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Feminism | Butler | Brocker I 743 Feminism/Butler: Problem: when a political movement identifies with the subject identity that poses a problem, a logic of its own develops. "Feminist critique must also understand how the category "wom(en)" is the subject of feminism, created and restricted precisely by those power structures by means of which the goal of emancipation is to be achieved.(1) >Emancipation, >Equality, >Method, >Power. Brocker I 745 Feminism would benefit from a more open and diverse understanding of gender. (2) Brocker I 746 Feminists have criticized that femininity is socially overdetermined, forced into forms that seem to go far beyond biological differences that may be necessary to preserve the species. >Overdetermination. ButlerVsFeminism: Butler asks more radically - not how much of "gender" is exuberant and based on the unjustified exercise of power, but whether the feminist movement should not generally work with the identity determination "woman" without a subject? >Identity/Butler, Gender/Butler. 1. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York/London 1999 (zuerst 1990); Dt. Judith Butler, Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter, Frankfurt/M. 1991, S. 17 2.Ibid. final chap.. Christine Hauskeller, “Judith Butler, Das Unbehagen der Geschlechter“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Multiculturalism | Feminism | Gaus I 257 Multiculturalism/Feminism/Kukathas: One of the most important objections to multiculturalism is that, in seeking exemptions or special rights for cultural groups or religious communities and organizations, it in effect seeks protection for groups whose practices are sexist and highly disadvantageous - if not altogether harmful - to women. Susan Moller OkinVsFeminism: this view has been put most forcefully by Susan Okin (1998(1); 1999a(2); 1999b(3); 2002(4)), who has taken issue with almost all of the most prominent defenders of multiculturalism, and found their commitment to women' s rights and interests wanting. Multiculturalism is in tension with feminism because the two ideas represent political visions that stand some way apart. Equality/PollitVsFeminism: As Katha Pollit puts it, 'In its demand for equality for women, feminism sets itself in opposition to virtually every culture on earth multiculturalism demands respect for all cultural traditions, while feminism interrogates and challenges all cultural traditions' (1999(5): 27). Feminist critics of multiculturalism thus not only ask why groups which do not accord women equal opportunity, or even equal dignity, should be given special rights or protections, but also why the Gaus I 258 liberal state fails to intervene in such cultural communities to ensure that women are not denied education, forced into marriage or made the victims of bodily mutilation. Why should a cultural group be entitled to try to live by its ways if these ways violate the individual rights of their members? ' Education: Why shouldn't the liberal state, instead, make it clear to members of such groups, preferably by education but where necessary by punishment, that such practices are not to be tolerated?' (Okin, 1998(1): 676). Religion: Thus when writers such as Margalit and Halbertal (1994)(6) defend public funding of religious education for ultra-orthodox Jews on the basis of the right to culture, feminists like Okin (1999b(3): 131) ask how this can be defensible when the corollary of this practice is an education for girls that is oriented towards facilitating the religious life of boys. Kukathas: (...) the fact of this conflict does not establish whether one philosophical stance or the other ought to prevail (Kukathas, 2001(7)). Shachar: some writers, however, have tried to argue that multicultural accommodation need not be incompatible with feminist concerns. The most notable contribution to this position has come from Ayelet Shachar, who argues that it is a mistake to think of multiculturalism simply in terms of the granting of 'external protections' to cultural groups. Since individuals are typically members of many groups, the question is how to 'allocate jurisdiction to identity groups in certain legal arenas while simultaneously respecting group members' rights as citizens' (Shachar, 2001(8): 27—8). >Multiculturalism/Shachar. Citizenship/culture/women: other writers have also sought ways to reach some solution to the tension between feminism and multiculturalism. Some have concluded that some form of differentiated citizenship will need to be developed if the claims of women and the claims of culture are to be mediated (Benhabib, 2002(9): 82—104). Others have suggested that a dialogic solution, forswearing the appeal to individual rights or procedural justice, offers a better prospect of reaching an accommodation of cultural values and women's interests (Eisenberg, 2003)(10). 1. Okin, Susan Moller (1998) 'Feminism and multiculturalism: some tensions'. Ethics, 108: 661—84. 2. Okin, Susan Moller (1999a) 'Is multiculturalism bad for women?'. In Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard and Martha C. Nussbaum, eds, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 7-24. 3. Okin, Susan Moller (1999b) 'Reply'. In Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard and Martha C. Nussbaum, eds, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 115—31. 4. Okin, Susan Moller (2002) '"Mistresses of their own destiny": group rights, gender, and realistic rights of exit'. Ethics, 112: 205-30. 5. Pollit, Katha (1999) 'Whose culture?' In Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard and Martha C. Nussbaum, eds, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 27—30. 6. Margalit, Avishai and Moshe Halbertal (1994) 'Liberalism and the right to culture'. Social Research,61: 491-510. 7. Kukathas, Chandran (2001) 'Is Feminism Bad for Multiculturalism?' Public Affairs Quarterly, 15 (2): 83-98. 8. Shachar, Ayelet (2001) Multicultural Jurisdictions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Benhabib, Seyla (2002) The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Umversity Press. 10. Eisenberg, Avigail (2003) 'Diversity and equality: three approaches to cultural and sexual difference'. Journal ofP01itica1 Philosophy, 11 41-64. Kukathas, Chandran 2004. „Nationalism and Multiculturalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
Religion | Nussbaum | Brocker I 906 Religion/Nussbaum: Religions can be granted certain privileges, but only to the extent that the individuals attached to them are strengthened. The freedom of religion may only be secured to the extent that there is freedom to give it up or to change it.(1) Religion/Nussbaum: has an intrinsic value with regard to sensual and identity formation. NussbaumVsFeminism: through a reductionist view of religion (when religion is seen as per se patriarchal and repressive towards women), no solidarity with those who are within a religious community is allowed Brocker I 907 against patriarchal tendencies.(2) >Paternalism/Nussbaum, >Feminism. Religion/Nussbaum: 1. consider each person as a purpose in itself 2. "moral constraint": according to it religion gets a high degree of freedom and protection, but only as long as the practice is compatible with constitutional principles. Interventions in the relation are permitted to protect capabilities. A limit for concessions to religions is given when constitutional or human rights-based fundamental rights (the purpose of which is to protect capabilities) are not guaranteed. 1. Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development. The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge 2000, p. 228 2. Ibid. p. 181f Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
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Feminism | Pinker Vs Feminism | I 611 PinkerVsFeminism/Popular Theories: the assumption that nature is sweet and kind is the basis of many objections to Darwinism. Pinker: bad psychology: thinking is determined by society. bad biology: nature is kind. According to this theory 1) carefree sex must be natural. If men want it more than women, they are neurotic. 2) Allegedly men rape women because they want sex, and not to relieve their rage, then the rape would be less bad. But since rape is bad, the assertion that they just want sex must be wrong. 3) In general what people want should be good. 4) Since beauty is not a sign for the value of a human being, the assertion that people like beauty must be wrong. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
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