Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Biopolitics Agamben Brocker I 826
Biopolitics/Agamben: Power analyses that make use of the concept of "biopolitics" focus on the concept of life - and not on the citizen, the subject, the subserviant - and thus focus on the growing current "politicization of life".
Brocker I 827
Agamben now combines Foucault's shifts to biopolitics (1) with Hannah Arendt's shifts to the concept of life. (2) AgambenVsFoucault: he has failed to shift his field of activity to the policies of the great totalitarian states of the 20th century. (3)
AgambenVsArendt: their analysis of totalitarian states lacks the aspect of biopolitics.
Solution/Agamben: Agamben brings the two strands together in the terms "naked" and "holy" life. See Holiness/Agamben, Terminology/Agamben, Life/Agamben, Humans/Agamben.


1. Cf. Michel Foucault, Sexualität und Wahrheit, Bd. 1: Der Wille zum Wissen, Frankfurt/M. 1977.
2. Hannah Arendt, Vita Activa oder vom tätigen Leben, München 1960.
3. Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita, Torino 1995. Dt.: Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben, Frankfurt/M. 2002, p. 127.


Maria Muhle, „Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Agamben I
Giorgio Agamben
Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben Frankfurt 2002


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Body Baudrillard Blask I 16
Sexuality/Body/BaudrillardVsFoucault: his theory of sexuality is obsolete: it does not analyze the simulacra.

Baud I
J. Baudrillard
Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994

Baud II
Jean Baudrillard
Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993
German Edition:
Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009


Blask I
Falko Blask
Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013
Body Agamben Brocker I 830
Body/AgambenVsFoucault/Agamben: While Foucault had still referred to the "bodies and lusts" as a possible antipole to power, Agamben calls for greater restraint.
Brocker I 831
Agamben: the body has always been a biopolitical body and thus a naked life for him. Nor is it possible to restore classical political distinctions such as that between "zōḗ" and "bíos" and thus either attribute the biopolitical naked body to the sphere of "oîkos" or to overcome it in favour of a political body. (1)


1.Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita, Torino 1995. Dt.: Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben, Frankfurt/M. 2002, p. 197.


Maria Muhle, „Giorgio Agamben, Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben“, in: Manfred Brocker (Ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Agamben I
Giorgio Agamben
Homo sacer – Die souveräne Macht und das nackte Leben Frankfurt 2002


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Interest Spivak Brocker I 716
Interest/Desire/Subject/Politics/Emancipation/SpivakVsFoucault/SpivakVsDeleuze/Spivak: Foucault and Deleuze (1) equate the interest and desire of the subject with what is wrong according to Spivak (2): Both ignore the question of subject production, in which desire and interest can neither be described symmetrically nor mutually reinforced. (3) The reason for this can be found in Marx, in a distinction between two types of representation (see Representation/Marx): the political representative of the small farmers is a representative of the middle classes who is not really interested in the fate of the farmers. (4) See Representation/Spivak.


1. Michel Foucault, „Intellectuals and Power. A Conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze”, in: Donald F. Bouchard (ed.) Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault, Ithaca, N.Y. 1977, p. 207f
2. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Cary Nelson/Lawrence Grossberg (Ed.) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Urbana Ill./Chicago 1988 271-313. Dt.: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the subaltern speak? Postkolonialität und subalterne Artikulation, Wien 2008, S. 275-278.
3. Vgl. Morris 2010, 3f.
4. Vgl. Karl Marx, Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, Frankfurt/M. 2007 (zuerst 1852)


Nikita Dhawan, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

PolSpiv I
Gayatri Ch. Spivak
Subaltern Studies. Deconstructing Historiography New York/Oxford 1988


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Philosophy Habermas Rorty III 142
HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsFoucault: their polemic against the Enlightenment turns the back on the social hopes of liberal societies. ---
III 143
Habermas shares with the Marxists the assumption that the true meaning of a philosophical opinion exists in its political implications.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Politics Spivak Brocker I 716
Politics/SpivakVsFoucault/SpivakVsDeleuze/Spivak: According to Spivak, the micropolitics favored by Foucault and Deleuze, which focuses on local forms of resistance, can only be determined by ignoring macropolitical lines of conflict. The two theorists neglected the (Marxist) ideology theory, leading to a view in which the dominated are constructed as classical-humanist subjects who are aware of their social situation. ((s) According to Spivak, they are only limited: see Subject/Spivak, Emancipation/Spivak, History/Spivak).

