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The author or concept searched is found in the following 27 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Comparisons | Dilthey | Gadamer I 237 Comparisons/Understanding/Dilthey: He explicitly justifies the fact that the humanities make use of comparative methods with their task of overcoming the accidental barriers represented by their own circle of experience "and ascending to truths of greater generality"(1). GadamerVsDilthey: The essence of the Gadamer I 238 comparison already presupposes the independence of cognitive subjectivity, which possesses both one and the other. It creates simultanity in a declared way. Comparison/Gadamer: One must therefore doubt whether the method of comparing is really sufficient for the idea of historical knowledge. Is not a method that is at home in certain areas of the natural sciences and triumphs in some areas of the humanities, e.g. linguistics, law, art studies, etc.,(2) here being elevated from a subordinate tool to a central importance for the nature of historical knowledge, which often only gives superficial and non-binding reflection a false legitimation? Comparisons/Paul Yorck von Wartenburg/Gadamer: Here one can only agree with Yorck von Wartenburg when he writes: "Comparison is always aesthetic, always adheres to the form"(3) and one remembers that before him Hegel had ingeniously criticized the method of comparison.(4) 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften VII, 99. 2. An eloquent advocate of this is E. Rothacker, whose own contributions to the matter admittedly testify advantageously to the opposite: the "unmethod" of witty ideas and bold syntheses. 3. Paul Graf Yorck von Wartenburg, Briefwechsel, 1923, S. 193. 4. Wissenschaft der Logik Il, ed. Lasson 1934, S. 36f. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Comparisons | Gadamer | Gadamer I 237 Comparisons/Understanding/Dilthey: He explicitly justifies the fact that the humanities make use of comparative methods with their task of overcoming the accidental barriers represented by their own circle of experience "and ascending to truths of greater generality"(1). GadamerVsDilthey: The essence of the Gadamer I 238 comparison already presupposes the independence of cognitive subjectivity, which possesses both one and the other. It creates simultanity in a declared way. Comparison/Gadamer: One must therefore doubt whether the method of comparing is really sufficient for the idea of historical knowledge. Is not a method that is at home in certain areas of the natural sciences and triumphs in some areas of the humanities, e.g. linguistics, law, art studies, etc.,(2) here being elevated from a subordinate tool to a central importance for the nature of historical knowledge, which often only gives superficial and non-binding reflection a false legitimation? Comparisons/Paul Yorck von Wartenburg/Gadamer: Here one can only agree with Yorck von Wartenburg when he writes: "Comparison is always aesthetic, always adheres to the form"(3) and one remembers that before him Hegel had ingeniously criticized the method of comparison.(4) I 401 Comparisons/Gadamer: [Linguistic interpretation] (...) is also present (...) where the interpretation is not of a linguistic nature at all, i.e. not a text at all, but rather a work of image or sound. One can demonstrate something by means of contrast, for example by placing two pictures next to each other or reading two poems next to each other so that one is interpreted by the other. In such cases, as it were, the demonstrating demonstration of the linguistic interpretation precedes. But in reality this means that such a demonstration is a modification of linguistic interpretation. In what is shown there is then the reflection of the interpretation that uses showing as a vivid abbreviation. Showing is then an interpretation in the same sense that a translation, for example, summarizes the result of an interpretation. >Translation/Gadamer, >Interpretation/Gadamer, >Meaning change, >Pointing, >Hermeneutics. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften VII, 99. 2. An eloquent advocate of this is E. Rothacker, whose own contributions to the matter admittedly testify advantageously to the opposite: the "unmethod" of witty ideas and bold syntheses. 3. Paul Graf Yorck von Wartenburg, Briefwechsel, 1923, p. 193. 4. Wissenschaft der Logik Il, ed. Lasson 1934, p. 36f. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Dasein | Heidegger | Gadamer I 261 Dasein/Heidegger/Gadamer: The fact that Dasein is concerned with its being, that it is above all distinguished from all other being by its understanding of being, does not (as it seems to be the case in "Being and Time") represent the last basis from which a transcendental questioning has to proceed. Rather, there is talk of a completely different reason that makes all understanding of being possible in the first place, and this is that there is a "there", a clearing Gadamer I 262 in being, i.e. the difference between being (German: "Seiendem") and "to be" (German: "sein"). >Nothingness/Heidegger. Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology and the analysis of the historicity of existence aimed at a general renewal of the question of being (...). Gadamer I 264 Understanding/HeideggerVsDilthey/HeideggerVsHusserl: Understanding (...) is the original form of Dasein, "being-in-the-world" (...). >Hermeneutics/Heidegger. Before all differentiation of understanding into the different directions of pragmatic or theoretical interest, understanding is the way of being of the Da-sein ("being-there"), as far as it is "possibility" and able to be. [Task of understanding]: to clarify this structure of existence through a "transcendental analysis of existence". >Recognition/Heidegger. Gadamer I 265 Understanding/Gadamer: Now (...) due to the existential future of human existence the structure of historical understanding becomes visible only in its entire ontological foundation. Gadamer I 266 History: (...) that we only make history as far as we are ourselves, means that the historicity of human existence in all its movement of the present and of forgetting is the condition for us to be able to visualize what has been. Gadamer I 267 Hermeneutics/Gadamer: [the question is] whether something can be gained from the ontological radicalization - brought by Heidegger - for the construction of a historical hermeneutics. Heidegger's intention itself was certainly different, and one must be careful not to draw hasty conclusions from his existential analysis of the historicity of existence (>Historicity). According to Heidegger, the existential analysis of existence does not include a specific historical ideal of existence. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Dilthey | Ricoeur | II 22 Schleiermacher/Dilthey/hermeneutics/unterstanding/Ricoeur: [There has been a] use and abuse of the concept of speech event in the Romanticist tradition of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics as issuing from Schleiermacher and Dilthey tended to identify interpretation with the category of "understanding," and to define understanding as the recognition of an author's intention from the point of view of the primitive addressees in the original situation of discourse. Ihis priority given to the author's intention and to the original audience tended, in turn, to make dialogue the model of every situation of understanding, thereby imposing the framework of intersubjectivity on hermeneutics. Understanding a text, then, is only a particular case of the dialogical situation in which someone responds to someone else. Ricoeur: This psychologizing conception of hermeneutics has had a great influence on Christian theology. It nourished the theologies of the Word-Event for which the event par excellence is a speech event, and this speech event is the Kerygma, the preaching of the Gospel. The meaning of the original event testifies to itself in the present event by which we apply it to ourselves in the act of faith. II 23 RicoeurVsSchleiermacher/RicoeurVsDilthey: My attempt here is to call into question the assumptions of this hermeneutic from the point of view of a philosophy of discourse in order to release hermeneutics from its psychologizing and existential prejudices. The assumptions of a psychologizing hermeneutic - like those of its contrary hermeneutics stem from a double misunderstanding of the dialectic of event and meaning in discourse and the dialectic of sense and reference in meaning itself. This twofold misunderstanding in turn leads to assigning an erroneous task to interpretion, a task which is well expressed in the famous slogan, "to understand an author better than he understood himself." ((s) Cf. >Meaning Change/Philosophical theories, especially >Meaning Change/Rorty. Ricoeur: Therefore what is at stake in this discussion is the correct definition of the hermeneutical task. >Hermeneutics/Ricoeur, >Speaking/Ricoeur, >Writing/Ricoeur. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Epistemology | Dilthey | Gadamer I 222 Epistemology/Dilthey/Gadamer: The tension between the aesthetic-hermeneutic and the historical-philosophical motif in the historical school reaches its peak with Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey's rank is based on his real recognition of the epistemological problem that the historical view of the world implies in relation to idealism. Gadamer I 223 The root of the ambivalence (...) lies in the already marked intermediate position of the historical school between philosophy and experience. It is not dissolved by Dilthey's attempt at an epistemological foundation, but finds its own culmination. Dilthey's effort to establish a philosophical foundation for the humanities seeks to draw the epistemological consequences from what Ranke and Droysen tried to claim with respect to German idealism. Dilthey himself was fully aware of this. DiltheyVsHistorism: [Dilthey] saw the weakness of the historical school in the lack of consistency of its reflections: "Instead of going back to the epistemological presuppositions of the historical school and those of idealism from Kant to Hegel and thus recognizing the incompatibility of these presuppositions, they connected these points of view uncritically"(1). Thus he was able to set himself the goal of building a new epistemologically sustainable foundation between historical experience and the idealistic heritage of the historical school. This is the purpose of his intention to supplement Kant's critique of pure reason with a critique of historical reason. >Historical Reason/Dilthey. Gadamer I 226 In some ways [the task of epistemology] is easier. It does not need to ask why it is possible that our concepts are in agreement with it. For the historical world, the knowledge of which is at issue here, has always been a world formed and shaped by the human spirit. For this reason Dilthey thinks that generally valid synthetic judgments of history are not a problem here at all(2) and refers to Vico for this. We recall that Vico, in response to the Cartesian doubt and the certainty of mathematical knowledge of nature which he had established, asserted the epistemological primacy of the man-made world of history. Dilthey repeats the same argument. He writes: "The first condition for the possibility of the science of history is that I, myself, am a historical being, that he who studies history is the same who makes history"(3). Gadamer: It is the sameness of subject and object that makes historical recognition possible. >Experience/Dilthey. Gadamer I 228 (...) the problem of history is not how to experience and recognize interrelation, but how to recognize such interrelations that nobody has experienced as such. After all, there can be no doubt how Dilthey sees the clarification of this problem from the phenomenon of understanding. Understanding is understanding of expression. In expression, the expressed is there in a different way than Gadamer I 229 cause in effect. It is present in the expression itself and is understood when the expression is understood. Gadamer I 234 Dilthey himself has pointed out that we only recognize historically because we ourselves are historical. That should be an epistemological relief. Gadamer I 235 GadamerVsDilthey: But can it be? Is Vico's often mentioned formula correct at all? Doesn't it transfer an experience of the human artistic spirit to the historical world, in which one cannot speak at all of "making", i.e. of planning and execution in view of the course of events? Where is the epistemological relief to come from here? Isn't it in fact a complication? Must not the historical conditionality of consciousness represent an insurmountable barrier to its completion in historical knowledge? >Historical Consciousness/Dilthey, >Spirit/Dilthey, >Philosophy/Dilthey, >Epistemology/Gadamer. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften Vll, 281. 2. Ges. Schriften Vll, 278. 3. a.a.O. (GadamerVsDilthey: Aber wer macht eigentlich die Geschichte?) |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Given | Dilthey | Gadamer I 70 Given/Humanities/Science/Dilthey/Gadamer: Since [Dilthey] is concerned with epistemological justification of the work of the humanities, the motif of the truly given dominates him everywhere. So it is an epistemological motif or better the motif of epistemology itself that motivates its conceptualization and that corresponds to the linguistic process (...) (>Experience/Dilthey). ((s)VsDilthey: see Wilfrid Sellars' criticism of the concept of the given: >Given/Sellars). Humanities/Gadamer: This is precisely what characterizes the development of the humanities in the 19th century, that they not only outwardly described the natural sciences as a role model but that they, coming from the same reason for which modern science lives, develop the same pathos of experience and research as they do. ((s) Cf. >Sensations/Carnap). Gadamer I 71 Dilthey/Gadamer: The conditions in the humanities are in fact of a special kind, and Dilthey wants to formulate this through the concept of "experience". In connection with Descartes' distinction of res cogitans he defines the concept of experience by reflexivity, by being within. He also wants to justify the knowledge of the historical world epistemologically from this special way of giving facts. The primary conditions on which the interpretation of historical objects are based are not data of experiment and measurement, but units of meaning. This is what the concept of experience wants to say: Given/Dilthey: The sense entities we encounter in the humanities no matter how strange and incomprehensible they may be to us - can be traced back to the last units of what is given in consciousness, which themselves no longer contain anything foreign, representational or in need of interpretation. They are the units of experience, which are themselves units of sense. Gadamer I 231 Given/Humanities/Dilthey/Gadamer: The concept of the given is [in the humanities] of a fundamentally different structure [than in the natural sciences]. It distinguishes the conditions of the humanities from those of the natural sciences, "that everything solid, everything alien, as is inherent in the images of the physical world, is given, must be thought away from the notion of what is given in this field"(1). All that is given is brought forth here. Dilthey: According to Dilthey, the old preference that Vico already attributed to historical objects is the basis of the universality with which understanding takes possession of the historical world. Gadamer: The question is, however, whether on this basis the transition from the psychological to the hermeneutical point of view is really successful or whether Dilthey gets entangled in problem contexts that bring him into an unwanted and unacknowledged proximity to speculative idealism. Not only Fichte, but also Hegel is visible right down to the words at the quoted passage. His criticism of "positivity"(2) the concept of self-alienation, the definition of the spirit as self-knowledge in otherness can easily be derived from Dilthey's sentence, and one wonders where actually the difference remains that emphasized the historical view of the world compared with idealism and that Dilthey undertook to legitimize epistemologically. This question is reinforced when one considers the central turn with which Dilthey characterizes life, this basic fact of history. >Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften VIl, 148. 2. Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, ed. Nohl, S. 139f. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Given | Humanities | Gadamer I 70 Given/Humanities/Science/Dilthey/Gadamer: Since [Dilthey] is concerned with epistemological justification of the work of the humanities, the motif of the truly given dominates him everywhere. So it is an epistemological motif or better the motif of epistemology itself that motivates its conceptualization and that corresponds to the linguistic process (...) (>Experience/Dilthey). ((s)VsDilthey: see Wilfrid Sellars' criticism of the concept of the given: >Given/Sellars). Humanities/Gadamer: This is precisely what characterizes the development of the humanities in the 19th century, that they not only outwardly described the natural sciences as a role model but that they, coming from the same reason for which modern science lives, develop the same pathos of experience and research as they do. ((s) Cf. >Sensations/Carnap). Gadamer I 71 Dilthey/Gadamer: The conditions in the humanities are in fact of a special kind, and Dilthey wants to formulate this through the concept of "experience". In connection with Descartes' distinction of res cogitans he defines the concept of experience by reflexivity, by being within. He also wants to justify the knowledge of the historical world epistemologically from this special way of giving facts. The primary conditions on which the interpretation of historical objects are based are not data of experiment and measurement, but units of meaning. This is what the concept of experience wants to say: Given/Dilthey: The sense entities we encounter in the humanities no matter how strange and incomprehensible they may be to us - can be traced back to the last units of what is given in consciousness, which themselves no longer contain anything foreign, representational or in need of interpretation. They are the units of experience, which are themselves units of sense. Gadamer I 231 Given/Humanities/Dilthey/Gadamer: The concept of the given is [in the humanities] of a fundamentally different structure [than in the natural sciences]. It distinguishes the conditions of the humanities from those of the natural sciences, "that everything solid, everything alien, as is inherent in the images of the physical world, is given, must be thought away from the notion of what is given in this field"(1). All that is given is brought forth here. Dilthey: According to Dilthey, the old preference that Vico already attributed to historical objects is the basis of the universality with which understanding takes possession of the historical world. Gadamer: The question is, however, whether on this basis the transition from the psychological to the hermeneutical point of view is really successful or whether Dilthey gets entangled in problem contexts that bring him into an unwanted and unacknowledged proximity to speculative idealism. Not only Fichte, but also Hegel is visible right down to the words at the quoted passage. His criticism of "positivity"(2) the concept of self-alienation, the definition of the spirit as self-knowledge in otherness can easily be derived from Dilthey's sentence, and one wonders where actually the difference remains that emphasized the historical view of the world compared with idealism and that Dilthey undertook to legitimize epistemologically. This question is reinforced when one considers the central turn with which Dilthey characterizes life, this basic fact of history. >Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften VIl, 148. 2. Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, ed. Nohl, S. 139f. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Hermeneutics | Dilthey | Gadamer I 180 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: [On the theological, especially Lutheran interpretation of the Bible]: (...) Reformation theology does not seem (...) to be consistent. By finally using the Protestant formulas of faith as a guideline for the understanding of the unity of the Bible, it too abolishes the principle of the Scriptures in favour of an albeit short-term Reformation tradition. Not only the Counter-Reformation theology has argued against this but also Dilthey(1). He mocks these contradictions of Protestant hermeneutics from the standpoint of full self-confidence of the historical humanities. Development of Dilthey's hermeneutics: First of all the hermeneutics had to break free from all dogmatic limitations and free itself, in order to ascend to the universal significance of a historical organon. This happened in the 18th century, when men like Semler and Ernesti realized that an adequate understanding of Scripture was the recognition of the diversity of their authors, thus presupposing the abandonment of the dogmatic unity of the canon. With this "liberation of interpretation from "dogma" (Dilthey), the collection of the Holy Scriptures of Christanity moved into the role of a collection of historical sources, which as written works had to be subjected not only to a grammatical but also to a historical interpretation(2). DiltheyVsTradition: The old principle of interpretation, to understand the individual from the whole, was now no longer related and limited to the dogmatic unity of the canon, but went to the comprehensiveness of the historical Gadamer I 181 reality, to the wholeness of which the individual historical document belongs. Gadamer: (...) just as there is now no longer any difference between the interpretation of sacred or profane scriptures and thus only hermeneutics exists, so in the end this hermeneutics is not only a propaedeutic function of all historiography as the art of the correct interpretation of written sources, but also overlaps the whole business of historiography itself. For what is true of the written sources, that every sentence in them can only be understood from the context, is also true of the contents they report. Their meaning is also not clear in itself. The world-historical context in which the individual objects of historical research, large and small, show themselves in their true relative importance, is itself a whole, from which all individual things are first fully understood in their sense and which, conversely, can only be fully understood from these details. Gadamer I 182 Tradition: In itself, the history of understanding has been accompanied by theoretical reflection since the days of ancient philology. But these reflections have the character of an "art doctrine", i.e. they want to serve the art of understanding, such as the rhetoric of oratory, the poetics of poetry and its evaluation. In this sense, the theological hermeneutics of patristics and that of the Reformation was also an art doctrine. DiltheyVsTradition/Gadamer: But now understanding is made as such. ((s) VsDilthey: Cf. >Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher.) Gadamer I 202 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: Historical interpretation can serve as a means of understanding a given text, even if it sees in it a mere source that is integrated into the whole of historical tradition. In clear methodological reflection, however, we find this expressed neither by Ranke nor by the sharp methodologist Droysen, but only by Dilthey, who consciously takes up Romantic hermeneutics and expands it into a historical methodology, indeed into an epistemology of the humanities. Ditlhey: Not only do the sources encounter as texts, but historical reality itself is a text to be understood. With this transfer of hermeneutics to history, however, Dilthey is only the interpreter of the historical school. He formulates what Ranke and Droysen basically think. Historical School/Dilthey/HegelVsHistorism/Gadamer: We will see that Hegel's philosophy of world history, against which the historical school rebelled (DiltheyVsHegel), recognized the importance of history for the being of the mind and the knowledge of truth incomparably deeper than the great historians, who did not want to admit their dependence on it. Gadamer I 245 Hermeneutics/Dilthey/Gadamer: As we saw with Schleiermacher, the model of his hermeneutics is the congenial understanding that can be achieved in the relationship between the I and the You. The author's opinion can be seen directly from his text. The interpreter is absolutely simultaneous with his or her author. This is the triumph of the philological method to grasp past spirit as present, foreign as familiar. Dilthey: Dilthey is completely imbued with this triumph. He bases on it the equality of the humanities. Just as scientific knowledge always questions the present through a discovery within it, so the scholar of humanities questions texts. In this way Dilthey believed he was fulfilling the task which he felt was his own, to justify the humanities epistemologically by conceiving of the historical world as a text to be deciphered. >Text/Dilthey. 1. Cf. Dilthey II, 126 Anm. 3 the criticism of Flacius by Richard Simon. 2. Semler, who makes this demand, admittedly means with it still to serve the sense of salvation of the Bible, provided that the historically understanding "is now also able to speak of these objects in such a way now, as the changed time and other circumstances of the people beside us make it necessary" (quoted after G. Ebeling, RGG3 Hermeneutics), i.e. history in the service of the applicatio. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Hermeneutics | Heidegger | Gadamer I 259 Hermeneutics/Heidegger/Gadamer: Under the keyword of a "hermeneutics of factuality" Heidegger confronted Husserl's eidetic phenomenology and the distinction between fact and being on which it was based with a paradoxical demand. Cf. >Life/Husserl, >Consciousness/Husserl. Heidegger: The unjustifiable and inferable factuality of "Dasein", the existence, and not the pure cogito as a constitution of essence of typical generality, should be the ontological basis of the phenomenological question (...). Prehistory/Gadamer: The critical side of this idea was certainly not entirely new. It had already been thought of by the Young Hegelians in the way of a criticism of idealism, and in this respect it is no coincidence that Kierkegaard, who came from the spiritual crisis of Hegelianism, was taken up by Heidegger as by other critics of Neo-Kantian idealism. On the other hand, however, this criticism of idealism then as now faced the comprehensive claim of the transcendental question. Insofar as transcendental reflection did not want to leave unthought any possible motive of thought in the unfolding of the content of the mind - and this had been the claim of transcendental philosophy since Hegel - it had always included every possible objection in the total reflection of the mind. HusserlVsHeidegger: (...) Husserl [could] recognize being in the world as a problem of the horizon intentionality of transcendental consciousness, because the absolute historicity of transcendental subjectivity had to be able to identify the meaning of factuality. For this reason, Husserl, in consistent adherence to his central idea of the primordial ego, had immediately objected to Heidegger that the sense of factuality itself is an eidos, i.e. that it essentially belongs to the eidetic sphere of the universal communities of beings(1). Gadamer I 264 Understanding/HeideggerVsDilthey/HeideggerVsHusserl: Understanding (...) is the original form of existence ("Dasein"), the being in the world (...). >Historism/Heidegger. Gadamer I 267 Hermeneutics/Heidegger/Gadamer: [the question is] whether something can be gained from the ontological radicalization brought by Heidegger for the construction of a historical hermeneutics. Heidegger's intention itself was certainly different, and one must be careful not to draw hasty conclusions from his existential analysis of the historicity of existence ("Dasein"). According to Heidegger, the existential analysis of existence ("Dasein") does not imply a