|Personality Traits||Tellegen||Corr I 102
Personality traits/Tellegen/Deary: TellegenVsCattell/TellegenVsMeehl: He assesses Cattell as having been too ready to accept factor-analytically-derived factors as actual traits, and characterizes Meehl as a believer in traits as entities with ‘biological underpinnings’ (Tellegen 1991, p. 10). (For Cattell and Meehl see >personality traits/Deary. Traits/Tellegen: Tellegen (p. 13) attempted a definition of traits that predated the inner locus and causal primacy ideas of Matthews and Deary (1998)(2): We can begin by defining traits as an inferred relatively enduring organismic (psychological, psychobiological) structure underlying an extended family of behavioural dispositions. In the case of personality traits it is expected that the manifestations of these dispositions can substantially affect a person’s life. Tellegen argued that, if we merely proceed by observing behaviour, inferring a trait and then successfully predicting another behaviour, we have got to co-variation but not explanation.
Causal explanation/TellegenVsCausal explanation: Even if we induce a broader construct of a trait cluster and use that successfully to predict behaviour, we still have the limitation that ‘from an explanatory viewpoint the construct is vacuous’, and nothing but a ‘tautological statement’, and ‘no causal explanations are provided’ (Tellegen 1991, p. 14).
1. Tellegen, A. 1991. Personality traits: issues of definition, evidence, and assessment, in W. Grove and D. Ciccetti (eds.), Thinking clearly about psychology, pp. 10–35. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
2. Matthews, G. and Deary, I. J. 1998. Personality traits. Cambridge University Press
Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press
Philip J. Corr
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
|Disputed term/author/ism||Author Vs Author
|Davidson, D.||Newen Vs Davidson, D.||Newen I 201
Behavior/DennettVsCausal Explanation/Explanation/Explanation of Behavior/Dennett/DennettVsDavidson/Ryle/Newen: Dennett (like Ryle): behavior cannot be explained causally, but by desires and beliefs as intentional attitudes, not causes. (DennettVsDavidson).
Belief/Intentionality/Intentional Explanation/Dennett/Newen: Dennett's explanation does not include the thesis that desires and beliefs even exist. DennettVsDavidson/VsCausal Explanation/Dennett/Newen: Thesis: the levels (intentional, physical, functional) are isolated and must not be linked.
Mental Phenomena/Dennett/Newen: can only be detected by the attribution of intentional attitudes. I 206 VsDennett: E.g. toothaches are a mental state. Then Dennett has to assert that the state depends on whether it is useful for someone to attribute toothache to this person.
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008