Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Social Goods Economic Theories Mause I 275
Public goods/Economic theories: Problem: because of the free rider problem (the use of public goods by non-paying members) the value of public goods cannot be determined. (See Public Goods/Samuelson). Solution: Suggestion: certain incentive mechanisms should encourage individuals to disclose their true willingness to pay. (Clarke 1971 (1), Groves & Loeb 1975 (2))
VsClarke/VsGrove/VsLoeb: Problem: 1. unwanted side effects due to the high complexity, 2. there are infinitely many Pareto optima, since the sum of the marginal willingness to pay depends on the distribution positions of the individuals in the society.
Mause I 276
Public Goods/Economic theories: in a world of distorting taxes, the expenditure side cannot be viewed without the revenue side. The optimal supply of public goods then depends on which taxes can be used and to what extent these taxes lead to welfare losses due to their incentive-distorting effect. Solution/Browning/Dahlby: the marginal costs of public goods are multiplied by one that represents the marginal costs of public funds. (3) (4) (5)
Vs: See Public Goods/Kaplow.

1. Edward H. Clarke. 1971. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice 11 (1): 17– 33.
2.Theodore Groves & Martin Loeb. 1975. Incentives and public inputs. Journal of Public Economics 4: 211– 226.
3. Edgar K. Browning, 1976. The marginal cost of public funds. Journal of Political Economy 84: 283– 298.
4. Bev Dahlby, 2008. The marginal cost of public funds: Theory and applications. Cambridge, MA
5. Charles L. Ballard & Don Fullerton. 1992. Distortionary taxes and the provision of public goods. Journal of Economic Perspectives 6( 3): 117– 131.

