Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Causal Laws | Cartwright | I 10 Asymmetry: causal laws are asymmetrical: cause and effect cannot be interchanged. - By contrast, symmetrical: Laws of Association/Hume: E.g. length of the shadow/height of the mast. - Fraassen: Thesis: asymmetries by explanation are not real. - There is no fact about what explains what. - CartwrightVsFraassen - Association/CartwrightVsHume: not sufficient E.g. malaria control: for distinguishing effective from ineffective strategies. >Association, >Symmetries. I 30 Causal Law/Causal Explanation/Cartwright: causal laws are not transitive - i.e. the causal chain does not have to be determined by a single causal law. >Transitivity. I 32 Causal Law/Cartwright: something that is always the case ((s) universal occurrence, universal fact, "permanence") cannot be consequent of a causal law. - ((s) this is a convention). - Alternatively: universal fact: Alternatively, it could be said that everything is the cause of a universal fact. - ((s) Def Universal Fact/Cartwright/(s): probability = 1.). I 36 Causal Laws/Cartwright: the reason why we need them for the characterization of effectiveness is that they pick out the right properties to which we apply our conditions. I 43 Effective Strategy/Cartwright: can only be found with assumption of causal laws. - Partition: the right one is the one that is determined by which causal laws exist - without causal laws it is impossible to pick out the right factors. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Conjunction | Fraassen | I 83 "Conjunction-objection"/PutnamVsFraassen: a conjunction of theories must transfer truth, but not empirical adequacy. PutnamVsPositivism: therefore there is no positivist substitute for the concept of truth. - PutnamVsAcceptability. PutnamVsRorty. PutnamVsPeirce: two incompatible theories can each be empirically adequate in itself. Problem: the conjunction of two theories need not be believed. Example: one is a correction of the other. >Theories, >Conjunction, >Truth, >Positivism, >Acceptability. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Method | Boyd | Fraassen I 77 Realism/Science/Methodology/Method/Boyd: only realism can explain the scientific activity of the experimental setup (method, experiment). This is needed for the legitimation of intertheoretical considerations. This is to explain the role played by accepted theories in experimental setup. >Theories, >Realism, >Explanation. I 78 BoydVsFraassen/BoydVsAnti-Realism: 1. Principle: (according to Boyd anti-realistic) if two theories have precisely the same deductive observation consequences, then every experimental evidence for or against the one is simultaneously one for or against the other. >Evidence, >Observation Consequences. BoydVs: this is simply wrong as it is stated there, and it cannot be improved either. Empirical equivalence/FraassenVsBoyd: I have a completely different definition of empirical equivalence than he has. >Empirical equivalence. 2. Principle: (according to Boyd accepted by all philosophers): Suppose a scientific principle contributes to the reliability of a method in the following minimal sense: its application contributes to the likelihood that the observational consequences of accepted theories will be true. Then it is the task of epistemology to explain the reliability of this principle. >Reliability, >Likelihood, >Epistemology, >Principles. Fraassen: I also believe that we should agree with that. It is itself a principle about principles. Boyd/Fraassen: they have a special example in mind: (P) a theory must be tested under conditions which are representative of those in which it is most likely to fail in the light of accompanying information if it can fail at all. Fraassen: this is harmless as it is stated there. I 79 Problem: "Accompanying information": I assume that he "understands" here "knowledge" as "light", i.e. as knowledge about the underlying causal mechanisms that are based on previously accepted theories. >Knowledge, >Prior knowledge, >Causal relations, >Causality. Boyd: e.g. Suppose, M: chemical mechanism A: Antibiotic C: Bacterial type L: Theory, which, together with accompanying information, assumes that the population of bacteria develops as a function of their initial population, the dosage of A and the time. Experiment: Question: what must be taken into account when constructing the experiment? 1. E.g. a substance similar to A is known, but it does not dissolve the cell walls, but interacts with a resulting cell wall after mitosis. Then we must test the implication of the theory L which is to be prooved, which does not work in this alternative way. Then the sample should be viewed in such a short time that the typical cell has not yet split, but it is long enough that a large part of the population is destroyed by A (if there is such an interval). 