Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 32 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
As if Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
III 156
As if-Intentionality/Searle: does not explain anything, if there is no genuine intentionality. It has no causal power - SearleVsDennett: it is as empty as his "intentional stance"

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Cognition Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
Chalmers I 113
Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmer: Dennett (1978c) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,... ---
I 114
...control unit and module for "public relations": for the implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.
Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991) without a central "headquarter".
ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.
Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a, p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3)
Cognitive Models/Chalmers: there are also models by Churchland, (1995), Johnson-Laird (1988), Shallice (1972, 1988a, 1988b). ChalmersVs: to all my criticism VsDennett from above applies.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999


Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Cognition Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 111
Cognition/explanation/consciousness/cognitive models/Chalmers: Cognitive models are very good when it comes to explaining things like learning and behavior, but not in the explanation of conscious experience. In all that is cognitively explained, the question remains why it is accompanied by something like consciousness.
---
I 112
Cognitive models can certainly cover the psychological side of consciousness (behavior explaining, learning, information processing), but not the phenomenal side of conscious experience. ---
I 113
Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmers: Dennett (1978c) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,... ---
I 114
...control unit and module for "public relations": for implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.
Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991) without a central "headquarter".
ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.
Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows is still everything it needs to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the different functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a, p.210) and Chalmers I 370.
Cognitive Models/Chalmers: There are also models by Churchland, (1995), Johnson-Laird (1988), Shallice (1972, 1988a, 1988b). ChalmersVs: to all applies my criticism VsDennett from above.
---
I 172
Cognition/Chalmers: it is wrong to assume that it is separate from consciousness, even if it belongs to another sphere (the physical). For example, one has a (physical) perception of something green which is psychologically individualized. On the other hand, we also have perceptions about our consciousness. ---
I 218
Cognition/consciousness/psychology/Chalmers: the coherence between conscious experience and cognitive structures is remarkable. We can recognize principles: Principles: 1. Reliability principle: Our judgments of the second level about consciousness are generally correct.
---
I 219
If I judge that I hear something, then I usually hear something. 2. The principle of deducibility (reversed reliability principle): although many experiences often escape us, we usually have the ability to notice them.
---
I 222/223
3. Principle of structural coherence: conscious phenomenal experiences are always accompanied by (appropriately characterized) psychological consciousness. ---
I 223
E.g. Structural features of the facial field are reflected in our experiences of larger and smaller, brighter, darker, etc. objects, and also in our reactions to them. This also applies to implicit structures such as relations between colors.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Consciousness Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 161
Consciousness/Dennett: it is an illusion to believe that consciousness is the exception to the rule that everything can be explained by its relations to other things. It is no exception. ---
Dennett I 534
Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way that we cannot even imagine today. ---
Dennett II 23ff
Language/animal/Consciousness/Dennett: since there is no limit to consciousness (with or without speech), since it has gradually emerged, the question of which animals have consciousness is undecidable - "a matter of style" - consciousness is not the same as thinking! Dennett: no thought without language but consciousness without thinking. ---
Metzinger/Rosenthal II 430
Consciousness/Dennett: not even for the first person it is always clear what is conscious and what is not - e.g. becoming aware of the inventory of a room - E.g. wallpaper pattern: Completion by judgment, is not sensory!
---
Metzinger II 475
Consciousness/Dennett: consciousness is like a simulation of the world - it relates to the brain as flight simulations relate to the processes in the computer. ---
Metzinger II 555
Consciousness/Dennett: 1) cultural construction - 2) you cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness - BlockVsDennett: Incorrect fusion of P-B and Z-B. (phenenmenal conscious and access-conscious). ---
Chalmers I 113
Consciousness/Cognition/Dennett/Chalmers: Dennett (1978c) brings a cognitive model of consciousness consisting of the perception module, short-term memory, memory,... ---
I 114
...control unit and module for "public relations": for implementation in everyday language. ChalmersVsDennett: that shows us something about information processing and the possibility to report about it, but not why there should be a way for such a model "how it is" to be this model.
Later, Dennett introduced a more elaborate model (Dennett, Consciousness Explained, 1991) without a central "headquarter".
ChalmersVsDennett: this also brings a possible explanation of attention, but not a better explanation of conscious experience.
Consciousness/DennettVsNagel/DennettVsChalmers: thesis: what he shows, is nevertheless everything it takes to explain consciousness. As soon as one has explained the various functions, one has explained everything (Dennett, 1993a, p.210) and (FN9/Chapter 3)
Cognitive Models/Chalmers: these models also exist by Churchland (1995), Johnson-Laird (1988), Shallice (1972, 1988a, 1988b). ChalmersVs: to all, my criticism VsDennett from above applies.
---
Chalmers I, 229
Consciousness/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett 1993b) Consciousness is what stands out in brain processes. ("Cerebral celebrity"). Such content is conscious that fix resources themselves and monopolize them. (P. 929). Chalmers: that is close to my approach, only that I speak of potential standing out, it must only be possible that a content can play this role.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Consciousness Nagel
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 144 ff
Dennett: his model of the manifold concepts relieves us of the obligation to explain (the metaphors of) Qualia. We can attribute to the historically developed language. NagelVsDennett: ridiculous! A theory of consciousness, in which the mental realities do not matter, is like a book on Picasso, without images.
Consciousness / Nagel: That a man has consciousness, is not merely a belief, but a conclusion from the evidence.
So there is a gap (according to Rorty) between the evidence and the conclusion from the evidence.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Consciousness Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
Rorty I 60
Consciousness: Antiquity had no name for it.
III 37/38
RortyVsRyle/RortyVsDennett: their doubts about whether there is something like ’mind’ or ’consciousness’ have to do with the idea of ​​a medium between the self and reality, a medium that realists consider to be transparent and skeptics to be opaque. Rorty: there is no medium.
VI 176
Consciousness/Rorty: What outcome do we want to see as a result of our research? Why would we want to change our intuitive conceptions? Neither intuition nor ambitious pursuit yield an Archimedean point.
Frank I 584
Consciousness/Rorty: does not really exist in the sense of a separate area of ​​the mental - mental events are conventions, a contingent language play - thesis: it can be abolished without loss.
Rorty I 132
Mental/Ryle/Rorty: thesis: mental states like opinions, desires, etc. are properties not of the consciousness but of the person.
III 37
Consciousness/mind/RortyVsRyle/RortyVsDennett: mind or consciousness are not a medium between oneself and reality.
III 67
Consciousness/Kant/Rorty: two parts: a) reasonable: same in everyone b) empirically contingent. - In contrast: Freud: treats rationality as a mechanism that adjusts contingencies to other contingencies. - Plato: (State) conscience = internalized parents and society. - Reason/Kant: general principles - FreudVsKant: return to the special. - Kant: honest people are paradigmatic. - Freud: nothing human is paradigmatic.
VI 147
Consciousness/behavior/Wittgenstein/Rorty: wrong question: Is the behavior a different fact than consciousness? - Wittgenstein: we should not try to come between language and object.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Consciousness Block
 
Books on Amazon:
Ned Block
Metzinger II 458
Consciousness/Block: is a mixed concept of "phenomenal consciousness" (P consciousness/terminology) and "access consciousness" (Z consciousness). Def Z Consciousness/Terminology/Block: Being aware of a fact z means that the information for rational inferring is available. (Functional concept)
Consciousness/Burge: (VsBlock): P consciousness Prerequisite for Z Consciousness.
Phenomenality is not the same as consciousness! Phenomenal states can also be unconscious.
II 524
Blindsight/Block: Patients who cannot see in part of their visual field can still give true verbal descriptions upon request.       This suggests that consciousness must have a function that is effective in survival, reporting, and behavioral control.
II 530
Access Awareness/Block: I call its basis the information-processing function of the phenomenal consciousness in >Schacter's model. (s) part or basis as a counterpart).
II 531
Def P Consciousness/Phenomenal Consciousness/Block: experience. It cannot be described non-circularly! But that's no shortcoming! P-conscious properties are distinguished from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property. Although functionalism is wrong with respect to P consciousness, functionalism can accept many of my points.
II 535
Def Z Consciousness/Access Consciousness/Block: a state is z conscious if by virtue of being in the state a representation of its content 1) is inferentially unbound, i.e. is available as a premise for considering
2) is available for rational control of actions
3) is available for rational language control (not necessary, even chimpanzees can be p conscious).
      P consciousness and Z consciousness interact: Background can become foreground. E.g. feeling the shirt feels at the neck.
Fallacy/Block: it is a mistake, however, to go unnoticed from one consciousness to the other.
Mistake: To conclude from the example blindsight that it is the function of the P consciousness to enable rational control of action.
P Consciousness/Block: not functional! Sensations.
Z Consciousness/Block: functional. Typical: "propositional attitudes".
Pain/Block: its representational content is too primitive to play a role in inferring. Pain is not conceptually mediated, after all, dogs can also feel pain.
Summary: P Consciousness can be consciousness of and consciousness of does not need to be Z consciousness.
II 555
Consciousness/Dennett:
1) Cultural construct!
2) You cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness. 3) Consciousness is a "cerebral celebrity": only those contents are conscious that are persistent, that monopolize the resources long enough to achieve certain typical and "symptomatic" effects.
BlockVsDennett:
Ad 1) this is a merging of several concepts of consciousness. 2) Consciousness cannot be a cultural product.
Also probably not the Z consciousness: many lower creatures have it, even without such a concept.
Ad 3) But that is a biological fact and not a cultural one.
II 568
Fallacy/BlockVsSearle: Question: why the thirsty blindsight patient in the example does not reach for the water: he lacks both P consciousness and Z consciousness. That's right. But it is a mistake to go from a function of the machinery of Z consciousness to any function of P consciousness.
     Fallacy: to prematurely draw the conclusion that P consciousness has a certain function from the premise that "consciousness" is missing (without being clear what kind of consciousness).


Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007


Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996
Consciousness Churchland
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
II Güven Güzeldere Ist Bewusstsein die Wahrnehmung dessen, was im Geist vorgeht? In Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
II 397f
Consciousness of mental states: "perceptual-like": Locke, Armstrong, Paul and Patricia Churchland, Lycan "Thought-like": Rosenthal, Carruthers, Dennett, also Descartes.
---
II 404
Awareness/Locke/Churchland/Armstrong/Lycan: speaking of "scanning" or "monitoring". Question: What is perceived, the content, or the state itself?
---
II 411
Consciousness/Churchland: introspective awareness is a subspecies of perception. Thesis: In the language of a mature neuroscience, there might be a more differentiated representation of "human subjective consciousness".
E.g. Dopamine level could be interpreted as Gm7 chords in music.
We need to learn this conceptual system and practice its application. (Davidson's conceptual scheme).
Güzeldere: Churchland is thus not only convinced that mental states are identical with brain states, but also that their properties are identical.
---
IIb Patricia Smith Churchland Die Neurobiologie des Bewusstseins - Was können wir von ihr lernen? In Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
II 475
Consciousness/Dennett: is a virtual machine. Thesis: People become aware of the extent to which they acquire language and learn to talk about themselves. In this transition, a parallel machine (the neural networks in the brain) simulates a serial machine (which performs the operations step by step on the basis of rules that can be recursive). Dennett: Consciousness behaves like the flight simulator to the processes within the computer.
---
II 476
ChurchlandVsDennett:
1. The assumption of the language dependence of consciousness denies children and animals consciousness. ---
II 477
2. It has been known for some time that recurrent neural networks can produce temporal sequencing. 3. No virtual machine is required, a particular class of operations can be the output of a single, if heavily distributed, network.
Dennett could be quite right, but not on this way.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Content Cresswell
 
Books on Amazon
II 69
Content/ Information / Vollmer: Normal lighting carries no information - content / Dennett: proposes to understand the role of content on the personal level partly as content at the sub-personal level. ("Anticipation", however, is not isolated.).
  McDowellVsDennett.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984

Content Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
McDowell I 77
Content/Dennett: proposes to understand the role of content on the personal level in part of the content at the sub-personal level. ("Presentiment", however, is not isolated). McDowellVsDennett.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999


MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Descriptions Nagel
 
Books on Amazon
I 93
Thinking/Nagel: thinking takes precedence over its description, because its description necessarily presupposes thinking. - - -
Rorty VI 144ff
Rorty: NagelVsDennett: something "else, describable" I do not care. One should not replace the indescribable by something describable. That would be like trying to ask Kant to recognize the thing in itself after the reception of Hegel.

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Evolution Fodor
 
Books on Amazon
IV 145
Evolution Theory/Dennett/Fodor/Lepore: sees Dennett as -Element of interpretation- Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: but should not see something as a means of survival that you do not have - DretskeVsDennett/MillikanVsDennett: that s why most evolutionists are realists in terms of content IV 146 Irrationality/belief/Evolution/rationality/Dennett: Thesis: we must not describe irrational mutations as a system of belief - a belief system that believes something wrong is a conceptual impossibility - Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: the theory of evolution can hardly act as the guarantor for the principle of truth.
IV 149
Theory of evolution/truth/Fodor/Lepore: if you use it to explain intentional attribution, it is rather an empirical than a conceptual question whether the principle of truth applies or not - but we do not agree with the antecedent anyway.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Functionalism Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 15
Functionalism/Lewis/Armstrong/Chalmers: Lewis and Armstrong tried to explain all mental concepts, not only some. ChalmersVsLewis/ChalmersVsArmstrong: both authors made the same mistake like Descartes in assimilating the psychological to the phenomenal (see ChalmersVsDescartes).
E.g. When we wonder whether somebody is having a colour experience, we are not wondering whether they are receiving environmental stimulation and processing it in a certain way. It is a conceptually coherent possibility that something could be playing the causal role without there being an associated experience.
---
I 15
Functionalism/Consciousness/ChalmersVsFunctionalism/ChalmersVsArmstrong/ChalmersVsLewis/Chalmers: There is no mystery about whether any state plays a causal role, at most there are a few technical explanatory problems. Why there is a phenomenological quality of consciousness involved is a completely different question. Functionalism/Chalmers: he denies that there are two different questions. ((s) Also: ChalmersVsDennett).
---
I 231
Functionalism/Consciousness/Chalmers: two variants: Functionalism of the 2nd level: Among these, Rosenthal's approach of thoughts of the second level about conscious experiences and Lycan's (1995) approach about perceptions of the second level. These theories give good explanations for introspection.
Functionalism of the 1st level : thesis: only cognitive states of the 1st level are used. Such theories are better in the explanation of conscious experiences.
Since, however, not all cognitive states correspond to conscious experiences, one still needs a distinguishing feature for them.
Solution/Chalmers: my criterion for this is the accessibility to global control.
---
I 232
Kirk: (1994): Thesis: "directly active" information is what is needed. Dretske: (1995): Thesis: Experience is information that is represented for a system.
Tye: (1995): Thesis: Information must be "balanced" for purposes of cognitive processing.
---
I 250
Functionalism/VsFunctionalism/Chalmers: the authors who argue with inverted Qualia or lacking Qualia present the logical possibility of counter-arguments. This is sufficient in the case of a strong functionalism. The invariance principle (from which it follows that conscious experiences are possible in a system with identical biochemical organization) is a weaker functionalism. Here the merely logical possibility of counter examples is not sufficient to refute. Instead, we need a natural possibility of missing or inverted Qualia.
Solution: to consider natural possibility, we will accept fading or "dancing" Qualia.
---
I 275
Functionalism/Chalmers: the arguments in relation to a lacking, inverted and dancing Qualia do not support a strong, but the non-reductive functionalism I represent. Thesis: functional organization is, with natural necessity, sufficient for conscious experiences. This is a strong conclusion that strengthens the chances for > artificial intelligence.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Functions Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
I 276
Function/causality/Dennett: having causal powers is not yet a function - Question: whether the first nucleotides already had a function - Function: more than causality - question: do the "gliders" in the "Game of Life" have a function or do they just move?
I 575
Meaning/function/Dennett: Vending machine and communication of the frog eye derive their meaning from the function - where the function returns no answer, there is nothing left to investigate - the meanings of people are just as derived as the meanings of the vending machine - that proves that ZE - otherwise one must postulate essentialism - PutnamVsDennett: Meaning has more to do with reference than with function - function does not allocate a correct causal role to meaning

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Hetero-Phenomenology Radner
 
Books on Amazon
Daisie Radner
Heterophänomenologie: wie wir etwas über die Vögel und die Bienen lernen in
Tie I D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005

Perler I 408
Hetero-phanomenology/HP/DennettVsBrentano/VsHusserl: hetero-phenomenology works from the perspective of the 3rd person instead of the first. RadnerVsDennett: Thesis: hetero-phanomenology can also be operated from the first person perspective.
---
I 409
Hetero-phenomenology/Radner: hetero-phenomenology deals with: 1. How things appear to a subject
2. How is the experience of the subject ("how is it for the subject ...")?
Frank Jackson: treats both as equivalent:
E.g Fred: for him there are two red hues, where all the others only perceive one. How is it for Fred to see Red1 and Red2?
Radner: the question varies between (1) and (2).
In the first sense, Jackson: "How is the new color?"
In the second sense, Jackson: "if we could adapt our physiology to that of Fred, we would finally know."
E.g. M. Tye: instead of saying,
A) The color blind Jones does not know how the different colors look, we can just as well say,
B) He does not know what it is like to have the experiences characteristic of seeing the colors.
Both hang together, but problems are not always the established and reversed equally well in the sense of 1. as of 2.
---
I 410
For example, color researcher Mary/Jackson/Radner: the problem is not how red may look for Mary (probably as for us), but how her experience will be. Will it be a surprise? ---
I 411
Environment/Inner world/Radner: both can be approached from the viewpoint of the 1st and the 3rd person. ---
I 412
This distinction does not correspond to that between car and hetero-phenomenology. Hetero-Phenomenology: 1., 3. Person/environment/inner world: all combinations of questions are possible.
Environment/hetero-phanomenological: 3rd person: E.g.: "How do things appear to the subject?"
1. Person: E.g. "How would things appear to me if I had a sense device like that of the subject?"
Inner world/hetero-phenomenological: 3rd person: E.g.: "How are the experiences of the subject?"
1. Person: E.g.: "How would my experiences be if I were in the circumstances of the subject and had certain characteristics in common with it?".
---
I 413
Hetero-phenomenology/Radner: E.g. he would like to know how a warning call sounds for another subject, e.g. for birds of prey like hawks or owls, which have a smaller head than us. ---
I 414
How would it be if I had no auricles and the ears were only two inches apart? Problem: I may be able to imagine other ears on my brain, but not how it would be for me with a cat brain.


Tie I
D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg)
Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005
Intentionality Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 27
Rorty: "intentional stance"/Intentional position/Dennett: is made possible through the detection of a Davidson pattern. The pattern of this rationality is the same as that of the truth. Neither language without rationality, nor one of them without truth.
I 316f
SearleVsDennett: "as-if intentionality". Intentionality/DennettVsSearle: but you have to start somewhere (if you want to avoid metaphysics). The first step in the right direction is hardly recognizable as a step towards meaning.
Def intentional position/Dennett: an attempt to determine what the designer (or Mother Nature) had in mind.
II 46
He often allows large jumps in the conclusions without the ignorance of the underlying physics disturbing them. E.g. Antikythera mechanism. the fact that he was a planetarium results from the fact that it was a good planetarium!
E.g. Martians wonder why there is so much excess capacity in the computer: Reason: chips became so cheap. This is a historical explanation, but it emanates from the intentional stance.
E.g. Flog Archaeopteryx? They are not sure, but found that his claws were ideal for sitting on tree branches! So how did he get up there ...? I 321
Def design stand point/Dennett: eg an alarm clock is (as opposed to stone) a designed object and is accessible to a sophisticated kind of predictions. (According to the design standpoint). When I press the buttons, something will happen a few hours later.
But I do not need to know the laws of physics for that.
Intentional position/Dennett: E.g. chess computer. Nothing in the laws of physics forces the chess computer to make the next move, but nothing in its design either.
Brandom I 109
Intention/Intentionality/Dennett: stance-stance: asserts that one cannot distinguish whether something really is an intentional system and whether it is being treated as such appropriately.
The I 592ff
Intentionality/Real/Derived/Dennett: E.g. freezing: robot must be able to act independently - must believe in reward, but develops self-interest - Question: intentionality still derived? - If so, then our own is also merely derived - but that s splitting hairs - Important Argument: we ourselves are only those survival machines for our genes
I 596
Intentionality/SearleVsDennett: no machine, no vending machine either. Freezing/DennettVsSearle: at some time intentionality is no longer derived, but real!.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Intentionality Searle
 
