Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 31 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chomsky | Deacon | I 35 Chomsky/Deacon: his theory is reminiscent of evolutionary theory by assuming "hopeful monsters": random mutations that produce new abilities. >Hopeful monsters. For example, children's ability to acquire the grammar of the grammar they learned first. Explanation/Chomsky: this can only be explained if we adopt a "universal grammar" that is built into all human brains as a blueprint. >Universal grammar. I 36 Such a "language organ" could explain why no other species has developed a language. It would also explain why there are no intermediate stages between human and non-human language. Other advantages: such a thesis explains why human and non-human communication are not similar, it explains the systematically independent nature of grammatical rules (they are all derived from the neurological interconnection of the brain), it explains the allegedly universal characteristics of language structures, it explains the reciprocal translatability of languages, it explains the ease of language acquisition with lean input and lack of error correction. I 37 DeaconVsChomsky/DeaconVsUniversal grammar: many linguists ask the wrong question: they expect something (the child's ability to learn) and ask how it comes about. The assumption of a universal grammar serves as a placeholder for everything that cannot be learned. >Learning. I 38 To say that only the human brain is able to produce a grammar, takes the problem from the linguists' hands and passes it on to the neurobiologists. >Grammar, >Neurobiology, >Neurobiology as author. Chomsky/Deacon: however, he is not concerned with the emergence of language, but with explaining the origin of language competence. >Competence, >Language acquisition, >Language emergence. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Chomsky | Psychological Theories | Slater I 191 Chomsky/psychological theories: Chomsky (1957(1) [argued] (…) for highly constrained innate biases that lead all natural languages to share a small number of universal properties. By implication, language acquisition does not require a protracted period of development during which the child is exposed to the idiosyncrasies of their native language. Rather, brief snippets of “surface” input serve to trigger one of a very few possible “hidden” structures, that then evolve into a system capable of generating an infinite variety of grammatically correct sentences in the particular native language to which the child is exposed. Psychology: while Chomsky never directly studied child language, psychological studies observed a multi-year period gradually increasing vocabulary and grammatical complexity. E.g., Eimas et al. (1971)(2). >Language development/Eimas. VsChomsky/ChomskyVsVs: When these language acquisition researchers noted the absence of evidence for innate linguistic skills, the explanation offered by those who espoused Chomsky’s nativist perspective was that children are beset by an impressive array of “production deficiencies” that mask their true underlying competence. VsProduction deficiencies see >Phonetics/psychological theories. Slater I 196 Chomsky: the argument for a special speech mode rested on two claims: (a) speech is perceived in a manner that is not shared with non-speech sounds, and (b) speech perception is fundamentally linguistic in nature, thereby arguing for an innate mechanism that is specific to humans. VsChomsky: Both of these claims were challenged by strong empirical data in the decade after Eimas et al. (1971(2)). First, Kuhl and Miller (1975(3), 1978(4)) showed that a non-human mammal (chinchilla) has CP (categorical perception) for VOT (voice onset time) including the very same synthetic speech sounds used in Eimas et al. >Phonetics/psychological theories, >Categorical perception. Moreover, Kuhl and Miller were able to develop a Slater I 197 method to obtain labeling data from the animals, and the manner in which chinchillas responded to VOT is virtually identical to human adults. Follow-up work by Kuhl and Padden (1982(5) tested rhesus monkeys and confirmed these findings with a species more similar to humans. Categorical perception: Thus, the presence of CP is not a sufficient argument for the operation of a linguistically relevant speech mode, since no one claims that chinchillas or monkeys achieve anything remotely like language, and certainly no ability to produce speech. Subsequent research by Kluender, Diehl, and Killeen (1987)(6) has shown that the fundamental properties of CP are not even unique to mammals (…). Cf. >Animal Language. Problem: CP (categorical perception) is not nearly as definitive as the claims made by Liberman and his colleagues (1957(7), 1961(8), 1967(9). See Pisoni and Lazarus (1974)(10), Miller (1997)(11). 1. Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. Mouton: The Hague. 2. Eimas, P. D., Siqueland, E. R.,Jusczyk, P., &Vigorito,J. (1971). Speech perception in infants. Science, 171, 303-306. 3. Kuhl, P. K., & Miller, J. D. (19 75). Speech perception by the chinchilla: Voiced-voiceless distinction in alveolar plosive consonants. Science, .190, 69—72. 4. Kuhl, P. K., & Miller, J. D. (19 78). Speech perception by the chinchilla: Identification functions for synthetic VOT stimuli. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 63, 905—917. 5. Kuhl, P. K., & Padden, D. M. (1982). Enhanced discriminability at the phonetic boundaries for the voicing feature in macaques. Perception and Psychophysics, 32, 542—550. 6. Kluender, K. R., Diehl, R. L., & Killeen, P. R. (1987). Japanese quail can learn phonetic categories. Science, 237, 1195—1197. 7. Liberman, A. M., Harris, K. S., Hoffman, H. S., & Griffith, B.C. (1957). The discrimination of speech sounds within and across phoneme boundaries. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54, 358—368. 8. Liberman, A. M., Harris, K. S., Kinney, J., & Lane, H. (1961). The discrimination of relative onset-time of the components of certain speech and non-speech patterns. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 61,379—388. 9. Liberman, A. M., Cooper, F. S., Shankweiler, D. P., & Studdert-Kennedy, M. (1967). Perception of the speech code. Psychological Review, 74, 431—461. 10. Pisoni, D. B., & Lazarus, J. H. (1974). Categorical and non-categorical modes of speech perception along the voicing continuum. Journal of the Acoustical Society of America, 55, 328—333. 11. Miller, J. L. (1997). Internal structure of phonetic categories. Language and Cognitive Processes, 12, 865—869. Richard N. Aslin, “Language Development. Revisiting Eimas et al.‘s /ba/ and /pa/ Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Competence | Chomsky | I 307 Competence/ChomskyVsHarman: I do not claim that they consist in "knowing-that", that language is described by the rules of grammar. >Propositional knowledge, >Knowledge, >Knowing how, >Capabilities. Competence/ChomskyVsHarman: not a number of habits, no reference to the ability of the cyclist - instead the mastery of generative grammar - (non-formulated knowledge). - Less than the ability to speak a language. >Speaking. --- Searle VIII 404 Competence/performance/Chomsky: Thesis: performance is just the peak of the iceberg of competence. >Performance. Searle VIII 437 SearleVsChomsky: the distinction is wrong: he assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more like a theory of performance than one of competence - he does not see that ultimately competence is a performance competence - ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: suspects behaviorism behind it. SearleVs: not true, because speech act theory involves intention. >Speech act theory. Searle VIII 409 Chomsky: new: object of study is the language skills. old: random number of sentences, classifications. ChomskyVsStructuralism: a theory must be able to explain which chains represent sentences and which do not. >Theories, >Explanation. Searle VIII 414 SearleVsChomsky: it is not clear how the grammatical theory provides the knowledge of the speaker. >Grammar, >Syntax, >Semantics. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Competence | Searle | VIII 404 Competence/performance/Chomsky: thesis: performance is just the tip of the iceberg of competence. VIII 437 SearleVsChomsky: the distinction is misled: he assumes that a theory of speech acts must be rather a theory of performance than one of competence - r does not see that competence is ultimately performance competence. ChomskyVsSpeech Act Theory: Chomsky suspects behaviorism behind it. >Behaviorism. SearleVs: this is not true, because Speech Act Theory involves intention. >Speech act theory. VIII 409/10 Chomsky: new: the object of study is language skills - old: we have indiscriminate sets of sentences, classifications. ChomskyVsStructuralism: a theory must be able to explain which chains represent sentences and which do not. VIII 414 SearleVsChomsky: it is not clear how the grammatical theory provides the knowledge of the speaker. >Transformational grammar. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Deep Structure | Searle | VIII 418 Deep structure/Chomsky: the deep structure determines the meaning. The surface structure determines the phonetic form (in Chomsky's late work: sometimes the meaning). Syntax/Chomsky: the syntax is inseparable from semantics. (According to Searle): a human is a syntactic creature, the brain is syntactical. VIII 421 SearleVsChomsky: it would follow that if one day humankind would have syntactically modified forms, we would have no more language, but something else. Cf. >surface structure, >transformational grammar, >syntax. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Epistemology | Putnam | III 87 Interest/knowledge/epistemology/recognition/Putnam: recognition is driven by interests (ChomskyVs). VsChomsky: that does not mean that we are free to choose our interests or that interests were not open to criticism. Also reasonableness depends on the circumstances. The claim that a term is relative to interests does not mean that all interests were equally reasonable. >Interest. --- I (g) 200 Kripke/Putnam: Kripke assumes that we have something like "intellectual intuition". PutnamVsKripke: something that should correspond to a "transcendental correspondence"? |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Forms | Pinker | I 218 Design/shape/Evolution/Chomsky: It is wrong to make selection responsible for all design - often there is simply a physical explanation. Explanation/selection/PinkerVsChomsky: Selection is usually not needed to explain utility, but something improbable. >Selection, >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Laws of nature. I 219 Definition design/Pinker: if the function cannot be described more economical than the structure, it is no design. - The term function will not add anything new. Cf. >Gestalt theory, >Gestalt psychology. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 |
| Generative Grammar | Chomsky | Lyons I 237 Generative Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: limits the classification. For example, longlegs/Bloomfield: be exocentric that they can occur both as singular and plural. However, this shows that these shapes are not constructions at all. Rather, they must be entered in the lexicon as entities that cannot be analyzed further. Distribution: e.g. longlegs is different from long legs. BloomfieldVsChomsky: but this cannot be accommodated by a productive formation rule. >Grammar, >Universal grammar, >Transformational grammar, >Generative grammar. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Generative Grammar | Lyons | I 158 Generative Grammar/Transformational Grammar/Lyons: "generative" is often misunderstood: generative grammar does not have to be transformational grammar. Both are often confused, since Chomsky introduced the terms at the same time. Transformation: was already used by Harris before in the same way as later by Chomsky. Def Generative/Grammar/Lyons: 1. "projective" ("predictive"): this also determines potential sentences. Through a number of grammatical rules that describe a corpus of sentences by "projecting" this corpus onto a larger number of sentences. I 159 2. "Explicit" ("formal"): provides a decision procedure as to whether sentences or combinations of language elements are grammatical or not. (similar in mathematics: Example 2 n: gives even numbers). A structural description is also provided. I 161 This second meaning of "generative" requires the formalization of grammatical theory. ((s) Instead of a list of rules). >Distribution/Lyons, >Grammar, cf. >Universal grammar, >Transformational grammar, >Categorial grammar. Lyons I 237 Generative Grammar/ChomskyVsBloomfield/Lyons: Chomsky speaks of generation. Generative Method, >Generative Grammar. BloomfieldVsChomsky: Bloomfield speaks of analysis (classification). >L. Bloomfield, >N. Chomsky. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Grammar | Chomsky | Searle VIII 414 ChomskyVsStructuralism: phrase structure rules alone cannot resolve ambiguities. E.g. >Active/Passive. Solution/Chomsky: transformation rules, transformation phrase markers by permutation, insertion, eradication of elements in other phrase markers - then the syntax consists of two components: base and transformation. VIII 418 Deep structure/Chomsky: determines the meaning. >Meaning. Surface structure: determines the phonetic form (late works: sometimes the meaning). Syntax/Chomsky: is to be separated from semantics - (according to Searle): man is a syntactic creature, the brain is syntactic. >Syntax. VIII 421 SearleVsChomsky: from this it would follow that if one day we had syntactically modified forms, we would have no language anymore, but something else. VIII 421 Generative grammar/NeogrammariansVsChomsky: semantics crucial for the formation of syntactic structures. >Young turks, >Neogrammarians. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Grammar | Lyons | I 136 Grammar/Antiquity/Lyons: Greek: "Art of writing". Later: entire linguistics. Today: narrower: summarizes what was traditionally called "flexion" and "syntax". Flexion/Lyons: deals with the inner word structure Syntax/Lyons: deals with the way words combine into sentences. Grammar/Lyons: contains rules for linking words to sentences. Grammar/Modernity/Lyons: in contrast to traditional "content-related" grammar, is now often referred to as "formal". ((s) Group: Lyons pro formal grammar, partly VsChomsky). >Syntax. I 137 Intermediate position: some grammarians assume that there are non-linguistic categories that are independent of the random facts of existing languages. Jespersen: Thesis: There are universal grammatical categories (tradition). Example "Speech parts" (parts of the speech), "tense", "mode" etc.). (It is a question of whether they even exist). Formal grammar/Lyons: does not exclude that these universal grammatical categories do not exist. The structure of each language should be described individually. >Language, >Languages, >Everyday language. I 172 Grammar/Tradition/Lyons: Basic units: Word and phrase. Today: constituent grammar: subdivides finer. >Words, >Sentences, >Morphemes, >Phonemes. I 182 Formal grammar/Lyons: pro: one must not assume in advance that all languages have fixed forms for question, command, exclamation or assertion. Cf. >Speech acts, >Question, >Command, >Answer. "Universal Grammar"/Tradition/Lyons: was in fact based on the peculiarities of Latin and Greek. >Universal grammar, cf. >Transformational grammar, >Categorial grammar. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Ideas | Searle | VIII 430 Judgment/idea/SearleVsEmpiricists: what makes the idea in mind become a judgment? Dilemma: if understanding of ideas is the same as a judgment, then we have a circularity. >Judgements. b) When ideas come in the form of a judgment, then they are only a series of ideas (imagination) in the mind, not sentences (this is inadequate). >Imagination. SearleVsChomsky: the same dilemma: a) If different readings of a sentence are only paraphrases, then there is circularly: competence for understanding paraphrases presuppose what they want to explain. b) If readings are only lists of items, then it is inadequate. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Innateness | Deacon | I 102 Innate/language competence/Deacon: it is undisputed that human brains are suitable for and specially equipped to learn a locally dominant language. DeaconVsChomsky: this does not have to be called innate "language competence". Competence/Deacon: is in turn a learnable skill. >N. Chomsky, >VsChomsky, >Language Acquisition, >Grammar, >Competence, >Brain/Deacon. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Language | Deacon | I 26 Language/DeaconVsTradition: traditional paradigms are e.g. 1. Explanation by association/associative images: according to that, the architecture of the language originates completely outside our organism 2. Mentalese/inner mental language: according to that it is completely within our organism 3. Innate grammatical knowledge >Chomsky. 4. Inner images triggered by sounds >Behaviorism. Nature/nurture/Deacon/(s): this classical question is about what nature has given us and what we have acquired ("nurture" = food). Depending on whether the answer is closer to the end of innate properties (instinctive knowledge), learning is seen as rather superfluous. >Nature versus nurture. DeaconVsChomsky: despite the amazing language learning skills of children, the origin must be sought elsewhere and other questions must be asked. >Language Acquisition. I 53 Language/Deacon: is a derived characteristic (derived from much longer existing animal communication) and should therefore be analysed as an exception to a rule, not vice versa. Cf. >Animals, >Animal language. Animal communication: is usually wrongly treated as "language minus something". I 54 In fact, language is a dependent stepchild of much richer communication, which also includes gestures, showing, tone of voice, interaction with objects, and so on. >Pointing, >Gestures, >Speaking, >Listening. It is not the case that language has replaced other forms of communication. Rather, it has developed in parallel. >Communication. I 309 Language/Brain/Deacon: Lateralisation (lateralisation, division of tasks between the right and left hemisphere of the brain) is almost certainly an effect and not a cause within the co-evolution of language and brain. I even believe that it is an effect in the language evolution of individuals. This involves a division of tasks,... I 310 ...so that they can be processed more easily in parallel. >Brain/Deacon. I 311 Children with only one cerebral hemisphere can learn all aspects of the language. (Plasticity of the brain) If we want to understand speech processing in the brain, we do not have to investigate so much the individual circumstances that change from individual to individual, but rather what drives individual development. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Language | Harman | Chomsky I 306 Language/Harman: because language is obviously not a "knowing-that", it must be a "knowing-how". >Knowledge, >Knowledge how, >Propositional knowledge, >Competence, >Performance, >Language acquisition. I 308 HarmanVsChomsky: the internal system for the selection of a grammar should be presented in a more fundamental language that would already have to be understood by the child. >Grammar, >VsChomsky. ChomskyVsVs: there is perhaps a more fundamental language, but the child does not have to speak it. The child has to learn the native language, but maybe it already actually masters a grammar. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Language Acquisition | Bruner | Upton i 74 Language acquisition/Bruner/Upton: Bruner’s theory provides a good example of an interactional framework for thinking about language development. He maintains that, while there may be an [language acquisition device] LAD as suggested by Chomsky (>Language acquisition/Chomsky), there must also be a language acquisition support system (LASS) (Bruner, 1983)(1). In this support system he is referring to the features of early relationships (…). Upton I 75 BrunerVsChomsky: Bruner cites the example of a well-known childhood game, Peek-a-boo, in which the mother, or other carer, disappears and then reappears. Through this ritual, which at first may be accompanied by simple noises, or ‘Bye-bye . . . Hello’, and later by lengthier commentaries, the child is both learning about separation and return, and being offered a context within which language, charged with emotive content, may be acquired. It is this reciprocal and affective nature of language that Bruner suggests Chomsky neglects to consider. Upton: For the importance of shared activity see e.g. Liebal et al. 2009(2). >Language acquisition/Dynamic systems theory. 1. Bruner, J.S. (1983) Child’s Talk: Learning to use language. New York: Norton. 2. Liebal, K., Behne, T., Carpenter, M and Tomasello, M. (2009) Infants use shared experience to interpret pointing gestures.Developmental Science, 12(2): 264–71. Available online at http://email.eva.mpg.de/~tomas/pdf/LiebalEtal_SharedExperience_2009.pdf (accessed 12 March 2011) |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Language Acquisition | Chomsky | I 281 Learning/Chomsky: a child learns as well Japanese as English - pointless to ask "which hypotheses it reduces" - there must be more than the ability to associate - structural grammar does not yield the structures that we have to postulate as generative grammar. >Grammar, >Generative grammar. I 283 Internal organization plays an important role for the perception, it determines an extremely restrictive initial scheme. I 285 VsGoodman: Learning a second language is not that different. >Learning. I 299 Learning/Chomsky: whether the evaluation function is learned or it is the basis for learning, is an empirical question. II 324 Language learning: behaviorist/Quine: Conditioning, association. ChomskyVsQuine: additionally principles , only by them infinitely many sentenes are explainable. ((s) For the question whether there are infinitely many possible sentences, see >Researchgate.) Upton I 74 Language acquistion/Chomsky/Upton: Chomsky (1979)(1) argues that there must therefore be an innate mechanism for language learning. He calls this the language acquisition device (LAD). LAD: Through the LAD the child is hard-wired to recognise the grammar of whatever language they are exposed to in infancy. This LAD matures over time, allowing the child to use increasingly complex language. VsChomsky/Upton: Contemporary theories of language development tend to be less extreme. Both sides have modified their position, so that nativists recognise that the environment has a role to play in language acquisition, and environmentalists accept that imitation and reinforcement are insufficient to explain the child’s entry into the complex world of language. >Language acquisition/Nativism, >Language acquisition/Bruner. 1. Chomsky, N (1979) Human language and other semiotic systems. Semiotica, 25: 31–44. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Language Acquisition | Deacon | I 39 Language acquisition/evolution/development of language/complexity/simplicity/Deacon: there are two paradigms: a) Evolution of greater intelligence b) Evolution of a specific speech organ Both have in common that the problem is learning a very large number of complex rules and that the complexity is simply too great for species other than humans. >Learning, >Rules, >Language rules, >Grammar, cf. >Universal grammar. DeaconVs: complexity is only one problem and not the deciding factor. I 53 Language acquisition/Deacon: depends decisively on non-linguistic communication. Much of it is already innate in animals. We also use a lot of non-linguistic elements such as tone of voice, gestures, etc. in everyday speech. >Communication, >Animals, >Animal language, >Gestures. I 125 Language Learning/Deacon: that children learn language best at a certain age seems to speak for innate structures in the brain. >Innateness. A better explanation seems to me to be the immaturity of children or young chimpanzees like Kanzi. We do not need to adopt an essentialist position if we concentrate on this aspect. I 126 In this age of immaturity, children have little memory performance for details. Young Bonobo Kanzi was able to concentrate strongly on the proper use of symbols, while older chimpanzees had to learn what to focus on. I 127 If this is true, it must be a characteristic of childhood that is independent of language. GoldVsChomsky/Deacon: Gold(1) brought a logical proof that rules of a logical system with the structural complexity of a natural grammar cannot be discovered inductively without explicit error correction, even not theoretically. It is not their complexity that is decisive, but the fact that the rules are not mapped on the surface of the sentence form. Instead, they are embodied in widely distributed word relations and are used recursively (repeatedly). This multiplies the possibilities of how a rule could actually be constructed geometrically. This makes it impossible for a child or other language learners to derive the correct rules from the nature of the language. This has led many authors to adopt innate abilities. >Induction/Deacon. I 128 Language Acquisition/Newport/Deacon: Question: Why can children learn grammar more easily than other things that are much easier?(2)(3) I 129 E.g. The younger a child is, the more difficult it is for him or her to consciously process new associations. This has to do with short-term memory and attention span. Could it be that these limitations favor language acquisition? The solution seems to be to start "small and simple," "less is more." >Neural Networks/Deacon, >Complexity. I 137 Language acquisition/Elissa Newport/Deacon: Newport was one of the first to propose that language learning for children should not be perceived as a function of a particular language learning system, but vice versa; such language structures are best passed on from generation to generation, which best correspond to the child's learning biases. I 339 Language acquisition/adaptation/brain/evolution/Deacon: in addition to the constant sensomotoric conditions of language use, there are also invariances of language evolution that affect the context of language learning. There are three types of language adaptation: a) innate, b) learned, c) those that develop in the interaction between the innate and the experienced. Universality is not a sure indicator that something of the evolution has been built into our brains. 