Nikita Dhawan, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

PolSpiv I
Gayatri Ch. Spivak
Subaltern Studies. Deconstructing Historiography New York/Oxford 1988


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Power Baudrillard Blask I 17
Power/BaudrillardVsFoucault: Power theory: its object has radically changed: no longer as in Foucault in defined areas like state and prison but everywhere. Baudrillard: Power has mutated into mere signs of itself. Foucault can only talk about the power because it has already disappeared. Baudrillard thesis: Power is only there to hide that it is not there anymore. Power should be affirmed without limit, so that it ultimately turns against itself.

Baud I
J. Baudrillard
Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994

Baud II
Jean Baudrillard
Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993
German Edition:
Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009


Blask I
Falko Blask
Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013
Reductionism Baudrillard Blask I 79
Reductionism/BaudrillardVsFoucault: a thinking which considers woman as the other of man's, madness as the other of reason, or the savage for the other of the civilized, is for Baudrillard reductionist, it assumes an inadmissible comparability.

Baud I
J. Baudrillard
Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994

Baud II
Jean Baudrillard
Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993
German Edition:
Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009


Blask I
Falko Blask
Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013
Representation Spivak Brocker I 716
Representation/Political Representation/Marx/Spivak: in reference to Marx' The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852), Spivak distinguishes between two forms of representation: According to Marx, the French parcel farmers do not represent a coherent class,(1) See Representation/Marx. Spivak: now distinguishes between "representation" as "speaking from" and "representation" as "speaking for".(2)
SpivakVsDeleuze/SpivakVsFoucault: for these two authors, the two forms coincide. Thus the aesthetic portrait, which symbolically represents the disempowered as a coherent political subject, becomes a transparent expression of their political desires and interests.
Problem: Deleuze and Foucault presuppose a coherence between interest and desire. See Interest/Spivak.


1. Vgl. Karl Marx, Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte, Frankfurt/M. 2007 (zuerst 1852)
2. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Cary Nelson/Lawrence Grossberg (Ed.) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Urbana Ill./Chicago 1988 271-313. Dt.: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the subaltern speak? Postkolonialität und subalterne Artikulation, Wien 2008, S. 275-278.

Nikita Dhawan, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

PolSpiv I
Gayatri Ch. Spivak
Subaltern Studies. Deconstructing Historiography New York/Oxford 1988


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Subjects Spivak Brocker I 715
Subject/SpivakVsDeleuze/SpivakVsFoucault/Spivak: Spivak criticises Foucault and Deleuze's positions as unintentional Eurocentrism(1): here one sees a complicity between Western knowledge formation and international economic interests. (2) Subject/Foucault/Deleuze/Spivak: Although French philosophers reject the idea of a sovereign subject, since it is unable to do justice to the heterogeneity of networks of power, desire and interest, they argue that the oppressed themselves have knowledge and can speak for themselves.
SpivakVs: they construct an undivided political subject while ignoring the discontinuity between desire and interest. According to Spivak, both authors also neglect the ideological construction of subjects on both sides of the colonial divide.


1. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Cary Nelson/Lawrence Grossberg (Ed.) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Urbana Ill./Chicago 1988 271-313. Dt.: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the subaltern speak? Postkolonialität und subalterne Artikulation, Wien 2008, S. 271, 274
2. Vgl. Michel Foucault, „Intellectuals and Power. A Conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze”, in: Donald F. Bouchard (ed.) Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault, Ithaca, N.Y. 1977, p. 205-217.


