Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analysis | Gould | I 95 Analysis/science/Gould: the fascination that Richard Dawkins's theory exerts is due to some of the bad habits of Western science: atomism, reductionism, determinism; in other words, the notion that wholeness is understood by breaking it down into its "basic" units. GouldVsDawkins: in addition, Dawkins assumes that genes have an influence on the body. Selection cannot see them if they do not translate into parts of the morphology, physiology or behavior that are important for the survival of an organism. Ironically, Dawkin's theory came to light just as pan-selectionist theories were increasingly rejected, according to which all parts of the body are formed in the crucible of natural selection. If most genes fail to be checked, they cannot be the units of selection. >Explanation, >Selection. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Criteria | Dawkins | I 372 Gene/selection/Dawkins: Under reasonable consideration, selection does not directly affect the genes. The DNA is spun into proteins, wrapped in membranes, shielded from the world and invisible to natural selection. (Like >GouldVsDawkins.) The selection would also hardly have a criterion for DNA molecules. All genes look the same just like all tapes look the same. Genes show in their effects. - ((s) Effect makes identity and difference.) |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| Darwinism | McGinn | II 98 Design argument/William Paley: organisms have a brilliant design: We have not designed them, so we have to assume that a foreign intelligence did it. Let us call this intelligence "God". So God exists. DarwinVsPaley: intelligent design does not require a Creator. Selection is sufficient. Mind/Consciousness/Evolution/McGinn: evolution does not explain consciousness - nor sensations. >Evolution, >Consciousness. II 99 Reason: sensation and consciousness cannot be explained through the means of Darwinian principles and physics, because if selection were to explain how sensations are supposed to be created by it, it must be possible to mold the mind from matter. II 100 ((s) Consciousness or sensations would have to be visible for selection.) (Similar GouldVsDawkins). >Selection, >Selection/Gould, >Selection/Dawkins. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Evolution | Mayr | I 43 Evolution/Mayr: Unit of evolution is the population (or species) and not the gene or the individual. (MayrVsDawkins). >Species, >Genes, >R. Dawkins, >Genes/Dawkins, >Evolution/Dawkins. Def Integron/Mayr: An integron is a system created by integration of subordinate units on a higher level. Integrons evolve by natural selection. They are adapted systems at each level because they contribute to the fitness (suitability) of an individual. >Selection. I 183 Evolution/Mayr: Species is the decisive entity of evolution. I 230 Evolution/Progress/Mayr: Cohesion: an expression of the fact that the system of development has become very narrow. Evolution: proceeds very slowly in large, member-rich species, and very quickly in small peripheral isolated groups. >Speciation, >punctuated equilibrium/Eldredge/Gould. A start-up population with few individuals and therefore little hidden genetic variation can more easily assume a different genotype. Macroevolution: is most strongly determined by the geographical factor (isolation). I 234 Evolution/Mayr: the concepts: 1) Rapid evolution: (transmutationism): type jump. Even after Darwin some researchers (including his friend Huxley) could not accept the concept of natural selection and developed saltationist theories. 2) Transformational evolution (transformationism) gradual change of the ice to the organism. Ignored by Darwin. I 235 3) Variation Evolution (Darwin) I 235 Darwin (early): adaptation modification. Vs: can never explain the enormous variety of organic life, because it does not allow for an increase in the number of species. I 236 Darwin/Mayr: The Origin of Species: 5 Main Theories 1) Organisms are constantly evolving over time (evolution as such). 2) Different species of organisms are derived from a common ancestor. 3) Species multiply over time (speciation) 4) Evolution takes the form of gradual change. (GradualismVsSaltationism). >Gradualism, >Saltationism. 5) The evolutionary mechanism consists in the competition among numerous unique individuals for limited resources that leads to differences in survival and reproduction (natural selection). I 234 Evolution/Mayr: the concepts: 1) Rapid evolution: (transmutationism): type jump. Even after Darwin some researchers (including his friend Huxley) could not accept the concept of natural selection and developed saltationist theories. 