Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 24 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beliefs | Sellars | Rorty VI 179 ff Belief/Sellars: every belief is revisable. Rorty: Belief/SellarsVsEmpiricism: can only be justified by concepts. (s) Not through "direct perception", "intuition", "experience", etc.). >Perception, >Empiricism. --- I XXXIII Ryle: had suggested to conceive mental predicates like "being convinced", "believing", etc. as expressions of dispositions, however without accounting for the fact that, again, there is an explanation instance, be it in the nature of the Freudian ego or superego. >Gilbert Ryle, >Dispositions/Ryle, >Behavior/Ryle. Ryle: being convinced means to behave in a certain way. Sellars: goes one step further than Ryle by asking how the behavioral dispositions themselves can also be explained. E.g., His tie retailer John developed a kind of theory which specifically refers to the verbal behavior of a community of Rylean ancestors. >Rylean ancestors. --- II 325 Action: fundamental beliefs are expressed in uniformity of behavior. This does not mean that no deviations are possible, but only that the representation of a principle is in any case also characterized by uniformity of behavior. >Regularity, >Behavior/Sellars. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Causality | Parsons | Habermas IV 309 Causality/Action/Motives/Moral/Durkheim/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons considers Durkheim's distinction between moral and causal force the decisive breakthrough. >Empiricism, >E. Durkheim, >Morals/Durkheim, >VsEmpirism. Parsons: the fear of sanctions is always secondary, the sense of moral obligation is primary.(1) >Duties. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 709. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Colour | Carnap | VI 126 Colors/Carnap: arise as abstraction classes of color identity. VI 102 Abstraction class: class of elements related to an arbitrary element - (s)> Unit Sets. VI 152 Similarity Circles/Carnap: at first, you take all classes of elementary experiences (EE) that are partially similar to each other - (due to reflexivity). >Experience. Then the two-, three-, etc. classes of partially similar EE - then one removes from this list all the classes that are contained in a different one as subclass VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (color theory): we are to remain in the field of sensory perception itself and notice the laws in the area of perception that exist between them - CarnapVsGoethe: the laws of physics do not apply there, but different, more complicated ones do. >Perception, >Phenomena, >Qualia. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Empiricism | Adorno | XIII 85 Experience/Empiricism/Adorno: In Locke, Berkeley, and Hume one finds a great deal about the experience, but the experience itself will hardly be encountered in this philosophy. >Experience/Locke, >Sensations/Berkeley, >Sensory impressions/Berkeley. >Experience/Hume. XIII 86 Philosophy has the problem that, as soon as it attempts to make its experiences valid, it always has only a concept of experience and not the content of experience. From this, it has made a virtue and derived from it that experience, because it can be expressed only in the concept of experience, is in itself only a concept, only a being. >Concepts/Adorno, >Concepts, >Essence. Content/Adorno: Paradoxically, the content of idealist philosophies such as in Hegel, but also Schelling, is much more effective than in empirical philosophies. >Content, >Content of truth/Adorno, >F.W.J. Schelling, >G.W.F. Hegel. XIII 155 Empiricism/Adorno: in contrast to rationalism, thinking, as it were, adds something. By adding itself from the outside to the given, the two pinciples (res cogitans and res extensa) are again immediate. >res cogitans, >R. Descartes, >Rationalism. Then all thinking without sense is just a mere idea. However, this approach also develops further and further from its own consequence in the sense of a progressive subjectivization. From Bacon's naively realistic empiricism, over Locke, as well as over Berkeley and Hume, a consistent empiricism gradually developed, in which, by a consistent recourse to the senses, nothing else is left to be valid as a legal source of knowledge than the immediate circumstances of my consciousness. From Bacon's naively realistic empiricism, Locke, as well as Berkeley and Hume, gradually developed into empiricism, in which, by consistently appealing to the senses, nothing else is left to be regarded as a source of knowledge than the immediate realities of my consciousness. >F. Bacon, >J. Locke, >G. Berkeley, >D. Hume. XIII 156 RationalismVsEmpiricism/EmpiricismVsRationalism/Adorno: the opposition between empiricism and rationalism is not so radically remote as is often imagined. Both are based on the scientific model of evidence. They are both residual theories of the truth, and thus always interrelate. >Truth/Locke. The moment of mastery of nature and finally self-control is the basis of both schools. >Nature/Locke, >Nature/Hume. XIII 157 Experience/Empiricism/Adorno: empiricism also treats experience always only as a principle, according to its most general categories, not at all according to its content. >Experience. XIII 158 Only the creator of empiricism, idealism, and in the most comprehensive measure Hegel have attempted to get the full mental experience under control. >Idealism, >Experience/Kant, >Experience/Hegel. KantVsEmpiricism/Adorno: There is absolutely no experience without thinking, otherwise it would stop by the mere discontinuity of the individual moments. The unity principle ((s) of subjectivity, reason, and mind) would then be completely omitted. >Empiricism/Kant, >Thinking/Kant. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Empiricism | Barrow | I 36 Empiricism/positivism/Barrow: both empiricism and positivism claim that there are only individual facts, not universals. EmpirismusVsUniversals; PositivismVsUniversals. >Universals, >Facts, >Individuals, >Individuation, >Identification, cf. >Individual causation, >Causality, >Causation. I 42 Both Vsoperationalism/Vsinstrumentalism: theories can only be discovered, they cannot be invented. >Operationalism, >Instrumentalism, >Theories. I 39 VsEmpiricism/Barrow: a theory of elementary particles is more than a mere list of their properties. - It excludes useful terms because they are not observable. - So that it forbids any law of nature! >Observation, >Observation language, >Observation sentences, >Observability, >Unobservables, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Theory language, >Concepts. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Empiricism | Easton | Brocker I 490 Empiricism/EastonVsEmpiricism/Easton: Empiricism runs out in a collection of facts without foundation. EastonVsEmpiricism: Accumulation of data as an end in itself, the theoretical peculiarity of which is not apparent.(1) >Theory/Easton, Politics/Easton. 1. David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1965, p. 17 Dieter Fuchs, “David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolEast I David Easton A Systems Analysis of Political Life New York 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Empiricism | Fodor | IV 191 Empiricism/Fodor/LeporeVsEmpiricism: empiricism cannot show the similarities of the concepts of uncle/aunt, ice/vapor, President/Cleopatra, etc. (they are conceptual). You cannot reduce conceptual relations to relations between observational concepts. >Observation, >Concepts, >World/Thinking, >Language. Network: observational concepts are on the periphery. Theoretical terms are in the center. >Network/Quine. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Empiricism | Goethe | Carnap VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Color theory): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. >Positivism, >Theory of Colors. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (in the perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all. >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Seeing, >Laws of nature. But these laws are of much more complicated form. Carnap VI 180 Physical world/CarnapVsGoethe: to be distinguished from the world of perception. Mere quadruples of numbers to which state variables are ascribed. VI 181 Only it is accessible to intersubjectivity, not the world of perception. >Nature, >World, >World/Thinking. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Empiricism | Husserl | I 23 HusserlVsEmpiricism: empiricism as a justification of laws will only lead to vague rules. History of judgements (acts of thought) is real whereas the content of judgment is ideal. >Content, >Content/Husserl. Instead of empiricism: research of essence or science of essence. T he prototype for this would be mathematical thinking. >Judgment. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 |
| Empiricism | Kant | Vollmer I 24 KantVsEmpiricism/Vollmer: unacceptable because then the concepts and principles of understanding would lack the necessity, they undoubtedly have. Experience/Kant: everyone has already ready structures. >Principles/Kant, >Unterstanding, >Concepts/Kant, >Experience/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Empiricism | Popper | I 129 Empiricism/proof/Popper: Who looks for rigorous proofs in the empirical sciences (or for strict considerations), will not be taught by a better experience. >PopperVsEmpiricism, Popper per >Rationalism. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Empiricism | Quine | Graeser I 146 QuineVsCarnap: (Holism): since theory is only debatable as a whole, theoretical terms escape the reduction to sensual terms. But: Empiricism/Quine: is not a strict opponent. How else is knowledge of the world possible? >Theoretical Terms/Quine. Quine VII (b) 40ff Empiricism/Quine: empiricism has excessively rich ontology. Science is double dependent on language and experience, but thesis: this duality cannot be traced back to individual statements. XII 90/1 Empiricism/Quine pro: 1) everything that speaks for scientific theories comes from experience 2) every word meaning is ultimately based on experience XII 94 One has abandoned the following methods: 1) trying to explain everything from sensory data - 2) the rational reconstruction. Stalnaker I 3 QuineVsEmpiricism/Two Dogmas/Stalnaker: empiricism is no basis for the distinction between language rules (rules) and our judgments about the world - no theory - neutral basis. >Two Dogmas/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Empiricism | Searle | I 89 SearleVsEmpricism: "empirical" is ambiguous: ontological (causal) or epistemologically (observable parallelism). >SearleVsEmpiricism. Behavior is irrelevant when it comes to the ontology of consciousness. We could have two systems (robots) with identical behavior, one of which has consciousness and the other does not. Empiricist philosophers will not be comfortable with these thought experiments. It will seem to you as if I am assuming the existence of empirical facts regarding the mental states of a system, but which cannot be proved by any empirical means. You believe that the behavior of another system is the only clue we have to attribute mental states to this system. >Robot, >Behavior, >Simulation, >Consciousness, >Zombies, >Mind, >Computer-model, >Turing test. There is a systematic ambiguity in the use of the word "empirical". (a) Ontological sense of "empirical." Then when one speaks of empirical facts, sometimes contingent facts in the world are meant. I 90 b) Epistemological sense of this word. Here one means a provable sense, namely from the perspective of the