Lexicon of Arguments


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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Reference Dretske
 
Books on Amazon:
Fred Dretske
Brandom I 600
Reference/Triangulation: he wants to avoid these difficulties by looking at the crossing point of two chains. Also Dretske: e.g. thermostat: one cannot say whether the system reacts to the temperature of the room, to the bimetallic strip, to the curvature of the bimetallic strip, or to the closing of the contact. (> Measuring) The practical consequences do not help. If the thermostat has a second sensor, such as a mercury thermometer which closes a contact accordingly and, if necessary, turns the heater on and off, the two causal chains intersect at two points: upstream with the change of the room temperature and downstream with the reaction to turn the heater on or off.
---
I 951
Since the two chains intersect at two points, one must imagine them curved. BrandomVsDretske: does that really solve the problem? Is there not still the reaction to the closest disjunctive stimulus? Closing the bimetal strip or the mercury contact?
---
I 601
Concept: Mere differing ability to react (> RDRD reliable differential responsive dispositions, Brandom) is not enough to recognize the use of terms! Rationalistic supplementation: the inferential role of the reaction is crucial.

Dret I
F. Dretske
Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997


Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Representation Pauen
 
Books on Amazon
V 57
Representation/Unit/Wolf Singer/Pauen: representation of unity needs not to be a uniform representation - because the connection between different aspects is represented by synchronous firing. ---
V 217 ff
Representation/Pauen: Problem: naturalization of intentionality - I do not violate any laws of physics, if I confuse a cat with a dog - problem: the failure of the explanation would cast doubt on the existence of mental states. - Asymmetry: representation stands for an object, but not vice versa, the object for a representation - R are parts of the language of the mind - computer analogy: Symbols - propositional position: relations to symbols. ---
V 226
Causality problem: presentation in the absence of the object. ---
V 232
Representation/causal theory/VsDretske/Pauen: E.g. sunburn no representation of the sun. ---
V 233
E.g. indigestion no representation of spoiled food. ---
V 235
But a failure of strong naturalization does not result in an argument VsIdentity theory.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Representation Dretske
 
Books on Amazon:
Fred Dretske
Pau I Michael Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt/M. 2001

Pau I 230
Meaning/Naturalization/mental representation/Dretske/Pauen: (Dretske 1994,1995): tries like Fodor to explain the emergence of meaning in a purely naturalistic manner. However, this also extends to non-human creatures. Four aspects:
1. Causal relation between object and representation
2. Function of representation for the organism
3. Development history of acquiring
4. Possibility of change.

Sign/Meaning/Causality/Dretske/Pauen: (ad 1.) a pure causal relation can only produce a natural sign ("sign/indication"). The normative moment has no place here.

ad 2. The normative distinction between the right and the wrong of the mental representation comes into play when a device or an organ receives the function of displaying another state of affairs.

ad 3. E.g. Magnetotactic bacteria are looking for deeper, oxygen-deficient water layers.
If these bacteria were transported to the northern hemisphere, they would seek flatter, more oxygen-rich water layers!
Here it would remain unclear what exactly the object of the representation is: is it the magnetic fields or the oxygen concentration?
---
I 232
Dretske: admits that this is hard to decide here. Solution: most organisms have several approaches to a state of affairs.
If a representation occurs in the normal case in the presence of an enemy, one can speak of a representation of the enemy.

ad 4. It seems possible that the objection, not the enemy, but the disjunction of all stimuli, is the object of the representation. E.g. smell or silhouette, or sound.
Here the learning ability is important. Higher living beings can learn new stimuli here, with which even a complete old disjunction might be absent.
Thus the disjunction is also not considered as a representation.
VsDretske/Pauen: a causally determined sun burn is nevertheless not a representation of the sun.
---
I 233
Stomach upsets are no representation of spoiled food. ---
Schifer I 46
Representation/FG/fuel gauge/Petrol/Dretske/Terminology/Schiffer: (Dretske 1986): "fuel gauge model of representation: it represents the fuel status because it is a reliable indicator for it. ((s) By regularity to the representation. Additional assumption: Contrafactic conditional). ---
Joelle Proust Das intentionale Tier in D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt/M. 2005

I 225
Mental representation/Dretske/Proust: 1. Covariance between internal condition and external situation ("Indication".) 2. The internal indicator has the function to display the external situation. Then it represents them.
3. Representations can be true or false.