2) Transformational evolution (transformationism) gradual change of the ice to the organism. Ignored by Darwin. I 235 3) Variation Evolution (Darwin) I 235 Darwin (early): adaptation modification. Vs: can never explain the enormous variety of organic life, because it does not allow for an increase in the number of species. I 236 Darwin/Mayr: The Origin of Species: 5 Main Theories 1) Organisms are constantly evolving over time (evolution as such). 2) Different species of organisms are derived from a common ancestor. 3) Species multiply over time (speciation) 4) Evolution takes the form of gradual change. (GradualismVsSaltationism). 5) The evolutionary mechanism consists in the competition among numerous unique individuals for limited resources that leads to differences in survival and reproduction (natural selection). >Selection. I 377 Evolution of life: a chemical process involving autocatalysis and a directing factor. Prebiotic selection. Cf. >St. Kauffman. I 237 Pasteur: proofed the impossibility of life in oxygen-rich atmosphere! In 1953, Stanley Miller grew amino acids, urea and other organic molecules in a glass flask by discharging electricity into a mixture of methane, ammonium, hydrogen, and water vapor. I 238 Proteins, nucleic acids: the organisms must form these larger molecules themselves. Amino acids, pyrimidines, puridine do not need to formed by the organisms themselves. I 239 Molecular biology: discovered that the genetic code is the same for bacteria, which do not have nuclei, as in protists, fungi, animals and plants. I 240 Missing link: Archaeopteryx: half bird half reptile. Not necessarily direct ancestor. Speciation: a) dichopatric: a previously connected area is divided by a new barrier: mountain range, inlets, interruption of vegetation. b) peripatrically: new start-up population emerges outside of the original distribution area. c) sympatric speciation: new species due to ecological specialization within the area of distribution. Darwin's theory of gradualism. >Gradualism. I 243 VsGardualism: cannot explain the emergence of completely new organs. Problem: How can a rudimentary wing be enlarged by natural selection before it is suitable for flying? I 244 Darwin: two possible solutions: a) Intensification of the function: E.g. eyes, e.g. the development of the anterior limbs of moles, whales, bats. b) Functional change: E.g. Antennae of daphia (water flea): additional function of the swimming paddle, which is enlarged and modified under selection pressure. E.g. Gould: Feathers probably first for temperature control before any animal could fly. Function/Biology: Functional differences are also related to behavioral patterns, e.g. feather cleaning. Competing theories on evolutionary change I 247 Salationism: Huxley later Bateson, de Vries, (Mendelists). The saltationist emergence of new species only occurs poyploidy and some other forms of chromosomal restructuring (very rare) during sexual reproduction. Teleological theories: assume that nature has a principle: Osbron's arsitogenesis, Chardin's omega principle. Should lead to perfection. >Teilhard de Chardin. Lamarck's Theories: Changes go back to use and non-use, environmental conditions. Until the 1930s! I 248 Def "soft inheritance" (acquired characteristics). Was refuted by genetics. Def "hard inheritance" (so-called "central dogma"): the information contained in the proteins (the phenotype) cannot be passed on to the nucleic acids (the genotype)! (Insight of molecular biology). I 256 Macroevolution: after saltationism, soft heredity and autogenesis, had been refuted with evolution, macroevolution had to be explained more and more as a phenomenon on the level of the population, i.e. as a phenomenon directly attributable to events and processes during microevolution. (Speciation: faster in isolation). (>Gould, Eldredge, 1971(1): "punctuated equilibrium", punctualism.) I 281 New: we know today that the cycles of herbivores elicit those of the predators and not vice versa! Coevolution: E.g. the Yucca moth destroys the plant's ovules by its larvae, but pollens the flowers. 