Lexicon of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 


[german]  

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
He/ He himself Perry
 
Books on Amazon
I 432f
"He*"/Perry: not without antecedent: nonsense: E.g. "God knows that he* (Jones) is in the hospital. ---
I 439f
Extra-sense/Perry: possible solution: "s": variable that ranks above sense - E.g. Sheila thinks that an s exists so that s = Ego(Ivan) and Ivan believes that s is wanted on the telephone. - Here Ivans extra sense i is not part of the proposition that Sheila beliefs but it is part of the proposition of which she believes that Ivan believes it. - Extra-sense/PerryVsCastaneda: we do not need one. ---
I 441
"He*"/PerryVsCastaneda: does not seem to be so different from "he" - "F-use", "he" as a placeholder of an aforementioned object - (*) In attachment to an F-using it is limited* to the meaning area on special extra sense. - Problem: that does not yet exclude believing in the evening star that it is the morning star (as long as X believes that evening star = evening star, a priori argument) - solution: E.g. "Albert wanted from Mary ... so he went over to her" must be "the woman on the corner" and not the one "he had seen last week". - Solution: it is not the "it/she" but the "that's why", which compels us to - "he*" not composed. - "*" Does not mean "itself". ---
I 446ff
"He*"/Perry: not composed of "he" and "self": E.g. Elwood bites himself/bites Elwood -Difference: a) covered with wounds, b) broken teeth - analog: a) believes of himself, to be rich - b) thinks of Privatus that he is rich. - Problem: the Dean was surprised to find out that he considered himself to be overpaid (among other description).

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002

I, Ego, Self Castaneda
 
Books on Amazon:
Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 159 ff
I/Castaneda: "volatile egos": like "here", "now", irreducible - entirely epistemological, only for re-presentation, not empirical - limited identity: only consubstantiation (sameness between coexisting sets of characteristics): not diachronic (transsubstatiation), therefore not all properties identical, no substitutability, no strict identity with person - I criteria-less, content-neutral - I can only be represented by the impersonal and situation independent quasi-indicator "he". I-design/Castaneda: VsI as "Something".
I 167ff
I*/Castaneda: "I myself" in an episode of self-awareness one refers to oneself - (corresponding for he*).
I 186
Not demonstrative.
I 170
Transcendent/I/Castaneda: we experience ourselves as a not completely identical with the content of our experience and therefore associated to the world beyond experience.
I 171
I/Self/Consciousness/Self-Awareness/SA/Logical Form/Hintikka/Castaneda: E.g. "The man who is actually a, knows that he is a". Wrong: "Ka (a = a). - Right: (Ex) (Ka (x = a)) -the individual variables occurring in "Ka (...)" are conceived as relating to a range of objects that a knows - "there is a person whom a knows, so that a knows that this person is a" - CastanedaVs: does not work with contingent assertions: "there is an object, so that a does not know it exists" - E.g. "the editor does not know that he is the editor" - (Ex) (Ka(x = a) & ~Ka(x = a))) was be a formal contradiction - better: (Exa)(Ka (x = a) & Ka (x = himself) (not expressible in Hintikka).
I 226f
I/Castaneda: no specific feature - different contrasts: opposites: this/that, I/she - I/he - I (meaning/acting person) - I/you - I/we -> Buber: I/it - I/you -> Saussure: network of contrasts (plural).
Frank I 378
I/hall of mirrors/Castaneda: seems to need two selves: one he speaks to, one he speaks about - but simple self as different from I and body not sufficient.
I 430f
I/Extra sense/Castaneda: psychological role that one associates with "I" - which explains mental states that do not explain proper names or descriptions: "I'm called for on the phone": spec. mental states - PerryVsCastaneda: not sufficient, you also need to know that it is the own It! - A proposition with "he*" itself says nothing about the meaning of this expression, therefore no identification - E.g. "heaviest man in Europe" could know this without a scale if "he*" could act independently without antecedent. Solution: intermediary extra sense for Sheila's beliefs about Ivan's extra sense i.
I 470
I/Castaneda: Variable, not singular term, not singular reference: instead: i is the same as j and Stan believes of j...

