Lexicon of Arguments


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The author or concept searched is found in the following 69 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Absoluteness Putnam
 
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III 122
Absolute reality/PutnamVsDescartes: their representatives have the wrong tendency to equate secondary qualities with sensation of secondary qualities - even Williams seems to assume a picture of the world without colors - Williams: ideally: "theory of knowledge and of error". ---
III 132
Absolute reality/Williams: tells us, but not foreign scientists, how we understand it - PutnamVs: so only locally - absolute reality/Putnam would also require convergence - QuineVsConvergence: inscrutability of reference. ---
III 134
Absolute reality/Williams: without normative terms - PutnamVs: precisely this leads to the problem of indeterminacy of translation - Putnam many true descriptions of the world in different vocabularies are possible.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Acts of Will Nietzsche
 
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Danto III 136
Will/Nietzsche/Danto: If it is true that Nietzsche tries to escape the usual distinction between mental and material, then the will to power must seem contradictory. After all, "will" is an expression concerning the mental. (See Causality/Nietzsche, I/Nietzsche, Subject/Nietzsche). Danto: That is not true. As with Schopenhauer, we have to combine connotations in Nietzsche concerning the usual and mental with the concept of "will" in the metaphysical sense. The will to power is not limited to the mental. If we do not respect this, we cannot understand Nietzsche.
NietzscheVsActs of Will: Nietzsche attacks the "Acts of Will", which are not only accepted by philosophers.
---
Danto III 137
Acts of Will/Danto: behave to actions like causes to effects. Hume/Danto: Hume rejected the idea that we could have an experience that corresponds to our idea of the causal nexus, how our will becomes active through our body parts or thoughts.
Hume: we have absolutely no idea how the will works. Nevertheless, Hume accepts acts of will.
NietzscheVsHume: is more radial, there is simply nothing that can be proven to be linked to our actions.
---
Danto III 138
Thinking/Certainty/Subject/NietzscheVsDescartes: Nietzsche disproves the Cartesian thought that our own mental processes are immediately transparent to us, that we know about our way of thinking. He disproves it by setting up a series of interlinked thoughts and letting them "freeze": When Descartes talks about his doubts about reality being at least certainly his own doubts, he drags a lot of tacit assumptions with him.
NietzscheVsDescartes: if his argumentation boils down to an "It is thought", our belief in the concept of substance is already assumed and a subject is accepted. (F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 577).

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Animals Lorenz
 
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Dawkins I 121
Animal/Lorenz: (The so-called evil) thesis: emphasizes the moderate and fair character of the fights of animals. They fight basically according to rules and prefer the bluff to the deadly seriousness. Submission gestures are recognized by the winner. Animals fight with "gloved fists." DawkinsVsLorenz: this interpretation can be disputed, also the human is not the only being who kills his own fellow-human beings.
In fact, unreserved fighting fury also entails costs.
---
I 125/126
Aggression/Evolutionary stable strategy/ESS/Maynard Smith: Strategy: "Attack when the enemy flees, chase it, when it fights back, run away." Dawkins: this must not be understood as a deliberately developed strategy of the individual!
---
I 126
Definition Evolutionary stable strategy/ESS/Dawkins: an evolutionary stable strategy is one that - if the majority of the members of a population adopts it - cannot be surpassed by any alternative strategy. ---
Page numbers here from the German Edition: K. Lorenz, Das sogenannte Böse Wien, 1963

II 71
Animal/Descartes: an animal does not act but is passive. McDougalVsDescartes/Lorenz: a healthy animal is active.

Lo II
K. Lorenz
On Aggression


Da I
R. Dawkins
Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996

Da II
M. St. Dawkins
Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993
Certainty Nietzsche
 
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Danto III 138
Thinking/Certainty/Subject/NietzscheVsDescartes: Nietzsche disproves the Cartesian thought that our own mental processes are immediately transparent to us, that we know about our way of thinking. He disproves it by setting up and "freezing" a series of interrelated thoughts: When Descartes talks about his doubts about reality being at least certainly his own doubts, he drags a lot of tacit assumptions with him.
NietzscheVsDescartes: if his argumentation boils down to an "It is thought", our belief in the concept of substance is already assumed and a subject is accepted. (F. Nietzsche Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 577).

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Cogito Kant
 
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I Danto2 179
KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanies thinking. ---
Bubner I, 107
"I think"/Kant: forms the last performance of the synthesis, which cannot be derived further. Here, the action-character is most obvious. Self-consciousness produces the unity ipso actu in connection.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Cogito Nozick
 
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II 87
cogito / Descartes / LichtenbergVsDescartes: has not established that "he thinks," but only that "it thinks" - Problem / Nozick: what is my knowledge that I am? -

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Cogito Hintikka
 
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I 113
Cogito/Descartes/Hintikka: the cogito is not a premise whose conclusion would be the sum. Solution/Hintikka: it is an act of thinking that proves the existence of the subject itself.
Analogously: a speech act also proves the existence of itself to the subject. Mark Twain says: "I exist".
HintikkaVsDescartes: Problem: 1. What kind of entity is this, which should prove "res" with it?
2. To answer the question, what has been proved at all, we need to clarify the status of the entity.
E.g. Italo Calvino: Charlemagne asks a knight why he has closed the visor. He answers; "Sir, I do not exist".
---
I 114
Existence/non-existence/subsistence/Hintikka: in this example, the knight does not exist in a certain way, but in another, namely, in which he can be the hero of history. N.B.: i.e. here the speech act is not a conclusive proof of its existence. ((s) Within fiction).
Cogito/Descartes/Hintikka: it would have been wrong, too, had Descartes concluded:
"Cogito, ergo Descartes exists". ((a) So for the "I", which is explicit in "sum", insert the name).
Analog: For example, if someone tells me in the street: "Mark Twain exists" that would be just as little evidence for the existence of Mark Twain. It would have to be him who performs the speech act.
Cogito/knowledge/Hintikka: Problem: Descartes must also know additionally that the questionable thinker is this entity, or that type of entity.
Existence/Identity/Entity/Identification/Quine/Hintikka: Quine: "No entity without identity": that is, Descartes needs to know something about himself to be able to say about himself that he exists.
Solution/Hintikka: we must distinguish two types of cross-world identification (cross-identification).
a) perspective (subject-centric) identification: this is not subjective, even if it is relative to a person.
---
I 115
It only uses one coordinate system defined by reference to the user. It itself depends on objective general principles. b) public (object-centered) identification.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Cogito Lacan
 
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Pagel I 51
Cogito/LacanVsDescartes: "I think where I am not, so I am where I do not think."


Lacan I
Gerda Pagel
Jacques Lacan zur Einführung Hamburg 1989
Cogito Nietzsche
 
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Danto III 139
Cogito/I think/NietzscheVsDescartes/Nietzsche/Danto: (F. Nietzsche: Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI., 2 p. 23f): When I break down the process that is expressed in the phrase 'I think', I get a number of bold assertions, the reasoning behind which is difficult, perhaps impossible - for example, that I'm the one that thinks that it must be something at all that thinks that thinking is an action carried out by a being which thinks as a cause that there is an 'I', finite, that it is already determined what is to be described with thinking - that I know what thinking is. But if I hadn't already decided about it with myself, according to what should I measure that what is happening isn't perhaps 'wanting' or 'feeling'? Cogito/Descartes/Danto: In order to do Descartes justice: these are, unlike doubt, individual cases of thought. Descartes leaves it open whether he might not doubt at all, but not whether he thinks or not.

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Conceivability Chalmers
 
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David Chalmers
I 73
Conceivability/Idea/Chalmers: when two worlds resemble each other in terms of all micro-physical conditions, there is no room for the notion that they differ in terms of higher-level properties such as biological phenomena. This unimaginability is not caused by any cognitive limitations. It is rather logically impossible that these worlds differ.
---
I 98
Imagination/Conceivability/argument/proof/VsChalermers: some may argue that conceivability is not an argument - there may always be details which have not been taken into account. ChalmersVsVs: but then one would have to specify somehow which details these are.
Chalmers: the only way in which conceivability and possibility are disjointed is connected to necessity a posteriori: e.g. the hypothesis that water is not H2O seems conceptually coherent, but water is probably H2O in all possible worlds.
Necessity a posteriori/Chalmers: however, necessity a posteriori is irrelevant to the problem of whether our conscious experience is explainable.
---
I 99
Conceivability/Chalmers: one might think that one could imagine a situation in which Fermat's last sentence is wrong. But it would turn out that the situation was described wrongly. As it would turn out, the terms were misapplied. ---
I 130
Idea/Conceivability/VsDescartes/Chalmers: Descartes' argument from the mere conceivability is considered as rejected. From the fact that it is conceivable that A and B are not identical does not follow that they are not. VsChalmers: Is that not true to the same extent for the zombies' example?
---
I 131
ChalmersVsVs: the difference is that it is not about identity here, but about supervenience! If one can imagine the existence of all physical properties without the existence of conscious properties, then it is simply that the physical facts do not exhaust everything. This is something completely different. Supervenience is also much more fundamental here.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Consciousness Carnap
 
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VI 226
Consciousness / Carnap: earlier than the self. Other minds even before the I ! - CarnapVsDescartes: the existence of the self is not a judgment of the given facts - from the "cogito" there is no inferencer to a "sum" .

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Consciousness Chisholm
 
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I 112
Consciousness/Chisholm: all my opinions are direct attributions - I am the subject of these attributions, but not their content - I/ChisholmVsDescartes: no certain propositions about themselves - existence also not property I am sure of - consciousness defined through self-presenting property - no direct access.
I 130
Consciousness/Unit/Chisholm: a person who realizes that they see something and realizes that they hear something is also aware that they see and hear something - Outsourcing/Mention/Use - Chisholm: but it is not sure that consciousness is the same.
I 133
Self-awareness: goes beyond direct attribution: subject must know that the properties are attributed to itself.
I 131f
Consciousness/Unit/Kant: the subject does not need to unite the ideas, but it must be able to - self-awareness: a) direct attribution of a property, b) going further: here, the subject must also know that it is the object of direct attribution itself - Accuracy results from observation, many people never observe.
Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986

II 193 ff
Two-Aspects Doctrine/Fechner: People have inner (mental) and external aspects (not two sides of the same coin) - they differ only by point of view! (No identity theory) - both do not have to be based on a being - VsFechner: only interesting if yet another sense can be connected to the "inner" - Fechner: being is monistic - but also: FechnerVsMonism: only makes sense if the world is perceived uniformly - as self-appearance, everything is ultimately spirit.
II 198f
FeiglVsFechner: all his E.g. are basically for external things! (Fechner has seen that himself) - also the interior of the body is physical - so the crucial difference does not even exist - Fechner: ultimately only metaphorical.

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Consciousness Sellars
 
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Rorty I 203
"Psychological nominalism": Sellars: any consciousness of varieties, similarities, facts and abstract entities, is a linguistic matter. The acquisition of language does not even presuppose the awareness of the varieties, similarities and facts, related to the so-called immediate experience. Consciousness/Sellars (as Rorty) distinguishes between two types of consciousness:
a) distinguishing behavior,
b) consciousness as a movement in the logical space of reasons.
a) can also be found in rats, amoebas and computers.
---
Frank I 264
Consciousness/SellarsVsSartre/SellarsVsDescartes: the thesis of self-transparency and self-disclosedness of consciousness is the "myth of the given".

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Correctness Brandom
 
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I 24 ff
Correctness/judgment/Kant/Brandom: normative, not governed by natural laws - contradictions not prohibited by natural laws. ---
I 48
KantVsDescartes: not correctness of representations, but of inferences is crucial. --
I 403
Definition correct: an inference from p to q is correct (in the sense of preserving the commitment) if the truth conditions of p are a subset of those of q.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Epistemology Locke
 
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Rorty I 159
Epistemology: Problem, how can we know whether our internal representations have accuracy. Locke: confusion of a mechanical theory of the operations of our mind with a "foundation of our knowledge claims."
Rorty I 160
SellarsVsLocke: same error as the naturalistic fallacy: the attempt to completely dissolve epistemic facts in non-epistemic facts. How could he be of the opinion, a causal theory about how an opinion is acquired, is an indicator of entitlement, with which you have that opinion? Rorty: because he did not think of knowledge simply as a justified true opinion, because he did not think of our knowledge as a relation between a person and a proposition (see: Rorty).
---
Euchner I 17
Knowledge/Locke: basis: sensations (sensory impressions) - they must be processed by reason and reasoning ability to conclusions - they help to recognize the existence of God.
I 30
Knowledge/Locke: not logical deduction but observation of mental processes - "inner sense".
I 31
Both perception and reflection are passive. ---
Arndt II 193
Definition knowledge/Locke: Perception of the relation or conflict of ideas - real knowledge: determinism of ideas (necessary but not sufficient condition.) - Definition Real Truth/Locke: not only verbal.
II 195
Demonstrative knowledge: through mediation of other ideas - sensitive knowledge: existence of things that are present to the senses - intuitive knowledge: the certainty that the perceived idea is such a one as the mind perceives it- intuitive and demonstrative knowledge form a complete disjunction of possible safe knowledge - VsDescartes: not recognizing predetermined conceptual content - instead empirically simple given ideas in mind.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Loc I
W. Euchner
Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996

Loc II
H.W. Arndt
Locke
In
Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg), Göttingen 1997
Errors Millikan
 
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I 94
Mistake/Falsehood/False/Error/Deception/Naturalistic fallacy/Millikan: nothing can be described as broken by looking at only this single, isolated thing. Normality/solution: it is always about how a thing "is supposed to be".
Problem: also false beliefs and false sentences do not show for themselves alone that they are wrong. Even senseless sentences do not show their senselessness in themselves.
Rationalism/MillikanVsRationalism: rationalism must therefore be false in relation to intentionality.
MillicanVsDescartes: Cartesian reflection alone does not even show the intentional character of our beliefs and ideas.
---
I 171
Error/Deception/Showing/index word/Millikan: e.g. there are two items on the table, an ashtray that I do not consider an ashtray, and a thing that is not an ashtray, but I think that it is an ahstray and say: "this is a nice ashtray". Question: Did I say with this that the ashtray is beautiful, even though I meant the other object?
E.g. I hold up a book and say "This belonged to my grandfather". I am wrong, however, and hold up the wrong book.
---
I 172
What I said is, of course, wrong. Not so clear is whether what I have meant is something different than what I said. Millikan: Thesis: here it is not the case that I and my token of "this" meant different things.
Solution: "this" is ambiguous in relation to the Fregean sense.
MillikanVsTradition: philosophers have often neglected this.
Solution/Millikan: perception can lead to temporary concepts in us.
Temporary concepts/intensions/Millikan: Intensions are then tied to our abilities to trace and reidentify things.
Provisional concept: e.g. this coffee cup is for me completely indistinguishable from a dozen others, but at the moment it is my cup.
---
I 173
Question: Does this even count as a concept? The ability to trace the object leads to an inner concept. This leads to the distinction between perception and thought. Thinking/Millikan: when thinking is not mediated by perception, the objects you think of are not indexed.
Perception: here the objects are indexed.
---
I 174
Error/Deception/Index Word/Perception/Misidentification/Millikan: E.g. Suppose I am wrong when I identify a recurring object. Then my inner concept has two senses, it has an ambiguous Fregean sense. 1. derived sense from the ability to trace the object
2. inner concept which I already had before
"This" is ambiguous.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Existence Kant
 
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W. Breidert Berkeley aus Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen, J. Speck (Ed) Göttingen 1997
I 236
Reality/Kant Schopenhauer: God does not guarantee the existence. ---
Danto I 195
Existence/predicate/Kant/Danto: E.g. 100 possible dollars: the term "100 dollars" remains the same, whether it is occupied in the real world or not. - Someone who says "I have 100 dollars, but they do not exist," does not abuse the concept 100 dollars, but the one of having. - ((S) So existence does not follow from the term). ---
I 196
Definition existence/Russell: There is an example of what is being discussed. ---
Kant I 73
Existence/Kant: feeling of existence has no concept - there can be nothing proved here. VsDescartes: "I think, therefore I am": error: to conclude from the concept to the existence of a thing.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Explanation Duhem
 
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I XVII
Explanation/Duhem: Explanations are reserved for the metaphysicians' claim to knowledge. ---
I 6
If a physical theory is to be an explanation, it has only reached its goal when it has eliminated sense perception and has grasped the physical reality. ---
I 40
Explanation/Descartes/DuhemVsDescartes: Descartes has never attempted to connect the law of refraction with his explanatory theory of light.

Duh I
P. Duhem
Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998

Externalism Davidson
 
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Externalism/Putnam/Kripke: correct causal chains between word and object. > Causal theory.
Externalism/DavidsonVsKripke, DavidsonVsPutnam: complete sentences, interpretation.
---
I 8
Definition Externalism/Davidson: Events and objects by which a belief is evoked determine at the same time their content - DavidsonVs: (s) nothing outside the mind determines a belief - externalism: shows the correctness (not infallibility) of the majority of judgments - (Davidson Pro). ---
I 72
Externalism/Davidson: pro variant: from twin earth, not from linguistic division of labor. Therefore no threat of the 1st person authority - Radical interpretation: interpreter has to find out the factors, by means of indirect evidence, that first determine the content of the thought of the others - there is no room for error for one's own content because the same factors determine both thoughts. ---
I 74
Externalism/Burge: two forms: a): social, meaning from linguistic practice (community) - b) importance of causal history (learning history) dependent on the individual - Burge: causal relationship to the object in order to comprehend content - DavidsonVsBurge: does not protect against error. ---
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 185
Externalism/Putnam/Kripke: correct causal chains between word and object. > Causal Theory - Externalism/DavidsonVsKripke/DavidsonVsPutnam: whole sentences, interpretation - reference of single words/Davidson: theoretical construct - ((s) derived from whole sentences). ---
Frank I 626ff
Externalism/Davidson: it does not matter if mental states are individuated by something outside, just like sunburn ceases to be on the skin because it has an external cause. ---
Frank I 663
Externalism/Authority: if thoughts are externally determined, then the subject does not necessarily need to know what it thinks of - if the externalism is correct, then VsFrege: thoughts cannot be completely comprehended - VsDescartes: inner states not certain - Burge: false use of terms: possibility to not know his own thoughts - DavidsonVsBurge: beliefs depend on other beliefs, therefore less strong possibility of error - DavidsonVsBurge: intent of successful communication has no necessary connection to the correct identification of meaning. ---
I 663-667
Externalism: Putnam: Distinguishing inner and "ordinary" external beliefs - Fodor: "methodological solipsism": only observing internal states - Burge: external factors find their way into the determination of the contents via "thought experiments" - e.g. wrongly used terms: wrong beliefs about oneself possible e.g. arthritis) - DavidsonVsBurge: initially pro: the content is not determined by what is going on in the person, but: content is determined so strong holistically that individual confusion of ideas cannot be so decisive, and therefore no rigid rules for the attribution of thoughts, we are not compelled to ascribe to the words of another person the same meaning as that person. ---
I 676
Mind/Tradition/DavidsonVsDescartes: if stage with alleged representatives of the objects, how can the mind pave his way out? - but the "objects" do not interest it, but their cousins, the propositions - but the mind has not the solution "in mind": externalism: all that helps to determine the object must likewise be grasped by the mind when it should know in which state it is.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Forces Leibniz
 
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Holz I 97f
Single/substance/force/Leibniz: every single substance is to be understood as a force center. The present state carries within itself the law of its generation and the law of its continuation. Force/Leibniz: Time, movement and change are manifestations of the original active force (vis primitiva activa) or of the striving for change of state (appetitus).
---
I 99
Force/Passivity/Leibniz: force also includes the ability to adapt one's own condition passively to the changes of the other substances. (Suffer). Thus the original force is divided: in vis activa and vis passiva.
Leibniz also calls the "points of force" "metaphysical points."
---
I 100
The original force is on all sides by the individual substances, which cannot be unfolded at will. Thus the derived forces are only modifications of the original force. Force/LeibnizVsDescartes: mere expansion is not enough! Therefore, one must add the force.
---
I 101
The merely extensive mass carries in itself no principle of qualitative distinction, since expansion is purely quantitative. Only in this way movement and change can occur. Nature must be explained from its own concept.
---
Holz I 106
Possibility/Leibniz: Possible things are always equipped with the active power to strive for reality. Otherwise nothing would exist. One cannot say with reason "certain possibilities" would have the tendency, "others" would not have them. Force/Leibniz: is the act of capability equipped with striving.
Reality/Leibniz: there are (infinitely many) gradations between possibility and reality.
---
I 107
Single/Substances/Leibniz: points of force. ---
I 108
Ambiguous: "acting in itself" and "acting upon oneself". The latter denotes precisely the transition of the outward action. The unity of both types of force is repeated at every point of force. The individual substances have spontaneity. They have no other action or suffering than that which they themselves produce. Absolute autonomy of substances.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Functionalism Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 15
Functionalism/Lewis/Armstrong/Chalmers: Lewis and Armstrong tried to explain all mental concepts, not only some. ChalmersVsLewis/ChalmersVsArmstrong: both authors made the same mistake like Descartes in assimilating the psychological to the phenomenal (see ChalmersVsDescartes).
E.g. When we wonder whether somebody is having a colour experience, we are not wondering whether they are receiving environmental stimulation and processing it in a certain way. It is a conceptually coherent possibility that something could be playing the causal role without there being an associated experience.
---
I 15
Functionalism/Consciousness/ChalmersVsFunctionalism/ChalmersVsArmstrong/ChalmersVsLewis/Chalmers: There is no mystery about whether any state plays a causal role, at most there are a few technical explanatory problems. Why there is a phenomenological quality of consciousness involved is a completely different question. Functionalism/Chalmers: he denies that there are two different questions. ((s) Also: ChalmersVsDennett).
---
I 231
Functionalism/Consciousness/Chalmers: two variants: Functionalism of the 2nd level: Among these, Rosenthal's approach of thoughts of the second level about conscious experiences and Lycan's (1995) approach about perceptions of the second level. These theories give good explanations for introspection.
Functionalism of the 1st level : thesis: only cognitive states of the 1st level are used. Such theories are better in the explanation of conscious experiences.
Since, however, not all cognitive states correspond to conscious experiences, one still needs a distinguishing feature for them.
Solution/Chalmers: my criterion for this is the accessibility to global control.
---
I 232
Kirk: (1994): Thesis: "directly active" information is what is needed. Dretske: (1995): Thesis: Experience is information that is represented for a system.
Tye: (1995): Thesis: Information must be "balanced" for purposes of cognitive processing.
---
I 250
Functionalism/VsFunctionalism/Chalmers: the authors who argue with inverted Qualia or lacking Qualia present the logical possibility of counter-arguments. This is sufficient in the case of a strong functionalism. The invariance principle (from which it follows that conscious experiences are possible in a system with identical biochemical organization) is a weaker functionalism. Here the merely logical possibility of counter examples is not sufficient to refute. Instead, we need a natural possibility of missing or inverted Qualia.
Solution: to consider natural possibility, we will accept fading or "dancing" Qualia.
---
I 275
Functionalism/Chalmers: the arguments in relation to a lacking, inverted and dancing Qualia do not support a strong, but the non-reductive functionalism I represent. Thesis: functional organization is, with natural necessity, sufficient for conscious experiences. This is a strong conclusion that strengthens the chances for > artificial intelligence.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Given Sellars
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 264
Consciousness/SellarsVsSartre/SellarsVsDescartes: the thesis of self-transparency and self-disclosedness of consciousness is the "myth of the given". ---
Sellars I 4
Shared/Sellars: this is about factual knowledge, not about objects -> sense data theory. ---
I 59
Myth of the Given Sellars: thesis that there is a level of individual facts - a) that presuppose no further knowledge - b) that this non-inferential knowledge is the final appeal body - SellarsVs: error: to assume that knowledge must be inferential. ---
I 67
Myth of the Given/Sellars: thesis that observation constructs authenticating, non-linguistic episodes by itself - whose authority is transferred to linguistic and quasi-linguistic executions - SellarsVs.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
I, Ego, Self Evans
 
Books on Amazon:
Gareth Evans
Frank I 24
I/EvansVsDescartes: the I is the body! - The I-centered space becomes an objective world place only when the subject can transfer it to a public map and recognize it. - The convertibility of the speaker's perspective, which has been described demonstratively, requires an independent space. ---
Frank I 485f
I/Evans: 1. void of criteria, 2. limited access (not everyone, not at any time) - 3. the manner of givenness is dependent on the existence: I must be in the place to say "here", but change is possible ("new meaning, old meaning "). ---
I 488
I-thoughts are de re. (They need information). ---
I 503
I/GeachVsDescartes: instead of "I get into a terrible mess!" I can also say: "This is really a terrible confusion" - Strawson: "There is a pain" instead of "I have pain". EvansVsGeach/EvansVsStrawson: a part of the reference is to make its audience do something. ---
I 504
I/Evans: our view of ourselves is not idealistic: we can understand the following without being able to justify or decide it: e.g. "I have been stilled" - "I will die". ---
I 545
"Here"/"I"/Evans: "here" and "I" are equal, both are not possible without the other.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
I, Ego, Self Geach
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 503
I / GeachVsDescartes: instead of "I get into a terrible mess!" I can also say: "This is really a terrible confusion" - Strawson: also "there is pain" instead of "I am in pain" - EvansVsGeach / EvansVsStrawson: for reference, it is necessary to get his audience into something.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
I, Ego, Self Strawson
 
