Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| He/ He himself | Perry | Frank I 432f "He*"/Perry: He* is not working without an antecedent: nonsense: E.g. "God knows that he* (Jones) is in the hospital." >Identification, >Indexicality, >Index words, >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 439f Extra-sense/Perry: possible solution: "s": variable that ranks above sense - E.g. Sheila thinks that an s exists so that s = Ego(Ivan) and Ivan believes that s is wanted on the telephone. Here Ivans extra sense i is not part of the proposition that Sheila believes but it is part of the proposition of which she believes that Ivan believes it. Extra-sense/PerryVsCastaneda: we do not need one. >H.-N. Castaneda, >Extra-sense/Castaneda. Frank I 441 "He*"/PerryVsCastaneda: He* does not seem to be so different from "he". "F-use", "he" as a placeholder of an aforementioned object (*). In attachment to an F-using it is limited* to the meaning area on special extra sense. Problem: that does not yet exclude believing in the evening star that it is the morning star (as long as X believes that evening star = evening star, a priori argument). >Identity, >Trivial identity, >Self-identity. Solution: E.g. "Albert wanted from Mary ... so he went over to her" must be "the woman on the corner" and not the one "he had seen last week". >Anaphora. Solution: it is not the "it/she" but the "that's why", which compels us to - "he*" not composed. - "*" Does not mean "itself". Frank I 446ff "He*"/Perry: not composed of "he" and "self": E.g. the dog Elwood bites himself/...bites Elwood. Difference: a) covered with wounds, b) broken teeth. Analog: a) believes of himself, to be rich b) thinks of Privatus that he is rich. Problem: e.g. the Dean was surprised to find out that he considered himself to be overpaid (according to other description). >Description, >Context, >Intension, >Extension. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Castaneda | Frank I 159 ff I/Castaneda: "volatile egos": like "here", "now", irreducible. - They are entirely epistemological, only for re-presentation, not empirical. Limited identity: only consubstantiation (sameness between coexisting sets of characteristics): not diachronic (transsubstatiation), therefore not all properties are identical, no substitutability, no strict identity with person. "I" is criteria-less, content-neutral. - "I" can only be represented by the impersonal and situation independent quasi-indicator "he". I-design/Castaneda: Vs "I" as "Something". >Guise theory, >Quasi-Indicator. I 167ff I*/Castaneda: "I myself" in an episode of self-awareness one refers to oneself - (corresponding for he*). I 186 "I" is no demonstrative. >Demonstratives. I 170 Transcendent I/Castaneda: we experience ourselves as a not completely identical with the content of our experiencen and therefore associated to the world beyond experience. I 171 I/Self/Consciousness/Self-Awareness/SA/Logical Form/Hintikka/Castaneda: E.g. "The man who is actually a, knows that he is a". Wrong: "Ka (a = a). - Right: (Ex) (Ka (x = a)) -the individual variables occurring in "Ka (...)" are conceived as relating to a range of objects that a knows - "there is a person whom a knows, so that a knows that this person is a" - CastanedaVs: does not work with contingent assertions: "there is an object, so that a does not know it exists" - E.g. "the editor does not know that he is the editor" - (Ex) (Ka(x = a) & ~Ka(x = a))) was be a formal contradiction - better: (Exa)(Ka (x = a) & Ka (x = himself) (not expressible in Hintikka). I 226f I/Castaneda: no specific feature - different contrasts: opposites: this/that, I/she - I/he - I (meaning/acting person) - I/you - I/we -> Buber: I/it - I/you -> Saussure: network of contrasts (plural). Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 Frank I 378 I/hall of mirrors/Castaneda: seems to need two selves: one he speaks to, one he speaks about - but simple self as different from I and body not sufficient. I 430f I/Extra sense/Castaneda: psychological role that one associates with "I" - which explains mental states that do not explain proper names or descriptions: "I'm called for on the phone": spec. mental states - PerryVsCastaneda: not sufficient, you also need to know that it is the own It! - A proposition with "he*" itself says nothing about the meaning of this expression, therefore no identification - E.g. "heaviest man in Europe" could know this without a scale if "he*" could act independently without antecedent. Solution: intermediary extra sense for Sheila's beliefs about Ivan's extra-sense-i. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 I 470 I/Castaneda: Variable, not singular term, not singular reference: instead: i is the same as j and Stan believes of j... >Singular Terms, >Variables. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Perry | Frank I 398ff Extra-sense/I/PerryVsCastaneda: can be recognized by others in the same way, does not explain the difference. >Extra-sense/Castaneda. Frank I 399f I/he/reference/relation/sense/meaning: difference: Quasi-indicator attributes reference, but does not establish it. >I/Castaneda, >quasi-indicator. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 Frank I 402ff I/Castaneda/Perry: "I" is not replaceable by specific labeling, when behavior is explained - "I" is a "key index word". Problem: same sentence, but different speaker: false belief "I'm making a mess ...". >Sugar trail example. Incorrect solution: "And I am the one": again a new index word. - "Lack of conceptual component" does not help: I can believe that it is me, with no specific concept of me. False: description: "the one who makes the mess"; this does not help, because there is no connection to me. Frank I 403 Belief/I/Perry: Solution: we need a distinction: belief-state/belief-object. E.g. the event starts at 12:00 - that means, "now!" or "already finished" or "there is still time". Subject: the event beginning at 12:00 State: "now". Specific decsription without an index is not enough. >Indexicality, >Index words. Frank I 414 I/individuation/Perry: The following conditions are not enough: Propositions de re, de dicto, additional conceptual feature localization in space and time, relativization on people and places, two different descriptions without "I". >Propositions, >de re, >de dicto, >Spatial localization, >Description. Perry like Castaneda: 'I' is not replaceable. >I, Ego, Self/Castaneda, >H.-N. Castaneda. Time/Person-Proposition: does not make me different from the others: "J.P. yesterday at the super market" is just as true for others. - judgement context = opinion context: "The event begins now" is true at 12:00 - does not help. True/false/truth value: does not help: that mountain A is higher than B, may be true, but does not lead to the right path. There is nothing what all have in common. >Wanderers-example. Solution: the lost wanderers are in the same opinion state (individuated by index words), but not of the same opinion. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Quasi-Indicator | Castaneda | Frank I 163 ff Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: is the fundamental role of the I only at the moment of the speech act - must refer to a antecedent: Peter believes that "he" ... >Anaphora, >I, Ego, Self/Castaneda. I 165 Thesis: "He*", etc. cannot be replaced by indicators, nor as variables or deputy singular terms or (descriptions). Thesis: (Conclusion of "He"): the reference of "I" is a logically irreducible category, which can only be represented equivalently by the impersonal and trans-situational quasi-indicator "he" - I 321 Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: contradicts the classical theory of propositions: that propositional attitudes are related to propositions. >Propositions, >Propositional attitudes. ChisholmVs/LewisVs: mental states are not primarily based on propositions, but a relation between subject and a property that is attributed directly. CastanedaVsChisholm: attribution theory does not explain sufficiently the explicit self-awareness. >Reference, >Self-reference, >Self-identification. Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 I 430ff Quasi-Indicator He/Castaneda/Perry: he* cannot be replaced by description or names that does not, in turn, contain a quasi-indicator. >Names, >Descriptions. PerryVsCastaneda: the other one can also think "he*, i.e. the other one..." I ~459ff Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: represents the indexical reference, it does not carry it out. Not entirely deputy, included in reference. >Indexicality, >Index Words, >Proxy, cf. >Placeholders. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Sense | Castaneda | Frank I 325 Sense/Meaning/CastanedaVsFrege: the denotation within intention in propositional contexts is not Fregean meaning, but Fregean sense. >Fregean Sense, >Fregean meaning, >Denotation, >Intention, >Propositional attitudes. Reversal of Frege: the world reference can only be explained by the objects being explained as systems of Fregean senses. Then "sense "and "reference" get entirely new meanings. >Sense, >Reference. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 Frank I 400ff Sense/Meaning/CastanedaVsFrege: Guise Theory: (of designs): Vs distinction sense/meaning. >Guise-Theory. From this also follows: VsFrege: indirect speech does not lose its reference - expressions always denote the same thing, namely guises (designs). VsPerry: that also makes his distinction of designating and expressing unnecessary. I 432ff Extra-Sense/Castaneda: E.g. Ivan believes that he* is required on the phone - here is (Ivan) Ivan referencce) and ego(Ivan) its special meaning i - in an assertion of speaker a "I" expresses ego(a). PerryVsCastaneda: this explanation leads to a gap in the theory of reports of beliefs - anyone who can believe anything of Ivan, can believe the corresponding proposition of Ivan that "i" is required on the phone - KretzmannVs: still private, not even God could grasp extra-sense - PerryVs: misunderstanding, "he*" cannot be replaced by description without Index - but that does not mean that the proposition "he himself is in the hospital" can be known by none other - "i"/PerryVsCastaneda: different psychological role for Ivan and Sheila still has to be explained - that Ivan but not Scheila is the reference is not enough - Ivan must also believe that he* is i, but that is initially nothing more than that i is i! - And Sheila also believes that - in addition: information that it is about their own extra-sense. Problem: the extra-sense does not help if Ivan does not know that he was appointed Editor. - Facts about the language are no solution. I 459ff Sense/Frege: psychological mediator role. - CastanedaVs, PerryVs. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Sense | Evans | Frank I 485f Sense/Evans: Evans is in favour of these views: pro Frege, pro Oxford (everyday language) - while he ist against these views: VsPerry, VsCastaneda. Fregean sense/Evans: should be regarded as a way of thinking instead of a way of givenness. >Way of givenness, >Fregean sense. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Two Omniscient Gods | Lewis | IV 139 Two Omniscient Gods/2 Gods/Lewis: the example is to show that objects of attitudes should not be identified with propositions as sets of possible worlds. E.g. both know exactly the world they inhabit - i.e. they know every true proposition - but do not know who they are themselves. Solution: self-attribution of a property, not a proposition - (spatial (not logical) localization is not propositional knowledge). >Localization, >Propositional knowledge. LewisVsCastaneda: Solution: de se: we just need to find a case where the editor of soul knows which world is his without knowing if he is among the millionaires - de se: self-identification, self-localization. de dicto: self-localization in logical space (which proposition one believes). >de re, >de dicto, >de se. IV 141 Two omniscient gods/Lewis: E.g. assuming a variant with two pairs of two gods in two possible worlds W and V, who swapped places - Assuming God 1 knows that the proposition "I’m on the highest" is true in W - and he knows that he lives in W! - It does not follow that he knows that he is on the highest! - Because if he had been on the coldest, the same sentence would have expressed a different proposition, one that is true in V and wrong in W - one of which he knew that it is false. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Castaneda, H.-N. | Kaplan Vs Castaneda, H.-N. | Frank I 430 KaplanVsCastaneda: developed the theory of peculiarity, which allows him to do without the "extra sense " ("special sense" that every "I" has for its bearer). Kaplan's "rigid contents" do not need to be special! They can be the same contents as those used with proper names, for example. Perry: We have to do this step before we can get clarity about the psychological role. (See also Burks: shows the irreplaceability of indexical elements by doubling arguments). John Perry (198]a): Castaneda on He and I, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983), 15-39 |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Castaneda, H.-N. | Boer Vs Castaneda, H.-N. | Frank I 387 Castaneda: Thesis: both the singular indexical reference of the first person and the quasi indexical reference corresponding to it are conceptually irreducible. Boer/LycanVsCastaneda: I 388 (1) Armand believes that he (himself) is happy. (1.A) [The triadic relation] BELIEF connects Armand, an empty sequence of objects, and [the demonstrative] THAT > [which refers to a type of sentence that has the same general behavioral role in every language as our sentence] "I am happy." Arrow: Showing/pointing action of the speaker In square brackets: the analyst's comment concerning the following expressions. THAT: implements Davidson's theory of indirect speech: it points to a sentence produced by the speaker placed merely phonetically or graphically beside the psychological verb. Role of the sentence: (according to Sellars): in Def "point quotation marks": this signals the role that tokens of this type play in the behavioral economy of the speaker: Example "red" (in dot quotation marks) denotes the same role as a "rouge" placed in dot quotation marks. This is a gain in knowledge. ((s) Language independent! unlike Tarski). This is a nominalistic analysis of "himself". (>Nominalism). Castaneda: Question: 1. (diagonal argument from 3. I 337): propositions have truth values, problem: are there enough propositions to describe infinite properties? 2. Realism: asks: how can objects and cases of behavior be distinguished from each other without qualities or relations providing classification criteria and role characteristics? Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Chisholm, R.M. | Castaneda Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Chisholm I 43 CastanedaVsChisholm: For him, propositions of the first person are not abstract (eternal) objects, but contingent things. They cease to exist when the person x ceases to exist. Frank I 330 Self-attribution/Chisholm: Builds on Lewis. Any attribution by others contains a self-reference (implicit). I 331 Consciousness/CastanedaVsChisholm: everybody first refers to their own world (as per Chisholm), but from that does not follow the necessity that every consciousness and every thought are explicitly self-conscious. (CastanedaVsFichte). The first-person perspective is only implicitly contained in a non-reflexive consciousness. An explicit self-consciousness differs from this consciousness, however, if it refers to conscious explicit self-reference. Self-attribution/CastanedaVsChisholm: if every consciousness includes direct attribution, including an I-less, purely world-facing consciousness, then direct attribution can only express a purely objective self-understanding and therefore does not explain self-consciousness. When Chisholm points out that reflection still has to be added, he argues circularly, because this self-consciousness should be explained just by the self-attribution. I 332 Reflection/self-consciousness/ChisholmVsCastaneda/Grundmann: This does not go to the heart of Chisholm’s argument: this would ultimately reject the insinuation that in the self-attribution a purely external or objective self-reference is articulated. External self-reference: extremely rare. E.g. Mach, Omnibus (see above). Self-attribution/Chisholm: denominates implicit self-consciousness. VsChisholm: However, he fails to explain the transformation from implicit to explicit self-consciousness. Reduction/CastanedaVsChisholm: according to Chisholm, the use of all indicators can be traced back to those of the first person. E.g. the subject attributes itself the property of directing its attention to a book and indirectly attributes to this book the property of being witty and exciting. I 333 Consubstantiation/CastanedaVsChisholm: the activity of directing the attention is only consubstantiated (implicit) in a determining sentence. Accordingly, the intentional act is not part of the demonstrative thought. I 338 Attribution/CastanedaVsLewis/CastanedaVsChisholm: should not be monolithic: it is necessary to distinguish between propositional attitude and practitions: "mixed conditionals": E.g. the intention to close the window when I open the door is different from the intention to open the door when I close the window. I 375 Consciousness/Attribution theory/CastanedaVsChisholm: Problem: distinction between reflective and non-reflective consciousness. This is a semantic pragmatic distinction between thought contents and it collides with Chisholm’s unit syntax. Fra I 380 Properties/CastanedaVsChisholm: 1) Considers properties to be subjects of predication 2) Quantifies over them - devastating in deontological contexts - too complicated for cumulative quotes. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Frege Sense/Meaning | Pro | Frank I 484 Evans: "Oxford Neo-Fregeans" (together mt McDowell and Peacocke) - VsCastaneda - Thesis: Frege s distinction sense / meaning is essential for any philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. Gareth Evans(1982b): Self-Identification, in: Evans (1982a) The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/New York 1982, 204-266 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quasi-Indicator | Boer, St. | Fra I 387 Castaneda: thesis: both the singular indexical reference of the first person as well as its corresponding quasi-indexical reference is conceptually irreducible. Boer / LycanVsCastaneda: + |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Quasi-Indicator | Castaneda, H.N. | Fra I 167 Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: forms the fundamental role of the I only in the moment of the speech act. Must refer to an antecedence: Peter believes that "he"... Fra I 165 Thesis "he*" etc. cannot be replaced by indicators, not even as variables or a substitute singular term or (description). - Thesis (conclusion of "HE"): the reference to "I" is a logically irreducible category, which can only be represented equivalently by the superpersonal and transsituative quasi-indicator "he". Fra I 387 Castaneda: thesis: both the singular indexical reference of the first person and the corresponding quasi-indexical reference are conceptually irreducible. Boer/LycanVsCastaneda: |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| pro Frege | Evans, G. | Fra I 484 Evans: "Oxford neo-Fregean" (along with McDowell and Peacocke) - VsCastaneda - Thesis: Frege s distinction sense / meaning is essential for any philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Quasi-Indicator | Lycan, W. | Fra I 387 Castaneda: both the singular indexical reference of the first person and its corresponding quasi-indexical reference is conceptually irreducible. Boer / LycanVsCastaneda. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| He* | Perry, J. | Fra I 451 According to the common sense we are already assuming the right. PerryVsCastaneda: one more argument for not making a difference between he* and he. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Additional Sense | Perry, J. | Fra I 398 Perry: Extra senses are 1st irrelevant, 2nd not necessary, 3rd inadequate (not enough). Extra-sense / "I" / PerryVsCastaneda: the ES is not part of the proposition. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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