Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reliability Theory | Esfeld | I 146 ~ Reliability theory: the correct causal relationship needs not to be known. VsExternalism as being crucial for belief. >Causal relation, >Causality, >Beliefs, >Externalism. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Burge, T. | Loar Vs Burge, T. | Stalnaker II 202 That-Sentence/Psychological Content/Loar: Thesis: psychological content is not always identical to what is captured by a that-sentence. There is only one loose match. Ascription/attribution/content/Principle/attribution principles/ascription principles/Loar/Stalnaker: there are two principles that Loar wants to prove false: 1. equality (Sameness) de dicto or indirect ascriptions implies equality of psychological content. 2. differences de dicto and indirect ascriptions imply differences in psychological content. LoarVsBurge: he accepts these two principles when he says that in normal declarations of conduct we actually attribute broad content. LoarVsBurge: if we negate the two principles, we can avoid assuming that it is further content that we attribute. StalnakerVsLoar: I do not understand his two principles because I do not see how to distinguish the content of normal belief ascriptions from the references of that-sentences. One could at best say a) the expressions (that-sentences) are either the same or different, b) the referencces (the that-sentences) are the same or different. Ad a): then the principles have no sense at all. The 1st principle (that the equality of belief ascriptions requires equality of content) would be wrong if the that-sentences are context-dependent. Loar forbids index words here, but also general terms can be context dependent, then the principle is wrong even for broad content! II 205 Privileged Access/Loar/Stalnaker: Loar's phenomenological argument for his internalism is the privileged access we have to ourselves. We know what our thoughts are about. LoarVsBurge/LoarVsExternalism: privileged access is incompatible with anti-individualism. (Camp: Loar pro internalism, Loar pro individualism). II 206 Loar: Thesis: it is hard to see how I could be wrong about my purely semantic judgment that my thought about Freud is about Freud - provided Freud exists timelessly. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Burge, T. | Stalnaker Vs Burge, T. | II 171 Positive assertion/VsExternalism/VsBurge/VsAnti-Individualism/Stalnaker: how can you define an individualistic analogous to a relational term? II 187 Negative approach/Revisionism/VsExternalism/VsAnti-Individualism/VsBurge/Individualism/Stalnaker: the negative approach has different descriptions: (>terminology): methodological solipsism: Putnam 1975, Fodor 1981a Individualism: Burge, also Fodor 1987 Principle of autonomy: Stich 1983. Thesis: all states and properties that are attributed and described in psychology should be intrinsic states. Behavior explanation: should only deal with properties that are relevant to the causal powers of the subjects. Indistinguishability/theory: things that are indistinguishable in terms of causal powers should not be included in the explanation. II 188 Def Individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically. Important argument: thus it is then not excluded that mental states are individuated because of relational properties. Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomical when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence StalnakerVsFodor: a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers. But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal forces. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis. Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger thesis. StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of strong with the weak thesis. Stalnaker: to eliminate that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content, you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. Example Fodor: Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with the example of a causally irrelevant relational property: E.g. h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with the head up, II 189 t-particle: we call this the same particle if the coin shows the tail. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this differentiation to explain the particle's behavior. StalnakerVsFodor: But from this it does not follow that psychological states have to be purely internal (intrinsic). II 193 Mental state/psychological/internal/head/StalnakerVsBurge: e.g. O’Leary believes that there is water in the basement. Is this state in his head? Of course! ((s) Against: Putnam: refers to the meaning of words such as basements and water). Stalnaker: and in the sense like a mosquito bite on his nose is on his nose. II 194 Narrow content/Stalnaker: is accepted as what is completely internal. Psychology: various authors: say that narrow content is necessary for every psychological explanation. They agree with Burge that normal content is often not narrow. Anti-Individualism/Burge/StalnakerVsBurge: seems to conflict with the everyday understanding that I, when I instead of talking about the world talk about how me things appear that I am then talking about myself. Narrow content/StalnakerVsBurge: it is less clear than it seems what narrow content is at all and II 195 I believed that there is such a great conflict between the individualist and anti-individualist. Narrow content/Stalnaker: 1. in which sense is narrow content at all narrow and in which sense is it in the mind purely internal? 