Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Entry
Reference
Theories Quine I 34
Theory does not have to be based on intention, it was internalized in the past. ---
I 56
QuineVsVerification: it is pointless to equate a sentence within the theory with one outside - Inter-theoretically no meaning - no additions with "or" (Cf. Goodman, Davidson, "fake theories"). ---
I 57
For the time being, we retain our beliefs in theory creation. ---
I 74
Theory: Carnap: Terms - Quine: sentences. ---
I 393
Theory is only predication, universal quantification, truth function (for derived properties) - general term (for primary properties) - (no "because"). ---
I 429
Theory: are isolated systems, mass point, infinitesimal size: behavior in every case more typical, the closer you get to zero, therefore it is acceptable - but not allowed in ontology - unlike geometric object: Position of mass points made no sense - therefore not individuateable - no identity. (> Quine, Word and Object, 1960, §52.) ---
I 431
Paraphrase (no synonymy): Newton could be reformulated relativistically - like Church: "true in a higher sense" - sometimes acceptable. ---
I 432
Theory: Structure of meaning, not choice of objects (Ramsey, Russell) Quine: new: even with physical objects they are also theoretical - Reason: sentences are semantically primary. ---
II 45
Equivalence of theories: is discovered when one discovers the possibility of reinterpretation - both true - but possibly logically incompatible. ---
VI 134
Theory/Empirically equivalent/logically equivalent/Quine: Two theories can be logically incompatible and yet empirically equivalent. E.g. Riemann/Euclidean geometry - Case 1: even untransformable theories (in the same terminology, where each implies certain sentences that the other one does not imply) are empirically equivalent - no problem - Case 2: additional theoretical terms - Case 3: logically incompatible - Davidson: can be traced back to case 2 - because contentious sentences depend on theoretical terms which are not empirical - therefore they are still empirically equivalent - Solution: theoretical term in question in two spellings (according to theory) - that makes them logically compatible. ---
VI 136
Empirically equivalent/logically incompatible/Theory/Quine: Case 2: (theory for global worlds without context embedding): - solution: eliminate exotic terms (without predictive power) - Important argument: then it is about consistency (otherwise QuineVsConsistency theory) - Elimination: justified by the fact that we have no other access to the truth except our own theory. ---
VI 139
Empirically equivalent/logically incompatible/Theory/Quine: Variant/Davidson: Both theories are valid, truth predicate: in comprehensive, neutral language - QuineVsDavidson: how much further should the variables reach then? - We need a stop, because we do not want a third theory - "everything different"/Important argument: the two systems definitely describe the same world - purely verbal question. ---
XII 70
Theory form/Quine: after abstraction of the meanings of the non-logical vocabulary and the value range of the variables - reinterpretation of the theory form provides models.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987