|Disputed term/author/ism||Author Vs Author
|Consequentialism||Nagel Vs Consequentialism||III 71
Def Consequentialism: (the view that it is about what should happen objectively, not what we do). DeontologyVsConsequentialism: is often challenged with two particular types of reasons which each seem to have the relative form, and whose existence apparently is independent of neutral values:
1) Reasons of autonomy: desires, obligations, personal relationships.
2) Claims of others not to be mistreated. (Not neutral, though, but derived from the relative claim of every individual, not to be mistreated themselves).
Def Deontology/Nagel: restricts what we are allowed to do in the service of both neutral and autonomous values. (Nagel pro).
Problem: deontology can be explained with relative reasons, but it is precisely that which allows doubts about the existence of these reasons.
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982
|Deontology||Mackie Vs Deontology||Stegmüller IV 227
Deontology/Stegmüller: does not lead to objectivism! DeontologyVsconsequentialism: Moral imperatives may not be of the form: "Act so that you will achieve a specific outcome" ((s) without regard to the means).
MackieVsDeontology: no morality can do without consequentialist considerations.
Morality/Mackie/Stegmüller: gives up the nowadays customary separation between the morally good and the non-morally good. "moral fairness".
When it comes to the introduction of principles that curtail the negative consequences of the limits of human sympathy, then these principles should be eligible to be endorsed by any position. Even if no agreement on the content of ideals can be achieved, what should be achievable is an agreement on the method of the settlement of differences.
Rights/Mackie: difference. 1. viewed from the outside: securing spaces of freedom.
2. viewed from the inside: results in a diversity of objectives, choice.
MackieVsTeleology/MackieVsDeontology: both unsatisfactory.
Morality/ethics/Mackie: Thesis: primacy of rights over duties and objectives.
Ethics/life/Mackie: there is no "fix life plan". There is a right to a flexible behavior of choice. Rights/Mackie: cannot be absolute, since they may conflict with each other. Rights prima facie need not be identical to those that evolve over time.
J. L. Mackie
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989