specific historical ideal of existence. To that extent it even claims an a priori neutral validity for a theological statement about humans and their existence in faith. Gadamer I 268 Through Heidegger's transcendental interpretation of understanding, the problem of hermeneutics gains a universal outline, indeed the addition of a new dimension. The interpreter's belonging to his or her subject, which could not find proper legitimation in the reflection of the historical school (>Hermeneutics/Dilthey), now acquires a concretely demonstrable sense, and it is the task of hermeneutics to provide the instruction of this sense. The fact that the structure of existence ("Dasein") is a cast design, that ">Dasein" is understanding according to its own consummation of being, must also apply to the understanding that takes place in the humanities. The general structure of understanding reaches its concretion in historical understanding, in that concrete ties of custom and tradition and the corresponding possibilities of one's own future become effective in understanding itself. The "Dasein" that is based on one's ability to be has always "been". That is the meaning of the existential ideal of the thrownness (German: "Geworfenheit"). That all free self-behaviour to his being cannot go back behind the factuality of this being was the point of the hermeneutics of factuality and its contrast to the transcendental Gadamer I 269 constitutional research of Husserl's Phenomenology. (HeideggerVsHusserl, >Constitution/Husserl). 1. Remarkably, in all previous Husserliana there is almost no mention of Heidegger by name. This certainly has not only biographical reasons. Rather, Husserl may have found himself repeatedly entangled in the ambiguity that made Heidegger's approach to "Being and Time" appear to him at times as a transcendental phenomenology and at others as a critique of the same. He could recognize his own thoughts in it, and yet they appeared in a completely different front position, in his eyes in polemical distortion. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Hermeneutics | Schleiermacher | Gadamer I 171 Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher/Gadamer: In the beginning, Schleiermacher as well as Hegel are aware of loss and alienation from tradition, which challenges their hermeneutical reflection. Yet they determine the task of hermeneutics in very different ways. Schleiermacher (...) is entirely focused on restoring the original purpose of a work in understanding. For art and literature handed down to us from the past have been wrenched from their original world. Thus Schleiermacher writes that it is no longer the natural and original, "when works of art come into circulation. Namely, each has a part of its comprehensibility from its original purpose". "Hence the work of art, torn out of its original context if it is not preserved historically, loses its significance. "He almost says, "So a work of art is therefore actually rooted in its ground, in its environment. It already loses its meaning when it is torn out of this environment and goes into circulation, it is like something that has been rescued from the fire and now bears scorch marks"(1). Gadamer I 172 Gadamer: According to Schleiermacher, historical knowledge opens the way to replace what has been lost and restoring tradition, provided it brings back the occidental and original. In this way, the hermeneutic endeavor seeks to regain the "point of contact" in the spirit of the artist, who should first make the meaning of a work of art fully understandable, just as it is usually done with texts by striving to reproduce the author's original production. ((s) Cf. the discussion of various philosophical theories on >Meaning Change). GadamerVsSchleiermacher: (...) the question is whether what is gained here is really what we seek as the meaning of the work of art, and whether understanding is correctly determined when we see in it a Second Creation, the reproduction of the original production. In the end, such a determination of hermeneutics is no less absurd than all restitution and restoration of past life. Restoration of original conditions, like all restoration, is a powerless beginning in view of the historicity of our being. Hegel/Gadamer: Hegel takes a different path than Schleiermacher: >Hermeneutics/Hegel. Gadamer I 182 SchleiermacherVsDilthey/SchleiermacherVsTradition/Gadamer: Schleiermacher (...) seeks the unity of hermeneutics no longer in the content-related unity of the tradition to which understanding is to be applied, but detached from all content-related particularity in the unity of a procedure that is not differentiated even by the way the thoughts are transmitted, whether in writing or orally, in a foreign or in one's own simultaneous language. (Cf. >Hermeneutics/Dilthey). Schleiermacher's idea of a universal hermeneutics is determined from Gadamer I 183 there. It arose from the idea that the experience of strangeness and the possibility of misunderstanding is a universal one. SchleiermacherVsTradition: (...) precisely the extension of the hermeneutic task to the "meaningful conversation", which is particularly characteristic of Schleiermacher, shows how the meaning of the strangeness that hermeneutics is supposed to overcome has fundamentally changed in comparison to the previous task of hermeneutics. Strangeness is indissolubly given in a new, universal sense with the individuality of the "you". Gadamer: Nevertheless, one must not take the lively, even brilliant sense of human individuality that distinguishes Schleiermacher as an individual characteristic that influences theory here. Rather, it is the critical rejection of all that which in the Age of Enlightenment under the title "Reasonable Thoughts" was regarded as the common essence of humanity, which requires a fundamental redefinition of the relationship with tradition(2). Gadamer I 188 Understanding/SchleiermacherVsTradtion: (...) instead of an "aggregate of observations" [it is necessary] to develop a real art of understanding. This means something fundamentally new. For now, the difficulty of understanding and misunderstanding is no longer reckoned with as occasional moments, but as integrating moments, the prior elimination of which is at stake. This is how Schleiermacher virtually defines: "Hermeneutics is the art of avoiding misunderstanding". It rises above the pedagogical occasionality of the interpretative Gadamer I 189 practice for the autonomy of a method, provided that "misunderstanding is self-evident and understanding at every point must be wanted and sought"(3). Gadamer I 191 Hermeneutics includes a grammatical and psychological "art of interpretation". Schleiermacher's own speciality, however, is psychological interpretation. It is ultimately a divinatory behaviour, a putting oneself in the writer's entire condition, a view of the "inner course of production" of the creation of a work(4). Understanding, then, is a reproduction related to an original production, a recognition of what has been recognized (Boeckh)(5), a reconstruction that starts from the living moment of conception, the "sprouting decision" as the organizing point of the composition(6). Gadamer: But such an isolating description of understanding means that the thought construct that we want to understand as speech or text is not understood in terms of its factual content, but as an aesthetic construct, as a work of art or as "artistic thinking". >Genius/Schleiermacher, >Understanding/Schleiermacher. Understanding/Schleiermacher: Schleiermacher [comes] to the conclusion that it is necessary to understand a writer better than he or she has understood him- or herself - a formula that has been repeated ever since and in whose changing interpretation the entire history of modern hermeneutics becomes apparent. 1. Schleiermacher, Ästhetik, ed. R. Odebrecht, S. 84 ff. 2. Chr. Wolff and his school included the "general art of interpretation" in philosophy, since "finally everything aims at the fact that one may recognize and examine other truths, if one understands their speech" (J. Walch, Philosophisches Lexikon, (1726), p. 165). It is similar for Bentley when he demands of the philologist: "His only guides are reason, the light of the author's thoughts and their compelling force" (quoted from Wegner, Altertumskunde, p. 94). 3. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik § 15 und 16, Werke I, 7, S. 29f. 4. Schleiermacher Werke I, 7, S. 83. 5. Schleiermacher Werke III, 3, S. 355, 358, 364. 6. Boeckh, Enzyklopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaft, ed. Bratuschek, 2.Autfl. 1886, S. 10. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Historical Consciousness | Dilthey | Gadamer I 233 Historical Consciousness/Dilthey/Gadamer: Is there also an absolute spirit for Dilthey? (...) [i.e.] a complete self-transparency, complete erasure of all strangeness (...)