Books on Amazon
I 123
Doctrine of non-possessing/I/self/consciousness/Strawson: (probably not Wittgenstein's position/StrawsonVs): Representative: "OP" (our philosopher): Descartes: the uniqueness of a body should be sufficient to evoke the idea that the experience is attributed to it - it was just unfortunatly expressed in terms of possessing - Our PhilosopherVsDescartes: then it would be inadmissible, to assume an "ego" additionally, whose sole function of this is "possessing" - difference: body has experience causally, contingently. ---
I 124
"Ego" has them necessarily, conceptually (wrong) - Solution/Our Philosopher: only things whose possession is logically transferable, can ever be possessed - experiences are then no ownership of the subject - StrawsonVsOur Philosopher: is using himself the false possession term. ---
I125
Actually our experience in this particular sense are our own, and only identifiable by that - StrawsonVsDescartes/VsOur Philosopher: there are not two uses of "I". ---
I 126
From particular experience of the subject arises not the necessity of a self-concept.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

I, Ego, Self Wittgenstein
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 38ff
I/Wittgenstein: Object-use by means of external characteristics: To erroneously believe a bump on the forehead - subject-use: immediately, no criteria, no self-identification no error possible. - Genitive subjectivus: Statement of the person, not about people - no characterization, no error. ---
Frank I 43
I/Wittgenstein: "I have a toothache" and "He has a toothache" are not values of a common propositional function. - "I have a toothache" denotes no owner. ---
Hintikka I 99
Nature/property/possession/Wittgenstein: de facto, but not essential relationship. The relation of possession is not part of the essence of objects. One of these objects is also the empirical ego.
In this sense, Wittgenstein says: "The solipsism coincides with pure realism".
---
II 226
I/WittgensteinVsDescartes "I" has no outstanding position among the words - it is simply used in the language practice. ---
IV 91
I/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 5631 there is no sense in which in the philosophy can be talked non-psychologically about the ego - the philosophical ego is not the human - not the body - 5.64 it shrinks to a point - to this point reality is coordinated - the subject is the limit of the world - with that it can be shown that solipsism is correct. - But it is not impossible to say it.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
I, Ego, Self Anscombe
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 76
I/Anscombe/Schaede: complicated argumentation: 1) If there is a reference for the expression "I", i.e. a singular entity exists to which "I" refers directly, then Descartes is right, if anyone.
VsDescartes: his theory, however, cannot explain specific peculiarities of the expression "I": e.g. the immunity against misidentification.
So Descartes is wrong and Elisabeth Anscombe is right.
Anscombe thesis "I" has no referees at all!
Course of the argumentation: first, Descartes' position is made as strong as possible to make some brief, almost essayistic remarks on Anscombe's own position at the end.
77
I/Anscombe: why does it have to be certain? E.g. John Smith himself could not know that he is John Horatio Auberon Smith, who is mentioned somewhere.
He could quote this text and speak of himself without knowing it!
When using "I", only the reference is specified (the speaker), but not the (changing) meaning!
Question: Does "I" work like a proper name? From a logical point of view (where the meaning is not relevant) it does syntactically! E.g. but only an idiot would sign "I".
Uncorrectability (immunity against misidentification): is not yet guaranteed by self-reference.
I 82
"I"/Anscombe: the peculiarity of this expression lies in its strict situation-relatedness. It follows that "I" should not be emphatically substantiated to an "I"!
The question remains: do "I" thoughts imply thoughts with "here" and "this", or is the implication just reversed?
Frank I 99
I/Body/Anscombe: "I" is not identified by the body: e.g. the bishop could mistake the lady's knee for his own, but will he mistake the lady herself for himself?
Fra I 100
Then that for which "I" stands would have to be the Cartesian ego. Assuming it is my body: e.g. I am in a situation (water tank with lukewarm water, unable to move) where I am practically deprived of my body. However, I can still think, "I do not want this to happen again."
The I is thus not identical with the body.
Thinking is just what is guaranteed by the cogito.
I 101
I/Anscombe: for "I" there is only the use! I/Ambrose Bierce: ("Devil's Dictionary"): ...the idea of ​​two that are I is difficult, but subtle.
I 102
I/Anscombe: Thesis solution: "I" is neither a name nor any other type of expression whose logical role it is to refer. (I has no reference).
I 103
I/Logic/Anscombe: we still accept the rule of the logician that the proposition is true if the predicates are true. But that is not a sufficient description of "I". Because it does not differentiate between "I" and "A". The truth definition of the whole sentence does not determine the meaning of the individual phrases.
Accordingly, the logical rule does not justify the idea that "I" from the mouth of x is another name for x.
But the rule means that the question "whose assertion?" was all decisive. For example, a translator could repeat the author's "I". (>quote).
It follows:
"I am E.A." is not at all an assertion of identity. An assertion of identity would be: "This thing is E.A."
But there is also the proposition: "I am this thing here".


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Idealism Leibniz
 
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Holz I 59f
Idealism/LeibnizVsDescartes: in order not to fall into an irrational transcendental idealism, the rationality of the factual must be proved. To this extent, Leibniz is definitely not a precursor of Kant.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Ideas Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
I 74
"Idea of idea," Berkeley / Rorty: makes it possible to make the concept of an extended substance superfluous. - BerkeleyVsDescartes
II 129
Berkeley / Rorty: Thesis: "nothing but another idea can be like an idea" - RortyVsBerkeley: He should have said - only one sentence may be relevant to the truth of another seentence - ((s)> coherence theory)

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Identification Evans
 
Books on Amazon:
Gareth Evans
Davidson I 20
Identification / demonstrative / Evans: identification is always demonstratively (ostensive definition, pointing) - therefore the thought of a unicorn is no idea - DavidsonVsEvans: there are no objects that are immune to misidentification ( DavidsonVsDescartes).

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Imagination Nagel
 
Books on Amazon
I 82ff
Of course, we can be wrong in some of our judgments about what is inconceivable and what is not. It is possible that a statement whose falsity we could not imagine still may be untrue. Mere external information about how we got there to hold the statement to be true is not enough. We may also have imagined something right, but later find out that we have described our actions incorrectly.
I 87~
Imagination: not even temporarily can we "bracket" the basic thought that the contraposition is valid and replace it with the purely psychological observation that we consider the falsity of this statement unimaginable (DescartesVs, see Nagel.)
I 88
NagelVsDescartes: demon: the idea of ​​confused thoughts also contains the disentangled thought.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Individuation Brentano
 
Books on Amazon:
Franz Brentano
Chisholm I 34
Individuation/I/Self/Idea/I/Intention/Brentano: in the self-evident mental states presented by us, we never capture any individualizing properties. ---
I 35
All my properties, which I can readily grasp, are such that they can at least be theoretically immediately exemplified in different things. (BrentanoVsDescartes).

Brent I
F. Brentano
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014


Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Inscrutability of reference Putnam
 
Books on Amazon
III 122
Absolute Reality/PutnamVsDescartes: their representatives have the wrong tendency to equate secondary qualities with the sensation of secondary qualities. - Even Williams seems to visualize a picture of the world without colors. - Williams: Ideal case: theory of knowledge and error. ---
III 132
Absolute Reality/Williams: explains to us, but not to foreign scientists, how we understand it. - PutnamVs: So only local. - Absolute Reality/Putnam: would also require convergence. QuineVsConvergence: inscrutability of reference.
---
III 134
Absolute reality/Williams: without normative terms. - PutnamVs: that is why we have the problem of indeterminacy of translation. - Putnam Thesis: there are many possible true descriptions of the world in different vocabularies. ---
III 133
Reference/Fodor: according to Quine's criticism of the inscrutability (indeterminacy) of reference: we have to abide to the individual sciences or everyday linguistic causality.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Knowledge Kant
 
Books on Amazon
Stroud I 130
Knowledge/skepticism/KantVsDescartes: Who reads a proof needs to know at the end. - Problem: this is only possible in the sciences, not in philosophy. - KantVsTradition: treats knowledge of the outside world always indirectly or inferentially. - Solution/Kant: immediate perception / = consciousness of external things. That is a sufficient proof of their reality. - With inferential access skepticism would be inevitable. - Per skepticism: forces to show that we have acquired our knowledge. KantVsMoore/Stroud: Moore does not show this.
---
I 134
Skepticism/Kant: is refuted only by a proof of realism.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Language Locke
 
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Black II 130
Language/Locke/Black: to transmit thoughts - (ideas). ---
Euchner I 33
Language/Locke: 1. recording - 2. communication of thoughts - 3. ease and speed of communication - language also prerequisite for society. ---
Euchner I 170
Language/Locke/Euchner: today: Locke fails to recognize the irreducible linguistic basics of empirical perception - but the correction has already been created: to include also abstract and general ideas among the empirically given, of which each reconstruction of knowledge must start> position. ---
Arndt II 181
Language/knowledge/LockeVsPascal/VsPort Royal/Arndt: 1. no necessary relations between concepts - 2. It is not clear how their content determination leads to mind independent objects - Language/Descartes/Pascal: subsequent codifying of objects - Locke: actual constitution of objects. ---
II 183
linguistic expression/Locke: "nodes" in which ideas, summarized in the mind, find their stable expression - we must refrain from words and look at meanings - but the ideas are something almost finished - Arndt: problem: then indicators more representative than synthetically - words: signify directly the idea, objects only indirectly. ---
II 188
ideas/meaning/Locke: analysis of ideas identical to the analysis of the meanings - language: not only a means of communication but also of knowledge - clarity/LockeVsDescartes: in his view bound to naming. - Presupposes the possibility of clear signification. ---
II 199 Language: is signifier at the same time and presupposes objectivity.
---
II 206
Language/Locke: is already finished: no one creates the abstract idea "fame" before he has heard the name - so independence of the mixed modes of the existence of the signified - thus one can understand names before they were applied to existing things (!) - E.g. so punishments can be established for not yet committed acts - punch line: dependence on community is result of the independence of the existence of the signified - translation: problem: nominal essence: change from community to community - language ultimately relates to particular therefore we learn name first. ---
Saussure I 34
Language/Locke: These words are signs of ideas in consciousness - ideas in turn are signs for objects outside of consciousness.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding


Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983

Loc I
W. Euchner
Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996

Loc II
H.W. Arndt
Locke
In
Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg), Göttingen 1997
Materialism Leibniz
 
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Holz I 101
Materialism/Leibniz/Holz: materialism is often misunderstood as idealistic. ((s) Because it has strongly influenced Hegel). On the other hand, the materialistic approach is strongly to be emphasized. ---
I 102
Matter/LeibnizVsDescartes: impenetrability is not enough! Descartes understood the bodies as immobile. Substantial being needs a bearer.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Matter Kant
 
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Danto III 266
Matter/Body/KantVsDescartes/Kant/Danto: Kant adhered to a dynamic theory of matter. He turned against Cartesian physics, according to which everything can be explained by the geometric properties of matter. The basic physical concept of the Cartesians was extension. Kant replied, not by extension would bodies take up space, but by intensity. Kant: Matter is the moveable, as long as it fills a space. Fulfilling a space means resisting all moving things, which through its movement is trying to penetrate into a certain space (...).
The general principle of the dynamics of material nature is: that everything real of the objects of external sense, which that is not merely the determination of space, must be seen as a moving force; that is, whereby the so-called solid or the absolute impenetrability, as an empty concept, must be expelled from the natural sciences and be replaced by a force driving back (s). (I. Kant, Metaphysisch Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, in: Werke in 10 Bänden Ed. W. Weischedel, Special Edition, Vol. III, Darmstadt 1983) (second main piece: Erklärung 1, Lehrsatz 1; Allgemeine Anmerkung zur Dynamik).
Danto: Kant implicitly invoked this honor in his confusing discussion of intense magnitudes in the section 'Anticipations of Perception of First Criticism (see Robert Paul Wolff, Kant's Theory of Mental Acitivity, Cambridge, 1963, p.). 232f).
Danto: Mass is defined there by the intensity with which matter fills a given space.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Meaning Davidson
 
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I 64
Quine has revolutionized our understanding of communication by having shown that there is not more about meaning than what a person with the associated facilities is able to learn by observing. Causal theory of meaning VsDescartes : senses do not matter - only in learning, but then contingent ( Vsscepticism )
I 47
Def meaning (interpretation) of a sentence is given by the fact that the sentence is assigned a semantic space in the structure of records that make up a language . The meaning of a sentence consists in being the holder of this place and no other place in the macro structure of the language . This is the only content of the concept of meaning for Davidson.
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 53
DavidsonVs social nature of meaning: idiolect in principle is also to be interpreted (via causal hypotheses). Putnam / Kripke: causal theory: correct link word / object - DavdisonVsPutnam: Interpretation of whole sentences.

Rorty VI 419
DavidsonVsQuine/Rorty: rejects notion of "stimulus meaning" from: Like Newton’s attempt to soar to the "Newton of the mind ". Instead: distal theory of meaning . There is no "central region " between linguistically formulated beliefs and physiology.
Dav I 95
Causal theory of meaning : meaning do not matter - only in learning, but then contingent (VsSKepticism).
I 99
DavidsonVsPutnam : that meanings are not in the head is not due to special names for natural kinds , but on broad social character of language.
K. Glüer, Davidson zur Einführung, 1993
Glüer II 50
Meaning / Davidson / Glüer : the interpretation is given by the fact that the semantic space of a sentence is located in the structure of sentences that make up the language - ( multiple language = truth - theories ) possible - Def Meaning / Davidson: then, is being the holder of this unique place in the macro structure of the language.
Glüer II 51
Meaning/Tarski/Davidson: Tarski-type theories are not based on meaning as defined entities ( per Davidson : Meaning ultimately not fixed ) - consequences: 1 DavidsonVsTaski: actually spoken language ultimately irrelevant - 2 the trivial thesis that meaning is conventional, must be abandoned.
Frank I 672
sunburn-example/Davidson: as sunburn is still a reddening of my skin, even though it was caused by the sun - not just external causation leads to the fact that meanings are not in the head - otherwise, pro Putnam: meanings not in the head , but rather simple prop. att.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Mental States Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 144
Rorty: (According to Wittgenstein: what would it look look when the sun revolved around the earth (ie just like it)?: Qualia/Dennett: (such as smart and Place): "How would it look if there really were nothing more than a compound of electrochemical processes in your brain?" ((s) that is the same).
I 274
Mind/Dennett: "PDP": Model of parallel distributed processing. Davidson, like Dennett: therefore the mind is not its own residence. VsDescartes. Mind/Meaning/Dennett: there once was a time when neither existed, nor error or function and no reasons. They were created along the way of the tiny improvements that evolution brought with it. (Finite regress).
I 274ff
Finite sequence of steps, without ever having to draw a line. Mind/Dennett: that s what mind is: no wonder apparatus, but a huge, semi-designed and self-transformaing compound of small appliances, each of which has its own designhistory and plays its own role. >Homunculi.
I 283
Robot/Dennett: from the fact that we are descended from robots (e.g. hemoglobin, etc.) does not follow that we are robots! We are descended from bacteria, but we are not bacteria. Neither are we monkeys. But we are composed of robots!
I 525
Mind/Evolution/Dennett: today, each and everyone of us is able to understand ideas that would have been unthinkable for geniuses from the generation of our grandparents.
II 183
Mind/Dennett: a human mind without paper and pencil, without language to compare notes and making sketches is something we’ve never met.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Mental States Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Wittgenstein, Strawson: there is nothing but the human body, VsDescartes
I 28
Non-spatiality is not a clear criterion for a mental state, because the concept of the state is so unclear, neither spatial nor non-spatial. I 77f Ryle: opinions, wishes and feelings (traits of reason and character) can be thought of as something that requires the human itself as a substrate, and not a non-material medium. This is more difficult with sensations, mental images and thoughts. (> Animal). I 76ff
State: this above argument makes it so easy to consider sensations, etc. not as states of things, but rather as things themselves. (RortyVs).
This allows some contemporary philosophers to afford mental things without a soul. I 80
Def neutral monism: considers the mental and the material as two "aspects" of an underlying reality. - reality accessible with intuition (Bergson) - Reality also to be identified with the material and the perception (Russell, Ayer) - The only way to escape skepticism. (Dewey, James)
I 106f
RortyVs: you cannot find a "neutral material" which is neither mental nor physical, and has its own powers and dispositions. Therefore, you simply postulate it. But that does not help.
Frank I 581
Mental/Rorty: a) Events: sensations, thoughts, etc. - b) states that are no events: opinions, moods, intentions, etc.
Rorty I 60
Idea/mind/Antiquity/Rorty: antiquity had no concept of the mental and no concept of a mind separated from the body - no concept of idea - no concept of consciousness - idea: new with Locke - only makes epistemology possible.
I 117
Mind/mental/RortyVsRyle: Ryle believed to have avoided the image of the mirror, but he failed in the attempt to prove that there are no uncorrectable reports.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Method Descartes
 
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Holz I 37
Rationalismus/Holz: für ihn ist es selbstverständlich, Begriffe oder Sachverhalte in einfachere Bestandteile zu zerlegen. (>Descartes). Methode/Descartes: besteht in der Ordnung und Disposition dessen, worauf sich der Blick des Geistes richten muss, damit wir eine bestimmte Wahrheit entdecken.
Holz I 37
Intuition/Descartes: nicht das wechselnde Zeugnis der Sinne, sondern ein so einfaches und distinktes Begreifen des reinen und aufmerksamen Geistes. So kann jeder mit dem Geiste erfassen, dass er existiert, dass er Bewusstsein hat, dass das Dreieck drei Seiten hat.
I 38
Methode/Intuition/HolzVsDescartes: das Verfahren führt, wenn nicht zwischen Wesentlichem und Unwesentlichem unterschieden wird, zu einer unabsehbaren Fülle von Einzelheiten. Das ist ein Problem bei psychisch geistigen und gesellschaftlich geschichtlichen Untersuchungen. Im mathematisch naturwissenschaftlichen Zeitalter bleibt das unartikuliert!
Descartes' Begriff der Intuition ist ungenau, weil er von subjektiver Überzeugtheit ausgeht.
Def Intuition/Holz: intuitive Erkenntnis ist Erkenntnis des Einfachen, das nicht mehr in Teile zerlegt werden kann.


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Mind Chalmers
 
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David Chalmers
I 11
Mind/Chalmers: conscious experience is not all there is to the mind. Cognitive sciences has had almost nothing to say about consciousness, but about mind in general as the internal basis of behaviour. Mind/Chalmers: a) phenomenal concept of mind: the conscious experience of mental states. That is what I will concentrate on.
b) The psychological concept as a causal or explanatory basis of behaviour.
ChalmersVsDescartes: Descartes may have been partly responsible for a conflation of the two concepts.
I 14
Mind/Psychology/Ryle/Chalmers: in philosophy, the shift in emphasis form the phenomenal to the psychological was codified by Gilbert Ryle (1949) who argued that all our mental concepts can be analysed in terms of certain kinds of associated behaviour, or in terms of dispositions to behave in certain ways (E. g. Lycan 1987). ChalmersVsRyle: Ryle intended all mental concepts to fall within the grasp of his analysis. It seems to me that this view is a nonstarter as an analysis of our phenomenal concepts such as sensation and consciousness itself.
But Ryle’s analysis provided a suggestive approach to many other mental notions, such as believing, enjoying, wanting, pretending and remembering.
ChalmersVsRyle: technical problems: 1. It is natural to suppose that mental states cause behaviour, but if mental states are themselves behavioural then it is hard to see how they could do the job.
2. it was argued (Chisholm, 1957, Geach, 1957) that no mental state could be defined by a single range of behavioural dispositions, independent of any other mental states. E.g. if one believes that it is raining, one’s behavioural dispositions will vary depending on whether one has the desire to get wet. It is therefore necessary to invoke other mental states in characterizing the behavioural dispositions. (GeachVsRyle, ChisholmVsRyle).

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Mind Body Problem Kripke
 
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I 164
Identities: E.g. Pain is the excitation of C fibers (types of mental states, types of physical states). Nagel/Davidson: Alleged impossibility of correlation of psychological and physical properties. ---
I 165
Descartes: Mind is different from the body, because the mind could exist without the body. ---
I 166
KripkeVsDescartes: He might as well have derived these conclusions from the premise that the body could have existed without the mind. A theory which states that a person is nothing beside or above their body, just like a statue is nothing beside or above the matter, would have to defend the necessary thesis that a person exists iff their body exists and also has a certain physical organization.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

Mind Body Problem Descartes
 
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Putnam V 108
Def Interactionism/Putnam: theory, according to which spiritual events interact with physical ones. Whereby the direction of origin could be in one direction as well as in the other! Descartes: the mind could influence matter if it was very, very ethereal (pineal gland). Notorious.
V 109
Most naïve version of interactionism: the mind as a kind of ghost that lives in the bodies. Vs: But it is not clear why we should have such complicated brains at all, it could be a very simple control mechanism. Descartes: (refined) mind and brain form a substantial unity. Somehow it is the mind-brain unity that thinks, feels, and represents a personality. I.e. that the mind is not what we commonly call the mind, but the unity of brain (body) and spirit.
PutnamVsDescartes: obscure: unity of two substances.


Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Object Davidson
 
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I 16 ff
Thought/Knowledge/DavidsonVsHume: there are infinitely many properties, so ignorance of the imagined objects is possible ... it is necessary to find objects for which mistakes are impossible. As objects that are necessary what they seem to be.
DavidsonVsDescartes: 1. such objects simply do not exist. Not even appearances are all what they seem to be. Also, the aspects of sense data cannot be protected against misidentification, insofar as they are real objects.
We must drop the idea that there are inner objects or mental images in the required sense.
No "internal objects", no "uninterpreted given", "no stream" within a schema (VsSchema/content).
---
Frank I 678
Objects/Putnam/Fodor: a) "true inward", "in front of the mind", "conceived" by him - b) those who identify thoughts in the usual way. (external) - Davidson: I agree that there are no objects that serve both purposes - ((s) not an excellent class). - Putnam: the two cannot coincide, because otherwise the mind could not be deceived. Ideas/impressions/Hume: "are as it seems and seem as it is" - DavidsonVsHume: such objects do not exist - neither abstract nor concrete, neither public nor private. Even propositions do not exist - there is no object that would satisfy the dual function to be in front of the mind and also to determine the content of the thought - otherwise one could not be deceived. - meaning depends on the types of objects and events which have caused the person acausally to take the words as applicable. But the agent cannot ask himself whether he regularly applies them correctly, because his regularity gives them importance. - Thus, authority of the first person and social character go hand in hand.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Objects of Thought Burge
 
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Tyler Burge
Frank I 704
Self-Knowledge/Content/Thoughts/Burge: the content of the first-level thought is fixed by non-individualistic (external) background conditions. Through its reflexive, self-referential character, the second-stage thought inheres this content.
Fra I 705
Since fake content does not logically undermine such self-knowledge, it is clear that it is not necessary to know the enabling conditions.
DescartesVs.
BurgeVsDescartes: it is wrong to conceive of one's own thoughts as objects, and to attribute to oneself a special faculty of infallibility. Either the new entity of an ability is introduced as new entities or special objects. OckhamVs. E.g. propositions which can only be thought when they have been fully understood, or
imaginations whose esse is their percipi.
These would be objects about which you could not make mistakes, like objects that could be seen from all sides at the same time.

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Person Kant
 
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Strawson V 142
Person/personal identity/Descartes: (not physical!) - Our ordinary concept brings very well empirically applicable criteria for numerical identity of a subject with itself (concept!) - but not by self-ascription - "I" is simply used without criteria - KantVsDescartes: the only criteria would be: "the same person", "the same soul" - circular. ---
V 146
Kant: there is no inner intuition of the subject.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Person Locke
 
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Graeser I 224
Person / Locke: by identity of consciousness, not the numerical identity of the substance.
Euchner I 55f
Person / Locke: awake / sleeping: not the same person (probably the same human being) - Person: someone who attributes past actions to himself - man: bound to shape - VsDescartes: when separated from the mental it is possible that a contemporary man was the person Nestor, but not the man Socrates > personal identity -> Ethics: a drunk is not liable if without consciousness.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding


Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002

Loc I
W. Euchner
Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996
Physicalism Schiffer
 
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Stephen Schiffer
I 138
SchifferVsPhysicalism: it must be wrong, because if there are true ascriptions of belief, they cannot be shown without mentalist or intentional vocabulary. ---
I 142f
Definition ontological physicalism/O.P./Schiffer: thesis: has no irreducible psychological entities. - Definition Sententialist physicalism/S.Ph.: there are no psychological sentences (which is wrong) - if there are any, the two physicalisms fall together. - Definition Sententialist Dualism/S.D.: there are true psychological sentences. - Belief properties (b.p.) if there are any, belief propositions and Sententialist Dualism cannot be true. - Ontological Dualism/O.D./SchifferVsDescartes: is unreasonable - Sententialist Dualism/ontological physicalism: because both are true, there are no belief propositions - NominalismVsDualism/Quine: If the Sententialist Physicalism is wrong, there are no true beliefs.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Proof of God’s Existence Leibniz
 
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Holz I 72
Ontological proof of God/Holz: the derivation of the axiom "only one being is necessary" is only equivalent in the outer form with the ontological proof of God. In fact, it differs, otherwise it would dissolve pantheistically in the world.
Leibniz: God can only be thought of as universal.
---
Holz I 78
Principle of Variety/Principles/Thinking/Leibniz: the formal principle of thinking is based on the principle of variety. ((s) Because you cannot think of a single thing without relation to anything else.)
Double movement/ascent/descent/Leibniz/Holz: from the certainty of the perceived multiplicity one can now ascend to the infinitesimal boundary concept "all beings at the same time".
Divine proof/LeibnizVsDescartes/Holz: this is similar to Descartes' proof of God, but in a modified form: it makes a difference whether I assume God as the creator outside, or the totality of the whole (and thus within). (> outside/inside).

