Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Dualism McGinn II 37
Dualism/McGinn: is much closer to our common sense than other perspectives. Definition dualism/McGinn: the view that between mind and brain is no logical relation.
The fact that we cannot explain the mind with reference to the brain, is that, that it is not essentially dependent on the brain. Consciousness is a separate basic factor in the universe, such as space, time, matter.
Perception/mind/brain/McGinn: E.g. that I perceive a loud bang, presents itself as a different kind of phenomenon as the electrical activity in my brain.
---
II 38
McGinnVsDualism: the problem is that he goes too far in the interpretation of data. He responds to the appearances by declaring that the mind is virtually independent of the brain. 1. The zombie problem
2. The ghost problem
Zombie/Dualism/McGinn: the zombie problem of dualism is that it allows us to withdraw the mind from the brain and leaves the brain intact. The zombie alternative is committed to epiphenomenalism.
---
II 40
Definition ghost problem/McGinn: is the reversal of the zombie problem: When the mind is separated from the body, not just the brain can exist without the mind, but also the mind without the brain. How could the mind then affect the physical world? Why do we even have such complex brains when they are so unnecessary for the functioning of the mind? Why does brain damage erases mental abilities?
---
II 107ff
Dualism/McGinn: There are two possible dualisms without God:
  1. Hyperdualism
  2. Panpsychism Definition Hyperdualism/McGinn: Suppose during the Big Bang there were two universes, a material and a parallel, which consisted only of consciousness. It does not contain matter, not even space. It consists in a kind of world mind, a vast sea of conscious sensations. However, it is totally disorganized. There is no self, no individual mind, as we know it. We can imagine, it contains particles, the basic building blocks of what will later become mind.
Definition Panpsychism/McGinn: moves the mind back into the material world (VsHyperdualism).("Elvis Is Everywhere").
     He says that consciousness is everywhere and wafts through outer space (presumably with Elvis together). That means, all matter, even stones, plankton, electrons and stars carry a trace of consciousness in themselves. The material components of the brain already carry their own special awareness package with themselves.
---
II 119
With that he claims that we already know which properties of the brain give rise to consciousness, namely the individual building blocks. (VsEmergence).   a) Hard version of panpsychism: the neurons in the brain literally feel the pain, see yellow, thinking about dinner. - And the same do electrons and stars.
Brain/panpsychism/McGinn: there still remain problems related to the generative forces of the brain: two points of view:
  a) The brain plays a minimal role, only one kind of trigger
  b) The brain plays a more active role: the brain makes use of the properties of matter and transforms it by its particular structure in mind. McGinn pro.
McGinn pro Panpsychism: all matter must have the potential to co-found awareness.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

Dualism Pauen Pauen I 35
Dualism/Pauen: two types of states that can also occur independently - interactionist dualism: mutual influence: Descartes (>Dualism/Descartes), >Eccles/Popper. - >Property dualism: certain neural processes have not only their physical characteristics but additionally also mental characteristics that are theoretically independent of the neural - Typical theory: computer analogy (>Computation), >Martians, etc.
I 60
Consciousness as an autonomous property.
I 38
Dualism/Pauen: 1. explanation for the uniformity of our experiences in light of the diversity of physical realizations (> Multiple realization). Integration performance of the free mind - 2. Explanation of >free will.
I 39
3. Pro dualism: VsMonism: Problem of qualitative varied experience by uniform activity of nerve cells
I 56
VsDualismus: has no concrete research subject.
I 44
Descartes/Pauen: the distinction of substances can be justified by the imaginability of such a distinction. The argument still plays an important role today: - Kripke uses it as the basis for its objection VsIdentifikation of mental and neural processes. (>Identity Theory).

