39
Freud/Rorty: belonged like Copernicus and Darwin to those who have decentered our worldview. Freud: "The I is not master in one's own home." > Mechanization of the worldview. ---
V 41
Freud/RortyVsHume: in contrast to Hume, Freud has actually redesigned our self-image! If the I is not master in its own home, it is because there is indeed another person! The unconscious of Freud is actually effective. ---
V 43
But it does not seem like a thing that we can claim, but as a person who claims us. The ego is populated by the counterparts of persons we must know in order to understand the behavior of a person. DavidsonVsFreud/Rorty: Splitting is always perceived by philosophers as disquieting. But: (pro Freud) there is no reason "you think subconsciously that p" instead of "there is something in you that causes you to act as if you believed that p".

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Freud, S. Luhmann Vs Freud, S. Reese-Schäfer II 62
Sexuality: about 1760 important changes: the concept of nature and concept of reason, which make it possible to solve passionate love from the shackles of society. Love threesome, etc. is allowed. And reason can only prohibit what harms other. LuhmannVsFreud: Pseudo scientific.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992
German Edition:
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997

Reese-Schäfer II
Walter Reese-Schäfer
Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001
Freud, S. Pinker Vs Freud, S. I 88
VsFreud "hydraulic model" with overpressure, valve, etc. PinkerVsFreud: but even the strongest feelings do not produce more discharges in the brain. The brain does not work because of some kind of pressure, but it produces it as a strategy for solving problems.

I 552/553
PinkerVsFreud: Oedipus complex: there is indeed actually an explicable phenomenon: Freud makes the mistake of mixing two types of the parent-child conflict. Small children compete for their mother's attention, but not sexually: On the other hand, there may well be sexual rivalry among older children, but not both are fighting for the mother! In many cultures there is a fight for the same women. A father is always in the way of the career of the son.            Men do not want to marry women who may be pregnant by another man. That is where the father's interest in the sexuality of the daughters comes from. Not desire!

I 566
Incest/Pinker: it seems that humans (and many animals) have developed a revulsion in the course of evolution.
I 569
E.g. Unrelated children who grew up in kibbutzim in close contact had an aversion against marrying each other.            People who actually commit incest were often not raised together.
PinkerVsFreud: he reports to have been sexually attracted to his mother while getting dressed. Freud, however, had a wet nurse, which could declare the mother as more remote.

Pi I
St. Pinker
How the Mind Works, New York 1997
German Edition:
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998
Freud, S. Searle Vs Freud, S. I 175
SearleVsFreud: it is clear that we envision the unconscious along the lines of the subconscious. The unconscious in Freud is based on a fairly simple model of conscious states. Like fish deep down in the sea. The fish that we cannot see below the surface, have exactly the same shape when they come to the surface. They are like objects that are stored in the dark attic of the mind. Could there be unconscious pain? >Unconscious.
I 188
Example Suppose we have a case in which we had use for terms "unconscious pain". Shall we say that during sleep actually no pain was present, that it rather only began at opening?
I 189
Or that it continued, was however unconscious during sleep? Searle: here it is not about a dispute with a tangible content. There is simply a different vocabulary to describe the same fact.
Freudians insist that there really are unconscious mental states. The other side says that conditions in which there really are mental states, then surely must be conscious.
I 190
But what facts in the world are to meet these two different statements? E.g. someone crawls under hypnosis around on the floor. After waking up, he turns a seemingly rational explanation: like, that he would have probably lost his watch somewhere.
Question: what is the ontology of the unconscious supposed to be exactly in this moment? What kind of a fact corresponds to the attribution?
Example The reason of the adolescent boy who revolted against the authority of the school is that he hates his father, so they say.
Nevertheless, we have to ask again: what is the ontology of the unconscious supposed to be as long as it is unconscious?
I 190/191
As with hypnosis, it must be also implied here that in neurophysiology the ability exists to produce a conscious thought with precisely this aspect figure. (SearleVsFreud). Then apparently the ontological question "do unconscious mental states really exist?" cannot have any factual substance.
The question can only mean: there are non-conscious neurophysiological states of the brain that are able to develop conscious thoughts and the corresponding behavior.
That was not a point of contention in ontological reality.
Def Consciousness: manner of perception of states that are in their mode of existence unconsciously.
Freud thinks that our unconscious minds are at once both unconsciously and intrinsically intentional, even if they are unconscious, they are actually present. They are like furniture in the attic of the mind that we spotlight with the torches of our perception. >Consciousness.
I 193
SearleVsFreud:
1. is not to reconcile with what we know about the brain. 2. can I not formulate the comparison between perception and consciousness so that it is coherent.
Regarding 1.: Suppose I go through a sequence of unconscious mental states without having any consciousness, then only neurophysiological processes are playing. What a fact is it now to make that they are unconscious mental states? If we consider what characteristics must have unconscious mental states as mental states: 1. an aspect shape, 2. they must be "subjectively" in any sense.
But how can the unconscious neurophysiology at the times during which it is unconscious have aspect shape and subjectivity?
Freud obviously means that there are also still some description level at which they invariably have all the features of conscious mental states, despite their complete unconsciousness (also intentionality and subjectivity).
I 194
The unconscious has everything the conscious has only minus consciousness. He has, however, not made to understand what might happen in the brain via the neurophysiological events out of events to form unconscious subjectivity and intentionality. Freud's evidence for the existence of the unconscious is always the patient's behavior, that it is as if he was in a certain state of mind. And because we know it independently, that the patient has no conscious mental state of this kind, Freud postulated an unconscious state of mind.
A verificationist would say that this postulate has only one meaning: the patient behaves in such and such a manner, and such behavior would usually be caused by a state of consciousness. But Freud is no verificationist.
It's hard for to find an interpretation which implies no dualism, since Freud does not postulate neurophysiological mental phenomena.
It looks as if this opinion has the consequence that consciousness is something completely externalistic. So nothing much what is linked to any state of consciousness. The analogy between consciousness and perception is an attempt to let the consciousness still fit into the picture.
I 195
We are forced to postulate that consciousness is a kind of perception of conditions and events that have their intrinsic nature unconsciously. However, this solution leads us from bad to worse. In the investigation of introspection we had seen that the model of perception based on the fact that there is a difference between perceived object and perceptual.
If I take away the bike, a perception remains to me that has no object (a hallucination, for example). But precisely this distinction we cannot do in the case of conscious thought.
There seems to be an infinite regress: what about the act of perception: is it a mental phenomenon? If so, it has to "per se" be unconscious, and then I would probably need some higher stage of act of perception of my act of perception to be aware of this act. >Perception.
I 195/196
Recent problems with this analogy: perception works because the object perceived exerts causal effect on my nervous system. But how can this work in the case where the object perceived is an unconscious experience itself?

