Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Experience Castaneda
 
Books on Amazon:
Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 241
Egoless experience/CastanedaVsFichte: E.g. "Friedrich watches the bees’ means any part of experience (seeing, hearing) has its own subject - the listening I is of shorter duration.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
I, Ego, Self Fichte
 
Books on Amazon
Nozick II 89
I/Fichte: the I sets itself as self-settling. - NozickVsFichte: can we conjure the rabbit from the rabbit? - But pro Fichte: otherwise we would have to assume a preexisting self and again ask for the origin. ---
II 92
Preexisting: if only the last momentary act of synthesis constitutes the self, but reverts to preexisting entities, they would be extinguished when looking into the past because the last act is the synthesis. - Then the preexisting things would not be the I. ---
II 94
Preexisting/Solution/Nozick: the person preexists - but not independent of the act of synthesis. Difference: person/self. ---
Bubner I 108
I/Fichte/Bubner: Action of the self-settling I.


No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Meaning Change Adorno
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty III 103
Meaning Change/Adorno/Dialectic of Enlightenment: Adorno thought that concepts were subject to historic change! Period provides the right concepts for each case. Dissolution of these concepts deprives the period of the right to further existence. Meaning Change/Adorno: E.g. "general validity in contrast to the relative validity" "morality in contrast to intelligence." Even the concepts of the mind, the truth, even of the Enlightenment itself have become animistic magic. (Ricouer: "hermeneutics of suspicion").
---
XIII 208
Meaning Change/Theory Change/SchopenhauerVsFichte/Schopenhauer/Adorno: it is sometimes the case that strictly identical motifs assume completely different meanings. For example, Schopenhauer's philosophy of will is not so far away from the philosophy of action. Nevertheless, even the same concepts, for instance, the absolutely self-imposed principle, which in Fichte is called the subject, and in Schopenhauer will, mean in both truths exactly the opposite. Therefore all the categories that arise from it have a completely different meaning. ---
XIII 237
Meaning Change/Theory Change/Adorno: To do justice to a thinker always means doing wrong to him at the same time. The philosophies require the reflections (...) so that they may come to their own right or possibly to their own wrong.

A I
Th. W. Adorno/M.Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Reality Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
I 264
World/reality/PutnamVsHegel/PutnamVsFichte: both would have asked us to describe the world, regardless of our language, but that is not possible. - How could one assume that that would go?

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Self- Consciousness Castaneda
 
Books on Amazon:
Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 211ff
Self-consciousness / Fichte: all consciousness includes a s.-c. - CastanedaVsFichte: mixing of external reflexivity (in relation to others) and internal reflexivity (the fleeting egos among themselves) - CastanedaVsKant: not apperception, but conversely! - No I is a naked isolated individual, but a collective point of connections - false problem: how to be subject and object of self-reflection at the same time: starts from a false assumption of amonolithic self.
I 231f
Self-consciousness/ Castaneda: is based on the basis of beliefs, that consist of a hierarchy of powers, dispositions and inclinations - lowest levels: metaphysical, self-evident - postulates an infinite number of aspects.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Absolutism Nozick Vs Absolutism
 
Books on Amazon
II 592
Absolute/Jean PaulVsFichte: makes us too familiar with reality, turns us too much into our own product.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Chisholm, R.M. Castaneda Vs Chisholm, R.M.
 
Books on Amazon:
Hector-Neri Castaneda
Chisholm I 43
CastanedaVsChisholm: For him, propositions of the first person are not abstract (eternal) objects, but contingent things. They cease to exist when the person x ceases to exist.
Frank I 330
Self-attribution/Chisholm: Builds on Lewis. Any attribution by others contains a self-reference (implicit). I 331 Consciousness/CastanedaVsChisholm: everybody first refers to their own world (as per Chisholm), but from that does not follow the necessity that every consciousness and every thought are explicitly self-conscious. (CastanedaVsFichte). The first-person perspective is only implicitly contained in a non-reflexive consciousness. An explicit self-consciousness differs from this consciousness, however, if it refers to conscious explicit self-reference. Self-attribution/CastanedaVsChisholm: if every consciousness includes direct attribution, including an I-less, purely world-facing consciousness, then direct attribution can only express a purely objective self-understanding and therefore does not explain self-consciousness. When Chisholm points out that reflection still has to be added, he argues circularly, because this self-consciousness should be explained just by the self-attribution.
I 332
Reflection/self-consciousness/ChisholmVsCastaneda/Grundmann: This does not go to the heart of Chisholm’s argument: this would ultimately reject the insinuation that in the self-attribution a purely external or objective self-reference is articulated. External self-reference: extremely rare. E.g. Mach, Omnibus (see above). Self-attribution/Chisholm: denominates implicit self-consciousness. VsChisholm: However, he fails to explain the transformation from implicit to explicit self-consciousness. Reduction/CastanedaVsChisholm: according to Chisholm, the use of all indicators can be traced back to those of the first person. E.g. the subject attributes itself the property of directing its attention to a book and indirectly attributes to this book the property of being witty and exciting.
I 333
Consubstantiation/CastanedaVsChisholm: the activity of directing the attention is only consubstantiated (implicit) in a determining sentence. Accordingly, the intentional act is not part of the demonstrative thought.
I 338
Attribution/CastanedaVsLewis/CastanedaVsChisholm: should not be monolithic: it is necessary to distinguish between propositional attitude and practitions: "mixed conditionals": E.g. the intention to close the window when I open the door is different from the intention to open the door when I close the window.
I 375
Consciousness/Attribution theory/CastanedaVsChisholm: Problem: distinction between reflective and non-reflective consciousness. This is a semantic pragmatic distinction between thought contents and it collides with Chisholm’s unit syntax.
Fra I 380
Properties/CastanedaVsChisholm: 1) Considers properties to be subjects of predication 2) Quantifies over them - devastating in deontological contexts - too complicated for cumulative quotes.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Fichte, J.G. Kant Vs Fichte, J.G.
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 239f
KantVsFichte: Kant seems to have allowed loose forms of consciousness .. + ... a) On the one hand, Fichtean position: (weaker conclusion): the categories relate to items in, we thought of in experience, which are subordinated to self-awareness(s.c.).
Castaneda: b) but he needs a stronger conclusion: consciousness of objects includes the application of the categories, whether it is a part of a s.c. or not. But for this he must pass from "I think that all my ideas must be able to accompany" to "... accompany"!
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Fichte, J.G. Nozick Vs Fichte, J.G.
 