Books on Amazon:
John R. Searle
Dav II 112
SearleVsDavidson: suggests to distinguish two types of intentions: a) "prior intentions" and
b) "intentions in action" intentional act only when the first, causes the second.
---
Dennett I 281
SearleVsDennett: "as-if intentionality". ---
Dennett II 67
Definition derived intentionality/Searle: limited form, that some of our art products have: e.g. words, sentences, books, maps, pictures, computer programs, etc. Their intentionality is only a loan from our mind. Shopping list, whether written or memorized. Likewise, mental pictures. Something internal, but still an art product. ---
Searle I 67
Intentionality biological, teleological: SearleVs: in case of confusion: words like "horse or cow" would be necessary. Intentionality is normative: truth, consistency, rationality intrinsic - the Darwinian evolution is in contrast not normative.
---
I 178
Fulfilment conditions: intentional states represent their fulfilment conditions only under certain aspects that are important for the person concerned. ---
I 266F
Intentional phenomena: Regulating consequences: genuine causal phenomena - Functional explanation: are only bare physical facts, causality only through interest-based description here - rules no cause of action. Objects of intentionality need not to exist: (hope)
belief, fear, wishes, belief no record, one just has them.
---
II 208
Intentionality/fulfilment conditions/Searle: the mind gives the production of sounds intentionality, so that it gives the fulfilment conditions of the mental state to the production -> speech act - double level of intentionality: a) mental state - b) level of intention. ---
III 156
As-if intentionality/Searle: explains nothing, if there is no real intentionality. It has no causal power - SearleVsDennett: it is as empty as its "intentional attitude". --
Graeser I 124
Intentionality/speech acts/Searle: action intentions have fulfilment conditions that are represented by them and by representing their fulfilment conditions, intended actions are ipso facto intentional - derived intentionality: physical realizations of speech acts are not intrinsically intentional as the propositional attitudes themselves.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Intentionality Proust
 
Books on Amazon
Joelle Proust Das intentionale Tier in D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg) Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt/M. 2005

Perler I 233
Animal/Mind/Intentionality/Premack/Woodruff/Proust: Premack/Woodruff's famous studies of "Theory of the Mind" in animals, "beliefs and desires", etc. Proust: if one speaks of a theory of the mind, one should distinguish it from a social one not from a psychological competence in the strict sense by which social animals try to influence each other.

Premack: an animal can deliberately act on what another is doing (social) or thinks (then also psychologically).
"Spoilsport version": the explanation of behavior: not intention but only established correlation is intended to explain the behavior of an animal.
---
I 234
Then the psychological side can be dispensed with. Speechless animals simply establish a correlation. DennettVs: intentional attitude for explanation.
---
I 234
Intentionality/Dennett: Levels: 1. Desires and beliefs can be attributed.
2. Beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires
3. Beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires of the second level, etc.
---
I 235
ProustVsDennett: opens the door for the human to apply his psychological concepts to apparently concept-less processes: cars, dogs, cats. It is slightly different with primates.


Tie I
D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg)
Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005
Introspection Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
I 13
Introspection/Psychology/Phenomenology/Behavior/Consciousness/Wundt/Chalmers: if one were to use introspection like e.g. Wilhelm Wundt, in order to explain behavior, one would behave 1. Cartesian, and 2. one makes phenomenology the referee on psychology. ---
I 26
Introspection/Chalmers: introspection is the way we become clear about the content of our inner states. This is an important component of our everyday concept of consciousness. Introspection can be analyzed in terms of a rational process of open-mindedness for information about inner states and the ability to apply this information meaningfully. Status reports: require additional language control.
---
I 189
Introspection/Consciousness/Explanation/Dennett/Chalmers: (Dennett, 1979) ... there are public reports about our consciousness and episodes of our propositional awareness, our judgments and - as far as introspection is concerned - darkness (1979, p.95). ChalmersVsDennett: then Dennett's introspection is very different from mine. I find sensations, feelings, pain, etc., although they are accompanied by judgments, they themselves are not merely judgments.
---
I 190
Introspection/Chalmers: Dennett's approach is better described than extrospection. He starts from the outside to explore his inner being. Dennett/Chalmers: (in Dennett, 1991, pp 363-364): what is the point is to explain why things appear to us as they do. And that would explain everything that needs to be explained.
Appearing/ChalmersVsDnett: There are two meanings of apparition:
a) phenomenal ("how it is ...")
b) psychologically (as disposition for judgments).
Dennett's theory explains only b).

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Language Nagel
 
Books on Amazon
I 57
NagelVsprimacy of language: leads to the devaluation of reason, decay product of analytic philosophy. Rejection of Frege. Thinking is often not linguistical. The most common forms of thinking do not depend on any single language.
I 57
If language reveals principles of thought, this is not because logic is grammar, but because grammar follows a logic.
I 61
That "and" has become the word for the conjunction by contingent circumstances has no concequences for the status of the true statement that p is implied by p and q. What a set of sentences means depends on conventions. What follows from a set of premises does not depend on them (formal).
Rorty Vi 144 ff
NagelVsDennett/Rorty: his "hetero-phenomenology" is not sufficient. - Nagel thesis: the sources of philosophy are preverbal, their problems are not dependent on culture.
Rorty VI 144 ff
NagelVsWittgenstein: (according to Rorty): the limits of language are not the limits of thinking! "The content of some thoughts goes beyond any form that they may take in human consciousness." (Per distinction scheme/content).

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Materialism Chalmers
 
Books on Amazon:
David Chalmers
Stalnaker I 242
Definition Type-A-materialism/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Chalmers 1996, 165-6) thesis: consciousness as far as it exists, logically supervenes on the physical for functionalist or eliminativistic reasons - Definition type-B materialism: thesis: consciousness does not logically supervene on the physical, so there is no a priori implication from the physical to the phenomenal - yet materialism is claimed. ---
Chalmers I XIII
Materialism/Chalmers: to account for consciousness, we have to go beyond the resources it provides. ---
Chalmers I 41
Definition Materialism/Physicalism/Chalmers: the thesis that all positive facts about the world supervene globally logically on physical facts. (> Supervenience/Chalmers) ---
I 42
Materialism is true when all the positive facts about the world are entailed by the physical facts. (See also Chalmers I 364). That is, if for every logically possible world W, which is physically indistinguishable from our world, all positive facts which are true of our world are also true of world W. This corresponds to Jackson's physicalism:
Definition Physicalism/Jackson: (Jackson 1994): Criterion: every minimal physical duplicate of our actual world is simply a duplicate of our world (See also Chalmers I 364).
---
I 123
Materialism/ChalmersVsMaterialism: if my assumptions about conscious experience (phenomenal consciousness) are correct, materialism must be wrong: 1. There are conscious experiences in our world
2. There is a logically possible world that is physically identical to our actual world in which the positive facts about consciousness are not valid in our world.
3. Therefore, facts about consciousness are additional facts, beyond the physical facts.
4. Therefore, materialism is wrong.
---
I 124
The same conclusion can be drawn from the logical possibility of worlds with interchanged conscious experiences. So when God created the world, after securing the physical facts, he had more to do, than Kripke says: he had to make that the facts about consciousness remain.
The failure of this kind of materialism leads to a kind of dualism.
---
139
MaterialismVsChalmers: could argue that the unimaginability of certain worlds (see above) is only due to our cognitive limitations. Then the corresponding world would not even be logically possible! (This would be a possible interpretation of McGinn 1989.) Analogy: one might suppose that the decision e.g. about the continuum hypothesis or its negation is beyond our cognitive abilities.
ChalmersVsVs: this analogy does not work in the case of our understanding of modalities (modes of necessity and possibility).
E.g. it is also not the case that a smarter version of the color researcher Mary would know better how it is to see a color.
---
I 144
Materialism/Chalmers: Chalmers would simply deny that Mary makes any discoveries at all. This is the strategy of Lewis (1990) and Nemirov (1990): Mary only acquires an additional ability (to recognize), but no knowledge. ChalmersVsNemirow/ChalmersVsLewis: Although there are no internal problems with this strategy, it is implausible.
---
I 145
Mary really learns new facts about the nature of the experience. She has reduced the space of epistemic possibilities. Omniscience/Chalmers: for an omniscient being, there is no such narrowing of possibilities.
Loar: (1990) he derives from this new knowledge of Mary conditionals: "If seeing red things is like this, and seeing blue things is like this, then seeing violet things is probably like this."
DennettVsJackson: (Dennett 1991) Mary does not learn anything at all. She could not be deceived, e.g. by experimenters holding a blue apple instead of a red one in front of her. She has already learned the necessary from the reactions of others in her environment.
ChalmersVsDennett: but this does not show that she had the decisive (phenomenal) knowledge.

Cha I
D.Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Meaning Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
I 565
Example Vending Machine: Thesis: The environment creates meaning / function / evolution / Dennett: the importance is how the function at the moment of their creation is still nothing definite! Example accepted zoo of fregs exclusively with flying dummies, but adequate replacement diet for Frogs: What do the eyes tell the brain then?
I 281
Meaning / Dennett: origins, birth of meaning: thesis: the nucleotide sequences, initially purely syntactically, take "semantics" - that "quasi-importance": e.g. mode of action of macromolecules - SearleVsDennett: just as-if intentionality - DennetVsSearle: ewe must start somewher - the first steps are not to be seen as steps towards significance - 282 I also parts that have only half-intentionality belong to us.
Brandom I ~ 110
Meaning / Dennett: that something is a piece of copper means nothing else than that it is appropriate to treat it as such.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Mental States Pinker
 
Books on Amazon
I 34
Definition mind/Pinker: thesis: The mind is a system of computational organs that was designed by the selection so that it can solve problems of hunters and gatherers, particularly by understanding and outwitting objects, plants, animals and other people. ---
I 37
Accumulation of not completed modules against each other - mind not = brain, but activity of the brain, but not the only one: the brain also transforms fat - seeing/thinking/feeling: information processing. ---
I 46
Mind/Fodor: Module - PinkerVs: too delimited - better: Chomsky: is the "mental organ". ---
I 182
Mind: Minsky: society with agents - Dennett: large collection of partially finished designs - no "President" - PinkerVsDennett: the agents are hierarchical.

Pi I
St. Pinker
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

Ontology Fine
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 172
Arthur Fine, "natural ontological attitude": one should not answer such questions. You should have no great ontological bonds. FineVsDennett: let us not talk about the "furniture of the physical world". No one would ask "How real is this". (Rorty ditto).

Fin I
K. Fine
The Limits of Abstraction Oxford 2008

FinA I
A. Fine
The Shaky Game (Science and Its Conceptual Foundations series) Chicago 1996


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Perspective Sterelny
 
Books on Amazon
Kim Sterelny Primatenwelten in D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg.) Der Geist der Tiere, Frankfurt 2005

Perler I 381
Definition Two Action Test/Method/Experiment/Perspective/Sterelny: Group 1 rats see A: Left lever is pressed. Group 2 rats see B: right lever is pressed.
1. This allows solutions with more than one behavioral program. A task can be divided into sub-tasks.
2. There must be different but equally appropriate ways of doing the sub-tasks.
E.g. a chimpanzee can do something with the feet just as well as with the hands.
If it now changes, then one can say that it executes the behavioral program correctly, but does not exactly imitate the subordinate tasks.
---
I 384
Perspective/animal/mind/Sterelny: instead of assuming that e.g. Chimpanzees can adopt a foreign perspective, the experiments can also be interpreted as: "Beg for food at those who have seen it": this does not need a theory about the internal causes of the behavior or about the role of seeing. ---
I 385
Extensive behavioral competences cannot be revealed by a single experiment. Dennett/Whiten: The more situations there are in which primates use the relevance of the direction of view, the more one can say that they understand it as something mediated by the mind.
SterelnyVsDennett: I see it less metaphysically and more methodically.