? For Dilthey it is not a question that there is and that it is historical consciousness that corresponds to this ideal, and not speculative philosophy. It sees all the phenomena of the human-historical world only as objects by which the mind recognizes itself more deeply. Insofar as it understands them as objectivations of the spirit, it translates them back "into the spiritual vitality from which they emerged"(1). The formations of the objective mind are thus objects of self-knowledge of that spirit for the historical consciousness. Historical consciousness extends itself into the universal, provided that it understands all the circumstances of history as an expression of the life from which they originate; "life grasps life here"(2). In this respect, the entire tradition becomes a self-encounter of the human spirit for the historical consciousness. It thus draws to itself what seemed to be reserved for the special creations of art, religion and philosophy. Not in the speculative knowledge of the concept, but in the historical consciousness; the knowledge of the spirit of itself is completed Gadamer I 234 by itself. It preserves historical spirit in everyting. Even philosophy is only an expression of life. As long as it is aware of this, it thereby gives up its old claim to be knowledge through concepts. It becomes philosophy of philosophy, a philosophical justification of the fact that there is philosophy in life - besides science. Dilthey has in his latest works drafted such a philosophy of philosophy, in which he attributed the types of worldview to the multi-sidedness of life that is interpreted in them(3). Dilthey himself has pointed out that we only recognize historically because we ourselves are historical. That should be an epistemological relief. Gadamer I 235 GadamerVsDilthey: But can it be? Is Vico's often mentioned formula correct at all? Doesn't it transfer an experience of the human artistic spirit to the historical world, in which one cannot speak of "doing", i.e. planning and executing in the face of the course of events? Where is the epistemological relief to come from here? Isn't it in fact a complication? Must not the historical conditionality of consciousness represent an insurmountable barrier for its completion in historical knowledge? Hegel/Gadamer: Hegel might have thought that by abolishing history in absolute knowledge this barrier had been overcome. But if life is the inexhaustible-creative reality as which Dilthey thinks it is, must not the constant change of the context of meaning of history exclude a knowledge that reaches objectivity? So is historical consciousness in the end a utopian ideal and contains a contradiction in itself? >Understanding/Dilthey, >Consciousness/Dilthey. Gadamer I 238 What is the distinction of the historical consciousness (...) that its own conditionality cannot abolish the fundamental claim to objective recognition? Knowledge/Absolute Knowledge: His distinction cannot be that it is really in the sense of Hegel's "absolute knowledge", that is, that it unites in a present self-consciousness the whole of the becoming of the spirit. Truth: The claim of the philosophical consciousness to contain in itself the whole truth of the history of the spirit is just denied by the historical world view. That is rather the reason why historical experience requires that human consciousness is not an infinite intellect for whom everything is simultaneously and equally present. Absolute identity of consciousness and object is in principle unattainable to finite-historical consciousness. Gadamer I 239 Dilthey/Gadamer: [one can summarize his view like this]: Historical consciousness is not so much self-extinction ((s) as in Hegel) as an increased possession of itself, which distinguishes it from all other forms of the spirit. It no longer simply applies the measures of its own understanding of life to the tradition in which it stands and thus further forms in naive appropriation of the tradition ("tradition" as in handing down sth) the tradition ("tradition" as in heritage). It knows itself rather to itself and to the tradition in which it stands, in a reflected relationship. It understands itself from its history. Historical consciousness is a way of self-knowledge. >Life/Dilthey. 1. Ges. Schr. Vll V, 265 2. Ges. Schr. Vll VII, 136 3. Ges. Schriften V, 339ff u. Vlll. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Historism | Gadamer | I 202 Historism/Historical School/Dilthey/Gadamer: With [the] transfer of hermeneutics to historiography, Dilthey (...) is only the interpreter of the historical school. He formulates what Ranke and Droysen basically think. Thus, Romantic hermeneutics and its background, the pantheistic metaphysics of individuality, were decisive for the theoretical reflection of historical research in the 19th century. Gadamer: That has become fatal for the fate of the humanities and the world view of the historical school. Cf. >History/Hegel, >Historiography/Dilthey, >L. v. Ranke, >J.G. Droysen. The resistance against the philosophy of world history thus drove [the Historical School] into the path of philology. It was their pride and joy that they were able to conceive Gadamer I 203 world history not teleologically, not in the style of the pre-Romantic or post-Romantic Enlightenment from an end state, which would be, as it were, the end of history, a recent day in world history. Rather, for them there is no end and outside of history. The understanding of the entire course of universal history can therefore only be gained from the historical tradition itself. But this is precisely the claim of philological hermeneutics that the meaning of a text can be understood from within itself. The basis of history is therefore hermeneutics. GadamerVsDilthey: This is how far the hermeneutic basis can go. But neither this detachment of the object from its interpreter, nor the closure of the meaning of a whole can support the historian's most important task, the universal history. For the story is not only not at the end - we stand in it as the understanders themselves, as a conditional and finite link in a rolling chain. GadamerVsHistorism/GadamerVsHistorical School: Even the "historical school" knew that there can basically be no other history than universal history, because it is only from the whole that the individual is determined in its individual meaning. How is the empirical researcher, to whom the whole can never be given, supposed to help him- or herself there without losing his or her right to the philosopher and his aprioristic arbitrariness? Cf. >History/Hegel. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Historism | Heidegger | Gadamer I 264 Historism/Heidegger/Gadamer: Understanding (...) is the original form of Dasein, the "being-in-the-world" (...). By reawakening the question of being and thus surpassing the previous metaphysics in its entirety - and not only its culmination in the Cartesianism of modern science and transcendental philosophy - Heidegger gained a fundamentally new position in relation to the aporias of historicism. HeideggerVsDroysen/HeideggerVsDilthey: The concept of understanding is no longer a methodological concept, as in Droysen. Neither is understanding, as in Dilthey's attempt at a hermeneutical foundation of the humanities, an inverse operation that follows the course of life towards ideality. Understanding is the original character of being of human life itself. >Understanding/Heidegger, >Recognition/Heidegger. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| History | Dilthey | Pfotenhauer IV 62 History/understanding/Vico/Dilthey: Dilthey wanted to adhere to Vico's principle of the general comprehensibility of historical phenomena. This should be asserted against the positivist indifference that was determined to look at history and nature in the same way. (DiltheyVsComte). >A. Comte. Dilthey's thesis: Dilthey proposed to interpret the event from the point of view of the objectives of interested, value-oriented subjects.(1) >Purposes, >Intentions, >Action. Pfotenhauer IV 63 HeideggerVsDilthey/GadamerVsDilthey/Pfotenhauer: From Heidegger(3) to Gadamer(3) the reproach of historical-esthetic presumption arose; one wanted to delightfully take posession of the humane in a way of understanding everything. The limitations of perspectives that have been shaped by biographical history are not methodically taken into account sufficiently. "Everyone is the most distant thing to oneself". >Understanding, >Hermeneutics, >Self-knowledge. Nietzsche's dictum could be regarded as a pointed wording for this objection. Pfotenhauer IV 97 Form/Content/Art/Nietzsche/Pfotenhauer: (F.Nietzsche 1888(4)): One is an artist at the price, that what all non-artists call 'form' is perceived as content, as the 'thing itself'. Content/Nietzsche/Pfotenhauer: the content would be the internal coherence itself, the internal coherence of the content. >Content, >Historiography. 1. M. Riedel Verstehen oder erklären? Stuttgart 1978, S. 19ff. 2. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen 1953, S. 397. 3. G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen 1972, S. 205ff. 4. F. Nietzsche, Nachgel. Fragm. Nov. 1887-März 1888, KGW VIII,2 S. 251f. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 |
