Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adolescence | Freud | Upton I 126 Adolescence/Anna Freud/Upton: (…) even when adolescents are physically mature enough to perform adult functions such as work and childbearing, they lack not only the psychological maturity, but also the social status and financial resources to perform those functions responsibly. This is because of the extended dependency brought about by social conventions such as the school-leaving age. Indeed, Anna Freud regarded any adolescent who did not experience emotional upheaval as ‘abnormal’ (Freud, 1958)(1). VsFreud, Anna: However, this image of the troubled or delinquent teenager was challenged as early as 1928(3) by Margaret Mead, who presented an account of the coming of age for Samoan adolescents that showed a very gradual and smooth transition from childhood to adulthood. The debate about storm and stress in adolescents is frequently mentioned in the literature (e.g., Arnett, 1999)(2); however, it seems that very few developmental psychologists still support this view. >Adolescence/Psychological theories, >Egocentrism/Psychological theories, >Egocentrism/Elkind, >Self-Consciousness/Developmental psychology, >Risk perception/Developmental psychology, >Morality/Developmental psychology, >Egocentrism/Elkind, >Youth Culture/Developmental psychology, >Self/Developmental psychology, >Friendship/Developmental psychology, >Peer Relationship/Developmental psychology, >Self-Esteem/Developmental psychology, >Identity/Marcia. 1. Freud, A (1958) Adolescence, in The Writings of Anna Freud, Vol. 5: Research at the Hampstead Child-Therapy Clinic and other papers 1956—1965, New York: Indiana University of Pennsylvania. 2. Arnett. JJ (1999) Adolescent storm and stress reconsidered. American Psychologist, 54: 317-26. 3. Mead, M (1928). Coming of Age in Samoa. A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilization. |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Drives | Bowlby | Corr I 229 Drives/Bowlby/BowlbyVsFreud/ Shaver/Mikulincer: [The] new conception of motivation (>Motivation/Bowlby) rendered the Freudian notion of general drives (e.g., libido) unnecessary. Goal directed and goal corrected behaviours are activated not by an accumulation of psychic energy or a desire to reduce drive intensity, but by conditions within a person or the person’s environment that activated behaviour intended to achieve a certain goal state or to avoid threats and dangers. >Attachment theory, >Behavior. Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Energy | Bowlby | Corr I 229 Energy/BowlbyVsFreud/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: Bowlby (1982/1969) rejected Freudian and object relations versions of psychoanalytic theory that conceptualize human motivation in terms of ‘drives’ and view the mind as powered by ‘psychic energy’. Instead, he created a >‘behavioural systems’ model of motivation, borrowed from ethology and cybernetic control theory, according to which human behaviour is organized and guided by species-universal, innate neural programmes (behavioural systems). >Motivation/Bowlby. Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Justice | Freud | Rawls I 539 Justice/Envy/Jealousy/Freud/RawlsVsFreud/Rawls: in his explanation of the emergence of the sense of justice, Freud confuses envy and resentment (see Resentiment/Rawls). Sense of justice/Freud/Rawls: Freud notes that the sense of justice arises from envy and jealousy. While some members of a social group are jealously anxious to secure their advantages, the disadvantaged are tempted by envy to rob them of these advantages. In the end, everyone realizes that they cannot pursue each other with hostile feelings without damaging themselves. As a compromise, they agree on equal treatment. Thus, the formation of a sense of justice is a reaction; a transformation of envy and jealousy into a social feeling. Freud assumes that this is learned in kindergarten and other social circumstances. RawlsVsFreud: this requires that the original settings are described correctly. I 540 However, in the initial situation of a society to be established, we do not assume that the members are driven by jealousy and envy. When children show feelings of envy or jealousy, we can also assume that they are the result of resentment, i. e. the feeling that has been violated against a principle of justice. (See Resentment/Rawls). (Cf. J. N. Shklar, Men and Citizens, (Cambridge, 1969), p. 49.) Justice/Freud/Rawls: what Freud means is that the energy that leads to the formation of the sense of justice comes from the energy of jealousy and envy and that without this energy there would be no need to create justice. |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Method | Freud | Wright I 154 Method/Marx/Freud/Wright, G. H.: Marx shows a clear ambivalence between on the one hand a "causalist","scientistic" and on the other hand a "hermeneutic-dialectic","teleological" orientation. This ambivalence gives rise to radically different interpretations of his philosophical