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Coherence Theory | Ayer | I 21 AyerVsCoherence theory: there could be different systems of coherent statements. I 293 Coherence/Carnap/Ayer: Carnap tried to rescue the coherence theory: pragmatism: what serves our goals? - AyerVsCarnap: that ultimately only one of the competing culturally distinct systems is acceptable, already exceeds the coherence theory itself. >Pragmatism, cf. >Correspondence theory. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Coherence Theory | Chisholm | II 19 VsCoherence theory: for each abstrusity one can construct a body of coherent statements. - Coherence theory can not reduce the variety of hypotheses. - Hence consistency can not be a criterion. Solution: evidence from immediate experience. >Acquaintance. Rutte, Heiner. Mitteilungen über Wahrheit und Basis empirischer Erkenntnis, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Wahrnehmungs- und Außenweltproblems. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
Coherence Theory | Frege | Dummett I 24 Dummett/Frege: Context principleVsCorrespondence theory - Context principleVsCoherence theory: meaning is not predefined. Those theories falsely ask for propositions instead of sentences. >Coherence; cf. >Correspondence theory, >Context, >Propositions, >Sentences. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Coherence Theory | McDowell | I 172 Definition "unforced coherence theory/McDowell: the thesis that the exercise of spontaneity has no external constraints - it can be controlled in a rational way by the facts if the facts manifest themselves in the experience. This is a control from outside of thought, not from outside of the thinkable. >Spontaneity, >Concept/McDowell, >Experience/McDowell. DavidsonVs: spontaneity is not subject to any external rational conditions. McDowellVsDavidson: so his coherence theory is without control. I 49 McDowellVsCoherence theory: it threatens to seperate idea and reality. Cf. >Coherence. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
Coherence Theory | Russell | II 65 Russell VsCoherence Theory/Russell: the truth definition presupposes the meaning of "coherence" - many scientific theories are not entirely coherent. Def coherence theory/Russell: Characteristic of the falsity of a thought is: if it does not place itself without contradiction in the totality of our opinions. According to this, the essence of any truth is to be part of a completely closed system which is "The Truth". (RussellVs). RussellVsCoherence Theory/Russell: 1 There is no reason to assume that only a set of coherent opinions is possible at all. Not so unusual in science. VII 66 The definition of truth according to the coherence theory already presupposes the meaning of "coherence", whereas in reality "coherence" presupposes the truth of the laws of logic. If we now wanted to try to subject the proposition of contradiction itself to a coherence test, we would find that - assuming it was wrong - there could be no incoherence at all between propositions! >Contradiction, >Truth/Russell, cf. >Coherence. IV 107 RussellVsCoherence Theory: An imaginative writer could invent a coherent new past that is consistent with everything we know and yet quite different from the real past. IV 109 There is no evidence that there is any one coherent system. Coherence/Russell: is not actually the meaning of truth, but it can provide an important criterion. >Criteria, >Truth criterion. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
Coherence Theory | Sellars | I XVIII Coherence theory: Pioneer: Sellars. Follower: Davidson: "nothing can be a reason for a belief, which is not itself a belief". >Coherence, >Beliefs/Davidson. I 60 Coherence Theory/TraditionVsCoherence theory/Sellars: the same (content) can only be reported when the same object is present. >Realism, >Perception, >Judgments. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
Consistency | Feyerabend | I 39 Consistency/FeyerabendVsCoherence Theory/Coherence/Feyerabend: the consistency condition, according to which new hypotheses must coincide with accepted theories, is irrational. Diversity of theories is fruitful for science, uniformity paralyzes its critical power. >Theories. Theory/Physics/Absence of Contradiction/Duhem/Feyerabend: E.g. the theory of Newton contradicts the case law of Galileo and Kepler's laws. For example, statistical thermodynamics contradict 2nd law of thermodynamics. Wave optics, for example, contradict geometrical optics. >Physics. Important Point: this is a logical inconsistency. It is quite possible that the differences of the predictions are so small that they cannot be determined experimentally! Moreover, the theories are not inconsistent in themselves. I 40 Consistency Condition/Feyerabend: the consistency condition is far less generous: it does not eliminate a theory because it contradicts the facts, but because it contradicts a different theory whose confirmed entities it shares. cf. >Coherence. Thus, the still untested part of this theory is made the criterion. The only difference between this criterion and a more recent theory are age and habit! A defendant of the consistency condition would say that the only real improvement would be the acquisition of new facts. >Facts. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