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Dualism Searle I 32 ff
Dualism: a) > href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=878165&a=$a&first_name=John%20R.&author=Searle&concept=Property%20Dualism">property dualism - b) >substance dualism - c) "concept dualism". ---
I 40
SearleVsMonism: it is wrong to start counting. >Monism. ---
I 54 f
SearleVsKripke: Dualist mind/body. ---
II 326
VsDualism: behaviorism: E.g. to have hands is to have a disposition to certain behavior - >Functionalism: hands can be completely described by causes/effects. Turing theory: to be in a computer state with specific inputs and outputs (for hands) -
>Action theory: to say, a system had hands, i.e., to take a certain attitude towards the system.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Dualism Vollmer II 86
Split-Brain / VsdualismVollerm: shows that consciousness is divisible! And this unit is the main argument of dualism - for the identity theory it is not a problem - Vsdualism: how should the surgeon’s scalpel double a supposedly intangible consciousness? - II 88 no matter how many equivalences, matches, correlations we will find, the will never decide between monism and dualism.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

Dualism Chalmers I 125
Dualism/Consciousness/Chalmers: we have seen that materialism failed because of the lack of logical supervenience of conscious experience on physical facts. This is followed by a dualism, but not a Cartesian dualism, which assumes a "mind in the machine", which performs extra causal work. Instead, for us, a kind of property duelism follows. > Property dualism/Chalmers. ---
I 134
Dualism/Chalmers: you could avoid the dualism by referring to a zombie world that is physically identical to ours as being described as false. ---
I 135
This world would at the same time be identical and different. We could make the physical properties rigid with the operator "dthat", e.g. dthat (plays the role of ...). N.B.: then the zombie world would not have some features that our world has.
N.B.: then consciousness could metaphysically supervene on other properties. That would be an interesting argument.
ChalmersVsVs: 1. this is speculative.
2. (more direct): it is based on an incorrect semantics of physical concepts.
---
I 136
For example, an electron with unrecognized properties would still be called an electron, but not an electron with the properties of a proton. Metaphysics/Chalmers: semantics is not so decisive here, but the metaphysical question remains.
---
I 154
Dualism/Definition Proto-phanomenal property/Chalmers: involves as the only one not experiencing itself, but several simultaneously existing could have this. This is strange to us, but cannot be excluded a priori. This would suggest a causal role of the phenomenal. To represent such a theory would simply mean to accept another possible world where something else had the role of causation, but such a world would not be logically excluded.
---
I 155
Dualism/Chalmers: if we were to take such a position, we would represent an essential dualism. ChalmersVsDualism: one can also understand this position non-dualist, albeit not as a materialistic monism. It then provides a network of intrinsic properties that "realizes" the extrinsic physical properties. The laws are still the physical ones. In extreme form, when all intrinsic properties are phenomenal, we are dealing with a variant of idealism, but according to Berkeley's type.
It would most likely correspond to a version of Russel's neutral monism:
---
I 155
Monism/Russell/Chalmers: neutral monism: the fundamental properties of the world are neither physical nor phenomenal, but the physical and the phenomenal are both built up from this fundamental. The phenomenal is formed from the intrinsic natures, the physical from the extrinsic. ---
I 156
Dualism/Definition Interactionistic Dualism/Definition Interactionism/Chalmers: here, experience fills the causal gaps in the physical process. ChalmersVs: that creates more problems than it solves. It does not solve the problems with epiphenomenalism.
Pro: the only argument for interactionist dualism are some properties of quantum mechanics that could be better explained. (> Eccles 1986)
---
I 157
ChalmersVsEccles: the effects would be much too small to cause any eventual behavioral changes. Other counter examples: VsInteractionistic Dualism/VsInteractionism/Chalmers:
1. it contradicts the quantum mechanical postulate that the microscopic "decisions" are random.
2. a behavior that was triggered by these microscopic influences would have to differ from behavior triggered differently.
ChalmersVsEccles: such theories are also silent on what should happen in the brain if the wave function collapses.
ChalmersVsInteractionistic Dualism: this makes the phenomenal irrelevant.
---
I 158
ChalmersVsEccles: if there are psychons, then they can manage with purely causal interactions, without assumed phenomenal properties. VsChalmers: one might object that psychons (or ectoplasm, or whatever) are constituted by phenomenal properties.
ChalmersVsVs: even then their phenomenal properties are irrelevant to the explanation of behavior: in the history of causation, it is only the relational properties that count. Thus this adheres to the causal unity of the physical.
ChalmersVsInteractionism/ChalmersVsEccles: even if one were assuming psychones, one could tell a story about zombies, which involved psychones. One would then again have to assume additional phenomenal properties of psychones without being able to prove them.
---
I 162
Definition Interactionist Dualism/Chalmers: Chalmers accepts that consciousness is non-physical (VsMaterialism) but he denies that the physical world is causally closed so that consciousness can play an autonomous causal role. ---
I 162
Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: so I characterize my own view: Thesis: Consciousness supervenes naturally on the physical, without supervening logically or "metaphysically". I argue that materialism is wrong and that the realm of physical is causally completed. ---
I 171
Naturalistic dualism/Chalmers: my position is already implicitly shared by many who still call themselves "materialists". All I have done is to make the ontological implications of the naturalistic view explicit - that consciousness "emerges" from the physical. We do not have to give up much, what is important for our scientific world.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Meaning McDowell I 160ff
