Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Epistemology | Rorty | I 16 Rorty thesis: knowledge has no foundations. >Ultimate Justification. I 163 Def recognize/Aristotle: insertion of something material into the soul. I 167 Epistemic problem: the next two centuries of philosophical thought might have been very different if the "epistemic problem" had been formulated in the terminology of relations between propositions and their degree of certainty, rather than in the terminology of alleged components of propositions. Kant: did not undertake the pragmatic turn. He did not talk about sentences, but but about inner ideas. >Kant, >Imagination/Kant, >Experience/Kant, >Epistemology/Kant. I 167 Knowledge/epistemic problem/Rorty: relations between propositions - not between components of propositions. VsKant: then you do not need synthesis. Kant/Rorty: he did not talk about sentences either, but about inner ideas. I 175 Foundations/knowledge/Rorty: arguments instead foundations! - Before Locke, no one would have searched for a foundation of knowledge. >Recognition/Locke, >Experience/Locke. I 191 Def recognize/Rorty: the social justification of opinions. The contrasting of people and situations. This allows us to get rid of the mirror of nature. I 210 Epistemology/SellarsVsEpistemology//Rorty: it confuses a theory of inner episodes with a theory about the right to make certain assertions. I 248 Epistemology/Quine/Rorty: epistemology always wavered between two criteria: a) causal proximity to the physical stimulus - b) the focal point of consciousness. I 249 Solution: The dilemma dissolves, if we merely speak of color spots. >sense data. I 271 Rorty: there’s no way from psychology to epistemology. No way from the discovery of intermediary instances to a critique of opinions about the world. (RortyVsepistemology). I 273 Epistemological Tradition: confused causal explanations of the acquisition of opinions with justifications of opinions. I 278 Epistemology: can be done in an armchair, psychology cannot. V 20f Knowledge/Foucault/Rorty: knowledge and power can never be separated from each other. RortyVFoucault: but these are no "rules of language". >Foucault, >Recognition/Foucault. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Epistemology | Ryle | I 400 ff RyleVsEpistemology: knowledge is not an episode, not teaching of a theory, but the building of a path (not walking). >Knowledge, >Understanding/Ryle, >Action, >Event/Ryle, >Thinking/Ryle, >Recognition. I 404 Meanings do not occur, they exist. Processes end with judgments, they do not consist of them. >Meaning, >Processes, >Judgments. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Method | Parsons | Habermas IV 311 Method/explanation/sociology/theory of action/Parsons/Habermas: Problem: if purposes and values in orders are already related to existing interests, institutionalized action can be understood as a process of realizing values under factual conditions. In this way, action and order could be correlated. However, Parsons isolates these two levels of analysis from each other. This exacerbates the construction problem. >Theory of Action/Parsons. Habermas IV 330 HabermasVsParsons: in connection with a theory of communicative action, the attempt to separate "material" from "immaterial" patterns of value increases the confusion. HabermasVsSubject Philosophy/HabermasVsEpistemology: the subject of epistemology directed at objects is a wrong model in its approach. Solution/Habermas: a model of communication-oriented action that can be used for studying how culture, society and Habermas IV 331 personality cooperate in the determination of action orientations. >Background/Habermas. Habermas IV 337 Method/HabermasVsParsons: when the pattern-variables (see Terminology/Parsons) describe a structural core common to several components (e.g. society, culture, personality), they cannot serve simultaneously to clarify the specific developments of these components on action orientations. Problem: there is no counterpart to the communication mechanism. Habermas IV 351 HabermasVsParsons: Parsons must make action connections suddenly understandable as systems without becoming aware of the change of attitude with which the concept of the action system is methodically first created through the objectification of the lifeworld. Therefore, he focuses on the theoretical introduction of the system concept. Solution/Parsons: Parsons simply gives basic conceptual priority to system theory. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Perception | Millikan | I 319 Perception/vision/seeing/tradition/epistemology/Millikan: Thesis: Perception is passive. I 320 MillikanVsTradition/MillikanVsEpistemology: Perception is nothing passive! We are focussing our attention and are constantly asking ourselves decision questions. "Is it alive? Is it moving?" >Awareness. Often, we relate to other things in order to identify them. Therefore, abilities are the same as implicit intensions. Implicit Intension/Millikan: but an implicit intension is not a "stimulus meaning". >Identification/Millikan. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Theories | Ryle | I 391f Theory/Ryle: tradition: to have a theory means to have and not to forget to do something. RyleVsTradition: instead it is a disposition for an application or an ability. >Ability. Intellectual capacity is not always accepted. I 394f Establishing a theory/Ryle: establishing a theory is like building a path, not walking, but grading (RyleVsEpistemology). >Epistemology/Ryle. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Descartes, R. | Cavell Vs Descartes, R. | Stroud I 258 Meaning/to mean/Knowledge/Cavell: For example "saying nothing at all" is a possibility that a philosopher does not know what he means. There is nothing to mean here. (Cavell, The Claim by Reason, Oxf. 1979, 210). CavellVsEpistemology: says surprisingly little. Assertion/Cavell/Stroud: is an action. But not every (speech) action is an assertion. Even if a well-formed sentence is produced! This also applies to questions etc. Conditions of utterance/Cavell: every type of utterance (type of speech action) has its conditions. If these conditions are not fulfilled, there is no assertion (utterance) at all. And this applies to traditional epistemology: it does not fulfill the conditions of utterance. Def "Basis"/Terminology/Cavell/Stroud: is a sentence that makes a special claim (supports). CavellVsDescartes: one should assume that his basis is the claim to want to know if he is sitting by the fireplace, with a piece of paper in his hand. N.B.: but this example is not to be understood as a case in which someone investigates a specific claim to knowledge (assertion of knowledge). I 259 CavellVsEpistemology, traditional: here there are no concrete claims of knowledge at all. For example, we are asked to imagine that sitting by the fireplace is not the same as imagining that we have claimed to know that we are sitting by the fireplace. The case of skepticism is not an assertion context. We cannot answer the question, although we have the feeling that we should answer it. But this is not about something being overlooked. One must really be able to imagine that an assertion was made, and that is not the case here. ((s) Otherwise, for example, two people would be in a divided situation and one would ask whether the other also perceives the fireplace). Cavell/Stroud: without a set claim to knowledge (knowledge assertion) the investigation would not even look similar to our everyday methods. Knowledge Claim/CavellVsDescartes: to imagine that a knowledge claim would have been made in Descartes' example, one would have to imagine a context in which the claim was made. Then one needs additional conditions for the context. N.B.: these conditions would first make the judgement possible in the particular case, and this would then again not be transferable to other cases. The (skeptical) judgment would not be representative. CavellVsSkepticism/CavellVsEpistemology: Dilemma: a) it must be a concrete statement if the procedure of the investigation is to be coherent at all, but if it is concrete, it cannot be general. b) Without the generality, it cannot be skeptical. Skepticism/Cavell/Stroud: pro Cavell: he shows a solution in the right generality. I 261 CavellVsSkepticism/Stroud: no statement that the traditional epistemologist can produce is representative of our epistemic situation towards the world in general that he aspires to. The judgment of the epistemologist or the skeptic is always particulate. It cannot be generalized. Stroud: Cavell must show that the philosopher (skeptic, epistemologist) must construe the meaning of each particular assertion wrongly in order to pretend his generalization. ( > StroudVsCavell...+...). |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Epistemology | Quine Vs Epistemology | QuineVsEpistemology: does not deserve its name! (Source: where?). Stroud I 226 Naturalized Epistemology/Quine: Epistemology should be regarded as an enterprise within the academic community. Sceptical doubts are scientific doubts. Logic/QuineVsTradition/QuineVsEpistemiology: "decisive logical point": science is under attack from within science itself (by the criticism of the "thinness" of our inputs). short: if our science is true, how do we know that it is true? |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Epistemology | Rorty Vs Epistemology | Rorty passimm RortyVsEpistemologic Model according to the analogy of visual perception, mirror of nature. Brendel I 136 Epistemology/Rorty/RortyVsEpistemology/Brendel: coincides with the disclosure of an interesting W concept. I 139 Epistemology/Tradition/Brendel: assumes the separation of (subjective) justification and (objective) truth. RortyVsEpistemology/Brendel: it tries "to link the temporal with the timeless". Rorty/Brendel: believes that epistemology is only feasible if the separation is maintained. Justification/Brendel: but does not need to be kept separate from truth by no means. >Justification. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Epistemology | Ryle Vs Epistemology | I 53 RyleVsEpistemology: demands, often wrongly, that dispositions express themselves similarly. Since they have realized that "knowledge" and "belief" are dispositional, they think that consequently there would have to be intellectually uniform processes. E.g. Someone who believes that the earth was round, would have to recognize and judge this repeatedly from time to time. I 174f Success Words/Ryle: absurd, pointless to say: that someone finds a treasure in vain, unsuccessfully wins a race, solves a puzzle wrong, a proves sentence invalidly. For this inability is a logical inability, it says nothing about human abilities, but only that winning unsuccessfully is a contradictory expression. RyleVsEpistemology: we will see later that the longing a guaranteed error-free observation is partly stirred by the fact that we do not recognize that observation is a success verb, so that a "faulty observation" is a contradictory expression like "contradictory evidence" or "unsuccessful healing"(correct would be: unsuccessful treatment), also "inconclusive observation" or futile observation are possible. Difference: whether it is a "search" word, or a "find" word. I 177 Deception/Ryle: we call feigned motives frauds or hypocrites, feigned inclinations are called charlatans and incompetents. Synonymous with the difference of ability and inclination. Knowledge/Belief/Ryle: epistemologists like to engage their readers in the distinction between knowledge and belief. Some say the difference is merely gradual, others that knowledge contains an introspective portion which belief lacks, or vice versa. (RyleVsEpistemology). In part, their confusion is because they consider "knowledge" and "belief" incident names. I 178 But even if they are recognized as a dispositional verbs, you also have to realize that they are dispositional verbs of entirely different kind. "Knowledge" is an ability word. The person can bring something in order or condition. "Belief", on the other hand, is a tendency verb and does not mean that something is ordered or produced. I 395 VsEpistemology/Ryle: epistemologists like to compare theoretical constructions with an act of seeing through, or similar to the teaching of a theory. RyleVs: as if Euclid had been equipped beforehand for what he was equipped for after acquisition of the theory. Conversely, epistemologists describe what Euclid did in teaching his theories as something that would be a revival of the original theory work (but is not). They describe path usage as if it were path construction. I 400 ff (+) Epistemology/Mental Processes/Event/Mental State/RyleVsEpistemology: wrong question, pointless: have you made two or three premises between breakfast and lunch? Have drawn one conclusion during dessert or more? Absurd. How long does a conclusion take? Epistemology/Mental States/Assets/RyleVsEpistemology: a realization is not an episode in the life of an explorer. A special division ability or squaring ability would have been expected of epistemology. It is certainly true, because tautological, that correct expressions have their meaning, but that does not entitle to ask where and when these meanings occur. The mere fact that an expression exists to be understood by anyone, says that the meaning of an expression cannot be marked as if it were an event, or as if it belonged to an event. (...) I 409 Processes end with judgments, they are not made of them. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Epistemology | Cavell Vs Epistemology | Stroud I 259 Skepticism/CavellVsEpistemology, traditional: here there are no concrete claims of knowledge at all. For example, to be asked to imagine that you are sitting by the fireplace is not the same as to imagine that we have claimed to know that we are sitting by the fireplace. The case of skepticism is not an assertion context Knowledge Claim/CavellVsDescartes: to imagine that a knowledge claim would have been made in Descartes' example, one would have to imagine a context in which the claim was made. Then one needs additional conditions for the context. N.B.: these conditions would first make the judgment possible in the particular case, and this in turn would not be transferable to other cases. The (skeptical) judgement would not be representative. CavellVsSkepticism/CavellVsEpistemology: Dilemma: it has to be a) a concrete assertion, if the procedure of the investigation is to be coherent at all, but if it is concrete, it cannot be general. b) without the generality. Then it cannot be skeptical. |
Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Epistemology | Millikan Vs Epistemology | I 319 Perception/view/tradition/epistemology/Millikan: Thesis: Perception is passive. I 320 MillikanVsTradition/MillikanVsEpistemology: Perception is not passive! We focus our attention and constantly put before us yes-no-questions. Ex "Does it live? Does it move?". We often bring us in relation to other things, to allow for their identification. Therefore, skills are the same as implicit intensions. implicit intension/Millikan. but there is no "meaning of stimulus". Test/Verification/theory/Millikan: that a test works, can often be known independently from knowing how it works. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Epistemology | Vollmer Vs Epistemology | I 177 VollmerVsEpistemology/Tradition: it is not that we can forget the knowledge of lower levels (children, computers, animals, idiots). |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Skepticism | Cavell Vs Skepticism | I (a) 52/53 Skepticism/Cavell: Asymmetry: you assume that your inability ((s) to show the pain) has the same meaning as that of the skeptic: he should be able to show what he has in mind, if it is understandable. Otherwise you assume that the skeptic cannot show that his position is understandable. For the skeptic, however, there is another asymmetry: he does not have to prove the comprehensibility of his incapacity. The critic of skepticism must therefore show that even the skeptic has no use for his words. For example, as long as one cannot show that it is possible to see through the objects, it is pointless (incomprehensible) to speak of the inability to see through. Why can the skeptic not just say, "You don't understand what I mean"? I (a) 54 The source of intelligibility are the words themselves then one can say: VsSkepticism: he uses the words in a case where they are no longer meaningful. SkepticismVsVs: that is double-edged: the objection shows that the sceptic changes the context, but it also shows that what the sceptic says is understandable! Stroud I 256 Skepticism/Cavell/Stroud: (Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy (Oxf. 1979, "CR", p. 45ff)) We must note the difference between the skepticistic assertion that we never know anything and the everyday assertion that in individual cases we do not know anything. Stroud: Question: how can the philosophical question about the general possibility of knowledge arise at all, while we are dealing with the assessment (evaluation) of an individual case? I 257 Cavell: is the example that the skeptic produces to be understood as an example of an individual case? Descartes/Stroud: we take them more as everyday questions. For example, I do not know if I am really sitting by the fireplace with a piece of paper in my hand. Basis/Terminology/CavellVs: Thesis: in the case of Descartes the basis is not introduced completely naturally. This is the key to diagnosis. CavellVsSkepticism: Thesis: "The skeptic does not do what he thinks he is doing". This does not mean, however, that he distorts the meanings of the terms used. (s.o. AustinVsMoore). I 258 N.B.: the point here is that the way of saying something is essential to what is meant (Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Oxf. 1979, 208) Use Theory/Cavell: assumes individual situations. Use TheoryVsEpistemology/Stroud: this is a special branch of the critique of skepticism. CavellVsSkepticism: it is not that he cannot mean the things he thinks he means because his conclusion would be contradictory. Rather, he ignores the terms of his sceptical claims, while his words retain their normal meaning. ((s) No change in meaning). |
Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
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| Skepticism | Cavell, St. | Stroud I 257 Def "Basis"/Terminology/Cavell/Stroud: is a sentence that makes a special claim. Basis/Terminology/CavellVs: Thesis: In the case of Descartes, the basis is not completely natural. This is the key to diagnosis. CavellVsSkepticism: Thesis: "The skeptic does not do what he thinks he is doing". This does not mean, however, that he distorts the meanings of the terms used. (see AustinVsMoore above). I 258 N.B.: the point here is that the way of saying something is essential to what is meant (Conceptual Role, 208) I 258 Use Theory/Cavell: The thesis is based on individual situations. I 258f Skepticism/CavellVsSkepticism: the skeptic does not do what he believes he is doing. He says nothing! - Then he cannot mean anything either. - Traditional epistemology: it says surprisingly little - it claims no knowledge! Def Basis/Cavell: a sentence that produces a special claim. CavellVsDescartes: did not make a claim either. - Difference: to imagine sitting by the fireplace, and to imagine claiming to know this. So the solution method cannot even look similar to our everyday methods. - Assertion: requires context that is not generally transferable. The sceptical judgement would not be representative. I 261 The judgement of the epistemologist or skeptic is always particular. I 261 StroudVsCavell: I can see that I have made a condition that is not met. Then this calls my knowledge into question, without me having previously put this forward in a claim to knowledge ("basis"). Nevertheless: like Cavell: StroudVsEpistemology: needs each time a concrete knowledge claim, which makes a general answer impossible. I 263 Stroud pro Cavell: I think he is right, thesis: that the traditional epistemologist needs conditions of expression for every concrete case, which make a generalization impossible. StroudVsCavell: I just want to show that you don't have to show that no assertion has been made. |
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| Epistemology | Goodman, N. | Geach IV 179 Epistemology/GoodmanVsEpistemology: Thesis: an unconscious preference for stupidity is characteristic of both internalist and externalist epistemology. It stems from the common belief that a) our epistemic objective is to accept or believe a proposition when it is true. And b) that the standard of acceptability cannot be set too high, otherwise skepticism will prevail. IV 200f Goodman Thesis: I believe that Holmes' predicament shows that knowledge of how contemporary theories conceive it is not and should not be our primary cognitive objective. For to understand it this way would mean to devalue cognitive abilities, sensitivity, breadth and depth of understanding, and other things. What is missing is a far-reaching study of cognitive excellence. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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