Correspondence Theory | Dummett | I 24ff Dummett/Frege: Context principle VsCorrespondence theory - context principle VsCoherence theory: Meaning is not given. - These theories ask wrongly about the proposition instead of the sentence. >Propositions, >Sentences, >Context. I 24ff To understand the proposition we must know what the sentence means. Therefore, the followers of the correspondence theory and the coherence theory consider the meaning of the sentences as something that is given before the realization of what they makes them true. Then almost everything could be regarded as something that makes the sentence true, it just depends on what the sentence means. I 26ff Correspondence Theory/Coherence Theory: meaning before truth. Davidson: truth before meaning (the truth conditions are defined later by the theory). >Meaning theory, >Truth conditions. Dummett: both together. II 89ff Correspondence Principle /Dummett: If a sentence is true, there must be something because of which it is true - ( truth-maker principle). >Truthmakers. II 90 Correspondence Principle: is only used when we already know the truth conditions; this requires deciding which sentences can be simply true. >Bare truth. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Correspondence Theory | Frege | Husted V 104 FregeVsCorrespondence Theory: the meaning of an expression which is not a sentence must be explained starting with its contribution to the determination of the meaning. V 104 FregeVsCorrespondence Theory: the expression is a contribution, not the object of the sentence. > Compositionality. V 105 FregeVsCorrespondence Theory: any attempt to define truth is a headless undertaking. If truth of a sentence were ownership of this or that property, then you would have to decide your own truth by deciding the truth of another sentence! (Regress). >Regress. Dummett I 24 Dummett/Frege: Context PrincipleVsCorrespondence Theory - Context PrincipleVsCoherence Theory: The meaning is not predefined. The representatives of the coherence theory ask incorrectly about the proposition instead of the sentence. >Coherence, >Context, >Proposition, >Sentence. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Correspondence Theory | Wittgenstein | Stegmüller IV 151 Correspondence/Kripke: presupposes that the members of the community agree as to whether or not they correspond. Justification conditions (assertibility conditions) are about correspondence as such; they are not an understanding of correspondence - the concept needs not be known. >Assertibility/Wittgenstein. II 95 Truth/Wittgenstein: the claim that there is a certain theory of truth is wrong, because truth is not a concept. WittgensteinVsCorrespondence Theory, WittgensteinVsCoherence Theory. Further authors on >Correspondence Theory, >Coherence Theory. II 284 Consistency/WittgensteinVsCorrespondence Theory: there is an enormous temptation to see all things as an extension of something else, we fall victim to this temptation when we say a sentence is true if it corresponds to reality. II 285 For example, all furniture can be regarded as chairs with certain extensions. II 286 Consistency/WittgensteinVsCorrespondence Theory: the statement that there is agreement between a sentence and reality does not mean anything because we do not know what is to be understood by agreement. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
Texts | Lakatos | Hacking I 212 Lakatos: you should read all the texts you can get hold of. Hacking and FeyerabendVsLakatos: this is an elitist demand! HackingVsCoherence theory: you can always fiddle the data situation! One can conclude that something is not an example! This does not mean that you are lying! >Coherence theory, >Coherence. But that withdraws the basics from Lakatos's historical analysis! According to Lakatos, we cannot rely on any other standards than the cognitive history as it is present. >History/Lakatos. FeyerabendVsLakatos: elitist. Rationality is simply defined by what is approved by a community. (Here, however, only the last 200 years). I 215 Lakatos/Hacking: Lakatos has attempted to characterize certain objective values of science without reference to copy theories of truth. (Increase in knowledge). >Science/Lakatos, >Progress, >Objectivity/Lakatos. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