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
I, Ego, Self Perry
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 398ff
Extra-sense/I/PerryVsCastaneda: can be recognized by others in the same way, does not explain the difference. ---
I 399f
I/he/reference/relation/sense/meaning: difference: Quasi-indicator attributes reference, but does not establish it. ---
I 402ff
I/Castaneda/Perry: not replaceable by specific labeling, when behavior is explained - "key index word" - Problem: same sentence, but different speaker: false belief "I'm making a mess ...". - Incorrect solution: "And I am the one": again a new index word. - "Lack of conceptual component" does not help: I can believe that it is me, with no specific concept of me. - False: Labelling: "the one who makes the mess" does not help, because no connection to me. ---
I 403
Belief/I/Perry: Solution: distinction belief-state/belief-object. - E.g. event starts at 12:00 - that means, "now!" or "already finished" or "still time". - Subject: the event beginning at 12:00 - state: "now" - specific labeling without an index is not enough. ---
I 414
I/individuation/Perry: The following conditions are not enough: Propositions de re, de dicto, additional conceptual feature localization in space and time, relativization on people and places, two different descriptions without "I" - like Castaneda: 'I' is not replaceable. Time/Person-Proposition: does not make me different from the others: "J.P. yesterday at the super market" is just as true for others. - judgement context = opinion context: "The event begins now" is true at 12:00 - does not help. - True/False: does not help: that mountain A is higher than B, may be true, but does not lead to the right path. - There is nothing what all have in common. - Solution: lost wanderers in the same opinion state (individuated by index words), but not of the same opinion.

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Quasi-Indicator Castaneda
 
Books on Amazon:
Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 163 ff
Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: is the fundamental role of the I only at the moment of the speech act - must refer to a antecedent: Peter believes that "he" ... -
I 165
Thesis: "He*", etc. cannot be replaced by indicators, nor as variables or deputy singular terms or (descriptions) - Thesis: (Conclusion of "He"): the reference of "I" is a logically irreducible category, which can only be represented equivalently by the impersonal and trans-situational quasi-indicator "he" -
I 321
Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: contradicts the classical theory of propositions: that prop Once upon beziehen- on propositions ChisholmVs / LewisVs: ment Zust not primarily based on propositions, but relation between subject and a property that is attributed it directly - CastanedaVsChisholm : attribution theory does not explain sufficiently the explicit self-esteem.
I 430 ~
Quasi-Indicator He/Castaneda/Perry* cannot be replaced by description or names that does not, in turn, contain a quasi-indicator - PerryVsCastaneda: the other one can also think "he*, i.e. the other one..."
I ~459ff
Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: represents the indexical reference, it does not carry it out. Not entirely deputy, included in reference.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Sense Castaneda
 
Books on Amazon:
Hector-Neri Castaneda
Frank I 325
Sense/Meaning/CastanedaVsFrege: the denotation within intention in propositional contexts is not Fregean meaning, but Fregean sense - reversal of Frege: the world reference can only be explained by the objects being explained as systems of Fregean senses - then "sense "and "reference" get entirely new meanings.
Frank I 400~
Sense/Meaning/CastanedaVsFrege: Guise Theory: (of designs): Vs distinction sense/meaning - from this also follows: VsFrege: indirect speech does not lose its reference - expressions always denote the same thing, namely guises (designs) - VsPerry: that also makes his distinction of designating and expressing unnecessary.
I 432 ~
Extra-Sense/Castaneda: E.g. Ivan believes that he* is required on the phone - here is (Ivan) Ivan referencce) and ego(Ivan) its special meaning i - in an assertion of speaker a "I" expresses ego(a) - PerryVsCastaneda: this explanation leads to a gap in the theory of reports of beliefs - anyone who can believe anything of Ivan, can believe the corresponding proposition of Ivan that "i" is required on the phone - KretzmannVs: still private, not even God could grasp extra-sense - PerryVs: misunderstanding, "he*" cannot be replaced by description without Index - but that does not mean that the proposition "he himself is in the hospital" can be known by none other - "i"/PerryVsCastaneda: different psychological role for Ivan and Sheila still has to be explained - that Ivan but not Scheila is the reference is not enough - Ivan must also believe that he* is i, but that is initially nothing more than that i is i! - And Sheila also believes that - in addition: information that it is about their own extra-sense - Problem: Extra-sense does not help if Ivan does not know that he was appointed Editor - facts about the language are no solution.
I ~459ff
Sense/Frege: psychological mediator role - CastanedaVs, PerryVs -.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Sense Evans
 
Books on Amazon:
Gareth Evans
Frank I 485f
Evans: pro Frege, Oxford, VsPerry, VsCastaneda - Fregean sense: way of thinking instead of way of givenness.

