Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Description Theory | Cresswell | II 47 Definition Description theory/Cresswell: (here): the description theory asserts that a name is synonymous with an equivalent specific description. This still allows for a wide range of interpretation. >Descriptions, >Names, >Synonymy. For example, "the planet called phosphorus" is such a description. - Vs: "Phosphorus" is the planet called Phosphorus" is not a necessary truth. ((s) de re). II 150 Discription Theory/Loar/Bach/Cresswell: Loar (1976(1), 370-373) and Bach (1981)(2) defend the kind of description theory, which makes "Phosphorus" to something, which means something like "is called "Phosphorus". II 150 VsDescription theory/Cresswell: the description theory is circular, because the use of a name to refer to someone is involved. - (Also Kripke 1972(3), 283, 286.) LoarVsVs: (1976(1) p.371): it is not at all that we are referring to something, by saying, "the referent of this expression "..." The reference is rather intrinsic. Cresswell ditto. >Reference, >Intrinsicness. II 153 Description theory/de re/Cresswell: Example (Partee) Loar believes that semantics is a branch of psychology, while Thomason believes that it is a branch of mathematics - that cannot be de re, because then both cannot be right. >de re, >de dicto. Solution: Description theory: Loar believes that the thing that is called "semantics" is a branch of psychology, while Thomason believes it is a branch of mathematics. - "It" then does not stand for a thing, but for the property of being called "semantics". >Semantics, >Properties. 1.Loar, B. The semantics of singular terms. Philos Stud 30, 353–377 (1976). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00372537 2.Bach, Emmon. 1981. On Time, Tense, and Aspects: An Essay in English Metaphysics. inPeter Cole (ed.), Radical Pragmatics , New York: Academic Press, 63-8 3. Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), 253-355 |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Description Theory | Evans | I 313f Description theory/Names: ~ "x is the only phi-ist, and everything elsethat phi-es is identical with x" - EvansVs: the situation for propositional attitudes is falsely portrayed as equal to the situation in which the object does not exist. >Proper names, >Descriptions, >Non-existence. I 313 Reference/Meaning/Generic Term/EvansVsDescription Theory: we are constantly using generic terms of whose fulfillment of conditions we have only the darkest ideas. E.g. chlorine, microbiology, etc. However, it is wrong to say that we do not say anything when we utter sentences that this generic term I 315 Name/Causal Theory/Kripke/Evans: Kripke’s causal theory looks something like this: the chain of causality only retains the reference if the speaker intends to use the name for the same thing for which it was used by the person from whom he has learned the name. Evans: Question: Is it sufficient that such use is a so described causal consequence? E.g. (Evans) a group of people talk in the bar about a certain Louis, of whom S has never heard. He asks "What has Louis done?" It’s clear that he refers to a certain man with that!. I 316 He might even continue to refer to him on a later occasion. VsDescription Theory: This is difficult to reconcile with it, because the chunk of information that S overheard could include any attitude and could match someone else much better. She has no explanation for why it is impossible that other descriptions outweigh this one. VsCausal Theory: It can probably ensure the right answer in this case. But it cannot rule out that S denotes a certain Frenchman - maybe Louis XIII - at any time in the future, as alien to the subject matter and as confused the speaker may seem, as long as there is a causal link to that conversation in the bar. I 321 EvansVsDescription Theory: If we thought at the same time that the name refers to the person who was killed by Elhannan, then it shows that the conditions of the description theory are not necessary and not sufficient. >Conditions, >Sufficiency. I 321/322 EvansVsKripke: this is the view for which Kripke should have argued, but did not argue. EvansVsDescription Theory: does not distinguish between the notions: a) that the described thing is determined by the intention of the speaker, and b) that the object fulfils the descriptions. EvansVsDescription Theory: point b) is the weakness: the "fitting in with" is absurd if, in the case of a speaker who is isolated from his community, it only fits this thing better than anything else because of a bunch of descriptions which the speaker associates. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Description Theory | Stalnaker | I 15 KripkeVsDescription Theory/Stalnaker: the description theory arises from a confusion between semantics and meta-semantics. >Semantics. Anti-Essentialism/Kripke/Stalnaker: the anti-essentialism arises from a confusion between semantics and metaphysics. >Essentialism, >Metaphysics. I 212 Purely descriptive language/Stalnaker: if we had a purely descriptive language, we would have no reference definition of general terms. >General terms, >Reference. On the other hand: Reference/causal theory of reference: (as a counter-position to descriptivism): the reference tells us how reference is acquired in general. - For names as for predicates. The knowledge about reference definition is then part of the language skills. >Causal theory of reference. I 212 Def Local Descriptivism/Lewis/Stalnaker: local descriptivism is simply a way to explain one part of the language by another ((s) according to Lewis and Stalnaker the only way). Global Descriptivism/LewisVs: global descriptivism makes it impossible to explain how statements can be wrong at all - this is Putnam’s Paradox ((s) then the expressions refer to "which things ever"). Then the properties and relations are always that what best makes the theory true. >Centered worlds. Additional Condition/Lewis: the simple terms have to split the world "at the joints". VsGlobal Descriptivism: 1) Global descriptivism would be holistic, i.e. what I think dependends on everything else that I think; 2) and it would be solipsistic, because depending on my causal relations: in that case "Tullius" means something else for me than for you. >Solipsism, >Holism. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Imagination | Evans | Evans I 313 Reference/Significance/General Term/EvansVsDescription Theory: we constantly use general terms, of which we have only the darkest idea of the conditions of fulfilment. e.g. chlorine, microbiology etc. But it is wrong to say that we say nothing when we utter sentences containing these general terms. I 314 Evans: For example, to express the idea that there are people with eleven fingers, general terms are sufficient. If the psychological state (mental state) includes an object, a general term will appear in its specification. This could be linked to the concession that there are certain objects to which one could refer more directly: the theory must even accept this, because otherwise it could not allow what appears to be possible: reference in a symmetrical or cyclical universe. EvansVsDescription theory: This idea of psychological attitudes directed towards objects obviously owes a lot to the feeling that there must be something we can say about what is meant, even if no suitable object can be found. >Reference, >Non-existence, >Meaning, >Objects of thought, >Meaning (intending). Frank I 515 Imagination/Evans: regardless of the ways to gain knowledge on the subject. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Truth Conditions | Evans | Evans I 318 My/Intention/Names/Truth Conditions/Evans: [My] goal (...) is to restore the connections between the aspects [of name use and intention]. Causal theory seems to clarify problems of meaning and intention in case of ambiguous statements. Even a child who cannot have comprehensive intentions can still say something specific. Evans I 312 Names/EvansVsDescription theory: the strong thesis that the conditions of the description theorist are sufficient is outrageous! The strict conditions of truth are quite unacceptable. Weaker thesis: a certain descriptive identification is necessary: understanding this is important: EvansVsKripke: his examples do not show that description theory is wrong. (Although I believe this too) 1. to say something, you have to aim at someone or something. 2. to have an intention, one must be in possession of a description. Davidson I 53 Truth conditions/DavidsonVsEvans: One should not align meaning with truth conditions. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bundle Theory | Newen Vs Bundle Theory | New I 233 Def Reference/Newen: Relation between the occurrence of a singular term and the object thus designated. ((s) i.e. general terms do not refer?). Names/Proper Names/Newen: two problems: 1) Reference definition: how is the reference determined 2) Meaning: what is the meaning of a name. Names/Description Theory/Newen: E.g. "Aristotle": the meaning would then be "student of Plato". Vs: Problem: it could be that someone does not know that Aristotle was a student of Plato, but otherwise uses the name correctly. Bundle Theory/Solution/Searle/Newen/(s): it should not happen that a single failure refutes the entire theory, therefore, a bundle of descriptions should be decisive, not a single description. I 234 Bundle Theory/Reference Definition/Searle/Newen: Searle's bundle theory simultaneously regards itself as a theory of reference