Books on Amazon
II 87
Synthesis/I/Self/Nozick: which principle should regulate how it works? What creates an array around the original point-shaped act A? Reflexive Self-Reference: Act A has its own aspects: 1) It is an intentional action expressed in the physical production of a sound or character II 88 And 2) localized somewhere, etc. Then again, certain aspects might stand out in the classification, as above. What is it that performs the synthesis? Does the classification principle exist independently of me, the subject? Or is my self synthesized? Who or what then performs the synthesis? Act: 1) let us first imagine acts without agents, then we have a series A1 ... An. These include (but are not limited to) acts that fulfil the schema of the next relation, that unite entities in classification and synthesize them. II 89 2) Now let us imagine a different act A0 of unification and synthesis which brings together A1 ... An and also A0 itself. Form of thought: insertion. A0 is (partly) an act of reflexive self-reference. The act of synthesis of A1 ... An. A0 unites them as parts of the same entity E. Agent view: although there are ways of combining acts without agents, we want to take the "agent view" here. Then, the entity E is the agent of these acts, including A0. If E already preexists independently, it is easy to understand. Then A0 only draws the borderline around E. Synthesis: but if we take the concept more seriously: can we say (afterwards) that what A0 did was the entity E synthesized by A0 itself? I/NozickVsFichte: can the rabbit be pulled out of the rabbit? That would be a Fichtean theory: the self sets itself as setting itself. That seems bizarre, if not incoherent. But otherwise we would have to assume a pre-existing self and in turn ask about the origin. Synthesis: an ongoing synthesis does not accurately determine the character of a subsequent synthesis, even if it is forward-looking, but it can cause what happens later. Nevertheless, the same type of synthesis can, if there are no obstacles, result in a continuous entity. ((s) Vs: How does Nozick know that?). Nozick: there is not a new creative act of synthesis necessary every time when referring to yourself. Nozick: not every act has to redraw the boundaries or involve the drawing of boundaries. One can assume former borders. II 90 Nozick: because the outline of the self in the synthesis is performed according to the principles of classification and entification, like previous syntheses, it is not accidental. That may nourish the illusion of a pre-existing entity.

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Fichte, J.G. Castaneda Vs Fichte, J.G.
 
Books on Amazon:
Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 211
Experience/CastanedaVsFichte: do not need to belong to Is (plural of I) But if they do, so the integration in the I requires unity of the experiences in its possession. Likewise CastanedaVsKant: against the role of apperception, instead: vice versa! Fichte: demands that the unity of consciousness contents transmits itself top down, from the self that experiences itself through experiencing, on the contents, which belong to the non-self. Castaneda: that contradicts the facts of experience and prevents an explanation of animal consciousness. VsFichte: unwarranted mixing of external and internal reflexivity! I 239 Consciousness/Accumulation/Subsumption/Castaneda: assuming the subsumtiven nature of consciousness, lower levels can exist irrespective of the higher levels. CastanedaVsFichte: not every consciousness is self-consciousness. This is the anti-idealistic naturalization of consciousness. The unity of consciousness episode cannot be explained, because this consciousness belongs to a self or I. In fact, the unity of experience in an I requires the unity of any consciousness content! That means if a consciousness episode internally belongs to an I, then the unity of that consciousness is an element in the constitution of this affiliation, i.e. it is an internal requirement of the existence of that I. Castaneda: nevertheless Fichte’s view is still widely spread, even among anti-Cartesian philosophers of our time. Consciousness/Fichte: "Wissenschaftslehre nova methoda, 1798, 1982, p 34" "All consciousness is accompanied by an immediate self-consciousness"...

I 244
Perception/Physiology/Castaneda: in complex cases, a kind of blind physical monitoring arises from finely tuned adaptation. This includes such things as the presentation of stimulus levels. This works even without the emergence of visualizations of the monitoring itself. VsFichte: Then consciousness without self-consciousness would exist (s.c.). Of course there can be recording systems. However, this recording is not identical with s.c. Fra I 331 Consciousness/CastanedaVsChisholm: everybody first refers to their own world (as per Chisholm), but from that does not follow the necessity that every consciousness and every thought are explicitly self-conscious. (CastanedaVsFichte). The first-person perspective is only implicitly contained in a non-reflexive consciousness. An explicit self-consciousness differs from this consciousness, however, if it refers to conscious explicit self-reference.
Consciousness/CastanedaVsFichte: is only a special case of consciousness, it is not present in every consciousness episode. E.g. purely sensitive consciousness, e.g. cognitive, but not self-conscious (>E.g. Friedrich watches the bees). Not only evolutionarily differentiated, but also in adults.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994