Meaning/Quine: New: "empiricist meaning": is intellectually prestigious, because it can be explained completely by the lawful operations of the receptivity. On the other hand, the old concept of meaning stands on the wrong side of this duality. (See also >content/McDowell). Meaning/Quine: the joke in Quine is that meaning in the intuitive sense cannot be determined by exogenous factors.
I 184/5
McDowell: if we drop the Third Dogma (>distinction schema/content), it is not surprising that the meaning is now underdetermined by the "empiricist meaning".
I 185
McDowell: the "empiricist meaning" cannot be a real meaning anyway, since, as a counterpart to "conceptual sovereignty," it can have nothing to do with reasons and justification. McDowellVsQuine: but that does not show that meaning is at all underdetermined. We would have to show that we have an indelible leeway if we are looking for a kind of understanding that brings us out of the field of "empiricist meaning". An understanding that shows how life phenomena are structured in the order of justification, the space of reason. This cannot be learned from Quine.
I 119
Meaning/McDowell: we must not construct it "socially-pragmatic" or "communitarian". (Wittgenstein did not do that either).   Otherwise it is no longer autonomous. Uninhibited Platonism would be a tendency to the occult.
  Wittgenstein: has not asserted that meaning is nothing but approval or rejection by the community.
I 119
Kripke's Wittgenstein/McDowellVsKripke: comes to the conclusion that there is nothing that constitutes the receptiveness for the claim that makes the meaning to us; instead, we must understand the role of thought in our lives through our participation in the community.
I 121
Thesis: Meaning/McDowellVsDualism: Solution: second nature. The idea of education assures that the autonomy of meaning is not inhumane. This leaves no real questions about norms. ---
II XIV
Meaning/McDowell: truth theory is not sufficient for a meaning theory because of the equivalence of "snow is white" and "grass is green". - This is true, but not meaningful. - McDowell: Thesis: we need additional psychological concepts.
II XV
Problem: then the propositional settings must be as fixed as the meanings. -> Radical Interpretation.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Object Carnap VI 32
Def Logical Object/Carnap: E.g. negation, implication, indirect evidence. (L.O. in the narrow sense).
VI 35
Quasi-Object/Carnap: characters that only have an independent meaning in conjunction with others (reference).
VI 36
Unsaturated sign: designate quasi-objects (qu.o.) - (> fiction character; > fictions). - E.g. "a dog" in "Karo is a dog" - E.g. "A dog is a mammal": here, no actual object names occur at all anymore - (> actual names).
VI 54
Quasi-Object/Carnap: E.g. the "class of groups of five" designates no real object, but a quasi object - E.g. the class of the five fingers of my hand is a qu.o. - It only serves to make statements about the elements, without having to list them all the time.
VI 223
Object/Order/CarnapVsDualism: there are certainly different forms of order, but not different types of object - E.g. fixed stars, distances, ratios of distances, triangles of distances between the stars, coverage of distance triangles: these are all different forms of order, but not objects in the real sense.
VI 228
Constitution Theory: similar: it is essential for the object that it belongs to certain order contexts.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Physicalism Schiffer I 138
SchifferVsPhysicalism: it must be wrong, because if there are true ascriptions of belief, they cannot be shown without mentalist or intentional vocabulary. ---
I 142f
Definition ontological physicalism/O.P./Schiffer: thesis: has no irreducible psychological entities. - Definition Sententialist physicalism/S.Ph.: there are no psychological sentences (which is wrong) - if there are any, the two physicalisms fall together. - Definition Sententialist Dualism/S.D.: there are true psychological sentences. - Belief properties (b.p.) if there are any, belief propositions and Sententialist Dualism cannot be true. - Ontological Dualism/O.D./SchifferVsDescartes: is unreasonable - Sententialist Dualism/ontological physicalism: because both are true, there are no belief propositions - NominalismVsDualism/Quine: If the Sententialist Physicalism is wrong, there are no true beliefs.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Second Nature McDowell I 19
Definition second nature/McDowell: Nature includes the second nature acquired by conceptual skills whose interrelationships belong to the logical space of reasons. Second nature(s): internalised background of norms borrowed from nature.
I 109/110
Second nature/McDowell: it cannot float freely above the possibilities that belong to the normal human organism. >Education.
I 114
Second Nature/McDowell: Our education updates some of the potentials with which we were born. But: Animal/Human/McDowell: this is not an adding to our animal nature. No admixture.
I 118
Second Nature/McDowell: Thesis: There are rules of nature, whether one is receptive to it or not. This is the result of proper upbringing. "Naturalism of second nature","Naturalized Platonism". Naturalized Platonism/McDowell: the structure of the space of reasons has autonomy.
But it cannot be derived from truths about humans.
It is not unbridled: not isolated from the "merely human". (Instead: sensitivity through education).
I 121
McDowellVsPlatonism: any platonism means that the norms are on the opposite side of the abyss. Wittgenstein's Quietism recognizes this as a pseudo-problem. Meaning/McDowellVsDualism: Solution: second nature. The idea of education ensures that the autonomy of meaning is not inhuman. This does not raise any real questions about norms.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Unity Luhmann Reese-Schäfer II 9
Unit/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: Luhmann is not a theorist of the unit, but of the difference - problem solving: by increasing the complexity.
Reese-Schäfer II 28
Dualism/Luhmann: nevertheless LuhmanVsDualism of observer and object.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992
German Edition:
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997


