Lexicon of Arguments


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The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Beliefs Sellars
 
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Rorty VI 179 ff
Belief/Sellars: every belief is revisable. Rorty17: Belief/SellarsVsEmpiricism: can only be justified by concepts. (s) not through "direct perception", "intuition", "experience", etc.).
---
I XXXIII
Ryle: had suggested to conceive mental predicates like "being convinced", "believing", etc. as expressions of dispositions, however without accounting for the fact that, again, there is an explanation instance, be it in the nature of the Freudian ego or superego. Ryle: being convinced means to behave in a certain way.
Sellars: goes one step further than Ryle by asking how the behavioral dispositions themselves can also be explained. His tie retailer John developed a kind of theory which specifically refers to the verbal behavior of a community Rylean ancestors.
---
II 325
Action: fundamental beliefs are expressed in uniformity of behavior. This does not mean that no deviations are possible, but only that the representation of a principle is in any case also characterized by uniformity of behavior.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Colour Carnap
 
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VI 126
Colors/Carnap: arise as abstraction classes of color identity.
VI 102
Abstraction class: class of elements related to an arbitrary element - (s)> one-classes
VI 152
Similarity Circles/Carnap: at first, you take all classes of elementary experiences (EE) that are partially similar to each other - (due to reflexivity) - then the two-, three-, etc. classes of partially similar EE - then one removes from this list all the classes that are contained in a different one as subclass
VI 181
GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (color theory): we are to remain in the field of sensory perception itself and notice the laws in the area of perception that exist between them - CarnapVsGoethe: the laws of physics do not apply there, but different, more complicated ones do.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Empiricism Barrow
 
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I 36
Empiricism / positivism / Barrow: both: there are only individual facts, not universals -EmpirismusVsuniversals / positivismVsuniversals - I 42 both Vsoperationalism / Vsinstrumentalism: theories can only be discovered, they can not be invented -
I 39
Vsempiricism / Barrow: a theory of elementary particles is more than a mere list of their properties - excludes useful terms because they are not observable - so that it forbids any law of nature.

B I
John D. Barrow
Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996

B II
John D. Barrow
Die Natur der Natur: Die philosophischen Ansätze der modernen Kosmologie Heidelberg 1993

B III
John D. Barrow
Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001

Empiricism Fodor
 
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IV 191
Empiricism/Fodor/LeporeVsEmpiricism: Cannot show the similarities of the concepts of uncle/aunt , ice/vapor, President/Cleopatra, etc. - (conceptual) - you cannot reduce conceptual relations to relations between observational concepts: - Network: observational concepts on the periphery, theoretical terms in the center

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Empiricism Quine
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
Graeser I 146
QuineVsCarnap: (holism): since theory is only debatable as a whole, theoretical terms escape the reduction to sensual terms. - But: Empiricism/Quine: is not a strict opponent. - How else is knowledge of the world possible? ---
Quine VII 40ff
Empiricism/Quine: has excessively rich ontology - science is double dependent on language and experience, but thesis: this duality cannot be traced back to individual statements. ---
XII 90/1
Empiricism/Quine pro: 1) everything that speaks for scientific theories comes from experience
2) every word meaning is ultimately based on experience.
---
XII 94
Abandoned: 1) trying to explain everything from sensory data - 2) the rational reconstruction. ---
Stalnaker I 3
QuineVsEmpiricism/Two Dogmas/Stalnaker: is no basis for the distinction between language rules (rules) and our judgments about the world - no theory - neutral basis.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Empiricism Adorno
 