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998


Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Reality Davidson
 
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I 90
Reality/world/Quine: proximal theory (nerve endings): closed from the world, which is perhaps quite different - ultimate source of evidence: irritation - DavidsonVsQuine. Cartesian separation; gap - also separation of scheme and content - DavidsonvsDescartes / DavidsonVsQuine: once one is decided to close that gap, one can not specify what the evidence actually was evidence for.
Rorty VI 63 ff
World/Putnam/Goodman (VsWilliams)/Rorty: there is no real suchness of the world. Davidson: the contribution that the world is contributing is inseparable from the part we contribute ourselves.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Reason Brandom
 
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I 395
Reason/Brandom: we are rational beings exactly as far as our recognition of discursive determinations makes a difference for what we will do next.
I 399
Mind/Brandom: Thesis: we gain mutual recognition out of our ability to say "we". ---
II 213
Definition mind/Brandom: the conceptual ability to understand rules - KantVsDescartes: normative rather than descriptive.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Representation Brandom
 
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I 155f
Kant-Hegel representation: Experience: inferential activity. Representation> de re attribution.
---
I 900
Representational contents: linguistic through and through, but not purely linguistic. The representational dimension of propositional contents becomes explicit through the social perspective nature of accounting.
---
Rorty VI 179 ff
Representation/Brandom/Rorty: wants to save them from Davidson, who threw them out with the bathwater. The representationalist semantic theory contains an undeniable insight: whatever has a high propositional content necessarily has such a representational side; nothing which does not have this aspect would be seen as an expression of his proposition. BrandomVsDavidson. Rorty: With this he does not mean that truth is a property, it is in fact only about approval, not about description (metaphysics).
---
Bandom I 127
Representation/Brandom: problematic: there is no room for the concept of error: representation requires accuracy - statement truth - representation is not possible without practice: red dots, blue lines on the map - VsDescartes: does not explain what it means to understand representation, namely understanding how we are responsible for them. ---
I 126
Representation is not an expression. ---
I 130
VsDescartes: it is about the correctness of the representation prior to understanding. ---
I 145
BrandomVsRepresentation: unclear how to come to the concept of propositional content. ---
I 923
Representation/SearleVsDavidson: content must be understood intrinsically and before analysis - but representation of signs, sounds not intrinsic, mere object of nature - derived intentionality comes from original intentionality of the mind. ---
I 404f
Representation/Brandom: from Descartes dualistic worldview of representation and the represented - four aspects: 1) Apart from "true", representation also needs "refers to" and "means" - 2) distinction between intensional and extensional contexts - 3) "of" in de re-contexts: something true of Kant but not of Hegel - 4) Correctness of judgment and inference. ---
I 412 ~
BrandomVsRepresentation: instead expressive role. ---
I 482
Representation/Brandom: Minority (Davidson): between propositionally rich intentional states and facts - Majority: no semantic priority is the result of the pragmatic prevalence of propositional - representation is initially representation of things, Reil and properties- Brandom: if this is true, allocation of intention and success cannot be explained at the level of propositional content. ---
I 719
Representation/Brandom: E.g. McCarthy: propositional content as worldview depends on the facts in relation to the objects they represent - representation in this sense is fundamental intentionality. ---
I 719f
Representation/Brandom: a) pre-conceptual: does not require grasping the specific contents - e.g. orienting oneself with a map (also possible non-linguistically) E.g. interpreting a cloud as a sign of rain - b) as part of a discursive practice: E.g. infer from symbols that there is a river between two cities. ---
I 722
Assertions and beliefs with a high propositional content are necessarily representationally substantial, because their inferential structure is essentially a social one.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Representation Esfeld
 
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I 136 ~
Representation: harmless: beliefs represent things and facts of the world - but they are not the original semantic property of beliefs. - EsfeldVsDescartes: Representation intentional, not pre-conceptive. - Representation/Descartes: 1. belief represents things, 2. access only by representation, 3. The things of which we are conscious, are representations (strong representation, realism) - Fodor: pro Descartes, content of belief state derived from original representative content - Problem: which causality is effective right now? Which characteristic is relevant? Does not allow conclusions. ---
I 144 ~
Representative semantics/Esfeld: Vs: similarity no explanation - which is the correct causal relation? ---
I 144 ~
VsRepresentation: Causal relation not fixable - Representation cannot distinguish between reference (extension) and meaning (intension) - meaning therefore not in the head.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

Sensory Impressions Descartes
 
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Stroud I 8
Senses/Descartes: Even if we know that we can be deceived, it is not wiser to assume that we are always being deceived than to think we would never be. Stroud: we should not assume all our senses to be fundamentally unreliable.
Stroud I 16
Senses/Knowledge/Descartes: E.g. if he knows that he is sitting at the fireplace, he thinks that he knows it due to the senses. But he also knows that it is compatible with the fact that he is only dreaming.
VsDescartes: if we allow a dreaming person to know something (e.g. mathematics, mathematical truths), does this not show that Descartes is wrong with his skepticism?
VsVs: this is not shown by that.

Skepticism Austin
 
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Stroud I 41
AustinVsSkepticism: Descartes merely undertook a re-definition of "knowledge". - E.g. someone asserted there were no doctors in New York - in that, he performs a re-definition of "doctor": as someone who could cure within 2 minutes. StroudVsAustin: Descartes goes deeper. SomeVsDescartes: knowledge does not require what Descartes asserts: not dreaming and knowing that. - Knowledge/Stroud: if VsDescartes is right, then knowledge did not have to a) be entirely under logical consequence or b) penetrate all the logical consequences of our knowledge. (StroudVsVs)
Stroud I 45
AustinVsSkepticism: "Enough is enough": it is not necessary to prove everything at all times in order to be able to claim knowledge. - The skeptic only asserts a lack of information. - StroudVsAustin - Austin: a "real" goldfinch is no more than a goldfinch. - Stroud: it would be absurd to argue philosophically against our usual knowledge, but that is not true of Descartes. - Dream/Austin: There are recognized procedures for distinguishing it from wakefulness - otherwise we could not use the words.
I 47
Austin: it can be qualitatively distinguished whether you are actually being presented to the Pope, or just dreaming about it.
Stroud I 48
Strong Thesis/Skepticism/Terminology/Descartes: We cannot know that we are not dreaming. - Austin's central thesis: the questioning of knowledge is hardly ever permitted in everyday life (if we are dreaming) - there must be specific reasons. - Austin thesis: you cannot always fool everyone. - Then Weaker Thesis/Austin: there must be a reason to doubt that we are awake - stronger: we always have to doubt it.
I 57
Austin: E.g. what is considered inappropriate? -> Distinction truth/assertibility (because of the different conditions).
Stroud I 64/65
Skepticism/Descartes/Stroud: (deeper than the one disputed by Austin) - can neither accepted be in everyday life nor in science. - Emphasis on theory and practice. - Stroud: standards of justification vary from case to case - in the speech act there is no general instruction regarding what we need to consider.
Stroud I 74
Def "Paradigm-Case Argument"/Knowledge/Truth/Oxford/Terminology/Austin/Stroud: in the mid-50s it was thought the skeptic would have come to the conclusion that in certain situations both S and non-S apply. - StroudVsAustin: in order to question the concept of "knowledge" we have ask how and why it was used. - Airplane-E.g. "He does not know" is definitely correct before the aircraft is on the ground) - But that is not the distinction between knowledge and ignorance. - Therefore, we cannot draw a skeptical conclusion from our language use.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Skepticism Davidson
 
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I 67
Skepticism/Davidson: As a minimum assumption one can assume that we are at least right with regard to our own person. Such a realization, however, is logically independent of what we believe about the world outside. So it cannot provide a foundation for the science and beliefs of the healthy human understanding.
Rorty VI 166
Skepticism: the skeptic says: from the fact that we must think of the world in a certain way does not follow that it is indeed so. He encounters all claims with the question "How do you know that?" DavidsonVsSkepticism: that can be pathologized and omitted (like FregeVsSkepticism): the skeptic is not curable, because even in his next utterance he cannot assume that his words still mean the same as before.
Skeptics: Why should not necessary assumptions be objectively wrong? It is common to all skeptical arguments that the skeptic understands the truth as a relation of correspondence between the world and belief, knowing that this can never be verified.
DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: The "problem of the outside world" and the "other minds" rests on a false distinction between the "phenomenological content of experience" (tradition) and the intentional states that one attributes to a person on the basis of their causal interactions with the environment.

Dav I 53/4
"Everything different"/Skepticism/Stroud: it could be that everything is different than we imagine it - Quine: that would be a distinction without differentiation: since the observation sentences are holophrastically conditioned for stimuli, the relationships to the evidence remain unchanged - Preserve the structure and you will preserve everything. ((s) Then yesterday everything was already different.)
I 94
Causal theory of meaning/VsDescartes: in basic cases, words act necessarily from the kinds of objects causing them. Then there is no room for Cartesian doubt. ---
I 95
DavidsonVsSkepticism: cannot be formulated because the senses do not play a role in the explanation of believing, meaning (to mean) and knowledge - as far as the content of the causal relations of the causal relations between the propositional attitudes and the world is independent. Of course, senses play a causal role in knowledge and language learning.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Skepticism Kant
 
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Stroud I 128
Skepticism/Kant: it remains a scandal of philosophy that the existence of things outside of us must be accepted solely on the basis of belief. - KantVsDescartes: the relation between philosophical question and everyday knowledge is more indirect and complex than he thought. - ((S) But for Kant the perception of external things is very direct.) --
Stroud I 136
KantVsSkepticism: two stages: 1. prove external things (Moore has managed) - 2. show the general possibility of such evidence - ---
Stroud I 138
Stroud: Problem: we do not have a specific text (sentence) with which Kant would formulate his realism and could prove it to Moore. ---
Stroud I 142
Everyday knowledge is unproblematic, complete and does not have to be proved. ---
Stroud I 140
Skepticism/KantVsSkepticism: can never reach a conclusion because of the premises accepted by himself. ---
Stroud I 147
KantVsDescartes: he does not go far enough and relies too heavily on "testimonies" - (documents, evidence) - more important: the conditions of possibility -> Davidson: Kant: no study of our knowledge could show that we always perceive something other than the independent objects we assume around us. Solution/Kant: "Copernican revolution": idealism of all appearances. - "We only have direct consciousness of what belongs to us. Our perception depends on our capacity - wrong. That our experience would be in accordance with the things, but vice versa.
---
Stroud I 149
Things of the outer world/objects/world/reality/Kant/Stroud: all our perception, whether internal or external, and all "external objects of perception ... we have to regard them as representations of what we can be immediately conscious . - ((s) so the thing is the representation of our consciousness -> Transcendental idealism - founds the a priori character of our knowledge of space and time (geometry) - therefore things cannot exist independently of our thoughts and experiences. ---
I 163
StroudvsKant: that we need to be aware of our experiences is the return of the "epistemic Priority" (from Descartes).
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Skepticism Nagel
 
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I 19
Subjectivism/Skepticism: says that there is no ability of such universal applicability and validity within us tp verify and substantiate our judgments.
I 22ff
Skepticism/Relativism: Reason cannot be criticized without using reason at any other point to formulate this criticism.
I 31
Skepticism: a skepticism generated by reasoning can not be total.
I 31 ff
Skepticism: in order to criticize it, one should not understand it as a widely applicable trivial empty phrase, but as something concrete, in order to turn the tables. This allows the conflict betw the inner content of the thoughts and the relativizing external view to be openly recognized. Subjectivism aims at a phenomenological reduction of thought to get out of them. This cannot succeed. Attempts to relativize the objectivity of a conceptual scheme fail for the same reason.
E.g. I cannot say "I believe that p, but this is merely a psychological fact that affects me. As for the truth, I do not settle".
I 89
NagelVsDescartes: demon: the idea of ​​confused thoughts also contains the disentangled ones.
I 92
NagelVsSkepticism: may not use arguments at all - a false calculation cannot be made right by saying that a demon had confused it.
I 94
Logical skepticism/NagelVsSkepticism/Nagel: we can never reach a point where there are two possibilities that are compatible with all evidence. I cannot imagine that I am in a similar realization situation where 2 + 2 = 5, but my brain would be confused, because I could not imagine that 2 + 2 = 5. The logical skeptic offers no level of reason - "there is no point that allows reviewing the logic without presupposing it -" not everything can be revised - "something has to be maintained in order to check that the revision is justified.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Skepticism Rorty
 
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Richard Rorty
Rorty VI 225
PragmatismVsSkepticism: (rough version): "We do not need to respond to skepticism at all; it makes no difference whether we respond to it or not". (WilliamsVs).
Horwich I 447
Skepticism/Peirce/Rorty/Leeds: PeirceVsIdealism/PeirceVsPhysicalism: both have a common error, "correspondence" a relation between pieces of thoughts and pieces of the world that must be ontologically homogeneous - (OH: e.g. only relations between representations, not between rep and objects ((s)> Berkeley) Peirce: this homogeneity does not need to exist - PlantingaVsPeirce: it does if the objects can only exist, for example, by showing their structure -" RortyVsPlantinga: this confuses a criterion with a causal explanation - RortyVsPeirce: "ideal" unclear.
I 448
Solution/James: "true of" is not an analyzable relation - therefore correspondence is dropped - solution/Dewey: It’s just an attempt to interpose language as an intermediary instance, which would make the problem appear interesting.
Rorty I 129
Skepticism/Tradition/RortyVsDescartes: not whether others are in pain is interesting - skepticism would never have become interesting, if the concept of "naturally given" had not arisen.
VI 223ff
Skepticism: main representative: Stroud: serious ongoing problem - Michael WilliamsVsStroud: arises only from absurd totality demand: that everything must be explained together - statements only make sense in a situation.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Hor I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Skepticism Stroud
 
Books on Amazon
I 13
Descartes: I cannot distinguish alertness from dream - Stroud: 1. the possibility that he dreams is really a threat to his knowledge of the world - 2. But he does not need to know whether he is dreaming to know something about the world - No knowledge: if one dreams E.g. that the shutters rattle and the dream caused it, one does not know that it rattles - (false causation, defies identity of the event). ---
I 17
Alone the possibility of deception is sufficient. ---
I 18
StroudVsDescartes: we can know sometimes that we are not dreaming - knowing that we do not dream is the condition for knowledge. ---
I 37
Intersubjectivity: it also is affected by Descartes' skepticism. ---
I 77
Platitudes/skepticism/Stroud: natural strategy VsSkepticism: 1. Objective world was there before us - "E.g. I believe that a mountain in Africa is more than 5000m high - that is completely independent of my knowledge - then it is not about assertibility conditions or truth conditions - otherwise: if you believe that we now know more about physics than 200 years ago, a reference to community and knowledge is implied - now truth condition and assertibility condition but still objectivity - Aeroplane-example: whether the manual is correct or not, is an objective fact that can be seen from the distanced position - distanced position: equivalent to skepticism - and at the same time determination that inside and outside diverge - inside: corresponds to our social practice. ---
I 87
philosophical skepticism/Stroud: its problem is not empirical. ---
I 110
Skepticism/Stroud: it is not sufficient to put forward a specific case - Descartes makes an assessment of all our knowledge. ---
I 270
Imaginability/Stroud: it is hard to say whether something is conceivable or not - a possibility would be to imagine it and see what happens - Vs: but that is not conclusive, since it may be that what my thoughts make possible for me, is even hidden from me. ---
I 272f
Dream/skepticism/Stroud: We have not yet asked if the dream opportunity is knowable to others. - StroudVs(s): we can very well "be all in the same boat" - I can use myself instead of Descartes - Stroud: I always say: it seems possible. - Imaginability: requires comprehensibility (Chapter 2) - and the possibility is comprehensible that we all dream - and then the question is whether I am dreaming, completely independent from the fact if someone else knows - then it is possible that all dream and nobody knows anything - and the skepticism is not to sit in opposition, thereby that it contradicts its premises - Conclusion: dream possibility: there is ultimately one because the possibility that someone knows something must not be presupposed - Stroud pro Descartes.

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Skepticism Anscombe
 
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Frank I 79
I/Descartes/Anscombe: pro: the conception of "I" cannot be a "self" and it must guarantee that the speaker is necessarily present. This shows how powerful the approach of Descartes is.
The conception is the "thinking of thoughts".

I/Anscombe: Error immunity:
1. The speaker must exist,
2. The referent must exist,
3. The referent exists as the one who is meant.

I/Body/AnscomeVsDescartes: E.g. I am tied up in a large water tank and cannot move. I think, "I will not let this happen to me again."
Thus it becomes clear that a body cannot be a referent of "I", but a Cartesian res cogitans.
Problem: the Cartesian ego fulfills the criteria of the guaranteed reference,...
---
Fra I 80
...but does not solve the problem of Locke: who guarantees that the referential object is in different "I" thoughts the same? AnscombeVsDescartes: he cannot even be sure that "I" does not refer to several thinkers at the same time!
I/Skepticism/Anscombe: Solution: "I" refers to nothing! So it is error immune.
This follows from the failure of logic in determining the meaning and the failure of Descartes' in determining the referent.
Question: Why did not someone come up with this solution earlier? Because of the "grammatical illusion of a subject". The questions about meaning and referent of the "I" are meaningless, however!


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Skepticism Descartes
 
Books on Amazon
Stroud I 4
Descartes/Skepticism/Knowledge/Stroud: Descartes wants to establish principles, a general method for the investigation of our knowledge. 1) Meditation: in the end, Descartes finds that there is no reason to believe anything about the world around him.
Stroud I 16
Senses/Knowledge/Descartes: E.g. if he knows that he is sitting at the fireplace, he thinks that he knows it due to his senses. But he also knows that it is compatible with the fact that he is only dreaming.
VsDescartes: if we allow a dreaming person to know something (e.g. mathematics, mathematical truths), does this not show that Descartes is wrong with his skepticism?
VsVs: this is not shown with that.
I 37
Descartes/Stroud: from the beginning, his skepticism was directed against everyday knowledge.

Substance Berkeley
 
Books on Amazon
Danto I 220
Substance / BerkeleyVsDescartes / HumeVsDescartes / Danto: underlying substance is a mere superstition, as well as the belief in an underlying self - matter / Danto: Berkeley s time matter was postulated in order to justify changes.
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Thinking Danto
 
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Arthur Danto
I 179
KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanies thinking.
It would completely miss the structure of thinking to say that the various assumptions are purely coincidentally associated in his mind.

I 307
Pavlov: associations are only external, ideas are not necessarily comboined.
Consequently, there are the logical links in addition to what can be causally associated with it.

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Thinking Kant
 
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Danto V 2
KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanies thinking. ---
Strawson V 61
Subject/thinking/Kant: there is a "way of thinking of an object in general" - Strawson:> objectivity.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Thinking Gärdenfors
 
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Peter Gärdenfors
I 72
Thinking without language/DennettVsGärdenfors: in contrast, some authors argue that thinking is not possible without language: (Dennett, 1991). Concepts/Dennett: Thesis: many concepts can only be formed when language is already present, such as B inflation, month, heritage.
Concepts/Gärdenfors: this is certainly true, but it does not deny that most of our concepts have been developed by observation and action before they found their linguistic expression. GärdenforsVsDennett.
---
I 259
Deduction/Shirky/Gärdenfors: (Shirky, 2003): deductive reason is over-estimated by people who work on artificial intelligence and especially on the Semantic Web. GärdenforsVsDescartes: this over-estimation comes from Arthur Conan Doyle whose Sherlock Holmes stories have done more harm to the idea of how the human mind works than anything since Descartes.

Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Unconscious Freud
 
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Searle I 197
Searle: In contrast to Freud's concept of the unconscious, the cognitive-scientific concept of the unconscious is not potentially conscious. ---
Rorty V 47
Unconscious/unconscious/Rorty: two meanings: 1. Several well-articulated beliefs and desire systems (quite rational).
2. Boiling mass in articulated instinctive powers, in which freedom of contradiction is irrelevant. If Freud had limited himself to this meaning, he would have left our self-image essentially unchanged.
---
V 47/48
Freud/Rorty: the new thing about him is that the unconscious ego is not a silent, stubborn staggering animal, but an intellectual equal to the other. If psychoanalysis had limited itself to the neuroses, it would never have attracted the attention of intellectuals. Unconscious/I/Rorty: the unconscious as a rational opponent. I can also discover that my unconscious knew better than myself. This discredits the idea of a "true" I.
---
V 60
FreudVsPlato/FreudVsKant/FreudVsDescartes/Rorty: the unconscious, our conscience, is nothing immutable, not even a central part. All parts are equally authorized. Mechanization, process, to change ourselves. ---
V 61
Definition Conscience/Freud/Rorty: memories of idiosyncratic events. No substitute for moral reasoning.

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011


S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Will Nietzsche
 
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Danto III 136
Will/Nietzsche/Danto: If it is true that Nietzsche tries to escape the usual distinction between mental and material, then the will to power must seem contradictory. After all, "will" is an expression concerning the spiritual. (See Causality/Nietzsche, I/Nietzsche, Subject/Nietzsche). Danto: That is not true. As with Schopenhauer, Nietzsche's usual connotations concerning the spiritual are combined with the concept of "will" in the metaphysical sense. The will to power is not limited to the mental. If we do not respect this, we cannot understand Nietzsche.
NietzscheVsActs of Will: Nietzsche attacks the "Acts of Will", which are not only accepted by philosophers.
---
Danto III 137
Acts of Will/Danto: behave to actions like causes to effects. Hume/Danto: Hume rejected the idea that we could have an experience that corresponds to our idea of causal nexus, just how our will becomes active through our body parts or thoughts.
Hume: we have absolutely no idea how the will works. Nevertheless, Hume accepts acts of will.
NietzscheVsHume: is more radial, there is simply nothing that can be proven to be linked to our actions.
---
Danto III 138
Thinking/Certainty/Subject/NietzscheVsDescartes: Nietzsche disproves the Cartesian thought that our own mental processes are immediately transparent, that we know about our way of thinking. He disproves it by setting up a series of interlinked thoughts and letting them "freeze": When Descartes talks about his doubts about reality being at least certain that these are his own doubts, he drags a lot of tacit assumptions with him.
NietzscheVsDescartes: if his argumentation boils down to an "It is thought", our belief in the concept of substance is already assumed and after that a subject is assumed. (F. Nietzsche: Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 577).
---
Danto III 140
Will/NietzscheVsSchopenhauer/Nietzsche/Danto: (F. Nietzsche: Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI., 2 p. 25): The philosophers tend to talk about the will as if it were the most known thing in the world; yes, Schopenhauer suggested that the will alone was known to us. DantoVsSchoepenhauer: in reality this is not the case. There is no simple, self-identifiable mental operation that would be recognized as an act of will and intuitively grasped.
Nietzsche: There is no 'will': this is just a simplistic conception of the mind. (F. Nietzsche: Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 913).
---
Danto III 141
Will/Nietzsche: Perhaps the worst of all these fallacies is the conclusion that 'wanting is enough for action' (F. Nietzsche: Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI., 2 p. 27). ---
Danto III 143
Will/Nietzsche/Danto: (F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI, 3 p. 85): The will does not move any more, therefore it does not explain anything - it merely accompanies processes, it can also be missing. Danto: if there is no will, there is no free or unfree will. (Cf. F. Nietzsche: Nachlass, Berlin, 1999, p. 913).
Freedom of will/Nietzsche/Danto: This conclusion is hasty: the doctrine of free will does not depend at all on a psychological theory about the will as a mental phenomenon; 'free' is applied to actions, but not to the will.
Nietzsche mostly puts the argument about free will on ice, the idea of free will is due to "logical emergency breeding".

Nie I
Friedrich Nietzsche
Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009

Nie V
F. Nietzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 2014


Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

The author or concept searched is found in the following 62 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Burge, T. Descartes Vs Burge, T.
 
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Frank I, 691f
Thinking/Externalism/Burge: what thoughts we can have depends on the relationships in which we are with our surroundings; a person does not need to explore their surroundings, to know what their thoughts are (not for that reason) Internalism/DescartesVsBurge: the possibility of deception is to prove that we can doubt the world while we know our thoughts authoritatively, i.e. supposedly independence from the world. Solution: ArnauldVsDescartes: even knowledge is not sufficient to know that mental events are independent of objects. Cogito does not provide knowledge about the (indexical, external) conditions of individuation.
Castaneda, H.-N. Evans Vs Castaneda, H.-N.
 
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Gareth Evans
Frank I24
"I"/Evans: directly referential (like Castaneda), but EvansVsCastanda: no fundamental priority over other index words. That which is identified by the "I" is always an object in space and time! EvansVsDescartes: I is nothing paranormal, timeless. No "res cogitans". Thus the need of intersubjective accessibility of the object of "I" thoughts is satisfied. The I-centered space only becomes an objective world place when the subject can transfer it to a public map and can recognize it. The convertibility of the demonstratively designated speaker’s perspective demands independent space.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
Clarke, Th. Stroud Vs Clarke, Th.
 