Tie I
D. Perler/M. Wild (Hg)
Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005
Prediction Fodor
 
Books on Amazon
IV 150
Prediction / Fodor / LeporeVsDennett: predictive capability need not be based on rationality. - It can also be based on regularity.
IV 150f
Predictability of behavior is not an argument for intentional attribution - regularity instead of indulgence - law-like connections with split stimuli sufficient - no rationality necessary.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Psychology Churchland
 
Books on Amazon:
Patricia Churchland
I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie in: Hügli/Lübcke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993
Lanz I 302
Everyday psychology/Churchland: (pro everyday psychology/Sellars - ChurchlandVsDennett): Link to Sellars: Everyday psychology has the status of a useful empirical theory. You have to check if A) the everyday psychological predicates actually designate natural species
B) whether the lingua mentis theory of functionalism, which is closely linked to everyday psychology, is plausible. The Churchlands deny a) and b).
Instead, Patricia S. Churchland: "Neurophilosophy":
Ad a): it is remarkable that due to everyday psychology we have not the faintest idea what underlies the psychological phenomena with which we are familiar.
---
I 303
Ad b): VsMentalese, VsLingua Mentis theory: from the perspective of evolution, language is a latecomer. There were intelligent creatures before language came into the world and there are intelligent creatures who are not able to speak. Thus, due to the evolutionary continuity between humans and their ancestors, a large number of non-language analog cognitive processes must also be assumed in humans.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Reality Rorty
 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
II 40
RortyVsHabermas: we linguistic historicists believe that dependency relations can only be uncovered when someone proposes concrete alternatives. There is no "humanity" that would have to be guided from an era of "distorted communication" (relative term) to a new era. - We reject the notion that people have a "Interior" that resists "external conditioning".
II 101 ff
Description/Rorty: the nature described will always have some sort of order.
Thing itself/Rorty: just nature which is not described by any human language.
II 106f
Freud/Rorty: has no interest in a distinction between reality and appearance! It’s about new description.
IV 49
World: "Non-sentences". - - -
VI 169
Reality / statements / Wittgenstein / Rorty: we are unable to move back and forth between our statements about electrons and the electrons themselves - not even between our attributions of beliefs and the beliefs themselves - E.g. (Wittgenstein) that would be like trying to confirm what s in the newspaper by comparing what is in another copy of the same newspaper.
VI 170
Success / explanation / reality / RortyVsDennett: Success as an explanation helps us to waive "reality" - the success depends on the usefulness.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Representation Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
Rorty VI 167
Representation / Dennett: how consensus can be explained by success: e.g. a map representing shoals, is simply better than one that does not. RortyVsDennett: e.g. electron: we are not able to go back and forth between what we say about electrons and the electrons themselves. And not between our attributions of beliefs and the beliefs themselves! E.g. (Wittgenstein) That would be like trying to verify what s in the paper by looking up what is in another copy of the same newspaper.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999


Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Terminology Fodor
 
Books on Amazon
IV 1
Def anatomical/Fodor/Lepore: is a property exactly in the case where, if anything hat it, then at least a second thing must have this property - ((s) but not all things, so unlike holism) - E.g. twin ((s) but not male twin) - Def atomistic: properties that are not anatomical - E.g. "... ate the last one...".
IV 13
Holism/Fodor/Lepore: E.g. assuming anatomical prop would also be holistic - then it could turn out that, e.g., no language would have an expression for "the pen of my aunt" if it did not also have expressions that correspond to the following expressions, e.g. "Two is a prime".
IV 134
E.g. Belief/Shmelief/Faith/Shfaith/Fodor/Lepore: shmeliefs: like beliefs but without charity being analytic for them, then the majority could be wrong, but beliefs must usually be true.
IV 140
Projectivism/Fodor/LeporeVs: 1) must assert that there are no beliefs on the Twin Earth - 2) cannot explain the element of interpretation of intentional attribution.
IV 148
Interpretation Theory/Fodor/Lepore: Thesis that there are no intentional states - Dennett pro? Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: if intentionality does not exist, interpretation cannot attribute any properties to it- "if there are no beliefs and wishes, there can be nothing for what they are selected.
IV 197
State space semantics/Churchland/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: The technical apparatus does not help if you do not understand the everyday concepts - E.g. "marriageable" is not explained by a dimension of marriageability.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Thinking Gärdenfors
 
Books on Amazon:
Peter Gärdenfors
I 72
Denken ohne Sprache/DennettVsGärdenfors: im Gegensatz dazu vertreten einige Autoren die These, dass Denken nicht ohne Sprache möglich ist: (Dennett, 1991). Begriffe/Dennett: These: viele Begriffe können erst gebildet werden, wenn Sprache schon ansatzweise vorhanden ist, wie B Inflation, Monat, Erbe.
Begriffe/Gärdenfors: das ist sicher richtig, aber es spricht nicht dagegen, dass die meisten unserer Begriffe sich durch Beobachtung und Handlung herausgebildet haben, bevor sie ihren sprachlichen Ausdruck fanden. GärdenforsVsDennett.
I 259
Deduktion/Shirky/Gärdenfors: (Shirky, 2003): deduktive Vernunft wird überschätzt von Leuten, die an Künstlicher Intelligenz arbeiten und insbesondere am Semantischen Web. GärdenforsVsDerscartes: diese Überschätzung kommt von Arthur Conan Doyle her, dessen Sherlock Holmes-Geschichten mehr Schaden angerichtet haben in Bezug auf die Vorstellung davon, wie der menschliche Geist arbeitet, als alles seit Descartes.


Gä I
P. Gärdenfors
The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014

Twin Earth Dennett
 
Books on Amazon
I 572
Twin Earth/Putnam/DennettVsPutnam: he calls for a leap in reference, a leap in intentionality.
I 573f
Dennett: one could now tend to think that the inner intentionality had a certain "inertia". The brain cannot focus on one thing and mean another. (Wittgenstein). Twin Earth/Dennett/VsPutnam: you cannot tell a story under the assumption that tables are no tables, even though they look like tables and are used like tables.
Anything else would be a "living creature that looks like Fury" (but is not Fury).
But if there are "Butterhorses" on the twin earth which are in all aspects like our horses, then Butterhorses are horses - not an earthly sort of horses, but horses after all.
((s) that is why the twin earth water does have a different chemical formula in Putnam: YXZ.
Dennett: of course you can also represented a stricter opinion, according to which the non-earthly horses are a separate species. Both is possible. ((s) VsDennett: it depends on how you define determination). ((s) that only works with "hidden" properties)
Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: he tries to close the gap by saying that we are referring to natural types, whether we know it or not.
Dennett: But what types are natural? A breed is as natural as a species or a genus.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999


The author or concept searched is found in the following 32 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Armstrong, D. Sellars Vs Armstrong, D.
 
Books on Amazon
I XXXVIII
Def Perception/Armstrong. "Nothing more than the acquisition of knowledge of individual facts about the world by means of the senses" (1961). It is here not about a descriptive content just like with Dennett.
I XXXIX
Perception/thinking/SellarsVsArmstrong/SellarsVsDennett/Sellars: it is not the same, whether you merely think something or if you see something and at the same time think! Even if one accepts that the thoughts that come into play in the perception possess a particular content (Sellars pro) so it is hardly understandable how the addition of another conceptual article can compensate for the difference between seeing and mere thinking.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999
Blackmore, S. Pauen Vs Blackmore, S.
 
Books on Amazon
Pauen V 244
I/Blackmore/Pauen: beliefs are merely accumulations of memes that are constantly changing. VsMinsky, VsDennett: The self has no pragmatic value either. Unencumbered by this, we can have a more unbiased approach to the presence. (NagelVs.)
V 245
I: no source of our desires, but a function of bundling. PauenVsBlackmore: how should continuity be maintained then?
Vs: individuals can behave very differently to desires, even if they belong to the same social group (controlled by memes).

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Churchland, P. Dennett Vs Churchland, P.
 
Books on Amazon
II 64
Language/numbers/measurement/Paul Churchland: has compared statements with numbers: E.g.    "X is a weight in grams of 144"
   "Y has a speed of 12 meters per second."
DennettVsChurchland: There are problems when we apply the same transformation rules and equating rules to different ways of expressing the same statement. Statements are, after all, unfortunately not so well-behaved theoretical structures such as numbers. Statements more closely resemble the dollar than the numbers! E.g.
  "This goat is worth $ 50".
  And how much in Greek drachmas?, Today more than in ancient Athens? etc.
- - -
I Lanz 302
Churchland: (via everyday psychology/Sellars ChurchlandVsDennett): are building on Sellars: everyday psychology has the status of a useful empirical theory. It has to be checked whether a) the everyday psychological predicates actually denote natural species
b) whether the lingua mentis theory of functionalism, closely adjoining the everyday psychology, is plausible. Churchland negates a) and b).
Instead, P.S. Churchland: "Neuro philosophy":
ad a): It is remarkable that we do not have the faintest idea of ​​what underlies psychological phenomena familiar to us because of everyday psychology.
I 303
ad b): VsMentalese, VsLingua Mentis Theory: from the perspective of evolution language is a latecomer. There were intelligent beings before language came into the world, and there are intelligent beings who are not gifted with language. So, because of the evolutionary continuity between humans and their ancestors, you have to assume a large number of non-language analog cognitive processes also with humans.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Davidson, D. Newen Vs Davidson, D.
 
Books on Amazon
Newen I 201
Behavior/DennettVsCausal Explanation/Explanation/Explanation of Behavior/Dennett/DennettVsDavidson/Ryle/Newen: Dennett (like Ryle): behavior cannot be explained causally, but by desires and beliefs as intentional attitudes, not causes. (DennettVsDavidson).
I 205
Belief/Intentionality/Intentional Explanation/Dennett/Newen: Dennett's explanation does not include the thesis that desires and beliefs even exist. DennettVsDavidson/VsCausal Explanation/Dennett/Newen: Thesis: the levels (intentional, physical, functional) are isolated and must not be linked.
Mental Phenomena/Dennett/Newen: can only be detected by the attribution of intentional attitudes. I 206 VsDennett: E.g. toothaches are a mental state. Then Dennett has to assert that the state depends on whether it is useful for someone to attribute toothache to this person.

New I
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Dennett, D. Brandom Vs Dennett, D.
 