1. N. Eldredge, S. J. Gould: Punctuated equilibria: an alternative to phyletic gradualism. In: T. Schopf (Ed), Models in Paleobiology, 82-115, San Francisco, (1972). |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Evolution | McGinn | II 57 Human/Evolution/mind/McGinn: it is a remarkable coincidence that we are the only species on earth that is able to do science and philosophy. There could easily be a different species with a certain level of scientific talent, about the level of a ten year old. Or a species that is superior in biology but inferior in physics etc. The kind of intelligence that we have, is absolutely not necessary for living beings to survive. >Intelligence. II 79 Consciousness/evolution/McGinn: consciousness is not the pinnacle of evolution and also not the most impressive part of organism structures. It is biologically, comparatively simple. It is part of our oldest facilities. (Not self-confidence!). Consciousness is as common as blood and bone: Even octopus need consciousness for the interpretation of what they perceive with their eyes. Consciousness is not a product of culture or civilization. (Self-esteem might be). The problem with consciousness results from our way of thinking, not from the consciousness itself. >Consciousness, >Culture, >Civilization. II 99f Mind/consciousness/evolution/McGinn: evolution does not explain consciousness, nor sensation. Reason: sensation and consciousness cannot be explained with the means of the Darwinian principles and physics, because if the selection will explain how sensations are caused by it, it must be possible to shape the mind of matter. ((s) Consciousness or sensation must be visible for selection. (Similarly GouldVsDawkins)) >Selection, >Darwinism. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Foundation | Rorty | VI, 246f Foundation / Dawkins / RortyVsDawkins: (thesis, that people are just vehicles for genes) - an inadequate thought of foundation - RortyVsKant: you should not hold on to an ahistorical "human nature" as well. >Ultimate Justification, >Absoluteness, >Nature. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Genes | Rorty | VI 241 ff Gen/Genes/Evolution/RortyVsDawkins: thesis that people are just vehicles for genes: is an inadequate foundation of thought. The claim that one knows something which is itself not intuitive morality, but probably could correct our intuitive morality. >Foundation/Rorty, >Ultimate Justification. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Order | Dennett | I 94 Design/Dennett: there is no quantitative measure of Design. It is not undisputed that a car contains more design than a bicycle, a shark more than an amoeba, etc. I 95. E.g. plagiarism contains no less design than the original (> forgery). I 172 Design/Dennett: since each newly emerging crafted thing contains a huge design effort somewhere in its origination, the most economical hypothesis will always assume that the design is essentially a copy of an earlier design. Design/Dennett: Can it be measured? Can we calculate the speed with which the genetic drift accumulates deviations? There is a cap to the speed, the actual evolution is much slower. I 316f The "products" are not the gene strings, but the creatures themselves. DennettVsDawkins. Complexity/design/Dennett: what is the relationship between the two? It's about the right combination of simplicity and complexity. It is about "opportunities for simplicity". E.g. a simple Seagull outboard motor is famous for the fact that it never breaks down. Of the paddle we rightly don t think so highly. Design/Dennett: If you know something about the design of a device, you can predict its behavior without having to worry about the basic physical properties of its parts. E.g. operate a video recorder. E.g. construction of a VCR: only here one must observe the basic laws of physics. I 85f Design/Dennett: Design needs a creator - Order: needs no creator - Darwin: reduced design to order - there is no quantitative measure of design. - It is not undisputed whether a bicycle has more design than a shark. I 95 Plagiarism: is no less designed than the original. I 94 Design: is a great investment - hence: most designs are a copy of previous design. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Selection | Dawkins | I 38 Selection/Dawkins: Thesis: Selection occurs at the lowest level. (Not species, not individual, but genes, unit of heredity). >Genes, >Genes/Dawkins. I 42 Selection/Dawkins: Earliest form of selection: simply a selection of more stable molecules and rejecting unstable ones. It would not make sense to shake the right number of atoms and the right amount of added energy to expect a human to come out. The age of the universe would not suffice for that. I 73 Order/ordering: The cards themselves survive the shuffling. Selection/Dawkins: If genes always mixed, selection would be absolutely impossible. I 158 Def Degree of relationship/Dawkins: generation span: steps on