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I 269
Skeptizismus/Lösung/Clarke: der Skeptizismus würde falsifiziert, 1. Wenn irgend jemand aufwacht. Oder
2. Wenn jemand von außerhalb auf die Erde käme und uns schlafend vorfände.
Fazit: kein Skeptizismus folgt aus der Traum-Möglichkeit, selbst wenn sie in der alltäglichen Wissbarkeit von Tatsachen über die äußere Welt involviert ist.
Traum: Frage: setzt die Traum-Möglichkeit Wissen über Tatsachen über die äußere Welt voraus? Wenn ja, könnten wir vielleicht VsSkeptizismus zeigen, dass weil dieser diese Voraussetzung ignoriert, bloß denkt, dass er die Verallgemeinerung erreicht hat?
Wir könnten vielleicht sehen, dass seine Einschätzung des Einzelfalls nur verallgemeinert werden kann, wenn sie nicht die skeptische Konklusion ((s) dass wir gar nichts wissen) zur Folge haben.
Stroud: ich hoffe gezeigt zu haben, wie kompliziert das ist. Für Clarke wird damit die Frage der Objektivität berührt:
Objektivität/Vorstellbarkeit/ClarkeVsSkepticism//Stroud: (Clarke, LS, S 766): es ist unvorstellbar, dass ich jetzt träumen könnte, wenn nicht jemand anderes etwas über meine tatsächliche Umwelt wissen könnte. Denn er selbst könnte dann auch nicht wissen, ob er träumt. Beide können nicht „im selben Boot“ sein.
Traum/Wissen/Dämon/Clarke: Bsp Descartes Traum-Möglichkeit macht gar keinen Sinn, wenn wir uns selbst fragen, wie der böse Dämon oder Gott denn wissen könnte, dass er nicht selbst träumt.
Vorstellbarkeit/Stroud: es ist schwer zu sagen, ob etwas vorstellbar ist oder nicht. Eine Möglichkeit ist, es sich vorzustellen und zu sehen was passiert.
Vs: das ist aber nicht schlüssig, denn es kann sein, dass das, was mir meine Gedanken ermöglicht, selbst vor mir verborgen ist.
I 271
Traum/Stroud: nicht nur ist es möglich, dass ich jetzt träume, sondern auch, dass niemand auf der Erde jemals wissen könnte, dass ich träume, weil alle anderen auch nicht wüssten ob sie träumen. Wenn ich die Tatsache hinzunehme, dass die Wahrheit über meinen Zustand dann gar nicht wißbar ist, scheint das aber nicht die ursprüngliche Möglichkeit zu beeinflussen. Ich kann mich irren, aber wer würde das merken?
ClarkeVsDescartes/ClarkeVsTradition: wir vergaßen bisher immer zu fragen, ob die Traum-Möglichkeit für andere wißbar ist oder nicht.
StroudVsClarke: das ist wahr, aber vielleicht ist es doch nicht wesentlich dafür, dass wir die Traum-Möglichkeit erkennen, dass wir darauf verzichten zu fragen, ob andere darüber wissen. These: Die Möglichkeit ist genauso vorstellbar, selbst wenn niemand anderes jemals etwas darüber wissen könnte. ((s) Weil alle träumen).
I 272
Stroud: wir könnten sehr wohl alle im selben Boot sein.

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Descartes, R. Anscombe Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Frank I 69
I/Body/AnscombeVsDescartes: E.g. I’m tied up in a large water tank and can not move. I am thinking, "I will not allow this to happen to me again". So it Becomes clear did a body can not be a reference of "I", but rather a Cartesian res cogitans.
Problem: The Cartesian ego does fulfill the criteria of a guaranteed reference, Fra.
I 80
But it does not solve the problem of Locke: Who Guarantees That the referential object is same in different "I" thoughts? AnscombeVsDescartes: He can not even Ensure that "I" does not refer to a number of thinkers Simultaneously!.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Descartes, R. Austin Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Stroud I 42
AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes/Stroud: (Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, 1962, 4-5) Thesis: the source of Descartes' skeptical conclusion is obtained by uncovering a series of misunderstandings and (especially verbal) errors and fallacies.
---
I 43
StroudVsAustin: Descartes goes much deeper than the example doctors in New York with its simple redefinition. It is also not about linguistic errors concerning the meaning of the terms dream and knowledge. But: Suppose that Descartes was wrong and there was no need to know that you were not dreaming to know that you know something about the world:
Problem: how could we know that this is true? What would show that Descartes is misunderstood?
Knowledge/VsDescartes/Stroud: if his critics are right that the term "knowledge" does not require what Descartes claims (not to dream and to know that),
then
A) Knowledge is not "closed under logical consequence", or
B) The word "knowledge" does not penetrate all the logical consequences of what we know, or
C) It does not penetrate to what we know as logical consequences (of our knowledge) or even
D) To what we know, what the logical consequences of this are in turn.
---
I 44
Stroud: But how are these assertions supported? ---
I 47
Method/Verification/Skepticism/StroudVsAustin: Austin does not say much about these "procedures", he seems satisfied with the idea that they must exist because otherwise our language usage could not always differentiate between the terms ("here" always "words"). ---
I 64
StroudVsAustin: The accusation AustinVsSkepticism (AustinVsDescartes) that the meaning of "knowledge" in everyday use would have been distorted can only be raised if it can be shown that a certain linguistic usage, a certain concept, and the relation between them was misunderstood. This would be much more than reproaching a simple "redefinition" of a single concept, namely, of knowledge.
Stroud: Thesis: that's what I meant by the fact that the source of Descartes' demand reveals something deep and important.
---
I 74
... .Stroud: something similar could be applied to Austin's question: "How should we use the words "wakefulness" and "sleep" if we have unrecognized methods to say in certain situations that we are not dreaming?" StroudVsAustin: that fails because it does not take into account how and why these terms are used in these situations. (Why question).
Dream/StroudVsAustin: there could be easily distinguishable characteristics for different situations and we could apply a term or its negation due to these characteristics.
Stroud pro Skepticism/StroudVsAustin: N.B.: (analog to the plane-example): if there are widespread but untested methods (like the manual of the soldiers) then it could be that the distinction we make is not the distinction between situations in which S is true in those in which it is not true. Then again we have no knowledge.
Correctness/Plane-Example: "He does not know it" is definitely correct.
---
I 75
But this distinction was not between knowledge and non-knowledge. Because even the careful spotter can be wrong, "he knows it is an F" is wrong as long as he did not see the plane on the ground. Conclusion/skepticism/usage theory/StroudVsAustin: we cannot draw an anti-skeptical conclusion from the mere fact that we use the terms "I know ..." and "I do not know ..." as we use them. ((s) It does not follow from the language use that we know when we know something (>plane-example), because we can still have information without knowing that they are missing).
---
I 76
Platitudes/StroudVsAustin/N.B.: if one would disprove skepticism by arguing that it changes the meaning of the term "knowledge" must show that the most common platitudes are false, and these appear to be obvious truths. (... + ...) Moore's hands/Stroud: so Moore's proof gains philosophical importance and power.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Descartes, R. Berkeley Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Danto2 I 220
Properties / Descartes: A thing can not - as its own properties - have properties which it wins or loses. (E.g. beeswax). Instead, we should speak of a change of properties. BerkeleyVsDescartes, HumeVsDescartes: underlying substance is a mere superstition, as well as belief on an underlying self.

I 228
BerkeleyVsDescartes: there is no material substance (though outer reality).
G. Berkeley
I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997
Descartes, R. Brandom Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Brandom I 40
BrandomVsDescartes: failed to show what it means to grasp or understand such contents as representations. He does not explain what makes a rabbit thought to a thought, which is about rabbits or anything at all. He also does not explain what it means that someone understands a thought as a thought.
I 131
BrandomVsDescartes: has burdened the tradition of representation: the privileging of knowledge and therefore the successful representation against the understanding and the intended representation. For Descartes representational intention is "as if about" intrinsic and characteristic property of thoughts. He does not explain the importance of understanding.
II 13
Kant and Descartes: mind primary, secondary language - BrandomVsKant and BrandomVsDescartes.
II 17
BrandomVsDescartes: expression rather than representation (Sellars ditto).
II 69
Content / representation / BrandomVsDescartes: possession of representational content as unexplained explainer.
II 213
Mind / Brandom: the conceptual ability to understand rules. KantVsDescartes: normative rather than descriptive.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Descartes, R. Brentano Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Franz Brentano
Chisholm I 34
Individuation/Ich /Selbst/Vorstellung/Ich/Intention/Brentano: in den selbstevidenten mentalen Zuständen, die von uns vorgestellt werden, erfassen wir niemals irgendwelche individuierenden Eigenschaften.
I 35
Alle meine Eigenschaften, die ich ohne weiteres erfassen kann, sind so, daß sie zumindest theoretisch sofort an verschiedenen Dingen exemplifiziert werden können. (BrentanoVsDescartes).

Brent I
F. Brentano
Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Descartes, R. Burge Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Frank I 699
Reliability theoryVsSkepticism/Burge: some want to block the skepticism by denying seclusion principles. BurgeVsDescartes: I think we can be sure that we are not being deceived by any deus malignus. We derive this knowledge from our perception knowledge. This is not transcendental, as some authors believe. BurgeVsDescartes: the second stage judgment (reflective) simply inherits the content of the first-stage thought. E.g. "Water is a liquid": 1) you need the ability to think the empirical thought of the first stage, and 2) to attribute it to yourself at the same time. The knowledge of the content of the thoughts does not require an upstream separate examination of the conditions, just like the knowledge of the contents of perception does not require this.
Fra I 700
One simply knows the thought by thinking it. We have no criterion, no phenomenon and no empiricism.
I 705
BurgeVsDescartes: it is wrong to conceive one’s own thoughts as objects and to attribute a special faculty of infallibility to oneself. Either you introduce the new entity of an ability or special objects as new entities. OckhamVs. E.g. propositions which can only be thought if they have been fully understood, or ideas whose esse is their percipi. That would be objects about which no mistakes could be made, like items that could be seen at once from all sides.
I 708
BurgeVsDescartes: main error: the difference between a-priori knowledge and authoritative self blurring knowledge of the first person. One has clearly no authority to know whether one of one’s own thoughts can be individuated or to explicated in a certain way. But one does not need this authority to know that one is thinking them. E.g. I can know that I have arthritis, and know that I think that without having clear criteria for arthritis. It is a truism that you have to understand what you think well enough to think of it. But this does not mean that such an understanding brings an ability to explication or substitution with it, nor that such an understanding is immune to errors. So you can know what your own thoughts are, even if you only understand them partially. DavidsonVs: that undermines the authority of the first person. BurgeVsDavidson: that is not necessary if a distinction is made between understanding and the ability to explicate.
I 709
Explication: requires a higher degree of objectification: a conceptual mastery of the conditions that are the basis of your own thoughts and a conceptual mastery of the rules that you follow.

Burge I
T. Burge
Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Descartes, R. Carnap Vs Descartes, R.
 
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VI 226
Ego/Carnap: class of elementary experiences. No bundle, because classes do not consist of their elements! CarnapVsDescartes: the existence of the ego is not a primordial fact of the given. From "cogito" does not follow "sum". Carnap: the ego does not belong to expression of the fundamental experience. But the "this experience". Thinking/RussellVsDescartes: "it thinks". (> Lichtenberg). ("Mind", p.18).

Stroud I 196
KantVsDescartes/CarnapVsDescartes. Rahmen/Bezugssystem/Carnap/Stroud: für Carnap gibt es keinen Standpunkt, von dem aus man einen Rahmen als adäquat oder inadäquat beurteilen kann. Das wäre eine "externe" Frage.
Kant/Stroud: die Parallele dazu ist bei Kant der transzendentale Idealismus: wenn die Dinge unabhängig von uns wären, wäre Skeptizismus unvermeidlich.
Problem: der transzendentale Idealismus ist schlecht mit dem Verifikationsprinzip zu kreuzen. Ist Carnaps eigene positive Theorie hier besser dran? Das ist eine Frage nach ihrem Status. Sie verfolgt dasselbe Ziel wie Kant: die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit von Erkenntnis zu erklären, aber ohne die Grenzen der Verständlichkeit zu überschreiten.
Allgemeines/Besonderes/innen/außen/Verallgemeinerung/Stroud: dazu wäre es notwendig, dass erklärt wird, wie die allgemeine skeptische Konklusion sinnlos sein kann, selbst wenn die besonderen alltäglichen empirischen Behauptungen sinnvoll sind. Das kann nicht einfach daran liegen, dass das eine allgemein und das andere partikular ist.
Descartes/Stroud: das Partikulare ist in seinem Argument repräsentativ, und kann daher verallgemeinert werden. Die Unsicherheit im Einzelfall ist repräsentativ für all unser Wissen. Das ist die Stärke des Arguments.
VerificationismVsGeneralization: gerade diese Verallgemeinerung hält er für verdächtig.
CarnapVsSkepticism/CarnapVsDescartes: Aussagen, die innerhalb eines Bezugsystems sinnvoll sind, können nicht sinnvoll auf das Bezugssystem selbst angewendet werden.
Stroud: aber das ist das Problem innen/außen und gar keine Frage von Allgemeinheit oder Besonderem.
StroudVsCarnap: er muss also zeigen, dass die Bewegung von innen nach außen unmöglich ist, und nicht die Verallgemeinerung. Dazu brauchte er aber eine Erklärung, warum die traditionelle Sicht der Relation zwischen „internen“ und „externen“ Fragen falsch ist, wenn er den Skeptizismus vermeiden will. ((s) Warum-Frage).
Besonderes/VerifikationismusVsDescartes: Thesis: der einzelne Satz von Descartes ist schon von Anfang an sinnlos. (Weil unverifizierbar). (StroudVsVs).
I 207
StroudVsVerificationism: er muss nun zeigen, wieso dieses Verdikt nicht auf alle einzelnen (besonderen) Sätze des Alltagslebens zutrifft. Der Verifikationismus müsste sonst annehmen, dass unsere ganze Sprache (Alltagssprache) sinnlos ist! (Weil sie nach skeptischen Kriterien nicht verifizierbar ist). Bsp "Ich weiß nicht, ob Erklärung vom Sitzen im Durchzug verursacht wird" oder Bsp "Der Flugzeug-Spotter weiß nicht, ob das Flugzeug ein F ist" wären als sinnlos verdammt! Wenn der Verifikationismus bestimmte Sätze nur dann als sinnlos verdammt, wenn sie z.B. von Descartes oder einem anderen Skeptiker geäußert werden, müsste er zeigen, dass es eine abweichenden Gebrauch bei solchen Gelegenheiten gibt. Sonst könnte er gar nicht angeben, was VsDescartes an seiner Äußerung falsch gelaufen sein soll. ((s) Äußerung hier = Handlung, nicht Satz, der ja sinnlos, weder wahr noch falsch sein soll).

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996

Ca III
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Descartes, R. Danto Vs Descartes, R.
 
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DantoVsDescartes: the only way to realize that the senses deceive us, is via the senses. So, this type of evidence dissolves into nothing.
  Basically, Descartes said the following: make sure that your experience is as intense and clear as can be.
I 170
Descartes: N.B. just at this moment, it could turn out that this clear and specific experience is also wrong, namely a dream. Clarity: clarifies something, but it does not prove that I perceive.
I 191
VsDescartes: daß seine Argumentation zirkulär ist, war stets die Standardkritik. Erst beweise er die Existenz Gottes, dann gebrauche er die Güte Gottes, um seinen Beweis abzusichern. Descartes/Danto: aber selbst in der dunkelsten Periode des Zweifels wissen wir, was unsere Ideen bedeuten. Es ist nicht so, als ob wir unserer Sprache irgendwie mißtrauen müßten! Wir wissen, was es hieße, wären unsere Ideen wahr. Nur ob sie es sind, dass eben wissen wir nicht.
Dann aber verschafft uns die Idee Gottes einen Fall, indem bloßes Verstehen schon Wissen nach sich zieht! Wir könnten nicht den Anspruch erheben, zu wissen, was Gott ist, und zugleich den Zweifel hegen, ob es Gott überhaupt gebe.

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Descartes, R. Davidson Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Frank I 629
Mental/Physical/DavidsonVsDescartes: from the nomological irreducibility follows no ontological separation of two areas. I 632 Token physicalism/Davidson: (pro) receives the authority of the first person, but he cannot guarantee that the content of thought as it is identified externalistically is conscious. Solution/DavidsonVsDescartes: this residual doubt is merely rest of the untenable Cartesian theory of consciousness as a place where the mind sees special objects. I 633 If the identity of consciousness objects were determined only through relations with objects outside of the consciousness, then it would be possible that one is not aware of the contents of consciousness. But that’s just the "myth of the subjective". I 634 DavidsonVsDescartes: Error: not considering the conditions that allow the substantial thoughts.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Descartes, R. Duhem Vs Descartes, R.
 
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I 17
DuhemVsDescartes: If only length width depth, but no other characters and no movements are allowed, no explanations are possible. But Descartes requires the perfection of God that his will is immutable. Consequence: the set of movements is fixed.   Instead of velocity you might as well have put the square of the velocity. (Leibniz: "living force").
I 81?
DuhemVsDescartes: fears the gap! ...

Duh I
P. Duhem
Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998
Descartes, R. Esfeld Vs Descartes, R.
 
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I 212
Materie/Descartes: "körperlich", "materiell" und "ausgedehnt" sind bei ihm synonym. EsfeldVsDescartes: seine Position ist doppeldeutig:
a) keine Substanz kann auf hören zu existieren, daher können wir nur eine Substanz zulassen.
b) auf der anderen Seite nimmt er an, daß die Teile der körperlichen Substanz selbst Substanzen sind! Es soll einen realen Unterschied zwischen den Teilen geben.
Def realer Unterschied/Descartes: Unterschied zwischen Substanzen.
Materie/Raum/Descartes/Esfeld: Materie = Raum! Die Materie mit dem Raum zu identifizieren impliziert, daß die Physik rekonstruiert werden kann, ohne auf materielle Dinge zusätzlich zum Raum festgelegt zu sein.
Weitere Konsequenz: Gebiete des Raums mögen physikalische Eigenschaften haben, aber sie können sich nicht bewegen.
I 213
Raum = Materie: diese Möglichkeit der Identifikation ist das einzige, was ich von Descartes übernehme.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Descartes, R. Evans Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Frank I 497
EvansVsDescartes/EvansVsHume/EvansVsLocke/EvansVsKant: the "I" of mental self-attribution refers neither to a Cartesian "Ego" now to a Lockean person, nor to a Humean bundle of perceptions, nor to a Kantian I, but rather to an object of flesh and blood! Consequence: the background element of self-identification must be the localization in space and time. I 517 EvansVsDescartes: strongest antidote: the fact that these ways to acquire knowledge about ourselves must be incoporated in the information component of a functional characterization of our "I" ideas.
I 522
Body Awareness/Descartes: not a way to achieve knowledge about oneself, but only about something that one has. EvansVsDescartes: It’s hard to make sense from this. (s) This is not an argument. Descartes: I have to admit defeat when Descartes says that this was a way to gain knowledge about myself, but one that uses my identification! Evans: I have to admit that. I 523 EvansVsDescartes: our "I" notions are notions of bearers of physical no less than mental properties. I 562 EvansVsDescartes: the use of "I" simply bridges the gap between the mental and the physical and is not more closely connected to one aspect than to the other.

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Descartes, R. Heidegger Vs Descartes, R.
 
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II 87
VsDescartes dictates the world its being VsDescartes: determined substance by being: ambiguity substance / substantiality
  VsDescartes: for him being is True-being (=certainty).

Hei III
Martin Heidegger
Sein und Zeit Berlin 2006
Descartes, R. Hume Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Danto2 I 220
Properties / Descartes: A thing can not - as its own properties - have the properties which it wins or loses. (E.g. beeswax). Instead, we should speak of change of properties. BerkeleyVsDescartes, HumeVsDescartes: underlying substance is a mere superstition, as well as the superstition of an underlying self.

Stegmüller IV 130
Descartes: the ego cannot be doubted. HumeVsDescartes: all reassurances of Descartes contradict actual experience:
If I try to capture myself, I only find very specific experiences again and again, but not a 'self' that 'has' these experiences.
> Lichtenberg: instead of saying 'I think' we should better say 'it thinks', where 'it' should be used like we do when we say 'it is raining.' (Wittgenstein pro).
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997
Descartes, R. Husserl Vs Descartes, R.
 
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I 18
Descartes: philosophy as a rigorous science should be initiated only by evidence. Husserl: the question of the realization of absolute necessities is different: theory of experience that works on immediate consciousness experience. Vs philosophical presuppositions. This should be clarified through an exemplary viewing of essence.
I 55
HusserlVsDescartes: res cogitans can not be separated from the body.
E. Husserl
I Peter Prechtl Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 (Junius)
II "Husserl" aus Hauptwerke der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Stuttgart
Descartes, R. Kant Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Danto I 179
KantVsDescartes: The cogito, that "I think" is not an indubitable proposition, but something that accompanies every sentence you claim. KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanied thinking.

Kant I 73
Existence/cogito/Kant: feeling of existence has no concept. Nothing can be proven here. VsDescartes: "I ​​think, therefore I am," error: to infer from the concept to the existence of a thing.

Field I 80
KantVsOntological proof of God’s existence/KantVsDescartes: (KdrV, B622,3 4): You can never assert the categorical (non-conditional) existence of something. Justification: Contradictions usually originate from the fact that one or more objects are postulated, and then assumptions that are mutually inconsistent: e.g. a triangle and it being quadrilateral.
But there is no contradiction to deny the existence of a triangle!
For we have not made any conflicting assumptions. ((s) by only assuming a triangle.)
Kant: The same applies to the notion of an "absolutely necessary being": if we deny its existence, we deny it with all its predicates, but then no contradiction can arise.
Nothing can be negated with all predicates and yet leave a contradiction. (s) So there is no necessary existence.
Field: it can not be contradictory to deny the existence of numbers, because they have no mysterious force to leave a contradiction if they are not there. (s) Has the triangularity a mysterious force if there is no triangle? No, but that is a predicate without a carrier and not comparable here).

Stegmüller IV 362
Proof of God’s existence / Kant Descartes: Four points (CPR A 594 p): 1. "If I pick up the predicate in an identical judgment and keep the subject, the result is a contradiction." I lift both together, there is no contradiction. E.g. I cannot lift the omnipotence if God is the same as omnipotence. But if I say God is not, neither omnipotence nor any other of his predicates are given. IV 363 StegmüllerVsKant: One can ask why Kant is so sure that no negative existential proposition is self-contradictory and why therefore no existence statement of the form "there is an x" can be an analysis.
2. Kant (A 597): "You have already committed a contradiction when you brought into the concept of a thing, of which you only wanted to think its possibility,the notion of its existence". MackieVsKant: This is unfair! Kant’s argument is based on the idea that Descartes has an "an open mind" concerning the existence of God or not, hence something is read into the concept of existence. But Descartes does not pretend that he is open-minded regarding the response, he is rather completely sure regarding the existence. But then he does not postulate what needs to be proofed as proofed.
3. Kant (A 598): Analytic/Synthetic distinction: there can be no analytical statements about existence. (However, he does not justify this claim).
IV 364
VsKant: Analytical judgments on existence are in arithmetic, e.g. there is a prime number between 10 to 20 Frege: All arithmetic truths are analytic.
4. Kant: The logic of existence statements reflect an incorrect grammar: the auxiliary verb "be" is ambiguous here when it is used as a means of predication and existence. (> Copula).
MackieVsKant: Kant stops halfway: If to "exist" is not a predicate, then what is it?
Existential quantifier: exists only since Frege.
IV 365
MackieVsDescartes: That is a deadlier argument: the existential quantifier cannot be an attribute and cannot express perfection, which may possess a thing or not. E.g. therefore the Revenus resident cannot be refuted, which has no necessary perfection but only an artificial perfection. There is no distinction between natural and artificial perfection in the existential quantifier, there is now no distinction between natural and artificial perfection. Then Descartes’ argument about the distinction of natural/artificial, with God the only exception of a being no longer with natural perfection, is not valid anymore. DescartesVsFrege: his only rebuttal would be if he could prove that a "this tree" or "I" or "God exists" ((s) so (ix) Fx (iota operator, indicator statement) exists MackieVsDescartes / Stegmüller.: In any case, he has not done this.


Strawson V 22
"Refutation of idealism"/ Kant Descartes: So that self-consciousness is possible, it must be at least possible to distinguish between consequences of our experiences on the one hand, and consequences of the objects of our experience which they show independently. For that, the items must be so designed that they exist in a stable framework. The necessary differences of temporal relations must be taken within the experience. We must therefore have a direct and non-deductive awareness of objects in space. "The consciousness of my own existence is at the same time the non-deductive consciousness of the existence of other things beside me." Terms / Kant: not any amount of terms is sufficient for us, there must be concepts of persistent and re-identified objects among them.
V 23
StrawsonVsKant: In the analogies, he always tries to squeeze more out of the arguments than there actually is. Self-awareness/Consciousness/Kant/Strawson: The distinctions must be created in the concepts themselves, because there is no such thing as a pure perception of the reference system!
V 103
KantVsDescartes: self-awareness is only possible through the perception of external objects. Substance, cause and community (or reciprocal interaction is a necessary condition for objective experience. And these concepts become only meaningful regarding external objects. Strawson: Kant relies here very little on his theories from the transcendental aesthetic as premises for its arguments in the analysis.

Strawson V 140
Def Soul/Descartes/Strawson: All of us know by the mere fact of conscious awareness that he exists as a (Cartesian), thinking substance, e.g. that it is capable as an intangible, lasting, not composite individual subject of ideas and experiences as well as an existence in complete independence of a body or of matter. KantVsDescartes: Which infringes the principle of sense: there is no empirical application criteria for this claim.
KantVsDescartes, KantVs rational psychology: Analysis of the origins of appearance: Mix-up of the unity of experiences and the experience of unity.
V 143
KantVsDescartes: After all, it is the unity of consciousness, which we, if the semblance has us under control, take erroneously for awareness of a unified subject.
V 145
Def rational psychology/(Descartes): Asserts that every person has immediate safety regarding the existence of his soul as an immaterial substance. KantVsDescartes: However,the only criteria for it would be "the same man, the same soul". Deathblow for rational psychology.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Descartes, R. Kripke Vs Descartes, R.
 
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I 165
Descartes: The spirit is different from the body because the spirit could exist without the body. KripkeVsDescartes: He could have derived these conclusions just as well from the premise that the body could exist without the spirit.
Many philosophers accept cheerfully the Cartesian premise and deny the conclusions.
A theory that states that a person is nothing next to or above their body, just like a statue is nothing next to or above the matter, would need to defend the necessary thesis that a person exists iff his/her body exists and has a certain physical organization as well.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984
Descartes, R. Kuhn Vs Descartes, R.
 