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I 113
Meaning / intentional systems / BrandomVsDennett: understanding belongs to meaning, and such systems do not understand.
II 54
BrandomVsDennett: if you have to distinguish derivative intentionality from the primordial intentionality of the interpreter then a regress threatens. BrandomVsHume, BrandomVsLocke: we should play down, with which they have struggled: the similarity with animals. (Also Dennett, as a naturalist).
We are cultural and not merely natural beings.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Dennett, D. Churchland Vs Dennett, D.
 
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Patricia Churchland
Metzinger II 477
ChurchlandVsDennett: 1st, the thesis of the language dependency of consciousness depreves children and animals from consciousness.   2nd It has been known for some time that recurrent neural networks can produce temporal sequencing!
  3rd, there is no virtual machine required - a certain class of operations can be the output of a single, albeit highly distributed network.
Dennett may well be right, but not this way.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Metz I
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996
Dennett, D. Davidson Vs Dennett, D.
 
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II 136
Event / Davidson: to have reasons - all propositional attitudes - as opposed to physical events that have physical descriptions. These descriptions of the material world can be in everyday language, just not intentionalist (DavidsonVsDennett) - Micro: to have a reason, Macro: body movements.
II 139
The individuation process of the intentionalist and the physicalist discourse have a fundamental incommensurability. The intentionalist predicates inherently have essential normativity.

D I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

D III
D. Davidson
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

D IV
D. Davidson
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
Dennett, D. Dretske Vs Dennett, D.
 
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Fred Dretske
Dennett I 567
Meaning / function / Dennett: it appears anbearable to some philosophies to associate meaning with function, because it ascribes no proper causal role to meaning. Similar idea: that the mind is only an effect and no root cause. (Evolution).
Meaning / DretskeVsDennett: this is not enough, the meaning has to play a role in our mental life that it never plays in the life of an artificial object (> E.g. Vending Machine).

Dret I
F. Dretske
Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge 1997

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Dennett, D. Field Vs Dennett, D.
 
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II 70
Representation/Measuring/Dennett/Field: (Dennett 1982) alternative representational theorem: Here, numbers are not attributed to physical objects, but to monadic mass properties, the property of having a particular mass. Analogy to Intentionality: no objects or incidents with Boolean or sentence structure, but properties with such a structure.
Field: does that commit us the less internal structure?
Intentional Properties/Dennett/Field: perhaps these Dennettian properties are to be attributed to an organism as a whole? An organism could have many of these at the same time. Then all we need in terms of structure are relations, which are suitable for propositions that exist between simultaneous states of a whole organism. But that is not what most people understand to be an "internal system of representation".
2) (more important, in connection with nominalism): not every image of representations on propositions that preserves the Boolean or sentence structure satisfies the explanation claims we make on propositions:
II 71
We could easily find some that preserve the Boolean or sentence structure, and attribute the proposition that grass is green to the mental state "snow is white". Proposition/Field: for them (other than for numbers) structure is not sufficient.
FieldVsDennett: hence his analogy is limited. The role of propositions is quite different from that of numbers.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Fie III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
Dennett, D. Fodor Vs Dennett, D.
 
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Dennett I 570
Meaning/Evolution/FodorVsDennett: E.g. Eye of the frog: reports about meaning are too unexact if they do not distinguish between shadow and real fly. Meaning/Evolution/DennettVsFodor: where you simply can not distinguish what was the selecting environment, there is no truth in the question of what the eye really says.
- - -
Fodor/Lepore IV 142
Def Normativism/Dennett/Fodor/Lepore: a being should be represented as one that has such intentional states as they are appropriate in the circumstances. And the wishes that match its interests. There are two directions as to why it should be related to the theory of interpretation: 1) because some of attribution principles should be normative, 2) at least some of the principles are idealized and heuristic. They will not be met by intentional systems of flesh and blood. Fodor/LeporeVsDennett/VsNormativism of intentional states: we question both. ad 1) So now, what principles? Here, Dennett does not differ from Davidson and Lewis.
IV 143
Let’s consider the following Principles of Charity/PoC: 1) principle of truth: necessary, intentional attributions are mostly true. (Davidson, Lewis, Dennett)
2) consistency principle: necessary, most intentional attributions are coherent. (Davidson, Lewis, Dennett)
3) containedness principle, unity principle: neccessary; if a creature believes P and P contains Q, one must assume that it believes both (only Davidson)
4) adequacy principle: most creatures want for themselves what is good for them. (All authors).
IV 144
Evolution Theory/Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: his evolutionary assumptions are dubious:
IV 145
The fact that a system has been selected evolutionarily does not mean that all of its subsystems are as well! It is not obvious that a system which believes most things correctly has a development advantage! (see Stich, The Fragmentation of Reason). Note
5)> IV 145
VsDennett: it is simply not true that if we find a being with an intentional structure, it must exist because of a selection.
IV 146/147
Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: 1) so the hermeneutic status of attribution of intentional attitudes (to us) seems to be derived from the corresponding hermeneutic status of attribution of biological functions (to mental states). Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: 2) It is not clear what purposes the thesis of the theory of interpretation (that there are no intentional states) will serve in biology.
IV 150
Forecast/Forecast Capacity/Predictability/Consistency/Rationality/Explanation/Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: The possibility of forecast does not need to be based on the assumption of rationality, it can also simply be based on identified regularity.
I 154
Normativism/Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: but his normativism is based on the principle of charity. Vs: but the evolutionary argument makes the relation between interpretation and charity contingent.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Dennett, D. Hofstadter Vs Dennett, D.
 
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II 709
Meaning / Computers / SearleVsDennett: computers do not have "semantics", and will never have.
Dennett, D. McDowell Vs Dennett, D.
 
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I 77
Content/Dennett: proposes to understand the role of content on the personal level as being a portion of the content at the sub-personal level. ("Presentiment", however, is not isolated). McDowellVsDennett.

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001
Dennett, D. McGinn Vs Dennett, D.
 
Books on Amazon
I 69
Consciousness / McGinn: Even a syntactic CaIM explanation, which assumes that there is in fact symbols in the brain that makes it impossible to explain consciousness as mere aggregation of such symbols. (McGinnVsDennett, McGinnVsPinker). (CaIM = combinatoric atomism with lawlike mappings).   Basic structure of the states of consciousness: if there ever is such a thing, it is at the level of consciousness! It is not a method for extracting of consciousness from brain states or brain characteristics.
II 191
Def death / McGinn: the annihilation of the ego, dying is the process of extinction.
II 192
  We have only the very idea of ​​it, to exist in an instant and to cease to exist in the next moment. The process remains vague and opaque.   It is in many ways the same as the beginning of existence. We can not simply imagine the beginning of the ego as we imagine how matter takes a form. (DennettVs).

McG I
C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McG II
C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Dennett, D. Nagel Vs Dennett, D.
 
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Rorty VI 144
Explanation/Dennett/Rorty: it is sufficient to explain why there seems to be something phenomenological, i.e. why it seems to be true "that there is a difference between thinking... that something seems to be pink, and the fact that something really appears to be pink. (!) VsDennett: his critics believe that his book is merely good for explaining away consciousness.
Belief/Existence/Dennett/Rorty: should reply that it is a good thing to explain something away, i.e. to declare that we do not have to make room for this something in our image, but only for the belief in that something.
NagelVsDennett/Rorty: Procrustes-like adaptation to objectivity. Instead, we should seek an objectivity which connects the position of the first person with that of the third person.
First Person/Nagel/Searle/Rorty: (inter alia): knowledge of intrinsic, non-relational properties of mental events.
RortyVsNagel/VsSearle: if they accept the maxim: "if all the relational properties are explained (all causes and effects), then the thing itself is explained", they will realize that they lose out here.
I 145/146
Nagel: (according to Rorty) therefore he must insist that non-relational properties are impossible reduce to relational ones. Consciousness/Nagel/Rorty: that a human has consciousness is not merely a belief, but a conclusion from evidence.
      I.e. there is a gap (according to Rorty) between the evidence and the conclusion from the evidence, the gap between the totality of the relations between the consciousness and the rest of the world, and the intrinsic nature of consciousness on the other ahnd.
VI 147
NagelVsDennett/Rorty: his "hetero-phenomenology" is not sufficient. Nagel Thesis: the sources of philosophy are pre-linguistic, their problems are not dependent on culture.
VI 149
Hetero-Phenomenalism/DennettVsNagel: he should accept the "hetero-phenomenalism" as a neutral description. RortyVsDennett, RortyVsNagel: both missed! Hetero-phenomenalism claims to speak that which Nagel thinks unspeakable. Nagel is right here in accusing him of a petitio principii, because this anticipates the decision about all the interesting questions.
DennettVsNagel: perhaps we are only now unable to describe certain things and later we will be!
NagelVsDennett: something "else, describable" does not interest me! The indescribable should not be replaced with something describable.
VI 150
That would be like trying to ask Kant to recognize the thing as such after the reception of Hegel.
VI 151/152
Def Hetero-Phenomenology/Rorty: claims for himself to tell the other what "he actually spoke about". VsQualia, VsUnrecognizable Nature, VsKnowledge that cannot be influenced by way of speaking, (reductionism). (RortyVsDennett: he falsely believes he is neutral).

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Dennett, D. Putnam Vs Dennett, D.
 
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Dennett I 575
Meaning / Dennett: Vending machine and the information of the frog eye derive their meaning from the function. Where the function returns no answer, there is nothing to investigate. The meanings of humans are just as derived as that of the vending machine. This proves the twin earth example. Otherwise, one must postulate essentialism. Meaning / PutnamVsDennett: has not primarily to do with function; rather with reference.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Dennett, D. Rorty Vs Dennett, D.
 
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Richard Rorty
VI 171
Existence/RortyVsDennett: no one would ask "how real is that?" unless in imagining a partisan opposition. (Royce: Z "some things are not so damned, really").
VI 172
Dennett believes all of them to be abstractions. In contrast, electrons are Illata for him! Ontology/Arthur Fine: "natural ontological attitude": one should not even answer such questions. One should not have grand ontological bonds.
FineVsDennett: one should not speak of the "furniture of the physical world".
Ontology/RortyVsDennett: once one has completed the task of anticipating and understanding the world, one feels no appeal to turn to a new topic, namely ontology.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Dennett, D. Searle Vs Dennett, D.
 
