Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Description Levels Quine IX 188
Predicate Calculus 2nd order: this predicate calculus compromises individuals and classees of individuals.
V 33
Similarity/Perception/Ontology/Quine: the transition from perception to perception similarity brings ontological clarity. Perception (the result of the act of perception) is omitted. >Perception/Quine.
V 34
Similarity/Quine: Perceptual similarity differs from reception similarity. The latter is purely physical similarity. Three digit relation: Episode a resembles b more than episode c. Perceptual similarity: on the other hand, is a bundle of behavioral dispositions of the 2nd order (to react).
The contrast can be eliminated by using the reception similarity, but not only speaking of individual episodes a, b, c, but more generally of episodes that have a reception similarity with these.
VI 71
Levels of Uncertainty: the uncertainty of the reference is not identical to the uncertainty of the translation, nor is it as serious. Translation indeterminacy is more serious because it is holophrastic (it refers to whole sentences): it can produce divergent interpretations that remain unexplored even at the level of whole sentences.
VI 72
The uncertainty of the reference can be illustrated by examples of compensating adjustment manoeuvres within a sentence.
X 20
QuineVsEquivalence of Sentences/Sentence Equivalence: the equivalence relation has no objective sense at the level of sentences.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Equivalence Theorem Ricardo Mause I 277
Equivalence Theorem/government debt/Ricardo/Barro: Thesis: the financing of public expenditure via taxes or via government debt is equivalent. However, this requires a number of restrictive assumptions. The theorem goes back to Ricardo, but was only brought into its present form by Barro. (1) N.B.: The question is whether additional expenditure makes sense in consideration of the need for private cutting consumption to finance it, but not in what way it is financed.
Reason: If government debt rises, private households will anticipate future tax increases and adjust their consumption patterns accordingly.
VsEquivalence Theorem: the empirical relevance of these questions can be questioned.
For example, there could be altruism between the generations: Parents plan with a basically infinite time horizon.
Another problem: it is also assumed that the path of expenditure policy is independent of the financial instrument used. This is only plausible if intergenerational altruism works and voters are perfectly informed.
Behavioral Economics/BuchananVsRicardo/BuchananVsBarro/BuchananVsEquivalence theorem: if government debt is perceived less strongly than taxes, debt-financed higher spending may be politically enforceable. Then Ricardo's equivalence collapses. (2)
This problem also exists when the capital markets are not perfect, allowing households to easily shift consumption between the present and the future, even without public debt instruments.
VsBarro: another problem: distorting taxes: If you move away from the first best tax system, it may well play a role for the welfare of individuals whether the state is in debt. Hereto:
Solution/Barro: subsequently introduced the argument of tax smoothing into the discussion. (3) In this case, it makes sense to compensate for fluctuations in tax revenue by increasing and reducing government debt, but to keep tax rates relatively constant.
BarroVsKeynesianism: The reason for this is not an economic policy countermeasure for Keynesian motives, but the fact that welfare losses caused by distorting taxes increase disproportionately with tax rates. For further problems: see Growth/Diamond.


1. Robert J. Barro. 1974. Are government bonds net wealth? Journal of Political Economy 82 (6): 1095 – 1117.
2. James M. Buchanan & Richard E. Wagner. Democracy in deficit. The political legacy of Lord Keynes. New York 1977.
3. Robert J. Barro. 1979. On the determination of the public debt. Journal of Political Economy 87 (5): 940– 971.

