Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dialectic | Adorno | Grenz I 14 Dialectic/Adorno/Grenz: the process breaks into an expressive (physiognomic) and a certain (negating) part. >Negation/Adorno. Grenz I 50 Dialectic/double negation/PopperVsDialectic/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno agrees with Popper's dialectic criticism: the equating of the negation of the negation with the positivity is the quintessence of the identification and thus of the reification. >Dialectic, >K.R. Popper. Grenz I 75 Dialectic/Adorno/Grenz: a) As a method, means of knowledge: the determined negation. b) Dialectic of natural history: unity of nature and history. This has objective character in the sense of reality... I 76 ...of the existing. >History/Adorno, >Cognition, >Recognition/Adorno, >Theory of Knowledge/Adorno. I Grenz 103 Dialectic at a standstill/Benjamin/Grenz: Thesis: in cultural phenomena, the dialectic of natural history stands still for us in a double sense: neither are 'structures' dynamical as something produced from preceeding structures or producing new structures, nor can the dynamism... I 104 ...of the development of the productive forces be gained from it. What can be deciphered in them is solely the difference between possibility and reality. >Relations of Production. --- XIII 40f Mediation/Dialectic/Adorno: the possibility, in the face of the antithetical concepts, to come to a real thought at all (e.g., empiricism/rationalism, idealism/realism) is to be sought in that way by going into these concepts onself, and to find their opposite in them oneself, instead of making up mediating worldviews between them, such as the so-called critical realism. >Thinking/Adorno, >Concepts/Adorno. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Dialectic | Nietzsche | Ries II 100 Dialectic/NietzscheVsDialectic: instead of dialectic there are only "degrees of existence", "stages of apparant things, lighter and darker shadows of appearances" left. (NietzscheVsHegel). >Dialectic/Hegel, >Thinking/Nietzsche, >World/thinking/Nietzsche. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 |
| Negation | Adorno | Grenz I 50 Negation/AdornoVsHegel/Grenz: Adorno separates, against Hegel, the subjective from the objective positivity of negated negation.(1) >Subjectivity/Adorno, >G.W.F. Hegel. I 50 Dialectic/double negation/PopperVsDialectic/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno agrees with Popper's dialectic criticism: the equation of the negation of the negation with the positivity is the quintessence of the identification and thus of the reification. I 50 Negation/Adorno/Grenz: The consciousness of the absence of something or of falsehood; this moment of the particular negation as the subjective for its part, cannot and must not be credited to objective logic and even to metaphysics.(2) >Objectivity. Grenz I 51 The definite negation does not alter the circumstances. It is only their consciousness. I Grenz 80 Certain negation/MarxVsHegel/Grenz: e.g. the bourgeois revolution against the feudal society: N.B.: here, certain negation as a method was lost. Feudalism is abolished in the double sense: the rule of less over many is liquidated, the social character of the society is preserved. Grenz I 83 Certain negation/AdornoVsHegel/AdornoVsMarx/Grenz: Adorno resolves the antinomy of the ambiguity of cancelling and incorporating of the practical element of history into the particular negation. >History/Adorno. Grenz I 91 Certain negation/Adorno/Grenz: New conception as immanent criticism: a) As a cancellation conceptualized inner-worldly - so it escapes the immanence critique of Hegel. I 92 b) Reveals the concept of purposive rationality as irrational.(3) Thus the necessity arises to eradicate the something-characteristic of the particular nothing history-philosophical.(4) c) This necessity is supported by the pushing trough of nature-history antagonism. Accordingly, the certain negation consists in the fact that the factual is opposed to its potentiality "which cannot suffice".(5) Grenz I 106 Certain negation/art/Adorno/Grenz: Revealing the image content of a cultural phenomenon is only possible as a certain negation of its social content, or, what is the same, as gaining the truth of its untruth. >Art/Adorno, >Works of art/Adorno, >Truth/Adorno, >Truth content/Adorno. Grenz I 113 Double Negation/Adorno/Grenz: Adorno understands the negation of negation as negative: full of content, but without something-character.