2. Which role shall narrow content play at the explanation of mental phenomena? How is the ascription of narrow content referred to the one of wide content? 3. Do we need narrow content at all for the behavior explanation? Or rather the access that we have to the content of our own thoughts? |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Burge, T. | Newen Vs Burge, T. | NS I 129 VsBurge/VsExternalism/Newen/Schrenk: if supervenience, i.e. a close relation between thoughts and brain states, exists, there cannot be an equally close relation between the thoughts and the community. This is because brain states (in contrast to thought content) are determined regardless of the surroundings and the language community. Namely with view to the activation of brain areas. Supervenience/Newen/Schrenk: no difference in content without difference in the brain states, but not vice versa: the same thought can be implemented through different brain states. I.e. one-sided dependence of thought content on the brain states. Terminology: then they say: thought contents supervene on brain states. Burge's thesis is inconsistent with supervenience. Or rather, the following three statements cannot be simultaneously true: 1) thought contents are determined depending on community and surroundings. 2) brain states independent from... 3) Thought contents supervene on brain states. NS I 130 But if thought contents do not supervene on brain states, it becomes difficult to understand how thought contents can be causally effective. VsBurge: E.g. Twin Earth/TE: if Karl was transported to Twin Earth without even noticing anything, he would have other thought contents. Because the objective content of expressions of thoughts would be different. But that would not cause any difference to the behavioral dispositions of Karl. The content change would be causally irrelevant. Externalism/Newen/Schrenk: Two varieties: 1) for the dependence of the content of statements from the surroundings (Putnam) 2) for the dependence of the thought contents from the surroundings (Burge). VsBurge: if he were to be right, we need a second concept of thought contents, namely a subjective content. (Narrow/Wide) narrow content: only considered in the way it is perceived by the subject. Only it is relevant for behavior explanations. Wide content: as the content is usually interpreted in the language community. It is decisive for what I have fixed myself on by utterances. Externalism: Frege: can there be a wide (objective) content of a thought so that you can understand the causal relevance of this entire content or is the causal relevance only to be understood for narrow (subjective) contents? |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Dretske, F. | Lehrer Vs Dretske, F. | Brendel I 218 Knowledge/Externalism/Internalism/Lehrer/Brendel: (Lehrer 1990b. 252) Thesis: LehrerVsInternalism, LehrerVsExternalism: Both answers to the question of what needs to be added to true conviction in order to obtain knowledge are wrong. (Lager) Solution/Lehrer: Thesis: Connection of internalism and externalism: Def Knowledge/Lehrer/Brendel: Is a rational connection of subjective states and truth, of mind and world. [ist eine rationale Verbindung subjektiven Zuständen und Wahrheit, zwischen Geist und Welt.] Three conditions: 1. Knowledge must be distinguished from accidental true conviction 2. It must be "articulable" in principle 3. The epistemic subject must know and must be able to recognize the difference between information and misinformation. Metaknowledge/Lehrer/Brendel: The third condition makes it necessary to have the term "metaknowledge". LehrerVsExternalism: Cannot represent metaknowledge (to recognize misinformation in light of my knowledge of information). LehrerVsDretske: Creating information is not a sufficient condition for knowledge; It also needs to know that the information is correct, e.g. defective measuring instruments do not lead to knowledge. I 219 Important argument: the temperature can coincidentally match the one indicated on the display of the defective measuring instrument. Solution/Lehrer: We need background information (e.g. barn facades) LehrerVsReliability theory: There would not be knowledge there as well. Reliability theoryVsVs: this is only valid for causal theories, die die r.th. selber ablehnt. Causal Theory/c.th.Lehrer/Brendel: It exceeds c.th. if Lehrer demands that the subject can recognize wrong information. LehrerVsExternalism/Brendel: By recognizing misinformation any variety of externalism must be rejected as well. |