Theories | James | Diaz-Bone I 72/73 Theory/Practice/James: E.g History of a squirrel: a squirrel hides from a hiker, by always moving on the far side of a tree. "Metaphysical question": Does the hiker walk around the squirrel when he or she walks around the tree? The solution depends on how to define its terms. >Metaphysics/James. Pragmatism: pragmatism serves primarily to clarify such stories, which would otherwise be endlessly pushed back and forth. The method is to choose the answer with regard to their respective practical consequences. For example, is a chemical substance a compound with a labile hydrogen atom that oscillates between two positions, or is it a mixture of isomers? Solution: the answer depends on the practical effects within an experiment. The debate becomes meaningless. I 74 Theory/James: a theory is also a form of practice, a meaning being separated from any action, perpetuity, belief is not conceivable. >Pragmatism/James. --- Horwich I 24 Theory/James: alternative theories can sometimes be just as compatible with all existing truths. (JamesVsCoherence Theory).(1) 1. William James (1907) "Pragmatisms Conception of Truth“ (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 4 p. 141-55 and 396-406) in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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Coherence Theory | Armstrong Vs Coherence Theory | Arm III 70 Vs Systematic approach/VsCoherence theory: there can always be equally coherent systems that are incompatible with these systematizations. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
Coherence Theory | Feyerabend Vs Coherence Theory | I 39 Consistency/FeyerabendVsCoherence Theory/Consistency/Feyerabend: the consistency condition according to which new hypotheses must be consistent with accepted theories is unreasonable. Theory diversity is fruitful for science, uniformity paralyzes its critical power. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
Coherence Theory | Field Vs Coherence Theory | II 365 Justification/Coherence Theory/Field: It is not certain that without circular justification there would be no rationality. This view is a variant of the coherence theory. Coherence Theory/Field: Thesis: simple deductive, inductive or perception rules do not count as "reasonably applicable" II 366 before the users have shown by a combination of deduction, induction and perception where this combination varies from case to case, that these rules are reliable. But once these rules are used to support themselves, it becomes reasonable to apply them. Justification/Compass/FieldVsCoherence Theory: this shall avoid unjustified rationality (Field pro unjustified rationality (reasonableness without justification, justification-less rationality)), but in the case of some induction rules this has no substance. Not any amount of self-supporting procedures counts as reasonable: E.g. various types of contra-deductive and contra-inductive methods. What then distinguishes those that are reasonable from those that are not? Proto-rationality/Field: the solution is that some methods must be proto-rational regardless of empiricism. They could depend on maintaining the truth or on reliability. Or on the fact that we find them reasonable! Solution: The moment when we realize that the method is reliable, the proto-rationality turns into normal rationality. Important Argument: contra-inductive and contra-deductive methods have no initial proto-rationality, so they do not support themselves! (Circle: cannot begin if no initial assumption is made). Coherence Theory/Justification/Compass/Field: this is the most direct way in which the coherence theory should distinguish reasonable from unreasonable self-supporting methods. Field: But then it is clear that this view is basically a notational variant of the view that there is justification-less rationality. It simply calls it "proto-rationality": PR: of course implies rationality Proto-rationality: does not imply it. Its representatives attribute a positive value to it. Field: but that merely means that they set a higher threshold for reasonableness. This corresponds to the coherence theory. Coherence Theory/Rationality/Field: higher threshold for reasonableness. Lower threshold: for rationality: Non-coherentist theories. Pro Lower Threshold/Rationality/VsCoherence Theory: 1) there are not so many problems with deductive justification of deduction and inductive justification of induction ("less than meets the eye to ...") 