Dret I
F. Dretske
Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997

Semantics Brandom
 
Books on Amazon
I 297
Brandom's thesis understanding the semantics based on the pragmatics. ---
II 145
Semantic theory/BrandomVsDretske/VsMillikan/VsFodor: Problem: Cannot explain how real representations (beliefs) differ from simple indicator states (>RDRDs, reliable differential responsive dispositions). ---
II 146
Reliability theory/Brandom: cannot be applied to the semantics ((s) otherwise circular?) - epistemology is its suitable working area. ---
Newen/Schrenk I 161
Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: reverses the conventional semantics - justifying "the correctness of e.g. if A is located east of B, B is located west of A" - by the meaning of - west - and - east -". ---
I 162
West and east acquire their meaning precisely because they occur in such inferences - " basic concepts: not truth and reference (Tarski s truth concept too weak) - "correctness: from social practice - "Meaning: arises from the inferential roles.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Armstrong, D. Lewis Vs Armstrong, D.
 
Books on Amazon
V 353
"New Work for a Theory of Universals" (1983) Universals/Armstrong: His theory of U. is supposed to be the solution for the problem of the One and the Multitude.
LewisVsArmstrong: But it allows for either nominalist solutions or for no solution of any kind.

Schwarz I 71
Combinatorialism/Armstrong: Merely consists of several fundamental properties for which - contrary to colours- any combination should be possible(1986,§7). LewisVs: 1986a,86, HellerVs (1998): It is unclear whether this is actually possible. LewisVsArmstrong: As such the problem is not solved, it only allows different interpretations of the descriptions: When does a set of sentences represent the fact that there are donkeys if there is no mention of donkeys? It does represent this fact if the sentences imply the existence of donkeys (1986e, 150 157).
Problem: Modality is required.
VsVs: It could be stated that the relationship between the distribution of fundamental properties and of all other truths is analytic, and can be characterized without requiring primitive modal vocabulary. (2002b, Heller 1996, see below Chapter 11. (LewisVs: 1992a,209).

Schwarz I 118
Laws of Nature/LoN/DretskeVsLewis/TooleyVsLewis/ArmstrongVsLewis: There is something missing in Lewis’ LoN: For Lewis, LoN are simple regularities. But they should be more than that. Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong-Theory: Thesis: LoN are based on fundamental relations between universals, therefore properties. Since regularities are logically independent from local events, possible worlds with precisely the same local events can nicely differ in their Laws of Nature. For one world, it may be a regularity, for the other, a relation of universals.
Relation of Universals: is the foundation for everything and cannot be analyzed. To state that there is a relation between F's and G's because all F's are G's is not enough. This would be the regularity theory.
SchwarzVs: This leads to problems with not instantiated universals (Mellor 1980, §6).
Laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong/LewisVsTooley/LewisVsDretske: If LoN express fundamental relations between universals which are logically independent from observable regularities why do we assume that physics will tell us something about LoN?
Schwarz I 119
What is the use of universals? Physicists only want to observe regularities. And what is then the relation between universals and regularities? Additional explanations will then be needed! How could a rule-maker exclude that N(F,G) is valid, but some F's are nevertheless not G's. It is not resolved by giving a name to the "rule-maker" like Armstrong does with the term "necessitation". NG/LewisVsArmstrong: Better: Regularities which are justified because of a primitive relation between universals. It is a relationship which also exists in poss.w. in which NG is not valid. It is rather more obscure, but at least not a miracle anymore that all F's are G's if a LoN demands it.
Schwarz I 124
Probability/LewisVsArmstrong: Vs fundamental probability- Property. Fundamental properties cannot fulfill the role which we attribute to probability.
Schw I 139
Cause/Causation/Armstrong: Absence is not a real cause. LewisVsArmstrong: Yes, it is. However, it is so common that is it ignored - Problem: Numerous absences in vacuum.
Schwarz I 140
Solution/Lewis: Absences are absolutely nothing, there is nothing. Problem: If absence is only empty space-time region, why would oxygen - and not nitrogen- only exist because of absence? > Solution/Lewis: "Influence", small increase of probability – I 141 counterfactual dependence as well between the how, when and where of the event.
Schwarz I 231
Def Principle of truth-maker/To make truth/Armstrong/Martin/Schwarz: All truths must be based on the ontology. Strong form: For each truth, there is something that makes it true. Its existence necessarily implies the truth. LewisVsArmstrong: That is too strong, e.g. the example "no unicorns exist" is true, not because there is something specific, but because unicorns really do not exist. (1992a,204, 2001b,611f).
Truthmaker: Would be an object here which only exists in worlds in which there are no unicorns. Problem: Why is it not possible for this object to also exist in worlds in which there are unicorns? Answer: Such an object would be a contradiction to the principle of recombination.
SchwarzVsLewis: But this is not true: the truth-maker for "no unicorns exist" could be an object which essentially lives in a poss.w. without unicorns. However, the object could very well have duplicates in the poss.w. with unicorns. The counterpart relation is not a relation of intrinsic resemblance.
To make truth/Predicate/Armstrong/Schwarz: (Armstrong 1997a,205f): If object A has the property F, an object must exist which implies the existence of this fact.
LewisVsArmstrong: Why can this object not exist, although A is not F?(1998b). If A is F in one world, but it is not so in the other world, why is it always necessary to have something that exists in one poss.w., but is missing in the other world: Two poss.w. are only different on the grounds of the characteristics the objects have in their worlds.
((s) So different characteristics in an area that remains constant).
Characteristics/Truth-maker/Lewis: A truth-maker is not needed for something that has a (basic) characteristic: The sentence "A is F" is true because A has the characteristic F. That is all. (1998b, 219).
Def Principle of truth-maker/LewisVsArmstrong/Schwarz: Only the following will then remain: Truth supervenes upon the things that exist, and upon perfect natural characteristics which it chooses to instantiate.(1992a,207,1994a,225, Bigelow 1988, §25).
Whenever two possibilities are different from each other, there are either different objects in them or this objects have different fundamental characteristics.(1992a,206, 2001b,§4).
Schwarz I 232
N.B.: If there are possibilities that are qualitatively indistinguishable, but numerically different(which Lewis neither states nor denies, 1986e,224), the principle must be limited to qualitative truths or characteristics (1992a, 206f). If there are none, simplification is possible: No other two possibilities are exactly the same regarding which objects exist as well as the fundamental characteristics are instantiated.((s) If the distribution of fundamental characteristics sets everything, then the objects are set as well. As such, the poss.w. are only different regarding their characteristics, but these are naturally then set.) Schwarz: This can be amplified.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Dretske, F. Brandom Vs Dretske, F.
 