statements. In this respect, it is interesting to compare Marx with Freud, in whose work an explicit, scientifically oriented search for causal explanations often runs counter to an implicit hermeneutic and teleological tendency of his thinking. >Causal explanation, >Causality, >Teleology, >Hermeneutics. Both authors make the impression that their thinking was hindered and distorted to a certain extent by the "Galileoism" prevailing at that time in both science and science theory ( the positiveism). (G. H. of WrightVsFreud.) >Positivism. |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Method | Marx | Wright I 154 Method/Marx/Freud/Wright, G. H.: Marx shows a clear ambivalence between a "causalist", "scientistic" and on the other hand a "hermeneutic-dialectic","teleological" orientation. Cf. >Hermeneutics, >Teleology. This ambivalence gives rise to radically different interpretations of his philosophical statements. In this respect, it is interesting to compare Marx with Freud, whose work often contravenes an explicit, scientifically oriented search for causal explanations with an implicit hermeneutic and teleological tendency of his thinking. Both authors make the impression that their thinking was hindered and distorted to a certain extent by the "Galileoism" prevailing at that time in both science and science theory (positivism). (G. H. von WrightVsFreud.). |
Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Motivation | Bowlby | Corr I 228 Motivation/Bowlby/Shaver/Mikulincer: BowlbyVsFreud: In explaining the motivational bases of personality development, Bowlby (1982/1969)(1) rejected Freudian and object relations versions of psychoanalytic theory that conceptualize human motivation in terms of ‘drives’ and view the mind as powered by ‘psychic energy’. Instead, he created a ‘behavioural systems’ model of motivation, borrowed from ethology and cybernetic control theory, according to which human behaviour is organized and guided by species-universal, innate neural programmes. >behavioural systems. These attachment, care-giving, exploration and sexual systems facilitate the satisfaction of fundamental human needs and thereby increase the likelihood of survival, adjustment and reproduction. Motivation: Bowlby (1982/1969)(1) viewed the systems as ‘goal directed’ and ‘goal corrected’ (i.e., corrected by changing sub-goals based on feedback about goal non-attainment). Each system was conceptualized as a servomechanism that could be turned on, or ‘activated’, by certain stimuli or situations and ‘deactivated’ or ‘terminated’ by other stimuli and situations (basically, by the attainment of what Bowlby called ‘set-goals’, which in the case of the attachment system include escape from and avoidance of threats and dangers). Corr I 229 BowlbyVsFreud: This new conception of motivation rendered the Freudian notion of general drives (e.g., libido) unnecessary. Goal directed and goal corrected behaviours are activated not by an accumulation of psychic energy or a desire to reduce drive intensity, but by conditions within a person or the person’s environment that activated behaviour intended to achieve a certain goal state or to avoid threats and dangers. >Affectional bond, >Attachment theory. 1. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969) Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Psychoanalysis | Beauvoir | Brocker I 298 Psychoanalysis/Beauvoir: The fact that the human body is fundamentally embedded in a culturally symbolic context leads to an examination of classical psychoanalysis and the gender model, as Freud derives this from the positioning of the male and female individual in the Oedipus complex. BeauvoirVsFreud: What Freud describes as a universal psychological mechanism, is understood by Beauvoir as a theory of socialization that traces a historically specific inculturation of the sexes. The superiority of the Father and the value of the phallus are social facts in a patriarchal society. Thus, the psychoanalytic approach shifts "inwards", as it were, what "outwards" is; it maps social relationships to psychic structures and derives a regularity from a description. Brocker I 299 Beauvoir: (Context: the anatomical difference of the human sexes): Of course, anatomy is not already destiny, for "only within the situation grasped in its totality, anatomical privilege establishes a human one. Psychoanalysis can only find its truth in a historical context" (1). See BeauvoirVsEngels. 1. Simone de Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe, Paris 1949. Dt.: Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht. Sitte und Sexus der Frau, Reinbek 2005 (zuerst 1951), S. 73. Friederike Kuster, „Simone de Beauvoir, Das andere Geschlecht (1949)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Psychology | Pinker | I 87 PinkerVsFreud: the brain is not functioning due to some pressure, but it will generate it as a tactic of dealing with issues. >Thinking, >Mind, >Spirit, >Memory, >Symbol processing, >Problem solving, >Cognition, >Information processing. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Psychology | Wittgenstein | II 194 Art/Beauty/Wittgenstein: in what sense is the aesthetic investigation a matter of psychology? Pain and joy do not belong on the same scale! >Pain. The scale from "boiling hot" to "ice-cold" is also not a degree scale. These are differences of the kind. II 195 Psychology/Aesthetics/Wittgenstein: while we are interested in causal connections in psychology, in aesthetic examination they are precisely what we are not interested in! This is the main difference. Causality/Terminology/Wittgenstein/(s): Wittgenstein gives reasons here, not causes. II 196 Cause/Psychology/Wittgenstein: the reasons for satisfaction you give have nothing to do with psychology. It is a juxtaposition of things like in court. Psychological reasons would not be aesthetic reasons. It would not be reasons, it would be causes. One reason to claim that would be to make a hypothesis. As far as the means to make a door that is too bulky on the upper end more pleasant resembles a means against headaches, it is not a question of aesthetics. II 197 Psychology/Freud/Wittgenstein: E.g. correlation between the position of the fetus, and our sleep. Although this looks like a causal connection, it is not, because here we cannot perform a psychological experiment. Freud's explanation does the same as an aesthetic explanation: it brings two factors together. >Causal relation, >Causality. II 197 Psychology/Joke/WittgensteinVsFreud: confusion between reason and cause. Laughter has a reason - otherwise consent to the analysis would be no way to find out the cause. Cause/Physics: is not about consent - also causes of laughter can be detected, but not by consent, but by experiment. for aesthetic investigation consent is also needed. II 200 Psychology/Wittgenstein: my examination is not psychological, although a sentence is dead in a certain sense until it is understood. If there was no understanding of the signs, we would not call the signs language. II 30 Colours/Wittgenstein: the colour octahedron is used in psychology. In reality, however, it does not belong to psychology, but to grammar. We can speak of a greenish blue, but not of a greenish red, etc. >Colour. VI 203 Psychology/Wittgenstein/Schulte: (1945, 49): attempts to classify psychological terms: experiences, emotions, beliefs. VI 205 They are terms of everyday life. >Everyday language, >Language games. IV 41 Def Epistemology/Tractatus: 4.1121 is the philosophy of psychology. >Epistemology. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Stages of Development | Erikson | Upton I 14 Stages of development/Erikson/Upton: EriksonVsFreud: thesis: development continued across the lifespan, rather than our childhood experiences determining our adult psychological health. Eight stages of development from infancy to late adulthood, the “Eight Ages of Man” (Erikson 1963(1): 1. Infancy; 2. Early childhood; 3.Preschool; 4. School age; 5.Adolescence; 6. Young adulthood; 7. Middle adulthood; 8. Maturity. In each stage the person confronts, and hopefully masters, new challenges. Each stage builds on the successful completion of earlier stages. As with Freud’s theory, the challenges of stages not successfully completed are likely to reappear as problems in the future. >Psychological development, >Adulthood, >School entry, >Adolescence, >S. Freud. 1. Erikson, EH (1963) Childhood and Society (2nd edn). New York: Norton. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Stimuli | Bowlby | Corr I 229 Stimuli/Bowlby/BowlbyVsFreud/Shaver/Mikulincer: Bowlby (1982/1969)(1) viewed the systems as ‘goal directed’ and ‘goal corrected’ (i.e., corrected by changing sub-goals based on feedback about goal non-attainment). >Behavioral system. Each system was conceptualized as a servomechanism that could be turned on, or ‘activated’, by certain stimuli or situations and ‘deactivated’ or ‘terminated’ by other stimuli and situations (basically, by the attainment of what Bowlby called ‘set-goals’, which in the case of the attachment system include escape from and avoidance of threats and dangers). >Situations, >Risk perception, >Anxiety. 1. Bowlby, J. 1982. Attachment and loss, vol. I, Attachment, 2nd edn. New York: Basic Books (original edn 1969) Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Terminology | Adorno | Grenz I 14 Adorno/Terminology/Grenz: Physiognomical: expressing Negating: determined. >Negation/Adorno. Grenz I 31 Sociology/Freud/Grenz: applied psychology AdornoVsFreud: "Society is not directly one of human beings, but the relations between the humans have become independent and are overpowering to all individuals.