Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Explanation | Vollmer | I 228 Explanation / Vollmer: misconception: each cognitive system would have to be more complex than the object that it explains. I 278 Explanation/"too much"/"too little"/Vollmer: a tautological explanation explains too little, an untestable explanation explains too much. >Theories, >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Strength of theories, >Stronger/weaker, >Verification. I 279 Questions/Science/Biology/Evolution/Vollmer: the question "Why?" is in biology always welcome - even if it does not always find an answer. II 58 Why-questions / Science / VollmerVsFeynman / Vollmer: why questions must always be asked - when they are unanswerable, they are therefore not illegitimate. - This shows the relational character of explanations. >Why-questions. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Feynman, R. | Cartwright Vs Feynman, R. | I 19 Science/Cartwright: My image of it is not as pure as that of positivism. It is a jumble of unobservable entities, causal processes, and phenomenological laws. Reality/Positivism/Cartwright: pro: we have no better reality apart from the one we have at hand. Cartwright: Thesis: there is no reality behind the things, which would be described by theoretical laws. Explanation/Feynman: fitting the phenomena into the patterns of nature. CartwrightVsFeynman: What patterns? Nature/Cartwright: is a wild abundance that our thinking does not tame. Things that seem to be the same are not if we look at them up close. I 59 Force/Forces/Composition/Cause/Composition/Causality/Physics/Laws of Nature/LoN/Cartwright: E.g. the mix of electromechanics and gravity is an example of the composition of forces. Forces: are composed vectorially. Is that not a solution for all fears? We then obtain from vector addition the "resultant force". Vector Addition/Cartwright: We add numbers here (that represent the forces). These are calculations. It is not nature that "adds" the forces. For the "component forces" do not even exist! Only in a metaphorical sense. And the related laws must be seen metaphorically as well. The story with the vector addition presupposes that Feynman has forgotten something in his version of the law of gravitation, because it sounds as if the law described the results rather than the components. I 60 Law of Gravitation/CartwrightVsFeynman: should be better be written as follows: instead of ’... exercise ... ": "two bodies produce a force between each other.... (the force according to the gravitational)..." I 161 Refraction/Causality/Model/Feynman: (2nd Volume Berkeley Physics lectures: ~ "...we can now solve differential equations better than in the first semester. Previously, we were only able to find the refraction index for materials of low density such as gases, but during this process the physical principles that produced this index became clear. I 162 Now on the other hand (with differential equations) the physical origin is obscured! (This comes from reflected waves that interfere with the original ones. However, the theory is now simpler. CartwrightVsFeynman: I do not understand what it means for a theory to be "telling a causal story". How does he explain in the first volume that the physical principles produce the refraction? Cartwright: I already know what he does and he is successful in extracting a causal representation from his model. Causality/CartwrightVsFeynman: but I have no philosophical theory about how this is done. Causality/Philosophy/Cartwright: we need a new theory for the relation between causal processes and the fundamental laws. Our old theories are not suitable. Here, neither the covering law approach nor my simulacrum view are of any help. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
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