Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Holism Hacking I 318
HackingVsHolism/HackingVsDuhem: the Physics of the microscopeis irrelevant for biologists. The theory explains interference and blur, but you just have to turn the wheel to eliminate them.

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996


The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Deduction Dummett Vs Deduction I 96
Explanation: DuhemVsFraassen: unification merely fictitious assumption to simplify - DuhemVsDeduction - DuhemVsDeductive-Nomological Model - FraassenVsDuhem: the empirical substructure of the theory should be isomorphic to that of the phenomena -DuhemVsFraassen: that’s only very roughly possible - (Cartwright ditto).

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982
Duhem, P. Ayer Vs Duhem, P. I 292
Ayer: fact / statement: (VsDuhem): the idea to check statements by reference to facts is neither incorrect nor metaphysical. Of course, we can not testify facts, without testifying them: there is no other way to characterize facts, except by true statements. But that does not mean that the statements must be identified with the matters described by them! Through observation and action the circle is broken.

Ayer I
Alfred J. Ayer
"Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ayer II
Alfred Jules Ayer
Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke

Ayer III
Alfred Jules Ayer
"The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Duhem, P. Cartwright Vs Duhem, P. I 89
CartwrightVsFraassen/CartwrightVsDuhem: both eliminate too much! I believe in theoretical entities.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954
Duhem, P. Genz Vs Duhem, P. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999
VIII 47
Experiment/Duhem: drei Typen von "fingierten Experimenten" (Gedankenexperiment). 1. wurde nicht, könnte aber realisiert werden.
2. unrealisierbar, setzt die Existenz eines Körpers voraus, den man nicht in der Natur antrifft,
VIII 48
3. Absurdes, das einen Lehrsatz beweisen will, der mit experimentellen Tatsachen im Widerspruch steht. DuhemVs Gedankenexperimente: da er keinen anderen als den induktiven Gebrauch kennt.
VIII 49
Gedankenexperiment/GenzVsDuhem: die Argumente, die daraus gewonnen werden, lassen sich in der Regel so anordnen, dass sie Auskunft über das Verhältnis geben, in dem Ideen, Vorstellungen und Einsichten zueinander stehen.

Gz I
H. Genz
Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999

Gz II
Henning Genz
Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
deductive- nomolog. Versus I 96
Explanation: DuhemVsFraassen: Unification merely fictitious assumption to simplify - DuhemVsDeduction - deductive-nomological model DuhemVs - FraassenVsDuhem: the empirical substructure of theory should be isomorphic to the phenomena - DuhemVsFraassen: that is more than very roughly - (Cartwright ditto).