Nikita Dhawan, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak “Can the subaltern speak?” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

PolSpiv I
Gayatri Ch. Spivak
Subaltern Studies. Deconstructing Historiography New York/Oxford 1988


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Ultimate Justification Habermas Rorty V 8
Foundation/final justification/RortyVsHabermas: I am distrustful of the remaining fundamentalism, striving for "universality." Habermas celebrates democracy, but he does not justify it. When HabermasVsFoucault raised the accusation of relativism and asked him to expose his "normative standards", Rorty: here I stand on the side of Foucault, who shrugs his shoulders and is silent.
Rorty V 9
World/Language/RortyVsHabermas: VsClaim, that the world-developing (poetic) power of language (Heidegger, Foucault) must be subordinated to the practice of the inner world.
Habermas IV 536
Ultimate Justification/Habermas: I call legal institutions legal norms which cannot be sufficiently legitimized by the positivist reference to procedures. For example, the foundations of constitutional law, the principles of criminal law and criminal procedure law. As soon as they are called into question, the reference to their legality is not sufficient. They require material justification because they belong to the legitimate orders of the lifeworld itself and, together with informal norms for action, form the background of communicative action. See Law/Habermas.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Foucault, M. Baudrillard Vs Foucault, M. I 17
BaudrillardVsFoucault: "Oublier Foucault" (1977). Baudrillard: teilt Foucaults Absage an freudsche und marxistische Theorien von Repression und Befreiung.
BaudrillardVsFoucault: seine Theorie der Sexualität ist veraltet: analysiert nicht die Simulakra. -
BaudrillardVsFoucault: Machttheorie: ihr Gegenstand hat sich radikal verändert: nicht mehr wie bei Foucault in abgesteckten Bereichen wie Staat und Gefängnis sondern überall. Baudrillard: Die Macht ist zu bloßen Zeichen ihrer selbst mutiert. - Foucault kann nur über die Macht sprechen, weil sie bereits verschwunden ist.
I 79
BaudrillardVsFoucault: ein Denken, das die Frau als das Andere des Mannes, den Wahnsinn als das Andere der Vernunft, oder den wilden für das Andere des Zivilisierten hält, ist für Baudrillard Reduktionistisch, es unterstellt eine unzulässige Vergleichbarkeit! BaudrillardVsFoucault: gegen unzulässige Vergleichbarkeit: das Andere der Vernunft gibt es nicht

Baud I
J. Baudrillard
Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994

Baud II
Jean Baudrillard
Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993
German Edition:
Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009
Foucault, M. Habermas Vs Foucault, M. I 317
Will to Knowledge/Foucault: intervenes in the constitution of the scientific discourses. He determines the exception of the rules by which true is distinguished from false. (Power). HabermasVsFoucault: the so disguised origin of the concept of power from the metaphysics-critical concept of the will to truth and to knowledge also explains the systematically ambiguous use of the category "power". On the one hand, the innocence of a concept that can be used descriptively, on the other hand, a constitution-theoretical basic concept which only gives analysis its reason-critical meaning.
I 318
HabermasVsFoucault: paradoxical combination of positivist attitude and critical aspirations.
I 320
Foucault Thesis: Power and knowledge formations form an indissoluble unity.
I 321
HabermasVsFoucault: this strong thesis can certainly not be justified with functionalist arguments alone. Form of Thought Proof: HabermasVsFoucault: he would have to prove that specific power strategies implement themselves in relevant scientific strategies of the reification of everyday language experiences, and thus preempt the sense of using theoretical statements about such constituted object areas.
HabermasVsFoucault: he has not taken up this approach later, otherwise he would have noticed that objectivist approaches no longer dominated the field in the human sciences in the seventies. They compete rather with hermeneutical and critical approaches.
I 322
HabermasVsFoucault: his genealogy appears in a confusing double role: on the one hand, the empirical role of an analysis of power technologies, on the one hand, a transcendental role of the same analysis of power technologies that are supposed to explain how scientific discourses are possible at all.  The forced connection of the idealistic notion of transcendental synthesis with empiricist ontology is not a way out of the philosophy of the subject: the concept of power is taken from the philosophy of consciousness itself!
I 323
HabermasVsFoucault: he turns the truth-dependence of power into the power-dependence of truth without further ado! Power becomes subjectless. HabermasVsFoucault: however, nobody escapes the conceptual constraints of the philosophy of the subject solely by performing inverse operations of the basic concepts.
I 324
HabermasVsFoucault: his genealogy turns out to be exactly the presentistic, relativistic and normative cryptographic pseudo-science it does not want to be! It ends in hopeless subjectivism.
I 325
HabermasVsFoucault: 1) involuntary presenteeism 2) unavoidable relativism of a present-oriented analysis which can only consider itself to be a context-dependent practical enterprise. 3) arbitrary partisanship of a criticism that cannot document its normative foundations. (Foucault is circumstantial enough to admit this.
I 326
HabermasVsFoucault: even the radical historicist can explain power technologies and domination practices only in comparison with each other and not every single one as a totality of itself.
I 327
HabermasVsFoucault: caught up in exactly the self-reference he fought: the truth claims are not limited only to the discourses in which they occur.
I 328
 Even the basic assumption of his theory of power is self-referencing; it must also destroy the validity, the basis of of the research inspired by it.
I 330
HabermasVsFoucault: Foucault’s concept of power does not allow such a privileged notion of counter-power (E.g. the workers). Every counter-power already awakens itself in the horizon of power.
I 336
He fights against a naturalistic metaphysics, which reifies a counter-power. HabermasVsFoucault: but therefore he also has to refrain from answering the question of the normative foundations of his criticism.