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XIII 85
Experience/Empiricism/Adorno: In Locke, Berkeley, and Hume one finds a great deal about the experience, but the experience itself will hardly be encountered in this philosophy. ---
XIII 86
Philosophy has the problem that, as soon as it attempts to make its experiences valid, it always has only a concept of experience and not the content of experience. From this, it has made a virtue and derived from it that experience, because it can be expressed only in the concept of experience, is in itself only a concept, only a being.
Content/Adorno: Paradoxically, the content of idealist philosophies such as in Hegel, but also Schelling, is much more effective than in empirical philosophies.
---
XIII 155
Empiricism/Adorno: in contrast to rationalism, thinking, as it were, adds something. By adding itself from the outside to the given, the two pinciples (res cogitans and res extensa) are again immediate. Then all thinking without sense is just a mere idea. However, this approach also develops further and further from its own consequence in the sense of a progressive subjectivization. From Bacon's naively realistic empiricism, over Locke, as well as over Berkeley and Hume, a consistent empiricism gradually developed, in which, by a consistent recourse to the senses, nothing else is left to be valid as a legal source of knowledge than the immediate circumstances of my consciousness.
From Bacon's naively realistic empiricism, Locke, as well as Berkeley and Hume, gradually developed into empiricism, in which, by consistently appealing to the senses, nothing else is left to be regarded as a source of knowledge than the immediate realities of my consciousness.
---
XIII 156
RationalismVsEmpiricism/EmpiricismVsRationalism/Adorno: the opposition between empiricism and rationalism is not so radically remote as is often imagined. Both are based on the scientific model of evidence. They are both residual theories of the truth, and thus always interrelate. The moment of mastery of nature and finally self-control is the basis of both schools.
---
XIII 157
Experience/Empiricism/Adorno: empiricism also treats experience always only as a principle, according to its most general categories, not at all according to its content. ---
XIII 158
Only the creator of empiricism, idealism, and in the most comprehensive measure Hegel have attempted to get the full mental experience under control. KantVsEmpiricism/Adorno: There is absolutely no experience without thinking, otherwise it would stop by the mere discontinuity of the individual moments. The unity principle ((s) of subjectivity, reason, and mind) would then be completely omitted.

A I
Th. W. Adorno
Max Horkheimer
Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978

A II
Theodor W. Adorno
Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000

A III
Theodor W. Adorno
Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973

A IV
Theodor W. Adorno
Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003

A V
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995

A VI
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071

A VII
Theodor W. Adorno
Noten zur Literatur (I–IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002

A VIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003

A IX
Theodor W. Adorno
Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003

A XI
Theodor W. Adorno
Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990

A XII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973

A XIII
Theodor W. Adorno
Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974

Justification Strawson
 
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IV 101
Justification / StrawsonVsEmpiricism British: there is no justification of a theory based on a part of this theory (here: the episodes of subjective states) - what should be explained is presupposed here.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Observation Language Sellars
 
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XXI I
Observation language/SellarsVsEmpiricism: the observation language is selected - and thus an ontology. ---
I XVII
Observation Reports/report/SellarsVsEmpiricism/Sellars: reports appear to form the basis of justification instead of the sensory data - Vs: sensory data are not independent in the sense that they require no further knowledge.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Operationalism Barrow
 
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I 37
Operationalism: Science is a system of rules for the exploration of the world in the laboratory - linguistically: how are the words used? - InstrumentalismVsEmpiricism: useful concepts are not only those which can be traced back to the sense data. - Theories and laws of nature are only instruments to make the environment understandable. True/false do not exist as properties of theories. - Idealism: since all knowledge is filtered through our minds, we are never sure if there is a connection to reality. I 42 OperationalismVsEmpiricism: theories may also be invented - therefore, the observer receives a more important role.
I 41f
VsOperationalism/Barrow: asks what is measurable. Therefore, he must exclude complex and irrational numbers. - Fragmentation of science: every time we use a different method of measurement, we need to consider a number as a different variable. - Circular: operationalism presumes that we know what an permissible operation is. - Problem: certain concepts may only be used when sensitive devices allow accurate measurements - ((s) thus excluding something in the future.)

B I
John D. Barrow
Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996

B II
John D. Barrow
Die Natur der Natur: Die philosophischen Ansätze der modernen Kosmologie Heidelberg 1993

B III
John D. Barrow
Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001

Syntheticity Chisholm
 
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Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 60
Synthetic: Existence/Kant: every existential judgment is synthetic according to Kant. Synthetic judgments a priori/Kant: make conditional existence assertion. (> Analogies of experience) - ChisholmVs. ---
II 61
Synthetic a priori/Kant: E.g. the space is three-dimensional. - RiemannVs: refuted - synthetic a priori/Chisholm: depends on whether there are non-analytic propositions of the form All S are P. - E.g. Chisholm: All squares are form-bearing, all red is colored, nothing red is green. - But not clearly: two forms: a) all humans are mortal, b) all humans are descendants. ---
II 62
Chisholm: form-identical with the analytical propositions - KantVsChisholm: form differs. ---
II 72
Synthetic a priori/Chisholm/Sauer: Problem: no synthetic a priori if the definition of necessity is: p expresses a contradictory proposition which can be negated - false solution: to chose necessity as mere inclusion (understanding a includes understanding b), then contradiction: it would be possible that there is no or one possible worlds , so that non-p. - reason: E.g. "p" expresses an inclusion, then non-p is contradictory. ---
II 73
Synthetic a priori/Chisholm/Sauer: E.g. (S) All red is colored: is not a logical truth because there are no red objects in every possible world (poss.w.). - analytic/Sauer: Problem: the same happens with the analysis: from the fact that (A) "all squares are rectangles" is analytic, would follow that this is true in every possible world, but not from the simple sentence "All squares are rectangles". - but: see below. ---
II 74
If "all squares are rectangular" is true, then the property of the square exists. ---
II 76
The doctrine of the synthetic a priori in Kant is VsEmpiricism. The doctrine of the analytic is VsRationalism: to reach the knowledge of objects by means of consistent thinking. - ((s) No existence follows from this.)