Books on Amazon
I 600
Dretske: E.g. thermostat: one cannot say whether the system reacts to the room temperature, to the temperature of the bimetallic strip, to the curvature of the bimetallic strip, or the closing of the contact. (> Measuring) A look at the practical consequences will not help. If the thermostat has a second sensor, such as a mercury thermometer which closes a contact accordingly and turns the heating on and off accordingly, then the two causal chains intersect at two points: upstream at the change of the room temperature, and downstream in the reaction of turning the heater on or off.
BrandomVsDretske: Does this really solve the problem? Isn’t this still the reaction to the nearest, albeit disjoint stimulus? The closing of the bimetallic strip or the mercury contact?
II 12
Concept/BrandomVsDretske, Fodor, Millikan: not semantic continuity to the non- or pre-conceptual, but strict discontinuity.
II 144
Semantic Theory: Dretske, Millikan, Fodor. BrandomVs: weakest where they turn to the question of what distinguisjes representations that deserve to be called beliefs from other indicator states. > Camp.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Dretske, F. Dennett Vs Dretske, F.
 
Books on Amazon
I 596
Intentionality / Dretske: we can (logically) create an artificial product that acquires original intentionality, but none that has intentionality from the beginning. Question: how much dealing with the world is necessary? DennettVsDretske: this is the old question of the essential forms. It is undarwinistic to think that not everything emerged gradually.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Dretske, F. Gettier Vs Dretske, F.
 