(1) Grenz I 39 Reification/Terminology/Lukàcs/Grenz: Lukàcs familiarizes a broad public with Marx's concept of abstraction in the exchange value under the name of the reification. >Reification, >G. Lukács. Grenz I 65 Innervate/Terminology/Adorno/Grenz: innervate means to react subjectively but physically mediated on history, to perceiev the historical state of rationality and subjectivity. I 65 Constellation/Terminology/Adorno/Grenz: the historical, which is innervated, is called social or aesthetic constellation in Adorno. Grenz I 69 Tradition/Adorno/Grenz: Tradition is what, as a seemingly natural implication of the possible, projects into the present: the "present oblivion"(2). >History/Adorno. I Grenz 129 Positivity/Terminology/Adorno: positivity is conceived as a contradiction of claim and being. Grenz I 195 Aura/Terminology/AdornoVsBenjamin/Grenz: Benjamin's criterion for aura is modified by Adorno. Not the immediate certainty of the authenticity of a single given but its content should make up the aura of a work. This is an extension of the concept. It is necessary because the concept of the subject which produces the real is inscribed in the concept of authenticity. >W. Benjamin. 1. Th.W. Adorno. Gesammelte Schriften Bd. 8 p. 89. 2. Th.W. Adorno. Philosophie der Neuen Musik p. 117f. --- XII 118 World view/Adorno: ideas of the essence and of the connection of things, which measure themselves with the subjective need for unity, after explanation. In other words, the opinion raised to the system. XII 119 While Kant never speaks of "my philosophy", this is done by Fichte, Schopenhauer, and, of course, Nietzsche. >I. Kant, >A. Schopenhauer, >J.G. Fichte. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Unconscious | Searle | I 192f Unconscious/Searle: according to the model of consciousness (pro, VsHeidegger) e.g. hammering is not done unconsciously but aware. There are two differences: conscious/unconscious, peripherals/center . Cf. >Awareness. I 160f SearleVsFreud: unconscious for him is like fish deep down in the sea (wrong idea of mental constance). They seem to have the same form. Problem: there is a false analogy: consciousness/perception (regress) requires yet another level of description, which does not exist, unconscious on the model of consciousness. >Regress. ((s) Cf. >Perception/Rorty). What is the ontology of the unconscious, as long as it is unconscious (revolt? hatred of the father?). If I take away the object (bicycle) from the perception, it is a hallucination, but that is what I cannot do in case of conscious thought, to obtain the unconscious. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| World | Freud | Rorty V 39 Freud/Rorty: belonged like Copernicus and Darwin to those who have decentered our worldview. Freud: "The I is not master in one's own home." > Mechanization of the worldview. V 41 Freud/RortyVsHume: in contrast to Hume, Freud has actually redesigned our self-image! If the I is not master in its own home, it is because there is indeed another person! The unconscious of Freud is actually effective. V 43 But it does not seem like a thing that we can claim, but as a person who claims us. The ego is populated by the counterparts of persons we must know in order to understand the behavior of a person. >Understanding, >Explanation. DavidsonVsFreud/Rorty: Splitting is always perceived by philosophers as disquieting. But: (pro Freud) there is no reason "you think subconsciously that p" instead of "there is something in you that causes you to act as if you believed that p". >Unconscious, >Morality, >Intention, >Morals, >Behavior, >Ethics. |
Freud I S. Freud Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Freud, S. | Luhmann Vs Freud, S. | Reese-Schäfer II 62 Sexuality: about 1760 important changes: the concept of nature and concept of reason, which make it possible to solve passionate love from the shackles of society. Love threesome, etc. is allowed. And reason can only prohibit what harms other. LuhmannVsFreud: Pseudo scientific. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Freud, S. | Pinker Vs Freud, S. | I 88 VsFreud "hydraulic model" with overpressure, valve, etc. PinkerVsFreud: but even the strongest feelings do not produce more discharges in the brain. The brain does not work because of some kind of pressure, but it produces it as a strategy for solving problems. I 552/553 PinkerVsFreud: Oedipus complex: there is indeed actually an explicable phenomenon: Freud makes the mistake of mixing two types of the parent-child conflict. Small children compete for their mother's attention, but not sexually: On the other hand, there may well be sexual rivalry among older children, but not both are fighting for the mother! In many cultures there is a fight for the same women. A father is always in the way of the career of the son. Men do not want to marry women who may be pregnant by another man. That is where the father's interest in the sexuality of the daughters comes from. Not desire! I 566 Incest/Pinker: it seems that humans (and many animals) have developed a revulsion in the course of evolution. I 569 E.g. Unrelated children who grew up in kibbutzim in close contact had an aversion against marrying each other. People who actually commit incest were often not raised together. PinkerVsFreud: he reports to have been sexually attracted to his mother while getting dressed. Freud, however, had a wet nurse, which could declare the mother as more remote. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Freud, S. | Searle Vs Freud, S. | I 175 SearleVsFreud: it is clear that we envision the unconscious along the lines of the subconscious. The unconscious in Freud is based on a fairly simple model of conscious states. Like fish deep down in the sea. The fish that we cannot see below the surface, have exactly the same shape when they come to the surface. They are like objects that are stored in the dark attic of the mind. Could there be unconscious pain? >Unconscious. I 188 Example Suppose we have a case in which we had use for terms "unconscious pain". Shall we say that during sleep actually no pain was present, that it rather only began at opening? I 189 Or that it continued, was however unconscious during sleep? Searle: here it is not about a dispute with a tangible content. There is simply a different vocabulary to describe the same fact. Freudians insist that there really are unconscious mental states. The other side says that conditions in which there really are mental states, then surely must be conscious. I 190 But what facts in the world are to meet these two different statements? E.g. someone crawls under hypnosis around on the floor. After waking up, he turns a seemingly rational explanation: like, that he would have probably lost his watch somewhere. Question: what is the ontology of the unconscious supposed to be exactly in this moment? What kind of a fact corresponds to the attribution? Example The reason of the adolescent boy who revolted against the authority of the school is that he hates his father, so they say. Nevertheless, we have to ask again: what is the ontology of the unconscious supposed to be as long as it is unconscious? I 190/191 As with hypnosis, it must be also implied here that in neurophysiology the ability exists to produce a conscious thought with precisely this aspect figure. (SearleVsFreud). Then apparently the ontological question "do unconscious mental states really exist?" cannot have any factual substance. The question can only mean: there are non-conscious neurophysiological states of the brain that are able to develop conscious thoughts and the corresponding behavior. That was not a point of contention in ontological reality. Def Consciousness: manner of perception of states that are in their mode of existence unconsciously. Freud thinks that our unconscious minds are at once both unconsciously and intrinsically intentional, even if they are unconscious, they are actually present. They are like furniture in the attic of the mind that we spotlight with the torches of our perception. >Consciousness. I 193 SearleVsFreud: 1. is not to reconcile with what we know about the brain. 2. can I not formulate the comparison between perception and consciousness so that it is coherent. Regarding 1.: Suppose I go through a sequence of unconscious mental states without having any consciousness, then only neurophysiological processes are playing. What a fact is it now to make that they are unconscious mental states? If we consider what characteristics must have unconscious mental states as mental states: 1. an aspect shape, 2. they must be "subjectively" in any sense. But how can the unconscious neurophysiology at the times during which it is unconscious have aspect shape and subjectivity? Freud obviously means that there are also still some description level at which they invariably have all the features of conscious mental states, despite their complete unconsciousness (also intentionality and subjectivity). I 194 The unconscious has everything the conscious has only minus consciousness. He has, however, not made to understand what might happen in the brain via the neurophysiological events out of events to form unconscious subjectivity and intentionality. Freud's evidence for the existence of the unconscious is always the patient's behavior, that it is as if he was in a certain state of mind. And because we know it independently, that the patient has no conscious mental state of this kind, Freud postulated an unconscious state of mind. A verificationist would say that this postulate has only one meaning: the patient behaves in such and such a manner, and such behavior would usually be caused by a state of consciousness. But Freud is no verificationist. It's hard for to find an interpretation which implies no dualism, since Freud does not postulate neurophysiological mental phenomena. It looks as if this opinion has the consequence that consciousness is something completely externalistic. So nothing much what is linked to any state of consciousness. The analogy between consciousness and perception is an attempt to let the consciousness still fit into the picture. I 195 We are forced to postulate that consciousness is a kind of perception of conditions and events that have their intrinsic nature unconsciously. However, this solution leads us from bad to worse. In the investigation of introspection we had seen that the model of perception based on the fact that there is a difference between perceived