Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Evolution | Agassiz | Gould I 170 ff Evolution/Biology/AgassizVsDarwinism/AgassizVsEvolution/Gould: In the second half of the 19th century, the theory of phylogeny being repeated by ontogenesis was the best guide for biologists to divide living beings into higher and lower forms. According to this theory, the children repeat in the growth of earlier developmental stages the following: embryos have gill slits, like a fish, later a three-chambered heart like a reptile, and later the tail of a mammal. > Recapitulation theory. One variant of this thinking is Louis Agassiz' "triple parallelism", unity of paleontology, comparative anatomy, and embryology. It refers to actual precursors of primitive organisms.(1) 1. L. Agassiz, |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Evolution | Cuvier | Gould II 101 Evolution/CuvierVsEvolution/Cuvier/Gould: he concluded from his principle of interaction that evolution had to be excluded.(1) Gould: Nowadays, organisms can be seen composed of parts that have developed to a certain extent independently (a surviving specimen may not have brought along an optimal claw, but may have survived due to other advantages and then reproduced). In this way, the parts can have largely developed historically, detached from the interrelationship. CuvierVsEvolution theory. Cf. >Parts, >Part-of-relation, >Complex, >Wholes, >Functions. 1. Cuvier, G. 1812. Recherches sur les ossemens fossils quadrupèdes, 4. volumes, Paris: Deterville. |
Cuvier I Georges Cuvier Essay on the Theory of the Earth London 2003 Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Evolution | Vollmer | I 51 Evolutionary Epistemology/Vollmer: in the evolution of science, there are no "mutations" because there is no "offspring" in scientific theories. Evolutionary epistemology is only useful insofar as subjective knowledge structures are inherited. >Success, >Pragmatism, >Proofs, >Provability. I 75 The evolutionary epistemology does not have the concept of truth of pragmatism - it is not proven by success. Success/Vollmer: only proves that the hypothesis was not entirely wrong. >Hypotheses. I 217 VsEvolution theory/VsDarwinismus. Circular. VollmerVsVs: it is wrong that "Fitness" can be defined without recourse to "surviving". >Survival, >Fitness. I 260 Fitness is not determined by the survival of the individual, but by reproductive success, more food, more habitat, more partners, more offspring, etc. I 264 Entropy/Evolution/life/Vollmer: contrary to popular belief it is not always a measure of disorder. >Entropy. Under special conditions (low total energy and existence of lasting interactions or inclusion by external forces) the increase in entropy even includes an increase of order and structure - thus the second law does not contradict the origin of living things. >Life, >Energy, >Order. I 279 Adaptation/selection/VsEvolutionary Epistemology is no falsification - the original eye is not falsyfied by the eye of the eagle - proper mapping does not matter - transferring the selection theory on cognitive skills can only succeed if there is objective truth and if knowledge is more useful than error (Simmel, 1895) - VollmerVsVs: this is not an argument VsEvolution - no matter who is adapting to whom - Co-adaption. I 298 Evolution/success/Vollmer: the accuracy of knowledge cannot be inferred from evolutionary success - otherwise naturalistic fallacy - confusion of facts with norms. >Naturalistic fallacy, >Norms, >Facts. --- II 190 Evolution/time direction/Vollmer: due to cosmic expansion there are no two moments of evolution identical - (> time arrow). |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Life | Agassiz | Gould II 106 Life/Nature/Agassiz/Gould: AgassizVsEvolution: Agassiz (died 1873) maintained throughout his life that the history of life was a predetermined divine plan. (1) Gould II 108 At that time it was believed that the depths of the oceans were a world that was always at rest without change. Selection/GouldVsAgassiz: this one has probably not understood that the theory of natural selection does not predict global and unstoppable progress, but only adaptations to local conditions. 1. Agassiz L., |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Reciprocity | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 174 Reciprocity/group behavior/psychological theories: what is special about ingroup reciprocity? It is perhaps no surprise that people expect reciprocity from the ingroup, but if reciprocity is the critical thing, why does it appear to be less effective when it is explicitly forthcoming from a minimal outgroup? Problem: researchers have tended to fall back on evolutionary arguments, proposing that from an evolutionary perspective there may be good reasons to trust the ingroup and to distrust or even fear the outgroup (Gaertner and Insko, 2000(1); Yamagishi et al., 1999(2)). Group behavior/VsEvolutionary psychology(Spears/Otten: a problem here is that standard evolutionary arguments might lead one to expect men to be generally more competitive than women (e.g., Sidanius et al., 1994(3); Yuki and Yokota, 2009(4)). And while it is difficult to rule out these evolutionary arguments, it is just as difficult to prove them. If bounded reciprocity is concerned with self-interest why do group members sacrifice self-interest as they do in the maximum differentiation strategy (MD; see >Method/Tajfel)? In this regard, Marilyn Brewer (1999)(5) has claimed that social identity theory (and the findings of the minimal group studies) are better able to explain ‘ingroup love’ than ‘outgroup hate’. Vs: this criticism would seem to apply even more to the bounded reciprocity argument: after all, this is more about reciprocating within the ingroup than harming the outgroup. In sum, then, self-interest may help explain why participants strive to maximize ingroup profit, but it struggles to explain why they sacrifice ingroup profit in order to deprive an outgroup of benefits. 1. Gaertner, L. and Insko, C.A. (2000) ‘Intergroup discrimination in the minimal group paradigm: Categorization, reciprocation or fear?’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79: 77–94. 2. Yamagishi, T., Kikuchi, M. and Kosugi, M. (1999) ‘Trust, gullibility, and social intelligence’, Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 2: 145–61. 3. Sidanius, J., Pratto, F. and Mitchell, M. (1994) ‘In-group identification, social dominance orientation, and differential intergroup social allocation’, Journal of Social Psychology, 134: 151–67. 4. Yuki, M. and Yokota, K. (2009) ‘The primal warrior: Outgroup threat priming enhances intergroup discrimination in men but not women’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45: 271–4. Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Darwin, Ch. | Verschiedene Vs Darwin, Ch. | Gould II 101 CuvierVsEvolution: he concluded from his principle of interaction that evolution had to be excluded. II 136 VavilovVsDarwin: variation does not take place in all directions, but arranged in classes of chemistry and crystallography, which are analogous. Vavilov has underemphasized the creative role of the environment. II 328 The opponents of Darwin always bring the same litany: Darwin must have been wrong - the order cannot arise by chance (e.g. KoestlerVsDarwin). Pinker I 403 Mortimer AdlerVsDarwinism: (Philosopher) 1940: Evolution could not have taken place, because there was also no three-and-a-half-sided triangle. Darwin: It is quite possible that intermediate forms have occurred in the past. Natural Species/Darwin: is not an ideal type, but a population. Vollmer I 260 Selection/Vollmer: there is no serious argument that the selection principle is circular. VsDarwinism/Tautology: the argument against Darwinism that it is tautological is misguided: "Survival of the survivor": VollmerVsVs: Fitness is not determined by the survival of the individual, but by reproductive success, more food, more living space, more partners, more offspring, etc. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Epistemology | Wittgenstein Vs Epistemology | II 102 Evolutionary epistemology/EE/WittgensteinVsEvolutionary epistomology: one cannot say, my knowledge of the evolution is the result of evolution. WittgensteinVsEvolutionary epistemology |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Evolution Theory | Verschiedene Vs Evolution Theory | Vollmer I 258 VsEvolution: the theory of evolution is circular: you can only "unroll" things that are already there. VollmerVsVs: the meaning of a term is never determined by etymology, but by definition, use, context. The term does not have the meaning that the Romans gave it when they coined it. >Change of concept. I 276 VsEvolution Theory: "Every adaptation requires a recognition of that to which it is to be adapted. Then the recognition of fitting is a circle." VollmerVsVs: it is not true at all that every adjustment requires recognition. VsEvolution Theory: not predictable VollmerVsVsVs: there is no compelling reason at all to use forecasting capability as a benchmark for the science of a theory. Vollmer: The goal of science is not prognoses, but explanations! I 277 VsEvolution Theory: "It is not falsifiable". For example, if one finds life on Mars, it is explained in evolutionary theory, if none is found, its absence or disappearance is also explained in evolutionary theory. (PopperVsEvolution Theory!) (s)Vs: For example, the not-being-damaged of a fallen cup can also be explained with the help of physics.) I 278 VsEvolution Theory: from the existence of characteristics one can only conclude that they allow and possibly enable life, but not that they promote it! Therefore, one cannot necessarily accept adaptation! (Roth, 1984). Especially one cannot claim that our previous survival proves the correctness of our view of the world! I 279 VollmerVsVsVs: that there are selection-neutral and even survival-damaging characteristics makes it probably an empirical question whether functionality is present in individual cases, but does not impair the fertility of that panselection maxim. The question "What for?" is always allowed in biology, even if it does not always find an answer. I 279 VsEvolution Theory: 1. The transfer of selection theory to the development of cognitive abilities can only succeed if there is objective truth and if knowledge is more useful than error. (Simmel, 1895). 2. Moreover, cognitive fits could also come about other than through self-adaptation, for example by the environment changing and itself adapting (by chance). 3. Correct mapping of the outside world obviously does not play a role in selection! Because there are so many species with "worse knowledge": plants are not "falsified" by the eye, the primordial eye not by the eagle eye, etc. I 282 VsEvolution Theory: can success guarantee truth? Truth/Simmel: actually goes the way of equating success with probation and probation with truth. >Pragmatism. Evolutionary EpistemologyVsSimmel: it does not adopt this pragmatic approach. It makes a strict distinction between truth definition and truth criterion. Truth/Vollmer: Success is neither necessary nor sufficient, but is always indicative. Fitting can be determined without any recourse to selection or evolution. I 284 But one can also proceed the other way round: one finds that the contribution of the subject to knowledge is at least partly genetically determined. (Interaction). I 285 Reference/VsEvolution Theory: (e.g. Putnam): it is not clear which reference physical terms have at all! |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Putnam, H. | Vollmer Vs Putnam, H. | I 285 Causality/Putnam: can be characterised 1. Regular sequences (purely physical, unsatisfactory) or 2. via the concept of explanation (not purely physical), or 3. via counterfactual conditions (this requires "normal conditions" or "worlds as similar as possible"). I 285 Def Reference/Lewis/Vollmer: functional property (not simply of a living being, but) of a living being with its environment. Causality/VollmerVsPutnam: overlooks the fourth possibility of characterizing causality: energy transfer. PutnamVsVollmer: if energy transfer is to play such a large role, then activating a light switch cannot be a cause! VollmerVsPutnam: this overlooks the fact that not all the energy has to be transferred, but only a minimum of any size. I 286 PutnamVsVollmer: if you admit this, the question is still how to characterize it without counterfactual formulation. VollmerVsPutnam: this is not necessary at all, because there is a physical characterization. Reference/VsEvolution Theory: (e.g. Putnam): it is not clear which reference physical terms have at all! VollmerVsVs: once you have a physical characterization of causal relationships (energy transfer), you can also physically explicate "reference". |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Structuralism | Mayr Vs Structuralism | V 371 Structuralism: teleological, antiselectionist. Recognizes order, logic and rationality in biology.(MayrVs) "Organisms are created according to rational principles". Wants to avoid "historical" causes (StructuralismVsEvolution Theory). V 164 MayrVsStructuralism: each discipline must also consider the other kind of causes. For example: molecular biology: directly: a molecule fulfils a certain function in a cell, therefore it is there. Indirect: it has formed in the course of evolution and differs from homologous molecules in other organisms. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Various Authors | Vollmer Vs Various Authors | II 169 Method/Physics/Vollmer: the method of experimental physics does not exist at all. What would be the "unity of science" then? II 170 Bondi: Method is the most important thing in science. VollmerVsBondi: Results are more important than the method, unity of science means more than unity of method. II 97 DitfuthVsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: (VsEvolutionist Identity Theory): Life is certainly understandable as a system property. However, a material system is either animated or not animated. There is nothing in between. Vitality is an all or nothing property. On the other hand, there are different, even unlimited degrees of "soulfullness/animation": the psychic is not erratic, but has developed very gradually! Therefore it is inadmissible to simply add the "mental" (soul) to matter as a further, analogous stage. Ditfurth Thesis: Evolution could lead to the emergence of our brain and thus of consciousness only because the mental was present and effective in this development from the very beginning! ((s) >Evolution/McGinn). II 98 VollmerVsDitfurth: this one constructs a contrast that does not exist in this sharpness. 1. Life has also developed in many small steps. However, the intermediate stages have long been eliminated. 2. One can also say from consciousness that something is either "animated" or not "animated". Consciousness/Mind/Soul/Vollmer: one has to differentiate stronger between the individual functions in the future: memory, abstraction, language ability, self-confidence. I 40 VollmerVsCopernicus/VollmerVsKant: only the evolutionary epistemology takes the human out of his central position as "legislator of nature" and makes it an observer of cosmic events, which includes it. I 293 VollmerVsVsVs: no critic defines "knowledge", only Löw: this includes subjectivity (which he does not define either). Information/Löw: Information always exists only for one subject". Vollmer pro, but perhaps too dogmatic. Similarity/Löw: Similarity exists only for one subject. VollmerVsLöw: this is surely wrong. VollmerVsProjection Theory II 90 VsIdentity Theory/Vollmer: psychological and physical processes seem completely incomparable. Neuronal processes are localized, consciousness is not. Vollmer:(pro identity theory): Some identity theorists do not take this seriously at all, but the argument is not a threat at all: we can interpret difference projectively: as subjective and objective aspects of one and the same thing. Fig. cylinder appears from different sides as a circle or cuboid. (s)Vs: Example not mandatory. VollmerVsVs: Identity: not all properties must match: the optical and haptic impression of an apple are also not identical. ((s) These are extrinsic properties). II 92 Projection/Vollmer: this is how the projective model explains the apparent incompatibility of different properties such as mind and physis as different aspects of the same thing. II 93 VsProjection/Vollmer: could be interpreted as a relapse into the postulation of an unknown substance. VollmerVsVs: Solution: System concept of System Theory: System Theory/Vollmer: For example diamond/graphite: consist of the same carbon atoms, but have a different structure. Example diamond/silicon: same structure, different building blocks: (here silicon). II 94 None of the components is logically or ontologically superior to the other! Knowledge of one does not replace knowledge of the other. Both are constitutive. This shows how little is gained with the knowledge of the building blocks. I 282 VsEvolution Theory: can success guarantee truth? Truth/Simmel: actually goes the way of equating success with probation and probation with truth. Cf. Pragmatism. Evolutionary EpistemologyVsSimmel: it does not adopt this pragmatic approach. It makes a strict distinction between truth definition and truth criterion. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Vollmer, G. | Kant Vs Vollmer, G. | I 206 KantiansVsEvolutionary epistemology/EE/KantianismVsEvolutionary epistemology/Vollmer: if Kant is right, the limits of factual knowledge coincide with the limits of sensory experience. Now, if the evolutionary epistemology detects a match with the reality, how can it claim to know what the objective reality truly is? I 207 VollmerVsKantians: This transcendental argument is wrong. The earth seems to be stationary, yet it moves. The space seems Euclidean, but it is not. Therefore, our knowledge goes beyond the perception via our senses. According to Kant, quarks, elementary particles, atoms, molecules, electromagnetic fields, neutron stars, black holes, quasars, etc. should never be objects of empirical science since they cannot be seen. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 |
| Vollmer, G. | Verschiedene Vs Vollmer, G. | Putnam I 196 Causality/Charles FriedVsVollmer: can easily be considered a physical relationship! For example, "act, smash, move" are causal verbs. (impulse transmission). Fried: Once you have made this mistake, it is easy to believe that functional properties would simply be higher-level physical states. (Putnam self-criticism: I believed this myself earlier) And then to think, reference (and pretty much anything at all) could be a functional property and thus physical. Vollmer I 275 VsEvolutionary Epistemology/EE: Adaptation is reciprocal. It is precisely the selection advantage of the human to be able to radically reshape his environment (in relation to his needs). Thus the constructive moment is excluded in the evolutionary epistemology. VollmerVsVs: the evolutionary epistemology has been developed by biologists who are well aware of the interaction of adaptation. However, the dynamic of the process does not affect the applicability of the concept of adaptation at all. (DennettvsAdaption, GouldVsAdaption). I 290 DretskeVsEvolutionary Epistemology: has very little to offer. (1971, 585) PutnamVsEvolutionary Epistemology: may not be scientifically wrong, but does not answer a single philosophical question! (1982a,6) I 292 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: some of its representatives already see a "knowledge-gathering process" in the entire biological evolution. Or one speaks of a molecule "recognizing" another molecule. I 293 VollmerVsVs: no critic defines "knowledge", only Löw: this includes subjectivity (which he does not define either). Information/Löw: Information always exists only for one subject. Vollmer pro, but perhaps too dogmatic. I 298 Truth/Success/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: when the correctness of experience is inferred from evolutionary success: 1. facts are confused with norms (quid juris, quid facti) 2. the problem of knowledge is reduced to its genetic context and thus 3. the question of the validity of a statement ist trivialized. This is a genetic fallacy. VollmerVsVs: it is true that factual and normative questions are considered inseparable here, but it does not mean that they are confused! The evolutionary epistemology does not conclude from survival the correctness of a world view! Rather vice versa: in general, a better understanding of the external world structures points to a survival advantage. Under competition then mostly the better world view prevails. I 300 Validity/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: The evolutionary epistemology does not solve the validity problem. Validity is central to knowledge, but not possible without reflection. Validity/Vollmer: what validity is, is seen very differently. Lotze: Validity Puntel: Discursive redeemability Gethmann: Ability to consent Generally necessary: a valid statement must be syntactically correct, logically consistent, semantically flawless, intersubjectively understandable, discursive, intersubjectively verifiable, compatible with accepted statements, etc. Sufficient: here one must distinguish between conditional (hypothetical) and unconditional (categorical) validity. Conditional validity: has a statement if another statement must be assumed as valid to prove its validity, otherwise unconditional validity. Vollmer: the claim of unconditional validity has never been honoured. (> Final statement). We must content ourselves with conditions for relative validity. I 309 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: if epistemology is empirical, it becomes circular. I 310 Evolutionary Epistemology/EE/Vollmer: it is not the task of epistemology to provide absolute justifications for knowledge and truth claims. One can, however, ask under which conditions certain factual knowledge would be possible, and to these questions it can also give reasonable answers. Epistemology/Vollmer: Tasks: Explication of concepts and knowledge Investigation of our cognitive abilities, comparison of different cognitive systems. Differentiation of subjective and objective structures, descriptive and normative statements, factual and conventional elements. Illumination of the conditions for cognition. Demonstration of cognitive boundaries. I 315 Causality/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: after the evolutionary epistemology, causality plays a threefold role: 1. order form of nature 2. thinking category 3. this category of thinking is the result of selection. Therefore, causality generates causality via causality. a) Through the multiple meaning of "causality" the principle of methodical order is violated. (Gerhardt, 1983,67 69,75). b) If causality is a category of thought, it cannot at the same time be a product of experience. For this it would have to be inductive or abstract like any experience. Thus, such event sequences must first of all have been recognized as causal. (Lütterfelds, 1982, 113,6). I 316 VollmerVsVs: the ambiguity is admissible, but easy to eliminate. Solution: instead, one can say that causality as a real category generates causality as a form of thinking via a causally effective selection. This is then not a life-worldly experience. I 318 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: says nothing new at all! Already Spencer was refuted. Haeckel already uses the term "biological epistemology". The thesis of the mind as an organ function is reminiscent of Kant's interpretation by Helmholtz and F.A. Lange: "The a priori as a physical psychic "organization". Vollmer I 313 Reason/BaumgartnerVsVollmer: cannot come out of himself. It is absolute in this sense and cannot be deceived. Reason/ZimmerliVsVollmer: the eye can see itself through apparatuses. But seeing can never see it, because it always does seeing. "Mental uncertainty relation". Explanation/HayekVsVollmer: no system can explain itself. I 314 Back-Reference/Hövelmann: in principle the ability to speak cannot be cheated on. VollmerVsVs: these authors do not explain "reason" etc. at all. Exception: I 323 Def Explanation/Hayek: requires classification. A system that is to classify objects according to n properties must be able to create and distinguish at least 2 exp n different classes. Therefore, the classifying system must be much more complex. However, no system can surpass itself in complexity and therefore cannot explain itself. I 314 Back-Reference/Vollmer: of course self-knowledge and self-declaration cannot impart secure or complete knowledge. But many "good circles" are quite consistent and informative. Example: "Good circles": |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Evolution Th. of Meaning | Pro | Dennett I 564 VsEvolution of meaning. Putnam, Fodor, Searle, Kripke, Burge, Dretske - "real" meaning, as opposed to "derived" meaning - Dennett: "unexpected coalition". |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Evolut. Epistemology | Vollmer, G. | I 37 Evolutionary Epistemology/EE/Vollmer: Thesis: our epistemological apparatus is a result of biological evolution. The agreement with real structures ("finished world"?) enables survival. However, the adaptation of an organism is never ideal, nor does it have to be. I 271 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: does not say anything new at all! Already Spencer was refuted. Haeckel already uses the term "biological epistemology". The thesis of the mind as an organ function is reminiscent of the Kant interpretation by Helmholtz and F.A. Lange: "The a priori as a physical-psychic organization". |
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