2)At least with induction it is impossible even to use the rules to argue for the reliability of the rules. Threshold: that means that it is difficult to justify a higher (coherentist) threshold without choosing such a high one that it becomes unreachable. Footnote: E.g. Assuming theory T and T* T* is valid until 2000, from then on theory U applies. II 367 Now it could be that in the last few millennia physical theory has changed every hundred years so that it seems likely that it will change again in 2000... ((s)> glue). Rationality/FieldVsCoherence Theory: Thesis: I prefer the lower threshold, according to which good induction and perception rules count as weakly a priori. Full Aprioricity/Field: the question for it is reduced to the question of empirical irrefutability. We will see below that this also has a quasi-terminological component. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Coherence Theory | James Vs Coherence Theory | Horwich I 24 Theory/James: alternative theories can sometimes be equally compatible with all existing truths. (JamesVsCoherence Theory).(1) 1. William James (1907) "Pragmatisms Conception of Truth“ (Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 4 p. 141-55 and 396-406) in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Coherence Theory | Russell Vs Coherence Theory | IV 108 VsCoherence theory: 1. a phantasy gifted writer could invent a coherent new past that is in accordance with everything that we know, and yet is something quite different from the real past. --- IV 109 There is no evidence that there is only a single coherent system. VsCoherence theory: 2. The Truth definition presupposes the meaning of "consistency", while in reality "coherence" presupposes the truth of the laws of logic. --- VII 65 Definition Coherence theory/Russell: feature of the falsity of a thought: if it cannot be classified, free of contradictions, into the whole of our opinions. After that the essence of all truth is to be part of a completely closed system, the is "the truth". (RussellVs). RussellVsCoherence theory/Russell: 1. There is no reason to believe that only a set of coherent opinions is possible. Not so unusual in science. --- VII 66 2. The definition of truth according to the coherence theory already presupposes the meaning of "consistency", while in reality "coherence" presupposes the truth of the laws of logic. If we wanted to try to subdue the law of contradiction itself to a consistency test, we would find that - assuming that it is wrong - that there could be no inconsistency between sentences anymore. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
Coherence Theory | Williams, M. Vs Coherence Theory | Horwich I 488 Coherence Theory/M. Williams: has to do with skepticism. The coherence theory says that the analysis of truth in non-epistemic terms makes it inaccessible. M. Williams: if that were true, disquotationalism, but also the richer correspondence theory, would be excluded. I 489 Truth/justification/acceptability/Arthur Fine: when one sees that the realistic T-concept creates a gap that keeps the epistemic approach ((s) justification) always out of reach, one might be tempted to redefine truth in epistemic terms to literally make it accessible. M. WilliamsVs: as an epistemic thesis, skepticism can only be derived under skeptical premises! Truth/Skepticism/M. Williams: no concept of truth makes it inaccessible by itself: one always needs epistemic premises! Gap/M. Williams: the gap Fine means is probable: even the best justified belief can be wrong. M. WilliamsVs: nevertheless, why should this lead to radical skepticism? ((s) Everyone can be wrong, but not all can be wrong). Correspondence Theory/Skepticism/M. Williams: combined with a Cartesian dualism it leads to skepticism. But if representations can only be compared with other representations, this leads to the coherence theory ((s) Berkeley> Coherence Theory). Correspondence Theory/M. Williams: modern form: tends towards naturalism and physicalism by identifying reference with a causal relation. (Causal Theory of Reference). I 490 Correspondence Theory: argues with the impossibility of an alternative. Coherence theory does the same! M. Williams: both do not answer the question: why not be satisfied with deflationism? Deflationism/M. Williams: can share many of the criticisms of Correspondence TheoryVsCoherence Theory and vice versa. Because he neither shapes the idea of truth as correspondence nor shows that truth