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John R. Searle
Dennett I 558
Intentionality/SearleVsDennett: cannot be reached by the composition of equipment or the construction of ever-improving algorithms. DennettVsSearle: this is the belief in sky hook: the Spirit shall not be created, it is not designed, but only (unexplained) source of design.
SearleVsDennett: the view that one can look for "floating grounds" for a selection process for the mind, is a caricature of Darwinian thinking.
- - -
Searle I 179
We can understand the concept of an unconscious mental state only so that it was about a real content of consciousness. Def "compound principle": the idea that all unconscious intentional states in principle consciousness are accessible.
1. SearleVsDennett: there is a difference between intrinsic intentionality and as if intentionality. If one wanted to give up this difference, one would have to accept the fact that everything is about something mental, because relative to any purpose can be anything and everything treated as if it were something intellectual.
E.g. Running water could be described as if it had intentionality: it is trying to get down, by visiting clever way the line of least resistance, it processes information, the calculated size of rocks, etc .. (> laws of nature) , But if water is something mental, then everything is something mental.
2. Unconscious intentional states are intrinsic.
I 180
3. intrinsic intentional states, conscious or unconscious, always have an aspect shape. Someone may want a glass of drinking water without wanting to drink a glass of H2O. There is an indefinite number of true descriptions of the evening star or a glass of water, but if someone wants a glass of water, this will only happen under certain aspects and not others.
I 181
4. The aspects feature can not be exhaustively or fully characterized alone with the help of third person predicates. There is always an inference gap gape between the epistemological reasons that we can gain from the behavior that the aspect is present, and the ontology of the aspect itself. A person may well create a behavior of the water searching on the day, but each such conduct will also be a search of H2O. There is no way exclude the second.
I 182
E.g. assumed we would have a brain o Skop to look into the skull of a person, and see that she wants water, but no H2O, then still a conclusion would play a part! We then would still have a law-like link that puts us in a position to conclude from our observations of the neural architecture that in this case the desire for water, but not the desire for H2O is realized. The neurophysiological facts are always causally sufficient for any amount of mental facts.
5. But the ontology of unconscious mental states is solely in the existence of purely neurophysiological phenomena.
E.g. we imagine someone fast asleep and dreamless. Now it is so that he believes that the capital of Colorado is Denver. Now, the only facts that may exist while he is completely unconscious are neurophysiological facts.
I 183
That seems to be a contradiction: the ontology of unconscious intentionality consists entirely of objective, neurophysiological third person phenomena, yet these states have an aspect shape. This contradiction is resolved when we consider the following: 6. The concept of an unconscious intentional state is the concept of a state which is a possible conscious thought.
7. The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective characteristics of the brain that are capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts.
I 184
The existence of causal features is compatible therewith that their causal powers may be blocked in each case due to confounding factors. An unconscious intentional state may be such that it could simply not be brought to consciousness by the person concerned. However, it must be a thing of the kind that, in principle, can be brought to consciousness. Mentalism: the naive mentalism leads to a kind of dispositional analysis of unconscious mental phenomena. The idea of a dispositional theory of mind has been introduced precisely for the purpose of getting rid of the appeal to the consciousness. (> Ryle).
- - -
III 156
Rule/VsSearle: one might say, "is it not simply so, "as if" we followed the rules?" As if/intentionality/Searle: "As if-Intentionality" explains nothing if there is no real intentionality. She has no causal power.
SearleVsDennett: it is as empty as the "intentional attitude".

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Dennett, D. Verschiedene Vs Dennett, D. I 400
VsDennett thesis "I m the guy who notoriously denies that people perceive colors and pain, and who believes that thermostats think - You just need to ask my critics"




Dennett, D. Peacocke Vs Dennett, D.
 
Books on Amazon
I 204/205
PeacockeVsDennett: the causal role of beliefs and other propositional attitudes cannot be detected in this derived way (via attribution rules), namely as consequence of an instrumentalist view. VsInternal Instrumentalism/VsInstrumentalism: Dennett's instrumentalist conditions are not sufficient for the attribution of mental states.
E.g. Suppose there is a "body" which exactly resembles a human body, except that it has no brain. It is controlled from Mars and the Martians fully understand the human neurophysiology. Their computer can predict nerve stimuli for any given stimulation and past situation.
The computer has a specification of the past of the "body", but only a finite set of conditionals that dictate how the "body" should behave. So it can make the "body" to behave in every situation like a human. This behavior is now just as predictable if it is assumed to have intentions. But it is just a puppet. Therefore, Dennett's conditions are insufficient.
Peacocke: what have the conditions omitted?
Wrong solution: propose that a system would have to be built by another intentional system. That would be too strict.
Solution: what is missing is that the belief and the others are not causally caused! E.g. if someone remembers, then there is a state in which he once was...
I 206
The computer does not have such states. There will certainly be a history of previous stimulations. But that can hardly be identified with a memory track.
PeacockeVsVs: back then, an intention may have formed at the same time that has survived. Then we cannot say that this intention also has the description of this encounter in the past as categorical grounds.
The computer explained as folk psychology, conceives beliefs, experience, memory, intention as interrelated.
Peacocke: this suggests that having intentions is more than a complex and cohesive family of dispositions (even together with a categorical foundation).
The case of the computer shows that Dennett's causal interactions are not always there when the instrumentalist conditions for the attribution of belief are fulfilled. Therefore, Dennett brings so-called "core elements" along. These are not present in the computer case.
Peacocke: we can say that the computer does not have any experiences, then it has no propositional attitudes either.
Peacocke: this makes it necessary to take a middle position. If it were not for this, it would force us to the side of Mentalese!


Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983
Dennett, D. Stalnaker Vs Dennett, D.
 
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II 180
DennettVsSententialism/Dennett/Stalnaker: Vs propositions as belief objects. (relation theory). Solution/Dennett: "Organismic contribution" of the believer. Neutral with respect to the manner in which it is represented.
Def notional attitude-Psychology/not. att./Dennett: (instead of propositional attitude) neutral in terms of the manner of representation. Defined in concepts of possible worlds (poss.w.), "notional worlds".
Def prop att-psychology/Dennett: describes attitudes in concepts of wide content.
Def sentential attitudes/sent. att./Dennett: syntactic, assumes Mentalese.
Def notional world/Dennett: a fictional world that is constructed from a theorist as an external observer,
II 181
to characterize the narrow attitudes of a subject. That means my twin on Twin Earth and I have the same notional world. Def narrow content/Dennett: is defined by a set of notional worlds that is the way in which a person who had actual world.
notional world/Stalnaker: seem to be exactly the poss.w. that characterize the wide content in the psychology of propositional attitudes.
StalnakerVsDennett: all poss.w. except one are fictitious – how can notional attitudes be different propositional attitudes. Why should not. att. be narrow and prop. att. wide?
narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: are then according to Dennett simply propositions. The difference is neither to be found in the worlds themselves nor the nature of the content if both are just sets of poss.w.. The difference lies in the different responses of the two theories to the question by virtue of which fact someone has a conviction with this content.
prop. att.-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: according to it contents are a function of relation to the actual world although the Twin-Earth-Example shows that they cannot be purely internal.
notional attitudes/not. att.-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: shall explain how purely internal (intrinsic) properties can pick a set of poss.w. that is different than the set that is picked by propositional attitudes.
Wide content: e.g. O'Leary (correctly) thinks that there is water on the ground floor. This is wrong in the twin earth (tw.e.) because it is not water but XYZ.
narrow content/solution: "water-like stuff".
Dennett/Fodor/Stalnaker: we can compare both approaches:
II 182
Narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: he changes the nature of the belief object, narrow contents are no longer propositions but functions of context on propositions. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: is for Dennett of the same kind as further content: both are propositions - function of poss.w. (=notional worlds) to truth values (tr.v.). What changed compared to the wide content is the relation between a believer in a proposition by virtue of which the proposition correctly describes the conviction.
StalnakerVsDennett: but in addition he still has to explain how the purely internal (intrinsic) properties of the subject determine the narrow content.
Solution/Dennett: e.g. Suppose we know all about the dispositions and skills of a subject but nothing about its causal history. Then that is similar as if we find an ancient object and ask what it was good for ((s)> Valéry, find on the beach, objet ambigu).
Dennett: then we imagine what it was ideally created for. In the notional world of an organism we imagine how the environment looks like to which it is best suited.
Solution: propositions that are true in such possible worlds (poss.w.) will be the narrow content of the convictions of these subjects.
StalnakerVsDennett: which is now not what we want: those poss.w. look more so that the desires and needs of the organisms in them are fulfilled and not that their propositions are true in them.
E.g. it is not clear that the antelope with its properties to respond to lions is better off in a world of lions or in one without. It could then do a better job in terms of survival and to reproduce.
Ideal/ideal environment/Dennett: could also be a very ugly poss.w. in which the organisms are, however, prepared to survive in it.
II 183
StalnakerVsDennett: that is better, surely we try to cope with the world in which we think we live. But something is missing: a) many properties that enable organisms to survive, have nothing to do with their convictions,
b) the fact that some counterfactual skills would help us to survive in a counterfactual poss.w. is not sufficient for saying that such a counterfactual possibility is compatible with the poss.w. which we believe to be the actual world.
E.g. Suppose there are no real predators of porcupines in the actual world, they carry their spines simply like that. Then it would be unrealistic to artificially populate their notional world with predators.
E.g. Suppose a poss.w. with beings who would like to eat us humans because of our special odor. Then we should not use such a poss.w. to characterize our convictions.
Solution/Stalnaker: a belief state must serve in any way to be receptive to information from the environment and the information must have a role in determining behavior.
StalnakerVsDennett: if we understand him like that we are still dealing with wide content.
II 184
Representation system/Stalnaker: is then able to be used in a set of alternative internal states that are systematically depending on the environment. S1, S2,.. are internal states
Ei: a state of the environment.
Then an individual is normally in a state Si if the environment is in state Si. Representation: then we could say that the organism represents the environment as being in state Ei.
Content: we could also say that the states contain information about the environment.
Assuming that the states determine a specific behavior to adequately behave in the environment Ei.
Belief state/BS: then we can say that these representations are likely to be regarded as a general type of BS.
That is like Dennett understands narrow content.
Problem/StalnakerVsDennett:
1. the description of the environment is not ascribed to the organism.
2. Information is not distinguished from misinformation (error, deception).
That means if it is in state Si it represents the environment as in Ei being no matter if it is.
Problem: the concept which originates from a causal relation is again wide content.
Important argument: if the environment would be radically different the subject might otherwise be sensitive to it or sensitive to other features ((s) would reverse everything) or it would not be sensitive to the environment at all!
narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: problem: if the skills and dispositions of the organism are included in the descriptions of the content the actual world is initially essential.
((s) problem/Stalnaker/(s): how should we characterize their skills in a counterfactual poss.w.?)
II 185
Dennett: if organisms are sneaky enough we might also here ascribe a narrow ((s) counterfactual) content. StalnakerVsDennett: I see no reason for such optimism. You cannot expect any information about virtual poss.w. expect when you do not make any assumptions about the actual world (act.wrld.) (actual environment).
Ascription/content/conviction/belief/Stalnaker: in normal belief attributions we ignore not only fairytale worlds but in general all possibilities except the completely everyday!
E.g. O’Leary: distinguishes only poss.w. in which the ground floor is dry or wet,
II 186
not also such in which XYZ is floating around. Question: Would he then behave differently? Surely for olive oil but not for XYZ. Twin earth/tw.e./ascription: even if the behavior would not change in twin earth-cases, it is still reasonable not to ascribe tw.e.-cases.
Context dependence/revisionism/Stalnaker: could argued that it is not twin earth but normal world which makes it unsuitable for scientific ascriptions.
Dennett: stands up for his neutral approach (notional world).
StalnakerVsDennett: nevertheless causal-informational representation is substantially relative to a set of alternative options (poss.w.).
internal/intrinsic/causality/problem: the system of causal relations cannot itself be intrinsical to the representing.
Theory: has admittedly a scope to choose between different possibilities of defining content
II 187
StalnakerVsDennett: but there is no absolute neutral context without presuppositions about the environment. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: binds himself a hand on the back by forbidding himself the information that is accessible to wide content.
StalnakerVsDennett: I believe that no sensible concept of content results from this restriction.
- - -
II 238
Language dependency/ascription/belief/Stalnaker: this third type of language dependence is different from the other three.
II 239
People must not be predisposed to express belief that type of language dependency at all. It may be unconscious or tacit assumptions. The content must also not involve any language. Dennett: e.g. Berdichev: we should distinguish simple language-specific cases - whose objects are informational states - from those, so propositions are saved - E.g. approval or opinions.
StalnakerVsDennett: we should rather understand such cases as special cases of a more general belief that also non-linguistic beings like animals might have.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Dennett, D. Pauen Vs Dennett, D.
 