| Interrelation | Dilthey | Gadamer I 228 Interrelation/Dilthey/Gadamer: The decisive step that Dilthey's epistemological foundation of the humanities has to take is (...) that from the construction of the interrelation in the life experience of the individual the transition to the historical context is found, which is no longer experienced by any individual. Here it becomes necessary - despite all criticism of speculation - to replace real subjects with "logical subjects". >Subject/Dilthey, >Experience/Dilthey. Dilthey is aware of this awkwardness. But he says to himself that this in itself cannot be inadmissible, as long as the togetherness of individuals - for example in the unity of a generation or a nation - represents a spiritual reality that must be recognized as such, precisely because one cannot go back behind it in an explanatory way. Certainly, these are not real subjects. This is already taught by the fluidity of their boundaries; also, the individual individuals are only ever present with a part of their essence. Yet, according to Dilthey, it is not a question that statements can be made about such subjects. The historian does so constantly when he speaks of the deeds and destinies of peoples(1). The question now is how such statements can be justified epistemologically. >Epistemology/Dilthey. (...) the problem of history is not how context can be experienced and recognized at all, but how such connections should be recognizable which nobody has experienced as such. After all, there can be no doubt how Dilthey conceived the clarification of this problem from the phenomenon of understanding. Understanding is understanding of expression. Gadamer I 229 The new methodological clarity that [Dilthey] gained from following Husserl is that he finally integrated the notion of meaning, which arises from the causal relationship and integrated it with Husserl's logical investigations. Dilthey's notion of the structured nature of the soul life corresponded to the doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness in so far as it too describes not only a psychological fact but also a definition of the essence of consciousness in a phenomenological way. Every consciousness is consciousness of something, every behaviour is behaviour towards something. >Meaning/Dilthey, >Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey. Gadamer I 235 The fact that a structural interrelation can be understood from its own centre (...) corresponded (...) to the old principle of hermeneutics and the demand of historical thought that one must understand a time from within itself and not measure it with the measures of a present foreign to it. According to this scheme - so Dilthey thought - the knowledge of ever further historical contexts could be thought of and extended to universal historical knowledge, just as a word can only be fully understood from the whole sentence, the sentence only in the context of the whole text, indeed of the entire literature handed down. GadamerVsDilthey: The application of this scheme admittedly presupposes that the historical observer's attachment to the location can be overcome. But exactly this is the claim of the >historical consciousness to have a truly historical standpoint on everything. Thus Dilthey himself felt to be the true "completer" of the historical world view, because he was the one who sought to legitimize Gadamer I 236 the consciousness to historical consciousness. What his epistemological reflection sought to justify was basically nothing more than the magnificent epic self-forgetfulness of Ranke. However, the aesthetic self-forgetfulness was replaced by the sovereignty of an all-round and infinite understanding. The foundation of history in a psychology of understanding, as Dilthey envisioned it, places the historian in precisely that ideal simultaneity with his object that we call aesthetic and admire in Ranke. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften V Il, 282ff. Georg Simmel tries to solve the same problem through the dialectics of experiential subjectivity and factual context - i.e. in the end psychologically. Cf. Brücke und Tür, p. 82f. 2. Ges. Schriften V Il, 291 "As the letters of a word life and history make sense." |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Knowledge | Nietzsche | Pfotenhauer IV 59 Knowing/I/Nietzsche: "We are unknown to each other, we recognize, we ourselves to ourselves (...) As far as life (...) is concerned, the so-called 'experiences' - who of us is serious enough for that?(1) NietzscheVsDilthey: "Even the most cautious (...) think that the known is easier to recognize than the foreign, for example, it is methodically required to start from the 'inner world' (...), because it is the world we know better! Error of the errors! The known is the familiar; and the familiar is hardest to 'recognize', that is to see as a problem, i. e. as foreign as far, to see it as 'other than us'..."(2) >Life/Nietzsche, >World/Nietzsche, >World/thinking/Nietzsche, >Experience/Nietzsche, cf. >Dilthey. (Apropos W. Dilthey, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften, cf. J. Kamerbeek, Dilthey versus Nietzsche in Studia ophilosophica, Jahrbuch der Schweizerischen Philosophischen Gesellschaft 10 (1950), p. 57ff.) 1. F. Nietzsche Vorrede zur Genealogie der Moral, 1; KGW VI,2, S. 259. 2. F. Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, V, 355; KGW V, 2, S. 276. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Pfot I Helmut Pfotenhauer Die Kunst als Physiologie. Nietzsches ästhetische Theorie und literarische Produktion. Stuttgart 1985 |
| Method | Dilthey | Gadamer I 13 Method/Dilthey/Gadamer: Dilthey [refers to] the independence of the methods of the humanities and [justifies] them by the consideration of their object(1). >Humanities. Gadamer: Such a vocation sounds well Aristotelian at first and could be a real replacement of to the scientific model. But now Dilthey nevertheless refers for this independence of the methods of the humanities to the old Baconian "Natura parendo vincitur"(2) - a principle that almost hits the face of the classical-romantic heritage that Dilthey wants to administer. GadamerVsDilthey: So it has to be said that even Dilthey, whose historical education constitutes his superiority over contemporary Neo-Kantianism, in his logical endeavours has basically not gone far beyond the simple statements >Helmholtz made. No matter how much Dilthey may have championed the epistemological independence of the humanities - what is called method in modern science is one and the same everywhere and is only particularly exemplary in the natural sciences. Method/GadamerVsDilthey: There is no separate method in the humanities. However, with Helmholtz one can ask how much method means here, and whether the other conditions under which the humanities operate are not perhaps much more important for their way of working than inductive logic. 1. W. Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften Bd. I. S. 4 2. Ebenda, S. 20 |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Objective Mind | Popper | Habermas III 116 Objective mind/Popper/Habermas: Popper deals with the basic empirical conception according to which the subject is suddenly confronted with the world, receives its impressions from it via sensory perceptions or acts on states in it. >Myth of the given. This problem context explains why Popper sees his doctrine of the objective mind as an extension of the empirical concept and introduces the objective as well as the subjective mind as "worlds", i. e. as special totalities of entities. World 1: physical objects, World World 2: states of consciousness, World 3: objective thought content) The older theories of the objective mind, developed from Dilthey to Theodor Litt and Hans Freyer in the historical and new Hegelian traditions, start from the primacy of an active mind that interprets itself in the worlds it constitutes. PopperVsLitt/PopperVsDilthey/PopperVsFreyer/Habermas: Popper, on the other hand, holds on fast to the primacy of the world over the mind and understands the second and third world in analogy to the first world ontologically. In this respect, his construction of the third world is more reminiscent of Nicolai Hartmann's theory of mental being. (1) (PopperVsEmpiricism). >Empiricism. World 3/Popper/Habermas: the products of the human mind immediately turn against him as problems:"These problems are obviously independent. They are not created in any way by us; rather, we discover them and in this sense they already exist before their discovery, moreover, at least some of these problems may be unsolvable.". (2) 1.N. Hartmann, Das Problem des geistigen Seins, Berlin 1932. 2.K. R. Popper, J. C. Eccles The Self and its Brain, Berlin 1977 p. 41ff. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Schleiermacher | Ricoeur | II 22 Schleiermacher/Dilthey/hermeneutics/unterstanding/Ricoeur: [There has been a] use and abuse of the concept of speech event in the Romanticist tradition of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics as issuing from Schleiermacher and Dilthey tended to identify interpretation with the category of "understanding," and to define understanding as the recognition of an author's intention from the point of view of the primitive addressees in the original situation of discourse. This priority given to the author's intention and to the original audience tended, in turn, to make dialogue the model of every situation of understanding, thereby imposing the framework of intersubjectivity on hermeneutics. Understanding a text, then, is only a particular case of the dialogical situation in which someone responds to someone else. Ricoeur: This psychologizing conception of hermeneutics has had a great influence on Christian theology. It nourished the theologies of the Word-Event for which the event par excellence is a speech event, and this speech event is the Kerygma, the preaching of the Gospel. The meaning of the original event testifies to itself in the present event by which we apply it to ourselves in the act of faith. II 23 RicoeurVsSchleiermacher/RicoeurVsDilthey: My attempt here is to call into question the assumptions of this hermeneutic from the point of view of a philosophy of discourse in order to release hermeneutics from its psychologizing and existential prejudices. The assumptions of a psychologizing hermeneutic - like those of its contrary hermeneutics - stem from a double misunderstanding of the dialectic of event and meaning in discourse and the dialectic of sense and reference in meaning itself. This twofold misunderstanding in turn leads to assigning an erroneous task to interpretion, a task which is well expressed in the famous slogan, "to understand an author better than he understood himself." ((s) Cf. >Meaning Change/Philosophical theories, especially >Meaning Change/Rorty. Ricoeur: Therefore what is at stake in this discussion is the correct definition of the hermeneutical task. >Hermeneutics/Ricoeur, >Speaking/Ricoeur, >Writing/Ricoeur. |