Lehr I K. Lehrer Theory of Knowledge Oxford 1990 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Externalism | Davidson Vs Externalism | I (d) 72 VsExternalism: In many cases, it is assumed that the externalism which refers to facts that lie outside the mind and may be unknown to the person concerned, cannot be reconciled with the authority of the first person. Putnam: meanings are not in the head, after all. The same is true for thoughts in general, in his opinion. (likewise Searle) DavidsonVs: This conclusion is not valid, at least not for my externalism. Which are the factors that determine the content of the thought of another person must be found out by the interpreter on the basis of indirect evidence, or suspected correctly. But because these factors determine both the content of this thought as well as the content of the thought that one believes to have, there is no room for errors regarding the content of one’s thoughts in the way they may arise for other thoughts. Frank I 660 DavidsonVsExternalism: those who believe that the contents of our thoughts are often determined by factors of which we know nothing, have of course noticed that if they were right, the Cartesianism of self-assurance and the Fregean notion of the thoughts that are thought completely must be wrong. But they have barely made an attempt to solve the conflict with the strong intuition that we do have the authority of the first person indeed. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Externalism | Putnam Vs Externalism | V 75 Putnam: per internalism. (Coherence) VsCorrespondence. Thesis: it is about compliance with our belief system, not with mental independent or speech independent "issues". (Metaphysical realism). --- V 76 Brains in a Vat/BIV/internalism/Putnam: the whole problem will be solved when you look at it from internalism. From whose point of view is the story actually told? Obviously not from the viewpoint of the sentient beings in this world. Externalism (PutnamVs): viewed from here, the problem cannot be so easily solved. --- V 77 Nevertheless: if we are really brains in a vat, we cannot think that we are, except in the bracketed sense, and this bracketed thought does not have reference conditions that would make it true. So it is not possible here that we are brains in a vat. Magical theory of reference: we would have to presuppose "noetic rays" or "self-identifying objects", and the realism does not want that, of course. --- V 78 Externalism: popular answer today: although there is no sign that corresponds necessarily with certain things, there are contextual (causal) connections. PutnamVs. E.g. "Electron" is contextually related to textbooks, but it does not refer to textbooks. The externalism will respond that this was no causal chain of the appropriate type. PutnamVs: but how can we have intentions that determine which causal chains are "appropriate", if we do not already refer to something? Internalism: here the situation is quite different: characters are used within the conceptual scheme of a community. Objects and characters are equally internal elements of the scheme, so it is possible to specify what corresponds to what. (> conceptual scheme). Within a language, it is trivial, what "rabbit" refers to: to rabbits, of course. --- V 79 Externalism: is of course also of the opinion that "rabbit" refers to rabbits, and "alien" to an element of the set of aliens. But this is no information for him what reference is. For him, it is a problem to find out what reference actually is. PutnamVsExternalism: the idea that a causal connection is necessary, is refuted by the fact that "alien" certainly refers to aliens no matter if we have ever been interrelated with them or not. Yes, even in such simple words as "horse" or "rabbit" the externalist could have noted that the extension includes many things with which we are not causally related (E.g. future horses or rabbits that live in the deep forest and have not seen a human yet). --- I (f) 158 PutnamVsExternal Realism/VsExternalism: E.g. textbooks are the main cause of my beliefs about electrons, but my use of "electron" does not refer to textbooks. RealismVs: this is not the "correct causal chain". VsRealism: but how could we have intentions that determine which causal chains: are of the right kind, if we were not already be able to refer? I (f) 160 InternalismVsExternalism: "of the same kind" does not make sense outside the category system. In some respects, finally everything is "of the same kind" as anything else. The whole apparatus of "correct causal chains and facts that make that future horses belong to the same kind" as the "with whom I have interacted" are far too complicated. There are simply horses. (Metaphysical position). InternalismVsExternalism: in a certain sense, the world is actually made of "self-identifying objects" but not in a sense that is accessible to the externalists. If "objects" are made as discovered, as well as products of our conceptual invention as the "objective" factor in the experience, then objects belong intrinsically to certain labels. I (f) 161 Because these labels were initially our tools to construct a version of the world with such objects. But this kind of "self-identifying objects" is not mentally independent. Realism/externalism: wants to imagine a world of objects that are at the same time mentally independent and self-identifying. Internalism/VsExternalism: one cannot do that. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Externalism | Stalnaker Vs Externalism | II 170 Externalism/Stalnaker: this had amazing paradoxical consequences: 1. If what we think is not in the head we cannot know what we mean or think. Or at least not have the authority of the first person. Note: not necessarily: what follows is that the intrinsic state is not authoritative which means it does not follow that if the head of someone is in an intrinsic state that he has a certain conviction. But this does not mean that he does not have the authority of the first person. 2. The externalism threatens the explanatory role of mental states. We explain the behavior of people in the way that they believe and want something. Problem: how can mental states be causally relevant if they themselves depend on something outside? VsExternalism/Stalnaker: some grant it truth but deny its significance. It would only show that our normal concepts are inappropriate for behavior explanation. This suggests that we need to make only minor revisions. Solution/some: the def "organismic contribution": that is the component which is dependent or supervenient on internal states. VsExternalism/revisionism/terminology/Stalnaker: the revisionist objection against the externalism makes a positive and a negative assertion. a) negative assertion: there can be no behavior explanation which is not individualistic (non-externalist). b) positive assertion: although the normal psychological concepts are not individualistic, they can be reinterpreted to preserve the structure of intentional explanation. narrow content/Stalnaker: first, I examine a very simple causal analogue of the narrow content: a "narrow footprint". Example normal footprint: is a causal-relational concept. Something is a footprint by virtue of the manner in which it was created. It is not with the sand intrinsically. Versus: "Narrow footprint"/twin earth/tw.e./Stalnaker: e.g. here a footprint that is similiar to the one of Jone was accidentally created by a wave. Pointe: so there is something on the tw.e. which is intrinsically indistinguishable from a footprint, not a footprint. Then a philosopher might say with a sense for grip formulations: "Externalism": "Divide the cake in whatever way you want, footprints are not in the sand!". VsExternalism: revisionism might reply that this would only apply to colloquial terms and these are of no interest to science. Scientifically only states that are intrinsically with the sand count. Solution/revisionism/VsExternalism: the concept of narrow content (here: e.g. "narrow footprint"). narrow concept: here the relevant state is independent from the causal history. E.g. narrow footprint: is a foot shaped impression, howsoever caused. Then we could isolate that component which is intrinsically with the medium (here: the sand). II 172 ExternalismVsVs: pointe: the new concept is still a relational one! E.g. narrow footprints are now not anymore dependent on a specific cause but are still dependent on general causes which are extrinsically with the sand. E.g. assuming normal feet on the TE have a different shape. Then the footprint which was caused by a wave is not only not a normal footprint but also no narrow footprint. Then the footprint in the sand is just not in the shape of a foot. ((s) only if you transfer the shape from the actual world to the twin earth). Stalnaker: there are still a lot of everyday examples for this strategy: Disposition concept/Stalnaker: we begin with a causal interaction e.g. water solubility then we use counterfactual conditionals (co.co.) to obtain a stable property that the thing has no matter whether it comes to the interaction. intrinsically/Stalnaker: water solubility may be a purely intrinsic property, others not: e.g. observability also depends on the skills of the observer. Narrow concept/Stalnaker: e.g. belief may be a narrow description of the concept of knowledge in the sense that the dependence on special causes between facts and knower was replaced by a more general of patterns of causal relations between facts and internal states. Alternative: Def narrow footprint: "foot-shaped impression" is now reference-determining definde: it shall now mean, formed in the way how feet are formed in the actual world (act.wrld.). Important argument: then the by the wave formed impression on the TE is still a narrow footprint. intrinsically: so, it seems we have isolated a purely intrinsic state of the sand. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Externalism | Brendel Vs Externalism | I 38 Externalismus/Wissen/Brendel: für externalistische Ansätze ist These eine wahre Meinung bereits dann Wissen ist, wenn eine bestimmte externe Beziehung (z.B. kausal oder nomologisch) zwischen der Meinung und einer sie wahr machenden Tatsache besteht. Dabei ist auch nicht notwendig, dass diese Beziehung dem Subjekt bekannt ist. I 39 Gettier-Bsp/Externalismus: gelten dann als Nicht-Wissen, weil die Verbindung nicht besteht. VsExternalismus: verfehlt das Thema, was ich glauben soll. ExternalismusVsVs: darum geht es auch gar nicht. I 42 BrendelVsExternalismus: unsere Wissenskonzeption ist nicht rein externalistisch. semantische Wahrheit/W-Def/Brendel/(s): lässt keine reine Außenperspektive zu. ((s) Weil die Metasprache die Objektsprache beinhalten muss). Wissensdefinition/Brendel: auf sie verzichten wir. I 200 Verläßlichkeitstheorie/Rechtfertigung/Wissen/BonJour, Lawrence/Brendel: These: zuverlässige Überzeugungen, über deren Zuverlässigkeit das Subjekt aber nichts weiß, sind weder hinreichend für epistemische Rechtfertigung noch für Wissen. Bsp ein zuverlässiger Hellseher, der recht hat, es selber aber nicht weiß. externalistisch/internalistisch/BonJour/Brendel: das Beispiel zeigt den Unterschied zwischen diesen beiden Auffassungen von Rechtfertigung. I 201 internalistisch: gibt es keine kognitiv zugänglichen Gründe. I 202 InternalismusVsExternalismus: der E. stelle sich nicht der skeptischen Herausforderung, da er keine Antwort auf die Frage der Ersten Person „Was kann ich wissen?“ gibt. Kriterien/Rechtfertigung//Externalismus/Brendel: werden bei ihm nicht thematisiert. Wissen/Internalismus/Brendel: These: gerade die subjektive Komponente der Rechtfertigung verleiht dem Wissensbegriff seinen erkenntnistheoretischen Charakter. I 234 BrendelVsInternalismus/Wissen/Brendel: kann die Kluft zwischen Rechtfertigung und Wahrheit nicht schließen. BrendelVsExternalismus/Wissen/Brendel: schließt zwar diese Kluft, aber zu dem Preis, dass Rechtfertigung dann gar keine Rolle mehr spielt. mögliche Lösung/Brendel: a) Wahrheit innerhalb der Wissensdefinition aufgeben und Wissen nur als besonders gut gerechtfertigte Meinung auffassen. Dann gibt es nur noch einen graduellen Unterschied zwischen Meinung und Wissen I 235 Problem: dann kann eine widersprüchliche Konjunktion gewußt werden, obwohl das eine Konjunkt falsch ist. Problem: dann sind auch viele frühere Meinungen, die einmal „gewußt“ wurden, heute kein Wissen mehr. I 240 Wissensanalyse/Wissen//Brendel: sollte den internalistischen Ansatz keinesfalls ausblenden. Der alltägliche Begriff von Wissen ist internalistisch geprägt. BrendelVsExternalismus: die Analyse des Wissensbegriffs darf nicht rein externalistisch sein. Rechtfertigung/Brendel: These: das Subjekt muss nicht alle Fehlerquellen ausschließen können. Internalismus/Externalismus/Wissen/Lehrer/Moser/Brendel: wir haben gesehen, dass eine Synthese von Internalismus und Externalismus problematisch ist. Daher ist der Begriff des Wissens selbst problematisch. |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Externalism | Newen Vs Externalism | I 174 Natural Species/Putnam/Newen: E.g. water, oil, tiger: in doing so, we single out individual specimens, even if we I 175 are unaware of the essential conditions for the existence of the natural species. I 176 Meaning/Putnam: is therefore dependent on the surroundings. >Externalism. Externalism/Burge: Transfers Putnam's knowledge to the contents of beliefs. Twin Earth: shows that beliefs cannot be fully characterized by the internal states. Arthritis/Shmarthritis/Burge/Newen: Alfred's belief that he had arthritis in the thigh becomes a true statement when changing to a language community in which this is common. I 177 Point: in this, however, we still assume that the use is determined by experts. I.e. we still can make mistakes! We may use it correctly sometimes, even though we connect false beliefs with it! VsExternalism/Newen: Problem: Supervenience! E.g. 1) beliefs depend on the surroundings 2) brain states are independent of the surroundings 3) beliefs supervene on brain states. That is impossible, if some are dependent and the others are independent. I 178 It might so happen that different beliefs are present in the same brain states. VsExternalism/Knowledge/Belief/Newen: 2) argument VsExternalism: it is inconsistent with our self-knowledge. In general, we know what we believe. It might be, however, that the surroundings have such an influence that the content is changed. There are two positions a) incompatibility thesis: either the externalism or the everyday intuition is true b) compatibility thesis: both are compatible at the price that our everyday intuition is significantly attenuated. NS I 139 VsExternalism: simply saying that you need causal chains for successful reference is not enough. You must also say what kind they need to be. E.g. direct visual contact, hearsay, instrument monitoring, etc. E.g. phlogiston: it was believed to be responsible for combustion processes. Question: Why does "phlogiston" not refer to oxygen? Why did this reference not succeed? VsExternalism: Problem: it cannot give the following answer, because it brings out the thesis rejected by him: "Intention determines the extension". Externalism has to say that the theory is so fundamentally wrong that it is not satisfied by any substance. Therefore, "phlogiston" does not reference. VsExternalism: thus it cannot show how the causal chains are linked and owes us a theory of causal chains in general. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Fodor, J. | Stalnaker Vs Fodor, J. | II 176 Def narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: is a generalization of Kaplan's character in the sense that the context considers any for the speaker external fact that is relevant to the determination of the wide content. Extensional identity criterion/narrow content/Fodor: (1987, 30 – 48)(1): C: be the condition that is fulfilled by the twin-me on twin-earth, C’: by myself in the actual world. Since there is no miracle it must be true that when an organism shares the neurophysiological constitution of my twin and fulfills C it follows that his thoughts and my twin also share the truth conditions (tr.c.). So the extensional identity criterion is that two thought contents (mental content) are the same iff they cause the same mapping of thoughts and context on truth conditions. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: that tells us less than it appears about the mapping that is used here. Nor how the relevant function is determined by what is going on in the mind of the believer. II 177 StalnakerVsFodor: we consider the following parody of his argument: e.g. I have the property of being exactly three miles from a burning stable - my twin is located on twin earth at exactly the same place, but, however, has the property of being exactly three miles from a snowy henhouse. C: then there surely is a property for my twin due to which he is three miles from the henhouse while this property does not exist for me. We call this condition C. C’: is then the property that makes up for me that I am three miles from the burning stable which does not exist for my twin. Since there is no miracle, we know at least this much: both, my twin and I, would in our respective world be three miles from a snowy henhouse when condition C ruled and both three miles from a burning stable if C' ruled. StalnakerVsFodor: problem: which determines no function at all that makes the condition C' to the property to be three miles from a snowy henhouse and at the same time condition C to the property to be three miles from a burning stable - a function that allegedly makes the contribution of the location of the subject to a specific relational property. StalnakerVsFodor: there are such functions and there is no need to identify one of them with the contribution of my intrinsic localization with the special relational property. My twin cannot sensibly say: "I did my part, as I - if condition C had ruled, .... Each localization is in the way that for any external conditions if those conditions rule something in this localizations is three miles away from a burning stable. narrow content/Stalnaker: question: does my cousin have the same narrow content as my conviction that salt is soluble in water but not in something else? StalnakerVsFodor: his theory gives no indication as to how an answer to this question was to be found! Note: however for me it is not about an uncertainty at all, this is also true for wide content but that we do not know at all how to identify narrow content. II 180 Belief/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: his image of faith is decisively motivated by his approach that there is an internal language (Mentalese) which is saved in the internal Belief/Fodor: are saved inner propositions. ((s) not propositions). They are convictions by virtue of their internal functional role. They are also identifiable independent of the environment of the subject. Semantic properties/Fodor: however partly depend on what happens in the environment around it but the way how they depend on it is determined by purely internal states of the subject! StalnakerVsFodor: here strong empirical presuppositions are in play. Def narrow content/Mentalese/Fodor/Stalnaker: function of context (in a very wide sense) on truth conditional content. StalnakerVsFodor: this is attractive for his intentions but it does not explain how it ever comes to that. And how to identify any narrow content. Narrow content/Stalnaker: is there any way at all to identify narrow content that is not based on Mentalese? Yes, by Dennett (…+…) II 188 Def individualism/Fodor: is the thesis that psychological states in terms of their causal powers are individuated. Science/Fodor: it is