2. E.g. one knows that the bacteria in question are susceptible to a mutation that mutates the cell walls. This leads to the possibility that theory L will fail if the time is long enough and the dosage of A is low enough to allow selective survival of resistant cells. Therefore, another experiment is required here. In this way accepted theories lead to a modification of experiments. Knowledge/Fraassen: we must understand knowledge here as "implied by a previously accepted theory". >Supervenience, >a posteriori necessity, cf. >Morals/Wright. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 Boyd W I Walter Boyd Letter to the Right Honourable William Pitt on the Influence of the Stoppage of Issues in Specie at the Bank of England on the Prices of Provisions and other Commodities London 1801 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Theoretical Entities | Cartwright | I 89 Theoretical Entities/CartwrightVsFraassen: they exist, because there is no real regularity at the level of phenomena. >Phenomena, >Regularity. I 98 Theoretical Entities/Hacking: the experimenter does not believe in electrons because they do not "ensure" phenomena, but on the contrary, because they lead to new phenomena. Cartwright ditto. >Experiments, >Observation. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Antirealism | Fraassen Vs Antirealism | I 18 Realism/Fraassen: this shows that he defines realism quite differently than I do. Realism/Fraassen: I defined it in terms of objectives of science and epistemic attitudes. Accept/Fraassen: Question: Do I have to regard a theory as a whole as true? No: we only consider it to be empirically adequate. VsFraassen/VsAnti-Realism: here it can be argued that what the anti-realist believes about the world depends on what he believes his world to be. Problem: his race might mutate. Then he had to accept conditions like If the epistemic community changes in the way Y, then my beliefs about the world will change in the way Z. Fraassen: if this is supposed to be VsAnti-Realism, you have to assume that our epistemology should provide the same results, regardless of the scope of evidence that is available to us. FraassenVsVs: this is not convincing. I 19 It could only be maintained if we presuppose consistent skepticism. Solution/Fraassen: instead empirical adequacy: i.e. a theory whose models preserve the observed phenomena. And what can be observed, is a function of what is the epistemic community. ("observable-for-us"). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Antirealism | Boyd Vs Antirealism | Fractions I 77 Realism/Science/Methodology/Method/Boyd: only realism can explain the scientific activity of the experimental setup (method, experiment). This is necessary for the legitimation of intertheoretical considerations. To explain the role played by accepted theories in experimental setup. --- I 78 BoydVsFraassen/BoydVsAnti-Realism: 1. Principle: (according to Boyd anti-realistic) if two theories have precisely the same deductive observation consequences, then every experimental evidence for or against the one is simultaneously one for or against the other. BoydVs: this is simply wrong as it is written down like this, and it cannot be improved either. Empirical equivalence/FraassenVsBoyd: I have a quite different definition of empirical equivalence than he does. 2. Principle: (accepted by all philosophers according to Boyd): Suppose, a scientific principle contributes to the reliability of a method in the following minimal sense: its application contributes to the likelihood that the observational consequences of accepted theories will be true. Then it is the task of knowledge theory (epistemology) to explain the reliability of this principle. Fraassen: I also believe that we should agree to that. It is itself a principle of principles. Boyd/Fraassen: has a special example in mind: (P) a theory must be tested under conditions which are representative of those in which it will most likely fail in the light of accompanying information if it can fail at all. Fraassen: this is harmless as it is written down like this. --- 79 Problem: "Accompanying information": I assume that he understands "knowledge" here "light", i. e. as knowledge about the underlying causal mechanisms, which are based on previously accepted theories. Boyd: E.g. Suppose, M: chemical mechanism A: Antibiotic C: Bacterial type L: Theory, which, together with accompanying information, assumes that the population of the bacteria develops as a function of their initial population, dosage of A and time. Experiment: Question: what must be taken into account when constructing the experiment? 