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Pauen V 143
Swapped Spectra/VsDennett: Of course, a neural network can realize two very different forms of activity, e.g. pattern recognition and behavior control. There is also no reason not to combine an activity with changing activities of the other type. A trained network can also be caused even to give various responses to a pattern.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Dennett, D. Rosenthal Vs Dennett, D.
 
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Pauen V 140
RosenthalVsDennett: Dennetts Beharren auf der Revidierbarkeit läßt sich sehr wohl mit der Zuschreibung mentaler Zustände vereinbaren.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Fodor, J. Dennett Vs Fodor, J.
 
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I 533
Cognitive Barrier/DennettVsMcGinn: the situation for the monkey is different than for us: he cannot even understand the question. He is not even taken aback! Neither Fodor nor Chomsky can cite cases of animals to which certain issues are a mystery. I 534 In reality, it is not as they represent it, a biological, but rather a pseudo-biological problem. It even ignores a biological fact: we can certainly find an intelligence scale among living beings.
Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from issues that cannot be solved in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness will develop in a way we cannot even imagine today.
I 570 Why do Chomsky and Fodor not want this conclusion? They consider the means to be unsatisfactory. If our minds are not based on sky hooks, but on cranes, they would like to keep that secret.
Meaning/Evolution/FodorVsDennett: E.g. eye of the frog: reports about meaning too vague if they do not distinguish between shadow and real fly. Dennett.
I 571
Meaning/Evolution/DennettVsFodor: where you simply cannot distinguish what was the selectioning environment, there is no truth in the question of what the eye really says. Material/Evolution/DennettVsFodor: the uncertainty that Fodor criticizes is in reality the material with which evolution works, its condition. (the "borderline cases").
I 571
Meaning/Meaning/Material/Evolution/DennettVsFodor: the view that there must be something in particular which the frog’s eye "means" is simple essentialism.
I Lanz 299
DennettVsFodor: denies Fodor’s assumption that intentional expressions actually denote existing personal states. Thus, Dennett denies their feature: Causal efficiency of intentional states (hence DennettVsLewis). - - -
Rorty I 279
DennettVsFodor/Rorty: two subjects can absolutely believe the same thing, although their respective processors do not even speak the same language. Accordingly, no conclusions are required from the propositions of the processors to the propositions which the subject believes. Unlike the "ideas" of the empiricists, the causal process does not need to comply with any conclusion chain, which justifies the opinions of the person. Explanations may have their private character, justification is public in as far as disagreements of different people on the functioning of their tricky minds neither refer nor should refer.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Instrumentalism Fodor Vs Instrumentalism
 
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IV 148
Theory of Evolution/Evolution/Dennett/Fodor/Lepore: E.g. Assuming the function of the forest would be seen by us so that it should prevent soil erosion. So ecology will use such a concept, or it will not.
If it does, it’s a fact what the forest is good for, if it does not use the concept, we cannot improve the situation by assuming "intentional attitudes"!
Of course we could tell a fairy tale about how "Father Erosion" wants to wash away the soil, and how the good Forest wants to stop him.
IV 149
But such a story by us cannot decide which biological functions exist or not. Fodor/LeporeVsInstrumentalism/VsDennett: look how God punishes instrumentalism: reject the distinction of theories against stories, and soon you will no longer be able to distinguish stories from theories.
Evolution Theory/Truth/Fodor/Lepore: if used to explain intentional attribution, it is rather an empirical than a conceptual question whether the principle of truth applies. But we do not agree with the antecedent anyway.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Pinker, St. McGinn Vs Pinker, St.
 
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I 69
Consciousness / McGinn: Even a syntactic CaIM declaration, which assumes that there are in fact symbols in the brain does not make it possible to explain the consciousness as a mere juxtaposition of such symbols. (McGinnVsDennett, McGinnVsPinker).   Basic structure of states of consciousness: if there is ever such a thing, it is at the level of consciousness! It is not a method for lifting the consciousness of brain states or brain properties.

McG I
C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McG II
C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001
Projectivism Fodor Vs Projectivism
 
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IV 139
Fodor/LeporeVsProjectivism/Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: 1) Projectivism is not able to construct existence quantifications that go beyond the contents of propositional attitudes. (In contrast to sentences that quote the content). E.g. Smith’s three-year-old hears his father talk about the distinction between analytic/Synthetic. He repeats later: "blahblahblah, analytical synthetical, blahblahblah". For the projection theory this is self-contradictory, because the state that is attributed by the (three-year-old) speaker is not a mental state after all!.
IV 140
E.g. Twin Earth/TE: Suppose the people on the Twin Earth have already found out that what they call "water" is not H2O. Therefore, the belief they express with "water is wet" is not of the belief that water is wet! Because they are not in the correct causal relationship with water (but to XYZ). Perhaps you would like to say that there are at least one or two other beliefs which are expressed by the use of this expression (formula) by its twin. Fodor/Lepore: But how can they say that if you know (and you do) that the belief which it expresses is none that you could express at all? ((s) in order to make the projectivist speaker attribution). 1) VsProjectivism: must assert that there are no beliefs on the Twin Earth! Conversely, your twin would have to deny them any belief. These are not just technical difficulties. If projectivism is right, what you believe depends on the interpreter. Vs: but if anything is metaphysically independent from something else, then it is the fact that the repertoire of potential beliefs of a person is independent from the potential speech acts of someone else is. 2) VsProjectivism: cannot explain the "element of interpretation" of the intentional attribution. On the other hand, it does count as a variety of the interpretation theory. Why should the projectivist not assume the reality of the intentional after all.
IV 141
Albeit one who rejects the usual assumptions about several-digit predicates of propositional attitudes? I.e. Projectivism: four-digit relation: 1) creature, 2) mental state, 3) propositional object 4) interpreter.

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Putnam, H. Dennett Vs Putnam, H.
 
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I 571/572
Meaning/Function/Evolution/Dennett: the meaning is like the function at the moment of their creation still nothing definite. Twin Earth/t.e./Putnam/DennettVsPutnam: it requires a leap in the reference, a jump in the intentionality.
Dennett: you could now tend to think that inner intentionality has a certain "inertia".
I 573
Twin Earth/Dennett/VsPutnam: you cannot tell a story assuming that tables are no tables, even though they look like tables and are used like tables. Something else would be a "living being that looks like Fury" (But is not Fury).
But if there are "twin earth horses" on the Twin Earth which are much like our horses, then twin earth horses are horses, a non-terrestrial kind of horse though, but after all horses.
((s), therefore, in Putnam the Twin Earth water has a different chemical formula: YXZ.)
Dennett: of course you can also represent a more stringent opinion according to which the non-terrestrial horses are a separate species. Both are possible.
I 575
Indeterminacy/Twin Earth/Dennett: Their idea of ​​what "horse" for really means suffers under the same indeterminacy like the frog’s idea of the fly as a "little flying edible object". Indeterminacy/DennettVsPutnam: E.g. "cat", "Siamese cat": Perhaps you simply find one day that you must make a distinction that was just not necessary previously, because the subject did not come up for discussion.
This indeterminacy undermines Putnam’s argument of the t.e.
Münch III 379
Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: he tries to close the gap by saying that we are referring to natural types, whether we know it or not. Dennett: But what types are natural? Races are as natural as species or classes! ((s) VsDennett: There is also the view that only the species are natural).
DennettVsEssentialism: E.g. Vending Machine has dissolved into nothingness. Equally: E.g. Frog: he would have caught food pellets in the wild just the same if they had come in his way. Disjunction: in a way "flies or pellets" are a natural type for frogs. They do not distinguish between the two naturally. On the other hand, the disjunction is not a natural type: it does not occur in nature!.
Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: "natural type" twin earth horse/horses/disjunction: E.g. Assuming someone had brought twin earth horse to the Earth unnoticed, we would have readily referred to them as horses. Meaning/Dennett: Vending machine and the information of the frog’s eye derive their meaning from the function. Where the function does not provide a response, there is nothing to investigate.
The meanings of the people are just as derived as those of a venidng machine. This proves the t.e. Otherwise you have to postulate essentialism.
Explanation/DennettVsPutnam: an explanation on microphysical level is not inconsistent with an explanation on rational grounds.
III 31 Putnam
DennettVsPutnam: according to Putnam’s conception the mind something chaotic. Dennett and Fodor: Both authors have an unspoken premise in mind, and this is reductionist. There is also cognition without reductionism.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Mü I
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Qualia Block Vs Qualia
 
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Ned Block
Block I 198
It could be said that some homunculi have saved sentences and "remember" them. However, that is no reason to suppose Qualia.
To have qualia is not a matter of information processing.
Theory/Block: The system that we are discussing here is something to which every true psychological theory applies according to the hypothesis. Any doubt that it has qualia would be a doubt that qualia belong in the field of psychology.
Vs: That can only be cognitive psychology. No wonder that qualia do not belong to this area.
BlockVsVs: I am not thinking of cognitive psychology: Instead, nothing that we know about the psychological processes underlying our conscious mental life has anything to do with Qualia!
 Only psychophysics could be designed in a way that it would be about Qualia on its own initiative. But it would only have to do with functional aspects, not with a qualitative character. So it would not enlighten the Qualia.
Block I 200
Dennett: Thesis: contents of consciousness consist only of judgments. Qualia are probably not judgments (opinions). Then they are artificial theoretical entities that we postulate to explain the desire to predict everything about what is going on in our minds. BlockVsDennett: he has the same relation to qualia that the American Air Force has to Vietnamese villages: he destroys them, to save them.
I 200
Argument of the lack of Qualia/Block: uses the possibility that the functional* and the psycho-functional state that are to be identified with pain, can occur without a Quale existing at the same time. It seems at least conceivable that a quale can occur without the functional state. E.g. split-brain patients report that they still feel pain, although the pain no longer torments them. They recognize pinpricks as sharp, but do not avoid them.