third person. Supposedly, all empirical facts are equally accessible to all competent observers. But we know that this is not true. There are any number of empirical facts which are not equally accessible to all competent observers. ((s) Otherwise one would have to define competence by access, which would be circular.) |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Individuals | Developmental Psychology | Upton I 5 Individuals/Developmental psychology/Upton: Question: To which extend is the development driven by external factors or by something inside each individual (>Environment/Developmenal psychology). Tradition: Traditional views of development see the individual as passive in their development. Empiricists see the child as a passive recipient of stimuli, while nativists see the child as passively following a biological programme. VsEmpiricism: Most contemporary theories of development recognise an active role for children in their own development. This thinking has its roots in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, who argued for a synthesis of nativism and empiricism. >Psychological Development/Kant. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Innateness | Vollmer | I 19 Innate/innate ideas/innate things/Vollmer: E.g. motion vision, color vision, sense of time, depth perception, so the "ability to interpret two-dimensional retinal images in three dimensions. >Seeing, >Colours. Consistency performances: recognition, form categories (classes, terms), knowledge of human faces, smile and anger facial expression, the optical fixing of a sound source (even if born blind), language ability, need for speaking. >Recognition, >Categorization, >Classification, >Language, >Language acquisition, >Language development. Partly innate: intelligence, musicality, logical structures (e.g. modus ponens, biologically realized by the ability to form certain reflexes), elementary mathematical structures (e.g. group structures and forming invariants). Possibly causal thinking. >Intelligence VollmerVsEmpiricism: most programs are already incorporated at birth and they consistently fit to our environment. >Empiricism. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Justification | Strawson | IV 101 Justification/StrawsonVsEmpiricism British: there is no justification of a theory based on a part of this theory (here: the episodes of subjective states) - what should be explained is presupposed here. >Circular reasoning, >Empiricism. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Language Acquisition | Empiricism | Upton I 2 Language Acquisition/Empiricism/Upton: the empiricist position on the question of language acquisition suggests that language input is sufficient to provide the information we require to learn the structure of language. This perspective proposes that infants acquire language through a process of statistical learning. Language is acquired by the general learning methods that apply to all aspects of human development. VsEmpiricism: >Language Acquisition/Nativism. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Objective Mind | Popper | Habermas III 116 Objective mind/Popper/Habermas: Popper deals with the basic empirical conception according to which the subject is suddenly confronted with the world, receives its impressions from it via sensory perceptions or acts on states in it. >Myth of the given. This problem context explains why Popper sees his doctrine of the objective mind as an extension of the empirical concept and introduces the objective as well as the subjective mind as "worlds", i. e. as special totalities of entities. World 1: physical objects, World World 2: states of consciousness, World 3: objective thought content) The older theories of the objective mind, developed from Dilthey to Theodor Litt and Hans Freyer in the historical and new Hegelian traditions, start from the primacy of an active mind that interprets itself in the worlds it constitutes. PopperVsLitt/PopperVsDilthey/PopperVsFreyer/Habermas: Popper, on the other hand, holds on fast to the primacy of the world over the mind and understands the second and third world in analogy to the first world ontologically. In this respect, his construction of the third world is more reminiscent of Nicolai Hartmann's theory of mental being. (1) (PopperVsEmpiricism). >Empiricism. World 3/Popper/Habermas: the products of the human mind immediately turn against him as problems:"These problems are obviously independent. They are not created in any way by us; rather, we discover them and in this sense they already exist before their discovery, moreover, at least some of these problems may be unsolvable.". (2) 1.N. Hartmann, Das Problem des geistigen Seins, Berlin 1932. 2.K. R. Popper, J. C. Eccles The Self and its Brain, Berlin 1977 p. 41ff. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Observation Language | Sellars | XXI I Observation language/SellarsVsEmpiricism: the observation language is selected - and thus an ontology. >Ontology, >Observation, >Empiricism. I XVII Observation Reports/report/SellarsVsEmpiricism/Sellars: reports appear to form the basis of justification instead of the sensory data. SellarsVs: sensory data are not independent in the sense that they require no further knowledge. >Sense data, >Knowledge. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Operationalism | Barrow | I 37 Operationalism: Science is a system of rules for the exploration of the world in the laboratory - linguistically: how are the words used? - InstrumentalismVsEmpiricism: useful concepts are not only those which can be traced back to the sense data. >Empiricism, >Instrumentalism, >Sense data. Theories and laws of nature are only instruments to make the environment understandable. True/false do not exist as properties of theories. Idealism: since all knowledge is filtered through our minds, we are never sure if there is a connection to reality. >Idealism. I 42 OperationalismVsEmpiricism: theories may also be invented - therefore, the observer receives a more important role. >Observation, >Ideal observer, >Theories. I 41f VsOperationalism/Barrow: asks what is measurable. Therefore, he must exclude complex and irrational numbers. >Numbers, >Measurements. Fragmentation of science: every time we use a different method of measurement, we need to consider a number as a different variable. Circular reasoning: operationalism presumes that we know what an permissible operation is. Problem: certain concepts may only be used when sensitive devices allow accurate measurements. >Fine-grained/coarse-grained. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Positivism | Goethe | Carnap VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Color theory): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. >Empiricism, >Theory of Colors. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (in the perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all. >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Seeing, >Laws of nature. But these laws are of much more complicated form. Carnap VI 180 Physical world/CarnapVsGoethe: to be distinguished from the world of perception. Mere quadruples of numbers to which state variables are ascribed. VI 181 Only it is accessible to intersubjectivity, not the world of perception. >Nature, >World, >World/Thinking. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Provability | Vollmer | II 154 Provability/theory/VsEmpiricism/Vollmer: facts never prove a theory. >Empiricism, >VsEmpiricism, >Proofs, >Facts, >Evidence. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Syntheticity | Chisholm | II 60 Synthetic: Existence/Kant: every existential judgment is synthetic according to Kant. Synthetic judgments a priori/Kant: make conditional existence assertion. (> Analogies of experience) - ChisholmVs. II 61 Synthetic a priori/Kant: E.g. the space is three-dimensional. - RiemannVs: refuted - synthetic a priori/Chisholm: depends on whether there are non-analytic propositions of the form All S are P. - E.g. Chisholm: All squares are form-bearing, all red is colored, nothing red is green. - But not clearly: two forms: a) all humans are mortal, b) all humans are descendants. II 62 Chisholm: form-identical with the analytical propositions - KantVsChisholm: form differs. II 72 Synthetic a priori/Chisholm/Sauer: Problem: no synthetic a priori if the definition of necessity is: p expresses a contradictory proposition which can be negated - false solution: to chose necessity as mere inclusion (understanding a includes understanding b), then contradiction: it would be possible that there is no or one possible worlds , so that non-p. - reason: E.g. "p" expresses an inclusion, then non-p is contradictory. II 73 Synthetic a priori/Chisholm/Sauer: E.g. (S) All red is colored: is not a logical truth because there are no red objects in every possible world (poss.w.). - analytic/Sauer: Problem: the same happens with the analysis: from the fact that (A) "all squares are rectangles" is analytic, would follow that this is true in every possible world, but not from the simple sentence "All squares are rectangles". - Problems: see below. II 74 If "all squares are rectangular" is true, then the property of the square exists. II 76 The doctrine of the synthetic a priori in Kant is VsEmpiricism. The doctrine of the analytic is VsRationalism: to reach the knowledge of objects by means of consistent thinking. - ((s) No existence follows from this.) Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Theories | Easton | Brocker I 490 Theory/Easton: According to Easton, American political science in the early 1950s was dominated by two approaches, which he called "historicism" and "empiricism". Historism/Historicism/Easton: focuses on a history of political ideas, each understood as an expression of its historical epoch. >Historicism. EastonVsHistoricism: 1. Thus political theory is no longer an autonomous theory, but only a manifestation of a temporal epoch. 2. With this, no answers to the problems of the present can be given. Empiricism/Easton: runs out in a collection of facts without foundation. EastonVsEmpiricism: Accumulation of data as an end in itself, the theoretical peculiarity of which is not apparent.(1) >Empiricism. Brocker I 491 Theory/Easton: a theory must not regard its subject itself as a derived phenomenon (in Easton's case, politics). 1. David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1965, p. 17 Dieter Fuchs, “David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
PolEast I David Easton A Systems Analysis of Political Life New York 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behaviorism | Searle Vs Behaviorism | I 30 Searle: the ontology of mental states is an ontology of the first person. (SearleVsBehavoirism). I 49 SearleVsBehaviorism: two types of objections: 1. objections of common sense. 2. Technical objections. 