Ricoeur I Paul Ricoeur De L’interprétation. Essai sur Sigmund Freud German Edition: Die Interpretation. Ein Versuch über Freud Frankfurt/M. 1999 Ricoeur II Paul Ricoeur Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of meaning Fort Worth 1976 |
| Science | Heidegger | Gadamer I 263 Science/Objectivity/Heidegger/Gadamer: Dilthey's endeavour to make the humanities understandable from life and to take life experience as a starting point had (...) never reached a real balance with the Cartesian concept of science to which he adhered. >W. Dilthey. Heidegger, on the other hand, was able to begin quite differently, when (...) Husserl had already made the decline to life a virtually universal working topic and thus left behind the restriction to the question of the methods of the humanities. His analysis of the world of life and the anonymous endowment of meaning that forms the basis of all experience gave the question of objectivity in the humanities a completely new background. >E. Husserl. Objectivity/Husserl: [Husserl's analysis] made the concept of objectivity in science appear as a special case. >Objectivism/Husserl. Science is anything but a fact to be assumed. The constitution of the scientific world is rather a task in its own right, the task of enlightening the idealization of science. But this task is not the first. In the retreat to the "performing life" (>Life/Husserl) the opposition of nature and spirit proves to be not ultimately valid. Both the humanities and the natural sciences can be derived from the achievements of the intentionality of universal life, that is, from an absolute historicity. This is the understanding in which the self-contemplation of philosophy alone is sufficient. >Understanding/Heidegger, >Life/Heidegger. Temporality of Understanding/Heidegger/Gadamer: (...) the mode of knowledge of the natural sciences [becomes] visible as a variation of understanding, "which got lost in the legitimate task of grasping the existing in its intrinsic Gadamer I 264 incomprehensibility."(1) Understanding/HeideggerVsDilthey/HeideggerVsHusserl: Understanding (...) is the original form of Dasein, the "being-in-the-world" (...). >Hermeneutics/Heidegger. Gadamer I 459 Science/Heidegger/Gadamer: It seems to me that Heidegger (...) in "Being and Time" has gained the point of view from which both the difference and the connecting element between Greek and modern science can be thought. When he presented the concept of "Vorhandenheit" (engl. presence-at-hand) as a deficient mode of being and recognized it as the background of classical metaphysics and its continued effect in the concept of subjectivity of modern times, he had followed an ontologically correct connection between the Greek Theoria and modern science. >Metaphysics, >Subjectivity. In the horizon of his temporal interpretation of being, classical metaphysics as a whole is an ontology of the existing, and modern science, without suspecting it, is its heir. In the Greek Theoria itself, however, there was certainly something else. Theoria grasps not so much what exists as the thing itself, which still has the dignity of the "thing". That the experience of the thing has as little to do with the mere ascertainability of the pure existence as with the experience of the so-called I 460 experiential science, was precisely emphasized by the later Heidegger himself(2). Gadamer: So, like the dignity of the thing, we will also have to keep the objectivity of language free from the prejudice against the ontology of the existing and in one with it from the concept of objectivity. >Language, >Language/Heidegger. 1. M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit p. 153. 2. Cf. on "das Ding" lectures and essays, pp. 164f. Here the summary of the "Theoria" with the "Science of the Existing" which "Being and Time" had undertaken, is dissolved under the question of the later Heidegger (see also ibid. p. 51 f.). (Cf. also my afterword to M. Heidegger's Kunstwerk-Aufsatz, Stuttgart 1960 (Reclam), pp. 102-125,now in "Heideggers Wege. Studien zum Spätwerk", Tübingen 1983, p. 81-92; Vol. 3 of the Ges. Werke). Rorty II 65 Science/Heidegger/Derrida: hard sciences are henchmen of technical progress, no views on the undisguised reality. Kierkegaard/NietzscheVsPlato, NietzscheVsAristotle: the pursuit of objective truth, not the most rewarding and most human activity. --- Figal I 107f Science/Heidegger: "it provides a picture" for acting. There is still "bias" in the orientation to the picture. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Figal I Günter Figal Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016 |
| Sympathy | Dilthey | Gadamer I 236 Sympathy/Understanding/Dilthey/Gadamer: For Dilthey, the consciousness of finiteness did not mean an endlessness of consciousness and no limitation. Rather, it testifies to life's ability to rise above all barriers in energy and activity. For this Dilthey follows the old teaching, which derives the possibility of understanding from the sameness of human nature. The barriers set to the universality of understanding by the historical finiteness of our being are thus only of a subjective nature to him. Certainly, he can nevertheless recognize something positive in them that will be fruitful for knowledge; thus he assures that only sympathy makes real understanding possible.(1) GadamerVsDilthey: But it is questionable whether this is of fundamental importance. First of all one thing should be noted: he sees sympathy alone as a condition of recognition. Sympathy/Droysen: One can ask with Droysen whether sympathy (which is a form of love) is not something quite Gadamer I 237 different than an affective condition for recognition. It belongs to the relationship forms of "I" and "you". Certainly, in such a real moral relationship, knowledge is also effective, and in this respect it is indeed evident that love makes you see.(2) But sympathy is much more than just a condition of recognition. Through it the you is transformed at the same time. Droysen sees this in a deeper way: "That is the way you have to be, because that is how I love you: the secret of all education"(3) When Dilthey mentions the relationship of Thucydides to Pericles or Ranke's relationship to Luther, he is referring to a congenial intuitive connectedness that only spontaneously enables the historian to achieve an understanding that would otherwise be difficult to achieve. Basically, however, he considers such understanding, which in exceptional cases succeeds in an ingenious way, always attainable through the methodology of science. The fact that the humanities make use of comparative methods is expressly justified by the historian with their task of overcoming the accidental barriers that the own circle of experience depicts "and to ascend to truths of greater generality"(4). GadamerVsDilthey: See >Comparisons/Dilthey. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften V, 277 2. Cf. above all the instructions concerning Max Scheler, Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle und von Liebe und Haß, 1913. 3. J.G. Droysen, Grundriss der Historik, 1868 § 41 4. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften VII, 99. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Sympathy | Droysen | Gadamer I 237 Sympathy/Droysen/Gadamer: For Dilthey, the consciousness of finiteness did not mean an endlessness of consciousness and no limitation. [Dilthey] (...) assures (...) that only sympathy makes real understanding possible.(1) GadamerVsDilthey: But it is questionable whether this is of fundamental importance. First of all one thing should be noted: he sees sympathy alone as a condition of recognition. Sympathy/Droysen: One can ask with Droysen whether sympathy (which is a form of love) is not something quite Gadamer I 237 different than an affective condition for recognition. It is one of the relationship forms of "I" and "you". Certainly, in such a real moral relationship, knowledge is also effective, and in this respect it is indeed evident that love makes you see.(2) DroysenVsDilthey: But sympathy is much more than just a condition of recognition. It transforms the you at the same time. Droysen sees it in a deeper way: "This is how you must be, because this is how I love you: the secret of all education."(3) >Sympathy/Dilthey. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften V, 277 2. Cf. above all the relevant references in Max Scheler, Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle und von Liebe und Hass, 1913. 3. J.G. Droysen, Grundriss der Historik, 1868 § 41 |