the family tree. To Uncle: 3 steps: the common ancestor is e.g. A's father and B's grandfather. Degree of Relationship: per generation span ½ multiplied by itself. For g steps (1/2) g. But that is only part of the degree of relationship. In case of several common relatives they must also be determined. I 158 Selection/relationship/altruism/Dawkins: Now we can correctly calculate the chances for the multiplication of genes for altruism: E.g., A gene for the suicidal rescue of five cousins would not become more numerous, but probably one for the suicidal rescue of five brothers or ten cousins. >Altruism. I 162 Family altruism/Dawkins: parental care is merely a special case of family altruism. The fact that siblings do not exchange genes is not relevant, because they have obtained identical copies of the same genes from the same parents. Family Selection/Kin Selection/DawkinsVsWilson, E.O.: transfers the concept of group selection to family. Now, however, the core of Hamilton's argument is that the separation between family and non-family is not clear, but a question of mathematical probability. Hamilton's thesis(1) does not imply that animals are selfless towards all family members and self-serving to all outsiders. I 164 DawkinsVsWilson: He does not consider offspring as relatives! (I 461: Wilson has now withdrawn that). Def Group selection/Dawkins: different survival rate in groups of individuals. I 164 Kin selection/Dawkins: Of course animals cannot be expected to count how many relatives they are saving! I 462 Kin selection/Dawkins: It is a frequent mistake for students to assume that animals must count how many relatives they are saving. I 165 Kin selection/Dawkins: To determine the degree of relationship actuarial weightings can be used as a basis. How much of my wealth would I invest in the life of another individual. I 166 An animal can behave as if it had done this calculation. E.g. just as a human catches a ball as if he had solved a series of differential equations. I 372 Gene/selection/Dawkins: Under reasonable consideration, selection does not directly affect the genes. The DNA is spun into proteins, wrapped in membranes, shielded from the world and invisible to natural selection. (Like GouldVsDawkins.) The selection would also hardly have a criterion for DNA molecules. All genes look the same just like all tapes look the same. Genes show in their effects. ((s) effect creates identity.) 1. Hamilton, W.D. 1964. The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior. In: Journal of Theoretical Biology 7. pp- 1-16; 17-52. |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| Selection | Gould | I 52 Selection/Darwin/Gould: I am convinced that natural selection has been the main but not the only means of change. I 94 Selection/GouldVsDawkins: if the selection directly affected a gene responsible for body strength when favouring a stronger body, then the theory of Dawkins could be justified. If bodies were unambiguous location maps of their genes, then the fighting parts of DNA could show itself outwards and the selection could have a direct effect on them. But bodies are not built that way. There is no gene for such unambiguous parts of morphology as the left patella or a fingernail. Hundreds of genes contribute to the structure of most body parts and their action is channelled through a kaleidoscopic series of environmental influences, through embryonic, postnatal, internal and external influences. Body parts are not simply transferred genes, and the selection is not even directed at certain body parts! It accepts or rejects whole organisms. II 19 ff Selection/Gould: if natural selection drives evolution by keeping preferred variants from a spectrum that is randomly distributed around an average value, a lack of variation will drive this process out of the way. Because natural selection does not produce anything itself. Against it: II 21 Sexual reproduction: sex creates a huge range of variations by mixing the genetic material of two individuals. Question: but why do the males have to be almost as big and complex as females? Darwin has shown that the natural selection is a battle between individuals, therefore, to pass on as many genes as possible. Since males are indispensable because of the sexual reproduction that the variation must guarantee, they become independent tools of evolution. They are not created for the benefit of their species, as independent tools they intervene in the struggle in their very own way. II 22 When fighting for females, heavyweights simply have a better chance. Combat avoidance strategies can be added to complex organisms. II 51 Selection/Gould: Gould is directed against the assumption of a consistent selection, i. e. the assumption that there is an effect of selection on each level at the same time, or the theory that every detail that can be found on an organism results from the selection. Each individual behavior may be a wonderful adaptation, but it must be shaped within a prevailing limitation. II 173 Selection/Gould: Gould suggests recognizing the selection (not evolution) on several levels. >Evolution, >Explanation. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dawkins, R. | Dennett Vs Dawkins, R. | I 172 The "products" are not the gene strings, but the beings themselves DennettVsDawkins. DennettVsDawkins: no analysis of the isolated genome can open the dimension at issue in living beings. that would be like trying to judge a novel by how frequently letters occur. I 346 Dawkins: "... In genetic hyperspace exists a smooth path connecting the prehistoric bony fish lying on its side with the flatfish with twisted fish - but no such path that connects these ancestors with flatfishes that ly on their stomach." Explanation / DennettVsDawkins: Does Dawkins KNOW that? I 510 Mem / Dawkins: we have the power to defy the selfish genes of our birth and our education. As the only living beings we can oppose the tyranny of the selfish replication. DennettVsDawkins: this "we" is a myth. This grants also Dawkins. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Dawkins, R. | Deutsch Vs Dawkins, R. | I 167 Environment: the genes do not experience the environment! They have neither sense nor experience. It is a simulation without an audience. In addition, the organism is not only simulated but made. (VsDawkins, per Gould). |
Deutsch I D. Deutsch Fabric of Reality, Harmondsworth 1997 German Edition: Die Physik der Welterkenntnis München 2000 |
| Dawkins, R. | Gould Vs Dawkins, R. | I 94 GouldVsDawkins: genes are not visible for selection (only individuals are) so the selection does not respond to them. I passim Richard Dawkins Thesis: genes are the relevant units of selection, GouldVs. VsDawkins: starting with Butler's famous aphorism Z "a hen is only the special way in which an egg produces a second egg". GouldVsDawkins: there is a fatal flaw in Dawkins' attack on Darwinian theory: no matter how much power Dawkins wants to attribute to the genes, he cannot give them one thing, namely direct visibility in the process of natural selection. I 94 GouldVsDawkins: he will have to use other metaphors. He will have to come back to the fact that genes gather, make alliances, respect each other, join a pact, and explore a possible environment. But we call the object composed of them a body. VIII 434 GouldVsDawkins: the theory of the selfish gene and the selfish DNA are very different. According to Dawkins, the genes increase in frequency because they have effects on the body - but the DNA for exactly the opposite reason, because they have no effects! VIII 372 Gene/Selection/Dawkins: on reasonable consideration, selection does not directly affect the genes! The DNA is spun into proteins, wrapped in membranes, shielded from the world and invisible to natural selection. (Like GouldVsDawkins.) Selection would also hardly have a criterion for DNA molecules. All genes look the same, as all tapes look the same! Genes show their effects! |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Dawkins, R. | Pinker Vs Dawkins, R. | I 263 Mem/PinkerVsDawkins: none of the procedures of the so-called mem-selection (success of musical themes, commercials, etc.) resembles natural selection. You just need to compare the input and output, e.g. design number 5 and design number 6 of an artist: they did not differ by a few randomly exchanged elements. The added value ensues, because mental faculties concentrate on it! And not because it is copied thousands of times. I 264 Cultural Evolution/Pinker: to call it a Lamarckian is to admit that you have no idea how it works. The outstanding features of cultural products result from mental calculations. Fallacy: the products of evolution need not look like evolution at all! I 265 E.g. The stomach has stopped trying out acid combinations that might be better. Its evolution is complete. In a very similar manner, the human mind does not have to understand the process of evolution to come up with a good idea. Mem/PinkerVsDawkins: The analogy rather comes from epidemiology than from evolution. Ideas are infectious diseases. A spirit that passively takes up all freely floating memes would be an easy victim of