Mause I
Karsten Mause
Christian Müller
Klaus Schubert,
Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Clarke, Th. Stroud Vs Clarke, Th. I 269
Skepticism/Solution/Clarke: skepticism would be falsified, 1. If anyone wakes up. Or
2. If someone came to Earth from outside and found us asleep.
Conclusion: no skepticism follows from the dream possibility, even if it is involved in the everyday knowledge of facts about the outer world.
Dream: Question: Does the dream possibility presuppose knowledge about facts about the outer world? If so, could we perhaps show VsSkepticism that because it ignores this precondition, it merely thinks it has achieved generalization?
We could perhaps see that his assessment of the individual case can only be generalized if it does not lead to the skeptical conclusion (s) that we know nothing at all.
Stroud: I hope I have shown how complicated this is. For Clarke, this touches on the question of objectivity:
Objectivity/Imaginability/ClarkeVsSkepticism//Stroud: (Clarke, LS, S 766): it is inconceivable that I could dream now if someone else did not know something about my actual environment. Because he would not know if he was dreaming. Both cannot be "in the same boat".
Dream/Knowledge/Demon/Clarke: For example Descartes dream possibility makes no sense at all if we ask ourselves how the evil demon or God could know that he is not dreaming himself.
Imaginability/Stroud: it is hard to say whether something is imaginable or not. One way is to imagine it and see what happens.
Vs: but this is not conclusive, because it is possible that what makes my thoughts possible is hidden from me.
I 271
Dream/Stroud: not only is it possible that I am dreaming now, but also that no one on Earth could ever know that I am dreaming because everyone else would not know if they were dreaming either. If I add the fact that the truth about my state is not known at all, it does not seem to influence the original possibility. I can be wrong, but who would notice that?
ClarkeVsDescartes/ClarkeVsTradition: we always forgot to ask whether the dream possibility is known to others or not.
StroudVsClarke: that is true, but maybe it is not essential for us to recognize the dream possibility, for us to refrain from asking if others know about it. Thesis: The possibility is just as conceivable, even if no one else could ever know anything about it. ((s) Because everyone dreams).
I 272
Stroud: we could very well all be in the same boat.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Tiles, J.E. Simons Vs Tiles, J.E. I 93
Event/mereology/Tiles (1981): for him, it is about which distinctive features are needed to identify events. He uses a fully classical theory like LG (Leonard/Goodman) whereby he understands amounts, however, to be virtual. Topologically: the intuitive concept of an individual which is completely within another is topological. Notation: ‹°.
TIA4 x ‹° U
TIA5 x ‹° y u y ‹ z ⊃ x ‹° z
I 94
(…) SimonsVsTiles: although the basic idea is good the execution suffers:
Def open individual/Simons: an individual that is its own inner portion (interior part) (see below and is nowhere touched by another individual) is open. Tiles' Axiom TIA7 (...) has the consequence that the only thing that exists is the universe.
But we want to have several open individuals, since they correspond to the open sets of the topology.
E.g. the three-element-mereology {x, y, U} with x and y as atoms and everything as the inner part of U. x and y should themselves have no inner parts. Then x and y are by definition interconnected and U is connected to itself.
Problem: if we change this modell to the point that we require that U <° x, we see that the axioms do not contain the obvious result that an inner part is a part: see the theory of Clarke, SimonsVsClarke.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Whitehead, A.N. Simons Vs Whitehead, A.N. I 94
Bowman L. Clarke/topology/mereology/Simons: formal objections against his system cannot be put forward. It is based on Whitehead's basic concept of compound, the relata are informally understood space-time regions.
I 95
Def connected/connection/Clarke/Whitehead: connected means sharing a point ((s) common point). But the points and all the other borders are no individuals. Limit/Whitehead/Clarke: the limit is no individual.
Individuals/Whitehead/Clarke: individuals have no interiors. This leads to a non-classical mereology.
Connection/spelling/Clarke: it is written as a small diamond with double tails up and down.
Separated/disconnected/external connection/spelling/Clarke: >< y”: x is externally connected with y, = "x touches y".
Non-classical mereology/Simons: here o (overlap) and < (part-relation) do not interact in the way as in the classic.
Only when an object touches nothing (that means intuitive, if it is open, see above) we can treat its parts as in classical mereology.
I 96
"Quasi-topologically"/Clarke: (Because there is no zero element and no boundary elements): e.g. concepts: "interior of x", "closure (completion, final, closure) of x", "outside of x", "x is open", "x is closed".
Product: a product of any two open individuals is again open.
Axioms: (...)
I 97
Bowman L. Clarke: "Just as the linguistic domain of the classical individuals calculus is a complete Boolean algebra without zero-elements, our theorems are a closing-algebra without zero elements and without boundary elements. It is interesting that this much topology can be operated with as minimal assumptions. SimonsVsClarke: the idea of "removing" the boundary elements can be understood in two ways:
a) that they "really exist" and we have an artificial limit by that
I 98
(This would explain why the mereology is non-classical.) b) that these elements do not exist at all, then we miss the remainder principle (Principle Remainder, RP, see above). If we remove the interior (of a non-open individual), nothing will change! In fact, nothing is left.
Closure/SimonsVsClarke: if we take any individual, its interior is a real part of its closure but there is no real part of its closure that is separate from the inside. So we have not even the weak supplement principle.
We should therefore think that there are two types of individuals:
a) "weak" (open) that do not touch anything and
b) "strong" that are in contact with something.
Nevertheless, we must not believe that there are any individuals who reconcile the difference again. We can distinguish individuals who differ only in one point but cannot determine the point.
SimonsVs: this is not satisfactory. Nevertheless, if we want to perform topology without points and other limits, it is difficult to see how we can solve the problem.
Solution/Simons: a philosophical approach must be more complex and allow vague approximations of sharp boundaries (> Menger, 1940, 107).

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Skepticism Clarke, Th. Stroud I 264
Skeptizismus/Stroud: Lösung/Thompson Clark: zwei Gebrauchsweisen der Wörter (> Repräsentativität) - These: Skeptische Zweifel sind mehrdeutig - a) "alltäglich" - b) "philosophisch".
I 267
Pointe/Clarke: These: Wenn ich aber niemals "philosophisch" erfahren kann, ob ich träume, dann besteht die Traum-Möglichkeit gar nicht: ich müsste mir etwas vorstellen, das ich mir gar nicht vorstellen kann. Clarke: These mein späteres Wissen (nach dem Aufwachen) ist weniger verletzlich als das "ursprüngliches Wissen", das durch die Traum-Möglichkeit bedroht war.
philosophisch: Angenommen, wir verstehen die Wissens-Behauptung philosophisch: hier müsste das Wissen, dass ich mir vorstelle beim Aufwachen zu erwerben, unverletzlich sein! .
D.h. das philosophische Problem entsteht, weil es anscheinend keine Möglichkeit gibt, jemals zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt zu sagen, dass man nicht träumt.
I 271
StroudVsClarke: These Die Möglichkeit ist genauso vorstellbar, selbst wenn niemand anderes jemals etwas darüber wissen könnte. ((s) Weil alle träumen).

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984