Reese-Schäfer II
Walter Reese-Schäfer
Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001

The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Dogmas (Quine) Davidson Vs Dogmas (Quine) Brandom I 854
DavidsonVsDualism scheme/Content. The problem is that the mind, if it is not to be superfluous, must change its material in applying the concepts somehow. (>Hegel’s phenomenology). (See also >BrandomVsKant). >Scheme/Content ("Third dogma").
I 85
The idea of ​​a really alien scheme is inconceivable for us. If others are in a state which cannot be determined with our methods, this cannot be because our methods fail (with which we determine the states of consciousness), but because such states are not referred to as states of consciousness. These are not desires, beliefs or intentions. The futility of imagining conceptual scheme that is forever unreachable for ​​our understanding is not owed to our inability to understand such a scheme, but is simply due to what we mean by such a scheme.
We cannot remove the conceptual layers sentence by sentence. Nevertheless, according to Quine a distinction is to be made betw. the invariant content and the changing layers. "Between report and invention, content and style, cue and conceptualization." "...by subtracting these indications from the worldview of man we get as a difference what he contributes to this worldview. This marks the extent of the conceptual sovereignty of man, the area in which one can change theories, without changing the data."
I 89
Davidson: That is precisely the distinction between scheme and content.
I 91
If now the last evidence is subjective in the manner described, this also applies to our beliefs, desires, etc., and everything we mean by words. Although they are fruit of our worldview, they maintain their Cartesian independence from that what they are about. They could be different, without anything changing in the world. One could say that modern philosophy has been dominated by the dualism scheme/content or equally by the dualism subjective/objective.
DavidsonVs we need a radically changed view of the relationship between mind and world.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Dualism Carnap Vs Dualism VI 223
Body-soul problem/Dualism/Carnap: first, the problem of dualism is to be distinguished from the body-soul problem. Dualism: thesis: that despite the unit of the basis there are different subject types.
VsDualism: there may be different forms of order, but not different object types. (> constitution system).
VI 224
E.g. fixed stars, distances, ratios of distances, triangles of star distances, coverage of distance triangles: these are all different order types, but not objects in the real sense. Body-soul problem/Dualism/Carnap: Physical/mental: various order forms, not different object types or "different substances".
Essence/Carnap: In today’s science there are enough equal object types that could claim to be presumed sides of the essence of the world with the same legal right.
CarnapVsDualism: therefore it is an arbitrary restriction to indeed important, but not in principle prominent subject areas.
Order/Object/CarnapVsDualism: there are an unlimited number of possible order forms. But only a single type of elements.