exploitation for others and selection would eliminate him quickly! |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Dawkins, R. | Verschiedene Vs Dawkins, R. | VIII 457 VsDawkins: Humans have more than 99% of genes in common, so they would all have to behave altruistically towards each other. VIII 310 DawkinsVsVs: this is a misunderstanding: ((s) 99% of DNA?). VsDawkins: some authors believe that this representation of the survival value of the God Memes is circular. DawkinsVsVs: these authors always want to point to the "biological advantages". "Psychological attraction" is not enough for them, they want to know why. Dawkins: Psychological attraction is attraction for brains, and they are formed by genes. VIII 314 Darwinism as meme: in all minds something specific - the essence e.g. of Darwinism is present. Meme/(s)VsDawkins: the whole thesis becomes problematic if it does not get along without the assumption of a "being". But perhaps this can be avoided. Dennett I 457 ((s) Meme-Theory leads to essentialism.) Meme/(s)VsDawkins: Problem: For example, premises and conclusions must probably be regarded as separate memes, but if an argumentation is particularly compelling, it could perhaps also be formulated briefly and then the question of the number and delimitation of memes arises. Dennett I 457 Genes/Selection/VsDawkins/Dennett: the most common criticism of gene centricity is that genes simply could not have any interests. (Also Gould). Dennett: even if they cannot represent their interests, they can have some! And that is unambiguous! |
Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Evolution Theory | McGinn Vs Evolution Theory | II 99 Mind / consciousness / evolution / McGinn: evolution does not explain consciousness! Also, not sensation. II 100 Reason: sensation and consciousness cannot be explained by Darwinian principles and physics , because if the selection explained how sensations are caused by it, it must be possible to mold the mind from matter. ((s) Consciousness or sensation should be "visible" for selection!. (Similar GouldVsDawkins)). |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Various Authors | Dawkins Vs Various Authors | I 34ff Aggression/Lorenz: (The so-called evil): Thesis: Aggression is a species-preserving function. Thus only the most suitable individuals propagate. I 121 DawkinsVsLorenz: Sample example for a circular conclusion. Circular. It is also contrary to Darwinism, which he does not seem to have noticed. Animal/Lorenz: (The so-called evil) Thesis: stresses the moderate and fair character of the battles between animals. They practically fight according to rules and prefer the bluff to the deadly blow. Submission gestures are recognized by the victor. Animals fight with a "gloved fist." DawkinsVsLorenz: this interpretation can be disputed, and man is not the only creature that kills his own fellow-human beings. I 135 In fact, unreserved fighting rage also entails costs DawkinsVsLorenz: the "gloved fist" turns out to be an ESS. The "open-minded redeemer". I 358 DawkinsVsAxelrod: the distinction between "simple" and "repeated prisoner dilemma" is too simple. Dennett I 347 SterelnyVsDawkins: assumes that a similarity of 5 % is better than one of 4 %! Is the selection really so fine-grained? Dennett I 347 |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Various Authors | Mayr Vs Various Authors | V 15 Types, typological thinking: MayrVs.: goes back to Plato, is unsuitable for evolutionary and population biology: here we are not dealing with classes, but with mixtures of unique individuals: populations. So there is no "essence" either (VsEssentialism) V 38 Vitalism: a peculiar phenomenon: among the physicists of the 20th century. There were vitalistic ideas. Bohr: certain laws could work in organisms that are not found in inanimate matter. Bohr looked in biology for evidence of its complementarity and used some desperate analogies. MayrVsBohr: there is really nothing to consider. (Blur only in the subatomic range). V 43 Evolution: Unit of evolution is the population (or species) and not the gene or individual. (MayrVsDawkins). |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| Various Authors | Pinker Vs Various Authors | I 26 Robots Basic Laws/Asimov: 1) A robot may never hurt a human being, 2) it must obey the orders of humans, unless the orders conflict with the first law 3) It must protect its own existence, unless this conflicted with the 1st or 2nd law. I 27 PinkerVsAsimov: he was not able to position himself outside his own thought processes. The ability of humans to do evil is