Lexicon of Arguments

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Definiteness Field
Books on Amazon
II 226
Definiteness/determined/definition/definite/vagueness/precision/(s)"definite"/Field: we cannot define "definitively true" ("determined", "determinately") by truth - we must conceive it as a reinforcement - solution : Operator: "Definiteness-Operator" - this one is independent of truth-theoretical terms - but there is no physical information which decides - - "determined" as basic concept - rules correspond to those for "necessary" - then the law of the excluded middle applies - it is definitely the case that he is either bald/non-bald - N.B.: it can still be the case then that he is neither definitely bald nor definitely non-bald - because there is no distribution about disjunction. ---
II 229
Definiteness-Operator: is used so that the deflationism can distinguish vagueness from non-vagueness - "strong-true" must be defined with definiteness-Operator. ---
II 231
Vagueness of higher level/Field/VsFine: the definiteness-operator is more natural than the Penumbar - FieldVsPenumbra: unnatural. ---
II 228
Limit/Vagueness/definiteness-Operator/Field: We need the definiteness-operator ("determined") to characterize a certain limit from a limit. ---
II 238
Vagueness/deflationism/Field: "definitive-operator": adds additional conditions to the game under which a statement is definitely true - (s) not merely literal repetition) - referential indeterminacy/(s): then a general sentence only applies to a part - this one is sorted out by the definiteness-operator.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Foundation Simons
Books on Amazon
I 340
Foundation/SimonsVsFine: cannot be made up of individuals of the same category - better R-families - normally include continuants and events (problem: then again no sum can be formed)- generic dependency: Often only something vague is required: E.g. any oxygen molecules. ---
I 342
Foundation/Husserl: explains best what the whole complex holds together. Connection/Husserl: ultimately purely formal - if objects cannot exist without each other, it is pointless to look for a chain.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987

Qua-Objects Fine
Books on Amazon
Simons I 298
Qua-objects/Kit Fine/Simons: x qua F - or x under the description of F. Definition Basis: the underlying object - Definition Explanation/gloss: x qua F is always differentiated from the base - SimonsVsFine: this is too strong, because then one would also have to distinguish "x qua self-identity" from x - also essential properties should not make up the qua. - Only contingent properties are ment to occur in the explanation. - Simons: most qua-objects have incorporated their explanation, not as a property. - (This already exists in Principia Mathematica). - Qua-objects provide an ontological dependency for a conceptual dependency - e.g. fist qua clenched hand. - e.g. statue qua shaped clay - SimonsVs: they do not achieve anything, one cannot form with them new singular terms from old.

Fin I
K. Fine
The Limits of Abstraction Oxford 2008

FinA I
A. Fine
The Shaky Game (Science and Its Conceptual Foundations series) Chicago 1996