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Freud, S. Wittgenstein Vs Freud, S. II 197
Joke/Freud/Wittgenstein: theory of the joke: the unconscious is the unsatisfactory witht that, the hypothetical. When we laugh, without knowing why, we can find out by psychoanalysis, why that is. WittgensteinVsFreud: I see here a confusion of cause and reason. If one knows why he is laughing, he does not know about a cause. Otherwise, the consent to an analysis of the joke that should explain why we laugh, would be no means to find out. The success of the analysis should precisely show that the concerned person agrees. In physics, there is nothing which corresponds to that.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Freud, S. Verschiedene Vs Freud, S. Derrida I 101
Analogy/Artaud: it cannot teach us what her counterpart is. (ArtaudVsFreud).
Derrida I 101
ArtaudVsFreud: the interpretation would deprive the theatre of its holiness, which belongs to it, because it is an expression of life in its elementary powers.
Lacan I 41
LacanVsFreud: against the rule of the (wrong) me. - Not where "it" was, should become "I", but the "it" is to be revealed and opened up, so that the subject can understand and experience itself from this eccentricity as a being and saying.
I 122
LacanVsFreud: not "I" instead of "it", but to reopen the horizon of "It speaks" and let the truth emerge behind the false objectivism. (BarthesVsLacan: there is no "behind").
Rorty V 42
Freud/RortyVsHume: in contrast to Hume, Freud has actually reshaped our self-image! If the ego is not master in its own house, it is because there is actually another person! The unconscious of Freud is actually effective.
V 43
But it does not seem like a thing that we can claim, but like a person that claims us. The I is populated by counterparts of people we need to know in order to understand a person's behaviour. DavidsonVsFreud/Rorty: Splitting is always perceived as disturbing by philosophers. But: (pro Freud) there is no reason to assume "you unconsciously believe that p" instead of "there is something in you that causes you to act as if you believed that p".
(Unconscious/unconscious/(s): "something in you..." then there are several brain users.)
V 62
Rorty: Freud's greatest achievement is the gratifying character of the ironic, playful intellectual.
V 63
MacIntyreVsFreud/Rorty: the abandonment of the Aristotelian "functional concept of the human" leads to "emotivism": to the annihilation of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations. Rorty: he was right, insofar moral concepts like "reason", "human nature" etc. only make sense from the Aristotelian point of view.
Def Emotivism/MacIntyre/Rorty: value judgements nothing more than the expression of preferences, attitudes or feelings.
V 64
"Ability"/Freud/Rorty: (according to Davidson): Freud drops the idea of "ability" at all and replaces it with a multitude of beliefs and desires.
V 65
RortyVsMacIntyre: this criticism only makes sense if such judgements could have been something else (e.g. expression of a rational knowledge of nature). Freud/Rorty: if we take him seriously, we no longer need to decide between a "functional" Aristotelian concept of the human, which is decisive in matters of morality, and the "terrible freedom" of Sartre.
V 66
We can track down psychological narratives without heroines or heroes. We tell the story of the whole machine as a machine, without central, privileged parts.
V 67
Dignity/Machine/Human Dignity/Rorty: only if we believe we have to have reasons to treat others decently, we lose our human dignity by proposing that our stories were about mechanisms without a centre.
V 67/68
Rationality/Traditional Philosophy/Tradition/Rorty: actually believes that there is a core of rationality in the deepest inner (even of the tormentor) to which I can always appeal. Freud: calls this "the pious world view".
V 69
Ethics/Morality/Psychology/Rorty: such a striving results in nothing more than the continued oscillating pendulum between moral dogmatism and moral skepticism.
V 70
What metaphysics has not been able to accomplish, psychology (no matter how "deep" it may be) cannot accomplish it either. Freud does not explain "moral motives" either.





Derrida I
J. Derrida
De la grammatologie, Paris 1967
German Edition:
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000