is an epistemic property. I 495 Correspondence Theory/Putnam/M. Williams: Putnam: because the truth of our beliefs explains success, a correspondence theory can explain, I 496 what is the contribution of language behaviour to the success of overall behaviour. Truth/Explanation: this is how success explains it: (i) if we have true beliefs about our goals, we will generally achieve them. (ii) We have true beliefs about how we achieve our goals. (iii) We generally achieve our goals. Horwich: admits that truth actually has an explanatory role here. Putnam would be right if there were no alternative explanation. VsPutnam/VsCorrespondence Theory: yet there is no obvious connection between his argument and a physicalistic correspondence theory: Truth/Law/M. Williams: you can save Putnam's argument by assuming that (i) involves a generalization that may even be lawful. BoydVsPutnam: does not want truth to appear in any laws. ((s) The theory explains success as well as the truth of the theory. Instead, the theories could simply be listed. - Vs: that would only work without generalization.) M. Williams: I do not believe that (i) is a law. That is because it is not really an empirical position. Belief/Content/Truth/Davidson: determining their content is not independent of giving meaning to our general behaviour and therefore most must be true. Ad (i): is then not an empirical law but a reflection of a condition of interpretation. I 497 Correspondence Theory/Putnam: it is not the explanation of our success that motivates the correspondence theory itself, but the consideration of Premise (ii): that most beliefs are true. Belief/PutnamVsDavidson: that most are true is not guaranteed by the methodology of interpretation, because the stock of beliefs is constantly changing. Therefore, we can only give (ii) meaning if we explain the reliability of learning and only realism can do that. Causal Theory/Correspondence/Putnam: the reliability of learning: would present us as reliable signal generators. What would the truth theory contribute? It communicates that the proposition is true iff the state exists. This is the correspondence involved in causal theory, it is exactly the correspondence established by the T-Def. Deflationism/Correspondence/M. Williams: to him this minimal correspondence is also available. I.e. Putnam's argument does not guarantee physical correspondence or any other substantial theory. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Coherence Theory | Tradition Vs Coherence Theory | I 60 TraditionVsCoherence Theory/Sellars: Autorität kann nicht einfach nur von anderen Aussagen gestützt werden (inferentiell). Es kann nur dasselbe berichtet werden, wenn derselbe Gegenstand gegenwärtig ist. Logische Wahrheiten: scheinen intrinsische Glaubwürdigkeit zu besitzen. Aber empirische Sätze können sich nicht vollständig auf die Glaubwürdigkeit anderer Sätze zurückführen lassen. Empirismus/Sellars: hat sich sogar dazu verstiegen: Thesis: es gibt eine Analogie zwischen analytischen Sätzen und Beobachtungsberichten: wenn sie nur auf korrekte Art und Weise gemacht werden, brauchen sie nicht wahr zu sein. Es ist eine Sache der Regelbefolgung für den Gebrauch von "dies", "ist" und "grün". |
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Correspondence Theory | Frege Vs Correspondence Theory | Dummett I 24 Context Principle: only whole sentences have meaning. Dummett/Frege: Context PrincipleVsCorrespondence Theory - Context PrincipleVsCoherence Theory: meaning not specified - they ask incorrectly for proposition instead of sentence. Frege I 104 Proposition here: what is expressed by a sentence. FregeVsCorrespondence Theory: the meaning of an expression which is not a sentence must be explained starting from its contribution to the determination of the meaning. IV 32 FregeVsCorrespondence Theory: Correspondence is a relation, but this is contradicted by the manner of use of the word "true", which makes no reference to something else to which it should correspond. Correspondence: can only be complete if the objects coincide, i.e. there is only one item alone. Truth/Frege: does not tolerate a more or less. What is only half true, is false. If you wanted to try to define "certain respects", the game could start anew. (> Regress). ((s) E.g. "Respects"/Concept: some animals are mammals: that is no correspondence or coincidence relation.") Frege: therefore truth is indefinable: it would always be down to "certain features" being true. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Correspondence Theory | Williams, M. Vs Correspondence Theory | Horwich I 487 Deflationism/M. Williams: (pro) However, we should not call it theory but perspective. He is interesting, not because he tells us something new, but because he denies that we need something beyond that. (VsCorrepsondence Theory, VsCoherence Theory). I 488 Question: What could a substantial truth theory (which goes beyond deflationism) say that deflationism cannot? Correspondence TheoryVsCoherence Theory/M.Williams: appeals to "intuition", which is not a helpful term. (Also Correspondence TheoryVsPragmatism). "Intuition": should be here that even ideally justified beliefs can be wrong. ((s) Whereby the term "ideal" is kept rigid.) Correspondence Theory: then follows realism by saying that truth has nothing to do with justification or acceptability, but with a non-epistemic relation to the world. ((s) Example causation). M.WilliamsVs: if this were the case: even if all philosophers shared this intuition, why should it be more than a cultural prejudice in favor of correspondence theory? Def Epistemic/(s): e.g. justification, acceptability. Instead of e.g. causation. M.WilliamsVsCorrespondence Theory: the intuition against epistemic access to truth is not automatically an argument for correspondence theory. At best it excludes an identification of truth with an epistemic property. Thus it becomes acceptable for deflationism, which does not make this identification either. Disquotationalism//M.Williams: this shows that even disquotational truth is "realistic". That is, truth is not an epistemic property (justification or acceptability, M. WilliamsVsPutnam), just as it is not in a full-fledged correspondence theory. Someone who believes that truth must be epistemic can regard disquotationalism as a "minimal realism". |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Correspondence Theory | Wittgenstein Vs Correspondence Theory | II 95 Truth/Wittgenstein: the statement that there is any particular theory of truth, is false, because truth is not a concept! WittgensteinVsCorrespondence theory, WittgensteinVsCoherence theory. --- II 284 Agreement/WittgensteinVsCorrespondence theory: there is an enormous temptation to see all things as an extension of something else, this temptation we fall victim to when we say that a sentence would be more true if it corresponds with reality. --- II 285 E.g. all furniture can be considered with certain extensions as chairs. --- II 286 Compliance/WittgensteinVsCorrespondence theory: the statement, between a sentence and the reality is agreement, says nothing, because we do not know what is meant by agreement. Falsehood/false/nonsense/useless/Wittgenstein: a sentence is false if this sentence does not correspond to any fact, but why, however, is this sentence if it does not correspond to any fact, not nonsensical as it would be a name when it does not name anything? --- II 287 Sense/falsehood/false/nonsense/Wittgenstein: E.g. "in this room is a chair with a human head." Although this sentence is not true, it makes sense. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
Holism | Neurath Vs Holism | Brendel I125 Definitional Coherence Theory/Truth/Neurath/Brendel: Representatives: Neurath. (Neurath did not explicitly refer to himself as a coherence theorist NeurathVsCoherence Theory/NeurathVsHolism). I 126 Neurath: pro empiricism. Truth/Neurath: Thesis, the truth definition must be exhausted in a empiricist truth criterion. Log Sentence/Schlick: foundation, unrevisable. "purely observational sentences". Log Sentence/NeurathVsSchlick: revisable. Since they are selected on the basis of decisions. Reality/Neurath/Brendel: Thesis: talking about it is sheer metaphysics. Truth/Neurath/Brendel: Therefore, can only be understood relative to a system of sentences (>coherence theory). NeurathVsCorrespondence Theory: "correspondence with reality": is rejected. "True World": pointless. I 127 Selection/Neurath: from several consistent statement sets: without truth criterion, by extralogical moments. |
Neur I O. Neurath Philosophical Papers 1913-1946: With a Bibliography of Neurath in English (Vienna Circle Collection, Volume 16) 1983 |