not considered, and their support is not excluded by the laws. I 458 Brain/Emotion/Tradition: "Triune brain": Unity of the cerebrum as evolutionary palimpsest of three layers: 1) Bottom: base ganglia (reptiles), seat of the primitive and selfish emotions 2) Limbic system: softer, more social emotions (parent feelings etc.) 3) The two are surrounded by the modern mammalian brain, the neocortex, which grew rapidly during evolution and is home to the intelligence. PinkerVsTrinity Theory (with Paul MacLean): the evolutionary forces do not simply accumulate layers. Although our bodies are witnesses of the past, they only possess few parts that have not been modified. Even the appendix is now conceded a function in connection with the immune system. Not even the circuits for emotions remain unaffected. (i.e. also: VsDennett?). I 459 Emotions are easy to reprogram! E.g. after less than 1,000 years of breeding dogs include Pitt Bulls and Saint Bernards. Furthermore, the cortex is not riding piggyback on the prehistoric limbic system. The systems work hand in hand. The amygdala dyes our experiences with feelings. It liaises with virtually every other part of the brain. I 62 Def SSM/"Sociological Standard Model": separation between culture and biology. Thesis: biological evolution was replaced by cultural evolution. (E.O.Wilson, later became victim of angry protests). LewontinVsWilson. I 63 Incorrect quotes of the opponents: E.g. Dawkins: "Genes created us, body and mind." (correct). VsDawkins: wrong quote: "genes control us, body and mind." - - I 324 Seeing/PinkerVsGombrich, Ernst H.: contrary to popular belief, we do not see what we expect to see. I 342 Seeing/Marr: completely ignores the backs, and even the surfaces. He analyzed the form of animals as if they had been made of pipe cleaners. Seeing/BiedermanVsMarr: assigns to every e.g. animal multiple geone combinations for different views. PinkerVsBiederman/PinkerVsGeones: it is precisely this concession that opens the possibility that forms are recognized in a completely different way. Why should we not think the idea through and assign many memory elements to every form, one for each position? Such memories do not need an exotic object-centered frame of reference, but can use the coordinates of the two-and-a-half dimensional sketch as long as there are so many memories that all perspectives are covered. Pinker: that was dismissed for many years from the outset. It took perhaps 40,000 aspects for each subject (memory elements). But this does not cover the positions outside the center of the field of vision yet! In recent times, it was considered, however, that for each object at most 40 aspects are sufficient when interpolating between views. I 343 Direction/Up/Down/Seeing/Pinker: People adjust themselves to the top down direction: if Africa lies on its side, it is not recognized, a square is not a diamond. This brings a further dilution of the geone theory: relations such as "over" or "above" must come from the retina, and not from the object. This limitation is likely to be indispensable, because often there is no way to define the "up" in an object before you recognized it! We can also turn objects in our mind (VsGeones). This makes a frame of reference of geones oriented to the object even less necessary. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
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Reference |
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| VsDawkins | Rorty, R. | VI 247 RortyVsDawkins: (Dawkins thesis: that humans are only vehicles for genes) as an inadequate foundation idea. VI 248 The claim that one knows something which is, in turn, no intuitive morality, but probably could correct our intuitive morality. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Reference |
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| Sozio-Evolut. | Wilson, E.O. | Pinker I 62 Def SSM. "Sozialwissenschaftliches Standardmodell": Trennung zwischen Kultur und Biologie. These: die biologische Evolution sei von der kulturellen Evolution abgelöst worden. (E.O.Wilson, wurde später Opfer wütender Proteste). LewontinVsWilson. I 63 Falsche Zitate der Gegner: Bsp Dawkins: Gene schufen uns, Körper und Geist." (Richtig). VsDawkins: falsches Zitat: "Gene kontrollieren uns, Körper und Geist". I 72 E.O.Wilson: These: Männer neigen stärker zur Polygamie. Steven RoseVsWilson . Buch: "Die Gene sind es nicht": Wilson wolle sagen: Mädels, werft euren Partnern nichts vor... |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
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