Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Causes Cartwright I 74
Cause/Causality/Empiricism/VsCauses - Russell: the law of gravity is given in equations - there are no "causes" and "effects" here. Equations/Cartwright: are today's generalizations. - They are the heart of science.
>Equations, >Generalization.
I 75
Explanations by equations are often redundant. - I.e. there are alternative equations! - Cause: cannot be redundant. - Equation: causes nothing, but includes phenomena in a frame.
I 79
Alternative equations: offer different laws. - (they compete) - E.g. multiple versions of the Schrödinger equation. CartwrightVsRussell: I prefer causes rather than laws. >Laws, >Natural laws.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954

Explanation Cartwright I 3
Explanation/Description/Physics/Cartwright: in modern physics, the phenomenological laws are considered as being descriptive, the fundamental laws as being explanatory. >Fundamental laws, >Laws, >Natural laws, >Physics.
Problem: the explanatory power comes at the cost of the adequacy of the description.
1) explanatory power (of laws) does not speak for truth
2) even for falsehood, because we need ceteris paribus laws
3) the semblance of truth comes from a false explanation model: wrong connection of laws with reality.
>Truth, >Reality, >ceteris paribus.
I 4
Cartwright instead: Def "Simulacrum" View/Cartwright: of explanation: Thesis: the way from theory to reality is this: theory > model > phenomenological law - Phenomenological Laws/Cartwright: are true of the objects of reality (or can be). Fundamental Laws/Cartwright: are only true of the objects in the model - E.: is not a guide to the truth.
I 11
E/Physics/Cartwright: wrong question: "which is the correct equation?" - Different models bring different aspects - causal explanation: not in scientific practice, we do not tell sometimes one, sometimes another causal story. >Theories, >Models.
I 44
E/CartwrightVsTradition: has nothing to do with truth - ((s)> Truth/M.Williams / >Truth/Horwich).
I 47
E/Cartwright: after the laws of nature (LoN) are known, we still have to decide which factors should occur in an explanation - the decision of which is, however, not suggested by our knowledge of the laws of nature.
I 50
Laws of Nature are never sufficient to explain something in a particular moment - the reasons to believe in them are not normal reasons, because we have never tested them - only reasons: explanation strategy - I 52 E: is still needed even after complete description. >Description, >Observation.
I 70
E/All/Generalization/VsSuper Law/C: E.g. "Why is the quail in my garden shaking its head?" - "Because all of them do it" - no explanation! - Nor: E.g. "All carbon atoms have 5 energy levels" - Super laws in turn require the application of individual laws - and these do not represent facts.
I 73
Explanation/Cartwright: Uses causes - ((s) not laws) - (EmpiricismVsCauses).
I 92
E/LoN/Cartwright: it is not the fundamental laws (laws of nature) that I need for the explanation, but E.g. properties of electrons - plus assumptions about the specific situation.
I 94 f
Explanation/Grünbaum: a more comprehensive law G explains a less comprehensive law L which it contains not through the causes of L.
I 96
Explanation/Duhem: does not draw a "veil" from reality - Explanation/Cartwright: explaining a set of phenomenological laws means giving a physical theory of them - without explaining these laws.
I 103
Explanation/W. Salmon/Richard Jeffries: E. are no arguments.
I 152
Explanation/Duhem: Organization (order of knowledge).
Hacking I 96~
Explanation/Cartwright/Fraassen: if something is an explanation, it is no reason to believe it.
I 99
Anti-Realism: E are not a feature of the truth but of adequacy. >Adequacy.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954


Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996


No results. Please choose an author or concept or try a different keyword-search.