a scientific principle that in a taxonomy individuals are individuated because of their causal powers. This can be justified a priori metaphysically. Important argument: thus it is not excluded that mental states are individuated due to relational properties. Relational properties/Fodor: are taxonomically when they consider causal powers. E.g. "to be a planet" is relational par excellence StalnakerVsFodor: a) stronger: to individuate a thing by causal powers b) weaker: to individuate the thing by something that considers the causal powers. But the facts of the environment do not constitute the causal powers. Therefore Fodor represents only the weaker thesis. Burge/Stalnaker: represents the stronger. StalnakerVsFodor: his defense of the negative approach of revisionism (FodorVsExternalism) builds on a mixture of the strong with the weak thesis. Stalnaker: to exclude that psychological states are individuated by normal wide content you need a stronger thesis. But the defense of individualism often only goes against the weaker thesis. E.g. Fodor: Individualism/Fodor/Stalnaker: Fodor defends his version of individualism with an example of a causal irrelevant relational property: e.g. h-particle: we call a particle when a coin lands with heads up, II 189 t-particle: we call that way the same particle if the coin shows tails. Fodor: no reasonable theory will use this distinction to explain the behavior of the particle. StalnakerVsFodor: but from this it does not follow that psychological states must be purely internal (intrinsic). (1) Fodor, J. A. (1987): Explorations in cognitive science, No. 2.Psychosemantics: The problem of meaning in the philosophy of mind. British Psychological Society; The MIT Press. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Loar, B. | Stalnaker Vs Loar, B. | II 195 Narrow Content/Loar/Stalnaker: (Loar 1987, 1988): Loar has an ingenious thesis and good examples that allow us to better understand the internalism. StalnakerVsLoar: his defense of internalism is, however, not entirely convincing. Stalnaker: I believe that something like Loar's narrow content will play a role in intentional explanation but that it will not be narrow content! II 203 Content/that-clause/Loar/Stalnaker: "loose connection": here there shall be a certain way how the world appears to the thinker and this be a purely internal characteristic of the thinker. Language/content/problem/Loar: our language is permeated by social and causal presuppositions so it can only inaccurately detect our internal content. Stalnaker: pro, but I do not think that the belief states are themselves infected one whit less causally and socially! II 204 "loose connection"/Loar: (e.g. Paul, arthrite) Problem: what things about the world of which Paul believes that he is in make Paul's convictions true? The ascription of "I have arthrite in the ankle" expresses something else than the ascription of "J’ai l’arthrite dans ma cheville". StalnakerVsLoar: I also think that this is a mystery, but about ascription. I do not think that supports an internalism. Truthmaker/conviction/possible World/poss.w./Stalnaker: are the facts about the world as it appears to Paul internal or facts on the language use in Paul's environment? Ascription/to make true/Stalnaker: to answer the question, we need a theory on what makes belief ascriptions (ascriptions of content) true or false. Solution/Stalnaker: we need a causal information-theoretical approach that uses counterfactual conditionals. And I do not see how this could go internalistic. Counterfactual conditional/co.co./Stalnaker: (externalistic) one might assume that Paul would be in another state when the world would be different. Or Paul is in his internal state iff the world is actual in this certain way. ((s) But that excludes illusions). externalistic: that would be non-internalistic because it is based on general causal regularities. Problem/Stalnaker: the same problems arise that already appeared in Loar's belief ascription. Content/Loar/Stalnaker: after Loar there are two dimensions, which are connected to a mental state: a) a purely internal content – the way how the world appears to the thinker – with it behavior is actually explained. II 205 b) a social content (to what the ascriptions refer). Stalnaker: it is not clear to me what role b) shall play. Content/StalnakerVsLoar: thesis: if we describe it properly psychological and social content fall together. Loar's examples do not show that psychological content is narrow. Loar: thesis: there are phenomenological reasons why the way the world appears to the thinker must be an internal property of the thinker. II 205 privileged access/Loar/Stalnaker: Loar's phenomenological argument for his internalism is the privileged access we have to ourselves. We know what our thoughts are about. LoarVsBurge/LoarVsExternalism: privileged access is incompatible with the anti-individualism. (Team: Loar per internalism, Loar per individualism). II 206 Loar: thesis: it is hard