HabermasVsFoucault: undialectical! Leveling of ambiguous phenomena - (Foucault admits weaknesses in earlier works)

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Foucault, M. Putnam Vs Foucault, M. V222
PutnamVsFoucault: he investigates with his relativism never clear examples like: peace is better than war. (Similar to Swift, and for the same reason: both are satirists).

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Foucault, M. Rorty Vs Foucault, M. Rorty III 142
HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsFoucault: their polemics against enlightenment turns the back on social hopes of liberal societies.
III 143
Habermas shares with the Marxists belief that the true meaning of a philosophical opinion consists in its political implications.
V 8
Foundation/Final Justification/RortyVsHabermas: I distrust the remaining fundamentalism, striving for "universality". Habermas celebrates democracy, but he does not justify it. If HabermasVsFoucault alleges relativism and challenges him to disclose its "normative standards". >Ultimate Justification. Rorty: here I stand on the side of Foucault, who shrugs and says nothing.
RortyVsFoucault: distrust him when he projects his desire for private Nietzschean autonomy in the public sphere. In this mood he rejects the democratic institutions.
V 20
Cultures/Rorty: have no axiomatic structures. That they have institutionalized norms, actually means the same as Foucault's thesis that knowledge and power can never be separated. If at a certain time at a certain place you do not believe in certain things, you'll probably have to pay for it.
V 21
RortyVsFoucault: but these standards are not "rules of language" or "criteria of rationality". They have the look of officials and policemen. Whoever disagrees, commits the
Def Cartesian fallacy/Rorty: he sees axioms where nothing but shared habits reign.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Foucault, M. Searle Vs Foucault, M. I 217
Cognitive theory: here it is claimed that we would have drawn the conclusion, when we look at a tree from one and then know that he has a back. SearleVsCognitive theory: on the contrary, what we do is simply this: we see a tree as a real tree. >Background/Searle.
The background is not a control system.
SearleVsFoucault: that was the weakness of Foucault's concept of discourse formation (Foucault 1981)(1). He believed just as Bourdieu that rules are of such phenomena, as we discuss here.
Searle: the rules interpret not themselves, to function they really need a background. >Rules/Searle, >Cognition/Searle.


1.M. Foucault Archäologie des Wissens, Frankfurt/M. 1981

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Hermeneutics Foucault Vs Hermeneutics Habermas I 325
FoucaultVsHermeneutics: self-reference is to be eliminated, the horizon is to be explained from basic practices. For example, the prohibition of gladiator battles is not to be traced back to the humanitarian influence of Christianity, but to be explained by the dissolution of one power information by the next.
I 326
HabermasVsFoucault: even the radical historian can only explain power technologies and dominance practices in comparison with one another and by no means each one as a totality from itself.

Foucault I
M. Foucault
Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970
German Edition:
Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994

Foucault II
Michel Foucault
l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969
German Edition:
Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981