1. Gold, E. (1967), Language identification in the limit. Information and Control 16, 447-474. 2. Newport, E. (1991), Maturational consteraints on language learning, Cognitive Science 14, 11-28. 3. Newport, E. (1991), Contrasting conceptions oft he critical period for language. In: S. Carey and R. Gelma (Eds.) Epigenesis of Mind: Essys on Biology and Cognition, NJ. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Language Development | Bruner | Upton I 3 Language development/BrunerVsChomsky/Bruner: theorists such as Jerome Bruner (1983(1)) agree with Chomsky’s notion of an LAD. However, Bruner asserts that Chomsky gives too big a role to this aspect of language acquisition, noting that social context, and the behaviour of parents in particular, have a significant impact on language development. This aspect of the environment he calls the language acquisition support system (LASS). According to Bruner, the LAD cannot function alone and every LAD therefore needs a LASS. Def Language acquisition support system (LASS)/Bruner: Bruner’s term to describe the range of interactive precursors, such as joint picture book reading, that help support language development in children. These social interactions provide a scaffolding environment to structure the child’s early language utterances. Upton I 62 Language development/Bruner/Upton: Joint attention and sharing interactions are key features of early relationships and, according to Bruner (1985)(2), these play a key role in the development of language. To begin with, such interactions might only involve the carer and child, for example playing a game of Peek-a-boo. >Interaction/Bruner, >Motherese/Developmental psychology. In joint-action formats the mother creates simple, structured activities with objects such as toys so as to teach her infant what the objects are for and how to use them – for example, building blocks into a tower, or using a spoon for feeding. Upton I 62 These shared sequences are also talked about by the mother, which encourages the infant to acquire language (Bruner, 1975(3), 1985(2), 1993(4)). The joint-action formats provide a mapping activity during which the child learns to link words and phrases with the correct objects and events. Pointing has an important role to play in ensuring joint attention during joint-action formats – for example, when reading picture books with their carers, infants show joint attention to objects shown in the book through pointing, which is usually accompanied by labelling of the object. Cf. >Triangulation. Adults’ role: the adult response to pointing by an infant is usually to label the object pointed at (Hannan, 1992)(5). Blindness: Research has also shown that blind children are able to label significantly fewer objects than sighted infants (Norgate, 1997)(6), which lends further support to the importance of pointing for acquiring object names. Spcial context/Bruner: Bruner argues that, in this way, the mother (or other carer) provides a social context in which the meaning of language can be learned. This idea that the social context supports language acquisition is supported by evidence that the first words to be understood by an infant are typically the child’s own name, the names of other family members and the names of familiar objects such as clock, drink and teddy (Harris et al., 1995a)(7). >Language acquisition, >Stages of Development. 1. Bruner, J. S. (1983) Child’s talk: Learning to use language. New York: Norton. 2. Bruner, J.S. (1985) Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 3. Bruner, J.S. (1975) The ontogenesis of speech acts.Journal of Child Language, 2: 1—19. 4. Bruner, J.S. (1993) Explaining and interpreting: two ways of using mind, in Harman, G (ed.) Conceptions of the Human Mind: Essays in honor of George A Miller. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 5. Hannan, T.E. (1992) An examination of spontaneous pointing in 20- to 50-month-old chil then. Perceptual andMotor Skills, 74: 65 1—8. 6. Norgate, S.H. (1997) Research methods for studying the language of blind children, in Horn berger, N.H. and Corson, D. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Languczge and Education, Vol. 8:Research methods in language and education. The Netherlands: Kiuwer Academic Publishers. 7. Harris, M., Barlow-Brown, F. and Chasin, J. (1995a) The emergence of referential understanding: pointing and the comprehension of object names. First Language, 15: 19–34. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Language Evolution | Deacon | I 25 Language evolution/Evolution/Deacon: Language is one of the most striking behavioural adaptations of our planet. Languages have developed only in one species, only in one way, without precursors - except in a very generalized sense. The differences between language and all other forms of communication are considerable. >Language, >Communication. This is also reflected in the anatomy of the human being, especially the brain and the vocal apparatus. We can see these differences in living species. I 34 Language evolution/human/animal/Deacon: the incomparability of human and non-human communication has led to exaggerated and unacceptable interpretations of the origin of language. I 35 For example, the assertion that language is the result of a certain interconnection in the brain, which is unique, is not only the assertion that it is a unique neurological characteristic correlated with this unique behavior, but also that it is a substantial biological discontinuity. DeaconVs: this is a modern mythology, according to which we would have given a monkey a speech computer in his hand. That reminds me of the movie "Short Circuit". I 44 Language evolution/Deacon: Thesis: Speech and brain have become more complex in common evolution and have been designed as they are today. Even though we do not find any simple languages today, the beginnings were certainly easier than the languages we find today. Somewhere in this development, the threshold was crossed to an extremely difficult symbolic reference. >Symbolic reference, >Symbols/Deacon, >Reference. I 105 - 110 Language evolution/DeaconVsChomsky/Deacon: Why do children so often make the right choice when they try out grammatical rules? It is the language that develops "user-friendly". Language develops faster than brains during evolution. >Evolution. Just as dolphins can only be taught tricks that they perform on their own initiative when they are in a good mood. However, the language is not as limited in its development as the interface of a computer, which is ultimately dictated by the design of the engineers. Language has evolved in terms of reproducibility, in relation to selection pressure by human users. Language that is easier to learn prevails stronger. N.B.: you do not have to assume, as Chomsky does, that children are particularly clever. I 111 It is helpful to imagine that language is a parasitic form of life that nests in brains to reproduce itself. I 112 Deacon/Morton Christansen: Thesis: There is a co-evolutionary dynamic between language and its host, the brain. One can compare language in a way with viruses, which are not completely independent living beings themselves, but are full of information for their own reproduction. I 113 The relationship between people and language can be described as symbiotic, both need each other to reproduce. Of course, the language as a whole cannot be defined in this way. I 114 Bilingualism: in the case of bilingual people, brain regions tend to be separated for the processing of the two languages. One explanation for this is that the two languages would otherwise compete for the neuronal resources in the brain of the user. Sooner or later, there would be a mutual disturbance. I 122 Brains have evolved along with language, but most of the adaptation was on the language side. I 354 Language formation/Lieberman/Deacon: Philip Lieberman has shown in a number of influential articles that the elimination of physiological limitations of vocal formation has contributed to a rapid acceleration in the development of language(1)(2). DeaconVsLieberman: however, it would mean to over-interpret the fossil finds at hand if one wanted to ascribe the language evolution exclusively to these anatomical developments by ascribing a sudden eruption of a series of abilities to this characteristic alone. I 355 The development of the brain and the vocal system were certainly both, both effects and causes in a mutually reinforcing process of language evolution. 1. Lieberman, Ph. (1984). The Biology and Evolution of Language, Cambridge, MA. (2) Lieberman, Ph. (1991). Uniquely Human: The Evolution of Speech, Thought and Selfless Behavior, Cambridge, MA. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Language Evolution | Gärdenfors | I 71 Language Evolution/Evolution/Language/Gärdenfors: Thesis: in early forms of communication the communicative act itself was more important than its expressive form. (See H. Clark, 1992(1), Winter, 1998(2), Gärdenfors, 2010(3)). Therefore, the pragmatics of natural language is evolutionary seen the fundamental. Later, when the communication acts become more diverse and independent of the immediate context, the semantics is brought to the fore. Syntax is needed when the communication becomes even more conventional later: markers are used to establish uniqueness. Then syntax is used only for the most subtle aspects of communication. VsGärdenfors: this is in contrast to most contemporary authors in linguistics. ChomskyVsGärdenfors: for Chomsky's school syntax is at the beginning of the investigation, semantic features are added only when grammar is not enough. GärdenforsVsChomsky. I 72 Pragmatics/GärdenforsVsChomsky/Gärdenfors: For Chomsky, the pragmatics is only the waste basket for the remains: context, deixis, etc.). Gärdenfors: for a theory of the evolution of language, we must proceed differently: pragmatics before semantics before syntax. I 73 Language formation/Gärdenfors: just as the money was later added to the exchange economy and made it more efficient, the language was added to the existing communication among humans. Analogy/linguistic communication/monetary economy/Gärdenfors: one can extend the analogy: just as the money allows a stable price system, a relatively stable system of meanings is formed by language. Game theoretical explanation/analogy: just as prices, linguistic meanings are also equilibrium points in a system. (> Meeting of minds). I 78 Langauge Formation/Communication/Gärdenfors: Thesis: growing semantic complexity is achieved by extending the domains in the shared conceptual space. One can understand the linking of different domains as the creation of product spaces. ((s) Product space: Cartesian coordinate system, where one axis corresponds to a conceptual dimension.) This is how domains are combined. 1. Clark, H. (1992). Arenas of language use. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Winter, S. (1998). Expectations and linguistic meaning. Lund University Cognitive Studies 71. Lund: Lund University. 3. Gärdenfors, P. (2010). Evolution and semantics. In P.C. Horgan (ed.) Cambridge encyclopedia of the language sciences (pp. 748-750). Cambridge: Cambridge University. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Method | Chomsky | I 278 Method/theory/Chomsky: requirement: we must be able to describe what the person receives. - The percept itself is a construction of the first order. - Its properties are determined experiment. Grammar: Grammar is a construction of the second-order. For this one must abstract from the other factors involved in the use and understanding of language and refer to internalized knowledge of the speaker. VsBehaviorism: excludes the concept of "what is perceived" and "what is learned" from the outset. >Behaviorism. I 297ff Method/theory: PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered through routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not that impressive. ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact this refers to competence and not to performance - routine does not matter here, but the inherent correlation between sound and meaning. >Ambiguity. I 303 Chomsky: my universal grammar is not a "theory of language acquisition", but one element of it. - My thesis is an "all-at-once" proposal and does not try to capture the interplay between the tentative hypotheses constructed by the child and new data interpreted with them. >Grammar, >Hypotheses. --- II 316 Method/theory/Chomsky: "association", "reinforcement", "random mutation ": hide our ignorance. ((s) Something dissimilar may also be associated.) II 321 Method/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty. - If reinforcement is needed for learning, it means that learning cannot happen without data. Cf. >Psychological theories on reinforcement and reinforcement sensitivity, >Learning. II 323 Language Learning/ChomskyVsQuine: he does not explain it: if only association and conditioning, then the result is merely a finite language. >Language acquisition. II 324 VsQuine: concept of probability of a sentence is empty: the fact that I utter a particular German sentence is as unlikely as a particular Japanese sentence from me. >Probability. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Omniscience | Hintikka | II XV Logical Omniscience/Hintikka: thesis: logical omniscience is only a supposed problem. ChomskyVsHintikka: Hintikka has given the alleged paradox as the reason for his rejection of any model-theoretical semantics for propositional attitudes. HintikkaVsChomsky: Chomsky's problem has been solved long ago. --- II 21 Omniscience/solution/Hintikka: we must allow individuals to not exist in every possible world. Otherwise, all world lines would have to be ad libitum extendable, then everyone would have to know what an individual would be in any world (in whatever disguise), namely on the basis of the form of knowledge + indirect W-question. II 23 Logical Omniscience/epistemic logic/model theory/Hintikka: problem: suppose (S1 > S2). That is, all S1 models are S2 models. Then all the epistemic alternatives in which S1 is true are those in which S2 is true. Problem: it follows that for each knowing person b and every scenario applies: (3.1) {b} KS1> {b} K S2. That is, one must also know all the logical consequences of one's knowledge. This has led some to reject model theory. Model Theory/HintikkaVsVs: model theory follows only if one cannot avoid omniscience, and one can avoid it. >Model theory. Solution: one can find a subset of logical consequences (S1 > S2) for which (3.1) applies. (i) This subset can be restricted syntactically. The number of free individual symbols together with the number of layers of quantifiers limit the number of individuals that can be considered in a set S (or in an argument). Solution: this number (parameter) should not be greater than the one in S1 or S2 at any point in the argument. Problem: there is no simple axiomatic-deductive system for this. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Pragmatics | Gärdenfors | I 72 Pragmatics/GärdenforsVsChomsky/Gärdenfors: For Chomsky, the pragmatics is only the waste basket for the remains: context, deixis, etc.). Gärdenfors: for a theory of the evolution of language, we must proceed differently: pragmatics before semantics before syntax. Gärdenfors: the pragmatics of a communication system will not determine the semantic structure. The meaning space can be divided in many different ways. Also, the semantics does not determine the syntax. However, the semantic structures will provide limitations on which syntactic structures are possible or likely. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Semantics | Chomsky | I 272 Semantics/Chomsky: here the surface structures hardly help, the deep structure helps even more. --- Strawson V 393 StrawsonVsChomsky: hardly deals with semantics - its lexicon contains much fewer entries than our dictionaries. >Lexicon, >Surface structure, >Deep structure, >Grammar, >Syntax, >Unambiguity. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Semantics | Searle | I 236 Chinese room: semantics is not intrinsic to the syntax. >Syntax. VI 205 Semantics/speech act theory/Searle: speech act theory is not an appendage, but encompasses everything that used to be called semantics and pragmatics. >Pragmatics, >speech act theory. VII 100 Semantics/pragmatics/Searle: I have never found the distinction between pragmatics and semantics useful, as it requires a specific theory in the philosophy of language. VII 102 Language/Searle: without a coherent general theory of syntax and semantics, we have no way of distinguishing between features of utterances that are derived from particular words and features that are derived from other facts, e.g. from speech or syntactic syntax. VIII 419 Generative semantics/"Young Turks": thesis: according to this opinion (of Chomsky's students) there is no boundary between syntax and semantics and therefore no such entities as syntactic deep structures. ChomskyVs: syntax should be studied separately from semantics. (This is the heritage of structuralism). Searle: deep philosophical view: for Chomsky the human being is a syntactic living being, the brain is syntactically structured. The semantic function does not determine the form of syntax. Form is only casually related to function. VIII 420 Generative semantics/"Young Turks"VsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is semantics. Even terms like "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! Example: "He called him a Republican and insulted him". >Generative grammar. VIII 422 Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a sentence. Searle: if generative semantics is right and there are no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes even more interesting; we can then systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection here!) >Young turks. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Speech Act Theory | Searle | II 25 Sincerity condition: the sincerity condition is internal to the speech acts. --- Husted IV 251 Speech act/Searle: speech acts are rule-determined actions. They always have constitutive (not regulatory) rules. Searle: the speech act is key to the meaning. VsSearle: this is controversial because language rules for e.g. singular term have a fundamentally different nature than for actions. J. Husted "Searle" in: Hügli/Lübke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993S. 251 --- V 68 The speech act is an unequal game. An explanation must presuppose rules. Rules are not equal. Convention: speaking rules are governed by behavior. For rules, behavior is not crucial. >Language game, >Convention. V 207 Traditional Speech Act Theory/Austin/Strawson/Hare: the word W is needed to perform speech act A, then e.g. "good" recommends, "true" reaffirms, "knowledge" guarantees something. SearleVs: this only works with performative verbs such as "promise" but not with judgmental ones. This does not satisfy the adequacy condition for semantic analysis: a word must mean in all grammatically different sentences the same; it cannot, if the meaning is supposed to be the execution of various acts. V 213 Wrong: to assume that the conditions for the execution of a speech act follow from the meanings of the words ( "fallacy of assertiveness"). --- IV 27 Speech Act Theory/SearleVsAustin: Austin accepts verbs for acts but one has to differentiate this, e.g. the announcement of a command is not the command. IV 78 Speech Act Theory/Searle: the speech act theory differs from other philosophical approaches in that it gives no set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the explicable phenomenon (e.g. linguistics: structural rules). >Structural rules. IV 86 The illocutionary act is the function of the meaning of the sentence. IV 86 Fiction/speech acts/Searle: fiction has no other speech acts but is a predetermined act, e.g. in literature it is no other act than in the newspaper. No semantic or syntactic property proves a text as fictional. IV 204 Speech Act TheoryVsChomsky, VsRules, instead of semantics/pragmatics. --- VII 99 Speech Act/proposition/Searle: difference: from the propositional content does not follow that the assertion conditions are satisfied - the proposition rather implies that the speaker implies within the act that they are satisfied. --- VIII 435 Speech Act/Searle: the speech act is hold together by the semantic intentions of the speaker. VsChomsky: Chomsky does not see the essential connection of meaning and speech acts. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Husted I Jörgen Husted "Searle" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted II Jörgen Husted "Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted III Jörgen Husted "John Langshaw Austin" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Husted IV Jörgen Husted "M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993 Husted V J. Husted "Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 |
| Symbolic Communication | Deacon | I 334 Symbolic communication/Deacon: there has never been a proto-language with simpler structures than e.g. the distinction between subject and predicate, which deals with symbols instead of pure indices at all. >Index/Deacon, >Symbol/Deacon. These forms were present from the very beginning, when symbolic communication was born. Deep structure: there are no characteristics for it so it that would be effective beyond language boundaries, such as sentence position, melody or specific words. >Deep structure, >N. Chomsky, >VsChomsky. It is therefore reasonable that Chomsky should withdraw from Darwinian explanation. I 335 Language/Brain/Deacon: the specific neuronal processes necessary to overcome the attention threshold depend on processes taking place in the prefrontal cortex. Here we have a common ground between individual brains and a point of attack for Baldwin's evolution. >Baldwin's Evolution, >Evolution/Deacon. I 353 Symbolic communication/evolution: symbolic communication has developed over 2 million years. It was not always the case that speaking is the essential part of everyday communication and the transmission of our language to children, as is the case today. >Communication, >Language development. I 354 Non-verbal communication may have been in competition with verbal communication for a long time. Cf. >Gestures, >Animals, >Animal language. I 362 Symbolic communication/gestures/articulation/language/Deacon: due to the untrained vocal abilities of early humans, early symbolic communication should not have been just a simpler language, but should differ from language in many ways. Some authors suspected that early language such as chains of words were without specific syntax or grammar. DeaconVs: paradoxically, the limitation of the vocal apparatus may have resulted in a greater complexity of earlier languages. >Syntax. I 363 A smaller repertoire of sound differences leads to longer chains. Such languages are then more prone to errors. In addition, the short-term memory is used to a greater extent. In order to avoid errors, an increased level of redundancy is likely to have been appropriate. >Redundancy. I 368 Language development: it is a common mistake to infer primitive language from the primitive use of tools of early peoples. It is also problematic to infer anything from the lack of evidence. I 370 While stone tools were similar in different regions of the world (their use was universal) the early symbolic communication of distant peoples will not have been similar to the same extent. I 372 Neanderthals had a fully developed modern brain from a neurological point of view. I 373 The main reason for the decline of former peoples were introduced diseases, not cultural inferiority. The rapid changes in the paleolithic age do not correspond to biological changes. >Extinction. I 378 Why has symbolic communication developed? It was useful for coordination in hunting, sharing knowledge about tool use and much more. But none of them can serve as an explanation, since it always requires a certain symbolic communication. The first beginnings were probably only a small part of social communication and not better developed than the communication of modern apes. Problem: Learning symbols requires much more indirect association than what is normally used for associations in other organisms than humans. These more indirect associations are not of any use at all at first, and are therefore inefficient and detrimental to survival. >Association. I 378-381 From an evolutionary point of view, the most important information is that which the female can obtain about the abilities of the male and which the male is able to deliver to the female. It must be possible to exclude erroneous information and distinguish information from other behaviours. I 382 Communication between males must be more complex when it comes to assessing the strengths of a rival without risking a direct battle. I 384 Human Communication/Deacon: Thesis: The development of more complex (symbolic) means of communication is probably designed to regulate the unavoidable conflict between sexual reproduction and social cooperation. I 385 A special characteristic of human versus animal communities is the long-term sexual bonding. Weddings establish a greater number of rights and obligations within a community. Marriage rules determine who can or cannot marry whom. Most communities are aware of an incest prohibition. Cf. >C. Lévi-Strauss. I 388 Characteristic for human communities is a relatively stable mating of parents and at the same time care for the rearing of offspring within a larger social association. The reason why this is rare in evolution is that such structures tend to undermine themselves. I 392 Coexistence in groups and simultaneous male brood care can only be maintained if access to reproduction is limited and unambiguous, which is the case only in carnivorous communities. Replacement for nursing care is only provided by relatives. A special feature is that we humans are particularly poorly equipped to steer social behaviour through smells. I 396 Females must have a guarantee that their offspring will be provided with meat by males. The males have to be sure that they only care for their own offspring. I 397 The problem of setting up a social structure that makes this possible can be solved by using symbols. I 401 In the context of marriage rules, reciprocity and altruism are at stake. It must be possible to represent past and possible future actions. Indexical communication is not enough. However, quite simple symbols are enough. >Altruism. Abstract reference: Reference to the absent was practiced and achieved through ritualization. I 403 Abstractness: a problem that is particularly difficult to symbolize is peace or its creation. This is due to the high cost of possible deception. >Deception, >Peace. I 405 Negation: to distinguish war and peace, negation or symbolic representation of negation is used. In addition, one needs generalization in order to understand peace as the absence of all conflicts. >Negation, >Generalization. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Symbols | Deacon | I 79 Symbols/Deacon: Tradition: assumes that symbolic association is formed by learning the connection between a sound or string with something else in the world. DeaconVsTradition: this is what we mean by index or index-like or indexing association. >Icon/Deacon. I 80 Words can also be an index: e.g."Aha!","there" etc. >Indexicality. Understanding: a sign that someone has understood a word is his ability to use that word in other sentences. However, if the word is only inserted somewhere, it would only be an index-like or iconic understanding. >Understanding, >Language use. Symbol: to use something as a symbol, you should be able to handle the referential functions (what does it refer to?). >Reference, >Symbolic reference. Def stimulus generalization: the transfer of associations from one stimulus to a similar one. Similarly, the transfer of learned patterns to a similar context. This is often confused with symbolic associations. >Association, >Stimulus, >Stimulus meaning, >Language use, >Generalization. I 81 Learning/DeaconVsTradition: such transfers are not special forms of learning, but simply iconic projections. This happens by itself, because ambiguity is always involved. Psychological models often speak of rules for this transfer. >Learning, >Rules. DeaconVs: since this is an iconic relation, there is no implicit list of criteria that is learned. ((s) Images are compared directly, not based on lists of criteria). Icon/Deacon: Words or stimuli stand for a set of things that differ more or less from each other. People and animals learn this. This learning is not done by criteria for symbols, but by iconic overlapping. This provides the basis for an indexed reference. I 83 Symbol/learning/Deacon: the difficulty of symbolic learning stems from the complex relation a symbol (e.g. a word) has to other symbols. Such complex relations do not exist between indices (simple signs with a physical connection to an object). I 92 Symbols/Deacon: Problem: Symbols cannot be learned individually as they form a system among each other. I 93 Before a single symbol-object association can be detected, the complete logical system of symbols must be learned. Problem: even with a few symbols there is a very large number of possible combinations, most of which are pointless. These must be sorted out, i.e. "forgotten". I 99 Symbols/Deacon: Symbols are not an unstructured set of tokens representing objects, but they represent each other. Symbols do not refer directly to things in the world, but they do so indirectly by referring to other symbols ((s) because they are located in a syntactic and semantic system). I 100 Limitation/Borders: Randomly uninterpreted strings of signs have no reference and therefore no limit in their set. Other symbols: their quantity is limited because of (practical, external) use and because of the use of the other symbols by which they are defined. Question: why are only some types of symbol systems implemented in human languages, but not others? I 266 Symbols/Deacon: it is wrong to assume they are located somewhere in the brain. They are rather relations between tokens, not the tokens themselves. It is also not constituted by a special association, but by the set of associations that are partially represented in each instance of the symbol. I 267 In the brain, the operations for organizing these combinatorial relations are located in the prefrontal cortex. I 336 Symbols/language/brain/evolution/Deacon: Thesis: it is the use of symbols that made it necessary for our human brain to develop in such a way that special emphasis could be placed on actions in the prefrontal cortex. >Adaptation/Deacon. I 339 Symbols/Evolution/Brain/DeaconVsPinker/DeaconVsChomsky: whatever we call "language instinct", symbol processing is so widely distributed in the brain that it cannot be subjected to natural selection. Thus language is cut off from what biological evolution can shape. >Thinking, >Cognition, >Information processing/psychology, cf. >Cognitive psychology. I 339/340 Universal grammar/language evolution/solution/Deacon: Co-evolution of languages with regard to the circumstances and dispositions of the brain. This can be an explanation for a developing grammatical universality. >Universal grammar, >Symbolic communication, >Symbolic learning, >Symbolic representation. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Syntax | Cresswell | I 47 Syntax/Cresswell: The modal operator belongs to the syntax. >Modal operators. Semantics: possible worlds belong to semantics. >Possible worlds, >Semantics. I 161 Syntax/Semantics/HintikkaVsChomsky: Syntax depends on semantics. - (In the context of the game theoretical semantics GTS, it is about the order of the applied rules) >Game-theoretical semantics. Cresswell: Thesis: Syntax first generates a large class of structures, this is then reduced by semantics, and then again syntactic principles reduce the class of grammatically acceptable chains. >Grammar. Every/any/Hintikka/Cresswell: the thesis that a sentence with "any" is unacceptable if "any" can be replaced by "every" without changing the meaning. >Acceptability. II 95 Semantic category/Cresswell: E.g. 0: Proposition. Corresponding syntactic category: sentence. >Semantic categories/Cresswell. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Transformational Grammar | Strawson | VI 386 Transformational grammar/Chomsky/Strawson: 1. lexical formativ: do names and general terms correspond, whose meaning is not somehow syntactically derived E.g. "singing", "red", "Mary" 2. non-lexical: heterogeneous group E.g. "past" for past tense. There is no mechanical process to find the deep structure. "Internal representation" is not sufficient for the explanation of the skills. >Deep structure, >Competence. Transformational grammar provides the basis for determining the grammatical relation for the semantic interpretation of sentences. VI 390 Grammar not circular, because it contains a lexicon. >Grammar, >Lexicon. StrawsonVsChomsky: no general theory about the connections of grammatical categories and formatives - only a list of elements without principles of allocation - no transparency. >Noam Chomsky, cf. >Generative Grammar. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bloomfield, L. | Chomsky Vs Bloomfield, L. | Lyons I 237 ChomskyVsBloomfield: speaks of creation. Generative method > generative grammar. BloomfieldVsChomsky: speaks of analysis (classification). generative grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: sets limits to the classification. E.g. longlegs/Bloomfield: are exocentric so that they can occur both as singular as well as plural. However, this shows that these forms are no constructions. They must rather be registered in the lexicon as not further analyzable entities. Distribution: of E.g. longlegs is different from that of long legs. BloomfieldVsChomsky: this cannot be accounted for with a productive formation rule. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Chomsky, N. | Dennett Vs Chomsky, N. | I 513 Chomsky: early thesis the brain works in a way that ultimately defies scientific analysis. Even >Fodor. Also >McGinn. DennetVsChomsky / DennettVsFodor: this is a kind saltationist view about the mind: they postulated cracks in the design space, and is therefore not Darwinian. Dennett: Chomsky actually represents quite a Darwinian view of the theory of language, but he has always shunned these views, like Gould. I 531 "Cognitive lock"/Independence/Chomsky/McGinn: Spiders can't think about fishing. That's how it is for us: the question of free will may not be solvable for us. McGinn/Fodor: human consciousness is such a mystery. I 533 Cognitive lock/DennettVsMcGinn: the situation for the monkey is different: he can not even understand the question. He is not even shocked! Neither Chomsky nor Fodor can cite cases from animals to which certain matters are a mystery. In reality, not as they represented a biological, but a pseudo-biological problem. It ignores even a biological accident: we can certainly find an intelligence scale in the living world. I 534 Consciousness/DennettVsMcGinn: apart from problems that are not solvable in the lifetime of the universe, our consciousness is still developing as we can not even imagine today. Why Chomsky and Fodor do not like this conclusion? They hold the means for unsatisfactory. If our mind is not based on skyhook but on cranes, they would like to keep it secret. I 556 DennettVsChomsky: he is wrong if he thinks a description at the level of machines is conclusive, because that opens the door for >"Strong Artificial Intelligence". |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Chomsky, N. | Dummett Vs Chomsky, N. | I 187 DummettVsChomsky: much too complicated theory actually about brain processes. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Chomsky, N. | Harman Vs Chomsky, N. | I 306 Competence/Performance/ChomskyVsHarman: competence as "knowledge that language is described by the rules of grammar". And that "grammar specifies this competence". ChomskyVsHarman: I have not only never asserted this, but also repeatedly rejected it publicly. It would be absurd if the speaker had to know the rules explicitly. Knowledge/Language/Harman: a) knowing that b) knowing how. Since language is obviously not "knowing that", it must be "knowing how". The speaker knows "how he has to understand other speakers." Analogous to the ability of the cyclist. I 307 ChomskyVsHarman: he uses "competence" very different than me. I see no relation to the "ability of the cyclist", not a "set of habits," or something like that. I 308 HarmanVsChomsky: the internalized system (that limits the choice of grammars) must be represented in a more fundamental language, and the child must have understood the latter already, before it can apply this schematism a) this leads to a circle: If you said that the child mastered the "more fundamental language" "directly", without having learned it, then why do you not also say that it mastered the actual language "directly" without learning it. Or: b) Regress: If, however, you said that it has to learn the more fundamental language first, then the question is how this fundamental language is learned itself. ChomskyVsHarman: even if you assume that the schematism must be represented at an "innate language", it does not follow what Harman sees: the child may need to master the "more fundamental language", but it does not have to "speak and understand" it. We just have to assume that it can make use of it. ad a): the assumption that the child masters its native language without learning it is wrong. It is not born with perfect knowledge of German. On the other hand, nothing speaks against the assumption that it is born with perfect knowledge of a universal grammar. HarmanVsChomsky: in a model, conclusions from the given data on a grammar can only be made, if detailed information on a theory of performance is included in the model. Chomsky: interesting, but not necessary. I 310 Empiricism/Theory/HarmanVsChomsky: calls Chomsky’s strategy "inventive empiricism", a doctrine that uses "induction principles". Such "inventive empiricism" is certainly not to be refuted, "no matter how the linguistic data look". ChomskyVsHarman: empiricism is not so important. I’m interested in the question of whether there are "ideas and principles of various kinds" which "determine the form of the knowledge acquired in a largely defined and highly organized manner" (rationalist variant) or whether on the other hand "the structure of the appropriation mechanism is limited to simple and peripheral processing mechanisms..." (empiricist variant). It is historically justified and makes heuristic sense to distinguish that. |
Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Chomsky, N. | Luhmann Vs Chomsky, N. | AU Kass 5 Self-organization/Luhmann: a system can only operate with self-assembled structures. No import of structures! Strange: E.g. language learning: it is almost incomprehensible how fast children learn languages. LuhmannVsChomsky: its deep structures were never discovered. Instead: modern communication research: rather in the communication itself the language is learned through use, through assumption of understanding the habit to develop asigning sounds. This does not contradict the thesis of self-organization. Otherwise, one would think that the learner is trained in a specific sequence, instead of starting to speak by himself. E.g. dyslexia: the tendency to make mistakes, is extremely variable from person to person. This makes switching to self-organization unavoidable. That does not mean that an external observer might not notice that these are the same words as they appear in the dictionary. But that cannot be explained by structural import, but by structural coupling (s.u.). |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Chomsky, N. | Maturana Vs Chomsky, N. | I 128 Syntax / Grammar: If recursion is possible, a closed area can be made of behavior: E.g. dance, human language. Within such a range, the syntactic or grammatical surface structure may be only the description of regularities. In principle, the surface structure can be arbitrary! Reason: its training is consensual coupling is dependent on the history and not a necessary result of any necessary physiology. I 129 Conversely, the "universal grammar" of linguists (MaturanaVsChomsky) is recursive only in the universality of the process of coupling structures. The causes of the ability to recursive structures coupling are not self-consensually. They are structurally and depend exclusively on the operations of the nervous system together as a closed neuronal network. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Chomsky, N. | Pinker Vs Chomsky, N. | Dennett I 545/546 Steven PinkerVsChomsky: specialization to the grammar is a conventional neo-Darwinist process. The majority of the most interesting properties of the "language organ" must have evolved through adaptation. Pinker: the objections to this position are mostly ridiculous - e.g. the structure of the cell should be "purely physical" and explained without evolution - e.g. language were not designed to communicate, etc. Pinker I 218 Design/Chomsky: It is wrong to make selection responsible for all design: E.g. the fact that I have a positive mass prevents me from eloping into outer space, but has nothing to do with selection. Simple physical explanation. Explanation/Selection/PinkerVsChomsky: you usually do not refer to selection to explain utility, but to explain something improbable. E.g. eye. If we calculate the parts of the universe with a positive mass and those equipped with an eye, we need an explanation for this difference. Vs: one might reply: the criterion: seeing/not-seeing was only introduced in retrospect, after we knew what animals are capable of. I 219 Most clusters of matter cannot see, but most cannot "fle" either, and I define that now as the composition, size and shape of the stone, on which I'm sitting now. Def Design/Pinker: If the function cannot be described more economically than the structure, no design is present. The concept of function adds nothing new. Design/Pinker: should not serve the harmony of the ecosystem or the beauty of nature. After all, the replicator must be the beneficiary. |
Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Chomsky, N. | Putnam Vs Chomsky, N. | Chomsky I 293 PutnamVsChomsky: Putnam assumes for phonetics in the universal grammar, that it only has a single list of sounds. This did not require a sophisticated explanatory hypothesis. Only "memory span and powers of recollection". "No upright behaviorist would deny that these are innate properties." ChomskyVsPutnam: but there have been set up very strong empirical hypotheses about the selection of the universal distinctive features, none of which seems to be explained on the basis of restrictions of memory. Chomsky I 298 PutnamVsChomsky: Thesis: instead of an innate schematism, "general multipurpose strategies" could be assumed. This innate base would have to be the same for the acquisition of any knowledge, so that there is nothing special about language acquisition. Chomsky I 299 ChomskyVsPutnam: with that he is no longer entitled to assume something is innate. Furthermore, it only shifts the problem. PutnamVsChomsky: the evaluation functions proposed in the universal grammar "the kind of facts is constituted which tries to explain the theory of learning, but not the required explanation itself". ChomskyVsPutnam: E.g. no one would say that the genetic basis for the development of arms instead of wings was "the kind of fact that attempts to explain the theory of learning". Rather, they are the basis for an explanation of other facts of human behavior. Whether the evaluation function is learned or is the basis of learning, is an empirical question. PutnamVsChomsky: certain ambiguities can only be discovered by routine, therefore their postulated explanation by Chomsky's grammar is not very impressive. ChomskyVsPutnam: he misunderstands it, in fact that refers to competence and not to performance (actual practice). What the grammar explains is why e.g. in "criticism of students" "student" can be understood as subject or object, whereas e.g. "grain" in "the growing of the grain" can only be subject. The question of routine does not matter here. Chomsky I 300 Innate Ideas/ChomskyVsPutnam: the innate representation of universal grammar indeed solves the problem of learning (at least partly) if it is really true that this is the basis for language acquisition, which may very well be the case! Putnam III 87 Putnam/Chomsky: Putnam proposes: correctness in linguistics is what the currently available data best explain about the behavior of the speaker under a current interest. What is true today, will be false tomorrow. PutnamVsChomsky: I never said that what is right today, will be wrong tomorrow. Putnam: Chomsky's hidden main theses: 1) the we are free to choose our interests at will, 2) that interests themselves are not subject to normative criticism. E.g. Hans' heart attack lies in the defiance of medical recommendations. Other explanation: high blood pressure. It may be, in fact, that on one day one fact is more in the interests of the speaker, and the next day another one. III 88 PutnamVsChomsky: 1) we cannot just pick and choose our interests. 2) It sometimes happens that the relevance of a particular interest is disputed. How can it be, however, that some interests are more reasonable than others? Reasonableness is supposed to depend on different conditions in different contexts. There is no general answer. III 88/89 The assertion that a concept is interest relative does not come out at the same as the thesis, all interests are equally reasonable. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Chomsky, N. | Quine Vs Chomsky, N. | XI 71 QuineVsChomsky: he is wrong if he suggests to him that sentences are learned only through conditioning. Searle VIII 427 Innate Ideas/QuineVsChomsky: "The behaviorist is knowingly and willingly up to his ears in innate mechanisms of willingness to learn." Innate ideas and inclinations are the cornerstone of behaviorism ". |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Chomsky, N. | Searle Vs Chomsky, N. | SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique. Dennett I 555 Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value. There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries). Searle I 273 SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism. By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased. IV 9 SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate. IV 204 Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms). IV 205 This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files. VIII 411 Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of the theory of syntax/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965(1)) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning. VIII 412 For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar) 2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative) 3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),. Also structuralism has phrase structure rules. VIII 414 It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules. VIII 420 Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man. VIII 421 If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication. The essence of language is its structure. E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure. Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else! Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him". ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology. VIII 422 Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition. Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!). VIII 426 Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words! Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not. Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes! VIII 429 Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma: a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion >mention/>use). b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate! SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker. The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination. VIII 432 The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular. E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition! b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion. VIII 433 ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings? Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc. Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones. VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages. SearleVs: the same dilemma: a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements. VIII 434 SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list. Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional. Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act. VIII 436 Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role. VIII 437 Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act. 1. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge 1965 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Chomsky, N. | Strawson Vs Chomsky, N. | VI 386 Transformational grammar: two kinds of formative: 1. lexical: correspond to names and general terms whose meaning is not somehow derived syntactically: e.g. "to sing", "to love", "red", "Mary". 2. non-lexical: heterogeneous group: e.g. the formative "pret" for the past tense. There is no mechanical process to find the deep structure. VI 389 Thesis: "Unconscious mastery" or "internal representation" is not enough to explain the linguistic abilities. The rules of transformational grammar provide the basis for the determination of those grammatical relations which are decisive for the semantic interpretation of sentences though not alone determining. VI 390 Grammar not circular, because it contains a lexicon. StrawsonVsChomsky: there is no general theory of the decisive class of compounds (of grammatical categories and formatives). VI 391 There is only the list of items in the dictionary without any representation of general principles of the allocation. But we should expect just such a theory if the grammar is to satisfy the conditions of transparency. Because we define with the grammatical categories the functions and relations of the sentence elements. That is what everyone understands without having explicitly learned grammar. We combine obvious semantic and syntactic considerations. VI 392 Explanation/Chomsky: this one admits that a "descriptively adequate" grammar must not be "explanation adequate". We need a theory of linguistic universals. In addition, it must be explained how our grammar was selected from other possible grammars. It must be explained: 1. Why do we understand infinitely many new propositions? (> See also the discussion "Is Language infinite?"). 2. The connection of semantics and syntax. VI 393 StrawsonVsChomsky: comments only expressly reserved on semantic considerations. Dictionary/Chomsky: is part of the base and contains far fewer entries than our ordinary dictionary. VI 395 Transformation grammar Vs traditional grammar: it was too unsystematic, no explanation of the traditional terms "verb", "noun", "object" possible. VI 396 PhilosophyVsGrammar/Strawson: is first freed from "empirical" requirements, does initially not need to cope with the actual formal requirements He has just like the grammarian a conception of meaning elements and a conception of semantically significant combination modes of these elements, to which the vocabulary is available in a transparent relationship. With these transparent relations he can consider possible formal arrangements by whom the combining functions could be dispensed. This is reminiscent of the construction of ideal languages. VI 397 Quine: (anywhere): "Do not show more structure than necessary". Grammar/Strawson: one must always distinguish between the actual (essential, crucial) and possible grammars. E.g. the essential grammar must show what elements belong to which, all combinations must be shown and be possible to distinguish. E.g. it must be possible to show when an element describes a non-symmetric relation. But the essential grammar determines in no way how these requirements are to be fulfilled. VI 398 We can choose one of several grammars. If it fulfills the requirements, we have a complete and totally transparent grammar. (Only idealized simplified, that is the price). Vocabulary/Strawson: we need a completely elaborate vocabulary or a set of related vocabularies. 