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007
Qualia Dennett Vs Qualia
 
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Block I 200
Dennett: contents of consciousness consist only of judgments. Qualia are probably no judgments (opinions). Then they are spurious theoretical entities that we propose to explain the desire to predict anything about what is going on in our minds. BlockVsDennett: he has the same relation to qualia, which has the American Air Force to Vietnamese villages: he destroys them, to save them.
PauenV 142
Qualia/DennettVsExplanatory Gap: nothing but complexes of dispositions. If you say: "This is my Quale", then you single out this complex whether you want to or not. It only seems as if you were referring to a private incomprehensible something before the eyes of the mind, but it only seems to be that way. Explanatory GapVsDennett: According to the representatives of this argument it is possible that differences exist on the phenomenal level, which do not correspond to any functional differences.
E.g. Argument of inverted spectra, argument of mising qualia (see below).
Inverted Spectra/Pauen: Argument: it is possible that two people have conflicting color perceptions, but have no differences on the physical level.
Neither behavior nor neuronal level show the difference.
V143
If we accept that, then phenomenal states could not be grasped in behavioral dispositions, not even in functional descriptions. Problem: this triggers the undesired consequences of epiphenomenalism if mental differences may not be noticeable at the neural level.
Inverted Spectra/DennettVsInverted Spectra/Pauen: behavior and phenomenal experience cannot be separated, because they are intertwined on the neural level. Therfore awareness and behavior are inseparable.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Searle, J.R. Dennett Vs Searle, J.R.
 
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I 282
Intentionality/Darwin/Dennett: Darwin turns it all around: intentionality is secured from bottom to top. The first meaning was not a fully developed meaning, it certainly does not show all ’essential’ properties (whatever they may be). "Quasi-meaning", half semantics.
I 555
SearleVsDennett: "as-if intentionality". Intentionality/DennettVsSearle: But you have to start somewhere (if you want to avoid metaphysics). The first step in the right direction is hardly recognizable as a step towards meaning.
SearleVsArtificial Intelligence: Computers only possess "as-if intentionality".
DennettVsSearle: then he has a problem. While AI ​​says we are composed of machines, Darwinism says we are descended from machines!.
I 557
You can hardly refuse the first if you agree with the second statement. How can something that has emerged from machines be anything other than a much, much more sophisticated machine?. Function/Searle: (according to Dennett): Only products that have been produced by a real human consciousness have a function ((s)> objet ambigu, Valéry).
DennettVsSearle: I.e. the wings of the aircraft, but not the wings of the eagle serve for flying!.
I 558
Intentionality/SearleVsDennett: cannot be achieved by the composition of machines or the ever better structure of algorithms.
I 569
DennettVsSearle: this is the belief in sky hooks: the mind is not supposed to emerge, it is not created, but only (inexplicable) source of creation. Intention/DennettVsSearle: (E.g. Vending Machine): Those who select its new function perhaps do not even formulate any new intention. They only fall into the habit of relying on the new useful function. They do not perceive that they carry out an act of unconscious exaptation.
Parallel: >Darwin: There is an unconscious selection of properties in pets.
II 73
Searle: In the case of the artifact the creator must always be asked. Intrinsic (original) intentionality/DennettVsSearle: is metaphysical, an illusion. As if the "author would need to have a more original intention".
Dennett: but there is no task for that. The hypothetical robot would be equally capable of transfering derived intentionality to other artifacts.
Intentionality/DennettVsSearle: there certainly used to be coarser forms of intentionality (Searle contemptuously "mere as-if intentionality").
Dennett: they serve both as a temporal precursors as well as current components.
We are descended from robots and consist of robots (DNA, macromolecules). All intentionality we enjoy is derived from the more fundamental intentionality of these billions of systems.

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Den II
D. Dennett
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
Sententialism Dennett Vs Sententialism
 
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Stalnaker II 180
DennettVsSententialismus/Dennett/Stalnaker: Vs Sätze als Glaubensobjekte. (relation theory). Lösung/Dennett: "organismischer Beitrag" des Glaubenden. Neutral in Bezug auf die Weise, wie er repräsentiert wird.
Def Notionale Einstellung-Psychologie/not. Einst/Dennett: (statt propositionale Einstellungen) neutral in Bezug auf die Weise der Repräsentation. Definiert in Begriffen von möglichen Welten (poss.w.), "notionalen Welten".
Def Propositionale Einstellungs-Psychologie/Dennett: beschreibt Einstellungen in Begriffen von weitem Inhalt.
Def Sententiale Einstellungen/sent.Einst/Dennett: syntaktisch, nimmt Mentalesisch an.
Def notionale Welt/Dennett: eine fiktionale Welt, die von einem Theoretiker als externem Beobachter konstruiert wird.
II 181
Um die engen Einstellungen eines Subjekts zu charakterisieren. D.h. Mein Zwilling auf der twin earth und ich haben die dieselbe notionale Welt. Def enger Inhalt/Dennett: ist durch eine Menge von notionalen Welten definiert, die die Weise ist, wie eine Person… sei.
Notionale Welt/Stalnaker: scheinen genau die poss.w. zu sein, die in der Psychologie der prop Einst den weiten Inhalt charakterisieren. (> StalnakerVsDennett).

Den I
D. Dennett
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Various Authors Pinker Vs Various Authors
 
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I 26
Robots Basic Laws/Asimov: 1) A robot may never hurt a human being,  2) it must obey the orders of humans, unless the orders conflict with the first law 3) It must protect its own existence, unless this conflicted with the 1st or 2nd law.
I 27
PinkerVsAsimov: he was not able to position himself outside his own thought processes. The ability of humans to do evil is not considered, and their support is not excluded by the laws. - - -
I 458
Brain/Emotion/Tradition: "Triune brain": Unity of the cerebrum as evolutionary palimpsest of three layers: 1) Bottom: base ganglia (reptiles), seat of the primitive and selfish emotions
2) Limbic system: softer, more social emotions (parent feelings etc.)
3) The two are surrounded by the modern mammalian brain, the neocortex, which grew rapidly during evolution and is home to the intelligence.

PinkerVsTrinity Theory (with Paul MacLean): the evolutionary forces do not simply accumulate layers. Although our bodies are witnesses of the past, they only possess few parts that have not been modified. Even the appendix is now conceded a function in connection with the immune system. Not even the circuits for emotions remain unaffected. (i.e. ​​also: VsDennett?).
I 459
Emotions are easy to reprogram! E.g. after less than 1,000 years of breeding dogs include Pitt Bulls and Saint Bernards.  Furthermore, the cortex is not riding piggyback on the prehistoric limbic system. The systems work hand in hand. The amygdala dyes our experiences with feelings. It liaises with virtually every other part of the brain.
- - -
I 62
Def SSM/"Sociological Standard Model": separation between culture and biology. Thesis: biological evolution was replaced by cultural evolution. (E.O.Wilson, later became victim of angry protests). LewontinVsWilson.
I 63
Incorrect quotes of the opponents: E.g. Dawkins: "Genes created us, body and mind." (correct).
VsDawkins: wrong quote: "genes control us, body and mind."
- -
I 324
Seeing/PinkerVsGombrich, Ernst H.: contrary to popular belief, we do not see what we expect to see. - - -
I 342
Seeing/Marr: completely ignores the backs, and even the surfaces. He analyzed the form of animals as if they had been made of pipe cleaners. Seeing/BiedermanVsMarr: assigns to every e.g. animal multiple geone combinations for different views.
PinkerVsBiederman/PinkerVsGeones: it is precisely this concession that opens the possibility that forms are recognized in a completely different way. Why should we not think the idea through and assign many memory elements to every form, one for each position? Such memories do not need an exotic object-centered frame of reference, but can use the coordinates of the two-and-a-half dimensional sketch as long as there are so many memories that all perspectives are covered.
Pinker: that was dismissed for many years from the outset. It took perhaps 40,000 aspects for each subject (memory elements). But this does not cover the positions outside the center of the field of vision yet!
 In recent times, it was considered, however, that for each object at most 40 aspects are sufficient when interpolating between views.
I 343
Direction/Up/Down/Seeing/Pinker: People adjust themselves to the top down direction: if Africa lies on its side, it is not recognized, a square is not a diamond. This brings a further dilution of the geone theory: relations such as "over" or "above" must come from the retina, and not from the object.
 This limitation is likely to be indispensable, because often there is no way to define the "up" in an object before you recognized it!
 We can also turn objects in our mind (VsGeones). This makes a frame of reference of geones oriented to the object even less necessary.

Pi I
St. Pinker
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Hetero-Phenomen. Dennett, D.
 
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Perler / Wild I 408
Hetero phenomenology / h.ph. / DennettVsBrentano / VsHusserl: from the perspective of the third person instead of the first. RadnerVsDennett: you can also operate h.ph. from the first person perspective.
Intentionality Dennett, D.
 
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I 281
Bedeutung/Dennett: Entstehung, Geburt der Bedeutung: These die Nucleotidsequenzen, zunächst rein syntaktisch, nehmen "Semantik" an . "Quasi-Bedeutung": Bsp Wirkungsweise von Makromolekülen - SearleVsDennett: nur Als-Ob-Intentionalität. DennettVsSearle: irgendwo muß man anfangen. die ersten Schritte sind aber nicht als Schritte in Richtung Bedeutung zu erkennen. I 282 auch zu uns gehören Teile, die nur Halb-Intentionalität haben.
II 147
Person/Intentionalität/Dennett: These Personwerdung ist der Übergang von einem intentionalen System 1. Ordnung (Überzeugungen und Wünsche, aber nicht über Überzeugungen und Wünsche) zu einem
intentionalen System 2. Ordnung (Überzeugungen über eigene und fremde Überzeugungen).
Intentionales System 3. Ordnung: ist in der Lage zu wollen, daß jemand glaubt, daß es etwas will.