object and perceptual. If I take away the bike, a perception remains to me that has no object (a hallucination, for example). But precisely this distinction we cannot do in the case of conscious thought. There seems to be an infinite regress: what about the act of perception: is it a mental phenomenon? If so, it has to "per se" be unconscious, and then I would probably need some higher stage of act of perception of my act of perception to be aware of this act. >Perception. I 195/196 Recent problems with this analogy: perception works because the object perceived exerts causal effect on my nervous system. But how can this work in the case where the object perceived is an unconscious experience itself? |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Freud, S. | Wittgenstein Vs Freud, S. | II 197 Joke/Freud/Wittgenstein: theory of the joke: the unconscious is the unsatisfactory witht that, the hypothetical. When we laugh, without knowing why, we can find out by psychoanalysis, why that is. WittgensteinVsFreud: I see here a confusion of cause and reason. If one knows why he is laughing, he does not know about a cause. Otherwise, the consent to an analysis of the joke that should explain why we laugh, would be no means to find out. The success of the analysis should precisely show that the concerned person agrees. In physics, there is nothing which corresponds to that. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Freud, S. | Verschiedene Vs Freud, S. | Derrida I 101 Analogy/Artaud: it cannot teach us what her counterpart is. (ArtaudVsFreud). Derrida I 101 ArtaudVsFreud: the interpretation would deprive the theatre of its holiness, which belongs to it, because it is an expression of life in its elementary powers. Lacan I 41 LacanVsFreud: against the rule of the (wrong) me. - Not where "it" was, should become "I", but the "it" is to be revealed and opened up, so that the subject can understand and experience itself from this eccentricity as a being and saying. I 122 LacanVsFreud: not "I" instead of "it", but to reopen the horizon of "It speaks" and let the truth emerge behind the false objectivism. (BarthesVsLacan: there is no "behind"). Rorty V 42 Freud/RortyVsHume: in contrast to Hume, Freud has actually reshaped our self-image! If the ego is not master in its own house, it is because there is actually another person! The unconscious of Freud is actually effective. V 43 But it does not seem like a thing that we can claim, but like a person that claims us. The I is populated by counterparts of people we need to know in order to understand a person's behaviour. DavidsonVsFreud/Rorty: Splitting is always perceived as disturbing by philosophers. But: (pro Freud) there is no reason to assume "you unconsciously believe that p" instead of "there is something in you that causes you to act as if you believed that p". (Unconscious/unconscious/(s): "something in you..." then there are several brain users.) V 62 Rorty: Freud's greatest achievement is the gratifying character of the ironic, playful intellectual. V 63 MacIntyreVsFreud/Rorty: the abandonment of the Aristotelian "functional concept of the human" leads to "emotivism": to the annihilation of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations. Rorty: he was right, insofar moral concepts like "reason", "human nature" etc. only make sense from the Aristotelian point of view. Def Emotivism/MacIntyre/Rorty: value judgements nothing more than the expression of preferences, attitudes or feelings. V 64 "Ability"/Freud/Rorty: (according to Davidson): Freud drops the idea of "ability" at all and replaces it with a multitude of beliefs and desires. V 65 RortyVsMacIntyre: this criticism only makes sense if such judgements could have been something else (e.g. expression of a rational knowledge of nature). Freud/Rorty: if we take him seriously, we no longer need to decide between a "functional" Aristotelian concept of the human, which is decisive in matters of morality, and the "terrible freedom" of Sartre. V 66 We can track down psychological narratives without heroines or heroes. We tell the story of the whole machine as a machine, without central, privileged parts. V 67 Dignity/Machine/Human Dignity/Rorty: only if we believe we have to have reasons to treat others decently, we lose our human dignity by proposing that our stories were about mechanisms without a centre. V 67/68 Rationality/Traditional Philosophy/Tradition/Rorty: actually believes that there is a core of rationality in the deepest inner (even of the tormentor) to which I can always appeal. Freud: calls this "the pious world view". V 69 Ethics/Morality/Psychology/Rorty: such a striving results in nothing more than the continued oscillating pendulum between moral dogmatism and moral skepticism. V 70 What metaphysics has not been able to accomplish, psychology (no matter how "deep" it may be) cannot accomplish it either. Freud does not explain "moral motives" either. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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