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004


The author or concept searched is found in the following 20 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Behaviorism Searle Vs Behaviorism
 
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John R. Searle
I 30
Searle: the ontology of mental states is an ontology of the first person. (SearleVsBehavoirism).
I 49
SearleVsBehaviorism: two types of objections: 1. objections of common sense. 2. Technical objections. 1. VsLogical Behaviorism: technical objections: behaviorism never succeeded to fully explain the concept of a "disposition".
Circle: if one wants to analyze the belief through behavior then you have to obviously also make reference to the wishing; if one wants to analyze the wishing by behavior, then you have obviously also have to make reference to the belief (Chisholm 1957).
I 50
LewisVsBehaviorism: technical objection: behaviorism ignores the causal relationships between mental states and behavior (Lewis 1966). The objections of common sense are ultimately the most embarrassing. The absurdity lies in the denial of the existence of all the inner states of mind. This is against our ordinary experience of how it is to be a human being.
I 57
Functionalism: what makes two neurophysiological states relating to occurrences of the same state of mind type, is that they perform the same function throughout the life of the organism. The two mind states must then stand on the following three things in the same causal relations: 1. To the stimulus that the organism receives as input,
2. To the various other "mental" states and
3. To the behavior that the organism produces as output.
Note that by the causal relationships two objections are avoided that were put forward VsBehaviorism: the first said that behaviorism neglects the causal relationship of mental states, the other said that in it a circularity was contained, and as convictions against recourse to requests and wishes had to be analyzed by resorting to convictions.
VIII 428
Grammar/language/SearleVsBehaviorism/SearleVsEmpiricism: Dilemma:
a) Either he relies solely on stimulus-response mechanisms (stimulus response) then he can not explain the acquisition of grammar. Or
b) He admits à la Quine that there are innate mechanisms. But once the mechanisms are rich enough, the stimulus-response part is not interesting!

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Empiricism Behaviorism Vs Empiricism
 
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Danto2 I 266
BehaviorismVsEmpiricism: B. turned away from empiricism to apply its principles in the observable. It assumes that there are no problems in the external world, but only in the interior.
Empiricism Dewey Vs Empiricism
 
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I 84
DeweyVsEmpiricism: Spirit does not response to external stimuli, but understanding of meaning. ((s) and empiricism without spirit would only be RDRD (reliable differential responsive dispositions/Brandom).

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004
Empiricism Dummett Vs Empiricism
 
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DummettVsEmpiricism, British:
Saussure:.. "... A term triggers in the brain a particular sound. This is a psychological phenomenon which in turn is followed by a physiological process, the brain initiates a pulse on to the vocal organs, then the sound waves to the ear of the other to be transmitted, a purely physical process.
I 117
DummettVsSaussure: This representation of the understanding process is obviously untenable. It mimics the equation of the British empiricists of idea and concept. (Vs). Terms are represented as mental images (ideas). Content of consciousness: private: fragrance, melody, name "idea" (no background necessary) - But not: ideas, thoughts, sense (public) - (VsBritish Empiricists: "ideas" are not terms).

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Du III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
Empiricism Feyerabend Vs Empiricism
 
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I 91
Reason/Perception/FeyerabendVsEmpiricism: it is better to leave aside the phenomenon and to use reason to reveal the appearance of an illusion - through reason, the impression becomes connectable with new observation statements.

Fe I
P. Feyerabend
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Fe II
P. Feyerabend
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979
Empiricism Fraassen Vs Empiricism
 
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I 59
Observation/Limits/Fraassen: there are limits to observation? Grover Maxwell: Thesis: in principle not.
Other AuthorsVsEmpiricism: precisely because there are such limits.
Description/Fraassen: a physical theory can not be translated without remainder into a corpus of sentences, which states only observable phenomena.
  ((s) Description/Fraassen/(s): must always take into account the unobserved).
Fraassen. this is sometimes turned VsEmpiricism. But I only concede the premise. (Fraassen pro empiricism).

