Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Illusory Correlation Fiedler Haslam I 237
Illusory correlation/Fiedler: Klaus Fiedler (1991)(1) proposed a new account that did not afford any special importance to paired or doubly distinctive information. (FiedlerVsHamilton, FiedlerVsGifford). >Illusory correlation/Smith, >Illusory correlation/Gifford/Hamilton, >Experiment/Gifford/Hamilton. Fiedler (like Smith) explained the illusory correlation effect as a natural consequence of asking people to process skewed distributions of information. In effect, the new models were explanations of the illusory correlation effect rather than of stereotype formation. See also Berndsen et al., (1998)(2), McConnell et al., (1994)(3), Sherman et al., 2009)(4).
Fiedler’s model focused on information loss. iI is likely that much of[the] information will be lost (…).Regardless of whether the information loss is a result of perceptual or memory processes (or both), the effect of the information loss is expected to take a particular form providing that this information loss is random.
Critically, if the information loss is random then on average the same amount of information loss will tend to do more damage to the impression of the smaller group. In the standard illusory correlation paradigm the balance of information about both groups is very positive. It follows that if perceivers had the full set of information they would form positive impressions of both groups. If a proportion of that information is lost about both groups then there may still be enough information to retain a positive impression about the large group, but the positive impression of the small group may decay. ((s) A similar approach that focuses on randomness is found in economics: the Random Walk Theory.)
Haslam I 238
VsFiedler: Problem: it is difficult to judge whether these processes are likely to yield effects that are big enough and rapid enough to explain the illusory correlation effect. It is also the case that the model should predict a rapid decay in the illusory correlation effect when the small group is large. The available evidence, however, is very limited on this point.


1. Fiedler, K. (1991) ‘The tricky nature of skewed frequency tables: An information loss account of distinctiveness-based illusory correlations’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60: 24–36.
2. Berndsen, M., Spears, R., McGarty, C. and van der Pligt, J. (1998) ‘Dynamics of differentiation: Similarity as the precursor and product of stereotype formation’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74: 1451–63.
3. McConnell, A.R., Sherman, S.J. and Hamilton, D.L. (1994) ‘Illusory correlation in the perception of groups: An extension of the distinctiveness-based account’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67: 414–29.
4. Sherman, J.W., Kruschke, J.K., Sherman, S.J., Percy, E.T., Petrocelli, J.V. and Conrey, F.R. (2009) ‘Attentional processes in stereotype formation: A common model for category accentuation and illusory correlation’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96: 305–23.



Craig McGarty, „Stereotype Formation. Revisiting Hamilton and Gifford’s illusory correlation studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Illusory Correlation McGarty Haslam I 238
Illusory correlation/McGarty: McGarty et al. (1993)(1) asked whether the illusory correlation effect was more than a byproduct of passive information processing but might instead reflect an active process of trying to make sense of the stimuli. The approach was built on the ideas of Fiedler (>Illusory correlation/Fiedler; Fiedler (1991)(2)) and Smith (>Illusory correlation/Smith; Smith (1991(3)). McGarty: Question: [are there] ways of interpreting the information presented to participants such that the so-called illusory correlation was actually not a distortion of reality but a fair response to the information presented to participants. (Cf. >Experiment/Gifford/Hamilton).
Thesis: when presented with two groups about which nothing was known prior to the experiment, participants would presume that there must be some difference between those groups and that they would be motivated to discover what that difference was. That is, in the absence of prior information that there was no difference between the groups, we expected the participants to search for a meaningful way to see the groups as in some way different. >Social World/McGarty, >Social World/Bruner, >Social Word/James.
Haslam I 239
Fiedler/Smith: if perceivers entertained the hypothesis that Group A is more positive than negative, then they have ten pieces of evidence that support this hypothesis (i.e., 18 – 8) but only five pieces of
Haslam I 240
evidence (i.e., 9 – 4) that support the alternative hypothesis that Group B is more positive than negative. (Cf. Fiedler (1991)(2) and Smith (1991)(3); >Illusory correlation/Fiedler, >Illusory correlation/Smith). McGartyVsFiedler/McGartyVsSmith: Thesis (McGarty and Turner(1992)(1): rather than simply encoding (or losing) this information, perceivers go beyond the information given in order to refine and sharpen the contrast between the two groups.
Test: if people were expecting that the groups they were viewing were different, then their task was to search for plausible ways to differentiate between the groups. Intriguingly, if this were the case then we should expect to find differentiation when there were expectations even if there was no stimulus information at all. We tested this idea simply by telling participants (a) that there were twice as many statements about Group A as about Group B and (b) that there were twice as many positive statements as negative ones.
Result: When they responded by indicating how they expected group members to behave, there was evidence of significant levels of illusory correlation (such that Group B was represented more negatively than Group A) in five of six tests.
[In a second study] We reasoned that if the illusory correlation effect was produced by reinforcing initial expectations that there should be differences between the two groups, then we should be able to eliminate the effect by reducing the motivation to detect such differences. To examine this idea, we replicated Hamilton and Gifford’s first study (>Experiment/Gifford/Hamilton), but told the participants that the large group (A) was composed of right-handed people and the small group (B) was composed of left-handed people. As predicted, participants’ subsequent responses revealed no evidence of perceived difference between the two groups (i.e., no evidence of illusory correlation) – presumably because they were not looking for differences.



1. McGarty, C., Haslam, S.A., Turner, J.C. and Oakes, P.J. (1993) ‘Illusory correlation as accentuation of actual intercategory difference: Evidence for the effect with minimal stimulus information’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 23: 391–410.
2. Fiedler, K. (1991) ‘The tricky nature of skewed frequency tables: An information loss account of distinctiveness-based illusory correlations’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60: 24–36.
3. Smith, E.R. (1991) ‘Illusory correlation in a simulated exemplar-based memory’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 27: 107–23.


Craig McGarty, „Stereotype Formation. Revisiting Hamilton and Gifford’s illusory correlation studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017