1. Ontological vocabulary e.g. space, time, thing, gen. characteristics 2. Semantic V., for types and individual (abstract) elements, proper names for things, 3. Functional V. for combination or relation types. Deictic elements. 4. Vocabulary of the formal apparatus. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Chomsky, N. | Loar Vs Chomsky, N. | EMD II 158 Complexity/Language/Loar: Thesis: it is not too far-fetched to claim that "incomprehensible" complex sentences are not part of our language! So we could reduce English to a finite fragment of the language we would have mastered if our brains were bigger. Then there is no problem for KD: KD: For each sentence s of LO, if L(S) = M, then all members of P know (implicitly or potentially) then if someone expresses S in circumstances where the sentence is free for M en, the speaker thereby expresses M. Vs: this is extremely controversial, and avoidable. Solution/Loar: two stages: 1. Language/Infinity/Loar: Thesis: the number of sentences we understand is enormous, but still finite! (LoarVsChomsky: also number of understandable sentences is finite). II 159 2. Stage of the solution: no language that is extended (created) by adding random non-English (sentences cum meaning) is excluded by this condition. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Chomsky, N. | Hintikka Vs Chomsky, N. | II XV Logical Omniscience/Hintikka: Thesis: is only an alleged problem. ChomskyVsHintikka: he has quoted the alleged paradox as a reason for his rejection of any model-theoretical semantics for propositional attitudes. HintikkaVsChomsky: his problem has already been solved long ago. (Essay 5) |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Disposition Theory | Verschiedene Vs Disposition Theory | Stegmüller IV 34 Disposition/Mind/Ryle: mean, meaning, intentionality: are not occurrences in consciousness, but abilities, dispositions. IV 35 I.e. in the case of plus/quus as of grue exactly the same mental history runs off together with identical mental states and consciousness processes. Conclusion: the decisive dispositions were acquired in the past. The difference then does not only exist in the present, it already existed in the past! RyleVsKripke: then I would also have used the standard function of addition in the past. IV 35/36 KripkeVsRyle: triple criticism: 1. External criticism: denies that any assumptions about dispositions are relevant at all. The problem is not understood at all. How can he invoke disposition as justification? An instruction to myself shows nothing at all. VsVs: a) I just have a hypothesis about myself. VsVsVs: why should precisely this hypothesis of countless other possible ones be the right one? IV 37 VsVs: b) We let the past rest. Right is what seems right to me now! WittgensteinVsVsVs: this leads to the fact that one can no longer speak of "right" here! 2. Internal criticism: (some people mistakenly think that Wittgenstein himself represented them): consists in specifying a criterion for a function F, which I mean by such a symbol. Def "Finity Problem"/Stegmüller: the finite cannot simply be transferred to the infinite. (Not only experiences, but also dispositions are finite). IV 38 Def "quus"/grue/Kripke's Wittgenstein/Stegmüller: Re-Definition: the skeptical problem is reproduced: the function is the quaddition that corresponds to the addition for all pairs that are sufficiently small to be added by me, and returns the result 7 for the others. Thus I have always had the same dispositions. VsDisposition Theory. Disposition Theory/Stegmüller: a) can try to defend itself by understanding disposition not literally, but as an idealization of actual practice. Ceteris paribus disposition. KripkeVs: then I would have to make more and more fantastic assumptions about what I would do if this and that happened to me. IV 39 b) The idealization could be interpreted differently: "if I had the ability..." KripkeVs: that becomes circular. It assumes that the function I mean is something fixed. The "fact" would have to be assumed that I have a very specific intention! Dilemma for the disposition theory: a) Either only disposition for a finite number of cases, or b) Idealization of the reaction. Problem: ba) if these conditions are specified precisely, nothing can be said about my reaction. bb) a fact is assumed. IV 40 KripkeVsDisposition Theory: it leaves no room for possible errors! The disposition theorist cannot defend himself here by saying that there is a gap between what he meant and what he "should mean". Because the "function that he actually means" is not fixed for him from the outset by a table independent of the disposition. IV 41 Rather, in the opinion of the dispositionalist, the function can be read from disposition. For this reason, the disposition, to make mistakes must be part of the overall disposition. Def "Skaddition"/Kripke: would be the disposition of our person including the disposition to make mistakes. IV 42 Rule/Competence/Kripke: Competence cannot explain rules because it requires rules. (This does not apply to VsChomsky). VsDisposition Theory: Similarities can also be based on the fact that we sometimes make mistakes. IV 47 Addition/Disposition Theory/Kripke's Wittgenstein: (see above "external criticism (1)"): Suppose it were true that by "+" I mean addition. Problem: what is the relation between this assumption and the kind of answer I will give to the question !117 + 159"? Disposition Theory: all variants falsely state that it is this and that descriptively comprehensible relation. Mean/intention/normative: but if one understands to mean in such a way that what I mean now determines what I should say in the future, that is normative, not descriptive. This is the main point VsDisposition. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Goodman, N. | Chomsky Vs Goodman, N. | I 287 Language learning/language acquisition/Goodman: Second language is not problematic because the acquisition of the first language is the acquisition of a "secondary symbolic system". ChomskyVsGoodman: that could have some weight if it could be shown. (For example, for the distinction of surface structure and depth structure). But we have no empirical evidence. --- I 288 ChomskyVsGoodman: Acquisition of first and second language: Fallacy: If we learn the second language easier by means of explanations from the first language, we would have had to acquire a language before the first language in order to acquire the first language (which is particularly easy). (Regress). Goodman: Acquisition of the first language is acquisition of a "secondary symbolic system" and therefore corresponds to the acquisition of the second language. Chomsky's: the primary symbolic systems that he has in mind are rudimentary and cannot be used in the same way as a first language in acquiring the second language. GoodmanVsChomsky: his theses cannot be checked because we do not have examples of "bad languages". --- I 289 ChomskyVsGoodman: There are dozens of books in which features of a universal grammar are formulated and their empirical consequences are examined, whereby each such property specifies "bad" languages. --- I 290 Grue/ChomskyVsGoodman: affects more of a border problem. The initial question is too vague. You can easily find a property, even a fairly general one, of the language "grue bleen", which is not the property of a "language like German". E.g. Chomsky: the predicate "be equal" (Structure of Appearance) applies only to objects instead of to Qualia. Now the language grue bleen has the peculiar property: "If an object A before t and an object B after t are examined, and if both are determined to be grue (or bleen), then we know that they are not like each other. But there is no such t that we could predict of these objects that they will not be equal. They could just as well be equal if both are grue (or bleen). Chomsky: it is undoubtedly a general property of natural languages that they behave more like German than "gruebleen". Thus, there is no difficulty in establishing a distinction between such languages as grue bleen and such as German. This would not suffice Goodman, of course, because one could still construct more refined examples. As long as it is only about vague terms like "like German" or "like Gruebleen", Goodman's requirement is impossible to fulfill. --- I 291 ChomskyVsGoodman: It may be relevant to induction, but not to linguistics, just as little as for any other science, such for the question of why embryos get arms and no wings within a given framework of conditions. ((s) is irrelevant because once conceptual, once empirical.) Chomsky: with this we cannot explain at all why the learner does not acquire grue as a generalization basis. Undoubtedly this follows from certain properties of the sensory system. Congenital ideas/ChomskyVsGoodman: it does not seem incomprehensible to me that any aspect of the "final state" of an organism or automaton is also an aspect of its "initial state". And this before any interaction with his environment! --- I 292 Innate ideas/ChomskyVsGoodman: in his essay, Goodman at least once admits that the mind contains ideas in some sense. Then it is obviously not incomprehensible that some of these ideas are "implanted as an original equipment" to the mind. |
Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Harman, G. | Putnam Vs Harman, G. | Harman II 421 Truth/HarmanVsPutnam: it is not merely idealized rational acceptability. It involves a relationship between a remark or a thought and the way how things are in the world. Putnam/Harman: is right when he equates the decisive point with a determination to the localization of all the facts in a world. Harman: when I suppose, thesis, there is one clear causal physical order, I ask myself the following questions: "What is the place of the mind in the physical world?", "What is the place of values in the world of facts?" I believe that it is a serious philosophical error, if we believe we can avoid these issues. PutnamVsHarman: a position as Harman's leads to two implausible conclusions: 1. Identity thesis of body and mind. (HarmanVs! I do not think that it follows from the assumption of a single causal order, rather to functionalism, that Putnam himself represented) 2. moral relativism. (Harman pro! There is nothing problematic). Harmans II 428 Truth/HarmanVsPutnam: I do not think that he would consider it as a good argument for the conclusion that truth is the same as >consistency: Problem: but then his argument does not show that truth is an idealization of rational acceptability. Harman II 434 Competence/Chomsky/Putnam: (Chomsky Syntactic Structures) promised us that there would be a normal form for grammars and a mathematical simplicity function that would explain everything precisely. Here you would have to look at various descriptions of the speaker's competence, which are given in the normal form, and measure the simplicity of every description, (with the mathematical function) in order to find the easiest. This would be "the" description of the speaker's competence. Putnam: actually Chomsky owes us also a mathematical function with which one measures the "goodness", with which the competence description fits with the actual performance. Chomsky/Putnam: the idea of mathematization has since been abandoned. The idea currently rests that the speaker's competence could be given by an idealization of the actual speaker's behavior, on an intuitive notion of a "best idealization" or "best explanation". Justification/PutnamVsChomskyPutnamVsHarman: to assume that the concept of justification could be made physicalistically through identification with what people should say in accordance with the description of their competence, is absurd. Harman II 435 Harman/Putnam: but would say that there is a difference whether one asks if the earth might have emerged only a few thousand years ago, Harman II 436 or whether one asks something moral, because there are no physical facts, which decide about it. PutnamVsHarman: if the metaphysical realism with Harman (and with Mackie) has to break, then the whole justification of the distinction facts/values is damaged. Interpretation/explanation/Putnam: our ideas of interpretation, explanation, etc. come from human needs as deep as ethical values. Putnam: then a critic might say of me, (even if he remains metaphysical realism): "All right, then explanation, interpretation and ethics are in the same boat" ("Companions in Guilt" argument). Putnam: and this is where I wanted it to be. That was my main concern in "truth, reason and history." (Putnam thesis explanation, interpretation and ethics are not in the same boat" ("companions in guilt" argument: in case of partial relativism the total relativism is near. PutnamVsHarman). Relativism/Putnam: There is no rational reason to support ethical relativism, but not at the same total relativism. Reference/Harman/Putnam: Harman's answer is that the world has a unique causal order. Harman II 437 PutnamVsHarman: but that does not help: if my linguistic competence is caused by E1, E2 ... , then it's true that it was caused* by E*1, E*2 ... whereby* the corresponding entity designates in a non-standard model. ((s)>Löwenheim) Problem: why is reference then determined by cause and not by cause*? Reference/Physicalism/Putnam: the only answer he could give, would be: "because it is the nature of reference". This would mean that nature itself picks out objects and places them in correspondence to our words. David Lewis/Putnam: has suggested something similar: ... + ... |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Harman I G. Harman Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995 Harman II Gilbert Harman "Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Lakoff, G. | Searle Vs Lakoff, G. | IV 199 Conversational Postulates/To mean/Gordon/Lakoff: SearleVs: represents the phenomena that require explanation is as if they themselves were already the explanation. Problem: how can the speaker say something and still mean something else? (to mean) IV 201 Conversational Postulates: shall additional rules be known in addition to the three rules (the introduction, the seriousness and the propositional content): for example, to conclude from one speech act to another. Searle: they assume that the patterns are the solution itself. IV 202 They reveal a pattern, according to which for example a speaker asks the listener for something, by asking the listener if he can do something. E.g. "Can you pass me the salt?". To explain this, they simply give a new description, they say, the speaker knows a rule. Searle: as with Ross, an unnecessary assumption is made to explain the data. It is completely ad hoc to say, in addition to all the knowledge conversational postulates would still have to exist. In reality, it would then be such conversational postulates that would have to be explained. IV 203 Searle: what the listener needs is speech act theory, a theory of conversation, background information and rationality and reasoning skill. Each of these components is independently motivated, that means apart from whatever theory of indirect speech acts, we have evidence that the speaker/listener has these features. IV 204 SearleVsGordon/SearleVsLakoff: their rules do not work that way! They call it "failed" that no question is meant. (E.g. "Can you pass me the salt?"). Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: is often said following Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms). IV 205 This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Its unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we come from sounds to acts. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Malcolm, N. | Rorty Vs Malcolm, N. | Frank I 610 Knowledge/Certainty/MalcolmVsIncorrigibility: (a propos Wittgenstein's "certainty"): we cannot claim any knowledge, e.g. in cases of pain. It is pointless to say, "I know that I am in pain." RortyVsMalcolm: intends to maintain incorrigibility. >Certainty, >incorrigibility. Rorty I 238 MalcolmVsChomsky/Rorty: internalized control system is a typical error of the traditional "theory of ideas". It is wrong to assume that a person must be guided when speaking. But no explanations are to be found here. I 239 RortyVsMalcolm/Rorty: Fallacy (goes back to Wittgenstein): 1) meaning cannot be explained by internal ostension but only by behavior. I.e. applies 2) psychology can only be dealing with empirical correlations between behavioral dispositions and external circumstances. VsRyle/Rorty: this is wrong, as critics of Ryle have shown; too operationalist. There may also be a plethora of equally necessary "internal" conditions. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Chomsky Vs Quine, W.V.O. | II 319 Language/Quine: interweaving of sentences. Theory/Language/ChomskyVsQuine: Quine himself must even presuppose that both are separated here: he certainly does not believe that two monolingual speakers of the same language can have no differences of opinion. ((s) If language and theory were identical, one could not argue, since even according to Quine the theories must have a certain unity. Chomsky: otherwise, according to Quine, every dispute would be completely irrational, as between two speakers of different languages. II 320 Definition Language/Quine: "Complex of present dispositions to verbal behavior, in which speakers of the same language have necessarily corresponded to one another." (W + O, 27) Language/ChomskyVsQuine: then our disposition would have to be explained to a certain verbal behavior by a certain system. This is certainly not the case. II 321 Reinforcement/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty. If reinforcement is needed to learn, this means that learning cannot go without data. This is even more emptier than with Skinner, who, unlike Quine, does not even require that intensifying stimuli influence. It is sufficient here that the reinforcement is merely imagined. II 324 Language learning: behavioristic/Quine: conditioning, association ChomskyVsQuine: additional principles, only so endlessly many sentences explainable. Probability/Language/ChomskyVsQuine: the concept of the "probability of a sentence" is completely useless and empty: II 325 Translation indeterminacy, indeterminacy: ChomskyVsQuine: disposition either with regard to stimulus, or with regard to the total body of the language: then all sentences are equally probable (reference classes). II 326 Logical truth/Quine: is derived by him by conditioning mechanisms that associate certain sentence pairs with each other, II 327 so that our knowledge of the logical relations can be represented as a finite system of linked propositions. ChomskyVsQuine: it remains unclear how we distinguish logical from causal relations. Truth functions/Quine: allow a radical translation without "non verifiable analytical hypotheses", so they can be directly learned from the empirical data material (W + O § 13) ChomskyVsQuine: his readiness to settle these things within the framework of the radical translation may show that he is ready to regard logic as an innate experience-independent basis for learning. Then it is, however, arbitrary to accept this framework as innate, and not much else that can be described or imagined. II 328 ChomskyVsQuine: his narrowly conceived Humean frame (Chomsky pro) with the language as a finite (!?) interweaving of sentences is incompatible with various triusms, which Quine certainly would accept. II 329 Analytical hypothesis/stimulus meaning/Quine: stimulus meaning invloves, in contrast to the analytical hypothesis only "normal inductive uncertainty". Since the corresponding sentences can contain truth functions, they lead to "normal induction". This is not yet a "theory construction" as in the case of analytical hypotheses. ChomskyVsQuine: the distinction is not clear because the normal induction also occurs within the radical translation. II 330 ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the terms of the language can be explained with physical dimensions. Aristotle: more connected with actions. VsQuine: not evident that similarities are localizable in space. Principles, not "learned sentences". II 333 VsQuine: cannot depend on "disposition to reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be too authoritive. II 343 Language may not be taught at all. II 335 Synonymy/ChomskyVsQuine: (he had suggested that synonymy "roughly speaking" exists in approximate equality of situations, and approximately equal effect). Chomsky: there is not even an approximate equality in the conditions that are likely to produce synonymous utterances. ChomskyVsQuine: Synonymy can thus not be characterized by means of conditions of use (conditions of assertion) or effects on the listener. It is essential to distinguish between langue and parole, between competence and performance. It is about meaningful idealization, Quine's idealization is meaningless. II 337 Translation indeterminacy/ChomskyVsQuine: the reason for the thesis is, in a psychological context, an implausible and rather contentless empirical assertion, namely, which innate qualities the mind contributes to language acquisition. In an epistemic-theoretical context, Quine's thesis is merely a version of the well-known skeptical arguments, which can equally well be applied to physics or others. II 337 Inconsistency/indeterminacy/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: any hypothesis goes beyond the data, otherwise it would be uninteresting. --- Quine V 32 Definition Language/Quine: "Complex of dispositions to linguistic behavior". ((s) that could be called circular, because "linguistic" occurs. Vs: then it should be expressed by the fact that there is not yet a language besides the behavior.) Disposition/ChomskyVsQuine: such a complex can presumably be presented as a set of probabilities to make an utterance under certain circumstances. Vs: the concept of probability fails here: the probability with which I utter a certain English sentence cannot be distinguished from the probability with which I express a particular Japanese sentence. QuineVsChomsky: one should not forget that dispositions have their conditions. --- V 33 We find this through the procedure of question and consent. --- Quine XI 115 Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: the language of a person and their theory are in any case different systems, even if one would agree with Quine otherwise. --- XI 116 Quine: (dito). Indeterminacy of the translation: because of it one cannot speak of an invariant theory opposite translations. Nor can we say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or vice versa, that different theories (even contradictory ones) can be expressed in one language. ((s)> Because of the ontological conclusion that I cannot argue about ontology, by telling the other that the things that exist with him are not there, because I then make the self-contradiction that there are things that do not exist). Lauener: that would correspond to the error that the language contributes the syntax, the theory but the empirical content. Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: that does not mean that there is no contradiction between the two: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, it means then that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions. But there are also contexts where the distinction language/theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language/theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network. |
Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Tradition | Chomsky Vs Tradition | Lyons I 136 Grammar/Modern/Lyons: is often referred to as "formal" today in contrast to the traditional "content-related" grammar. ((s) stock: Lyons pro formal grammar, partial VsChomsky). --- I 137 Interposition: some grammarians assume that there are extralinguistic categories independent of the random facts of existing languages. Jespersen: Thesis: there are universal grammatical categories (tradition). For example, "parts of speech", "tense", "mode", etc.). (see below, the question is whether there is any at all). Formal grammar/Lyons: does not exclude that there are no such universal grammatical categories. The structure of each language should be described individually. --- Quine X 38 ChomskyVsTradition/Quine: Trees of educational rules are not enough, you also need grammatical transformation. Some compositions can best be understood by looking back and forth between different trees of the educational rules. Transformations allow this lateral movement. Quine: this is superfluous for the artificial expressions of logic. --- Searle VIII 407 ChomskyVsTradition: most famous example "John is easy to leave" - "John is eager to leave". The (structuralist) tradition treats both sentences as grammatically equal. However, the VP(Verb Phrase) and NP(Noun Phrase) are grouped differently. |
Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Hintikka, J. | Cresswell I 161 "Any-Theses"/everyone/someone/Hintikka/Cresswell: the thesis that a sentence with "any" is unacceptable if "any" in it can be replaced by "every" without changing meaning. Therefore: Syntax/Semantics/HintikkaVsChomsky: Syntax depends on semantics. (In connection with the counterpart theory it is about the order of the applied rules). Cresswell: Thesis: syntax first generates a large class of structures, which is then reduced by semantics, and then syntactic principles further reduce the class of grammatically acceptable chains. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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| Deep Structure | Luhmann, N. | AU Cass 5 LuhmannVsChomsky: its deep structures were never discovered. Instead: modern communication research: in the communication itself the habit is developed to assign sounds and thus the language is learned. This does not contradict the thesis of self-organization. |
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| Speech Act | Searle, J.R. | IV 251 Searle: speech acts are governed by constitutive rules that define the social institutions. V 29 Searle: speech is rule-governed behavior. VI 205 Speech act / Searle: The purpose of language is communication - its unity is the illocutionary speech act - VsChomsky: it s not about rules - S.Th. includes everything that used to be called semantics and pragmatics. |
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