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982
Dualism Deutsch Vs Dualism I 165
Leben: Lebende Moleküle (Gene) sind lediglich Moleküle und gehorchen denselben Naturgesetzen wie unbelebte! Sie enthalten keine besondere Substanz und haben auch keine besonderen physikalischen Eigenschaften!(VsDualismus: Leben keine Substanz).

Deutsch I
D. Deutsch
Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997
German Edition:
Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000
Dualism Esfeld Vs Dualism I 201
Regelfolgen/Esfeld: 1. VsReduktion der Beschreibung von intentionalen Zuständen auf die Beschreibung von physikalischen Zuständen. 2. VsDualismus in der Ontologie: denn intentionalen Vokabular ist genau deshalb nicht auf physikalisches reduzierbar, weil intentionale Zustände nur relativ zu sozialer Praxis determiniert sind.
Dies Praktiken haben allerdings eine physikalische Realisierung.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Dualism McDowell Vs Dualism I 121
Meaning/McDowellVsDualism: Solution: second nature. The idea of ​​education ensures that the autonomy of meaning is not inhumane. This allows no genuine questions about standards.
I 127
Consciousness/McDowell: to avoid Cartesianism, we should not speak of the "flow of consciousness" (stream of consciousness), but of a lasting perspective on something that itself is outside of consciousness.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Dualism McGinn Vs Dualism McGinnVsDualism: the problem is that he goes too far in the interpretation of data. It responds to the appearances, by declaring that the mind is virtually independent of the brain.
  1 The zombie problem
  2 The Haunted problem II 38
McGinnVsDualism: seperates the mind to radically from the brain. So as if the mind could go about its business without assistance of the brain machine .
He s right that the brain, just as we presently understand it, can not explain the mind - he is wrong when he concludes that no brain property can do this. II 42
Mind / brain / McGinn: the spirit is manifest in a causal relation to the brain, as difficult as this may be to believe. Why should that be so, if the existence of consciousness depends on God (VsDescartes).
Theism / McGinn: the theistic dualism exaggerates the gap between mind and brain. II 106
Def Hyper Dualism / McGinn: assumed in the Big Bang there were two universes, a material and a parallel, which consisted only of consciousness. II 108 - II 110 McGinnVs Hyper dualism: Where is the fatal error? In the concept of causality. The mental universe is said to contain no matter and yet events and circumstances in this universe make things happen in the other universe. Thus, it is assumed that disembodied consciousness be able to influence the course of events. This raises two major questions:
  1st How can a disembodied consciousness be the cause of something?
  2nd How can the physical sequence of events be disturbed by anything in the material universe, which is going on in the other universe?

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Dualism Ryle Vs Dualism Pauen I 82
Ryle/Pauen: it seems as if Ryle wanted to deny the existence of mental states, but this is a misunderstanding. He simply denies an autonomous mental substance.
I 84
RyleVsDualism: Category Error: falsely assumes that we can speak of mental processes in the same context as of physical processes. As if mind and brain differed like Library and Lecture Hall. Therefore, it is pointless to speak of "concurrent" mental and physical events.