EconRic I
David Ricardo
On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Equivalence Theorem Barro Mause I 277
Equivalence Theorem/government debt/Ricardo/Barro: Thesis: the financing of public expenditure via taxes or via government debt is equivalent. However, this requires a number of restrictive assumptions. The theorem goes back to Ricardo, but was only brought into its present form by Barro. (1) N.B.: The question is whether additional expenditure makes sense in consideration of the need for private cutting consumption to finance it, but not in what way it is financed.
Reason: If government debt rises, private households will anticipate future tax increases and adjust their consumption patterns accordingly.
VsEquivalence Theorem: the empirical relevance of these questions can be questioned.
For example, there could be altruism between the generations: Parents plan with a basically infinite time horizon.
Another problem: it is also assumed that the path of expenditure policy is independent of the financial instrument used. This is only plausible if intergenerational altruism works and voters are perfectly informed.
Behavioral Economics/BuchananVsRicardo/BuchananVsBarro/BuchananVsEquivalence theorem: if government debt is perceived less strongly than taxes, debt-financed higher spending may be politically enforceable. Then Ricardo's equivalence collapses. (2)
This problem also exists when the capital markets are not perfect, allowing households to easily shift consumption between the present and the future, even without public debt instruments.
VsBarro: another problem: distorting taxes: If you move away from the first best tax system, it may well play a role for the welfare of individuals whether the state is in debt. Hereto:
Solution/Barro: subsequently introduced the argument of tax smoothing into the discussion. (3) In this case, it makes sense to compensate for fluctuations in tax revenue by increasing and reducing government debt, but to keep tax rates relatively constant.
BarroVsKeynesianism: The reason for this is not an economic policy countermeasure for Keynesian motives, but the fact that welfare losses caused by distorting taxes increase disproportionately with tax rates. For further problems: see Growth/Diamond.


1. Robert J. Barro. 1974. Are government bonds net wealth? Journal of Political Economy 82 (6): 1095– 1117.
2. James M. Buchanan & Richard E. Wagner. Democracy in deficit. The political legacy of Lord Keynes. New York 1977.
3. Robert J. Barro. 1979. On the determination of the public debt. Journal of Political Economy 87 (5): 940– 971.

EconBarro I
Robert J. Barro
Rational expectations and the role of monetary policy 1976

EconBarro II
Robert J. Barro
David B. Gordon
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policcy 1983


Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018

The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Propositions Quine Vs Propositions V 61
QuineVsPropositions: to maintain the old "ideas": the idea that a sentence expresses. Superfluous.
VI 99
QuineVsPropositional Stances de re: peculiar intention relation between thoughts and intended things. There are no reliable policies for that. Not scientific. Better: Opinions de dicto.

VI 142
Propositions/QuineVsPropositions: are not sentence meanings. This is shown by the indeterminacy of translation.
X 19
Proposition/QuineVsPropositions: as meaning of sentences, as an abstract entity in its own right. Some authors: consider it as what t/f is, and between which there are implications.
Oxford/Terminology: many authors use "proposition" for statements.
Quine: in my earlier works I used it for assertions. I gave up on it, because of the following trend:
Proposition/Oxford: actions that we perform when we express assertions.
X 20
Proposition/QuineVsPropositions: their representative believes to save a step and thus to achieve immediacy: Truth/Tarski/Quine: the Englishman speaks the truth,
1) Because "Snow is white" means that snow is white and
2) Snow is white.
Quine: the propositionalist saves step (1).
The proposition that snow is white is simply true, because snow is white. ((s) >Horwich: "because snow...").
He bypasses differences between languages ​​and differences between formulations within a language.
Quine: my disapproval does not arise from dislike of abstract things. Rather:
QuineVsPropositions: if they existed, they would bring about a certain relationship of synonymy or equivalence between propositions themselves:
False Equivalence/Quine: such sentences would be equivalent that express the same proposition.
QuineVsEquivalence of Sentences/VsSentence Equivalence: the equivalence relation makes no objective sense at the level of sentences.

X 32
Letter/Quine: p can be schematic letter (only for sentences) or variable (then only for objects). Here problem: that does not work simultaneously! Solution: semantic ascent: we only talk about sentences.
Sentence/Name/Quine: the other formulation could be given sense by stipulating that sentences are names, for example, of propositions.
Some Authors: have done that. Before that, however, the letter "p" is no variable about anything except schematic letters, placeholder for sentences in a logical formula or grammatical structure.
QuineVsPropositions: Problem: once sentences are conceived as names of propositions, the letter "p" is also a variable about objects, namely propositions.
Then, however, we can correctly say: "p or not p' for all propositions p"
((s) Because the letter p is no longer at the same time a variable about objects and a schematic letter for sentences, but only a variable about objects.)

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987