Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conditions | Bigelow | I 270 Conditions/causation/cause/causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore, we will not treat the necessary and sufficient conditions separately, but assume a general modal relation between cause and effect. It is this theory that we reject. >Causality, >Effect, >Causes. Conditions/sufficient/necessary/causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: general problem: corresponding theories are too strongly bound up with a determinism of nature. Determinism/Bigelow/Pargetter: is here meant only in a broader sense. >Determinism. VsDeterminism/Bigelow/Pargetter: from it would follow that there is no effect without sufficient conditions. And that would mean, to the extent that there is indeterminism, we would have to give up the conept of causation. Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: we do not have to give it up in the macroscopic world. >Causality. Causes/Bigelow/Pargetter: are not conditions. Cause/Probability/Bigelow/Pargetter: Representatives of causes as conditions could weaken their thesis and speak of probability rather than of sufficient conditions. >Probability, >Sufficiency. I 271 Probability/cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: thus sufficient and necessary conditions are brought together. This is very plausible for many cases. Nevertheless, it is wrong. >Necessity. Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a local feature of a cause-effect pair. It is a two-digit relation. No relation with undefined many places. However, we can leave the causal relation unchanged if we insert a different cause. For example, a backup system (see, for example, another slice of bread which has the same effect). Conditions/sufficient/necessary/Bigelow/Pargetter: are - unlike the causation relation - a global feature. For example, when the backup system occurs, what is a necessary condition ceases to be a necessary condition. However, the intrinsic character of the process is unchanged. >Process. Causal laws/causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: there are causal laws! And they are global. The truth of the causal laws rests on the character of the world as a whole, not of its constituents. But the truth supervenes on the existence of a pattern of causal transaction in the world. >Causal laws, >Supervenience. I 272 Causal Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: is (or includes) a generalization of causal transactions. It is even stronger than a generalization, because we believe that modality plays a role. >Modality, >Generality, >Generalization Causal/Bigelow/Pargetter: are not the transactions because the laws exist but vice versa. Conditions/sufficient/necessary/Bigelow/Pargetter: are supported by causal laws. Therefore, they are also global. Causal Reaction/Bigelow/Pargetter: is local, in contrast. Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: thus, it is also local. Causal process/Bigelow/Pargetter: is local. >Cause, >Effect. I 273 Effect/Bigelow/Pargetter. One and the same effect could have had different causes. E.g. pregnancy by different men. DavidsonVs. > BigelowVsDavidson: this is wrong, but we do not go into it. But even if he were right, it would not save the modal theory of causation ((s) which integrates necessary and sufficient conditions). Probability/probabilistic causation/theory/Bigelow/Pargetter. E.g. causing a pregnancy by an almost infertile man - could also be understood as the prevention of parthenogenesis. I 274 LewisVs: such counterexamples are implausible. >Prevention. 1. Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on actions and and events. Oxford University Press. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Determinism | Barrow | I 232 Determinism / Barrow: what except the present, should determine the future? >Initial conditions, >Past, >Present, >Future, >Time, >Causality, >Path dependence. I 420 BarrowVsDeterminism: a weakness of the usual determinism: it often forgets what we need to know about the elasticity in the image of the great billiards game. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Determinism | Dummett | I 149 KantVsDeterminism: action not by rules but by notions of rules. - Nevertheless: the move in a chess game has its meaning not from knowledge of rules, but from the rules themselves. >Rules. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Determinism | Lewis | V 37 Determinism/Lewis: it is not certain that our world is indeterministic. - More certain is asymmetry - this could also come about under deterministic conditions. >Asymmetry. V 45 Determinism/Possible worlds/Lewis: It is wrong to say that two deterministic possible worlds would differ only slightly from each other - they can diverge just as quickly as indeterministic ones - there are many probablities for small differences which become then large. V 58 Indeterminism/Lewis: should not be derived from the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. - This is a frivolity - to anthropocentric. - Instead: obviously also in radioactive decay processes. - But this also allows possible world/asymmetry: more simple: now we do not need anymore small wonders to justify deviations - convergence: here, the problem remains the same. - ((s) It is difficult to justify with and without determinism.) - Variant: perfect convergence: is difficult to explain with the indeterminism. >Possible world/Lewis. V 120 LewisVsDeterminismus: what is it then supposed to mean that a coin is fair? V 162 Determinism/Causing/Causality/Lewis: here: not universal causation, but - here pro: in the sense that there are not two possible worlds which are exactly equal up to a point in time and then differ without violating the laws. Indeterminism/Lewis: not Vs, but problem: the >counterfactual conditional analysis will not cover all cases. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Rules | Dummett | I 149 KantVsDeterminism: action not by rules but by notions of rules. On the other hand: a move in chess has a meaning not because of knowledge of rules, but from the rules themselves. >Description levels, >Levels (Order), cf. >Chess. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Sufficiency | Bigelow | I 270 Conditions/Causation/Cause/Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore, we will not treat necessary and sufficient conditions separately, but assume a general modal relation between cause and effect. It is this theory that we reject. >Necessity, >Possibility, >Modalities, >Cause, >Effect. Conditions/sufficient/necessary/causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: general problem: corresponding theories are too strongly linked to a determinism of nature. >Conditions/Bigelow, >Determinism. Determinism/Bigelow/Pargetter: is meant here only in the broader sense. VsDeterminism/Bigelow/Pargetter: it would follow that there is no effect without sufficient conditions. And that would mean that we would have to give up the concept of causation to the extent that indeterminism exists. Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the macroscopic world, however, we do not have to give it up at all. >Causality. Causes/Bigelow/Pargetter: are not conditions. Cause/Probability/Bigelow/Pargetter: representatives of causes as conditions could weaken their thesis and speak of probability instead of sufficient conditions. >Probability. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aristotle | Nozick Vs Aristotle | II 145 Relation/Law/Incident/Language/Interpretation/Nozick: Wittgenstein needed people to teach the language with its instances. Nozick: but it cannot be people who teach a natural law with its instances. Causal laws also apply for people, inter alia, and were valid before people existed. The consent of people to something depends on causality and cannot determine causality itself. (FN 22). Law/Nozick: therefore seems to have no own ontological status, because it cannot reach for incidents itself. Nevertheless, if a natural law only determines a pattern, it is merely descriptive. Without ontological status it cannot support counterfactual conditionals beyond actual events and how could laws then be used to explain something? Explanation/Nozick: how does a higher level pattern explain a lower level one? Is every explanation implicitly only a repetition? Explanation/Law/NozickVsAristotle: explanatory laws need not be necessary truths, but do they need to be anything at all? If events proceed according to laws, what is the connection between the event and the law? It can of course not be causal. ((s) recourse). But even any logical connection must be interpreted in turn. Can a lawlike statement interpret itself? I.e. can a law give instructions for the interpretation? Problem: these instructions would have to be interpreted again II 146 If the interpretation was to be fixed, the law would have to include something analogous to reflexive self-reference. This itself is mysterious. Hence, we must not treat laws as related to statements. Gödel: there is no formal system in which all the truths of number theory can be proved. Nozick: that is bad luck for a picture of all the facts from which the statements of fact can be completely derived. Determinism/Nozick: should therefore not rely on derivability from causal laws! (FN 23). NozickVsDeterminism: claims: if the initial state was repeated, the later states would also repeat themselves. Problem: in a re-collapsing universe other laws could apply for another big bang. I.e. the subjunctivist conditional, (subjunction = counterfactual conditional, unlike implication (metalinguistical)) on which determinism is based would be wrong. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Determinism | Berkeley Vs Determinism | I 233 BerkeleyVsDeterminism: false fragmentation of the mind into its various activities or abilities such as judging, commanding, perceiving, etc. False abstraction doctrine. >Abstraction. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Determinism | Dawkins Vs Determinism | I 394 Aesop: "The rabbit runs faster than the fox, because it runs for its life, the fox runs only for a meal." Behavior/Dawkins: this makes it possible that animals sometimes act in a manner that is not beneficial for them. (VsDeterminism: even animal behavior is clear in higher animals within limits). |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| Determinism | Kant Vs Determinism | Dummett I 149 KantVsDeterminism: action not by rules but by notions of rules - contrary to that: chess: move has its meaning not because of the knowledge of rules, but from the rules themselves. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Determinism | Nozick Vs Determinism | II 314 Determinism/Nozick: is often expressed by saying that we would have to go back to before we were born to find the reasons for our actions. This is intended to preclude our decision-making ability. It would mean that we did not control our actions. But is our concept of control transitive? Even if so, it does not follow that only the first incident and nothing in between in the chain of events controls the last incident. E.g. even if I myself design a thermostat, build it and install it, II 315 it is still the thermostat itself which controls the temperature in the house! NozickVsDeterminism: Nobody has ever said that because determinism is true, thermostats did not control the temperature. Therefore, even if there were reasons for my actions that reach back to before I was born, it would not excluded that I am in new causal chains. And I could very well control them. Reasons: that they exist is not within the control of one person, but the fact that they cause their actions is! |
No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Determinism | Eccles Vs Determinism | Pauen I 51 Bewusstsein/Popper/Pauen: nicht Substanz, sondern Prozeß. VsPopper/Pauen: da es sich ausschließlich um ein nicht physisches Phänomen handelt, kommt es zum Konflikt mit dem Prinzip der kausalen Geschlossenheit. Tatsächlich besteht Popper auf der Offenheit der physischen Welt. Eccles/Popper: (1989): Lösung: psychophysische Interaktion wird als Steuerung aufgefaßt. Damit scheint gemeint zu sein, dass der Geist nicht das Ausmaß der Aktivität bestimmt, aber die Richtung. (Energieerhaltungssatz). Eccles/PopperVsDeterminismus: die Quantenmechanik verletzt ihn, und also die ganze Welt. (Vs: man muss die Unterscheidung Mikro/Makro aufrechterhalten). |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Determinism | Barrow Vs Determinism | I 420 BarrowVsDeterminism: weakness of the usual determinism: often forgets that we need to know e.g. the elasticity, with which the things in the image of the great billiards game collide. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B II John D. Barrow The World Within the World, Oxford/New York 1988 German Edition: Die Natur der Natur: Wissen an den Grenzen von Raum und Zeit Heidelberg 1993 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
| Kant | Mackie Vs Kant | Stegmüller IV 319 KantVsDeterminism: freedom is a prerequisite of our moral thinking. MackieVsKant: this yields the prerequisite of a metaphysical objectivism. IV 320 VsDeterminism: undermines the possibility of moral judgement in general! One cannot have a conviction and at the same time assume that it is causally determined! VsVs: this reasoning is simply wrong: the determinacy does not undermine the correctness of the judgement! Determinism/Stegmüller: today we know too little to decide whether it is true or false. But if it were true, would it undermine our moral thinking? Terminology: Def Incompatibility Thesis/morality/Stegmüller: if determinism were true, there would be no moral thinking. Responsibility, duty, benevolence etc. became meaningless. Stegmüller IV 171 Mackie/VsKant: the categorical imperative is not of objective validity! There must be at least one premise that is not truth-apt, but expresses the fact that a decision has been made. Stegmüller IV 323 Self/MackieVsKant: supposed to act on the basis of rational arguments. Problem: how is that possible if the self is not causally connected to its acts by its reasons for action? How can actions belong to the self and yet be only random events? The theorist of incompatibility would have to construct an analogon to causality and deny its causal character at the same time. metaphysical Self/Kant/Stegmüller: essential for Kant, because it is the addressee of the moral ought. MackieVsKant: as a subjectivist he does not even need to introduce the metaphysical self. Stegmüller IV 431 God/immortality/morality/MackieVsKant: (i) has an ambivalent position: on the one hand primacy of practical reason whose claims are to be adopted by theoretical reason. On the other hand he asks if our knowledge is truly broadened by that. Kant: "Certainly, but only in a practical sense." Mackie: this revokes everything. Two possible interpretations: 1. Kant wants to say that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul can be proven as facts, 2. not as facts, but as the necessary conditions for our consciousness as a rational being. IV 432 MackieVsKant: greatest weakness: 1. the transition from "we should seek to promote the highest good" to "that must be still possible". Ought/Kant: elsewhere he had tried to show that the "Ought" presupposes a correspondent "Can." (Where?). But that had been about the obediance of the moral law. MackieVsKant: the analogy to the summum bonum does not make sense. But that be granted. 