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Empiricism Frege Vs Empiricism
 
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II 19
Numbers/Frege: the very widespread tendency not to accept anything that is not given to the senses, tempts to consider the numerals themselves as numbers and as actual objects of contemplation. (FregeVsEmpiricism).
II 20
Such a conception is untenable, because we cannot speak of any arithmetic properties of the numbers without going back to the meaning of the numerals. The property of 1 being 1 again if multiplied by itself, for example, would be a pure fiction. We may speak of definition, but no definition is as creative as to impart properties on a thing that it simply does not have.
Number Equality/Calculating/Frege: you might say: 1+1 is a sum, but 6:3 is a quotient. But what is 6:3? The number which is 6 if multiplied by 3. The number, not "a" number. There is only one number that satisfies this condition.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Empiricism Hume Vs Empiricism
 
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II 196
Empiricism/KantVsEmpiricism/LockeVsEmpiricism/HumeVsEmpiricism/Black: all three have recognized that exclusive reference to experience was bound to limit the possibility of known answers! Hume: sees the danger and wrote that libraries might burn for this later.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Empiricism Husserl Vs Empiricism
 
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I 23
HusserlVsEmpiricism: Vs empirical justification of laws: this adheres to them the character of vague rules: E.g. the principle of contradiction: could only be formulated as a conjecture. (> Degrees of probability).
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart
Empiricism James Vs Empiricism
 
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I 57
JamesVsEmpiricism: "nominalism": empiricists assert that there is a term for any object. James: how about facts for which there is no concept?. - Worse: Language / James: supports the nominalist tendency to fragment the stream of consciousness.
Nevertheless, James developed a position of radical empiricism (VsRationalism, Vsempiricism that is represented by Hume.).
JamesVsHume: to be radical empiricism must neither accept elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly.
Radical empiricism / James:
1st Only those issues can be discussed, that are based on categories of observation.
2nd The relationships between the objects of experience are just as accessible as the objects themselves.
3rd connection as a result of the sequence of partial experience is itself an object of experience. The experience of this relationship is the power of consciousness.
4th No upfront construction of subjective consciousness.
Empiricism Maturana Vs Empiricism
 
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I 154
There are well-known hallucinations, e.g. shadows that are seen in color, although they are gray. This is often referred to as illusion. Maturana: it must be clear to us that we do not describe an independent reality. Illusion can only be distinguished by comparing different types of experiences, i.e. outside of a concrete experience!
In the experience itself, we can not distinguish between illusion, hallucination or perception.
This is a constitutive feature of all living systems.
Perception / MaturanaVsEmpiricism: that should cause us to question any certainty that is based on perception.

Mat I
U. Maturana
Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000
Empiricism Quine Vs Empiricism
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
IV 397
British Empiricism: based on ideas in the mind. These are of course not intersubjectively observable. That means the foundation is private, not public. QuineVsBritish Empiricism: VsMentalistic approach: in the Quine's eyes not consistent. One should stick to what openly observed is true to anyone. Language is nothing private, but something social.
IV 398
The language: a social skill that is acquired through the observation of the social use. The externalization of empiricism leads to behavioral access to meaning. (Behaviorism).
IV 402
QuineVsBritish Empiricism: Is based on the assumption of ideas (derived from Locke). Uncritical mentalism. Too simple picture of the experiential reference of languages ​​and theories.

VI 11
"Linguistic Turn"/Quine: that was good, but not good enough: the distinction between observation sentences and theoretical propositions was only made derivatively, no theoretical terms should appear. Therefore Reichenbach used "bridge sentences" to connect the two sentence types. (VsBritish Empiricism).
Observation/Quine: we do not start with objects (we eliminate them), but with sentences! This allows us to define the observation sentence, without bothering about whether it is theory-free or not!
We also no longer need to decide which objects the words should designate! (Without reification). Instead of objects stimulus meaning: the willingness to agree to a sentence.
VI 11/12
Singular Term/Singular Terms/Ontology/Existence/Quine: if we had assumed terms instead of sentences, we would have skipped the whole issue of objectification and always conceded object-relation from the hollow gut.
Meaning Theory/M.Th./Quine: must be empirical.
QuineVsLogical Empiricism: neither the analytical truths nor the observation base resists the skeptical attack.

