Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Best Explanation | Hacking | I 96 Best Explanation/Hacking: For the best explanation you will need: 1st simplicity, 2nd an argument of the cosmic coincidence and 3rd success (HackingVs). >Simplicity, >Coincidence/Hacking, >Coincidence, >Success. HackingVsExplanations: explanations do not belong to the existence of the universe. >Explanations, >Universe. I 98 Existence is not actually part of the explanation. ((s) It is not a good explanation if the possibility of the existence of the objects arises within the explanation itself.) >Existence, >Circular reasoning, >Ontology. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Explanation | Hegel | Schurz I 224 Explanation/Hegel/Schurz: Thesis: Explanation goes in principle beyond description, it is a kind of "Wesensschau". DuhemVsHegel/WittgensteinVsHegel: Science can only describe at all! (WittgensteinVsExplanation). >L. Wittgenstein, >P. Duhem, >Description, >Explanation/Duhem, >Explanation/Wittgenstein. Law/laws of nature/solution/Hempel: also laws are descriptions - just general descriptions! Explanation/Hempel: goes beyond description in that it establishes a logical connection. >Explanation/Hempel. I 225 Last explanation/Schurz: does not exist in science for exactly this reason: every explanation must presuppose something unexplained. Example gravitation law, example the fact that there was a big bang. Nothing can explain itself, there is no "self-explanation". >Explanation/Schurz, >Explanation/Hempel, >Ultimate justification. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Explanation | Logic Texts | II 94 Explication: for the logic it is between analytic and synthetic definition. The explication of a concept can be more accurate and more fruitful than the original term. >Analyticity/Syntheticity, Cf. >WittgensteinVsExplanation. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 |
| Explanation | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 29 Inexplicable/explanation/analysis/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: not the usual language use is unanalysable and inexplicable according to Wittgenstein - but the language games are. I 190 Explanation/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Metaphysics (> Metaphysics/Duhem). Large typescript: "Supposing my face image would be two equal red circles on a blue background: what's here available in a double number, and what just once? One could say we have a color here and two locations. But it was also said that red and circular were properties of two objects, which could be called spots and which are in a certain spatial relationship to each other. Sounds like an explanation of physics. I could also answer: two red lanterns, etc. But an explanation is not required here (trying to solve our dissatisfaction by an explanation is the mistake of metaphysics) (> Metaphysics/Duhem). What is worrying to us, is the ambiguity about the grammar of the sentence "I see two red circles on a blue background." I can also say: "I see the color red in two different locations" but then the grammar of the words "spot", "location" , "color" would need to align to the words of the first sentence. The confusion arises here in that we believe that we have to decide about the presence or absence of an object (spot). Like when you decide whether what I see (in a physical sense) is a red coat or a reflex. I 238 Demonstrate/ostensive definition/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in the lectures of the early 30s the ostensive definition is downright rejected. "The ostensive definition does not lead us beyond the symbolism ... thus we can do nothing further than to replace a symbolism with another." HintikkaVsWittgenstein: that is, one might think, blatantly wrong because gestures of pointing can well lead us away from the field of purely linguistic. WittgensteinVsVs: denies that. He explains what we accomplish through ostensive explanation is not a connection between language and reality, but a connection between the written or spoken language on the one hand and the sign language on the other hand. Ostensive explanation/Wittgenstein: is nothing more than a calculus. I 255 Explanation/WittgensteinVsExplanation/Hintikka: "Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we should see the facts as "primordial phenomena". In the later philosophy the language games are really the measure of all things. --- II 44 Indicative Definition: With this, however, nothing more is done than adding something to the symbolism. II 45 It will not lead us beyond this symbolism. We just replace a set of symbols by another. The explanation of the meaning of symbols will in turn be indicated to the symbols. II 56 Explanation/Science/Wittgenstein: we explain an event in physics by describing another event - Analysis: finding out something new - not so in philosophy. II 60 Music/Language/Wittgenstein: #, b, resolution characters are signals in the strict sense. The language does not consist of signals. A signal must be explained, and the explanation must indicate something, whereby the signal is supplemented. We explain them in the same sense as colors. Besides the word "green" we need something else, additional. II 61 Explanation/Wittgenstein: the sentence with the explanation is not in this way different from the explanation itself. The explanation of a sentence is always something like a definition that replaces a symbol set by another. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Individual Causation | Vollmer | II 56 Uniqueness/Unique/explanation/uniqueness/unique items/Science/Vollmer: Pauli: the unique does not have to be less essential - uniqueness/Vollmer: only when something is in principle and necessary or proven unique the arguments can be applied VsExplanation. >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Essence. II 57 E.g. cosmology: refers to the principle unique. II 58 Uniqueness/Unique/explanation/uniqueness/unique items/Science/Vollmer: Problem: then law of nature is indistinguishable from boundary conditions. >Natural laws, >Conditions. E.g. Why the gravitational constant G has the value G = 6.67 has 10 -8, does not follow from the whole classical physics - all the constants have random values. >Natural constants. Law of nature/Vollmer: also the laws of nature are random. >Contingency, >Random. II 63 Mistake: to assume that only the repeating is based on laws of nature, but not the unique - solution: causality as energy transfer. >Energy. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Language | Wittgenstein | Rorty III 40 Wittgenstein: naturalizes consciousness and language, in which all questions about relations to the universe are transformed in causal questions. (Also Ryle and Dennett). >Causality, >Causal relation, cf. >Naturalism. --- Rorty VI 134 Language/Wittgenstein: You cannot find a method with which it is possible to step between the language and the object. >Reality, >World, >Perception. --- Hintikka I 22 Language/ontology/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: one cannot specify in the language, how many objects there are. - These are given by name. - ((s) one can well give a list - Wittgenstein: The existence of an object cannot be expressed - only through the use of the name in the language. >Use, >Names. I 41 Language relativism/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "Could a lion talk, we would not understand him." (I 323 Hintikka: a lion has other sensory data) - Hintikka: in mathematics, there is no "common behavior". - In different systems different sentences are true and false. >Truth values. I 190 Basic physical language/explanation/Wittgenstein/WittgensteinVsExplanation/Hintikka: "metaphysics" - (> Large typescript) - Instead: phenomenology is grammar. - E.g. one should not decide whether two red circles on a blue background are two objects or one. - Each transcription must depend on the one of the first sentence. - Uncertainty about the grammar - Hintikka: a) the objects are the colors - b) the objects are the spots. - Both phenomenological. - Both are secondary to the language of physical objects and their properties. - Wrong question: how many objects are there. >Grammar, >Metaphysics. WittgensteinVsPhenomenology: this wanted to decide how many objects there are. I 255 Language/Wittgenstein/Philosophical Investigations §§ 143-242/Hintikka: language is not a calculus. - It has no concrete defined rules - not that the rules were vague - but the question arises only in the context of language games. >Language game, >Rules. --- II 60 Language/signal/Wittgenstein: E.g. resolution characters in music: is a signal in the strict sense. - Language does not consist of signals. - A signal must be explained. - In the same sense as colors. - In addition to the color word "green" we still need something extra. II 226f Language/Wittgenstein: there are actually no gaps in our language - even if there are not enough words to describe the changes of the sky. - It is also not a shortage of our vision that we cannot count the raindrops. - Also impossibility can be expressed - E.g. that an object would be simultaneously green and red - solution: it is excluded by arbitrary convention. --- VI 74 Language/Tractatus/Schulte: language disguises the thought - from the outer form one cannot infer the form of thought - it can be formed according to quite different purposes. VI 116 Language/purpose/Wittgenstein/Schulte: one can do anything with the language, but none of these purposes determines the nature of language. Not even such a thing as understanding or "expression of thoughts". >Understanding, >Interpretation, >Thoughts. --- Tetens VII 74 Language/facts/Tractatus/Tetens: Question: Could there also be an irreducible sign for each fact? Then no two fact-signs would have common elements (e.g. words). - Problem: then it could not be shown that an object is found in several situations. >Facts, >Signs. VII 75 Logic: would be impossible. ((s) No conclusions, no syllogisms)> fine-grained/coarse-grained. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
| Logic | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 138 Frege/logic/Hintikka: his logic is considered as the theory of complex sentences - Wittgenstein in contrast: easiest parts of the world - eliminate logical constants - They do not represent. >Logical constants, >Representation. I 205 Logic/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: no other author than Wittgenstein has ever had the thought, in the logic it had ultimately no more explanation than what is given to us in experience through the simple objects - all phenomenology is just logic. - HusserlVs - Husserl: possibilities are motivated by background beliefs. --- II 160 Logic/WittgensteinVsFrege: 1. It is rather arbitrary, what we call a sentence - therefore logic means something else in my opinion than in Frege's. 2. VsFrege: All words are equally important - Frege: thesis: "Word", "sentence", "world" are more important. >Sentences, >Words, >World, >Symbols. II 238 Logic/arbitrary/Wittgenstein: the rules of logic are insofar arbitrary that they can be eliminated for greater expressiveness - E.g. sentence of the excluded third (SaD) is invalid - at least "contradiction" is used in different meanings - as well as double negation -. Some authors: "the application is different." WittgensteinVs: one cannot talk independently of a sign from its use. - ((S) Then it is another sign - against see below. >Signs, >Use. II 328 The sentence of the excluded third is universal. II 327 Logic/Wittgenstein: it is not a science, but a calculus - in it you can make inventions, but no discoveries. II 333 Logic/WittgensteinVsCarnap: one cannot construct a logic for all cases - because one cannot abstract both applications from the application. --- VI 85 Logic/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Schulte: not we express with the signs what we want - but in the logic the nature of the nature-necessary sign states itself - (6,124). VI 89 Logic/border/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the logic is not given a limit through the use of the language, of course - it is, so to speak, the common framework of "my" and "your" language. VI 118 Logic/Wittgenstein: say/show: logic says nothing, it shows something about necessity - grammatical sentences (about the language) thus fall out of the language game -> training: no speakable rules but blind following. TrainingVsExplanation, instead: Description - (> tell/show: Explanation/Wittgenstein). --- IV 101 Logic/Tractatus: (6.1264) each sentence of logic is a, in characters expressed, modus ponens - (And this cannot be expressed by one sentence). - (> Show/tell: > Ostension/Wittgenstein). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Positivism | Hacking | I 77 Def Positivism/Hacking: 1st Verification, 2nd observation, 3rd VsCausality, 4th VsExplanation (just brings phenomena in an order that does not explain why.), 5th VsTheoretical Entities, 6th VsMetaphysics (leaves nothing that is not verifiable). >Verification, >Observation, >Causality, >Explanations, >Theoretical entities, >Metaphysics. I 80 PopperVs the label "positivist", VsSense Data - not VsMetaphysics: non-verifiable sentences are acceptable as a first step. That was later refuted by Popper. >K. Popper, >Sense data. I 80 Empiricism: empiricism is concerned with measuring (theoretical entities exist). >Empiricism, >Measurements. Positivism: positivism is concerned with seeing, feeling, smelling, hearing, tasting (theoretical entities do not exist). |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Best Explanation | Fraassen Vs Best Explanation | Field I 15 Principle of the Best Explanation/Field: Suppose we have a) certain beliefs about the "phenomena" that we do not want to give up b) this class of phenomena is large and complex c) we have a pretty good (simple) explanation that is not ad hoc and from which the consequences of the phenomena follow d) one of the assumptions in the explanation is assertion S and we are sure that no explanation is possible without S. Best Explanation: then we have a strong reason to believe S. False: "The phenomena are as they would be if explanation E was correct": As If/Field: As-if assertions that are piggyback passengers on true explanations may not be constructed as explanations themselves (at least not ad hoc). Then the principle is not empty: it excludes the possibility that we accept a large and complex set of phenomena as a brute fact. (van FraassenVsBest Explanation: 1980) Best Explanation/BE/Field: the best explanation often leads us to believe something that we could also test independently by observation, but also to beliefs about unobservable things, or unobservable beliefs about observable things. Observation: should not make a difference here! In any case, our beliefs go beyond what is observed. I 16 Important argument: if no test was done, it should make no difference in the status of the evidence between cases where an observation is possible and those where no observation is possible! A stronger principle of the best explanation could be limited to observable instances of belief. FieldVs: but that would cripple our beliefs about observable things and would be entirely ad hoc. Unobserved things: a principle could be formulated that allowed the inference on observed things - that have been unobserved so far! - while we do not believe the explanation as such. FieldVs: that would be even more ad hoc! I 25 VsBenacerraf: bases himself on an outdated causal theory of knowledge. I 90 Theory/Properties/Fraassen: theories have three types of properties: 1) purely internal, logical: axiomatization, consistency, various kinds of completeness. Problem: It was not possible to accommodate simplicity here. Some authors have suggested that simple theories are more likely to be true. FraassenVsSimplicity: it is absurd to suppose that the world is more likely to be simple than that it was complicated. But that is metaphysics. 2) Semantic Properties: and relations: concern the relation of theory to the world. Or to the facts in the world about which the theory is. Main Properties: truth and empirical adequacy. 3) pragmatic: are there any that are philosophically relevant? Of course, the language of science is context-dependent, but is that pragmatic? I 91 Context-Dependent/Context-Independent/Theory/Science/Fraassen: theories can also be formulated in a context-independent language, what Quine calls Def "External Sentence"/Quine. Therefore it seems as though we do not need pragmatics to interpret science. Vs: this may be applicable to theories, but not to other parts of scientific activity: Context-Dependent/Fraassen: are a) Evaluations of theories, in particular, the term "explained" (explanation) is radically context-dependent. b) the language of the utilization (use) of theories to explain phenomena is radically context-dependent. Difference: a) asserting that Newton’s theory explains the tides ((s) mention). b) explaining the tides with Newton’s theory (use). Here we do not use the word "explains". Pragmatic: is also the immersion in a theoretical world view, in science. Basic components: speaker, listener, syntactic unit (sentence or set of sentences), circumstances. Important argument: In this case, there may be a tacit understanding to let yourself be guided when making inferences by something that goes beyond mere logic. I 92 Stalnaker/Terminology: he calls this tacit understanding a "pragmatic presupposition". (FraassenVsExplanation as a Superior Goal). I 197 Reality/Correspondence/Current/Real/Modal/Fraassen: Do comply the substructures of phase spaces or result sequences in probability spaces with something that happens in a real, but not actual, situation? ((s) distinction reality/actuality?) Fraassen: it may be unfair to formulate it like that. Some philosophical positions still affirm it. Modality/Metaphysics/Fraassen: pro modality (modal interpretation of frequency), but that does not set me down on a metaphysical position. FraassenVsMetaphysics. I 23 Explanatory Power/Criterion/Theory/Fraassen: how good a choice is explanatory power as a criterion for selecting a theory? In any case, it is a criterion at all. Fraassen: Thesis: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the inevitable demand for hidden variables. (VsReichenbach/VsSmart/VsSalmon/VsSellars). Science/Explanation/Sellars/Smart/Salmon/Reichenbach: Thesis: it is incomplete as long as any regularity remains unexplained (FraassenVs). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Explanation | Wittgenstein Vs Explanation | I 255 Explanation/WittgensteinVsExplanation/Hintikka: "Our mistake is, to look for an explanation where we should seee the facts as "primary phenomena"." In the later philosophy the language games are really the measure of all things. --- I 256 PU §§ 143-242 First: Wittgenstein states that the language is not like a calculus with precisely defined rules. One cannot even ask if it is sometimes so similar to the use of a formula. The question itself is already a mistake. (HintikkaVs most other authors). Also Wittgenstein does not want to go further into the fact that the rules are not exact, but he thinks that the question exact or not? can only be asked in the context of language games. --- VI 60/61 Declaration/WittgensteinVsExplanation/Schulte: "All explanation must be left behind, description must take its place." |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Wittgenstein Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | Schurz I 224 Explanation/Hegel/Schurz: Thesis: is in principle beyond description, it is a kind of "showing nature". DuhemVsHegel/WittgensteinVsHegel: science can only ever describe. ((s) WittgensteinVsExplanation/WittgensteinVsHegel). Law/Law of nature/NG/solution/Hempel: even laws are descriptions - simply general descriptions. Explanation/Hempel: goes beyond description in it, that it sets up a logical connection. --- I 225 Last clarification/Schurz: does not exist in science for this very reason: any explanation must presuppose something unexplained. E.g. law of gravity, e.g. the fact that there was a big bang. Nothing can explain itself, there is no "self-explnation". |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Explanation | Versus | Cartwright I 96 Explanation: DuhemVsExplanation? - Duhem per Wittgenstein? - ((s) WittgensteinVsExplanation). I 96 Theory / Duhem: is an abstract system for summation and logical classification of a lot of experimental laws, without explaining these laws. Explanation / Duhem: is not something that pulls a "veil" of reality. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
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