1. VsLogical Behaviorism: technical objections: behaviorism never succeeded to fully explain the concept of a "disposition". Circle: if one wants to analyze the belief through behavior then you have to obviously also make reference to the wishing; if one wants to analyze the wishing by behavior, then you have obviously also have to make reference to the belief (Chisholm 1957)(1). I 50 LewisVsBehaviorism: technical objection: behaviorism ignores the causal relationships between mental states and behavior (Lewis 1966)(2). The objections of common sense are ultimately the most embarrassing. The absurdity lies in the denial of the existence of all the inner states of mind. This is against our ordinary experience of how it is to be a human being. I 57 Functionalism: what makes two neurophysiological states relating to occurrences of the same state of mind type, is that they perform the same function throughout the life of the organism. The two mind states must then stand on the following three things in the same causal relations: 1. To the stimulus that the organism receives as input, 2. To the various other "mental" states and 3. To the behavior that the organism produces as output. Note that by the causal relationships two objections are avoided that were put forward VsBehaviorism: the first said that behaviorism neglects the causal relationship of mental states, the other said that in it a circularity was contained, and as convictions against recourse to requests and wishes had to be analyzed by resorting to convictions. VIII 428 Grammar/language/SearleVsBehaviorism/SearleVsEmpiricism: Dilemma: a) Either he relies solely on stimulus-response mechanisms (stimulus response) then he can not explain the acquisition of grammar. Or b) He admits à la Quine that there are innate mechanisms. But once the mechanisms are rich enough, the stimulus-response part is not interesting! 1. R. Chisholm, Perceiving Ithaca, NY, 1957 2. D. Lewis, An argument for the identity theory, Journal of Philosophy 63, 1966: pp.17-25 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Carnap, R. | Verschiedene Vs Carnap, R. | Skirbekk I 16 Probation: correspondence between sentence and the reality NeurathVsCarnap: coherence rather than correspondence. Carnap VI 177 Attribution/Quality/Sensory Quality/Carnap: there is no sharp line between attributable and non-attributable sensory qualities. Organ sensations can hardly or not at all be attributed to certain world lines (i.e. visual things). Example "melancholic forest": This attribution is justified! VI 178 Because it arouses a sensation of corresponding quality. Like sugar the sweet one. (external) VsCarnap: "pathetic fallacy". VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Theory of Colours): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (n of perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all. But these laws are of a much more complicated form. VI 71 Characteristics/characteristic/definition/constitution/Carnap: Problem: e.g. foreign psychic: the behavior is not the same as the foreign psychic itself! Realism: the angry behavior is not the anger itself. Solution/Carnap: but one can transform all scientific (not metaphysical) statements about F into statements about K while keeping the logical value (truth value). Then F and K are logically identical. (s) But not vice versa: the concept of behavior is not the concept of anger. VI 72 A meaning for K that did not agree with F could not be given scientifically! (many authors VsCarnap). Carnap: this has to do with Leibniz's identity. VI 78/79 Foreign Psychic/Carnap: every psychological process, if it occurs as foreign psychic, is in principle recognizable (by behavior) or questionable. So every statement can be transformed into a statement about the corresponding characteristics. It follows from this that all psychological objects can be traced back to physical objects (movements of expression, behaviour). (BergsonVsCarnap). |
Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Empiricism | Behaviorism Vs Empiricism | Danto2 I 266 BehaviorismVsEmpiricism: B. turned away from empiricism to apply its principles in the observable. It assumes that there are no problems in the external world, but only in the interior. |
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| Empiricism | Dewey Vs Empiricism | Suhr I 84 DeweyVsEmpiricism: Spirit does notsimply response to external stimuli, but understanding of meaning. ((s) Empiricism without spirit would only be "reliable differential responsive dispositions". See RDRDs/Brandom). |
Dew II J. Dewey Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004 Suhr I Martin Suhr John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 |
| Empiricism | Dummett Vs Empiricism | DummettVsEmpiricism, British: Saussure:.. "... A term triggers in the brain a particular sound. This is a psychological phenomenon which in turn is followed by a physiological process, the brain initiates a pulse on to the vocal organs, then the sound waves to the ear of the other to be transmitted, a purely physical process. I 117 DummettVsSaussure: This representation of the understanding process is obviously untenable. It mimics the equation of the British empiricists of idea and concept. (Vs). Terms are represented as mental images (ideas). Content of consciousness: private: fragrance, melody, name "idea" (no background necessary) - But not: ideas, thoughts, sense (public) - (VsBritish Empiricists: "ideas" are not terms). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Empiricism | Feyerabend Vs Empiricism | I 91 Reason/Perception/FeyerabendVsEmpiricism: it is better to leave aside the phenomenon and to use reason to reveal the appearance of an illusion - through reason, the impression becomes connectable with new observation statements. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Empiricism | Fraassen Vs Empiricism | I 59 Observation/Limits/Fraassen: there are limits to observation? Grover Maxwell: Thesis: in principle not. Other AuthorsVsEmpiricism: precisely because there are such limits. Description/Fraassen: a physical theory can not be translated without remainder into a corpus of sentences, which states only observable phenomena. ((s) Description/Fraassen/(s): must always take into account the unobserved). Fraassen. this is sometimes turned VsEmpiricism. But I only concede the premise. (Fraassen pro empiricism). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Empiricism | Frege Vs Empiricism | II 19 Numbers/Frege: the very widespread tendency not to accept anything that is not given to the senses, tempts to consider the numerals themselves as numbers and as actual objects of contemplation. (FregeVsEmpiricism). II 20 Such a conception is untenable, because we cannot speak of any arithmetic properties of the numbers without going back to the meaning of the numerals. The property of 1 being 1 again if multiplied by itself, for example, would be a pure fiction. We may speak of definition, but no definition is as creative as to impart properties on a thing that it simply does not have. Number Equality/Calculating/Frege: you might say: 1+1 is a sum, but 6:3 is a quotient. But what is 6:3? The number which is 6 if multiplied by 3. The number, not "a" number. There is only one number that satisfies this condition. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Empiricism | Hume Vs Empiricism | II 196 Empiricism/KantVsEmpiricism/LockeVsEmpiricism/HumeVsEmpiricism/Black: all three have recognized that exclusive reference to experience was bound to limit the possibility of known answers! Hume: sees the danger and wrote that libraries might burn for this later. |
D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 |
| Empiricism | Husserl Vs Empiricism | I 23 HusserlVsEmpiricism: Vs empirical justification of laws: this adheres to them the character of vague rules: e.g. the principle of contradiction: could only be formulated as a conjecture. (> Degrees of probability). |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 |
| Empiricism | James Vs Empiricism | I 57 JamesVsEmpiricism: "nominalism": empiricists assert that there is a term for any object. James: how about facts for which there is no concept?. - Worse: Language / James: supports the nominalist tendency to fragment the stream of consciousness. Nevertheless, James developed a position of radical empiricism (VsRationalism, Vsempiricism that is represented by Hume.). JamesVsHume: to be radical empiricism must neither accept elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly. Radical empiricism / James: 1st Only those issues can be discussed, that are based on categories of observation. 2nd The relationships between the objects of experience are just as accessible as the objects themselves. 3rd connection as a result of the sequence of partial experience is itself an object of experience. The experience of this relationship is the power of consciousness. 4th No upfront construction of subjective consciousness. |
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| Empiricism | Maturana Vs Empiricism | I 154 There are well-known hallucinations, e.g. shadows that are seen in color, although they are gray. This is often referred to as illusion. Maturana: it must be clear to us that we do not describe an independent reality. Illusion can only be distinguished by comparing different types of experiences, i.e. outside of a concrete experience! In the experience itself, we can not distinguish between illusion, hallucination or perception. This is a constitutive feature of all living systems. Perception / MaturanaVsEmpiricism: that should cause us to question any certainty that is based on perception. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Empiricism | Quine Vs Empiricism | IV 397 British Empiricism: based on ideas in the mind. These are of course not intersubjectively observable. That means the foundation is private, not public. QuineVsBritish Empiricism: VsMentalistic approach: in the Quine's eyes not consistent. One should stick to what openly observed is true to anyone. Language is nothing private, but something social. IV 398 The language: a social skill that is acquired through the observation of the social use. The externalization of empiricism leads to behavioral access to meaning. (Behaviorism). IV 402 QuineVsBritish Empiricism: Is based on the assumption of ideas (derived from Locke). Uncritical mentalism. Too simple picture of the experiential reference of languages and theories. VI 11 "Linguistic Turn"/Quine: that was good, but not good enough: the distinction between observation sentences and theoretical propositions was only made derivatively, no theoretical terms should appear. Therefore Reichenbach used "bridge sentences" to connect the two sentence types. (VsBritish Empiricism). Observation/Quine: we do not start with objects (we eliminate them), but with sentences! This allows us to define the observation sentence, without bothering about whether it is theory-free or not! We also no longer need to decide which objects the words should designate! (Without reification). Instead of objects stimulus meaning: the willingness to agree to a sentence. VI 11/12 Singular Term/Singular Terms/Ontology/Existence/Quine: if we had assumed terms instead of sentences, we would have skipped the whole issue of objectification and always conceded object-relation from the hollow gut. Meaning Theory/M.Th./Quine: must be empirical. QuineVsLogical Empiricism: neither the analytical truths nor the observation base resists the skeptical attack. V 189 Theory/Ontology/Quine: how should a scientific theory look like at best? We want as many as possible and good predictions. Guiding principles: simplicity and conservatism. V 190 Both are in a dialectical relation! (To use an expression by my students). An strong oversimplification can justify a relatively large deviation. Between the two, we need a compromise. Conservatism/Quine: among other things, caused by our lack of imagination. But also prudence when it comes to hypotheses. Simplicity/Conservativeness: both are already at work in language learning. Language Learning/Quine: occurs in leaps and bounds. Is always based on similarities and analogies. V 191 Short steps are conservative. They are guided by relative empiricism. Def Relative Empiricism/Quine: do not stray further from sense data than necessary. Quine pro: That keeps theory changes low. QuineVsRadical Empiricism: we gave it up when we gave up hope to reduce talk of objects to talk of sense data. Important argument: that requires us to stick with the substitutional quantification over abstract objects. This speaks to the nominalistic mind. It manifests itself in relative empiricism, for both are the same. Nominalism: must not overestimate the ontological harmlessness of the variables of sQ. In general, we can say the values of variables determine the whole ontology if we only have object variables, truth functions and predicates. Stalnaker I 3 QuineVsEmpiricism/Two Dogmas/Stalnaker: when it comes to accepting or not accepting a whole language, along with a theory that is formulated in this language, then it is not certain that there is a base for a distinction which are the language rules (rules), and what are the judgments about the world. There is no theory-neutral way to separate factual questions from semantic ones. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Empiricism | Sellars Vs Empiricism | Rorty VI 205 SellarsVsEmpiricism, British/Rorty: Confusion of causal conditionality and justifiable reason. Rorty I 194 QuineVsEmpiricism/SellarsVsEmpiricism/logical/Rorty: their legal doubts about the epistemic privilege: that certain assertions are used as reports of privileged ideas. Gavagai/Quine/Rorty: asks how the propositions of the natives can be distinguished in contingent empirical platitudes on the one hand and necessary conceptual truths on the other hand. For the natives it is enough to know which propositions are certainly true. They have no idea of conceptual, necessary truths. I 195 Assertibility/Rorty: if assertions are justified by their being common and not by their nature of inner episodes it makes no sense to try to isolate privileged ideas. I 196 Necessity/Quine/Rorty: necessary truth: equivalent to the fact that nobody had to offer an interesting alternative that could cause us to question it. Incorrigibility/Sellars/Rorty: until now nobody has proposed a viable method of controlling human behavior that could verify the doubt in this matter. I 196/197 Truth/justified assertibility/Rorty: (stems from Dewey). Sellars, Quine, Chisholm and many others have the intention of making truth more than this modest approach. VI 219 RortyVsEmpiricism: contains nothing that would be worth a rescue. Sellars I XVII To seem/to appear/Sellars: like Lewis and Chisholm: about how something appears to someone any error is in fact impossible! But VsLewis: by this the propositions do still not advance to the foundation of the justification. Observation reports/SellarsVsEmpiricism/Sellars: seem to be able to build instead of the sense-data the foundation of justification. Vs: they are not in the sense independent that they require no further knowledge. Someone who always only responds with "This is green" does not express with it alone any knowledge. (> Thermometer, parrot). He has no position in the "logical space of reasons". I XXI SellarsVsLogical Empiricism/SellarsVsEmpirismus/Sellars: the special wit his criticism is that the experiences of the minute taking persons that should constitute the basis of the theory in logical empiricism, are reconstructed by him as quasi theoretical postulated entities of an everyday world view. I XXII Sellars: (different than Wittgenstein and Austin): Connection between questions of classical philosophy and everyday language. Sellars I 54 Elementary word-world connections are made between "red" and red physical objects and not between "red" and a suspected class of private red single objects. (SellarsVsEmpiricism). This does not mean that private feelings are maybe not an essential part of the development of these associative connections. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Empiricism | Strawson Vs Empiricism | IV 98 British Empiricism: thesis: the general structure of our imagination must be derived in any way from a small part of themselves. StrawsonVsEmpiricim, British: narrow-minded reduction of sensory experience on impressions or images of simple sensory qualities. IV 99 1. After one of these directions our general thought structure is something like an elaborated theory based on subjective state of affair sequences. It therefore needs a rational justification. 2. Hume: thinking that we are inherently subject to. Explanation only by basic materials. 3. All concepts constructed of basic elements. The basic elements are the subjective states of affair themselves. (conceptual atomism). IV 101 Justification/StrawsonVsEmpiricism, British: there is no justification of a theory due to a part of this theory. (Here: the subjective state of affair sequences). What is to be explained, is assumed here. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Empiricism | Wittgenstein Vs Empiricism | Stegmüller IV 59 Imagination/Kripke WittgensteinVsHume: 1. Assuming that the meaning understanding or meaning (to mean) would be a kind of headache or toothache, --- IV 60 and "+" meaning (to mean) would always be accompanied by a distinctive type of headache. How can the pain be a help for me to decide if the correct answer is "276" or "7"? (For a new task with which I did not previously face). (WittgensteinVsEmpiricism). There may be distinctive qualities, but this just does not help the VsSkepticism. --- Wittgenstein II 100 Rationalism/empiricism: WittgensteinVsRationalism: is wrong with the assumption that there are a priori synthetic judgments. They think you can always sit so, and only use reason. Empirists/Wittgenstein: they realized that we can only describe the world. That's right. WittgensteinVsEmpiricism: error: they were trying to make the philosophy empirically. Correct: the reason cannot decide everything. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Empiricism | Cartwright Vs Empiricism | I 39 Empiricism/Cartwright. makes two assumptions: 1) statements about probabilities (prob) are justified only in stable frequencies. There notorious problems with finite vs. infinite areas (ensembles). But this much is certain: Probability/Empiricism/Cartwright: which prob exist does not depend on metaphysical or causal considerations in any case. 2. Causal considerations can be completely reduced to probability considerations, although it takes more empirical facts in order to secure the necessary asymmetries. CartwrightVsEmpiricism: (here only Vs2): In order to close new causal laws, we need antecedent causal knowledge together with prob. Empiricism/Cartwright: pro: 1) We should maintain empiricism: probabilities and causality should be kept apart, because probabilities can serve so many other things. Prob/Karl Pearson: (Grammar of Science): Thesis: Prob should remain theory-free. Cartwright dito. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Empiricism | Kanitscheider Vs Empiricism | I 392 Particle Horizon: also generates the causality paradox in the Big Bang models: in the past, two galaxies were unconnected until their particle horizon touched. If, however, they have the same inner composition, this would have to be regarded as a coincidence. I 394 Horizon/Kanitscheider: Question whether the horizons represent real boundaries of knowledge. They certainly do not concern theoretical knowledge. Empiricism/Kanitscheider: the limitation by the horizon is not an ontological one. VsEmpiricism: if one model has an event horizon, all galaxies drift bit by bit across the border, which were previously visible, on the other hand another object remains eternally visible, because its history is infinitely delayed when approaching the event horizon. Optically frozen with infinite redshift. For the observer on the object, however, this phenomenon does not exist. On the other hand, more and more objects are entering the visible region of the particle horizon. This shows that both horizons are not physical barriers but optical boundaries. I 395 Kanitscheider: a galaxy drifting over the horizon does not change its ontological status, only its epistemic one. (>epistemic/ontological). This also makes the concept of a "total universe" meaningful, since the boundaries of the visible world do not represent the boundaries of the world. The expression is constituted by the existence of a continuous law-like connection. Objects outside this context must be understood as unresearchable. But there is also no reason for their postulation. They are not a scientific problem. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Empiricism | Barrow Vs Empiricism | I 39 ff VsEmpiricism: the inquiring scientist is disturbed by the thought that a theory could never aspire to be anything but a description of data. No particle physicist would confuse a theory of elementary particles with a list of the properties of the particles. I 40 What do we do if we follow empiricism in the view that only facts lay a claim to existence, with the most important thing about the accumulation of facts being that they are in many ways interrelated and have common properties? Empiricism may sound like a harmless sophistry at first. But it has inconvenient consequences: It excludes many useful physical concepts, because they are not observable. First, it prohibits any universal law of nature! Because its validity can only be confirmed in a few practical cases. This seems to lead to the downfall of science. The first retreat tactics, then, is to consider a statement as useful if it can have verifiable consequences in connection with others, but then nothing will be excluded anymore in the end. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Empiricism | Saussure Vs Empiricism | I 37 SaussureVsEmpiricism: structure as a system is not directly recognizable in its functioning. |
F. de Saussure I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius) |
| Hume, D. | James Vs Hume, D. | I 55 JamesVsHume, JamesVsMill: "associationism": sees in conceptual ideas and experiences only reflections of perceptual impressions that generate by acting on the organism ideas. >Association. James: This "determinism" may explain the sensations of details, but not the experience of volition, moods, rationality, memories. I 57 VsRationalism, VsEmpiricism as it is represented by Hume.). JamesVsHume: radical empiricism must neither take elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly. |
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| Nominalism | James Vs Nominalism | I 30 James VsNominalism: inductive classification uncovers the "real identity of the phenomena". Cf. Order. >Empiricism: I 57 JamesVsEmpiricism: supports a kind of "nominalism": empiricists assert that there is a term for any object. James: how about facts for which there is no concept?. - Worse: Language /James: supports the nominalist tendency to fragment the stream of consciousness. |
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| Rationalism | James Vs Rationalism | I 57 Rationalism: James developed a position of radical empiricism (Vsrationalism, Vsempiricism as it is represented by Hume). >Empiricism/Hume. JamesVsHume: in order to be radical the empiricist must neither accept elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly. Horwich I 24 Truths/James: in the plural they have only one thing in common: they pay off. Truth/JamesVsRationalism: is produced. (1) 1. William James (1907) "Pragmatisms Conception of Truth“ (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 4 p. 141-55 and 396-406) in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Empiricism | Pro | Hume I 103 Transcendental critique VsEmpiricism: some philosophers ask on a methodologically limited level: how can there be a given, setting of constructive logic, which goes back to mathematics. (HumeVs). (Camp: transcendentalism / empiricism). |
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