Metaphysics | Chisholm Vs Metaphysics | III 133 "Theories of reality"/VsMetaphysics/Chisholm: metaphysical: we could set up a "theory about the nature of truth": E.g. that an entity such as the one introduced above is additionally created in a way that Socrates is mortal if it is evident for this entity that he is mortal. III 134 Then we could not only say that if it is evident to such a being, then Socrates is also mortal, but we could say that if it is true that Socrates is mortal, then Socrates is mortal. Thus we arrive at a theory of reality. ((s) the relevant fact would then follow from the truth. This is not objectionable, but presupposes a being that knows). Problem/Chisholm: such theories existed many times in history. They always assume that there is a being that judges with evidence, and this is then the "measure of all things". Note III 193 Brentano: this comes down to the truth belonging to the judgment of right one who judges rightly, i.e. the judgment of the one who judges like the one would judge who makes his judgment with evidence. (Truth and evidence, Hamburg 1962, p. 139) Reality/Peirce: depends on the real fact that the investigation if it is only carried out long enough, is destined to lead to a belief in it. III 134 ChisholmVs: how we make sure that what is evident to us is also evident to that being? I.e. our metaphysician requires us to go yet another step. ((s) whose necessity he has not recognized). 3) In the next step each of us is required to be identical with these adopted ((s) ideal) beings. Problem: then every one of us is also identical with the others! ChisholmVsCoherence theory: this is what underlies the idealistic tradition of coherence theory. That’s too high a price for the desired connection of the truth with the evident. Solution/Aristotle: you are not white, because our opinion that you are white is correct, but it is because you’re white that we are telling the truth when we say this. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
Schlick, M. | Ayer Vs Schlick, M. | III 101 SchlickVsCoherence theory: beyond the consistency of a system, one can determine the correspondence with reality. Ayer: per Schlick. AyerVsSchlick: but we have no class of synthetic propositions which are indubitable. III 103 Def Truth criterion/Verification criterion/Ayer: the criterion by which we test the validity of our synthetic propositions is their conformity with reality (= sensation). I.e. the criterion is the agreement with our observations. Observation sentence/AyerVsSchlick: unfortunately is not content with that, but asserts that the sentences with which we describe our observation sentences, would be absolutely unquestionable. III 104 Observation sentence/AyerVsSchlick: the only sense in which a sentence can be absolutely sure is that its negation would be self-contradictory. And it is not self-contradictory E.g. saying "that’s not green" if someone says "this is green". Synthetic sentences are just not true because of their form alone. Observation sentence/Schlick: would say that he never asserted this. But that he only talked about the truth of such a proposition at the moment of perception. AyerVsSchlick: yet we must distinguish between false and such propositions that are true but trivial. What Schlick says, is nothing more than p implies p. But it is wrong to say that when I feel pain the sentence that I feel pain is objectively certain. Because that would be a different form: p implies that (p is objectively certain). And that is wrong if it is a synthetic proposition. III 105 Confirmation/Schlick/AyerVsSchlick: that Schlick felt uncomfortable with this himself is due to the vagueness of his concept. "Confirmations", of which he believed they were indubitable. Confirmation/Schlick: is nothing that could be identified with something that can be expressed. This suggests that he thinks of actual perceptions, as opposed to the sentences that describe them. AyerVsSchlick: Dilemma: a) if confirmations are not entences but perceptions themselves, it makes no sense to say that they are indubitable or not indubitable. Because perceptions are not the sort of thing that can be doubted. It simply occurs. b) if they are observation sentences, they cannot be indubitable (see above). |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Verificationism | Horwich Vs Verificationism | Horwich I XII Truth/Peirce/Horwich: (Peirce 1932): if correspondence is problematic, why should we not simply identify truth with verifiability? I XIII a) Verification holistic/Bradley/Hempel: (Chapter 5): a belief (conviction) is justified if it is part of a whole consistent and harmonious belief system. b) Verification Method/Dummett/Putnam: (Dummett: Chapter 16, 1978; Putnam: Chapter 21, 24, 1981). Horwich: so truth corresponds to provability. Verificationism/Horwich: verification is much clearer than correspondence theory. HorwichVsVerificationism: the postulated link between the concepts of truth and verification is much too strong. VsCoherence Theory/Problem: there may be multiple coherent systems that are mutually incompatible. Thus, consistency does not guarantee truth. |
Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
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