Ryle I 226 ff
Dualism/RyleVsDualism/Ryle: life is not a double series of events that take place in two different kinds of matters. It's only a chain of events of various genres whose differences are mainly in that logically different types of statements of law and law-like statements are applicable to them.
I 228
We are not looking into a secret chamber. In reality, the problem is not of that kind. It is is rather about the methodological question of how we prove law-like statements about the silent demeanor of people and apply them. E.g. I find out that someone is a true master of chess by watching him. That a student is lazy by watching him for a longer while.
The question is not the frame question: "How do I discover that we have a soul?", but: a whole series of special questions of the form: how do I discover that I am more selfless than you, that I do poorly in dividing, but better at solving differential equations? That you are suffering from anxiety or easily overlook certain kinds of facts?
Apart from such purely dispositional questions, there is the whole range of execution and event questions of the form: how do I find out that I got the joke, but you did not? That your deed required more courage than mine?
I 229
Questions of this kind are not a mystery!
I 230
In short, it is part of the meaning of "he understands" that he could have done this and that and that he would have done it... and the test is a set of tasks. With a single success we would not entirely have been satisfied, but we were with twenty. (Whether a boy can divide).
Wittgenstein VII 147
Philosophy/Nonsense/Logical Grammar/Tetens: the thesis that philosophy is based on a misunderstanding of the "logical grammar" of language, can neither be found in Carnap nor in the Tractatus, but in Ryle in his criticism RyleVsDualismus, VsDescartes (Ryle 1969).

Ryle I
G. Ryle
The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949
German Edition:
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Dualism Wittgenstein Vs Dualism IV 49
Monism/Dualism/WittgensteinVsMonism/WittgensteinVsDualism: there are no designated numbers in the logic and therefore there is no philosophical monism or dualism.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
Dualism Verschiedene Vs Dualism Vollmer II 86
Split-Brain/VsDualism: shows that consciousness is divisible! And unity is the main argument of dualism! No problem for identity theory.
VsDualism: how should the surgeon's material scalpel be able to double a supposedly immaterial consciousness?
Eccles: the right brain is just a kind of computer.
II 87
VsDualism: the effect of alcohol, narcotics, psychotropic drugs, simple chemical compounds that seem to have a tremendous effect on consciousness. VsDualism: the occurrence of identical twins, schizophrenia, unconsciousness, sleep, coma.
BungeVsDualism: a scientific anomaly: nowhere else is there such a separation between a system and its characteristics and functions! There are otherwise only properties of something.
For example movement is movement of a body, energy is energy of a system, not independent beings.
The dualist reifies these qualities and states into separately existing things.
Otherwise we are not talking about the "body-movement-problem"!





Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Dualism Pauen Vs Dualism Pauen I 56
VsDualismus: it appears to explain the consistency of experiences and the free will better indeed, but it still remains absolutely unclear how consciousness was able accomplish this integration feat. What non-physical regularities govern it? The dualist does not have any concrete research subject! If this integration takes place completely unconsciously, it is not an activity of the consciousness!
MonismVsDualism: has a research object in contrast whose mode of operation is known in principle and which can be checked for evidence of integration feats.
I 57
VsDualism: merely shifts the problem of free will by autonomous mind. The autonomous mind can hardly have created itself. Therefore, it is also dependent on the properties and characteristics that go back to the act of creation, or were acquired after this act.
I 58
VsDualism: is it not at least superior in the question of the origin of consciousness? Again, only shift of the problem: the dualist cannot rely on theories of neuronal processes here, but has to rely on something beyond that. However, it is absolutely unclear where it should start here.
The assumption that immaterial substance possessed the ability to produce consciousness is as mysterious as the assumption that material processes possessed it.
Nor can you define the mind as a "capacity to create consciousness". That would be as circular as reducing playing chess to the "ability to play chess".
MonismVsDualism: has a concrete object of study here, even though it is pondering the same question.
I 59
VsInteractionalistic Dualism: if it assumes an interaction, it violates the principle of the causal closure and the principle of physical determination. E.g. brick: the flight cannot rely on consistently physically described events, after all, the reaction would depend on an act of will.
The principle of physical determination is also violated: the act of will had no equivalent in physically describable events, after all, it is supposed to be independent of neuronal activity.
I 60
Property Dualism: ignores these problems and represents consciousness as an autonomous property that is simultaneously a new kind of physical properties. For this, one would have to encounter events that cannot be explained by neural processes. This would force us to enhance the natural sciences methodically.
MonismVsDualism: contrary to the principle of ontological austerity.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Reductionism Esfeld Vs Reductionism I 201
Regelfolgen/Esfeld: 1. VsReduktion der Beschreibung von intentionalen Zuständen auf die Beschreibung von physikalischen Zuständen. 2. VsDualismus in der Ontologie: denn intentionalen Vokabular ist genau deshalb nicht auf physikalisches reduzierbar, weil intentionale Zustände nur relativ zu sozialer Praxis determiniert sind.
Dies Praktiken haben allerdings eine physikalische Realisierung.
I 202
VsReduktionismus/Esfeld: eine Beschreibung , die einem außenstehenden Beobachter zugänglich ist, verfehlt notwendigerweise den begrifflichen Inhalt.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Various Authors Dewey Vs Various Authors Suhr I 57
DeweyVsAbility: there is no "ability in itself", but only in connection with a task! Thinking is trial treatment.
I 95
DeweyVsDualismus: experience does not come from nature but is in nature.
Hacking I 109
Dewey/Hacking: it has the (false) appearance that for Dewey everything is a social construct. DeweyVsDualism, all dualisms. Theory/Practice, Mind/Matter, Thinking/Action, Fact/Value. Vs "Spectator Theory of Knowledge".
Putnam III 237
Durkheim: had come to the conclusion that political opinions should be based on the "opinion of experts".
III 238
DeweyVsDurkheim: perhaps did not even know this treatise, yet Vs: "It cannot fail to happen that an expert class moves so far away from the interests of the community that it becomes a class with private interests and private knowledge. And private knowledge is not knowledge at all in relation to social affairs."
Rorty VI 88
Truth/Goal/DeweyVsSpencer: there is no goal of a truth to be achieved (this goal is also represented today by Peirce and by Bernard Williams).