definition. Names/Proper Names/KripkeVsBundle Theory/KripkeVsDescription Theory/KripkeVsSearle/Kripke/Newen: (modal argument): there is a necessary condition for Def meaning equality/Kripke: (meaning equality) if two expressions a1 and a2 have the same meaning, they are mutually replaceable in sentences that are introduced by the modal operator "It is necessary that", without changing the truth value. I 235 E.g. It is necessary that Aristotle is K. Here, "student of Plato" is not usable. Hence the name "Aristotle" (quotation marks by Newen) cannot have the same meaning as "student of Plato". Description Theory/Meta-Linguistic/Names/Newen: special case description theory of proper names: the so-called meta-linguistic description theory: E.g. the meaning of the name Aristotle can be specified with the description "The bearer of the name "Aristotle"." Point: this description captures the context-independent knowledge of a speaker with respect to the name. KripkeVs/Newen: if the modal argument is also true for the meta-linguistic theory, it cannot be right: it is indeed necessary that Aristotle is Aristotle, but not necessary that Aristotle is I 236 the bearer of the name "Aristotle". He could have been given a different name. Object Theory/Meaning/Names/Proper Names/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of a name is the designated object. A variation of this theory is Russell's theory of the meaning of logical proper names. ("dis", etc.) Epistemology/VsRussell/Newen: Russell's epistemology proved untenable. Solution/Newen: Reference definition by a description: "The only object that satisfies the description associated with the concept "E" (quotation marks by Newen)". Frege: was the first to specify this (in his theory of sense and meaning) Names/Frege/Newen: the Fregean meaning of a name is the designated object. Reference Definition/Frege/Newen: through description. This is Frege's theory of sense. Sense/Frege/Newen: through description (= reference definition for proper names). Names/Frege/Newen: Frege combines an object theory of meaning with a description theory of reference definition. I 237 ((s) KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsDescription Theory/Newen/(s): Kripke also criticized the description theory of reference definition: E.g. Schmidt was the discoverer of the incompleteness theorem, not Gödel. Nevertheless, we refer with "Gödel" to Gödel, and not to an object which is the singled out with a description that can be true or not.) Solution/Kripke: causal theory of proper names. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Description Theory | Evans Vs Description Theory | I 313 Reference/Meaning/Generic Term/EvansVsDescription Theory: we are constantly using generic terms of whose fulfillment of conditions we have only the darkest ideas. E.g. chlorine, microbiology, etc. However, it is wrong to say that we do not say anything when we utter sentences that this generic term I 315 Name/Causal Theory/Kripke/Evans: Kripke’s causal theory looks something like this: the chain of causality only retains the reference if the speaker intends to use the name for the same thing for which it was used by the person from whom he has learned the name. Evans: Question: Is it sufficient that such use is a so described causal consequence? E.g. (Evans) a group of people talk in the bar about a certain Louis, of whom S has never heard. He asks "What has Louis done?" It’s clear that he refers to a certain man with that!. I 316 He might even continue to refer to him on a later occasion. VsDescription Theory: This is difficult to reconcile with it, because the chunk of information that S overheard could include any attitude and could match someone else much better. She has no explanation for why it is impossible that other descriptions outweigh this one. VsCausal Theory: It can probably ensure the right answer in this case. But it cannot rule out that S denotes a certain Frenchman - maybe Louis XIII - at any time in the future, as alien to the subject matter and as confused the speaker may seem, as long as there is a causal link to that conversation in the bar. I 321 EvansVsDescription Theory: If we thought at the same time that the name refers to the person who was killed by Elhannan, then it shows that the conditions of the description theory are not necessary and not sufficient. I 321/322 EvansVsKripke: this is the view for which Kripke should have argued, but did not argue. EvansVsDescription Theory: does not distinguish between the notions: a) that the described thing is determined by the intention of the speaker, and b) that the object fulfils the descriptions. EvansVsDescription Theory: point b) is the weakness: the "fitting in with" is absurd if, in the case of a speaker who is isolated from his community, it only fits this thing better than anything else because of a bunch of descriptions which the speaker associates. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Description Theory | Kripke Vs Description Theory | Evans I 310/311 Reference/Description/Acquaintance/Kripke: Although the reference is set by the standard meter of Paris, not every speaker must know it or even know that it exists (according to Evans). Strawson: "the mean of different opinions". KripkeVsDescription Theory/Evans: His attacks were only directed against the first variant (speaker designation). They ignore the social character of naming. Field II 117 Reference/Deflationism/Field: Deflationism seems to make the hard work of recent years regarding the study of the reference insignificant. For if truth conditions do not play a central role, neither do the references. E.g.: KripkeVsDescription Theory/Name/Field: (Kripke 1972): This is not correct. Field: At least if they do not use metalanguage. Reference/Deflationism/Field: Problem: When the truth condition does not matter, then it is also valid for the reference since the relevant scheme is: (R) if b exists, "B" refers to b and nothing else; if B does not exist, "b" refers to nothing. Problem: It this is all that can be said about reference, what is the meaning of Kripke’s critique on Description Theory? Description Theory/Gödel-Schmidt Case/Kripke: e.g. Gödel = proves the "Incompleteness Theorems" Then e.g. Schmidt did actually prove it, but was murdered. Everyone would say that "Gödel" nevertheless refers to Gödel and not to Schmidt. Deflationism/Field: Problem: If deflationism is unable to explain this, then something is wrong with it! But it is actually able to: Reference/Deflationism/Field: The reference is not the actual basis, but observations about our practice of closing. That is actually what Kripke shows. Stalnaker I 15 KripkeVsDescription Theory/Stalnaker: Arises from a confusion between semantics and metasemantics. Anti-Essentialism/Kripke/Stalnaker: Arises from a confusion between semantics and metaphysics. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Description Theory | Verschiedene Vs Description Theory | Stalnaker I 211 Def Causal Descriptivism/Terminology/Stalnaker: a description theory of names that incorporates the causal chain into the description that is the content of the name. Thus it also incorporates a stiffening operator that ensures that the identifiers for which the names are an abbreviation (>Russell) have wide range. Counter Position/VsDescriptivism/VsDescription Theory: causal theory of the reference. VsCausal Descriptivism/Stalnaker: moves the meta semantic Black Peter from the names to the common terms. We need to know how their reference is established. Jackson: For example, suppose we have a language in which the reference definition of names is excluded. It would still have the expressiveness "to a certain extent to say how things are". Stalnaker: if there was such a thing, it would make sense to say that the reference definition is part of the descriptive content of names. Possible Languages/Stalnaker: we can make up any semantics we want. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Description Theory | Schiffer Vs Description Theory | I 36 SchifferVsDescription theory (as solution for Twin earth e.g.)/theory of descriptions: you can not just say "This thing before me" or unshakable truth: "This is the thing in front of me". (see below). Twin Earth Example/Some authors Vs Twin earth example: the example had too strong science fiction character. SchifferVsVs: going past the point: it's all about that to believe in cats you need to have contact with cats. I 37 Twin earth/SchifferVsDescription theory: (see below 3.5) the description theory of terms for natural species is as wrong as a philosophical theory of this state can be. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Description Theory | Donnellan Vs Description Theory | Stalnaker II 220 Belief/Content/DonnellanVsDescription Theory/Donnellan/Stalnaker: (Donnellan 1971): in his example two persons are represented as one (cf. Pierre-Example: here one thing is represented in two different ways). For example, at a party, a student is introduced to a man that is supposed to be the famous philosopher Aston-Martin, of whom he has already heard and read something. The two are talking. And the student thinks he has spoken to the philosopher. But in reality this Aston-Martin is another person with the same name. Stalnaker II 221 Donnellan: when the student says, "I met Mr. Aston-Martin and talked to him," he clearly refers to the philosopher and makes a false statement. ((s) Without mentioning the job title.) In contrast, when he says, "And then Robinson tripped over Aston Martin's foot and fell," he clearly refers to the man he met at the party and makes a true statement. |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Description Theory | Newen Vs Description Theory | NS E 105 KripkeVsDescription Theory/(s): E.g. Gödel Schmidt case: we always refer to Gödel when we use the name, even if it turned out that Gödel has not found the incompleteness proposition. Newen/Schrenk: the name always designates the person, regardless of which descriptions apply to them in other hypothetical situations. This shows that the characteristic descriptions in names are not responsible for the reference definition. |
Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Evans Vs Kripke, S. A. | I 310 Name/Description Theory/EvansVsKripke: there are two description theories that he does not distinguish: 1) meaning theory of the speaker relation: Upon a specific occasion of its use by the speaker S, the name N refers to x iff x is the one thing that satisfies all or most of the descriptions φ. (Bundle Theory). 2) The meaning theory of what a name refers to: what can be taken from a set of opinions from a group of speakers who believe and intend that they use a name to describe the same thing. This does not imply that every speaker has to be in possession of the description. EvansVsKripke: The fact that he does not distinguish the two of them, becomes evident from the fact that he sometimes refers to speaker descriptions and sometimes to the unsettling cocnept of "idiolect". I 311 Name/EvansVsDescription Theory: the strong thesis that the conditions of the description theorist are sufficient is outrageous! I 312 The strict truth conditions are completely unacceptable. Weaker thesis: a certain descriptive identification is necessary: it is important to understand this: EvansVsKripke: his E.g. do not show that it is false. (Although I also think so). 1) in order to say something, you have to target someone or something. 2) in order to have an intention, you have to be in possession of a description. I 317 Criteria/EvansVsKripke: the criteria for "About whom does he believe something?" differ dramatically from those for "Who is the original name giver?". I 323 Causal Theory/EvansVsKripke: like K.: the absurdity lies in the lack of any causal connection. But he locates the causal relationship wrongly: Evans’ thesis is about the causal relation between the states and behaviors of the thing and the amount of information the speaker, and not between being baptized and the current use. (Poor philosophy of mind). E.g. A textbook states that Arthur had a son, Anir, "whom the legend perhaps confused with his burial site". VsKripke: if he now said that the part of the group who say that Anir is a burial site, could designate a person there is little for this term. I 324 Evans’ thesis "intended reference" is typically a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for x necessarily being the source of the causal origin of the amount of information which S associated with the name x. 1 30 Name/EvansVsKripke: both VsDescription Theory and VsCausal Theory. Per Description Theory: Reference is generally determined by the amount of information that can be extracted from the users. Evans: Name stands for the object which has caused most information causally. But not causal chain! But causal relationship between states and activities of the object and the amount of information the speakers. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Causal Th./Names | Versus | Evans I 320 Name / EvansVsCausal Theory: ignores the context - EvansVsDescription Theory: not sufficient and not necessary. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Names | Evans, G. | I 311 Names/EvansVsDescription Theory: the strong thesis that the conditions of the description theorist are sufficient is outrageous! I 312 The strict truth conditions are quite unacceptable. Weaker thesis: a certain descriptive identification is necessary: it is important to understand this: EvansVsKripke: his examples do not show that it is wrong. (Although I also believe that). 1. to say something, you have to aim at someone or something. 2. to have an intention, you must have a description. I 323 Evans thesis: it is about the causal relation between the states and behaviors of the thing and the information set of the speaker - not between being baptized and the present use. (Bad philosophy of the mind). Staln I 189 Names/Example Evans/Stalnaker: sure "Julius" is not a real name, but real names work the same way because their reference and what is said with them depends on the facts. I 190 Likewise, e.g. Hesperus/Phosphorus were determined by various causal chains (or historical chains)! |
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