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Fine, Kit Lewis Vs Fine, Kit
Books on Amazon
V 43
Kit FineVsLewis/VsA 2: e.g. the counterfactual conditional (co.co) "If Richard Nixon had pushed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust."["Wenn Nixon den Knopf gedrückt hätte, hätte es einen nuklearen Holocaust gegeben"] is true or can be imagined as being true. According to Lewis' analysis the co.co. is then probably wrong because by imagining just a slight change in reality, the effects will not exist. [ist wahr oder kann als wahr vorgestellt werden. Nach Lewis Analyse ist das KoKo dann wahrscheinlich falsch. Denn wir müssen uns nur einen kleinen Wechsel in der Realität vorstellen, der die Folgen außer Kraft setzt.] LewisVsFine: Surely the event or not of an atomic holocaust will strongly contribute to a basing relation or not [sicher trägt das Vorliegen oder Nichtvorliegen eines atomaren Holocausts stark zu einer Ähnlichkeits- oder Unähnlichkeitsrelation bei.]
But the similarity relation (s.r.) which rules over the co.co. is not one of those! Still, s.r. can be a relation for similarity everywhere, but not because it determines explicit judgments, rather because it is a result of many single similarity relations according to particular priorities of evaluation. [regiert, ist keine von diesen! Sie kann dennoch eine Relation für Ähnlichkeit überall sein, aber nicht, weil sie explizite Urteile regiert, sondern eher weil es nach gewissen Prioritäten der Gewichtung ein Resultat vieler einzelner similarity relations ist.]
V 44
w0: e.g. Nixon pushed the button at the time t. w0. This can but does not need to be in our actual world. This world could have deterministic laws, and the world is sufficient for our darkest visions of buttons that are pushed. A nuclear holocaust happens because all connections of the button do work. [kann, muss aber nicht unsere wirkliche Welt (WiWe) sein. Sie habe deterministische Gesetze und sie genügt unseren finstersten Visionen über gedrückte Knöpfe. Ein nuklearer Holocaust tritt ein, weil die Verbindungen des Knopfes alle funktionieren.] There are now all possible worlds where Nixon pushes the button, but those worlds are different from our actual world. Which world resembles our the most? Some are simply squib loads or the missile is simply filled with confetti.
e.g. w1: w1 is exactly like w0 until shortly before t. In the last moment both worlds diverge: In w1 the deterministic laws of w0 are violated.
Lewis: Supposing a minuscule little miracle happens: Maybe some extra neurons in Nixon's brain. As a result, Nixon pushes these extra neurons. The holocaust happens. As such, both worlds are quite different from each other, at least regarding the surface of the planet. ((s) It was only counterfactual in w0 : If he pushes, the holocaust would happen.)
Lewis: so w1 is sufficient for analysis 1 (asymetry by postulate.) (We assume that we are in w0.) It should appear that worlds, like w1 in the basing relation, have more resemblance than all the other worlds in which Nixon would have pushed the button.
[Es sollte sich herausstellen, dass Welten, wie w1 unter der gesuchten ÄR ähnlicher sind als alle anderen Welten, in denen Nixon den Knopf gedrückt hätte.]
Miracle/Lewis: I simply mean the violation of laws of nature. But the violated laws are not in the same world! This would be impossible!
V 45
Miracle: Relation between possible worlds because the laws of a single world are not violated! w2: A second class of candidates of worlds that resemble w0 the most: without any miracle, the deterministic laws of w0 are followed exactly.
Difference to w0: Nixon pushes the button.
Determinism: After this, both worlds are either always or never the same. This is why both are never exactly the same for any period of time. They are even different in the past of a long time ago. [ Sie differieren sogar in der entfernten Vergangenheit.]
Problem: It cannot be stated what can be done in order to make the difference in recent past disappear. It is difficult to imagine how two deterministic worlds an actually be only slightly different over a long period of time. There is too much probability for small differences, which become a big sum.
[man kann nicht sagen, was man tun sollte, um die Unterschiede in der frühen Vergangenheit verschwinden zu lassen. Man kann sich einfach schwer vorstellen, wie zwei deterministische Welten sich überhaupt über längere Zeit nur wenig unterscheiden sollten. Es gibt zu viel Wschk für kleine Differenzen, die sich zu großen summieren.]
Naturally, worlds like w2 are not the most similar world for a world w0 in which Nixon pushes the button. This would lead to infinite backwards arguments.
[sind Welten wie w2 nicht ähnlichste Welten zu einer Welt w0, wo Nixon drückt. Das würde zu Rückwärts Argumenten ohne Ende führen.]
Bennett: co.co. would also be rendered senseless. We do not know enough to know which of them would be true.
To conclude: what we learn by comparing w1 to w2: in the basing relations, a small miracle is needed in order to have a perfect concordance of single facts.
w3: begins like w1: w3 is exactly like w0 until shortly before t. Then a small miracle happens, Nixon pushes the button, but there is no war!
This is because a second small miracle happens immediately after the push. It can as localized as the first one. The fatal signal is erased. Still, Nixon's action has left its marks: his fingerprints on the button, an empty bottle of gin, etc.
V 46
There are numerous differences between w3 and w0, but no one is particularly important. w3: There is more than only small differences, e.g. Nixon's memoirs have no influence on later generations, etc.
But even if it is unclear whether the differences will have strong repercussions it is not important.
[Aber selbst wenn es nicht sicher ist, dass sich die Unterschiede sehr stark auswirken, macht das nichts.]

Schwarz I 51
Counterfactual Conditional/co.co./FineVsLewis: His analysis clearly gives wrong results even with our vague intuitive similarity standards, e.g. "If Richard Nixon had pushed the button, there would have been a nuclear war". Problem: A possible world, in which Nixon pushed the button and an atomic war was started, must then resemble our actual world more than a world, in which he pushed the button, the mechanism failed and nothing happened. But an undestroyed world should surely have more similarities with our world? LewisVsFine: Here wrong resemblance criteria were used. The important categories are those in which his analysis is proven correct. hier wurden falsche Ähnlichkeitskriterien gebraucht. Die richtigen Kriterien sind nämlich die, unter denen seine Analyse sich als korrekt erweist ("Inversion";"Umkehrung"): we need to find out what we now about truth and wrongness of the co.co. in order to ascertain whether we can find a sort of basing relation.[wir müssen sehen, was wir über die Wahrheit und Falschheit der KoKo wissen, um herauszufinden, ob wir eine Art Ähnlichkeitsrelation finden können.] (1979b,43, 1986f,211).
Lewis/Schwarz: this is why his theory of co.co. is more a frame for such theories. Analysis tells us which sort of facts make co.co. true, but it does not tell us for which specific conditionals in specific contexts they are.
[daher ist seine Theorie der co.co. eher ein Rahmen für solche Theorien. Die Analyse sagt uns, welche Art von Tatsachen co.co. wahr machen, aber nicht, welche Tatsachen das für bestimmte Konditionale in bestimmten Kontexten genau sind.]

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005