Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Extensionality | Prior | I 48 Extensionality: "Law of extensionality": if the sentences S1 and S2 have the same truth value, then, each composite sentence that differs only in that it has S1 as a subset , where the other has S2 as a subset, also the same truth value. >Truth values, >Truth, >Extensions, >Clauses. PriorVs: one can count mixed constructions like "__is green and__" also "__believes that__" into the same category as the simple. - If the law of extensionality is true, then must "grass is pink" and "grass is purple" be the same thought. >Thoughts, >Thought/Frege, cf. >Fregean meaning, >Fregean sense. Solution: "x thinks, grass is pink" is not a compound sentence with "grass is pink" as a component. Cf. >Compositionality, >Thinking, >Sentences, >Propositions. I 50 Extensionality/Prior: Lesniewski/Lukasiewicz: if one drops the E, one must admit that some propositions are neither true nor false. >St. Lesniewski, >J. Lukasiewicz. PriorVsExtensionality: truth value of a statement depends not only on its truth value. (Circular). >Circular reasoning. I 93 Law of extensionality: propositions with the same truth value are identical. >Identity, cf. >Equivalence. I 139 Extensionality/Prior: "cause", "bring about" seems to be the most extensional operator: the one who brings p about, brings everything into existence ipso facto, what is equivalent with p. Cf. >Command/Prior. But it does not bring into existence what it contains (entailment, asymmetric implication ): E.g. someone is caught by the FBI and a communist, but that does not bring about, that he is a communist. >Causation, >Entailment/Prior. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Identity | Simons | Chisholm II 171 Identity/Simons: thesis: differentiated objects may well have all parts in common: e.g. I and my body (ChisholmVs). >Parts, >Part-of-relation. --- Simons I 113 Identity/individual/whole/part/whole/extensional mereology/RescherVsExtensionality: (Rescher 1955): the extensional property that involves that wholes are identical if they have the same parts, excludes those part-whole relations, in which the organization ((s) internal structure) is involved, e.g. different sentences can consist of the same sentences, e.g. two "I's", and must not be identical if they have the same parts. E.g. a building committee equals a personnel committee, e.g. family Robinso equals the basketball team Robinson, e.g. a person/its body. N.B.: this is not about relations among themselves. >Mereology. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Essentialism | Simons Vs Essentialism | I 272 Mereological Essentialism/Chisholm/Simons: there is a disarmingly simple example by Chisholm (1976, 146): E.g. a table is formed out of a stub and a plate. It is only the same table, if both remain the same. Chisholm: so it should seem that a certain table is necessarily built of this plate and this stub. Simons: this is the only example of "person and object". I 273 As it stands, it is indeed convincing. a: stub, b: plate, c: the restulting table: N(E!c > (t)[Ext c > a ≤≤t c u b ≤≤t c]) Everyday language translation/logical form/(s) : "(t)[E Ext a...": "at all times in which", "always if a c exists.. " – "N(E!c > …”:a c has to....”… - "N(E!c > (t)[Ext c ..." "a c always has to...". Simons: this is different than the sum that also would exist if plate and stub would not be connected, the table can only exist if both are connected. Superposition/Simons: so the parts do not guarantee the existence of the table (or the identity of the table with the sum)! I 275 SimonsVsEssentialism: that e.g. the engine of a car must be a specific engine is not so clear. Here there is room for vagueness and convention. Pro essentialism: clear case: e.g. an atom must have these particular protons, otherwise it is a different atom. I 276 (...) Chisholm pro Essentialism: >Sorites, Sorites/Chisholm. SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsEssentialism: our everyday linguistic concept scheme provides no such identity conditions and living conditions for ordinary objects (things, objects) so that they could not continue to exist at the slightest change. I 278 Most of the objects of science, e.g. stars, planets, organisms or volcanoes are such that they are both: natural objects or whole while mereologically variable so that there is a middle path. Middle path: there is a middle path between Chisholm's extreme essentialism and the position that the parts of an object would be merely determined arbitrarily or conventionally. Simons: thesis: one could assume a "naturally unified object". (see below: "normal style", "normal thing", "normal piece of music"). I 338 Connection/Whitehead: (see above WD5’) individuals are connected if they have a binary sum. Together with Tiles' definition then in Whitehead's system each individual is self-connected, which corresponds to his intentions. SimonsVsExtensionality: all this does not refute the arguments VsCEM: systems that limit the existence of sums and smallest upper bounds, but nevertheless remain extensional, are still too strong to be able to act as a general theory of part and whole. (However, they are still useful.) Characteristic relation/whole/Simons: continuity is only one characteristic relationship among many. Some may not be important, but one should not exclude any a priori. E.g. the political relations between Alaska and the rest of the United States outweigh the spatial continuity with Canada. Continuity: continuity helps to exclude discontinuous sums, e.g. sums of chemicals of several organisms. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Extensionality | Prior Vs Extensionality | I 48 Extensionalism/Fallacy of/Extensionality/Extension/Extensional/Prior: Ontology/PriorVsQuine: existence as "being a value of a bound variable" is only a unproven dogma. Quantifiers: There is another unproven dogma: that mixed constructions like "__ is green and __" or "believes that __" cannot fall into the same category as the simple ones. In particular, it is said that "X believes that __" should not fall into the same category as "It is not the case, that __". I.e. supposedly they not both single-digit links. Resistance comes from the formal logicians who want to simplify their systems by saying that if the sentences S1 and S2 have the same truth value, then every composite sentence, which only differs in that it has S1 as a sub-sentence where the other one has S2 has as a sub-sentence, has the same truth value. This is the "law of extensionality". PriorVsExtensionality: if the law was true, the following two sentences would have to mean the same thing: a) "X thinks the grass is pink" b) "X thinks the grass is purple" But everyone knows that you can think one thing without thinking the other. Point: "X thinks the grass is pink" is not a true composite sentence with "grass is pink" as a component. Technically speaking: It is no real function with "grass is pink" as an argument. Extensionality/Prior: but, apart from a certain narrow-mindedness, I cannot derive from this that the law of extensionality is wrong. One must admit that there is a long and interesting history of logic in which it is true, just like classical mechanics in physics. I 49 On the other hand, if its defenders speak of intuitive and immediate knowledge of its truth, then I can only say that I have contrary intuitions. Extensionality/Extension/Lesniewski/Lukasiewicz/Prior: both schools tell us that if you drop extensionality, you must admit that some propositions are then neither true nor false. This is justified in classic logic by the fact that there are only four cases a) "true p" is always true, no matter if "p" is true or false, b) "false p": reversed c) not p: reverses the truth value d) "asserts p": true if p is true, otherwise false. Furthermore: if "p" and "q" have the same truth value, then function of "p" has the same truth value as the function of "q". Now, if a function does not obey the law of extensionality, it cannot be one of these four, and if there are other besides these, there must be more than two truth values. (PriorVs). Vs: the first step of this argument already presupposes what it is to prove: namely, that the only property of "p", on which its truth value depends, is its truth value. E.g. "If X thinks that p" was a function of "p". But there are no functions that are false with true arguments. I 50 But why should the truth value of a function "p" not depend on of other properties of "p" than its truth value? To say that this was impossible is to say that for each function fx of a number x, the question whether x > 0 depends on whether x is > 0, which is simply false. E.g. fx = x 1: because in some cases, where x > 0, e.g. x = 2, is x 1 > 0, while in other cases, e.g.: x = 1, x is 1 not > 0. So whether this function of x itself is > 0 does not depend on whether x itself is > 0, but whether x > 1. Likewise, whether X believes that p does not depend on whether it is the case or not that p. Prior: why ever not? ((s) Both are true, but the analogy does not need to be true.) I 101 Protothetics/Protothetic/Lesniewski/Prior: our system is a fragment of Lesniewski's "Protothetics". (20s). 1) normal propositional calculus, ((s) p,q..u,v,>,...) 2) quantifier logic 3) normal identity laws. Full protothetics also includes the law of extensionality. (Tarski seems to support it, because it has proved his independence.) PriorVsExtensionality. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Extensionality | Simons Vs Extensionality | I 116 Extensionality/Simons: we leave extensionality with the rejection of ≤. I 117 ≤: the relation ≤ is not antisymmetric, it is a partial order, that means it is reflexive and transitive. In terms of it one can define a symmetric predicate: Def coincidence of parts/mereology/spelling/Simons: SD16 x ≤≥ y ≡ x ≤ y u y ≤ x. Coinciding individuals are perceptually indistinguishable for their period of coincidence. They are in superposition. Def superposition/mereology/Simons: they occupy the same place at the same time. Question: (see below): do all superposed objects coincide mereologically? By rejecting the proper parts principle we receive an abundance of descriptions and explanatory power. SimonsVsExtensionality: extensionality is too ascetic for mereology. I 251 Part/SimonsVsExtensionality/VsCEM/VsExtensional Mereology/Simons: we see which abundance we have to give up if we want to remain extensional, because now we have three concepts of part instead of one, which throws together the SSP and there may be even more. CEM/Extensional Mereology/Simons: extensional mereology is actually a substantive thesis: individuals who are of the same material are identified. Coincidence-Principle/Simons: 1. For the two more powerful coincidence concepts of identity and the strong coincidence we refuse it. 2. For weak coincidence we allow it, provided we consider only superimposed material individuals. Strictly weak inclusion: e.g. there is no reason to deny that Caesar's heart is weakly included in the matter of Caesar. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Extensionality | Rescher Vs Extensionality | Simons I 113 Identity/individual/whole/part/extensional mereology/RescherVsExtensionality: (Rescher 1955): the extensional property that implies that wholeness is identical when they have the same parts excludes those "part-whole" relations in which the organization (being ordered, (s) internal structure) is involved. For example, different sentences may consist of the same sentences. Identity Condition/Simons: "...if they have the same parts" is thus ambiguous. Simons: the Rescher Sense corresponds to SF13. SF13 (z)[z ≤ x ≡ z ≤ y] ⊃ x = y. Individual/Partial/Identity condition/SimonsVsRescher: but he also has something like SF12 under his axioms, although at the same time he argues that "part" does not need to be reflexive, while our two relations "<" and ">" are indeed reflexive. Simons: one can put it this way: ((s) holistic): Some individuals exist only because other individuals exist, namely their parts. These are the sums. SimonsVsRescher: for example different sentences from the same words: the example is unfortunate because it speaks of what could be instead of what is. Thus he has already accepted the reference to abstract types instead of concrete tokens. Mereology/Simons: but we are not talking about the mereology of abstract entities, but of concrete tokens. Let us assume, for example, plastic pieces that are shaped like words. In a box there are tokens of the word "cardinals" and tokens of the word "multiply". Thus a sum of these two can exist as long as they are in the box, but no sentence. ((s) thus sum unequal to sentence!). Now we can form sentences: 1. "Multiply Cardinals": this could mean: a) one imperative to mathematicians, b) another to the Pope. Sum/Rescher/Simons: cannot be the same as the sentence, because the sum already existed before in the box. Now we can make a new sentence out of the same words: 2. "Cardinals multiply": "cardinals multiply" (a) because the Pope is active, or b) the cardinals: ba): in mathematics, bb) otherwise). Vs: one could argue that these sentence exist at different times. Thus the representative of extensionalism has a way to introduce temporal parts. I 114 Solution/Simons: assuming the plastic words are semicircular, then one can make both sentences at the same time. PPP/Simons: the example is not necessarily a refutation of PPP, and SCT71 PPP Ez[z << x] u (z)[z << x] ⊃ z < y SCT71 (Ez)[z << x] v (Ez)[z << y ] ⊃. (z)[z << x ≡ z << y] ⊃ x = y because it is not completely wrong to say that one sentence also contains the fragment "nals mult", but the other does not! RescherVsExtensionality/Simons: for a counter-example in its style we need two individuals who are not identical, although they all have parts in common. So that their difference is a question of the relations between the parts. ((s) Structure, intensional). For example, the Robinson family can be the same as the basketball team Robinson at a time. But we shouldn't identify either of them. Similarly, for example, the Building Committee can have the same members as the Personnel Committee. |
Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning Theory | Loar, B. | Avramides I 29 Group: Loar/Meaning Theory: close to Lewis, VsMcDowll, VsWiggins, thesis: semantics and pragmatics are not separate - (not even with Grice) - Wiggins/McDowell: separation Theory of Sense/of Power - Loar: ultimately psychological and thus reductionist. I 31 Meaning Theory/Philosophy of Mind/Loar: thesis the meaning theory is part of the theory of mind and not vice versa. I 32 Loar: thinks that if we do not take the psychological concepts as fundamental, they will be forgotten. Avramides: that does not have to be. Thesis: with the reciprocal interpretation of the biconditional (the recognition of the place of the concept in the conceptual system, not reductive) in "Grice" analysis, we can just as well bring the philosophy of language into the realm of the philosophy of mind, whereby the analysis of meaning remains partially autonomous, but under the umbrella of intentional action. Not all questions of public language have to do with the philosophy of mind. EMD II 138 Meaning/Loar: Thesis: semantic concepts are localized within a larger framework of propositional attitudes, and therefore I make substantial use of intentional entities. But nowadays it is common to think that a purely extensional meaning theory is possible. We owe this largely to Davidson. Davidson/Loar: seems to make a compromise to join Quine's attack against intentions without abandoning all our intuitions about certain semantic facts. LoarVsExtensionality: Z meaning theory without intention is like Hamlet without Prince of Denmark. EMD II 146 Loar thesis: the semantic properties of the clauses (constituents) are a certain function of the propositional attitudes of the speaker. Question: Should propositional attitudes then not best be described as relations to sentences or other linguistic entities? But that would be a circle. EMD II 149 Loar thesis: What I want to show is that the meaning theory is part of the theory of mind and not vice versa! II 148 ... KripkeVsVs: E.g. Measuring: one object refers to another, the default, but if it didn't exist, the object would still have had a length - LoarVs: but that doesn't work for the meaning theory - thesis: therefore you have to introduce intensional entities for a meaning theory. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
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