V 189
Theory/Ontology/Quine: how should a scientific theory look like at best? We want as many as possible and good predictions. Guiding principles: simplicity and conservatism.
V 190
Both are in a dialectical relation! (To use an expression by my students). An strong oversimplification can justify a relatively large deviation. Between the two, we need a compromise.
Conservatism/Quine: among other things, caused by our lack of imagination. But also prudence when it comes to hypotheses.
Simplicity/Conservativeness: both are already at work in language learning.
Language Learning/Quine: occurs in leaps and bounds. Is always based on similarities and analogies.
V 191
Short steps are conservative. They are guided by relative empiricism. Def Relative Empiricism/Quine: do not stray further from sense data than necessary. Quine pro: That keeps theory changes low.
QuineVsRadical Empiricism: we gave it up when we gave up hope to reduce talk of objects to talk of sense data.
Important argument: that requires us to stick with the substitutional quantification over abstract objects. This speaks to the nominalistic mind. It manifests itself in relative empiricism, for both are the same.
Nominalism: must not overestimate the ontological harmlessness of the variables of sQ. In general, we can say the values ​​of variables determine the whole ontology if we only have object variables, truth functions and predicates.

Stalnaker I 3
QuineVsEmpiricism/Two Dogmas/Stalnaker: when it comes to accepting or not accepting a whole language, along with a theory that is formulated in this language, then it is not certain that there is a base for a distinction which are the language rules (rules), and what are the judgments about the world. There is no theory-neutral way to separate factual questions from semantic ones.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Empiricism Sellars Vs Empiricism
 
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Rorty VI 205
SellarsVsEmpiricism, British/Rorty: Confusion of causal conditionality and justifiable reason.
Rorty I 194
QuineVsEmpiricism/SellarsVsEmpiricism/logical/Rorty: their legal doubts about the epistemic privilege: that certain assertions are used as reports of privileged ideas. Gavagai/Quine/Rorty: asks how the propositions of the natives can be distinguished in contingent empirical platitudes on the one hand and necessary conceptual truths on the other hand. For the natives it is enough to know which propositions are certainly true. They have no idea of conceptual, necessary truths.
I 195
Assertibility/Rorty: if assertions are justified by their being common and not by their nature of inner episodes it makes no sense to try to isolate privileged ideas.
I 196
Necessity/Quine/Rorty: necessary truth: equivalent to the fact that nobody had to offer an interesting alternative that could cause us to question it. Incorrigibility/Sellars/Rorty: until now nobody has proposed a viable method of controlling human behavior that could verify the doubt in this matter.
I 196/197
Truth/justified assertibility/Rorty: (Dewey). Sellars, Quine, Chisholm and many others have the intention of making truth more than this modest approach.
VI 219
RortyVsEmpiricism: contains nothing that would be worth a rescue.
Sellars I XVII
To seem/to appear/Sellars: like Lewis and Chisholm: about how something appears to someone any error is in fact impossible! But VsLewis: by this the propositions do still not advance to the foundation of the justification.
Observation reports/SellarsVsEmpiricism/Sellars: seem to be able to build instead of the sense-data the foundation of justification.
Vs: they are not in the sense independent that they require no further knowledge.
Someone who always only responds with "This is green" does not express with it alone any knowledge. (> Thermometer). He has no position in the "logical space of reasons".
I XXI
SellarsVsLogical Empiricism/SellarsVsEmpirismus/Sellars: the special wit his criticism is that the experiences of the minute taking persons that should constitute the basis of the theory in logical empiricism, are reconstructed by him as quasi theoretical postulated entities of an everyday world view.
I XXII
Sellars: (different than Wittgenstein and Austin): Connection between questions of classical philosophy and everyday language.
Sellars I 54
Elementary word-world connections are made between "red" and red physical objects and not between "red" and a suspected class of private red single objects. (SellarsVsEmpiricism). This does not mean that private feelings are maybe not an essential part of the development of these associative connections.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Empiricism Strawson Vs Empiricism
 