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I 207
Perception/KuhnVsDescartes: It is wrong to analyze the perception as a process of interpretation. (It became a tradition only after Descartes.) The claim that members of different groups may have different perceptions when they are confronted with the same stimuli does not mean that they actually have any perceptions! E.g. in many environments a group unable to distinguish wolves from dogs could not exist.
Stimulus/sensation: Experience and knowledge of nature is built into the transition from stimulus to sensation.

Ku I
Th. Kuhn
Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973
Descartes, R. Leibniz Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Leibniz I 35
"Clear and Distinct"/"Clare et Distincte"/LeibnizVsDescartes: Unsatisfactory, because not clearly determined. Perception: either dark or clear
Def clear: either confused or distinct
Def distinct: either adequate or inadequate
Def adequate: either symbolic or intuitive
Def Absolute Knowledge [Vollkommene Erkenntnis]: if it is both adequate and intuitive at the same time
Def dark: is a term that is not sufficient for recognition
Def clear: is a term if it is sufficient for recognition
Def confused: if insufficient indicators can be enumerated separately. ((s) can still be clear, see above).
Def distinct: e.g. the coin assayers' idea of gold
I 36
Def symbolic: If we do not see the whole essence of a thing all at once, and use symbols there, then knowledge is symbolic. Def intuitive: Is knowledge if it is nevertheless possible to think of different terms constituting the object at the same time (constituting as in "the object shows its terms itself").
Important argument: They are all operationalistic definitions, which is sensible if the terms cannot be dissected further.
I 43
Knowledge/Thinking/LeibnizVsDescartes: He needs a true God (who is not a fraud) so that the self-confidence does not remain imprisoned in a content-free "pure thinking in itself". Leibniz: instead: reasoning by truth of fact, e.g. about the ontological status of the world.
I 59
LeibnizVsDescartes: To refrain from falling into an irrational transcendental idealism, the rationality of facts must be proved. As such, Leibniz is definitely not a precursor of Kant!

Construction/World/Experience/Rationality/Identity/Leibniz: The construction of Leibniz' ontology consist in two phases:
1. The possibility to deduce all meaningful, i.e. true and knowledge-contained sentences are shown by reducing them on identical sentences.(Deduction/Reduction). (Prädikative Evidenz).
2. The evidence of identity shall be proved itself as such in the world. The identity as the world's basis shall find its basis once again in the constitution of the world's being.

I 78
Proof of God/LeibnizVsDescartes/Holz: Is similar to Descartes' proof of God, but modified. There is a difference between accepting God as author for the exterior or for the totality of the whole (and as such for the interior as well).
I 80
Particulars/Leibniz: Depicts the effects of the interrelationship in itself and obtains the whole. Dual Inclusion: Of the particular in the whole and the whole in the particular. Problem: circular argument Solution/Descartes: Justification by God. LeibnizVsDescartes: This is not possible because metaphysics are based on a complete conjunction.
Solution/Leibniz: The function of sensory perception cannot be deceived.

I 99
Force/Passivity/Leibniz: Force is also the ability to adapt your own state to the changes of other substances. Sufferance [Erleiden] The original force is twofold: vis activa and vis passiva.
Leibniz calls these "force points" also "metaphysical points".
I 100
The original force is blocked from all sides by the individual substances which cannot unfold freely. So the derived forces are only modifications of the original force. Force/LeibnizVsDescartes: A simple expansion is not sufficient! Therefore, force needs to be added.
I 101
The merely expanded mass does not carry a principle of qualitative differentiation since expansion is purely quantitative. Only then motion and change can happen. Nature needs to be explained from its own definition!
I 102
Matter/LeibnizVsDescartes: Impenetrability is not sufficient! For Descartes the body was immobile. Substantial being needs a carrier.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998
Descartes, R. Locke Vs Descartes, R.
 
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I 27
angeborene Ideen/LockeVsScholastics/LockeVsDescartes: es gibt keine angeborenen Ideen! Weder im spekulativen noch im praktischen (moralischen, theologischen) Denken, auch nicht in Form von "Maximen", also unmittelbar einleuchtenden Prinzipien. 1. spekulative Prinzipien: wären sie angeboren, müssten sie bei noch nicht durch Vorurteile verbildeten Menschen nachweisbar sein, als z.B. bei Kindern oder Geistesschwachen, und das sind sie nicht!
2. wären Wahrheiten in Form von Sätzen angeboren , so müssten dies auch die dazugehörenden Begriffe sein, sogar die Folgerungen aus diesen Sätzen! Derartige Annahmen dehnten den Bereich angeborener Begriffe und Sätze aber ins Unübersehbare aus.
3. Maximen: die spontane Zustimmung zu ihnen bedeutet, dass sie zuvor nicht gewusst wurden! Angeborenes müsse aber immer präsent sein.
ChomskyVsLocke/(s): würde einwenden, dass Grammatikregeln auch erst ins Bewusstsein treten. Da geht es um die Leichtigkeit des Lernens).
angeborene Ideen/Locke: die Annahme, Denken beginne mit der Anwendung angeborener Denkgesetze oder erster Prinzipien, die mehr seien als bloß instrumentales Denkvermögen, ist eine Täuschung.
I 45
Körper/Ausdehnung/res extensa/LockeVsDescartes: Ausdehnung und Körper sind daher nicht identisch! Es ist auch gar nicht ausgemacht, dass sie der Geist vom Körper unterscheiden lassen muss. (Riskierte den gefährlichen Vorwurf des Materialismus). Die Idee der Ausdehnung und die Idee des Körpers sind verschieden.
Ausdehnung: schließt weder Festigkeit noch Widerstand gegen Bewegung (Trägheit) ein.
Raum: kann nicht geteilt werden, weil sonst Oberflächen entstünden!
VsCartesians: diese müssen zugeben, dass sie in Anbetracht der Unendlichkeit des Raums entweder Körper als unendlich denken, oder aber zugeben müssten, dass Raum nicht mit Körper identifiziert werden kann.
I 52
res cogitans/LockeVsDescartes: Descartes: Welt der Körper und des Denkens strikt zu trennen.
Locke: gibt zu bedenken, ob es nicht ausgedehnte Dinge, also Körper geben könnte, die denken, etwas fließende Materiepartikel. Jedenfalls ist nicht auszuschließen, dass Gott in seiner Allmacht "Materiesystemen" die
I 53
Kraft der Wahrnehmung und des Denkens gegeben oder "übergestülpt" habe. Dadurch fühlten sich zeitgenössische Theologien, besonders sein Kontrahend Stillingfleet provoziert.
LockeVsDescartes: führt auch zu Problemen mit der menschlichen Identität (s.u.).
I 54
Identität/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: das Verhältnis von Substanz und Person, wenn die Denkfähigkeit allein einer immateriellen Substanz zugeschrieben wird. Bsp so wäre es denkbar, dass jemand die Überzeugung vertreten könnte, er sei dieselbe Person wie Nestor. Wenn man nun die Richtigkeit der Cartesianischen These voraussetzt,
I 55
so sei es denkbar, dass ein zeitgenössischer Mensch tatsächlich die Person Nestor sei. So sei er deshalb aber doch nicht der Mensch Nestor, eben weil die Idee des Menschen nicht von seiner körperlichen Gestalt ablösbar sei.
Das ist für uns heute abstrus. (> Geach).
Locke relativiert die These damit, dass es für das Bewusstsein auf die Beschaffenheit der Substanz gar nicht ankomme, weshalb er diese Frage offen lassen wolle - er vermittelt dabei den Eindruck, dass er der materialistischen Sichtweise zugeneigt ist.

II 189
Klarheit/LockeVsDesacrtes: kein Wahrheitskriterium, sondern weiterer Sinn: auch im Bereich bloß wahrscheinlichen Wissens.
II 190
Deutlichkeit/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: bei ihm an Benennbarkeit gebunden. Setzt die Möglichkeit eindeutiger Bezeichnung voraus. (>Sprache).
II 195
Erkenntnis/Locke: intuitive und demonstrative Erkenntnis bilden nach Locke eine vollständige Disjunktion der möglichen sicheren Erkenntnis. VsDescartes: diese besteht nicht in einem Erkennen vorgegebener begrifflicher Gehalte, das sich in deren Anschauung vollzieht, sondern konstituiert sich erst auf der empirischen Grundlage einfacher Ideen in der Verstandestätigkeit.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Descartes, R. Moore Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Traum/MooreVsDescartes: wenn ich nicht weiß dass ich nicht träume, dann weiß ich auch nicht, dass ich gerade aufstehe.
StroudVsMoore: eben diese Konsequenz von Descartes führt gerade zum Skeptizismus. Ich verstehe nicht, wieso Moore sie akzeptiert.
I 121
MooreVsDescartes: das ist aber kein Problem, weil es "beide Richtungen abschneidet". Denn wenn ich weiß, dass ich aufstehe, weiß ich, dass ich nicht träume. Also: weil ich weiß, dass ich nicht träume, weiß ich, dass ich aufstehe! StroudVsMoore: daher glaubt er, dass sein Argument empirisch ist. Ich sehe aber nicht, wie das daraus folgt.
Der Skeptizismus kann natürlich das Gegenteil (Konverse) sagen. ((s) Wenn ich nicht weiß, dass ich nicht träume, weiß ich nicht, dass ob aufstehe oder träume, aufzustehen).
Stroud: das eine Argument ist so gut wie das andere.
Stroud: ist das gerechtfertigt?
Bsp Skeptiker: man weiß nicht, ob man aufsteht – das ist analog zum Argument Bsp DetektivVsAssistent, dass die Liste nicht vollständig ist.
StroudVsMoore: daraus kann man aber kein "Unentschieden" folgern. Das Argument ist nicht "in beiden Richtungen abgeschnitten". Er kann nicht sagen. Bsp "Weil ich weiß, dass der Butler der Täter war, weiß ich, dass die Liste vollständig ist". Der Assistent hat die Liste nicht geprüft.
StroudVsMoore/(s): Moore beruft sich immer nur auf Dinge auf der Liste.
StroudVsMoore: er müsste aber zeigen, dass er weiß, dass die Liste nicht unvollständig sein kann.
I 122
Er kann nicht einfach das Argument des Skeptikers so umdrehen, wie er das tut. ((s) Weil er eine distanzierte Position (externes Wissen) braucht, die der Skeptizismus einnimmt, nicht indem er etwas bestimmtes behauptet, sondern etwas allgemeines).
Pointe: natürlich kann sich der Detektiv geirrt haben und der Assistent hätte die Liste vollständig gecheckt haben. D.h. in der Behauptung des Detektivs gibt es nichts, das etwas impliziert, das unerfüllbar wäre. ((s) Die Position des Skeptizismus ist also nicht, die Unvollständigkeit der Liste oder eine fehlende Berechtigung der Liste zu zeigen.)
Erklärung: die "Liste" impliziert nicht, dass ein externer Standpunkt unmöglich wäre.).
Skeptizismus/Moore/Stroud: es gibt andere Stellen in seinem Werk, wo er sich auf den Skeptizismus zubewegt (+) er scheint niemals damit zufrieden gewesen zu sein. Er gesteht sogar die "logische Möglichkeit" zu, dass wenn seine gesamten Sinneseindrücke Traumbilder sein könnten, er nicht wissen würde, dass er nicht schläft.
I 123
Lösung/Moore: Erinnerung an unmittelbar Vorhergehendes. Skeptizismus/StroudVsMoore: er zeigt nicht, dass diese logische Möglichkeit nicht besteht.
Descartes, R. Nagel Vs Descartes, R.
 
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I 39
VsDescartes: a standard argument blames Descartes of circularity in his argumentation in favor of the existence of a non-deceiving God.
I 88
Descartes/NagelVsDescartes/Nagel: Descartes refuses to accept this priority. He was wrong, even if only temporarily, to consider the hypothesis that an evil demon could muddle his mind. For this purpose he would have to think the following: "I cannot decide between these two possibilities: a) I believe that 2 + 3 = 5 is true, b) I only believe it, because an evil demon manipulated my mind. Therefore, the result might as well be 4." This idea is incomprehensible for two reasons: 1) because it contains the false result 4, and this "thought" has neither been given sense, nor can it acquire one by assuming that a demon had confused his thoughts. I 89 2) the judgment that there are these two exclusive alternatives is in itself an application of reason. Descartes displayed logical thinking without being disturbed by the possibility that his mind might be manipulated by a demon.
Nonsense: the proposition 2 + 3 = 4 is not nonsense; it has enough sense to be false by necessity! It is not possible to think that 2 + 3 = 4, but it may be assumed for the sake of argument that it follows from certain assumptions.
Descartes: God could have designed arithmetics differently, but we would not have been able to grasp that.
I 90
NagelVsDesacrtes: this opinion is incomprehensible for the same reason. This implies a hierarchy in the judgments a priori which is not convincing.
I 90/91
It is impossible to believe that God is responsible for the truths of arithmetic if that implies that 2 + 3 = 5 could have been wrong! That is exactly the same as if you wanted to base logic on psychology or life forms. DescartesVsSkepticism/Nagel: it remains an interesting question to know whether Descartes was right in that it is incomprehensible to abstain from faith with respect to all empirical statements about the external world. (Davidson).

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979
Descartes, R. Nozick Vs Descartes, R.
 
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II 87
I/Self/Synthesis/Nozick: let us begin with the act of reflexive self-reference. Act: what is the point, where are its limits? We could look for a pre-existing entity, the support of the act, the agent.
This already includes a theory, namely that every act needs an agent (actor, player).
LichtenbergVsDescartes: has not found that "he thinks", but only that "it thinks".
In the "agent view" we should assume: "I'm tired" = "agent of this act is tired".
Problem: what does my knowing that I am the agent consist in? (Sometimes my subsequent knowledge of a previous act).
If there must be a pre-existent being for it, how am I supposed to know about it? And how am I to know that this pre-existing being is the agent of my current act?
Suppose, then, there is no pre-existent entity: rather that the I is represented around the act (outlined, delineated). Then there are two possibilities:
19 an agent is postulated, then the boundaries are outlined
2) we imagine that an entity is outlined and is synthesized around the act.

Reference/Self-Reference/Nozick: when we start with the act of reference: A refers to x, then we can also form the concept that A refers to A.
II 93
Then we can build a concept of ​​Gödel's self-reference, by virtue of a permanent defining feature of A, and then it is necessarily self-referring in all possible worlds. Next step: self-reference not by a permanent defining characteristic, but by a characteristic which arises in the act.
Explanation: Are we not applying self-reference in the latter case to explain itself? Namely, if it is the sense? This merely points back to an earlier constant or bound variable.
Indexicality: something can refer to something else by virtue of a characteristic that is given in the act, but that is not reflexive! E.g. "exactly this" is described from the outside.
Therefore, there is no particular problem: how is reflexive self-reference possible?
Reflexivity/Nozick: there are no particular issues with respect to reflexivity, but there are about the intelligibility of speech of acts, even of non-reflexive ones with independent agents.
Nozick: I do not deny these problems, but we were willing to put them to the side, because we presumed with LichtenbergVsDescartes that "thinking is going on" and not "I think".
Reflexive Self-Reference/Nozick: we have understood it as composed of simple components and not as irreducible mysterious phenomenon. But if we want to guarantee the explicability of reflexive self-reference, we must explain why these acts occur.
II 94
Solution: we explain them with a pre-existing person, but it does not exist independently of the act of synthesis. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that there is an intuitive and compelling quality of the view that the self is independent of all acts. That would be a view that is discussed vehemently between Buddhists and Vedantists.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994
Descartes, R. Peirce Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Black II 197
Clarity/PeirceVsDescartes/Black: the Cartesian criterion for clarity amounts to little more than the requirement that the ideas should be known and explicitly definable (distinct). Although the latter may be useful, it is not sufficient. The entire function of thinking consists in producing habits of action.

Peir I
Ch. S. Peirce
Philosophical Writings 2011

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983
Descartes, R. Positivism Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Danto2 I 181
VsDescartes: the problems, which he believed to be solved were only pseudo-problems, such as the positivists have long been claiming.
Descartes, R. Putnam Vs Descartes, R.
 
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V 108
Definition Interactionism/Putnam: theory according to which mental events interact with physical ones. Whereby the causation direction could run both in the one and in the other direction. Descartes: the mind could affect the matter when it is very, very ethereal (pineal gland). Notorious. ---
V 109
Naive version of interactionism: the mind as a kind of ghost, who lives in the bodies. Vs: but it is not clear why we should have such complicated brains, it could be a very simple control mechanism. Descartes: (refined) mind and brain are an essential unit. Somehow it should be the mind-brain unit that thinks, feels and represents a personality. That is, what we commonly call the mind, is not the mind, but the unity of the brain (body) and mind.
PutnamVsDescartes: obscure: unity of two substances.


Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990
Descartes, R. Quine Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Willard V. O. Quine
I 56
The truth attributions are in the same boat as the true propositions themselves. QuineVsDescartes: Even if we are in the midst of in philosophizing, we retain and use - unlike Descartes - our present beliefs until we improve them here and there because of the scientific method.

Stroud I 227
Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception is simply in the departure from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, 3) Illusions only exist relative to a previously held assumption of real objects.
Given Facts/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: This may be the reason to assume a non-binding given fact. (SellarsVsQuine).
QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: Important Argument: then it might seem impossible to refer to the possibility of deception, because a certain knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion!
Stroud: We have treated arguments of this form earlier (see above >distortion of meaning). Violation of the conditions necessary for the application of certain concepts.
Quine/Stroud: he could now be answered in line with StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine will not make these mistakes.
Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to the language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no way to refer to what the meaning of a particular term is.
StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts"
I 228
the epistemologists are "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question becomes even more complicated by Quine's explicit denial that:
Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying that he leaves the question unanswered, he is right in using science to reject science. I merely say that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts.
TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical error to eventually disprove doubts from the science itself so that at the end there is certainty, what then is the decisive logical point he has missed?
StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science.
SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic might respond with a "reductio ad absurdum" and then epistemology would no longer be part of science:
"Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either
a) science is true and gives us knowledge or
b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the external world is knowledge.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003
Descartes, R. Rorty Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Richard Rorty
I 60
Def Mind/Rorty: 1) Reason (grasping universals) 2) (later): Mind Descartes/Rorty: clear criterion for distinguishing between the extended and the non-extended (Rorty pro: just like we can distinguish between the finite and the infinite, trivial).
RortyVsDescartes: but does not help in borderline cases.
I 69
Descartes: could argue with Leibniz' principle of identity: that something whose existence can be doubted cannot be identical with something whose existence cannot be doubted. (RortyVsDescartes: that's "too harshly" thought!). Descartes/Rorty: allows only three "substances": thinking, expansion, God.
I 76
Def Existence/Independent of Body/Rorty: every definition would have to draw a line between stomach cramps and the associated feeling in the consciousness.
I 77
Descartes/Rorty: not spatially: e.g. pain "in" amputated limbs. Descartes/Rorty: "I cannot recognize anything more easily and more evidently than my mind".
Cogito/RortyVsDescartes: confusion of the cogito as proof of my existence and as exclusion of my nature.
I 129
Skepticism/Tradition/RortyVsDescartes: traditional skepticism that asks if other beings, for example, are in pain is as little interesting as whether the table exists if we do not perceive it. This skepticism would never have attracted the attention of philosophers had it not been for the idea of ​​the naturally is given and its consequence that everything was merely a "reduction", a "conclusion", a "construction".
VI 27
Skepticism/RortyVsDescartes/Rorty: his doubts are so non-specific that they should simply be dismissed.
VI 167
Mind/Dennett/Rorty: "PDP": model of parallel distributed processing. Davidson like Dennett: therefore the mind is not its own place of residence. VsDescartes.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Descartes, R. Ryle Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Danto I 176
Idea / Descartes: Enforcement of a kind of act on the basis of an idea. Even if I were a stone now, then I would just be a thinking stone; ens cogitans. (RyleVs). Descartes thought = action - Thinking stone possible: ens cogitans
Ryle I 67ff
RyleVsDescartes: the semi-metaphorical idea seems to be based on the deeper philosophical assumption that there are two different kinds of existence (wrong!).
I 10
Descartes: Thesis: ~there is a polar opposition between mind and matter in a common field, which is called "space".
I 11
Privileged access: the reports of a psyche about its own affairs have a certainty to them that reports about the physical world cannot have. Sensation may be mistaken or confused, consciousness and introspection are not.
II 258
RyleVsDescartes: myth of the mind in the machine: Descartes: dualism:
1) The body is in space and time, the mind is only in time
2) The body can be described mechanically the mind cannot.
3) The body is publicly observable, the mind is private.
4) Through introspection and evidence of their consciousness a person has has direct knowledge, (privileged access), other minds can never be accessible.
5) The mind is seen as the sum of internal processes and states, which in turn can cause physical processes or activities and states.
II 259
RyleVsDescartes: Problem: the suspected link between the "mind machine" and the physical machine: the relations must be understood as either a mechanical or quasi mechanical. A third possibility is ruled out. But whichever opinion we follow: we only name the problem, but we don't solve it; because the question remains as to how it should be possible at all that the two models of explanation are mutually exclusive: on mechanical processes cannot be impacted by quasi mechanical ones and vice versa!

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
Descartes, R. Strawson Vs Descartes, R.
 
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I 128
Strawson: we mainly talk to other people, for information. How can one ascribe to others what one ascribes to oneself? StrawsonVsDescartes: in the case of the Cartesian ego this cannot be answered and the problem at all is insoluble. (Because if you can rely solely on private experience, you can also not speak competently about your own states, let alone ascribe them to others).

I 134
Person/Strawson: logically simple, primitive: Everything I said about primitivity is that it is not to be analyzed in a certain way. We must not regard this kind of entity (person) as secondary compared to two primary kinds: an individual consciousness and an individual body.
StrawsonVsDescartes: his mistake is only the special case of a general mistake, namely: that the designations or apparent designations of persons do not designate the same thing or the same entity, no matter what kind of predicates are ascribed to the designated.
I 135
That means: to avoid this mistake, we must not assume that "I" or "Smith" are type ambiguous. We should speak only with the predicates of type ambiguity.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Descartes, R. Wittgenstein Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Frank I 514
I/Body/Descartes: our I-thoughts leave the possibility open that we might be nothing more but mind. I/WittgensteinVsDescartes: a) Object use: E.g. "My arm is broken", "I have a bump on my forehead",
b) subject use: E.g. "I hear so and so"
meaningless: to ask. "Are you sure that you are in pain?" (> Certainty)
But: the statement, "I am in pain" is no more a statement about a particular person, as a groan.
But the reference is clear, it refers to the speaker.
---
Frank I 523
WittgensteinVsDescartes/oral/Evans: when someone says "I think it will rain soon, therefore I am" then I do not understand him. ---
Wittgenstein II 226
I/WittgensteinVsDescartes: the word "I" is one of several symbols with practical use, and if it was not necessary for language practice, you could drop it. It does not take any prominent position among the other words. Unless we begin to use it as Descartes did. I have just tried to demonstrate convincingly the opposite of Descartes' emphasis on the 'I'.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Descartes, R. Verschiedene Vs Descartes, R. Danto I 191
VsDescartes: daß seine Argumentation zirkulär ist, war stets die Standardkritik. Erst beweise er die Existenz Gottes, dann gebrauche er die Güte Gottes, um seinen Beweis abzusichern.
Duhem I 55
PascalVsDescartes: "hochmütiges Vertrauen in die unbegrenzte Macht der metaphysischen Methode. HuygensVsDescartes: I 56...

Duhem I 160
PascalVsCartesianer: Es gibt Leute, die ein Wort durch sich selbst erklären: Das Licht werde durch eine Leuchtbewegung der leuchtenden Körper erzeugt. >Moliere: virtus dormitiva.
Kanitscheider I 434
NewtonVsDescartes: nicht "unbestimmter" sondern aktual unendlicher Raum!
Kanitscheider II 38
Materie/NewtonVsDescartes: nicht Ausdehnung, sondern träge Masse Schlüsseleigenschaft der Materie.
Lacan I 51
LacanVsDescartes: "Ich denke, wo ich nicht bin, also bin ich, wo ich nicht denke".
Descartes I 10
PascalVsDescartes: "Herzenslogik" statt Verstandeslogik.
Vaihinger I 196
Lamettrie/Vaihinger: ähnlich wie Arnobius, gegen cartesianische Doktrin von den angeborenen Ideen. LamettrievsDescartes.





Dt I
A. C. Danto
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Dt VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005

Duh I
P. Duhem
Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998

Kan I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kan II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996

V I
H. Vaihinger
Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924
Descartes, R. Mackie Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Stegmüller IV 361
Proof for the existence of God / Descartes / Stegmüller: in my mind, I find the idea of a most perfect being. So I know with at least the same clarity and precision as I understand every mathematical proposition that such a being actually and eternally exists. For existence is perfection, which is why a being who did not exist, would be less perfect.
Descartes: although we can distinguish existence and essence in all other things, it becomes apparent that the existence of God is not anymore separable from its essence than the idea of a valley from the mountain.
Proof of God's existence/MackieVsDescartes: even someone who would like to be a theist must say that this is too good to be true. Incidentally, there are mountains that soar without valley from a plane.
In short, Descartes includes "existing" as part of the meaning of the term "God."
IV 362
Ex: Suppose there is a term "Venusian" of which is true "intelligent being that inhabits the planet Venus." Next there is "Revenusian" (terminology: real Venusian), the term of which includes its existence.
The sentence "The Revenusian does not exist" would be inconsistent, so that we would have to conclude that there is at least one intelligent being on Venus. Fallacy.
DescartesVs: would probably say "Revenusian" is just an artificial term. Not so with "God": all infinite perfections form a unit, none of them would be comprehensible without the others.
VSVS: thereby Descartes has to add an important assumption: namely, that whoever has a notion of this term, be conscious of an objective necessity, namely of the unity of the perfections, that is included by their existence.
Stegmüller: of that we have no clear and definite, but only a vague idea. ((S) conceptually it would be clear).