1. E.g. a substance similar to A is known, but it does not dissolve the cell walls but interacts with a resulting cell wall after mitosis. Then we must test the implication of the theory L to be tested, which does not work in this alternative way. Then the sample should be viewed in such a short time that the typical cell has not yet split, but it is long enough that a large part of the population is destroyed by A (if there is such an interval). 2. For example, one knows that the bacteria in question are susceptible to a mutation that allows the cell walls to mutate. This leads to the possibility that theory L will fail if the time is long enough and the dosage of A is low enough to allow selective survival of resistant cells. Therefore, another experiment is required here. In this way accepted theories lead to a modification of experiments. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 Boyd W I Walter Boyd Letter to the Right Honourable William Pitt on the Influence of the Stoppage of Issues in Specie at the Bank of England on the Prices of Provisions and other Commodities London 1801 |
| Deduction | Dummett Vs Deduction | I 96 Explanation: DuhemVsFraassen: unification merely fictitious assumption to simplify - DuhemVsDeduction - DuhemVsDeductive-Nomological Model - FraassenVsDuhem: the empirical substructure of the theory should be isomorphic to that of the phenomena -DuhemVsFraassen: that’s only very roughly possible - (Cartwright ditto). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Duhem, P. | Cartwright Vs Duhem, P. | I 89 CartwrightVsFraassen/CartwrightVsDuhem: both eliminate too much! I believe in theoretical entities. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Fraassen, B. van | Armstrong Vs Fraassen, B. van | Arm III 108/109 ArmstrongVsFraassen: Suppose we have good inductive evidence that it is a law that Fs are Gs. What kind of a thing should the law be? Theistic and atheistic view are both logically stronger than agnosticism. Agnosticism/ Armstrong: involves a disjunction, and an excluding one at that! We can not remain in this view. For we have neither a reason to remain in the "theistic" nor in the "atheistic" position. Both are logically possible and the principles of logical possibility that apply here do not tip the scale to one or the other side. They make no distinction between negative and positive statements. Between the presence of a relation between universals and the absence of such. Certainly, the regularity theory is "logically weaker" than the universals theory and therefore "on the safe side". But it’s clear what the "weakness" is. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Fraassen, B. van | Duhem Vs Fraassen, B. van | Cartwright I 96 Fraassen: the empirical substructure provided by the theory, should be isomorphic to that of the phenomena. DuhemVsFraassen: at best, this is possible in very rough approximation. (Cartwright ditto). |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Fraassen, B. van | Hacking Vs Fraassen, B. van | I 93 HackingVsFraassen: he makes no big difference between theories-realism and entity-realism. However, I believe that it is possible - not because of presumed truth - but for different reasons, to be convinced that certain theoretical entities really exist. ((s) Electron/Hacking: we can "spray" them. >Existence/Hacking). |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Fraassen, B. van | Putnam Vs Fraassen, B. van | V 62 PutnamVsFraassen: I believe that those other philosophers are right who represent the thesis, we would not survive if a sufficient number of our beliefs were not true. Reason: the trial and error method does not explain why our theories are observable adequate". --- V 62/63 This can only be explained by reference to characteristics of the interaction between the environment and humans, who explain why the trial and error method is successful. To assume that this interaction produces false theories, would mean to postulate a completely inexplicable series of coincidences. We have leading bealiefs that are derived from many other beliefs. --- V 63/64 E.g. Assuming, some of us have other beliefs than the standard beliefs (>interpretation J): so has "it seems to me that I press the button" in the "bracketed" sense (certain subjective experience) under J like under the "normal "interpretion I, not only the same truth conditions, but also the same interpretation. And the same is also true for "it seems to me, I get the expected satisfaction". --- If only sufficiently many of our leading beliefs are true under the nonstandard interpretation J, we will certainly have success and survive. The leading beliefs are linked under both interpretations not only with the same subjective experience, but they also have the same truth conditions. Cf. >Löwenheim. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Fraassen, B. van | Verschiedene Vs Fraassen, B. van | Fraassen I 47 Empirically Equivalent/VsFraassen: one could argue that theories can only appear empirically equivalent as long as we do not consider their possible extensions. I 48 Different theories must have different empirical significance (empirical import). FN 6 Imperfect Example: Brownian motion: showed the superiority of kinetic theory over phenomenological thermodynamics. The example is imperfect because it was already known that in the long run the two would also differ in terms of macroscopic phenomena. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Fraassen, B. van | Cartwright Vs Fraassen, B. van | I 10 Asymmetry/Explanation/Causality/Fraassen: (The scientific image): Thesis: the asymmetries (by way of explanation) are not real!. CartwrightVsFraassen: I think he is mistaken. But his question is strong and could cause us to abandon certain explanation strategies. Cartwright Thesis: what we do not give up so easily are our strategies for action in everyday life. E.g. spraying marshes with anti-mosquito agents is effective E.g. burning sheets of malaria patients is not. I 89 FraassenVsTheoretical Entities/Cartwright: why should one believe in them?. CartwrightVsFraassen: theoretical entities exist, because there is no real regularity at the level of phenomena. Regularity/Cartwright: Only exists at the level of theoretical entities, not of phenomena. Law/Laws of Nature/Cartwright: their universal applicability does not only explain why the phenomena behave as regularly as they do, but also why we sometimes see exceptions. Van Fraassen admits that. Explanation/van Fraassen: Problem: but from the fact that a bunch of principles ensures the phenomena it cannot be concluded that they are true!. right: E.g. "I think therefore I am". wrong: E.g. "P explains Q. Q is true, therefore P is true". I 92 Electron/Cartwright: Important argument: is not an entity of any particular theory! (Electrons are not theory-dependent!). That means it is not about Bohr’s electrons in contrast to Rutherford’s electrons. CartwrightVsFraassen: I choose an E.g. of van Fraassen to show how we differ: E.g. Cloud chamber/Fraassen: unlike the contrails in the sky, we cannot see anything at the frond of the cloud chamber trail, no matter how well we look. Therefore, there are no theoretical entities. CartwrightVsFraassen: I agree with the premise, not the conclusion. I 93 Theoretical entities/Cartwright: The special thing about explanations that involve theoretical entities is that they are causal explanations (not inferring the best explanation). And existence assertion is characteristic of causal explanations. Cause/Causality/Fraassen/Cartwright: he does not believe in causes. The whole causality is a fiction. I 160 Theory//Fraassen/Sellars/Cartwright: both have extraordinary respect for the theory. Both expect it to grasp the facts about the observable correctly. For van Fraassen, theoretical assertions (about the unobservable) do not have to do that. CartwrightVsFraassen/CartwrightVsSellars: a good theory does not have either! The observation consequences ((s)> observation conditional) can be broadly what we believe to be true, but they are usually not the best we can expect. CartwrightVsFraassen: 2) For me, it is not only about the observable. I suppose theoretical entities and causal processes. This brings me closer to Sellars. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Sense Data | Fraassen Vs Sense Data | I 72 Observation/Evidence/Theory/Fraassen: if a theory is only about the observable, empirical adequacy and truth coincide. But this leads to conclusions about the structure of the observable phenomena and that goes beyond the available evidence. VsFraassen: It might be objected that I have drawn the line observable/unobservable arbitrarily. E.g. Sense data and experiences are also theoretical entities if they are not understood in the context of phenomena in advance. They are even worse, because they come from an armchair philosophy. FraassenVsVs: I am sure that sense data do not exist, but I am agnostic when it comes to the existence of unobservable aspects of the world as it is described by the sciences. (FraassenVsSense Data). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Thomas Aquinas | Hume Vs Thomas Aquinas | Fraassen I 212 Proof of the Existence of God/HumeVsThomas Aquinas/Fraassen: our new view (modern analogy) is not exposed to criticism by Hume (HumeVsThomas Aquinas). Even though regress in causation or explanation must end. I 213 There is no reason to assume that this end (end point) should not be the universe (world) itself (instead of God). Problem: because if the world can only be understood by reference to the will of God, how are we to understand God's will? And if we cannot understand Him, why should we not halt at the universe? VsHume: all counterarguments seem to be based on the assumption that God is essentially different from the universe. God himself requires no explanation or justification. Fraassen: this may be true for God, yet there is a possible counterargument for our case: namely as follows: Explanation/Fraassen: in terms of explanation there is no difference between galvanometers and electrons. Instead: we assume a microstructure (MiSt). Microstructure/MiSt/VsFraassen: demanding a microstructure does not mean appealing to a cosmic coincidence, e.g. that cloud chambers and galvanometers behave like this, is even then surprising if there are theoretical entities such as electrons. Because it is surprising that there should be such a regularity in the behavior of the electrons. If we are not metaphysically minded, we should be glad that our relation to quantum mechanics has brought order in there. Because we do not understand the underlying (prior, not temporal) coincidence. If we then continue to ask what brings the micro-things of the same kind to behave in the same way in the past, present and future, we have a new exaggerated realism. FraassenVsVs: Explanation/regularity/Fraassen: thesis: there are regularities of observable phenomena that need to be explained! Theoretical Entities/Fraassen: the question of why they behave the way they do is a question on a different level than that of explanation. Because then there are two possibilities: a) there is another, still unexplained regularity or b) there is the presumption that our theory can still be improved by being simplified. In neither case the regularities behind the phenomena demand an explanation. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Cause | Versus | Cartwright I 93 van Fraassen: Vs causality - FraassenVs causes - Fraassen per Hume - CartwrightVsFraassen: per causal explanations - Cartwright per theoretical entities |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Causal Explanation | Versus | Cartwright I 93 van Fraassen: Vs Causality - FraassenVsUrsachen - "Fraassen per Hume - CartwrightVsFraassen: per causal explanations - Cartwright per theoretical entities. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 |
| Theoretical Entities | Pro | Field III 8 FieldVsFraassen: Field per theoretical entities - due to greater explanatory power in explaining the phenomena - Cartwright ditto. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| deductive- nomolog. | Versus | I 96 Explanation: DuhemVsFraassen: Unification merely fictitious assumption to simplify - DuhemVsDeduction - deductive-nomological model DuhemVs - FraassenVsDuhem: the empirical substructure of theory should be isomorphic to the phenomena - DuhemVsFraassen: that is more than very roughly - (Cartwright ditto). |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Laws | Cartwright, N. | Cartwright: I have three connected arguments. Thesis 1: The obvious explanatory power of fundamental laws does not speak for their truth. Thesis 2: The way in which fundamental laws are used in explanations speaks for their falsity. We explain by ceteris paribus laws by merging causes by approximations that exceed what the fundamental laws dictate. Thesis 3: The appearance of truth comes from a bad explanatory model, I 4 that connects laws directly to reality. Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum-View"/Cartwright: from explanation: Thesis: the path from theory to reality goes like this: theory > model > phenomenological law. Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are true only of the objects in the model. I 10 Asymmetry: Causal laws are asymmetric: Effect and cause cannot be interchanged. - On the other hand symmetrical: Laws of Association/Hume: e.g. length of shadow/height of mast. - Fraassen: Thesis: The explanatory asymmetries are not real. There is no fact about what explains what. CartwrightVsFraassen - Association/CartwrightVsHume: Association is not sufficient to distinguish between effective and ineffective strategies to fight malaria. I 51 Laws of Nature/Science/Cartwright: Thesis: There are no laws for cases where theories overlap. |
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| Vs Fraassen | Quine, W.V.O. | V 62 Bas van Fraassen s thesis: a successful theory need not be true, but merely "adequate observation." (Correct predictions). V 61 PutnamVsFraassen: I believe that those other philosophers are right: we would not survive if sufficiently many of our beliefs were not true! Reason: the trial-and-error method does not explain why our theories "are observationally adequate." |
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