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IV 98
British Empiricism: thesis: the general structure of our imagination must be derived in any way from a small part of themselves. StrawsonVsEmpiricim, British: narrow-minded reduction of sensory experience on impressions or images of simple sensory qualities.
IV 99
1. After one of these directions our general thought structure is something like an elaborated theory based on subjective state of affair sequences. It therefore needs a rational justification. 2. Hume: thinking that we are inherently subject to. Explanation only by basic materials.
3. All concepts constructed of basic elements. The basic elements are the subjective states of affair themselves. (conceptual atomism).
IV 101
Justification/StrawsonVsEmpiricism, British: there is no justification of a theory due to a part of this theory. (Here: the subjective state of affair sequences). What is to be explained, is assumed here.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Empiricism Wittgenstein Vs Empiricism
 
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Stegmüller IV 59
Imagination/Kripke WittgensteinVsHume: 1. Assuming that the meaning understanding or meaning (to mean) would be a kind of headache or toothache,
---
IV 60
and "+" meaning (to mean) would always be accompanied by a distinctive type of headache. How can the pain be a help for me to decide if the correct answer is "276" or "7"? (For a new task with which I did not previously face).
(WittgensteinVsEmpiricism).
There may be distinctive qualities, but this just does not help the VsSkepticism.
---
Wittgenstein II 100
Rationalism/empiricism: WittgensteinVsRationalism: is wrong with the assumption that there are a priori synthetic judgments. They think you can always sit so, and only use reason. Empirists/Wittgenstein: they realized that we can only describe the world. That's right.
WittgensteinVsEmpiricism: error: they were trying to make the philosophy empirically. Correct: the reason cannot decide everything.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Empiricism Cartwright Vs Empiricism
 
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I 39
Empiricism/Cartwright. makes two assumptions: 1) statements about probabilities (prob) are justified only in stable frequencies. There notorious problems with finite vs. infinite areas (ensembles). But this much is certain:
Probability/Empiricism/Cartwright: which prob exist does not depend on metaphysical or causal considerations in any case.
2. Causal considerations can be completely reduced to probability considerations, although it takes more empirical facts in order to secure the necessary asymmetries.
CartwrightVsEmpiricism: (here only Vs2): In order to close new causal laws, we need antecedent causal knowledge together with prob.
Empiricism/Cartwright: pro: 1) We should maintain empiricism: probabilities and causality should be kept apart, because probabilities can serve so many other things.
Prob/Karl Pearson: (Grammar of Science): Thesis: Prob should remain theory-free. Cartwright dito.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983
Empiricism Barrow Vs Empiricism
 
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I 39 ff
VsEmpiricism: the inquiring scientist is disturbed by the thought that a theory could never aspire to be anything but a description of data. No particle physicist would confuse a theory of elementary particles with a list of the properties of the particles. I 40 What do we do if we follow empiricism in the view that only facts lay a claim to existence, with the most important thing about the accumulation of facts being that they are in many ways interrelated and have common properties? Empiricism may sound like a harmless sophistry at first. But it has inconvenient consequences: It excludes many useful physical concepts, because they are not observable. First, it prohibits any universal law of nature! Because its validity can only be confirmed in a few practical cases. This seems to lead to the downfall of science. The first retreat tactics, then, is to consider a statement as useful if it can have verifiable consequences in connection with others, but then nothing will be excluded anymore in the end.

B I
John D. Barrow
Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996

B II
John D. Barrow
Die Natur der Natur: Die philosophischen Ansätze der modernen Kosmologie Heidelberg 1993

B III
John D. Barrow
Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001
Empiricism Saussure Vs Empiricism
 
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I 37
SaussureVsEmpiricism: structure as a system is not directly recognizable in its functioning.
F. de Saussure
I Peter Prechtl Saussure zur Einführung Hamburg 1994 (Junius)
Hume, D. James Vs Hume, D.
 
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I 55
JamesVsHume, JamesVsMill: "associationism": sees in conceptual ideas and experiences only reflections of perceptual impressions that generate by acting on the organism ideas.   James: This "determinism" may explain the sensations of details, but not the experience of volition, moods, rationality, memories.
I 57
VsRationalism, VsEmpiricism as it is represented by Hume.). JamesVsHume: radical empiricism must neither take elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly.
Rationalism James Vs Rationalism
 
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I 57
Nevertheless, James developed a position of radical empiricism (Vsrationalism, Vsempiricism as it is represented by Hume.). JamesVsHume: in order to be radical the empiricist must neither accept elements that are not directly experienced, nor exclude elements that are experienced directly.

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Empiricism Pro Hume I 103
Transcendental critique VsEmpiricism: some philosophers ask on a methodologically limited level: how can there be a given, setting of constructive logic, which goes back to mathematics. (HumeVs). (Camp: transcendentalism / empiricism).