Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Aspects | Fechner | Chisholm II 193 ff Two-Aspects Doctrine/Fechner: People have inner (mental) and external aspects (not two sides of the same coin) - they differ only by point of view! (No identity theory) - both do not have to be based on a being - VsFechner: only interesting if yet another sense can be connected to the "inner" - Fechner: being is monistic - but also: FechnerVsMonism: only makes sense if the world is perceived uniformly - as self-appearance, everything is ultimately spirit. >Aspects, >Monism, >Dualism, >Anomalous monism. II 198f FeiglVsFechner: all his examples are basically for external things! (Fechner has seen that himself) - also the interior of the body is physical. - So the crucial difference does not even exist. Fechner: ultimately only metaphorical. Stubenberg, Leopold. Chisholm, Fechner und das Geist-Körper-Problem. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Fech I G. Th. Fechner Ueber die Physikalische Philosophische Atomenlehre Charleston 2008 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
Consciousness | Chisholm | I 112 Consciousness/Chisholm: all my opinions are direct attributions - I am the subject of these attributions, but not their content. >Content, >I, Ego, Self, >Attribution. I/ChisholmVsDescartes: no certain propositions about themselves - existence also not property I am sure of - consciousness defined through self-presenting property - no direct access. I 130 Consciousness/unity/Chisholm: a person who realizes that they see something and realizes that they hear something is also aware that they see and hear something - Outsourcing/Mention/Use - Chisholm: but it is not sure that consciousness is the same. I 133 Self-awareness: goes beyond direct attribution: subject must know that the properties are attributed to itself. >Awareness, >Self-consciousness. I 131f Consciousness/Unit/Kant: the subject does not need to unite the ideas, but it must be able to - self-awareness: a) direct attribution of a property, b) going further: here, the subject must also know that it is the object of direct attribution itself - Accuracy results from observation, many people never observe. II 193 ff Two-Aspects Doctrine/Fechner: People have inner (mental) and external aspects (not two sides of the same coin) - they differ only by point of view! (No identity theory) - both do not have to be based on a being - VsFechner: only interesting if yet another sense can be connected to the "inner" - Fechner: being is monistic - but also: FechnerVsMonism: only makes sense if the world is perceived uniformly - as self-appearance, everything is ultimately spirit. >Aspects, >Monism, >Dualism, >Anomalous monism. II 198f FeiglVsFechner: all his examples are basically for external things! (Fechner has seen that himself) - also the interior of the body is physical. - So the crucial difference does not even exist. Fechner: ultimately only metaphorical. Stubenberg, Leopold. Chisholm, Fechner und das Geist-Körper-Problem. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Fechner, G. Th. | Chisholm Vs Fechner, G. Th. | II 193 Two aspects-teaching/Fechner/Stubenberg: Thesis: people have an "internal" and an "external" aspect; the inner one is "mental". The theory is not merely another name for the identity theory. FechnerVsMonism: only makes sense if the world is also perceived as uniform; as a self-appearance everything is ultimately spirit. II 195 Fechner: Thesis: mind and body or the material and ideal are not ultimately reason and essence, but only different according to position and view or perception. What appears to itself as mental from an inner position, can appear physical to an external person. Diversity of appearance depends on the position. Stubenberg: this is a protagorean position (Man is the measure of all things). II 196 Stubenberg: most interpretations of Fechner’s theory are wrong because they are based on the analogy of two sides of a coin, etc. Fechner: the two aspects of perception are firmly anchored in common sense. II 197 Fechner: there is no need to undermine the mental or material properties, respectively, with essence. 1. "mental" is, what appears to itself. "physically" what appears to someone else. 2. we "have" ourselves in two ways. 3. the identity of the underlying essence. StubenbergVsFechner: "mind" as an internal point of view is only of interest if a sense can be associated with the concept "inner view". II 198 FeiglVsFechner: Problem: All examples only have a clear meaning in the discourse about physical or geometrical objects. E.g. Also the interior of the body is physical. ((s) Thus, the difference at the decisive point does not exist.) II 200 Inner/VsFechner: that has no specific spatial sense. II 202 VsFechner: one could say that at the level of appearance a duality of mind and body arises again. II 204 VsFechner: he does not know himself what the "underlying essence" is. Poor metaphysics. II 206 ChisholmVsFechner: in his thinking there is no place for people. II 209 VsFechner: every part of the body that can be represented cannot be the seat of the soul. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
Idealism | Carnap Vs Idealism | VI 219 Identity/CarnapVsAvenarius: is not a "pure experience", because it is not originally given. VI 29 Identity/CarnapVsFechner: the finding with respect to the body-soul problem remains an empty word, what is actually meant by "underlying" or "inner and outer side." VI 253 Experience/Carnap: Task: Investigation of non-constitutional properties and relations of objects. Knowledge/Marburg School/Natorp/Carnap: the article is "the eternal X", its purpose is incompletable. (> Positions) CarnapVsNatorp: a final number of provisions is sufficient. According to this, the article is not an "X" anymore, but something unambiguously determined, whose complete description admittedly remains incompletable. II 195ff Def Constitution/Carnap: of a concept a from different concepts or objects b and c: the indication of a general rule for how statements that contain the concept a can be reformulated so that they only contain b and c. Construction of the numbers as a model for constitution. The model of the constitution is neutral towards realism/idealism. (CarnapVsIdealism/Realism debate: meaningless dispute over concepts). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
Various Authors | Carnap Vs Various Authors | II 205 Content speech: expressed in pseudo-object sentences (quasi-syntactic sentences). formal speech: uses parallel syntactic phrases. CarnapVsTradition: generally used neither object nor syntactical phrases. To be scientifically useful, the sentences used should be expressed as syntactic phrases in a substantive speech. Carnap: the content of speech must not be eliminated. One must be only aware that they are used to avoid endless pseudo discussion. VI 219 Identity/CarnapVsAvenarius: is not a "pure experience", because it is not originally given. VI 29 Identity/CarnapVsFechner: the finding with respect to the body-soul problem remains an empty word, what is actually meant by "underlying" or "inner and outer side." VI 253 Experience/Carnap: Task: Investigation of non-constitutional properties and relations of objects. Insight/Marburg School/Natorp/Carnap: the article is "the eternal X", its purpose is incompletable. (> Positions) CarnapVsNatorp: a final number of rules is enough! According to this, the article is not an "X" anymore, but something unambiguously determined, whose complete description is admittedly incompletable. II 195ff Def Constitution/Carnap: of a concept a from different concepts or objects b and c: the indication of a general rule for how statements that contain the concept a can be reformulated so that they only contain b and c. Construction of the numbers as a model for constitution. The model of the constitution is neutral towards realism/idealism. (CarnapVsIdealism/Realism debate: meaningless dispute over concepts). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |