Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Quine | I 120 Lasting Sentences: In lasting sentences the meaning of the stimulus is more sparse. Accordingly, the synonymy of stimuli is less plumable. > VsAnalyticity. I 339 Material implication "p impl q" is not equal to "p > q" (> mention/use) "Implies" and "analytical" are the best general terms. V 114 QuineVsAnalyticity: one can form universal categorical sentences later e.g. "A dog is an animal". Of these, we will not say that they are analytical or even true. Analyticity is as social as language. Random first examples should not have any special status. Definition Analytical/Quine: a sentence is analytical if everyone learns the truth of the sentence by learning the words. That is bound as social uniformity because of the observation character. Every person has a different set of first learned analytical sentences - therefore Vs. VI 79 Quine: HolismVsAnalyticity. >Holism/Quine. --- VII (b) 21 Analytical/QuineVsKant: Quine limits them to the subject-predicate form. They can be reformulated as following: "true by force of meaning, regardless of the facts". VsEssentialism: a creature is arbitrary: a biped must be two-legged (because of his feet), but he does not need to be rational. This is relative. VII (b) 23 Analyticity/Quine: a) logically true: "No unmarried man is married" - b) this is translatable into logical truth: Bachelor/unmarried. The problem is that it is based on unclear synonymy. Analytical/Carnap: "true under any state description" - QuineVsCarnap: this only works when the atom sentences are independent. it does not work with e.g. bachelor/unmarried. VII (b) 28ff Analyticity/Quine: we need an adverb "neccess.", which is designed in that way that it delivers truth when it is applied to an analytical truth, but then we would indeed have to know what "analytical" is. - Problem: The extensional agreement of bachelor/unmarried man relies more on random facts than on meaning. A. cannot mean that the fact component would be zero: that would be an unempirical dogma. VII (b) 37 Verification Theory/Peirce: the method is the meaning. Then "analytically" becomes a borderline case: method does not matter. Synonymous: the method of refutation and confirmation are the same. VII (b) 37 Analytical/Quine: early: a is a statement when it is synonymous with a logically true statement. VII (i) 161ff Analyticity/Quine: analyticity is an approximate truth because of meaning. That says nothing about existence. >Synonymy/Quine, >Verfication/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Citizenship | Mouffe | Gaus I 283 Citizenship/identity/Mouffe/Mottier: Mouffe (1992)(1) (...) founds her conception of citizenship on a critique as well as a critical reappropriation of liberalism. However, Mouffe's project of 'plural democracy' also draws strongly on postmodern and poststructuralist arguments (...). >Democracy/Mouffe, cf. >Identity/Postmodernism, >Gender/Poststructuralism. MouffeVsEssentialism: Indeed, Mouffe adopts an antiessentialist position towards citizenship, emphasizing the social and political construction of gender identities. Certain feminists fear that anti-essentialist positions limit the possibilities for political action and mobilization around women's identity. For Mouffe, on the contrary, the critique of essentialist identities is in fact a precondition for a truly feminist politics. Sex difference: The most urgent task in her view is to recognize the process of social construction through which sex difference has acquired such importance as a structuring factor of social relations of subordination. According to Mouffe, it is precisely within Gaus I 284 these processes that the real power relations operate in society. Therefore, a perspective that focuses only on the consequences of sex difference - whether 'equality of treatment' means that women and men should be treated differently or the same - is meaningless in her eyes. MouffeVsPateman/MouffeVsElshtain: Mouffe's anti-essentialism leads her to criticize feminists who primarily promote the revalorization of female values, such as (although coming from different perspectives) Pateman or Elshtain. For Mouffe, as for Judith Butler (1990)(2), such a position is problematic, as it assumes the existence of homogeneous identities such as 'men' and 'women'. Citizenship: Contrary to Pateman and Young, Mouffe thinks that the solution is not to make gender or other group characteristics relevant to the concept of citizenship, but on the contrary, to decrease their importance. The project of radical and democratic citizenship that she proposes implies a conception of citizenship which is neither gendered nor gender-neutral, based on a real equality and liberty of all citizens. She proposes, on the contrary, to focus on political issues and claims and not on presumably fixed and essential gender identities. Accordingly, the distinction between the private and the public spheres needs to be redefined from case to case, according to the type of political demands, and not in a fixed and permanent way. 1. Mouffe, Chantal (1992) 'Feminism, citizenship and radical democratic politics'. In Judith Butler and Joan Scott, eds, Feminists Theorise the Political. New York: Routledge, 22-40. 2. Butler, Judith (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Concepts | Putnam | VI 392 Concepts/Ockham/Putnam: concepts could be mental particulars, i.e. if characters are particulars as "signs", then any concept we have of the relation between sign and object is another sign. >Regress. PutnamVsOckham: problem: this relation cannot be unambiguously identified by holding up a sign with COW or another sign, with REFERS. VI 393 On the other hand: if concepts are not particulars, there may be uses of signs (if they are "in the head", Putnam pro). >Use, >Sign, >Particulars, >Reference, >Relation. But: problem: the use does not clearly single out a relation between the concepts and "real objects" ((s) "concept": here means "way of using characters"). If concepts are neither particulars (signs) nor ways of use, only the mysterious "grasping of forms" remains. --- Putnam V 40ff Concepts/Putnam: concepts cannot be identical to inner notions, because concepts are public. They are (partially) skills, not incidents. --- I (b) 63 Cluster concept/Putnam: e.g."human" as a list of properties. PutnamVs: the speaker does not need to have any knowledge of the laws that rule the electrons. Even if reference was "socially" determined, this cannot correspond to what "every speaker implicitly means". >Convention, >Meaning(Intending). I (g) 190 Concept/possible world/Putnam: modern semantics: functions about possible worlds represent concepts, e.g. the term "this statue" is not equal to the term "this piece of clay". PutnamVsPossible Worlds: question: is there in the real world (the actual world) an object to which one of these concepts applies essentially and the other one only accidentally? Possible worlds deliver too many objects. PutnamVsKripke/PutnamVsEssentialism: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot justify it. >Ontology, >Possible world/Kripke, >Possible world/Lewis, >Possible world/Putnam, >Essentialism. Modal properties are not part of the materialistic equipment of the world. But Kripke individuates objects by their modal properties. Essential Characteristics/Putnam: I have not shifted the essential characteristics to "parallel worlds" but rather to possible states of the real world (e.g. a liquid other than H20 is water). This is essentialist in as far as it allowed us to discover the nature of water. We just say water should be nothing else (intention). That is simply our use and not "built into the world" (intrinsic) (Kripke ditto). VsMaterialism: this semantic interpretation does not help him, because it already presupposes reference (materialism wants to gain reference from "intrinsic" causal relationships). >Reference, >intrinsic, >Materialism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Essence | Dennett | I 276 Essence/Nature/Dennett: Nothing that is so complicated that it is interesting can have an essence. ((s) Reason: if it consists of several parts, it can only have developed gradually, while discarding useless parts.) Therefore, it was not essential at any time. Of course, not even at the present time. I 565 Example Vending Machine: A beverage vending machine that recognizes quarter dollar coins is later shipped to Brazil, where it accepts certain local coins. Thesis: The environment creates the meaning. Meaning/function/evolution/Dennett: the importance is how the function at the moment of their creation is still nothing definite! Example: a zoo of frogs exclusively with flying dummies, but adequate replacement diet for frogs: What do the eyes tell the brain then? I 569 DennettVsEssentialism: Essentialism has dissolved the vending machine into nothingness. Similarly: E.g. frog: would have tried to catch food pellets in the wild just the same if they had crossed his path. Disjunction: in some ways "fly or pellets" is a natural kind of frogs. They do not naturally make a distinction between pelkets and flys. On the other hand, disjunction is not a natural kind: it does not occur in nature. >Disjunction, >Essentialism. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Essence | Wiggins | II 286 Essence/RussellVsEssentialism: it is a purely linguistic question which properties we use in the presence of a name. - So names might have essence, things can not have an essence. Socrates is no more stable than the things that happen to him. "Mr Smith" is a collective name of incidents, i.e. a speaker referred to something completely unknowable. Wiggins per: an ontology of events is possible: (e.g. M. Proust: houses, streets, fleeting as the years, thin layers of experience). >Ontology, >Existence, >Objects, >Unambiguity, >Reference, >Individuation, >Identification. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Essentialism | Quine | Lauener XI 58 QuineVsEssentialism/Quantification/Lauener: quantification takes no account of the terminology - e.g. Fx is true if there is an object that satisfies that, no matter how it is called - e.g. 9 is the successor of 8 whether it is the number of planets or not. >Quantification/Quine. Lauener XI 175 Essentialism/singular term/general term/modal logic/Follesdal/Lauener: a semantics of modalities must distinguish between singular terms on the one hand and general terms and sentences on the other: i.e. between expressions that have a reference ((s) reference object) and expressions that have an extension ((s) a specifiable set). >Singular Terms/Quine, >General Terms/Quine. Quantification into opaque contexts/solution/FollesdalVsQuine: to be able to quantify into opaque contexts, we then have to make these contexts referentially transparent and at the same time extensionally opaque. Essentialism: that is what essentialism means: Def referential transparency/Follesdal/Lauener: what is true about an object applies to it, no matter how we refer to it. Def extensional opacity/Follesdal/Lauener: among the predicates true of an object, some apply necessarily and others accidentally. Quine VII (b) 21 QuineVsEssentialism: what is considered essential is arbitrary: a rational biped must be bipedal (because of its feet), but it does not have to be rational. The latter is relative. VII (h) 151ff QuineVsModal Logic: The modal logic makes essentialism necessary, i.e. one cannot do without necessary features of the objects themselves, because one cannot do without quantification. Actually, there is nothing necessary about the objects "themselves", but only in the way of reference. VII (h) 156 Barcan formula: You have to accept an Aristotelian essentialism if you want to allow quantified modal logic. ((s) Therefore, Kripke calls himself an essentialist.) > Barcan formula. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
| Essentialism | Stalnaker | I 71 Essentialism/today/VsQuine: most modal logicians today accept essentialism. QuineVsEssentialism: incorrect: it is incorrect to say that one description is better than the other, because it better characterizes essential properties of an object. >Essential property, >Possible worlds, >Modal logic. I 72 Essence/essentialism/essential property/LeibnizVsQuine/Stalnaker: thesis: every property of every individual constitutes its essence and only the existence of the thing as a whole is contingent. >Leibniz. I 74 Anti-Essentialism/quantified modal logic/Stalnaker/conclusion: in order to connect the two, we need real semantic conditions for atomic predicates. Reason: (Ex)N(Fx) > (x)N(Fx) is a theorem, but not its substitution instance (Ex)N(Rxy) > (x)N(Rxy). If something necessarily is father of x, then everything is necessarily father of x. Of course, only intrinsic predicates are in question, but this is assumed and not explained. >Intrinsicness. I 85 Essentialism/Stalnaker: questions about essentialism are questions about how far it is appropriate and possible to abstract. >Abstraction. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Identity | Mouffe | Gaus I 283 Citizenship/identity/Mouffe/Mottier: Mouffe (1992)(1) (...) founds her conception of citizenship on a critique as well as a critical reappropriation of liberalism. However, Mouffe's project of 'plural democracy' also draws strongly on postmodern and poststructuralist arguments (...). >Democracy/Mouffe, cf. >Identity/Postmodernism, >Gender/Poststructuralism. MouffeVsEssentialism: Indeed, Mouffe adopts an antiessentialist position towards citizenship, emphasizing the social and political construction of gender identities. Certain feminists fear that anti-essentialist positions limit the possibilities for political action and mobilization around women's identity. For Mouffe, on the contrary, the critique of essentialist identities is in fact a precondition for a truly feminist politics. Sex difference: The most urgent task in her view is to recognize the process of social construction through which sex difference has acquired such importance as a structuring factor of social relations of subordination. According to Mouffe, it is precisely within Gaus I 284 these processes that the real power relations operate in society. Therefore, a perspective that focuses only on the consequences of sex difference - whether 'equality of treatment' means that women and men should be treated differently or the same - is meaningless in her eyes. MouffeVsPateman/MouffeVsElshtain: Mouffe's anti-essentialism leads her to criticize feminists who primarily promote the revalorization of female values, such as (although coming from different perspectives) Pateman or Elshtain. For Mouffe, as for Judith Butler (1990)(2), such a position is problematic, as it assumes the existence of homogeneous identities such as 'men' and 'women'. Citizenship: Contrary to Pateman and Young, Mouffe thinks that the solution is not to make gender or other group characteristics relevant to the concept of citizenship, but on the contrary, to decrease their importance. The project of radical and democratic citizenship that she proposes implies a conception of citizenship which is neither gendered nor gender-neutral, based on a real equality and liberty of all citizens. She proposes, on the contrary, to focus on political issues and claims and not on presumably fixed and essential gender identities. Accordingly, the distinction between the private and the public spheres needs to be redefined from case to case, according to the type of political demands, and not in a fixed and permanent way. 1. Mouffe, Chantal (1992) 'Feminism, citizenship and radical democratic politics'. In Judith Butler and Joan Scott, eds, Feminists Theorise the Political. New York: Routledge, 22-40. 2. Butler, Judith (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge. Véronique Mottier 2004. „Feminism and Gender Theory: The Return of the State“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Modal Properties | Putnam | I (g) 189 Nature/essence/Kripke: e.g. statue: the statue and the piece of clay are two items. The fact that the piece of clay has a modal property, namely, "to be a thing that might have been spherical" is missing in the statue. VsKripke: that sounds initially odd: e.g. when I put the statue on the scale, do I measure then two objects? E.g. it is equally strange to say that a human being is not identical with the aggregation of its molecules. Intrinsic Properties/Putnam: e.g. suppose, there are "intrinsic connections" to my thoughts to external objects: then there is perhaps a spacetime region in my brain with quantity-theoretical connections with an abstract object which includes some external objects. >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic. Then this spacetime region will have a similar quantity-theoretical connection with other abstract entities that contain other external objects. Then the materialist can certainly say that my "thoughts" include certain external objects intrinsically, by identifying these thoughts with a certain abstract entity. Problem: if this identification should be a train of reality itself, then there must be real essences in the world in a sense that the set theory cannot explain. Nature/essential properties/PutnamVsKripke: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot serve to justify it. >Essentialism, >Essence. I (g) 190 Term/possible world/Putnam: modern semantics: functions about possible worlds represent terms, e.g. the term "this statue" unequals the phrase "this piece of clay". PutnamVsPossible Worlds: question: in the actual world, is there an object to which one of these terms significantly and the other only accidentally applies to? Possible worlds provide too many objects. PutnamVsKripke/PutnamVsEssentialism: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot justify it. Modal properties are not part of the materialistic means of the world but Kripke individuated objects by their modal properties. Essential Properties/Putnam: I have not shifted them into "parallel worlds" but instead into possible states of the actual world (other liquid than H20 water) which is insofar essentialist that we have thus discovered the nature of water. We just say water should not be anything else (intention). That is our use and not "built into the world" (intrinsic, Kripke ditto). VsMaterialism: this does not help the semantic reading because it presupposes reference (materialism wants to win reference from "intrinsic" causal relationship). >Materialism, >Reference, >intrinsic. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Necessity | Wiggins | II 285 Necessity/QuineVsAristotle/QuineVsEssentialism: the essence not independent of our specification of the objects. >Essentialism, >Essence, >Necessity/Quine. II 292 Wiggins: An Operator "it is necessary that ..." creates opaque contexts: E.g. to be taken for Jekyll is not the same as to be taken for Hyde, although Jekyll = Hyde. >Opacity, >Beliefs, >Speaker intention. Also rigid designators in contexts with "it is possible that .." are not interchangeable (and probably not even in "necessary..."). >Operators, >Rigidity. II 301 Necessary/Wiggins: analog to inner/outer negation: Tradition: to blurr the difference after the first method: E.g. "necessarily Socrates is a human" and "Socrates is necessarily a human". Wiggins pro second method -> Definition satisfaction for sentences with "necessary": Wiggins pro existence as necessary feature -> Existence generalization. II 303 Necessary/de dicto/Wiggins: simply wrong: E.g. necessarily (x)(x = Cicero)> (x is a human). de dicto: is it true? If so, we get the wrong thing: necessarily (Ez)(x)(x = z > (x is a human). |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aristotle | Descartes Vs Aristotle | Esfeld I 209 DescartesVsAristotle: 1) VsTeleology, 2) VsEssentialism. No hierarchical order of forms that culminates in God. >Essentialism, >Teleology. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Aristotle | Quine Vs Aristotle | EMD II 285 Necessity/QuineVsAristotle: cannot be considered independently of the way the objects are specified. Newen I 71 Synonymy/Two Dogmas/Quine: Problem: the concept is based on interchangeability salva veritate. Vs: Ex bachelor/unmarried man: "... has n letters". Here, interchangeability is not given salva veritate, although the words are synonymous. Variant: it must be possible to to exchange them in simple sentences without quotation marks. Vs: Example beings with a heart/beings with kidneys are koextensive. Variant: in simple modal contexts without quotation marks. Solution: for Ex heart/kidney, because it was not necessary but contingent that living beings with heart only developed if they also had kidneys. Newen I 72 QuineVs: QuineVsEssentialism/QuineVsAristotle. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Aristotle | Russell Vs Aristotle | EMD II 286 Nature/name/RussellVsEssentialism/RussellVsAristoteles: (History of Western Philosophy): E.g. Socrates is sometimes happy, sometimes sad. Because these things change, they are not part of his nature. But it is thought of Socrates, that he is a huamn. So the question of the nature is a question on how to use the words. We use the same name on several occasions for things or people that we see as the manifestations of the same. The nature of Socrates is then in the properties, in whose absence we will not use the name of Socrates. So names might have nature, things cannot have nature. --- EMD II 286/287 We find it convenient to summarize certain events in the life of "Socrates" and others in the life of "Smith". Then we believe that Socrates is somehow more stable than the things that happen to him. But he is not. "Mr. Smith" is a collective name for such occurrences, that is, it refers to something completely unknowable. --- Prior Prior I 121 Unicorn/Mill: stays on more safer ground than Reid when it comes to centaurs, but he seems to have forgotten what he said before. Syllogism/MillVsAristoteles: E.g. A dragon breathes fire a dragon is a serpent Ergo: some or all snakes breathe fire This is valid, according to Aristotle. RussellVsAristoteles: this is simply invalid because the premises are wrong: a dragon does not exist. Russell: either the premises mean: "Dragon is a word that means a thing that spits fire" or "The idea (idea) of a dragon is the idea of a thing that spits fire". ((s) Once a "word", twice an "idea".) Question: if there is no dragon, then the idea is no wrong idea? What would you say about that: "I would be afraid if a dragon would came inside"? Would he call this an idea or a word? VsReid: his own principles should have told him better. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Carnap, R. | Field Vs Carnap, R. | I 118 FieldVsCarnap: although my approach is similar to that of Carnap in Meaning and Necessity, 1) it does not refer to meaning at all. I.e. no "meaning relations between predicates" ((s)> meaning postulates). 2) my treatment of free variables does not require the introduction of "individual concepts" and is consistently anti-essentialist. (FieldVsEssentialism): no formula of the form "MB" is true in a model with view to an attribution function if it is not also true in the model in relation to any other attribution function. Nino Cocchiarella/Carnap/Field: Cocchiarella: ("On the Primary and Secondary semantics of logical necessity"): an approach similar to Carnap: FieldVsCocchiarella/FieldVsRamseyFieldVsCarnap: leads to Ramsey’s bizarre conclusion that E.g. "it is possible that there are at least 10 to the power of 10 to the power of 10 objects" is logically false if the world happens to contain fewer objects (empirical). FieldVsCarnap: 3) his idea that modal concepts are derived from semantic concepts should be modified, Field: Just the other way around! (QuineVsField). II 186 Referential Indeterminacy/Reference/Theory Change/Reference Change/Semantic Change/Field: we now have all the components for the indeterminacy of reference: Only (HR) and (HP) remain, but are mutually exclusive. (HP) Newton’s word "mass" denoted net mass. (HR) Newton’s word "mass" denoted relativistic mass. In fact there is no fact on the basis of which you could opt for one of two. Vs: it could be argued that we only lack additional information. FieldVsVs: but then it should be possible already to say what kind of information that is supposed to be. And we have already found that there can be no fact here. "Mass"/Newton/Denotation/Reference/Field: the issue is not that we do not know what Newton’s "mass" denotes, but that Newton’s word was referentially indeterminate. (Because we do not know which of the two, HP or HR should be excluded.) II 187 The truth and falsity of (4R) and (5P) cannot be explained on the basis of what Newton referred to. FieldVsReferential Semantics/FieldVsCarnap: this is excluded by this indeterminacy of reference. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Essentialism | Locke Vs Essentialism | I 169 Empiricism/Euchner: Locke's empiriscism is regarded as a decisive contribution to overcoming the old view of the world, which imputed direct knowledge of divinely revealed essential qualities. (VsEssentialism). Locke also refers to God, but he functions exclusively as the author of the cognitive ability. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Essentialism | Quine Vs Essentialism | Esfeld I 27 QuineVsEssentialism: because it is set to modal logic (QuineVsModal Logic). NS I 72 QuineVsEssentialism/Necessity/Analyticity/Two Dogmas/Quine: defining "it is necessary" as "it is analytically true" leads back or into a circle. Our aim was to explain "analytically". Two Dogmas/Conclusion/Quine: synonymy and meaning as a vehicle for the explication of analyticity must be abandoned. All three form a concept family that rejects a non-circular definition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Essentialism | Cresswell Vs Essentialism | I 119 Metaphysics/Cresswell: this is not about metaphysics, i.e. we just assume that things may have different characteristics in different possible worlds. ((s) CresswellVsKripke: Properties not necessary, but here not a metaphysical thesis. Otherwise: CresswellVsEssentialism). |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Essentialism | Stalnaker Vs Essentialism | I 72 Bare-Particular-Anti-Essentialism//b.-p.-AE/Stalnaker: thesis: for each individual and each property there are possible worlds (poss.w.), in which the individual has this property and other poss.w., in which it does not. Exceptions: multiple exceptions are required: a) tautological properties as e.g. to-be-identical-with-itself. For such properties it is not valid that they could be omitted in some poss.w.. Vs: 1. we need a special semantics for the b.-p.-AE. This must be different from the standard semantics for modal logic (ML). In Leibniz's anti-essentialism that was not necessary. His formal semantics can be viewed as a special case of possible worlds semantics. Vs: 2. I want to present an alternative semantics that makes sense out of the theory of bare particular. It does not require that the AE is true. But the AE is embedded in a natural way in a formal condition for models in this semantics. Bare particulars/Stalnaker: I do not want to defend it but while I am doubting that the bare-particulars-thesis is metaphysically true, I think that the fact that it does not make sense within the extensional semantics shows a limitation of this extensional semantics. Essentialism/Stalnaker: it is for me not primarily about to argue VsEssentialism but to formulate by a formally correct representation of the counter-doctrine (AE) some new questions about the obligations the essentialism has. I 72/73 Anti-Essentialism/AE/Stalnaker: we examine the thesis that all properties of all objects are accidental. Here we need three types of exceptions, three types of undeniably essential attributes. They were discussed by Ruth Marcus (1967) Terry Parsons (1967 and 1969). ((s) bare particulars/b.p./Stalnaker/(s): theory of the b.p.: thesis that there may be things without properties as an alternative to the thesis that all things have essential properties.) |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Essentialism | Simons Vs Essentialism | I 272 Mereological Essentialism/Chisholm/Simons: there is a disarmingly simple example by Chisholm (1976, 146): E.g. a table is formed out of a stub and a plate. It is only the same table, if both remain the same. Chisholm: so it should seem that a certain table is necessarily built of this plate and this stub. Simons: this is the only example of "person and object". I 273 As it stands, it is indeed convincing. a: stub, b: plate, c: the restulting table: N(E!c > (t)[Ext c > a ≤≤t c u b ≤≤t c]) Everyday language translation/logical form/(s) : "(t)[E Ext a...": "at all times in which", "always if a c exists.. " – "N(E!c > …”:a c has to....”… - "N(E!c > (t)[Ext c ..." "a c always has to...". Simons: this is different than the sum that also would exist if plate and stub would not be connected, the table can only exist if both are connected. Superposition/Simons: so the parts do not guarantee the existence of the table (or the identity of the table with the sum)! I 275 SimonsVsEssentialism: that e.g. the engine of a car must be a specific engine is not so clear. Here there is room for vagueness and convention. Pro essentialism: clear case: e.g. an atom must have these particular protons, otherwise it is a different atom. I 276 (...) Chisholm pro Essentialism: >Sorites, Sorites/Chisholm. SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsEssentialism: our everyday linguistic concept scheme provides no such identity conditions and living conditions for ordinary objects (things, objects) so that they could not continue to exist at the slightest change. I 278 Most of the objects of science, e.g. stars, planets, organisms or volcanoes are such that they are both: natural objects or whole while mereologically variable so that there is a middle path. Middle path: there is a middle path between Chisholm's extreme essentialism and the position that the parts of an object would be merely determined arbitrarily or conventionally. Simons: thesis: one could assume a "naturally unified object". (see below: "normal style", "normal thing", "normal piece of music"). I 338 Connection/Whitehead: (see above WD5’) individuals are connected if they have a binary sum. Together with Tiles' definition then in Whitehead's system each individual is self-connected, which corresponds to his intentions. SimonsVsExtensionality: all this does not refute the arguments VsCEM: systems that limit the existence of sums and smallest upper bounds, but nevertheless remain extensional, are still too strong to be able to act as a general theory of part and whole. (However, they are still useful.) Characteristic relation/whole/Simons: continuity is only one characteristic relationship among many. Some may not be important, but one should not exclude any a priori. E.g. the political relations between Alaska and the rest of the United States outweigh the spatial continuity with Canada. Continuity: continuity helps to exclude discontinuous sums, e.g. sums of chemicals of several organisms. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Essentialism | Parsons Vs Essentialism | Cresswell I 58 Essentialism/Cresswell: Part of the problem is characterizing it at all. Def Essentialism/Terence Parsons/Cresswell: (Parsons 1969): the doctrine that some things necessarily have a property that other things do not necessarily have. Limited to single-digit predicates: logical form: the following applies for a 8.1 (E.g.) N x and (E.g.)~N x (Parsons also has several-digit predicates): Cresswell: in a complex wff a (where only x is free) which is supposed to be a modal essentialist formula, we can sipmly extend the language by forming an extra predicate and adding the following formula to L(T): 8.2 (x)(a ↔ (x)). ParsonsVsEssentialism/Parsons: an essentialist proposition is false in a maximum model. And for any consistent set of closed non-modal formulas (i.e., for the models of L(T)), there is a maximum model. Point: i.e. that no physical theory contians essentialism with regard to its predicates. Provided, of course, that W consists of all models of L(T). |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Putnam, H. | Dennett Vs Putnam, H. | I 571/572 Meaning/Function/Evolution/Dennett: the meaning is like the function at the moment of their creation still nothing definite. Twin Earth/t.e./Putnam/DennettVsPutnam: it requires a leap in the reference, a jump in the intentionality. Dennett: you could now tend to think that inner intentionality has a certain "inertia". I 573 Twin Earth/Dennett/VsPutnam: you cannot tell a story assuming that tables are no tables, even though they look like tables and are used like tables. Something else would be a "living being that looks like Fury" (But is not Fury). But if there are "twin earth horses" on the Twin Earth which are much like our horses, then twin earth horses are horses, a non-terrestrial kind of horse though, but after all horses. ((s), therefore, in Putnam the Twin Earth water has a different chemical formula: YXZ.) Dennett: of course you can also represent a more stringent opinion according to which the non-terrestrial horses are a separate species. Both are possible. I 575 Indeterminacy/Twin Earth/Dennett: Their idea of what "horse" for really means suffers under the same indeterminacy like the frog’s idea of the fly as a "little flying edible object". Indeterminacy/DennettVsPutnam: E.g. "cat", "Siamese cat": Perhaps you simply find one day that you must make a distinction that was just not necessary previously, because the subject did not come up for discussion. This indeterminacy undermines Putnam’s argument of the t.e. Münch III 379 Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: he tries to close the gap by saying that we are referring to natural types, whether we know it or not. Dennett: But what types are natural? Races are as natural as species or classes! ((s) VsDennett: There is also the view that only the species are natural). DennettVsEssentialism: E.g. Vending Machine has dissolved into nothingness. Equally: E.g. Frog: he would have caught food pellets in the wild just the same if they had come in his way. Disjunction: in a way "flies or pellets" are a natural type for frogs. They do not distinguish between the two naturally. On the other hand, the disjunction is not a natural type: it does not occur in nature!. Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: "natural type" twin earth horse/horses/disjunction: E.g. Assuming someone had brought twin earth horse to the Earth unnoticed, we would have readily referred to them as horses. Meaning/Dennett: Vending machine and the information of the frog’s eye derive their meaning from the function. Where the function does not provide a response, there is nothing to investigate. The meanings of the people are just as derived as those of a venidng machine. This proves the t.e. Otherwise you have to postulate essentialism. Explanation/DennettVsPutnam: an explanation on microphysical level is not inconsistent with an explanation on rational grounds. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 Putnam III 31 DennettVsPutnam: according to Putnam’s conception the mind something chaotic. Dennett and Fodor: Both authors have an unspoken premise in mind, and this is reductionist. There is also cognition without reductionism. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Newen Vs Quine, W.V.O. | New I 129 Concept/Holism/Quine/NewenVsQuine/Newen: not all concepts are linked to all others. E.g. color concepts are independent of the concept of the electron. NS I 68 Meaning/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: Quine is a meaning skeptic. His raw material for a reconstruction of a theory of meaning are the empirical sciences. Two Dogmas/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: is Quine's largest "Wrecking Ball". NS I 69 Two Dogmas/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: 1. Dogma: distinction analytic/synthetic 2. Dogma: reductionism: any meaningful synthetic sentence is equivalent to a sentence whose terms all refer to the sensory experience. Meaning/Two Dogmas/Quine: the concept of meaning is not well defined. Analyticity/Analytical/Two Dogmas/Quine: 1) Experimental Definition: "... true because of the meanings of the words in it, regardless of empirical facts. Vs: Problem: the transition from e.g. "every unmarried man is unmarried" to "every bachelor is unmarried". Analytical: its definition thus depends on the concept of meaning. Meaning/Quine: Problem: reference objects cannot always serve: e.g. creatures with heart/kidneys. Same Extension. But only because of the (random) evolution), not because of the meaning of words. It cannot always be true solely on the basis of the meaning of words, because the words are different ((s) and "heart" and "kidneys" just are not synonymous.) NS I 70 Today: VsQuine/Newen/Schrenk: recent developments have advanced: although meaning is not the same as the reference object, the reference object may be part of the meaning. (see below >natural kinds). Synonymy/Quine: is closely linked to the concept of meaning. If you wished that the meaning was an abstract object, then the class of all synonymous terms/sentences can serve as this abstraction. It follows a new definition: Analyticity/Analytical/Two Dogmas/Quine: 2) Experimental Definition: a statement is analytically true if it is true because of synonymy relations and regardless of facts. Point: "meaning" does not occur here anymore. New: the class of the synonymous sentences of w.g. "every bachelor is unmarried" contains the sentence "all unmarried men..." NS I 71 Dictionary/Two Dogmas/Lexicon/Quine: the dictionary already presumes the concept of synonymy. Dictionaries are empirical hypotheses about the use. Synonymy/Two Dogmas/Quine: Problem: the concept is based on interchangeability salva veritate. Vs: example Bachelor/unmarried man: "... has n letters". Here, interchangeability salva veritate is not given, although the words are synonymous. Variant: it must be possible to exchange them in simple sentences without quotation marks. Vs: e.g. heart/kidneys Variant: in simple modal contexts without quotation marks... Solution: for example heart/kidneys, because it was not necessary but contingent that living creatures with hearts have only evolved if they also had kidneys. NS I 72 QuineVs: QuineVsEssentialism/QuineVsAristotle. Essentialism/VsQuine/Newen/Schrenk: in modern metaphysics and philosophy of science essentialism is experiencing a comeback. (Lit 4-4). NS I 74 Analyticity/Synonymy/Meaning/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: these expressions are not well defined. Solution/Quine: stimulus meaning: consists of positive and negative stimulus meaning: also contains irrelevant stimuli, i.e. the total package of stimuli on one occasion that lead a particular speaker to accept or decline. It is only a pale imitation of the original concept of meaning. This is part of Quine's meaning nihilism. NS I 75 Stimulus Synonymy: only for defined speaker. The same stimulus meaning. Stimulus Analyticity: only for defined speaker. Agreement with each stimulus. Differs from the original analyticity concept. NS I 76 Indeterminacy/Gavagai/Quine/Newen/Schrenk: 1) inscrutability of reference: E.g. unseparated rabbit parts comply with the same observation situations 2) indeterminacy of translation: E.g. unseparated rabbit part: can a) "be the same" b) "belong to the same thing" (both in the foreign language! This goes beyond the inscrutability of reference 3) underdetermination (of a theory) by the data: (corresponds to translation indeterminacy): there may be rival theories that match the same number of observations. VsQuine: some argue that it never comes to radical translations, because many aspects of language are evolutionarily enscribed in the brain and cannot vary so widely (literature: 4-2). I.e. only the third uncertainty remains. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Skepticism | Craig Vs Skepticism | Brendel I 182 Def Wissen/Craig: ein Zustand, durch den eine epistemisches Subjekt in die Lage versetzt wird, ein guter Informant zu sein. Def guter Informant/Craig: muss folgende Bedingungen erfüllen: er muss (subjektiv) guter Informant sein I 183 bezüglich der Frage, ob p der Fall ist, bestimmte Eigenschaften muss, die das Urteil rechtfertigen, dass er mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit (Wschk) in der Frage, ob p der Fall ist, recht hat. (Craig 1993, 94, 133, 139) Skeptizismus/Wschk/Craig(Brendel: können wir mit dem Begriff der Wschk verstehen. Der Skeptiker will die Forderung der Wschk ins Absolute steigern. Skeptizismus/CraigVsSkeptizismus: es ist aus pragmatischen Gründen nutzlos, vom guten Informanten zu verlangen, dass er den Skeptizismus widerlegt, denn das kann er nicht und könnte daher nie ein guter Informant sein. Aber das ist ja auch nicht der pragmatische Zweck. Wir gewönnen dadurch keine Meinung. BrendelVsCraig: fällt damit wieder Gettier-Bsp anheim: jemand könnte den Bedingungen für „guter Informant“ genügen, und p könnte falsch sein, er dennoch zufällig etwas Wahres ableiten. I 184 Bsp jeder Informant ist ein guter Informant, wenn er die Richtung zum Bahnhof mit einer Wschk von mehr als 0,5 angibt. Das kann n auch darauf beruhen, dass jemand sich falsch erinnert. falsche Lösung: die bedingungen zu „objektivieren“: Craig selbst lehnt aber de Steigerung solcher Bedingungen „ins Absolute“ ab. Daher kann es immer eine Kluft zischen der tatsächlichen Wschk und 1 geben. Wissen/Craig/Brendel: Craig verzichtet aber ganz bewußt darauf, von Wissen als „wahrer Überzeugung“ zu sprechen. Wissen hängt zwar mit Wahrheit zusammen, diese sollte aber kein definierender Bestandteil sein. „Wissen“ bleibt ein schillernder Ausdruck. I 185 Def Zweck/Wissen/Craig/Brendel: der Zweck von Wissen ist, jemand zu einem guten Informanten zu machen. Wissen/Craig/Brendel: These es gibt kein „Wesen“ und keinen festgelegten Umfang und Inhalt von „Wissen“. CraigVsEssentialismus Bezug auf Wissen. BrendelVsCraig: die Angabe notwendiger und hinreichender Bedingungen für Wissen führt nicht notwendigerweise zum Essentialismus und auch nicht zum Ende einer philosophischen Analyse. I 186 Begriffsanalyse/Brendel: bildet sowieso nur den Anfang, wie bei „Wahrheit“. BrendelVsCraig: der bloße Verzicht auf eine Definition bringt nichts. Es müsste auch gezeigt werden, dass es prinzipiell keine geben kann. I 187 BrendelVsCraig: geht von der fragwürdigen Annahme aus, dass es einen intuitiven Umfang des Wissensbegriffs gäbe. Wissen/Umfang/Inuition/BrendelVsCraig: über den „intuitiven Umfang“ besteht keineswegs. |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Various Authors | Mayr Vs Various Authors | V 15 Types, typological thinking: MayrVs.: goes back to Plato, is unsuitable for evolutionary and population biology: here we are not dealing with classes, but with mixtures of unique individuals: populations. So there is no "essence" either (VsEssentialism) V 38 Vitalism: a peculiar phenomenon: among the physicists of the 20th century. There were vitalistic ideas. Bohr: certain laws could work in organisms that are not found in inanimate matter. Bohr looked in biology for evidence of its complementarity and used some desperate analogies. MayrVsBohr: there is really nothing to consider. (Blur only in the subatomic range). V 43 Evolution: Unit of evolution is the population (or species) and not the gene or individual. (MayrVsDawkins). |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
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Reference |
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| Essentialism | Pro | Stalnaker I 121 Plantinga per essentialism but PlantingaVs extreme essentialism - StalnakerVsEssentialism. not: PlantingaVsEssentialism. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Vs Essentialism | Field, Hartry | I 38 FieldVsEssentialism: these operators are non-essentialistic and therefore quite unusual in modal logic. ((s) FieldVsKripke: non-essentialistic modal operators). These less barren terms should be treated with extreme caution (recent essays). They are not meaningless, on the contrary, one can often give a "hygienic" explanation of them by putting them in terms of logical possibility etc. (even more essentialistic). |
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