2. then, the thesis that we should seek to promote the highest good includes that we can seek to promote it. To conclude therefrom the possibility of a full realization is ineligible. Moral/MackieVsKant: Kant cannot even assert that the possible realization were a necessary condition for moral thinking. IV 433 MackieVsKant: the tension between his theism on the one hand and his emphasis on the autonomy of morality on the other is irresolvable. KantVsPopular notion: neither our knowledge of God and his will nor this will itself are a rationale of the moral law, but only reason! Therefore, "self-legislation" of practical reason. MackieVsKant: yet, Kant speaks misleadingly of "laws of the Supreme Being". But God himself is just another rational being! MackieVsKant: the correspondence of morality and happiness is still represented in an unconscious thinking in terms of reward and punishment. The consistent recognition of the autonomy of morality should have brought him towards more of a Stoic conception: that morality requires no other happiness than the awareness of righteousness itself (possibly Hume, Marc Aurel, Adam Smith).. Morality/God/Kant: Kant seems to have been aware of this difficulty. In his Metaphysics of Morals he anticipates the argument of conscience by J. H. Newman. Also, he oscillates between the idea of God as a purely intellectual construction (e.g. Adam Smith's ideal observer) and the assumption of a real existence. V 437 MackieVsMoral proofs of God: there are better explanations for action than for the existence of a divine person. Practical decisions must be based on convictions about facts and not vice versa! Whatever we are inclined to view as a rational act is no evidence of what is actually the case. IV 438 MackieVsKant: problem with his moral argument: if a particular practical principle presupposes certain factual allegations, then the reason, as pure as it may be, cannot claim to have demonstrated the validity of this practical principle, if it did not prove the validity of the relevant factual allegations independently. IV 461 Freedom/determinism/morality/Mackie/Stegmüller: other kinds of freedom are fully compatible with determinism (e.g. freedom of neurotic compulsion)! IV 462 Will/Kant: (Metaphysics of Morals): "is a kind of causality of living beings, as long as they are reasonable, and freedom would be the property of this causality, since it can take effect independent of external determining causes." "external causes": reward, punishment, but also desires and inclinations! Autonomy/Kant/Stegmüller: here, consistency with its own ideal of reason is an end in itself. MackieVsKant: misapprehension: he probably even thought himself to have characterized the contra-causal free will, but in fact he distinguished between external causes and the autonomous efficacy of the will. And that is something completely different! IV 463 autonomous activity: completely compatible with two assumptions: 1. that there are sufficient preliminary causes for the will to have a certain strength. 2. that, whatever such a will does, is dependent on the character of the person and his*her strength of will. Will/capriciousness(Willkür)/Kant/Stegmüller: later he differentiates the two: the latter is the only one that posses contra-causal freedom; it is the free will in its usual sense. Freedom/Kant: (late) he moves completely towards autonomy (autonomous legality of the will). Vs: but that is not a solution to our problem. Judgement/conviction/Kant/Stegmüller: (Metaphysics of Morals): it is not possible to render a judgement in the theoretical (speuculative) realm or to express a genuine conviction, while at the same time admitting to having been externally induced to do so. IV 464 Judgement/conviction/MackieVsKant: whoever makes a rational judgement cannot interpret it in a way that it was reached incorrectly. However, there is no problem in seriously holding a rational conviction and at the same time acknowledging that it has been reached in an appropriate manner. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
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Reference |
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| Determinism | Versus | Barrow I 420 BarrowVsDeterminism: weakness of the usual determinism: it is often forgotten that we need to know the elasticity of the things in the image of the great billiards game. |
B I John D. Barrow Warum die Welt mathematisch ist Frankfurt/M. 1996 B III John D. Barrow Impossibility. The Limits of Science and the Science of Limits, Oxford/New York 1998 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des Unmöglichen. Forschung an den Grenzen des Wissens Heidelberg 2001 |
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