Books on Amazon
Brendel I 204
Def Information/Dretske/Brendel: kein quantitatives Maß, das die beim Empfänger beseitigte Unbestimmtheit angibt, sondern das Rohmaterial, aus dem Bedeutungen entstehen.
I 205
Sie ist eine objektive Ware, deren Schaffung, Übertragung und Rezeption keine Interpretation voraussetzt oder erfordert. Signal/Dretske: Bsp Dinge, Sachverhalte, Ereignisse, Zeichen, Nachrichten usw. sie tragen Informationen. Kognitiv Handelnde können aus ihnen Wissen gewinnen.
Informationsgehalt/Dretske: es geht darum, den IG dieser Signale zu bestimmen.
Def Information/Informationsgehalt/Dretske/Brendel: ein Signal r trägt die Information, dass s F ist, = die konditionale Wahrscheinlichkeit (Wschk) von s, F zu sein, gegeben r (und k) ist 1 (aber gegeben k allein, weniger als 1). (Dretske 1981a, 65).
k: ist das, was der Empfänger schon weiß.
Information/Dretske/Brendel: These: ist vorsprachlich, Bsp ein Verkehrszeichen. Keine Aussage. Problem: das kann so nicht in eine logische Form eingefügt werden.
Dretske: Z „Am Anfang war Information. Das Wort kam später“.
I 206
Wschk/Dretske/Brendel: soll die subjektive Komponente einführen, dass ein und dasselbe Ding für Subjekte mit verschiedenem Vorwissen verschiedene Informationen übermitteln kann.
Wschk/Dretske/Brendel: er kann keine subjektive Wschk meinen, denn dann verliert der Informationsbegriff völlig seinen objektiven Charakter.
objektive Wschk/Brendel: ist aber relative Häufigkeit (relH) bzw. deren Grenzwert, der Limes der relH von F in G.
Problem: auch das kann von Dretske nicht intendiert sein, weil wenn die Bezugsklasse G unendlich ist, so ist der Grenzwert eine Schätzung, da man nur endlich viele Beobachtungen machen kann. Dann könnte eine Wschk von 1 erhalten werden, ohne dass dies dem tatsächlichen Grenzwert entspricht.
Wschk/Dretske: eine solche lehnt er daher explizit ab.
I 207
Lösung/Dretske: Wschk als relH zwischen Bedingungstypen. 1. es muss kein endliches Beispiel sein, dass die aktuale Wschk reflektiert.
2. die Relation, von der die Kommunikation von Inhalten abhängt, ist die gesetzmäßige Abhängigkeit einer Bedingung von einer anderen.
DretskeVsCohen/DretskeVsLehrer: keine Identifikation einer Wschk von 1 mit einer Grenze von 1.
BrendelVsDretske/Brendel: der Begriff der Wschk bzw. Häufigkeit ist nur sinnvoll bei wiederholbaren Fällen, Bei Dretske geht es jedoch meist um einmalige Ereignisse.
Lösung/Loewer/Brendel: seinen Informationsbegriff ohne Wschk reformulieren.
Lösung/Dretske: nomische Regularität zwischen Ereignistypen, die nomisch das Vorkommen von r ausschließt, wenn s nicht F ist.
I 209
BrendelVsDretske: diese Verschiedenheit des fraglichen Vorwissens sichert noch nicht die Rekursivität. Zirkularität muss direkt ausgeschlossen werden: Das tut Dretske jedoch nicht. 2. BrendelVsDretske: was ist „kausale Stützung“: auch sie ist vom Wissen abhängig, Bsp Interpretation eines Klopfens an der Tür.
I 212
BrendelVsDretske: er zeigt nicht, die man diese nomologische Verbindung (informationale Relation) erkennen kann. D.h. wir haben gar keine Anwendungsbedingungen. …+…
I 217
Wissen/BrendelVsDretske: wenn wir nun zwei Wissensbegriffe nötig hätten, hieße das, dass Dretske Wissen nicht definiert hat. SkeptizismusVsDretske/Brendel: woher sollten wir ein solches grundlegendes Wissen haben? Und wie könnten wir sicher sein, dass wir es besitzen? Woher wissen wir, dass alle Alternativen berücksichtigt wurden? Das beantwortet Dretske nicht.

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Dretske, F. Brendel Vs Dretske, F.
 