Dew II
J. Dewey
Essays in Experimental Logic Minneola 2004

Suhr I
Martin Suhr
John Dewey zur Einführung Hamburg 1994

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Various Authors Luhmann Vs Various Authors Habermas I 436
VsParsons: simply reproduces the classical model through systems. (Social system = action system). Luhmann instead: human as part of the environment of society. This changes the premises of all questions. Methodical anti-humanism.
Habermas I 440
LuhmannVsHumanism: "Cardinal Error". A fusion of social and material dimensions.
Reese-Schäfer II 28
LuhmannVsDualism: of observer and object. Universality/Vs: the total view, the universality had to be given up and was replaced by "critique", with which the subject's point of view on universality is rounded up again". Foundation/Luhmann: there is no last stop. (Like Quine, Sellars, Rorty).
Reese-Schäfer II 42
VsMarx: rejects the speech of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly aspire to the same good. Contradiction/Luhmann: arises only from the self-reference of sense. Not as in Marx.
Contradictions/Legal System: does not serve for the avoidance, but for the regulation of conflicts.
Reese-Schäfer II 78
Freedom of Value: (Max Weber): the renunciation of valuations is, so to speak, the blind spot of a second level observation.
Reese-Schäfer II 89
Vs Right Politics: here there is no theory at all that would be able to read other theories. There is only apercus or certain literary guiding ideas. Reese-Schäfer II 90/91
VsGehlen: we do not have to subordinate ourselves to the institutions.
Reese-Schäfer II 102
VsAction Theory: a very vague concept of individuals that can only be defined by pointing at people. Thus language habits are presented as language knowledge: because language requires us to employ subjects. LL. Language.
Reese-Schäfer II 103
Reason/VsAdorno: one should not resign oneself (dialectic of the Enlightenment) but ask whether it does not get better without reason!
Reese-Schäfer II 112
Overstimulation/LuhmannVsTradition: cannot take place at all. For already the neurophysiological apparatus drastically shields the consciousness. The operative medium sense does the rest.
Reese-Schäfer II 138
Human/Gehlen: tried to determine the human from its difference to the animal. (LuhmannVs).
AU Cass. 3
VsParsons: Terminology limited by structural functionalism: one could not ask about the function of structures, or examine terms such as inventory or inventory prerequisite, variable or the whole methodological area. Limitation by the fact that a certain object was assumed as given. There were no criteria for the existence of the object - instead the theory must be able to contain all deviance and dysfunction. (not possible with Parsons) - Question: in which time period and which bandwidths is a system identifiable? (e.g. Revolution: is society still the same society afterwards?) Inventory criteria Biology: Definition by death. The living reproduces itself by its own means. Self-reference (important in modern system theory) is not possible within the framework of the Parsons' model. Therefore we need interdisciplinary solutions.