Macki I
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977
Descartes, R. Schiffer Vs Descartes, R.
 
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I 145
Mind Body Problem/m.b.p.Schiffer: (see above 2.2) there are three: a. in terms of things, (>mind)
b. in terms of state of affair tokens and event tokens (mental states of affair)
c. in terms of properties. (mental).
Among the entities each of these categories can have three positions
1. you can affirm the existence of mental entities as irreducibly mental.
2. you can affirm them and simultaneously hold them reducible (VsDescartes).
I 146
In terms of mental properties that would mean to regard them as e.g. functional properties 3. you can deny mental entities at all.
oP: is the thesis that 1 does not match any ontological category.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Descartes, R. Hintikka Vs Descartes, R.
 
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I 113
Cogito/Descartes/Hintikka: the cogito is not a premise whose conclusion would be the sum. Solution/Hintikka: it is an act of thought which itself proves the subject its existence. analog: a speech act also proves its existence to the subject E.g. Mark Twain says: "I exist". HintikkaVsDescartes: Problem: 1) What kind of entity is the "res" which is to be proved by that? 2) In order to answer the question of what was actually proved, we need to clarify what status the entity has. E.g. Italo Calvino: Charlemagne asks a knight, why he has the visor closed. He responds: "Sir, I do not exist".
I 114
Existence/Nonexistence/Subsistence/Hintikka: in this example, the knight does not exist in a certain way, but does in another, in the one in which he can be the hero of the story. Important argument: i.e. here the speech act is no conclusive evidence of his existence. ((s) Within the fiction). Cogito/Descartes/Hintikka: it would also have been wrong, had Descartes drawn the following conclusion: "Cogito, ergo Descartes exists". ((s) I.e. use the name instead of the "I" that is implied in "sum"). analogously: E.g. if someone told me on the street: "Mark Twain exists" it would be just as little proof for the existence of Mark Twain. It would have to be Mark Twain himself who carries out the speech act. Cogito/Knowledge/Hintikka: Problem: Descartes must know additionally that the thinker in question is this entity, or this type of entity. Existence/Identity/Entity/Identification/Quine/Hintikka: Quine: "No entity without identity": i.e. Descartes needs to know something else about himself in order to be able to say that he exists. Solution/Hintikka: we must distinguish two kinds of cross-world identification (cross identification). a) perspective (subject-centered) identification: it is not subjective, however, even if it is relative to a person.
I 115
It uses only one coordinate system that is defined by reference to the user. It depends, however, on objective general principles. b) public (object-centered) idenification. Knowing Who/Seeing/Visual Perception/Perspective Identification/Hintikka: Def Seeing/Hintikka: seeing an object: persons and bodies that take the same space in John’s field of perception can be identified by him. He also knows there can be different objects at different times in that place. Important argument: John does not need to know who this person is! Knowing Who/Seeing Who/Hintikka: for this we need an additional identification that is based on public (object-centered) criteria.

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W I
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996
Descartes, R. Cavell Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Stroud I 258
Bedeutung/Meinen/Wissen/Cavell: Bsp "gar nichts sagen" ist eine Möglichkeit, dass ein Philosoph nicht weiß was er meint. Hier gibt es nämlich nichts zu meinen. (Cavell, The Claim von Reason, Oxf. 1979, 210). CavellVsErkenntnistheorie: sagt erstaunlich wenig.
Behauptung/Cavell/Stroud: ist eine Handlung. Aber nicht jede (Sprech-) Handlung ist eine Behauptung. Selbst wenn ein wohlgeformter Satz hervorgebracht wird! Das gilt auch für Fragen usw.
Äußerungsbedingungen/Cavell: jeder Äußerungstyp (Typ von Sprachhandlung) hat seine Bedingungen. Wenn diese nicht erfüllt sind, gibt es gar keine Behauptung (Äußerung). Und das trifft auf die traditionelle Erkenntnistheorie zu: sie erfüllt nicht die Äußerungsbedingungen.
Def "Basis"/Terminologie/Cavell/Stroud: ist ein Satz, der einen speziellen Anspruch vorbringt (unterstützt, supports).
CavellVsDescartes: man sollte annehmen, dass seine Basis der Anspruch ist, wissen zu wollen, ob er am Kamin sitzt, mit einem Stück Papier in der Hand.
Pointe: dieses Beispiel ist aber nicht als ein Fall zu verstehen, in dem jemand einen speziellen Wissensanspruch (Behauptung von Wissen) untersucht.
I 259
CavellVsEpistemology, traditional: hier gibt es überhaupt keine konkreten Behauptungen von Wissen. Bsp aufgefordert werden sich vorzustellen, man säße am Kamin ist nicht dasselbe wie Bsp vorzustellen, wir hätten zu Wissen behauptet, dass wir am Kamin sitzen. Der Fall des Skeptizismus ist kein Behauptungs-Kontext. Wir können die Frage nicht beantworten, obwohl wir das Gefühl haben, wie sollten sie beantworten.
Aber hier geht es nicht darum, dass etwas übersehen wurde.
Man muss sich wirklich vorstellen können, dass eine Behauptung gemacht wurde, und das ist hier nicht der Fall.
((s) Sonst wären Bsp zwei Leute in einer geteilten Situation und der eine fragt, ob der andere den Kamin auch wahrnimmt).
Cavell/Stroud: ohne aufgestellten Wissensanspruch (Wissensbehauptung) würde die Untersuchung nicht einmal unseren alltäglichen Methoden ähnlich sehen.
Wissensanspruch/CavellVsDescartes: um sich vorzustellen, eine Wissensbehauptung wäre in Descartes’ Beispiel aufgestellt worden, müsste man sich einen Kontext vorstellen, in dem die Behauptung gemacht wurde. Dann braucht man zusätzliche Bedingungen für den Kontext.
Pointe: diese Bedingungen würden erst das Urteil in dem besonderen Fall möglich machen, und dieses wäre dann wiederum nicht auf andere Fälle übertragbar. Das (skeptische) Urteil wäre nicht repräsentativ.
CavellVsSkeptizcism/CavellVsEpistemology: Dilemma: es muss sich a) um eine konkrete Behauptung handeln, wenn die Prozedur der Untersuchung überhaupt kohärent sein soll, aber wenn sie konkret ist, kann sie nicht allgemein sein.
b) Ohne die Allgemeinheit kann sie nicht skeptisch sein.
Skeptizismus/Cavell/Stroud: pro Cavell: er zeigt einen Lösungsweg in der richtigen Allgemeinheit.
I 261
CavellVsSkepticism/Stroud: keine Aussage; die der traditionelle Erkenntnistheoretiker hervorbringen kann, ist repräsentativ für unsere epistemische Situation gegenüber der Welt in der Allgemeinheit, die er anstrebt. Das Urteil des Erkenntnistheoretikers oder des Skeptikers ist stets partikulär. Es kann nicht verallgemeinert werden. Stroud: Cavell muss zeigen, dass der Philosoph (Skeptiker, Erkenntnistheoretiker) die Bedeutung jeder partikularen Behauptung falsch konstruieren muss, um seine Verallgemeinerung vorzutäuschen. (> StroudVsCavell…+…).

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002
Descartes, R. Spinoza Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Esfeld I 212
Ausdehnung/SpinozaVsDescartes: gehört zur Natur Gottes. SpinozaVsAtomismus. (Wie Descartes).

Spin I
B. Spinoza
Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Descartes, R. Pauen Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Pauen V 22
Consciousness/Pauen: instead we could ask, however, what states of consciousness have in common. Tradition: Descartes: "Non-Spatial". VsDescartes: numbers and rules are also non-spatial, but they are not states of consciousness.
V 44
VsDescartes: not all physical entities are expanded.
V 45
VsDescartes/Pauen: main problem: psycho-physical interaction. The epiphysis is in turn under the influence of the brain. Problem: violation of the law of energy conservation.
It is not a solution to merely attribute a control function to the spirit.
Nor is it a solution to exclude psycho-physical interactions from the conservation laws, because then it becomes unclear how the non-physical mind can influence.
Descartes himself admits that an explanation is not even possible.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Descartes, R. Holz Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Leibniz I 38
Methode/Intuition/HolzVsDescartes: das Verfahren führt, wenn nicht zwischen Wesentlichem und Unwesentlichem unterschieden wird, zu einer unabsehbaren Fülle von Einzelheiten. Das ist ein Problem bei psychisch geistigen und gesellschaftlich geschichtlichen Untersuchungen. Im mathematisch naturwissenschaftlichen Zeitalter bleibt das unartikuliert.
Descartes’ Begriff der Intuition ist ungenau, weil er von subjektiver Überzeugtheit ausgeht.

Lei I
H. H. Holz
Leibniz Frankfurt 1992
Descartes, R. Freud Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Rorty V 60
FreudVsPlaton/FreudVsKant/FreudVsDescartes/Rorty: das Unbewusste, unser Gewissen, ist nichts Unveränderliches, nicht einmal ein zentraler Teil. Alle Teile sind gleichberechtigt. Mechanisierung, Verfahren, uns selbst zu verändern.

Freud I
S. Freud
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse Hamburg 2011

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Descartes, R. Millikan Vs Descartes, R.
 
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I 94
Error/falsehood/false/mistake/deception/naturalistic fallacy/Millikan: nothing can be described as faulty (broken) by considering only this single, isolated thing. Normality/Solution: It's always about how a thing "should be" ("supposed to be").
Problem: even false convictions and false sentences show do not by themselves that they are wrong. Also, meaningless sentences do not indicate themselves their meaninglessness.
Rationalism/MillikanVsRationalism: must therefore be wrong in regard to intentionality.
MillikanVsDescartes: Cartesian reflection alone does not even show the intentional character of our convictions and ideas.

Millk I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987
Descartes, R. Stegmüller Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Stegmüller IV 370
Wissen/Erkenntnistheorie/Descartes/Stegmüller: Descartes war unzufrieden mit dem Status, der dem Wissen in seiner Zeit zukam. Den wollte er mit seinem methodischen Zweifel stärken.
IV 371
(i) ich kann ohne Widerspruch die Existenz meines Körpers bezweifeln, nicht aber die meines Bewusstseins als Träger meiner Zweifel. (ii) Cogito-Prinzip: unbezweifelbar wegen der Tatsache, dass ich seine Wahrheit klar und deutlich erkenne.
(iii) Gott als vollkommenes Wesen kann nicht betrügen. Sinnestäuschungen rühren nicht von Gott, sie entstehen im komplizierten physiologischen Wahrnehmungsapparat.
Wissen/Erkenntnistheorie/VsDescartes/Stegmüller:
1. der Status der allgemeinen Regel bleibt unklar. Sie wird zumindest durch die Möglichkeit eines täuschenden Gottes bedroht.
Problem: entweder die Regel ist absolut sicher, dann ist sie auch nicht durch einen deus malignus bedroht, oder sie ist nicht völlig sicher, dann bedroht sie jedes Denken.
2. Cogito-Argument: beruht auf der Einsicht in den Selbstwiderspruch "Ich denke jetzt nicht".
IV 372
Das ist aber eine andere Klarheit als die der Mathematik und auch der des Gottesbeweises. Aus dem Cogito-Argument lässt sich die Autorität des klaren und deutlichen Denkens nicht ableiten! 3. Daraus, dass ich zunächst mit Gewissheit nur auf mich als denkendes Wesen schließen kann, folgt nicht, dass mein Bewusstsein eine denkende Substanz und ein von meinem Körper verschiedenes Ding ist.
IV 373
MackieVsDescartes/Stegmüller: zwei Punkte: 1. Descartes behauptet, Vollkommenheit sei ein positiver, Unvollkommenheit ein negativer Begriff, der den ersteren voraussetzt.
IV 374
Andererseits gibt er selbst zu, dass ich die Unendlichkeit Gottes nicht verstehen kann und sich in meinem Geist keine eigenständige Idee von Vollkommenheit findet. Dann kann ich aber ein positives Verständnis meiner eigenen Unvollkommenheit gewinnen, aus dem ich umgekehrt den negativen Begriff der Vollkommenheit bilde. Ich bin im ständigen Wandel und bin mir dessen bewusst.
Ich könnte auch sagen, dass der rein negative Begriff der Freiheit von allen Mängeln mir als einziger zur Verfügung steht für die Vorstellung der Allwissenheit.
2. MackieVsPlato/MackieVs ideale Formen:
Bsp absolute Gerade: Derartige Vorstellungen könnten nicht aus der Sinneswahrnehmung stammen, da keine reale Strecke vollkommen gerade ist. Sie müssten dann aus der direkten nicht sinnlichen Vertrautheit mit idealen Wesenheiten stammen.
Wir können aber sehr wohl die Vorstellung von einer gekrümmten Strecke haben, die aus der Wahrnehmung gewonnen ist!
Dann können wir uns auch denken, dass diese Strecke weniger gekrümmt ist. Ich kann mir dann den Begriff eines Grenzfalls machen, der nicht weiter von Krümmung befreit sein könnte.
Die Vorstellung der Vollkommenheit lässt sich also hinsichtlich ihres Inhaltes völlig vom Material der Sinneswahrnehmung und dem Verständnis der Negation her erklären.

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Descartes, R. Vollmer Vs Descartes, R.
 
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Vollmer I 14
LockeVsDescartes: keine angeborenen Ideen! Seele bei Geburt weißes Papier, tabula rasa, Wachstafel. Sinneserfahrungen bringen Ideen hervor, die vorher nicht vorhanden waren. These: "Nichts ist im Verstand, was nicht vorher in den Sinnen gewesen ist". (DescartesVs).
Dennoch reicht das nicht als Beweis, dass nicht einige Ideen doch schon bei Geburt vorhanden sind. Locke braucht dafür Beweise, die jedoch
LeibnizVsLocke: zu schwach sind.
Locke: muss sicherstellen, dass die Ideen die Welt auch richtig abbilden:
primäre Qualitäten: vom Körper untrennbar, konstant bei allen Veränderungen: Bsp Festigkeit, Ausdehnung, Gestalt, Bewegung oder Ruhe, Zahl. (objektiv)
sekundäre Qualitäten: nichts in den Gegenständen selbst, sondern nur das Vermögen, mittels ihrer primären Qualitäten in uns verschiedenartige Empfindungen hervorzurufen.: Bsp Farben, Töne, Geschmacksarten, auch Wärme (!) usw. (subjektiv).

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Dualism McGinn Vs Dualism
 
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McGinnVsDualism: the problem is that he goes too far in the interpretation of data. It responds to the appearances, by declaring that the mind is virtually independent of the brain.
  1 The zombie problem
  2 The Haunted problem II 38
McGinnVsDualism: seperates the mind to radically from the brain. So as if the mind could go about its business without assistance of the brain machine .
He s right that the brain, just as we presently understand it, can not explain the mind - he is wrong when he concludes that no brain property can do this. II 42
Mind / brain / McGinn: the spirit is manifest in a causal relation to the brain, as difficult as this may be to believe. Why should that be so, if the existence of consciousness depends on God (VsDescartes).
Theism / McGinn: the theistic dualism exaggerates the gap between mind and brain. II 106
Def Hyper Dualism / McGinn: assumed in the Big Bang there were two universes, a material and a parallel, which consisted only of consciousness. II 108 - II 110 McGinnVs Hyper dualism: Where is the fatal error? In the concept of causality. The mental universe is said to contain no matter and yet events and circumstances in this universe make things happen in the other universe. Thus, it is assumed that disembodied consciousness be able to influence the course of events. This raises two major questions:
  1st How can a disembodied consciousness be the cause of something?
  2nd How can the physical sequence of events be disturbed by anything in the material universe, which is going on in the other universe?

McG I
C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McG II
C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Dualism Ryle Vs Dualism
 
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Pauen V 82
Ryle/Pauen: it seems as if Ryle wanted to deny the existence of mental states, but this is a misunderstanding. He simply denies an autonomous mental substance.
V 84
RyleVsDualism: Category Error: falsely assumes that we can speak of mental processes in the same context as of physical processes. As if mind and brain differed like Library and Lecture Hall. Therefore, it is pointless to speak of "concurrent" mental and physical events.

Ryle I 226 ff
Dualism/RyleVsDualism/Ryle: life is not a double series of events that take place in two different kinds of matters. It's only a chain of events of various genres whose differences are mainly in that logically different types of statements of law and law-like statements are applicable to them.
I 228
We are not looking into a secret chamber. In reality, the problem is not of that kind. It is is rather about the methodological question of how we prove law-like statements about the silent demeanor of people and apply them. E.g. I find out that someone is a true master of chess by watching him. That a student is lazy by watching him for a longer while.
The question is not the frame question: "How do I discover that we have a soul?", but: a whole series of special questions of the form: how do I discover that I am more selfless than you, that I do poorly in dividing, but better at solving differential equations? That you are suffering from anxiety or easily overlook certain kinds of facts?
Apart from such purely dispositional questions, there is the whole range of execution and event questions of the form: how do I find out that I got the joke, but you did not? That your deed required more courage than mine?
I 229
Questions of this kind are not a mystery!
I 230
In short, it is part of the meaning of "he understands" that he could have done this and that and that he would have done it... and the test is a set of tasks. With a single success we would not entirely have been satisfied, but we were with twenty. (Whether a boy can divide).
Wittgenstein VII 147
Philosophy/Nonsense/Logical Grammar/Tetens: the thesis that philosophy is based on a misunderstanding of the "logical grammar" of language, can neither be found in Carnap nor in the Tractatus, but in Ryle in his criticism RyleVsDualismus, VsDescartes (Ryle 1969).

Ry I
G. Ryle
Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Epistemology Cavell Vs Epistemology
 
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Stroud I 259
Skeptizismus/CavellVsEpistemology, traditional: hier gibt es überhaupt keine konkreten Behauptungen von Wissen. Bsp aufgefordert werden sich vorzustellen, man säße am Kamin ist nicht dasselbe wie Bsp vorzustellen, wir hätten zu wissen behauptet, dass wir am Kamin sitzen.. Der Fall des Skeptizismus ist kein Behauptungs-Kontext Wissensanspruch/CavellVsDescartes: um sich vorzustellen, eine Wissensbehauptung wäre in Descartes’ Beispiel aufgestellt worden, müsste man sich einen Kontext vorstellen, in dem die Behauptung gemacht wurde. Dann braucht man zusätzliche Bedingungen für den Kontext.
Pointe: diese Bedingungen würden erst das Urteil in dem besonderen Fall möglich machen, und dieses wäre dann wiederum nicht auf andere Fälle übertragbar. Das (skeptische) Urteil wäre nicht repräsentativ.
CavellVsSkepticism/CavellVsEpistemology: Dilemma: es muss sich
a) um eine konkrete Behauptung handeln, wenn die Prozedur der Untersuchung überhaupt kohärent sein soll, aber wenn sie konkret ist, kann sie nicht allgemein sein.
b) Ohne die Allgemeinheit kann sie nicht skeptisch sein.

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002
Evans, G. Davidson Vs Evans, G.
 
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I 20 ff
Gareth Evans: Demonstrative identification is the only possible psychological relationship that provides "fundamental identification" (> ostensive definition).  If someone thinks they are thinking a thought with singular reference, while they are actually using a name with no reference (unicorn?), no proposition is given for them to think about, and consequently there is no thought for them to think in the first place. If they use a sentence that contains a name with no reference, they express no thoughts at all.
DavidsonVsEvans: Cartesian pursuit of knowledge, which is guaranteed to be immune against failures. If it is assumed that all knowledge is given by a mental connection with the object, objects must be found in respect to which errors are impossible. As objects that are necessarily what they seem to be.
DavidsonVsDescartes: there simply are no such items. Not even appearances are all that which they are thought to be! Even the aspects of the sense data can not be protect against misidentification, unless they are really objects.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Hume, D. Moore Vs Hume, D.
 
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I 104
Wissen/Existenzbeweis/Existenz/Hume/Stroud: zwei Prinzipien: 1. Niemand weiß von der Existenz von etwas, wenn er es nicht direkt wahrgenommen (apprehended, >Apprehension: ungeordnet) hat oder dass er weiß, dass etwas, was er direkt wahrgenommen hat, ein Zeichen der Existenz dieses Dings ist.
2. Niemand kann wissen, dass ein Ding ein Zeichen von etwas anderem ist, wenn er diese beiden Dinge (Ding und Zeichen) nicht
I 106
direkt wahrgenommen hat. (>Bekanntschaft). Moore: daraus folgt, dass man nicht von materiellen Dingen wissen kann, wenn sie nicht direkt wahrgenommen werden. Dazu brauchen wir Bewusstseinsakte, Sinnesdaten und direkt wahrgenommene Bilder.
StroudVsMoore: ich verstehe nicht, warum er das (MooreVsDescartes) akzeptiert. Ich verstehe auch nicht, wieso er die Konsequenzen der Sinnesdaten-Theorie übersieht.
MooreVsHume: die beiden Prinzipien sind falsch: Bsp ich weiß, dass dieser Stift existiert, aber wenn Humes Prinzipien wahr wären, könnte ich das nicht. Daher sind sie, eins oder beide, falsch.
Moore/Stroud: akzeptiert, dass wenn man von Humes Position ausgeht, dann folgt, dass er nicht weiß, dass da ein Stift ist.
StroudVsMoore: beide Argumente sind gültig. Und sie haben eine gemeinsame Prämisse. Für Moore läuft die Frage, welche Konklusion man akzeptieren sollte darauf hinaus, ob es sicherer ist, dass er weiß, dass dies ein Stift ist oder sicherer, dass Humes Prinzipien wahr sind.
I 107
MooreVsHume: Bsp Stift: ist sogar das stärkste Argument um zu beweisen, dass seine Prinzipien falsch sind.
Kant, I. Descartes Vs Kant, I.
 
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Stroud I 131
Direct Perception/= Consciousness/Kant/Stroud: of things (of this kind) is then a sufficient proof of their reality! Stroud: thus we are in the everyday situation where the (Kant): "external perception ... provides the immediate proof of something real in space." (A 375).
DescartesVsKant: could say that Kant is not in a position to do so.
Stroud: it is not about which of the two gives the correct description of the situation.
KantVsDescartes: his description cannot be correct. But he does not simply give a competing alternative. Rather, he defines conditions for access to knowledge.
Kant, I. Stroud Vs Kant, I.
 