Books on Amazon
I 204
Def Information/Dretske/Brendel: kein quantitatives Maß, das die beim Empfänger beseitigte Unbestimmtheit angibt, sondern das Rohmaterial, aus dem Bedeutungen entstehen.
I 205
Sie ist eine objektive Ware, deren Schaffung, Übertragung und Rezeption keine Interpretation voraussetzt oder erfordert. Signal/Dretske: Bsp Dinge, Sachverhalte, Ereignisse, Zeichen, Nachrichten usw. sie tragen Informationen. Kognitiv Handelnde können aus ihnen Wissen gewinnen.
Informationsgehalt/Dretske: es geht darum, den IG dieser Signale zu bestimmen.
Def Information/Informationsgehalt/Dretske/Brendel: ein Signal r trägt die Information, dass s F ist, = die konditionale Wahrscheinlichkeit (Wschk) von s, F zu sein, gegeben r (und k) ist 1 (aber gegeben k allein, weniger als 1). (Dretske 1981a, 65).
k: ist das, was der Empfänger schon weiß.
Information/Dretske/Brendel: Thesis: ist vorsprachlich, Bsp ein Verkehrszeichen. Keine Aussage. Problem: das kann so nicht in eine logische Form eingefügt werden.
Dretske: Z "Am Anfang war Information. Das Wort kam später".
I 206
Wschk/Dretske/Brendel: soll die subjektive Komponente einführen, dass ein und dasselbe Ding für Subjekte mit verschiedenem Vorwissen verschiedene Informationen übermitteln kann.
Wschk/Dretske/Brendel: er kann keine subjektive Wschk meinen, denn dann verliert der Informationsbegriff völlig seinen objektiven Charakter.
objektive Wschk/Brendel: ist aber relative Häufigkeit (relH) bzw. deren Grenzwert, der Limes der relH von F in G.
Problem: auch das kann von Dretske nicht intendiert sein, weil wenn die Bezugsklasse G unendlich ist, so ist der Grenzwert eine Schätzung, da man nur endlich viele Beobachtungen machen kann. Dann könnte eine Wschk von 1 erhalten werden, ohne dass dies dem tatsächlichen Grenzwert entspricht.
Wschk/Dretske: eine solche lehnt er daher explizit ab.
I 207
Lösung/Dretske: Wschk als relH zwischen Bedingungstypen. 1. es muss kein endliches Beispiel sein, dass die aktuale Wschk reflektiert.
2. die Relation, von der die Kommunikation von Inhalten abhängt, ist die gesetzmäßige Abhängigkeit einer Bedingung von einer anderen.
DretskeVsCohen/DretskeVsLehrer: keine Identifikation einer Wschk von 1 mit einer Grenze von 1.
BrendelVsDretske/Brendel: der Begriff der Wschk bzw. Häufigkeit ist nur sinnvoll bei wiederholbaren Fällen, Bei Dretske geht es jedoch meist um einmalige Ereignisse.
Lösung/Loewer/Brendel: seinen Informationsbegriff ohne Wschk reformulieren.
Lösung/Dretske: nomische Regularität zwischen Ereignistypen, die nomisch das Vorkommen von r ausschließt, wenn s nicht F ist.
I 209
BrendelVsDretske: diese Verschiedenheit des fraglichen Vorwissens sichert noch nicht die Rekursivität. Zirkularität muss direkt ausgeschlossen werden: Das tut Dretske jedoch nicht. 2. BrendelVsDretske: was ist „kausale Stützung“: auch sie ist vom Wissen abhängig, Bsp Interpretation eines Klopfens an der Tür.
I 212
BrendelVsDretske: er zeigt nicht, die man diese nomologische Verbindung (informationale Relation) erkennen kann. D.h. wir haben gar keine Anwendungsbedingungen. …+…
I 217
Wissen/BrendelVsDretske: wenn wir nun zwei Wissensbegriffe nötig hätten, hieße das, dass Dretske Wissen nicht definiert hat. SkepticismVsDretske/Brendel: woher sollten wir ein solches grundlegendes Wissen haben? Und wie könnten wir sicher sein, dass wir es besitzen? Woher wissen wir, dass alle Alternativen berücksichtigt wurden? Das beantwortet Dretske nicht.

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Dretske, F. Lehrer Vs Dretske, F.
 
Books on Amazon:
Keith Lehrer
Brendel I 218
Knowledge/Externalism/Internalism/Lehrer/Brendel: (Lehrer 1990b. 252) Thesis: LehrerVsInternalism, LehrerVsExternalism: Both answers to the question of what needs to be added to true conviction in order to obtain knowledge are wrong. (Lager) Solution/Lehrer: Thesis: Connection of internalism and externalism:
Def Knowledge/Lehrer/Brendel: Is a rational connection of subjective states and truth, of mind and world. [ist eine rationale Verbindung subjektiven Zuständen und Wahrheit, zwischen Geist und Welt.]
Three conditions:
1. Knowledge must be distinguished from accidental true conviction
2. It must be "articulable" in principle
3. The epistemic subject must know and must be able to recognize the difference between information and misinformation.
Metaknowledge/Lehrer/Brendel: The third condition makes it necessary to have the term "metaknowledge".
LehrerVsExternalism: Cannot represent metaknowledge (to recognize misinformation in light of my knowledge of information).
LehrerVsDretske: Creating information is not a sufficient condition for knowledge; It also needs to know that the information is correct, e.g. defective measuring instruments do not lead to knowledge.
I 219
Important argument: the temperature can coincidentally match the one indicated on the display of the defective measuring instrument. Solution/Lehrer: We need background information (e.g. barn facades)
LehrerVsReliability theory: There would not be knowledge there as well.
Reliability theoryVsVs: this is only valid for causal theories, die die r.th. selber ablehnt.
Causal Theory/c.th.Lehrer/Brendel: It exceeds c.th. if Lehrer demands that the subject can recognize wrong information.
LehrerVsExternalism/Brendel: By recognizing misinformation any variety of externalism must be rejected as well.