VsAction Theory: the concept of action is not suitable because an actor is assumed! But it also exists without an observer! In principle, an action can be presented as a solitary thing without social resonance! - Paradox/Luhmann: the procedure of the dissolution of the paradox is logically objectionable, but is constantly applied by the logicians themselves: they use a change of levels. The only question that must not be asked is: what is the unity of the difference of planes?
(AU Cass. 4)
VsEquilibrium Theories: questionable today; 1. from the point of view of natural science: it is precisely the imbalances which are stable, equilibrium is rather metaphor.
(AU Cass. 6)
Tradition: "Transmission of patterns from generation to generation". Stored value patterns that are offered again and again and adopted by the offspring. However, these patterns are still the same. VsTradition: Question: Where does identity come from in the first place? How could one talk about selfhood without an external observer? That will not be much different either with the assumptions of a reciprocal relationship with learning. Luhmann: instead: (Autopoiesis): Socialization is always self-socialization.
AU Cass 6
Information/Luhmann: the term must now be adapted to it! In the 70s one spoke of "genetic information", treated structures as informative, the genetic code contained information.
Luhmann: this is wrong, because genes only contain structures and no events!
The semantic side of the term remained unexplained for a long time, i.e. the question of what information can choose from.

Reese-Schäfer II 76
LuhmannVsMarx/Reese-Schäfer: rejects the talk of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly strive for the same good.
AU Cass 11
Emergence/Reductionism/System Theory/Luhmann: this does not even pose the actual question: what actually distinguishes an emergent system? What is the characteristic for the distinction from the basal state? What is the criterion that enables emergence? Will Martens: (Issue 4, Kölner Zeitschrift f. Sozialforschung): Autopoiesis of social systems.
It deals with the question following the concept of autopoiesis and communication.
Communication/Luhmann: Tripartite structure:
Information,
Communication, Understanding (not action sequences). (Comes from linguistics, but also antiquity!).
Martens: this tripartite division is the psychological foundation of communication. Communication must first be negotiated in the individual head, I must see what I assume to be unknown and what I want to choose, and my body must also be in good shape.
Marten's thesis: sociality only comes about in the synthesis of these three components.
Social things arise when information, communication and understanding are created as a unit with repercussions on the participating mental systems, which must behave accordingly.
The unity is only the synthesis itself, while the elements still have to be described psychologically or biologically etc. Without this foundation it does not work.
LuhmannVsMartens: I hope you fall for it! At first that sounds very plausible. But now comes the question:
What is communicated in the text by Martens? Certainly not the blood circulation! There is also no blood in the text! The editors would already fight this off, there is also no state of consciousness in the text! So I cannot imagine what the author was thinking! I can well imagine that he was supplied with blood and sat in front of the computer. And that he wanted to take part in the discussion.
Luhmann: these are all constructions which are suggested in communication, but which are not actually present in communication. (>Interpenetration).
Communication/LuhmannVsMartens: Question: what is actually claimed in the text, and does it not actually refute it itself?
Paradox: the text that tells of blood and thoughts claims to bring blood and thoughts, but it only brings letters and what a skilled reader can make of the text. That is communication. That is all I can actually see!
Communication/Luhmann: if you think realistically and operatively, you cannot see more in the text. We have to put the words together from the letters ourselves.
When psychic systems respond to communication, they change their internal states accordingly.
Communication/Luhmann: if one has received this message (from Martens), one can say: everything is actually correct, one could describe a communication completely on the basis of physical or psychological facts. Nothing would be missing, with the exception of autopoiesis itself.
Question: we have to explain how communication maintains itself without incorporating psychological and physical operations!
Luhmann: this reproduction of communication through communication goes only through total exclusion from physical, psychological, etc. operations.

AU I
N. Luhmann
Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992
German Edition:
Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992

Lu I
N. Luhmann
Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Reese-Schäfer II
Walter Reese-Schäfer
Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001