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I 145
Def Realität/real/(Kant: "was immer mit einer Wahrnehmung nach empirischen Gesetzen verbunden ist, ist real". (A 376).
I 146
StroudVsKant: aber er geht nicht ins Detail, wie wir Realität von Erscheinung in Einzelfällen unterscheiden können, wo die Frage auftauchen könnte.
I 159
Skeptizismus/transzendental/StroudVsKant: wiederlegt er den Skeptizismus wirklich mit seiner Transzendentalphilosophie? Ist sie eine bessere Antwort als andere? 1. Wir können seine Antwort nur verstehen, wenn wir seinen transzendentalen Ansatz verstehen und akzeptieren. Wir müssen dann auch seinen Idealismus akzeptieren.
I 160
Verstehen/Stroud: sollten wir am besten, wenn wir Menschen und ihr Verhalten beobachten (>Behaviorismus). Das wäre aber eine empirische Untersuchung. Es ginge um Sprache, Sprachverhalten und Spracherwerb.
StroudVsKant: wir verstehen sein Argument nur, wenn wir seinen Begriff des a priori-Wissens verstehen. Und diese Untersuchung setzt voraus, dass wir den transzendentalen Idealismus akzeptieren. Das scheint zirkulär! (Zirkel):
um den Idealismus wiederum zu verstehen, müssen wir die besondere Natur der Untersuchung verstehen, die den Idealismus transzendental macht.
I 161
2. StroudVsKant: (das wären sogar Kantische Gründe VsKant): nach Kant sind Gedanken nur möglich, wenn sie auf das angewendet werden, worauf Kategorien angewendet werden können. Aber das ist nur im Rahmen möglicher Erfahrungen möglich. Die Begriffe müssen eine empirische Anwendung haben können. ((s) Sie müssen also in der Empirie gelernt werden). StroudVsKant: wie ist’s dann möglich, dass wir überhaupt (transzendentale) Gedanken haben können, die nicht durch empirische Bedingungen bestimmt sind?
a) empirisch:
Bsp wenn Ausdrücke wie "direkt wahrnehmen" und "unabhängig von uns" im alltäglichen empirischen Gebrauch gegeben sind, dann sehen wir ((s) nach Kant!), dass
der Satz "Wir nehmen unabhängige Dinge direkt wahr" wahr ist. Empirisch verstanden heißt das einfach: Bsp ohne Spiegel oder Bildschirme.
b) transzendental: anderer Sprachgebrauch:
hier drückt der Satz "wir nehmen unabhängige Dinge direkt wahr" keine Wahrheit aus.
((s) Vorsicht, Stroud sagt nicht, dass er nach Kant falsch sei).
StroudVsKant: mit der transzendentalen Bedeutung entfernen wir uns also von der Alltagssprache.
KantVsStroud: würde erwidern, dass dieser Gebrauch für uns verständlich sein muss, sonst wäre Wissen über die Welt nicht möglich.
I 162
StroudVsKant: das führt zu zwei Problemen: 1. Angenommen, wir akzeptierten Kants Transzendentalismus:
Frage: warum wäre die Ablehnung des Idealismus auf transzendentaler Ebene attraktiver als ihn auf dem empirischen Ebene zu akzeptieren?
Warum lehnt Kant den empirischen Idealismus ab?
((s) "Bedingung"/empirisch/(s): eine Bedingung kann man nicht empirisch auffassen. Wohl aber ihr Erfülltsein > Tatsache . Einer Tatsache kann man aber nicht ansehen, dass sie etwas erfüllen soll.)
Lösung: einen entsprechenden Satz wahr machen. Dieser Satz muss aber zuerst geäußert werden).
StroudVsKant: wenn das Argument lautet, dass unser Wissen sonst auf die Dinge beschränkt wäre, von denen wir wissen, dass sie von uns abhängig sind, warum sollten wir dann "Zuflucht" suchen in der Sicht, dass unser Wissen auf Dinge beschränkt ist, die wir als (transzendental gesprochen) abhängig von uns erkannt haben.
Skeptizismus/StroudVsKant: ist gerade deswegen so schmerzlich, weil er kein Wissen von unabhängigen Dingen erlaubt. Warum sollte Kants Lösung weniger schmerzlich sein, bloß weil sie transzendental daherkommt?
Empirischer Idealismus/KantVsStroud: kann nicht wahr sein.
2. Frage nach der Stärke der Garantie, de Kants Transzendentalismus gibt:
Das entspricht der Frage, warum Kant den transzendentalen Realismus ablehnt.
KantVsTranscendental Realism: wäre keine korrekte Erklärung unseres Wissens, weil - wenn er wahr wäre - wir niemals von uns unabhängige Dinge direkt wahrnehmen könnten und daher niemals in Bezug auf ihre Existenz sicher sein könnten.
Damit gibt der transzendentale Realismus den Weg frei für den empirischen Idealismus, indem er die äußeren Dinge als etwas von den Sinnen getrenntes auffasst.
Problem: wir können uns dann unserer Repräsentationen bewusst sein, aber wir wissen nicht, ob ihnen auch etwas Existierendes entspricht!
StroudVsKant: er weist diese Einstellungen aus dem einzigen Grund zurück, aus dem transzendentale Erklärungen überhaupt zurückgewiesen werden können: dass sie keine Erklärung liefern, wie ist’s möglich, dass wir etwas wissen?
StroudVsKant: warum denkt er, dass der empirische Idealismus dem transzendentalen Realismus den Weg bereitet?
Wahrscheinlich weil er glaubt, dass die einzigen Dinge die wir direkt wahrnehmen können die Dinge sind, die von uns abhängig sind. Und das nimmt er nicht als empirische These an, sondern nur als transzendental verstanden.
Der Satz "alles was wir wahrnehmen ist abhängig von uns" ist wahr, wenn transzendental verstanden.
Kant/Stroud: wahrscheinlich nimmt er das an, weil er nicht versteht, wie Wahrnehmung möglich ist, ohne die Wahrnehmung einer "Repräsentation" oder etwas "in uns".
StroudVsKant: so erscheint hier die Thesis von der "epistemischen Priorität"
wieder:
I 164
Uns zwar von der empirischen auf die transzendentale Ebene verschoben. Wahrnehmung/Kant/Stroud: er kann direkte Wahrnehmung unabhängiger Dinge empirisch gesprochen nur akzeptieren, weil er sie nicht transzendental gesprochen akzeptiert.
StroudVsKant: wichtig: dass dies der einzige Punkt ist, den er ablehnt.
Kant: wenn wir äußere Dinge als Dinge an sich behandeln, ist es unmöglich zu verstehen, wie wir zu einem Wissen gelangen können.
StroudVsKant: Angenommen, Kant hätte recht, dass transzendentaler Realismus unser Wissen von äußeren Dingen unerklärt lässt.
Frage: warum soll das alleine hinreichend sein, unsere Theorie falsch zu machen, transzendental gesprochen? Könnte es nicht einfach transzendental wahr sein, dass die Dinge unwißbar sind?
Kant/Stroud: würde sagen, nein, so wie er "transzendental" versteht: transzendentales Wissen ist Teil der Erklärung unseres Wissens.
direkte Wahrnehmung/Kant: ist nur von abhängigen Dingen (Repräsentationen usw.) möglich.
Transzendentaler Realismus/Kant/Stroud: würde dann sagen müssen, dass es außerdem noch unabhängige Dinge gibt. Nämlich solche, die diesen Repräsentationen entsprechen. Aber dann wären wir gezwungen zu schließen, dass alle unsere Repräsentationen (Sinneserfahrungen) inadäquat wären, um die Realität dieser Dinge zu etablieren. (A 369). Die äußeren Dinge wären dann getrennt von den Dingen, die uns bewusst sind.
StroudVsKant: das einzige Problem des transzendentalen Realismus ist dann, dass er unsere Erklärung "wie ist Wissen möglich", verhindert.
I 165
Problem: dann gibt es keine unabhängige Weise, seine Wahrheit oder Falschheit festzustellen. Der einzige Test seiner Akzeptabilität ist, ob er eine Erklärung möglich macht. Transzendentale Ästhetik/transzendentaler Idealismus/Kant/Stroud: der transzendentale Idealismus ist in die transzendentale Ästhetik eingebunden: (A 378), und zwar unabhängig von diesen Konsequenzen.
StroudVsKant: aber er ist nicht anders als transzendental oder a priori eingebunden als a priori Bedingung einer Untersuchung der Bedingungen der Möglichkeit von Wissen. Und das ist die einzige Möglichkeit, wie eine transzendentale Theorie überhaupt begründet werden kann: dass sie die einzige mögliche Erklärung unseres synthetisch a priori möglichen Wissens in Geometrie und Arithmetik ist.
Skeptizismus/StroudVsKant: es gibt also keine unabhängige Möglichkeit, eine transzendentale Theorie zu begründen. ((s) als dass sie die einzige Erklärung für etwas anderes ist). Dann muss man fragen, ob der Skeptizismus damit überhaupt widerlegt ist.
I 166
Skeptizismus/StroudVsKant: es gibt mindestens zwei Weisen, in der eine Erklärung unseres Wissens von der äußeren Welt fehlschlagen kann: Wenn Skeptizismus wahr wäre; Kant beansprucht, das wenigstens empirisch gesprochen widerlegt zu haben, aber nur, indem er eine transzendentale Version derselben Beschreibung an die Stelle gesetzt hat.
Verstehen/StroudVsKant: wenn wir den Transzendentalismus (transzendentalen Gebrauch unserer Wörter) überhaupt verstehen, ist dieser Gebrauch nicht befriedigend. Er repräsentiert Wissen immer noch als beschränkt auf Dinge die ich als abhängig von mir verstehe.
Damit bin ich erneut ein Gefangener in meiner Subjektivität.
Transzendentaler Idealismus/StroudVsKant: ist dann letztlich schwer vom Skeptizismus zu unterscheiden.
D.h. nicht, dass er dasselbe wie empirischer Idealismus wäre, sondern er ist als Erklärung unbefriedigend, und zwar auf der empirischen Ebene!
I 167
Transzendentaler Idealismus/KantVsStroud/KantVsDescartes: Kant würde sagen: "ich verliere nichts, wenn ich ihn akzeptiere". Mein Wissen ist nicht beschränkt auf die Dinge, die empirisch von mit abhängig sind oder nur empirisch subjektiv sind. Ich bin theoretisch in der Lage, die beste Physik, Chemie und andere Wissenschaften zu liefern. Ich bin in einer besseren Position als Descartes.
StroudVsKant: aber dann ist all unser wissenschaftliches Wissen nach Kant immer noch subjektiv oder von unserer menschlichen Sensibilität abhängig.
I 168
Wissen/Erklärung/StroudVsKant: wir könnten aber auch auf eine andere Weise einer Erklärung entbehren: nicht weil der Skeptizismus wahr wäre (und damit nichts zu erklären wäre) , sondern weil die allgemeine philosophische Frage nicht schlüssig gestellt werden kann! (>Carnap, s.u.). Kant/Stroud: Pointe: plädiert in einer Weise für eine eingeschränkte ("deflationary") Sicht, die dieser Kritik entspricht. ((s) deflationär hier: nicht auf den umfassendsten Rahmen gerichtet, s.u.).
KantVsDescartes: wenn seine Frage kohärent gestellt werden könnte, wäre Skeptizismus die einzige Antwort. Daher ist die Frage illegitim.
StroudVsKant: dieser erklärt damit aber nicht, worüber Descartes besorgt war.

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Leibniz, G.W. Locke Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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II 190
Deutlichkeit/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: bei ihm an Benennbarkeit gebunden. Setzt die Möglichkeit eindeutiger Bezeichnung voraus.

Loc III
J. Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Leibniz, G.W. Stegmüller Vs Leibniz, G.W.
 
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Stegmüller IV 388
Kontingenz/Leibniz: jedes Ding ist kontingent, weshalb es nicht so wäre, wenn ein anderes Ding anders wäre. Alle Dinge sind kausal verbunden. Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit dieser Dinge, weshalb die Welt als Ganzes ebenfalls kontingent ist!
Welt/Leibniz: es mag durchaus sein, dass die Reihe der Ursachen unbegrenzt ist. Leibniz nimmt nicht notwendig einen zeitlichen Anfang an!
zureichender Grund/Leibniz: muss dann außerhalb der Welt liegen! Es muss etwas anderes sein als die Welt!
IV 389
Er muss ein notwendiges Wesen sein. VsLeibniz: 1. Woher wissen wir, dass alles einen zureichenden Grund braucht?
2. Kann es ein notwendiges Wesen geben, das einen zureichenden Grund in sich selbst hat?
Sollte die zweite Frage negativ beantwortet werden, hat die Gesamtheit keinen zureichenden Grund!
KantVsLeibniz: der kosmologische Beweis beruht implizit auf dem (widerlegten) ontologischen Beweis. (s.o. KantVsDescartes).
IV 390
Existenz/StegmüllerVsKant/StegmüllerVsFrege/StegmüllerVsQuine: die Auffassung, der Begriff der Existenz gehe vollständig im Existenzquantor auf, ist umstritten! Existenz/Kontingenz/StegmüllerVsLeibniz: wir könnten notwendige Existenz als Negation von Kontingenz auffassen.
Problem: 1. Die Prämisse, die Welt als ganzes sei kontingent (es würde nicht existieren, wenn etwas anderes anders gewesen wäre), müsste fallengelassen werden: Selbst wenn jeder Teil der Welt kontingent ist, spricht nichts für die Annahme, dass die Welt als ganze nicht existieren würde, wenn nicht (sic?) etwas anderes anders wäre oder gewesen wäre.
Der Schluss von der Kontingenz jeden Teils auf die Kontingenz des Ganzen ist unzulässig.
2. Alternative: Kontingenz: etwas sei kontingent, wenn es auch nicht existieren könnte.
IV 392
Das muss man mit der obigen Bemerkung kombinieren, dass es nicht logisch unmöglich wäre, dass das behauptete notwendige Wesen auch nicht existieren könnte. Das aber ist unverständlich. zureichender Grund/VsLeibniz: (ad (i)): Woher wissen wir, dass alles einen zureichenden Grund haben muss? Bisher hat niemand eine Notwendigkeit a priori dafür zu zeigen vermocht. Das hätte auch keine Plausibilität:
1. Es ist richtig, dass wir immer nach Symmetrien suchen, aber es gibt keine Garantie, dass wir sie immer finden.
2. Wir halten uns immer innerhalb unserer Welt auf, Extrapolationen sind unzulässig!
Selbst wenn nun alles innerhalb der Welt einen zureichenden Grund hätte, hätten wir kein Recht, auf einen zureichend Grund außerhalb der Welt zu schließen.
Verbreitetes Argument: die Dinge müssen durch und durch verstehbar sein.
MackieVs: das stimmt überhaupt nicht!
IV 393
Wir haben keinen Grund anzunehmen, dass sich das Universum nach unseren intellektuellen Bedürfnissen richtet.

Ca V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Quine, W.V.O. Stroud Vs Quine, W.V.O.
 
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I 183
Intern/extern/Carnap/StroudVsQuine: in Carnaps Unterscheidung muss noch etwas anderes geben. Dass sie als interne Frage beantwortbar ist, als (gleichlautende) externe jedoch nicht, zeigt, dass die beiden nicht verwechselt werden dürfen. Sprache/Carnap/Stroud: daher unterscheidet Carnap verschiedene "Sprachen" oder "Systeme". Diese beantworten jeweils nur interne Fragen.
Ausdruckskraft: dass eine "philosophische" (externe) Frage dann sinnlos ist, liegt nicht bloß an der Terminologie.
I 184
Die Terminologie ist jeweils bedeutungsvoll. Bsp innerhalb der Mathematik ist "Es gibt Zahlen" sinnvoll.
I 223
Wissen/Skeptizismus/Quine: wenn alles Wissen zugleich auf dem Prüfstand steht, kann man sich auf keinen Teil des Wissens berufen. ((s) > Bsp "Alles was er sagte ist wahr"). Empirie/Wissen/Lösung/Quine: das ist der Grund, warum Wissen auf Basis der Sinneserfahrung gerechtfertigt werden muss.
Psychologie/Wissen/Erklärung/Rechtfertigung/Quine: eine Preisgabe der Erkenntnistheorie an die Psychologie führt zur Zirkularität. ((s) Weil die Psychologie selbst über das bloße Feststellen von Reizen hinausgeht).
StroudVsQuine/StroudVsNaturalised Epistemology: ist genauso eine Preisgabe der Erkenntnistheorie an die Psychologie. Und damit genauso zirkulkär!
Erkenntnistheorie/Stroud: kann es sein, dass damit wohl die traditionelle Erkenntnistheorie widerlegt ist, nicht aber Quines naturalisierte Erkenntnistheorie selbst? Liegt die Lösung in der Relation zwischen beiden?
Quine: legt manchmal nahe, dass die beiden Standpunkte (naturalisierteVstraditionelle Erkenntnistheorie) sich unterscheiden: die "doktrinäre" Frage sollte als falsche Hoffnung ad acta gelegt werden.
Bewusstsein/Kenntnis/Tradition/Erkenntnistheorie/Rechtfertigung/Stroud: die traditionelle Erkenntnistheorie insistiert auf einer Isolation gewisser Objekte des Bewusstseins, um unzweifelhafte Information zu identifizieren.
Bewusstsein/QuineVsTradition: wir können die Frage des Bewusstseins umgehen und einfach versuchen zu erklären,
I 224
wie unser reichhaltiger Output aus den Ereignissen entsteht, die an unserer sensorischen Oberfläche (Nervenenden) geschehen. Pointe: das kann man wissenschaftlich angehen.
Dann kann man zwei Arten von Ereignissen in der beobachtbaren physikalischen Welt unterscheiden, und das ist dann das wissenschaftliche Ziel.
StroudVsQuine: das sieht nun so aus, als hätte Quine nur das Thema gewechselt. Skeptizismus droht dann noch immer. Und das will Quine nicht.
„befreite“ Erkenntnistheorie/Quine: (Wurzeln der Referenz, 3): ist nicht dasselbe wie empirische Psychologie, es ist eher ein "erleuchtetes Fortbestehen" (enlightened, "Erleuchtung") des traditionellen epistemischen Problems.
Empirie/Wissen/Rechtfertigung/Begründung/Zirkel/Quine: (s.o.) Tradition: unser Wissen kann nicht empirisch gerechtfertigt werden, weil sonst zirkulär.
QuineVsTradition: diese Angst vor Zirkularität ist unnötige logische Schüchternheit.
„Erleuchtung“/“befreite“ Erkenntnistheorie/Quine: die Einsicht in die Tatsache, dass der Skeptizismus aus der Wissenschaft selbst entspringt. Und um ihn zu bekämpfen sind wir berechtigt, wissenschaftliches Wissen einzubringen.
QuineVsTradition: hat die Stärke ihrer Position gar nicht erkannt.
I 225
Wissen/Skeptizismus/QuineVsTradition: die traditionelle Erkenntnistheorie hat nicht erkannt, dass die Herausforderung des Wissens aus dem Wissen selbst heraus entstand. These: die Zweifel an seiner Verlässlichkeit waren immer wissenschaftliche Zweifel. Bewusstsein/Quine: die Verwirrung beruhte auf der Konzentration auf das Bewusstsein.
Introspection/Tradition: dachte, Fakten über unseren "mageren" Input würden durch Introspektion ans Licht gebracht.
QuineVsIntrospection: die Gründe dafür, den Input mager zu finden, kommen aus der Wissenschaft.
I 227
Täuschung/Skeptizismus/QuineVsTradition: der Begriff der Illusion beruht selbst auf der Wissenschaft, denn die Qualität der Täuschung besteht einfach in dem Abweichen von externer wissenschaftlicher Realität. (Quine, Roots of reference, RR 3) Illusionen gibt es nur relativ zu einer vorher akzeptierten Annahme echter Körper.
Gegebenes/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: das kann der Grund sein, ein unverbindliches Gegebenes anzunehmen. (SellarsVsQuine).
QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: Pointe: dann könnte es so scheinen, dass es unmöglich ist, sich auf die Möglichkeit der Täuschung zu berufen, weil ein gewisses Wissen über die äußere Realität notwendig ist, um den Begriff der Illusion zu verstehen!
Stroud: wir haben Argumente dieser Form schon früher behandelt (s.o. >Verzerrung der Bedeutung). Verletzung der notwendigen Bedingungen für die Anwendung gewisser Begriffe.
Quine/Stroud: ihm könnte man jetzt analog zu StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin antworten, aber Quine macht diese Fehler nicht.
Sprache/Skeptizismus/Quine/Stroud: sein Ansatz in Bezug auf die Sprache (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) lässt ihm keine Möglichkeit, sich auf das zu berufen, was in der Bedeutung eines bestimmten Terms liegt.
StroudVsQuine: aber, wenn er denkt, dass die wissenschaftlichen Ursprünge nicht zum Skeptizismus führen, warum denkt er, dass weil die "skeptischen Zweifel wissenschaftliche Zweifel" sind,
I 228
der Erkenntnistheoretiker "klarerweise" berechtigt ist, empirische Wissenschaft einzusetzen? Die Frage wird noch schwieriger durch Quines explizite Leugnung, dass:
Skeptizismus/Quine: ich sage nicht, dass er die Frage unbeantwortet lässt, er hat Recht darin, Wissenschaft zu bemühen, um Wissenschaft zurückzuweisen. Ich sage eben bloß, dass skeptische Zweifel wissenschaftliche Zweifel sind.
TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: das ist wichtig für die Verteidigung des traditionellen Erkenntnistheoretikers: wenn es kein logischer Fehler ist, Zweifel aus der Wissenschaft selbst heraus letztlich zu widerlegen, so dass am Ende Gewissheit steht, was ist denn dann noch der entscheidende logische Punkt, den er verfehlt hat?
StroudVsQuine: wenn sein "einziger Punkt" ist, dass skeptische Zweifel wissenschaftliche Zweifel sind, dann wird Erkenntnistheorie ein Teil der Naturwissenschaft.
SkeptizismusVsQuine/Stroud: aber der Skeptiker könnte mit einer "reductio ad absurdum" antworten, und dann wäre Erkenntnistheorie nicht mehr Teil der Wissenschaft:
"reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: entweder
a) Wissenschaft ist wahr und gibt uns Wissen oder
b) Sie ist nicht wahr und gibt uns kein Wissen. Nichts was wir über die äußere Welt glauben, ist Wissen.
I 230
Moore/Stroud: auch Moore soll damit nicht verleumdet werden. Nach Kant und Carnap ist es völlig legitim was er sagt. Skeptizismus/StroudVsQuine: Pointe: die Ergebnisse einer unabhängig durchgeführten wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung wären im selben Boot wie Bsp Moores Hände. Sie wären "wissenschaftliche" Versionen von Moores Argument mit dem Common Sense.

Philosophie/Wissenschaft/Quine: beide gehen kontinuierlich in einander über.
Stroud: damit könnten sich Descartes und andere traditionellen Philosophen einverstanden erklären.
StroudVsQuine: Problem: dann haben wir eben vielleicht auch gar kein wissenschaftliches Wissen. Wir haben nicht mehr Grund daran zu glauben, wie nicht daran zu glauben. Keine wissenschaftliche Untersuchung könnte hier Klarheit verschaffen.
I 231
Es wäre auch keine Herausforderung "von innen" denkbar. Also würde der Skeptizismus folgen.
I 233
Skeptizismus/StroudVsQuine: aber ob er korrekt ist oder nicht, ist nichts, was durch zukünftige Erfahrung oder durch Experimente entschieden wird! Wenn die erkenntnistheoretische Frage richtig gestellt sie - so wie Quine sie stellt – dann wissen wir schon jetzt, wie zukünftige Erfahrung geartet sein wird! Wir werden immer mit der Frage nach dem Überschuss unseres reichhaltigen Outputs über den mageren Input konfrontiert sein. Sicher, wenn wir heute mit einer Erfahrung konfrontiert werden, die unseren Glauben unterminiert, wird der Skeptizismus heute gerechtfertigt. Aber: Pointe: genauso war er schon 1630 gerechtfertigt!
I 234
Naturalismus/StroudVsQuine: wird nicht genug sein, wenn der Skeptizismus mit der reductio ad absurdum argumentiert. Wir müssen eben das Schiff auf hoher See umbauen. Der traditionelle Erkenntnistheoretiker kann das Stück aus dem Schiff heraussägen (identifizieren!), das den mageren Input repräsentiert.
I 240
Wissen/StroudVsQuine: selbst wenn ich den „mageren „Input dafür verantwortlich machte, dass er eine "Projektion" angenommen hat, wäre das keine Erklärung seines Wissens oder wahren Glaubens.
I 245
Wissen/Wissenstheorie/Erklärung/Projektion/StroudVsQuine: Angenommen, ich nehme mit Quine an, dass alle meine Glaubenseinstellungen nur "überfließender Output aus magerem Input" (also Projektion) sei, dann heißt das nicht, dass ich nicht denken könnte, dass ich wahre Glaubenseinstellungen habe, in dem Sinn, dass es nichts gibt, was meinen Glauben davon abhalten könnte, wahr zu sein. Problem: selbst wenn sie alle wahr wären, wäre ich nicht in der Position erklären zu können, oder auch zu verstehen, wie eine Wissenstheorie sie erklären und verstehen sollte. Ich kann nicht erklären, wie mein ((s) zufällig) wahrer Glauben zum Wissen beiträgt.