to see how I could be wrong about my purely semantic judgment that my thought about Freud is about Freud - assuming Freud exists timelessly. StalnakerVsLoar: this is true but why is this in conflict with the externalism? LoarVsExternalism/Stalnaker: Loar's arguments are based on observations of the externalist analysis of the reference relation. logical form: (of the argument);: I do not judge that I stand in relation R to x ("R") be an externalist conception of this relation of aboutness or reference). aboutness/"about"/Loar/Stalnaker: therefore "R" cannot be a correct analysis of the aboutness relation to which I have privileged access. aboutness/"about"/Loar: it is implausible that I, to know that my thoughts are about Freud, need an opinion on a causal-historical relation to him. Such a relation has no one properly characterized yet. StalnakerVsLoar: two things are wrong about this: 1. a philosophical analysis of a concept may be correct, even if a competent user of the concept does not know the analysis. 2. the externalism does not specify that the aboutness-relation is analyzable. Burge: proposes no analysis Kripke: (in his defense of the causal theory) does not assert that this is reductionist. Loar/StalnakerVsLoar: he is right that my "pre-critical" perspective, "that my thought that my thought about Freud is a thought about Freud" does apparently not need an externalist concept. ((s) "drastic content". see below). II 209 Context dependency/ascription/Loar/Stalnaker: Loar shows us, however, correctly that belief-ascriptions are context-dependent. And he is also right to accept realization conditions for it. Realization conditions/StalnakerVsLoar: but these give us no opportunity to come to purely internal properties of the believer Def content/Stalnaker: (whether psychological or social) is a way to put us in touch with others and to our environment. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Moore, G.E. | Stroud Vs Moore, G.E. | Brendel I 267 Moore's Hands/Brendel: Moore is aware that his example does not refute the sceptic. VsMoore/Brendel: but his critic starts from a concept of knowledge that he himself does not share. He admits that he cannot prove the premises of his proof. Knowledge/Moore: N.B.: but it does not follow that he cannot know that he has two hands! Thesis: knowledge is also possible without proof. I 268 StroudVsMoore: Moore did not really get involved with the skeptical hypothesis. His "proof of the outside world" is an internal reaction. This is inadequate. Skepticism/Stroud: Thesis: his question cannot be posed within a certain knowledge context. External/Internal/Skepticism/Moore's Hands/Stroud/Brendel: to show that Moore is right one would have to show that the skeptical hypothesis cannot be formulated externally. Moore's Hands/BrendelVsStroud: could also be understood as an external assertion. The fact that a subject can know something without justification is typically externalistic (see above). BrendelVsExternalism: (see above 8.3.3). I 270 Moore's Hands/BrendelVsMoore/pro Stroud/Brendel. Stroud I 115 Knowledge/Skepticism/Stroud: Example Question: were there apples in Sicily 400 B.C.? I do not know, but I have an idea how to find out: New question: is it known whether there...? Then I could ask historians. Some will say "I know...". Then when someone asks me, I can say: "Yes, it's known that ..." These are all questions about knowledge that are answered directly. StroudVsMoore: the same is not possible if you do not know anything about the world at all. The example implies that one knows something about Sicily at all ((s) that one knows that it exists at all. Existential assumptions are already implied if knowledge questions are answered). Moore/Stroud: assumes that such questions need not be taken seriously, I 116 because it's very easy to answer. Knowledge/Stroud: it is about the fact that there are general truths about human knowledge that simply follow from the fact that something is known at all. Moore/Stroud: such a general question could therefore be answered with reference to a certain piece of knowledge. This is how Moore seems to understand it. For example, geology explains something about rock layers, so there are material things, for example, there are nine planets, so there are at least nine material things. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Externalism | Versus | Esfeld I 133 EsfeldVsExternalism: social practice rather than physical environment - Twin Earth VsEsfeld: physical environment, ultimately, reference, - Dretske: representations individuated externally. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Externalism | Versus | Frank I 686 Externalism: also Millikan and Dretske, as Burge - VsExternalism: Searle, Fodor. Tyler Burge (1988a): Individualism and Self-Knowledge, in: The Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 649-663 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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