Droys I J. G. Droysen Grundriss der Historik Paderborn 2011 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Texts | Dilthey | Gadamer I 245 Texts/Hermeneutics/History/Dilthey/Gadamer: While Schleiermacher's hermeneutics is based on an artificial methodical abstraction that strived to create a universal tool of the spirit, but wanted to use this tool to express the salvific power of the Christian faith, hermeneutics was more than a means for Dilthey's foundation of the humanities. It is the universal medium of historical consciousness, for which there is no other knowledge of truth than that of understanding expression and in expression life. Everything in history is understandable. Because everything is text. "Like the letters of a word, life and history have a meaning"(1) Thus, in the end, Dilthey conceives of the exploration of the historical past as a deciphering rather than a historical experience. GadamerVsDilthey: It is undeniable that this did not fulfil the aim of the historical school. Romantic hermeneutics and the philological method on which it is based are not sufficient as a basis for history; Gadamer I 246 nor does Dilthey's concept of the inductive process, borrowed from the natural sciences, suffice. Historical experience, as he basically means it, is not a procedure and does not have the anonymity of a method. Gadamer: [Dilthey approached] romantic hermeneutics in so far as it (...) did not even consider the historical nature of experience itself. It presupposed that the object of understanding is the text to be deciphered and understood in its sense. Thus every encounter with a text is a self-encounter of the spirit. Every text is foreign enough to set up a task, and yet familiar enough to know that its fundamental solvability is certain even if one knows nothing else about a text than that it is text, writing, spirit. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften VII, 291 |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Understanding | Heidegger | Gadamer I 264 Understanding/Heidegger/Gadamer: Understanding (...) is the original form of the accomplishment of Dasein, the "being-in-the-world" (...). Before all differentiation of understanding into the different directions of pragmatic or theoretical interest, understanding is the way of being of the Da-sein (German: "being-there"), as long as it is "possibility" and able to be. >Dasein/Heidegger. HeideggerVsDroysen/HeideggerVsDilthey: The concept of understanding is no longer a methodological concept, as in Droysen. Neither is understanding, as in Dilthey's attempt at a hermeneutical foundation of the humanities, an inverse operation that follows the course of life towards ideality. Cf. >J.G. Droysen, >W. Dilthey. Understanding is the original character of being of human life itself. (...) [Task of understanding]: to clarify this structure of Dasein through a "transcendental analysis of existence". >Recognition/Heidegger. Figal I 69 Understanding/Heidegger/Figal: we understand ourselves in the different contexts of everyday life. Matter of course. >Stuff. Figal I 85 Understanding: immediately perceiving possibilities (future character). |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Figal I Günter Figal Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016 |
| Understanding | Ranke | Gadamer I 215 Understanding/Ranke/Historism/Gadamer: Ranke, Thesis: The last result of historical science is "compassion, complicity of the universe"(1). Rankes' famous twist to erase himself is based on this pantheistic background. DiltheyVsRanke: Of course, such self-extinction is in truth, as Dilthey(2) has objected, the expansion of the self into an inner universe. RankeVsDilthey: For Ranke, self-extinction is still a form of real participation. One must not understand the concept of participation in psychological-subjective terms, but must think of it from the standpoint of the concept of life that underlies it. Because all historical phenomena are manifestations of All-Life (German: "All-Leben"), participation in them is participation in life. Gadamer: From there the expression of understanding gains its almost religious sound. Understanding is direct participation in life, without the mental mediation through the concept. It is precisely this point that the historian is concerned not to relate reality to concepts, but to reach the point where "life thinks and thought lives". The phenomena of historical life are grasped in understanding as the manifestations of All-Life, the divinity. Such an understanding penetration of the same means in fact more than a human cognitive achievement of an inner universe, as Dilthey reformulated the historian's ideal against Ranke. It is a metaphysical statement that puts Ranke in the greatest proximity to Fichte and Hegel when he says: "The clear, full, lived insight, that is the marrow of being (German: "Seyns") has become transparent and sees through itself"(3). In such a phrase it is quite noticeable how close Ranke remains to German idealism. The full self-transparency of being, which Hegel thought of in the absolute knowledge of philosophy, legitimizes even Ranke's self-confidence as a historian, no matter how much he rejects the claim of speculative philosophy. Gadamer I 216 Gadamer: The pure devotion to the vision of things, the epic attitude of one who seeks the fairy tale of world history(4) may indeed be called poetic, provided that for the historian God is present in everything not in the form of the concept but in the form of the "external imagination". Indeed, one cannot better describe Ranke's self-image than by these terms of Hegel. The historian, as Ranke understands him, belongs to the figure of the absolute mind, which Hegel described as that of the >Kunstreligion. DroysenVsRanke/Gadamer: For a sharper-thinking historian, the problem of such a self-conception had to become visible. The philosophical significance of Droysen's historiography lies precisely in the fact that he seeks to detach the concept of understanding from the indeterminacy of aesthetic-pantheistic communion that he has with Ranke and formulates his conceptual premises. The first of these preconditions is the concept of expression(5). Understanding is understanding of expression. >History, >History/Ranke, >Historiography, >World History, >Universal history. 1. Ranke (ed. Rothacker). S. 52. 2. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften V, 281. 3. Lutherfragment 13. 4. Ebenda S. 1 5. Vgl. auch unten S. 341 f. , 471 f. und Bd. 2 der Ges. Werke, Exkurs VI, S. 384ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Universal History | Dilthey | Gadamer I 203 Universal History/Dilthey/Gadamer: The ideal of universal history [must (...)] gain a special problematic for the historical view of the world, insofar as the book of history is a fragment that breaks off in darkness for every present. The universal context of history lacks the closure that a text possesses for philologists and which, for the historian, seems to make a life story, for example, but also the history of a past nation that has retreated from the scene of world history, even the history of an epoch that is finished and lies behind us, into a finished whole of meaning, a text that can be understood in itself. >Historiography. (...) Dilthey [also] thought (...) from such relative units, and thus continued to build entirely on the basis of romantic hermeneutics. What is to be understood here and there is a whole of meaning that finds itself here and there in the same detachment from the understanding itself. It is always a foreign individuality that must be judged according to its own concepts, standards of value, etc., and that can nevertheless be understood, because you and I are of the same life. GadamerVsDilthey: This is how far the hermeneutical basis can go. But neither this detachment of the object from its interpreter nor the closure of the meaning of a whole can support the historian's most important task, the universal history. For history is not only not at the end - we stand in it as the understanders themselves, as a conditional and finite link in a rolling chain. >W. Dilthey. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Universal History | Historism | Gadamer I 215 Universal History/Historism/Gadamer: Universal history, world history - these are in truth not embodiments of a formal nature, in which the whole of what is happening is meant. In historical thought, the universe as the divine creation is elevated to the consciousness of itself. Admittedly, this is not a comprehensible consciousness. The ultimate result of historical science is "compassion, complicity of the universe"(1). Ranke's famous twist can be understood on this pantheistic background according to which he wants to exterminate himself. >World history. DiltheyVsRanke: Of course, such self-extinction is in truth, as Dilthey(2) has objected, the expansion of the self into an inner universe. But it is not by chance that Ranke does not carry out such a reflection, which leads Dilthey to his psychological basis of the humanities. >L. v. Ranke. RankeVsDilthey: For Ranke, self-extinction is still a form of real participation. One must not understand the concept of participation in psychological-subjective terms, but must think of it from the concept of life that underlies it. Because all historical phenomena are manifestations of "all-life" (German: "All-Leben"), participation in them is participation in life. >W. Dilthey. 1. Ranke (ed. Rothacker). S. 52. 2. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften V, 281. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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