Strd I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Representation Brandom Vs Representation
 
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I40
VsRepresentations: here the mind is treated as an unexplained explainer. (Descartes).
I125
BrandomVsRepresentation: very problematic: if it is understood as a term, it should make the grammatical difference between singular terms and sentences understandable through reference to the ontological difference between objects and facts. But it does not follow that it is possible to introduce the category of facts as what is in the same sense represented by and that-sentences. I 126 an ontological category of facts cannot be made understandable primarily and regardless of explaining the declarative sentences. Representation is not expression!
I 132
Rebecca West: VsRepresentation: "Mind as a mirror of nature": we do not need an image of the world, "one copy of these damn things is enough."
I 292
Belief: can be ambiguous: one can be convinced of something wrong. The distinction often refers to the objectivity of representations (BrandomVsRepresentationalism, instead social practice as a guarantee of objectivity.)
I 404
BrandomVsRepresentationalism: four aspects: 1) in addition to "true", representations need "refers to" and "means". (Later Frege)
I 405
2) distinction between intensional and extensional contexts. 3) the "of" in de-re attributions. The concept of intentional relatedness: something is true of Kant, but not of Hegel.
4) concept of objective representational accuracy of judgment and reasoning. Can be justified by direct observation, inferential determinations or reference to certificates.
I 412
BrandomVsRepresentation: instead expressive role.
I 690
Brandom pro representationalism: contains the indisputable insight: whatever has a propositional content, necessarily has a representational side. The objection only applies to treating the representation as fundamental.
II 69
Content/Representation/BrandomVsDescartes: possession of representational content as unexplained explainer.
Rorty VI 181
BrandomVsRepräsentation/Rorty: statt dessen: "richtige inferentielle Verbindungen zwischen Behauptungen herstellen". Wenn es uns gelungen ist, ein logisches und semantisches Vokabular zu verwenden, brauchen wir nicht zusätzlich zu erklären, wie sie an ihre "psychischen Kräfte" gekommen sind.
Repräsentation/McDowellVsBrandom: Repräsentation kann nicht anhand des Folgerungsbegriffs rekonstruiert werden. "Inferentialistische" Erklärungen der Begriffe funktionieren nicht.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Skepticism Austin Vs Skepticism
 
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Stroud I 48
Dream/AustinVsSkepticism/AustinVsDescartes: it is about the strong thesis of Descartes that we cannot know if we are not dreaming. Without them, skepticism would be disarmed. Austin major thesis
Method/everyday language/AustinVsDescartes: Can it be shown ((s) > manifestation) that Descartes violates the normal standards or conditions for knowledge with his strong thesis?
Stroud: we have already seen it that it seems like this. (In terms of our everyday life and science).
---
I 49
For example, no one asks whether the other is not dreaming when he points to a goldfinch, or e.g. in court, if the witness does not dream. But even in very important cases the dream possibility is not allowed in the discussion as a relevant alternative.
---
I 50
Knowledge/Austin: is only questioned in special cases. ---
I 51
Only then certain alternatives are relevant. Austin: typical e.g. external psychological. And again, there are (more or less) established procedures.
Error/Deception/Austin: Thesis: "You cannot always deceive all people".
Austin/Stroud: his demand for specific reasons for doubt related to e.g. suspected deception are not the same as the above requirement that there must always be a "special basis" for the question, e.g. "is it really a goldfinch?".
E.g. Goldfinch: this is all about the question of whether there are certain reasons to assume something else.
This can also be the case, for example, when we quote authorities.
Reliability/everyday language/Austin: it is fundamental for our speech that we are entitled to trust others, unless there is a concrete reason against it.
Knowledge/Stroud: excludes error or mistake.
Austin: dito: "If you know something, you cannot be wrong": this is perfectly fine.
John L. Austin
I Austin Wahrheit in: Wahrheitstheorien Hrsg. Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M 1996
II Jörgen Husted "Austin" aus :Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhhundert, Reinbek 1993
III Austin: "Ein Plädoyer für Entschuldigungen" aus: Linguistik und Philosophie (Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg)) Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974/1995
Skepticism Kant Vs Skepticism
 
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Stroud I 129
Skepticism/knowledge/KantVsDescartes: The relation between the philosophical question and our everyday or scientific knowledge is more indirect and complex than he thought. ((s) (see below): But for Kant the perception of external things is very direct). Descartes/Stroud: for him the skepticism is inevitable!
Kant: would agree. That is why he developed another concept.
"Scandal"/Kant: that a theory has never been developed in the history of philosophy that avoids skepticism.
Knowledge/theory/Kant/Stroud: there are conditions to be met by any theory of knowledge: the theory must not be deny that there are external things. Suppose there were no external world, then Descartes’ skepticism would loose its sting! Then there would be no limit to my knowledge that I know nothing about the things except me, because there would be nothing after all.
I 130
Def problematic idealism/Kant/Stroud: Thesis: that the world which is independent from us is unknowable. Or that the world is dubious or not reliable as other things that we know. That makes everything problematic. (B 274) KantVsIdealism: misinterprets our actual situation in the world.
Knowledge/Kant/Stroud: whoever reads the proof, must know at the end that the example is a goldfinch or actually three typographical errors.
Stroud: these are not really high standards. It seems that every access to knowledge needs to meet this standard.
Problem: virtually no philosophical theory satisfies this condition!
KantVsDescartes: (end of the 1. Meditation) does not meet this condition.
KantVsSkepticism: therefore, any inferential approach must be avoided to avoid it.
World/reality/Kant: the external things which we know need to have a "reality"((s) a particular property?) which does not allow to be inferred . (A 371). ((s) Kant here similar to Hume: direct perception of things)).
immediate perception/= Awareness/Kant/Stroud: there is then a sufficient proof of the things’ (of this kind)reality! ((s)> proof of existence). (A 371).
Stroud: so that we are in a daily situation where the (Kant), "external perception [provides] ... the direct evidence of something real in space". (A 375).
DescartesVsKant: could say that Kant is actually not capable.
Stroud: But this is not a matter which one of both gives the correct description of the situation.
KantVsDescartes: its description cannot be correct. But he is not just giving a competing alternative. He rather gives conditions for the access to knowledge.
I 132
At least such theories must take account of the traditional skepticism. E.g. if Descartes was right, we could not know anything about the outside world. That is the reason why Kant does not allow to infer knowledge of external things. Otherwise, skepticism is inevitable.
Stroud: So it requires precisely the kind of knowledge that Moore gives!
I 140
Def "Epistemic Priority"/terminology/Stroud: you could call Descartes’ thesis that sensory experience, perception, representations (which Descartes calls Ideas’) are epistemically placed before the perceived objects.
I 141
Stroud: that means that epistemically subordinated things cannot be known without epistemically antecedent things being known. And not the other way around. That means that the latter are less knowable, so the outer world is less knowable than our sensory experiences. KantVsDescartes/KantVsEpistemic priority: this view needs to be rejected since it cannot explain how knowledge is actually possible!
Perception/KantVsDescartes: we perceive things directly, without conclusion.
Stroud: we understand Kant only when we understand Descartes.
Realism/KantVsSkepticism/KantVsDescartes: these considerations which involve him are those which lead to the epistemic priority (priority of sensations (or "ideas") before the objects).
I 142
We need to understand this in order to understand Kant’s version of realism. (VsMoores simple realism). That means the realism which explains how it is possible that we know something of the world? (Conditions of the possibility of knowledge).
I 146
Knowledge/KantVsSkeptizismus/Stroud: when external perception (experience) is the condition for inner experience, and when external experience is immediate then we can know (in general) that there is an external reality which corresponds to our sensory experiences (sensations).
I 147
Then there may be deception in individual cases, but no general skeptical questioning. KantVsSkeptizismus/KantVsDescartes: cannot be extended to all, it can only appear in individual cases.
Perception/KantVsDescartes: N.B. if one could assume the skepticism at any rate, one would have to assume that our perception has come about not directly but indirectly, inferentially (via conclusion).
KantVsDescartes: this does not go far enough and relies too heavily on the "testimonies" of our everyday expressions.
I 148
Descartes should have examined the conditions that actually make experience possible. KantVsSkepticism: even the "inner experience" of Descartes are possible only if he firstly has outer experiences. Therefore, the skeptical conclusion violates the conditions of experience in general. Descartes position itself is impossible:
no examination of our knowledge could show that we always perceive something other than the independent objects, which we believe exist around us.
Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: Kant accepts at least the conditional force ((s)e.g. the premises) of the traditional skepticism.
KantVsDescates: But he rejects the skeptical conclusion: they contradict every adequate philosophical theory of knowledge.
Solution/Kant: what we know touches the phenomena.
KantVsSkepticism/Stroud: The antecedent of the skeptical conclusion can only be true if the consequent is false.
Knowledge/world/KantVsMoore/Stroud: Thus, he has a different understanding of the relationship between philosophical study of knowledge and the knowledge in daily life.
I 159
Science/reality/everyday/knowledge/KantVsDescartes/Stroud: our everyday and scientific knowledge is invulnerable to skepticism. KantVsMoore: But there is no conclusion of our perceptions of knowledge about unrelated things.

I 168
Knowledge/explanation/StroudVsKant: But we could not need an explanation: not because skepticism were true (and therefore there would be nothing that could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be provided conclusively! (> Carnap, S.U.). Kant/Stroud: Important argument: advocates in a manner for a limited ("deflationary") perspective, which corresponds to this criticism. ((s) "deflationary": here: not directed at the most comprehensive framework).
KantVsDescartes: when his question could be provided coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate.
StroudVsKant: this does then not explain what Descartes was concerned about.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03
Spinoza, B. Strawson Vs Spinoza, B.
 
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Rorty I 28
Wittgenstein/Strawson/Rorty: thesis: there is nothing but the human body, VsDescartes: Vs splitting in res cogitans and res extensa. Aspect/VsSpinoza: "Two aspects". That is okay as long as you do not ask: "Are organisms something physical?"


Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Tradition Externalism Vs Tradition
 
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Frank I 676
Geist/Tradition/Descartes: eine Bühne auf der "Erscheinungen, Sinnesdaten und Qualia vorbeiziehen". Was da erscheint, sind nicht die gewöhnlichen Objekte, sondern ihre angeblichen Vertreter. Und das Herz soll diese Vertreter lieben.
DavidsonVs: Problem: 1. wie ist es dann möglich, sich einen Weg nach außen zu bahnen?
2. wie kann sich das Selbst in diesem Bild unterbringen? Denn es scheint auf der einen Seite alles zu umfassen, Theater, Bühne, Schauspieler und Publikum, auf der anderen Seite wird das, was gewusst und registriert wird, allein vom Publikum gewusst und registriert.
Problem der Lokalisierung: sind die Objekte im Geist, oder werden sie von ihm betrachtet?
Davidson: diese Objekte interessieren mich hier nicht, sondern ihre urteilsartigen Vettern: Propositionen, partikulare Vorkommnisse von Propositionen, Repräsentationen oder Fragmente des "Mentalesischen": der Geist "faßt" sie nicht, er ist auch nicht "mit ihnen bekannt" oder "hat sie vor Augen".
I 676/677
ExternalismusVsTradition/ExternalismusVsDescartes: korrigiert dieses Bild: wenn externe Faktoren beteiligt sind, dann muss all das, was bestimmen hilft, um was für ein Objekt es sich handelt, gleicherweise vom Geist erfaßt werden, wenn der Geist wissen soll, in welchem Zustand er ist.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Various Authors Kanitscheider Vs Various Authors
 
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Kanitscheider I 433
Unendlichkeit/materielle Existenz/Physik: einige Modelle verlangen physikalische Unendlichkeit: die hyperbolische Welt der Allgemeine Relativitätstheorie (AR), die Steady Astate theory (SST). Unendlichkeit/Mathematik/Physik:
Gauß: skeptisch gegenüber aktual unendlichen Größen.
LucretiusVsArchimedes: Unendlichkeit bloße Möglichkeit eines Objektes, neue Raumzeitpunkte zu durchlaufen? (Bis heute Diskussion).
Bolzano: die objektive Existenz unendlicher Mengen kann nicht an der Unmöglichkeit scheitern, sich jedes einzelne Objekt vorzustellen.
I 434
NewtonVsDescartes: nicht "unbestimmter" sondern aktual unendlicher Raum! KantVsNewton: Unendliches unvorstellbar!
NewtonVsKant: nicht vorstellbar, aber begrifflich erfassbar!
Riemann: Unterscheidung unendlich/unbegrenzt (neu!). Lösung für das Problem des "Jenseits des Raums". Dreierkugel (S³) begrifflich analytisch problemlos handhabbar.
I 435
Mengen/unendlich: hier ist der Satz: "Das Ganze ist größer als die Teile" nicht mehr anwendbar. (Aber extensionale Bestimmung auch nicht nötig, intensionale reicht). Raum: Frage: kann ein offener unendlicher Raum mehr als Aleph0 Objekte endlicher Größe enthalten?
Lösung: "dichteste Packung" räumlich konvexer Zellen: diese Menge kann nicht größer als abzählbar sein. Damit kein a priori-Hindernis dafür, dass die Zahl der Galaxien in einem unbegrenzten Riemann Raum von nichtendlichem Volumen die kleinste transfinite Kardinalzahl ist.

II 102
Messung/Bewusstsein/Beobachter/Quantenmechanik/QM: psychologistische Interpretation: Fritz London und Edmund Bauer, 1939. >New Age Bewegung.
II 103
These: der Beobachter konstituiert durch sein Bewusstsein die neue physikalische Objektivität, nämlich die Drehung des Vektors im Hilbertraum. 1. KanitscheiderVsBauer: Problem: dann ist überhaupt kein definitiver Einzelzustand der Materie ohne den Eingriff einer Psyche vorhanden.
2. KanitscheiderVsBauer: einerseits wird das Bewusstsein in die quantenmechanischen Gesetze einbezogen andererseits soll es im Innern des Beobachters wieder Sondereigenschaften besitzen, nämlich jene, die das kombinierte System von Objekt, Apparat und Beobachter ohne äußeren Anstoß aus dem hybriden Überlagerungszustand in den Einzelzustand überführt, in dem die Teilelemente entkoppelt sind.
3. KanitscheiderVsBauer: merkwürdig, dass die Schrödinger-Gleichung, das grundlegendste Gesetz der QM damit nicht auf das Bewusstsein anwendbar sein soll.
4. KanitscheiderVsBauer: außerdem Zweifel, ob das Bewusstsein wirklich im Überlagerungszustand von verschiedenen völlig gleichwertigen Seelenlagen sein kann.
(Bauer hatte seine These von Erich Bechers interaktionalistischen Leib Seele Dualismus übernommen II 104).

I 423
Raumkrümmung/Empirische Messung/Schwarzschild/Kanitscheider: Schwarzschild: Verzerrung des Dreiecks, das durch die Erdbahnparallaxe gebildet wird. Obwohl die Krümmungsfaktoren nicht bekannt sind, kann man schließen, dass wenn der Raum hyperbolisch ist, (K < 0), die Parallaxe der sehr fernen Sterne positiv sein muss.
I 424
Beobachtet man nun Sterne mit verschwindender Parallaxe, dann liefert die Messgenauigkeit eine obere Grenze für den Wert negativer Krümmung. Wenn der Raum sphärisch ist - die Parallaxe negativ sein
Schwarzschild: beim hyperbolischen Fall müsste der Krümmungsradius mindestens 64 Lichtjahre,
im elliptischen mindestens 1600 Lichtjahre betragen.
KanitscheiderVsSchwarzschild: solche theorieunabhängigen Versuche gelten heute mit Recht als aussichtslos.

I 296
Zeitreisen/Kanitscheider: VsZeitmaschine/VsWells: H.G.Wells macht den Fehler, dass er den Reisenden auf dem gleichen irdischen Raumpunkt die Weltlinie der Erde auf- und absteigen lässt. Genau dies führt zur begrifflichen Unmöglichkeit von Vorwärts und Rückwärtsbewegung in der Zeit. Zeitreisen/AR/Kanitscheider: das ändert sich, wenn Materie ins Spiel kommt.

Kan I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kan II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Positivism Pro Bezzel Wittgenstein (where?)
HabermasVsWittgenstein: Wttg. positivist.
  WittgensteinVsDescartes: "Game of doubt already presupposes certainty.
  WittgensteinVs: behaviorism, metaphysics, ostensive definition, "second-order language," progressive thinking of natural science, (western philosophy)
Skepticism Versus Bezzel Wittgenstein (where?)
  WittgensteinVsDescartes: "Game of doubt already presupposes certainty.
  WittgensteinVs: behaviorism, metaphysics, ostensive definition, "second-order language," progressive thinking of natural science, (western philosophy)
Positivism Versus Bezzel Wittgenstein
: HabermasVsWittgenstein: W. Positivist.
WittgensteinVsDescartes: "Spiel des Zweifels setzt schon Gewißheit voraus.
WittgensteinVs: Behaviorismus, Metaphysik, hinweisende Erklärung, "Sprache zweiter Ordnung", Fortschrittsdenken der Naturwissenschaft,(westlich)
eliminat. Materialism Pro Frank I 578
Rorty per eliminative materialism: is linked to Feyerabend - RortyVsKant, RortyVsDescartes
Fra I 584
Foucault: man disappears, Rorty: the mental disappears).

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Inferentialism Versus Vollmer I 17
Descartes: knowledge purely inferential possible - LockeVsDescartes: Thesis: "there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses" - Locke: tabula rasa mind LockeVsInnate Ideas - LeibnizVsLocke: LeibnizVsTabula Rasa - the mind already brings some characteristics with (Aristotle ditto) - I 24 Kant: everyone already brings with finished structures.

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Inferentialism Pro Vollmer I 17
Descartes: knowledge purely inferential possible - LockeVsDescartes: Thesis: "there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses" - Locke: tabula rasa mind LockeVsInnate Ideas - LeibnizVsLocke: VsTabula rasa - the mind already brings some characteristics with (Aristotle ditto) - I 24 Kant: everyone already brings with him finished structures.

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Vs Skepticism Austin, J.L.
 
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Stroud I 42
AustinVsSkeptizismus/AustinVsDescartes/Stroud: (Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, 1962, 4-5) an die Quelle von Descartes skeptischer Konklusion gelangt man durch die Aufdeckung einer Reihe von Mißverständnissen und (vor allem verbaler) Irrtümer und Fehlschlüsse.
I 44
Wissen/Philosophie/Alltag/Austin/Stroud: (Austin Other Minds, (Phil.Papers) 1961,45) These die typische philosophische Untersuchung weicht von unserer normalen (Alltags-) Praxis ab.
I 45
Austin These: "genug ist genug": d.h. es muß nicht alles gesagt werden. Es muß nicht immer bewiesen werden, Bsp daß dieser Goldfink kein ausgestopfter Vogel ist. (OM 52).
I 48
Traum/AustinVsSkeptizismus/AustinVsDescartes: es geht um die starke These von Descartes, daß wir nicht wissen können, ob wir nicht träumen. Ohne sie wäre der Skeptizismus entwaffnet. Austin Kernthese
Methode/Alltagssprache/AustinVsDescartes: kann es gezeigt werden ((s) >Manifestation), daß Descartes mit seiner starken These die normalen Standards oder Bedingungen für Wissen verletzt?
I 51
Irrtum/Täuschung/Austin: These -ždu kannst nicht alle Leute immer täuschen-œ.
I 64
StroudVsAustin: der Vorwurf AustinVsSkeptizismus (AustinVsDescartes), daß die Bedeutung von -žWissen-œ im Alltagsgebrauch verzerrt worden wäre, kann nur erhoben werden, wenn gezeigt werden kann, daß ein bestimmter Sprachgebrauch, ein bestimmter Begriff und die Relation zwischen ihnen falsch aufgefaßt wurde. Stroud: das ist es was ich damit meinte, daß die Quelle von Descartes Forderung etwas Tiefes und Wichtiges zum Vorschein bringt.
I 76
Stroud: das führt uns auf die Tiefe und Wichtigkeit des Skeptizismus. Es geht um viel mehr als darum zu entscheiden, ob man etwas über die Welt um einen herum weiß, es geht um unsere Praxis (Handlungen) und Reflexion unseres Wissens (Selbst-Wissen). Können wir hier eine distanzierte Position einnehmen?
I 82
Skeptizismus/Quelle/Stroud: These die Quelle des philosophischen Problems der Außenwelt liegt irgendwo in unserem Begriff einer objektiven Welt oder unserem Wunsch, nach einem Verstehen unserer Relation zur Welt.
Sketpicism Cavell, St.
 
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Stroud I 257
Def -žBasis-œ/Terminologie/Cavell/Stroud: ist ein Satz, der einen speziellen Anspruch vorbringt Basis/Terminologie/CavellVs: These im Fall von Descartes ist die Basis nicht völlig natürlich eingeführt. Das ist der Schlüssel zur Diagnose.
CavellVsSkeptizismus: These -žder Skeptiker tut nicht, was er zu tun glaubt-œ. D.h. aber nicht, daß er die Bedeutungen der verwendeten Begriffe verzerrt. ((s.o. AustinVsMoore).
I 258 Pointe: hier geht es gerade darum, daß die Weise, etwas zu sagen, wesentlich dafür ist, was gemeint ist (CR, 208)
I 258 Gebrauchstheorie/Cavell: These geht von Einzelsituationen aus.
I 258f Skeptizismus/CavellVsSkeptizismus: der Skeptiker tut nicht, was er zu tun glaubt -" er sagt nichts! -" dann kann er auch nichts meinen -" traditionelle Erkenntnistheorie: sagt erstaunlich wenig -" behauptet kein Wissen! - Def Basis/Cavell: ein Satz, der einen speziellen Anspruch hervorbringt -" CavellVsDescartes: hat auch keine Behauptung gemacht -" Unterschied: sich vorzustellen, am Kamin zu sitzen, und sich vorzustellen zu behaupten, dieses zu wissen -" so kann die Lösungsmethode nicht einmal unseren alltäglichen Methoden ähnlich sehen -" Behauptung: erfordert Kontext, der nicht allgemein zu übertragen wäre -" das skeptische Urteil wäre nicht repräsentativ -" I 261 das Urteil des Erkenntnistheoretikers oder Skeptikers ist stets partikular -" I 261 StroudVsCavell: ich kann feststellen, daß ich eine Voraussetzung gemacht habe, die nicht erfüllt ist -" dann stellt das mein Wissen in Frage, ohne daß ich das vorher in einem Wissensanspruch (-žBasis-œ) vorgebracht habe -" dennoch: wie Cavell: StroudVsErkenntnistheorie: braucht jedesmal einen konkreten Wissensanspruch, der eine allgemeine Beantwortung unmöglich macht -
I 263
Stroud pro Cavell: ich glaube er hat recht, These daß der traditionelle Erkenntnistheoretiker für jeden konkreten Fall Ã"ußerungsbedingungen braucht, die eine Verallgemeinerung unmöglich machen. StroudVsCavell: ich möchte nur zeigen, daß man dazu gar nicht zeigen muß, daß gar keine Behauptung aufgestellt wurde.
Innate Descartes, R.
 
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Vollmer I 14
LockeVsDescartes: keine angeborenen Ideen! Seele bei Geburt weißes Papier, tabula rasa, Wachstafel. Sinneserfahrungen bringen Ideen hervor, die vorher nicht vorhanden waren. These "Nichts ist im Verstand, was nicht vorher in den Sinnen gewesen ist". (DescartesVs).

Vo I
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd I Stuttgart 1988

Vo II
G. Vollmer
Die Natur der Erkenntnis Bd II Stuttgart 1988
Space Descartes, R.
 
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Kanitscheider II 38
Materie/Raum/Descartes: neu: absolutistische Raumauffassung besonderer Art: Die Geometrie wird dem Raum nicht von außen durch Objekte aufgeprägt, sondern besitzt die geometrische Struktur innerlich - NewtonVsDescartes: nicht Ausdehnung, sondern träge Masse ist die Schlüsseleigenschaft der Materie - Newton: These Raum absolut, von Materie unabhängig - II 39 Einstein: es gibt keinen "feld-leeren" Raum.

Kan I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kan II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Skepticism Descartes, R.
 
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Stroud I 11
Descartes: These die Sinne zeigen uns nicht mit Sicherheit, ob die Situation in der wir uns zu befinden glauben, tatsächlich vorliegt. Das zeigt, dass wir überhaupt nichts über die Außenwelt wissen können. Descartes: These ich kann Wachheit nicht von Traum unterscheiden.
I 18
Descartes/Traum/Skeptizismus/Stroud: These beide Schritte von Descartes- Überlegungen sind korrekt. Dennoch: StroudVsDescartes: These wir können manchmal wissen, daß wir nicht träumen.
I 19
StroudVsDescartes: These man kann auch etwas über die Welt wissen, wenn man träumt (s.u.).
I 24
schwächere These/ StroudVsDescartes: die unleugbare Wahrheit ist bloß, daß wenn man träumt, daß einem dann Wissen fehlt. ((s) das ist also eine schwächere These). Skeptizismus/Stroud: These wird nur mit der stärkeren These erreicht!
I 111
Skeptizismus/Descartes/Stroud/VsMoore: Descartes gelangt zu seiner These durch eine Einschätzung all unseres Wissens. Quelle: waren bei ihm die Sinne.
I 140
-žalles anders-œ/Skeptizismus/Descartes/Stroud: erreicht seine skeptische Konklusion aus der These, daß unsere Wahrnehmung genau so sein könnte, wie sie ist, auch wenn es gar keine äußeren Dinge gäbe. Lücke/DB/Stroud: für Descartes gibt es einen Lücke zwischen Erscheinung und Realität.
Personal Identity Locke, J.
 
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I 53
Identität/Mensch/Person/personale Identität/Locke: (27.Kapitel II. Buch des Essays: "Über Identität und Verschiedenheit"). These Es gibt einen Unterschied zwischen einer beliebigen Materiemasse und einer strukturierten Materie, die Leben ermöglicht.
Was diese Basis betrifft, besteht zwischen Pflanzen, Tieren und Menschen kein Unterschied.
Eine andere Auffassung von der geistigen Identität verankere diese allein in der immateriellen Seele (Descartes) und abstrahiere völlig von Körper und Gestalt.
Diese Position läßt sich mit dem Gedanken der Seelenwanderung vereinbaren, für die Locke aber offensichtlich nicht viel Sympathie hatte.
I 54
Identität/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: das Verhältnis von Substanz und Person, wenn die Denkfähigkeit allein einer immateriellen Substanz zugeschrieben wird. Bsp so wäre es denkbar, daß jemand die Überzeugung vertreten könnte, er sei dieselbe Person wie Nestor. Wenn man nun die Richtigkeit der Cartesianischen These voraussetzt,
I 55
so sei es denkbar, daß ein zeitgenössischer Mensch tatsächlich die Person Nestor sei. So sei er deshalb aber doch nicht der Mensch Nestor, eben weil die Idee des Menschen nicht von seiner körperlichen Gestalt ablösbar sei.
Das ist für uns heute abstrus. (>Geach).
Locke relativiert die These damit, daß es für das Bewußtsein auf die Beschaffenheit der Substanz gar nicht ankomme, weshalb er diese Frage offenlassen wolle - er vermittelt dabei den Eindruck, daß er der materialistischen Sichtweise zugeneigt ist.
Mind Rorty, R.
 
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I 28
Wittgenstein / Strawson / Rorty thesis: there is nothing but the human body, VsDescartes: Vs splitting into res cogitans and res extensa. Aspect / VsSpinoza "two aspects". That s okay as long as you do not ask: "Are organisms something physical?"
Philosophy Ryle, G.
 
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Tetens Wittgenstein VII 147
Philosophy / nonsense / logical grammar / Tetens: the thesis that philosophy comes from a misunderstanding of the "logical grammar" of the language, is to be found neither Carnap nor in the Tractatus, but at Ryle in his criticism Vs dualism, VsDescartes (Ryle 1969) .

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Self-consciousness Sellars, W.
 
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Fra I 264
Consciousness / SellarsVsSartre / SellarsVsDescartes: the thesis of self-transparency of consciousness is the "myth of the given".

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
absolute Space Newton, I.
 
Books on Amazon
Kanitscheider II 38
Materie/Raum/Descartes: neu: absolutistische Raumauffassung besonderer Art: Die Geometrie wird dem Raum nicht von außen durch Objekte aufgeprägt, sondern besitzt die geometrische Struktur innerlich - NewtonVsDescartes: nicht Ausdehnung, sondern träge Masse ist die Schlüsseleigenschaft der Materie - Newton: These Raum absolut, von Materie unabhängig - II 39 Einstein: es gibt keinen -"feld-leeren" Raum.

Kan I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kan II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Self-consciousness Sartre, J.P.
 
Books on Amazon
Fra I 264
Bewusstsein/SellarsVsSartre/SellarsVsDescartes: die These von der Selbstdurchsichtigkeit und Selbst-Erschlossenheit des Bewusstseins ist der "Mythos des Gegebenen".

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994