Lehr I
K. Lehrer
Theory of Knowledge Oxford 1990

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999
Dretske, F. Pauen Vs Dretske, F.
 
Books on Amazon
V 230
Meaning/Naturalization/Mental Representation/Dretske/Pauen: (1994.1995): tries, like Fodor, to explain the origin of meaning purely naturalistically. But extends this also to non-human beings. Four aspects:
1) Causal relationship between object and representation
2) Representational function for the organism
3) Evolution of earning
4) Possibility of change.
Sign/Meaning/Causality/Dretske/Pauen: (ad 1) a purely causal relationship can only cause a natural sign ("signs"). The normative aspect has no place here.
ad 2) The normative distinction between right and wrong of the mental representation comes into play when a device or an organ is assigned the function of displaying a different state of affairs.

ad 3) e.g. magnetotactic bacteria pursue deeper, low-oxygen water layers.
Suppose these bacteria were brought to the northern hemisphere, they would head for shallower water layers with higher oxygen content!
Here it would be unclear what exactly is the object of representation: the magnetic fields or the oxygen concentration?
V 232
Dretske: acknowledges that this is difficult to decide. Solution: most organisms have multiple approaches to a situation.
If a representation normally occurs in the presence of an enemy, one can speak of a representation of the enemy.
ad 4) Only the objection that not the enemy, but the disjunction of all stimuli is the subject of the representation seems possible. E.g. odor or silhouette, or sound.
Here, the ability to learn is important. Higher organisms can learn new stimuli, which means that a complete old disjunction could even be absent.
Thus, the disjunction cannot be considered as a representation.
VsDretske/Pauen: a causally determined sunburn is still not a representation of the sun.
V 233
Indigestion are no representation of spoiled food.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Fodor, J. Brandom Vs Fodor, J.
 
Books on Amazon
I 731
BrandomVsNarrow Content: it is not easy at all to tell a coherent story here. Narrow states should be the same for similar individuals. However, because of different contexts there are also some that are distinct for different individuals. These can be identified as copies of each other only by restricting the permissible distinction in their language. This restriction can not be justified without a circle.
II 12
Criteria / BrandomVsDretske, VsFodor, VsMillikan: not semantic continuity to the non- or pre-conceptual, but strict discontinuity.
II 144
Semantic Theory: Dretske, Millikan, Fodor.   BrandomVs: the theory is weakest where they ask of what distinbguishes representations that deserve to be called beliefs, from other index states.
Esfeld I 71
FodorVsSemantic holism: compositionality principle (words contribute to the meaning of the sentence): a semantics of the inferential role cannot account for the KP. BrandomVsFodor: compositionality is neutral with respect to an explanation that starts from below.
NS I 161
Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: kehrt die herkömmliche Semantik um. Statt wie die Semantik anzunehmen, dass die Korrektheit des Schlusses Bsp „Wenn Princeton östlich von Pittsburgh liegt, liegt Pittsburgh westlich von Princeton“ durch die Bedeutung von „östlich“ und „westlich“ zu begründen,
NS I 162
Führt er eine kopernikanische Wende durch: Brandom: These: „westlich“ und „östlich“ erhalten ihre Bedeutung gerade, weil sie in solchen Folgebeziehungen vorkommen. Das ganze Netz von Satzäußerungen, in denen die Worte vorkommen, und auch die entsprechenden Handlungen konstituieren den begrifflichen Gehalt der Worte.
Inferentialismus/Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: sieht nicht Wahrheit und nicht Referenz als fundamentale bedeutungskonstituierende Einheiten an.
Korrektheit/Brandom: welche Folgerungen aus welchen Äußerungen korrekt sind, wird pragmatisch über die durch implizite Regeln geleitete soziale Praxis festgelegt.
Bedeutung/Holismus/Brandom: die Bedeutung von Begriffen und Äußerungen erwächst aus ihren inferentiellen Rollen zu anderen Begriffen und Äußerungen, daher sind sie nicht atomistisch sondern holistisch. (BrandomVsFodor).

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002