(6) Grenz I 116 Negation/Adorno/Grenz: certain negation and something-character of the particular nothing are separated by the transformation of the certain negation into the physiognomical analysis and of the determined nothing into a category of experience which is based on being and is only polemically related. This is the performance of Adorno's negative dialectic, with which it brings historical and dialectical materialism to itself. >Materialism/Adorno. Grenz I 180 Negation/Adorno/Grenz: Results of physiognomic negations are artworks or hermetic texts. They thus fail as negations, inasmuch as they negatively negate the negativity of their neganda in practice, but do so without meaning, and thus undefined and diffusely. Theory: on the other hand, the theory-performed determination of beings as negative is merely theoretical, but determined. 1. Th. W. Adorno. Negative Dialektik, In: Gesammelte Schriften, Band 6: Negative Dialektik. Jargon der Eigentlichkeit. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1970.p. 159, FN 2. Ebenda. 3. Negative Dialektik, p. 8 4. Th. W. Adorno. Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente. Amsterdam 1947. p 126. 5. Th. W. Adorno. Ästhetische Theorie, In: Gesammelte Schriften 7, Rolf Tiedemann (Hg.), Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. 1970. p. 205. 6. Negative Dialektik, p. 159f |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 |
| Reflection | Adorno | XIII Reflection/Adorno: without the moment of reflection, so that a thing becomes its own otherness by its consciousness of itself, dialectics is, i.e. a moving-in-opposites, not at all conceivable. >Dialectic, >Dialectic/Adorno, >Speculative Philosophy/Hegel. Since, it can only reflect itself in one consciousness in its own otherness, one cannot remove the moment of subjectivity or reflection from the dialectic. >Subjectivity/Adorno. AdornoVsDialectical Materialism: As soon as this happens, the reason for this transition to a state religion was set already in this spot philosophically, which we are able to observe with horror at the decline of the dialectical theory. >Materialism/Adorno. Solution/Marx/Adorno: in Marx this is different in that his materialism is economic materialism. He traces everything back to the exchange process, or rather to the form of abstraction, since, in exchange, the qualitatively different is brought to a common denominator, to the equivalence form. >K. Marx, >About K. Marx. Exchange/Adorno: exchange contains the subjective moment of reflection, which is lost when hypostatized as a metaphysical principle to absoluteness. >Economic theories on exchange. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Broad, C.D. | Wittgenstein Vs Broad, C.D. | II 94 Dialectics/Wittgenstein: the dialectical method is a very robust process and one which we really use. VsDialectics/VsBroad: but it should not create a more complex sentence out of two. It should be about finding ambiguities. --- II 96 A priori/empirical/Broad/Wittgenstein: Broad suggests a distinction between these two terms. WittgensteinVsBroad: these are not two types of sentences. a priori: that must be a sentence whose meaning guarantees its truth. But the meaning requires that we verify the sentence. ((s) Verificationism: cannot accept analytic truths). --- II 98/99 Broad differentiates apriori and empirical terms and names "ideal boundaries" (the perfect circle, etc.) and categories (causality, etc.) as the only "plausible" examples for a priori terms. WittgensteinVsBroad: E.g. Under the microscope a straight line turns out to be crooked. Such thing can be explained by the distinction between visual space and physical space. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Plato | Martin Vs Plato | Arm II 186 MartinVsDialectics/VsPlato: neither is not being a form of being nor being a form of not being. Yet the chain of presence and absence of something is essential and completing for each other. The concept of an end is the concept of a border where something is and is not something. Levels/Stages/Order/Martin: one does not have to explain this with dubious higher stages of being, it is only good for theoretical exercises on the blackboard. To deal with everything in terms of the 1st level is difficult, but it can be done. Absence of 1st level makes "general facts" or "general states" superfluous. |
Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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