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Two Omniscient Gods Lewis
 
Books on Amazon
IV 139
Two Omniscient Gods/2 Gods/Lewis: the example is to show that objects of attitudes should not be identified with propositions as sets of possible worlds - E.g. both know exactly the world they inhabit - i.e. they know every true proposition - but do not know who they are themselves - Solution: self-attribution of a property, not a proposition - (see above spatial (not logical) localization is not propositional knowledge). LewisVsCastaneda: Solution: de se: we just need to find a case where the editor of soul knows which world is his without knowing if he is among the millionaires - de se: self-identification, self-localization - de dicto: self-localization in logical space (which proposition one believes).
---
IV 141
Two omniscient gods/Lewis: E.g. assuming a variant with two pairs of two gods in two possible worlds W and V, who swapped places - Assuming God 1 knows that the proposition "I’m on the highest" is true in W - and he knows that he lives in W! - It does not follow that he knows that he is on the highest! - Because if he had been on the coldest, the same sentence would have expressed a different proposition, one that is true in V and wrong in W - one of which he knew that it is false.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Castaneda, H.-N. Kaplan Vs Castaneda, H.-N.
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 430
KaplanVsCastaneda: entwickelte die Theorie der Eigenart, was ihm gestattet, auf den "Extra Sinn" ("spezieller Sinn", den jedes "Ich" für seinen Träger hat) zu verzichten.
Kaplans "rigides Gehalte" brauchen nicht speziell zu sein! Sie können dieselben Gehalte sein, wie sie z.B. mit Eigennamen verwendet werden.
Perry: diesen Schritt müssen wir tun, bevor wir uns Klarheit über die psychologische Rolle verschaffen können. (Siehe auch Burks: zeigt die Unersetzbarkeit indexikalischer Elemente durch Verdopplungsargumente).
D. Kaplan
Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Castaneda, H.-N. Boer Vs Castaneda, H.-N.
 
Books on Amazon
Frank I 387
Castaneda: These: sowohl die singuläre indexikalische Bezugnahme der ersten Person als auch die ihr entsprechende quasi indexikalische Referenz ist begrifflich irreduzibel. Boer/LycanVsCastaneda:

Boer I
Steven E. Boer
Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010

Boer II
Steven E. Boer
Knowing Who Cambridge 1986

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Chisholm, R.M. Castaneda Vs Chisholm, R.M.
 
Books on Amazon:
Hector-Neri Castaneda
Chisholm I 43
CastanedaVsChisholm: For him, propositions of the first person are not abstract (eternal) objects, but contingent things. They cease to exist when the person x ceases to exist. - - -
Frank I 330
Self-attribution/Chisholm: Builds on Lewis. Any attribution by others contains a self-reference (implicit). I 331 Consciousness/CastanedaVsChisholm: everybody first refers to their own world (as per Chisholm), but from that does not follow the necessity that every consciousness and every thought are explicitly self-conscious. (CastanedaVsFichte). The first-person perspective is only implicitly contained in a non-reflexive consciousness. An explicit self-consciousness differs from this consciousness, however, if it refers to conscious explicit self-reference. Self-attribution/CastanedaVsChisholm: if every consciousness includes direct attribution, including an I-less, purely world-facing consciousness, then direct attribution can only express a purely objective self-understanding and therefore does not explain self-consciousness. When Chisholm points out that reflection still has to be added, he argues circularly, because this self-consciousness should be explained just by the self-attribution.
I 332
Reflection/self-consciousness/ChisholmVsCastaneda/Grundmann: This does not go to the heart of Chisholm’s argument: this would ultimately reject the insinuation that in the self-attribution a purely external or objective self-reference is articulated. External self-reference: extremely rare. E.g. Mach, Omnibus (see above). Self-attribution/Chisholm: denominates implicit self-consciousness. VsChisholm: However, he fails to explain the transformation from implicit to explicit self-consciousness. Reduction/CastanedaVsChisholm: according to Chisholm, the use of all indicators can be traced back to those of the first person. E.g. the subject attributes itself the property of directing its attention to a book and indirectly attributes to this book the property of being witty and exciting.
I 333
Consubstantiation/CastanedaVsChisholm: the activity of directing the attention is only consubstantiated (implicit) in a determining sentence. Accordingly, the intentional act is not part of the demonstrative thought.
I 338
Attribution/CastanedaVsLewis/CastanedaVsChisholm: should not be monolithic: it is necessary to distinguish between propositional attitude and practitions: "mixed conditionals": E.g. the intention to close the window when I open the door is different from the intention to open the door when I close the window.
I 375
Consciousness/Attribution theory/CastanedaVsChisholm: Problem: distinction between reflective and non-reflective consciousness. This is a semantic pragmatic distinction between thought contents and it collides with Chisholm’s unit syntax.
Fra I 380
Properties/CastanedaVsChisholm: 1) Considers properties to be subjects of predication 2) Quantifies over them - devastating in deontological contexts - too complicated for cumulative quotes.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999

Chi I
R. Chisholm
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chi III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.
Disputed term/author/ism Pro/Versus
Entry
Reference
Frege Sense/Meaning Pro Frank I 484
Evans: "Oxford Neo-Fregeans" (together mt McDowell and Peacocke) - VsCastaneda - Thesis: Frege s distinction sense / meaning is essential for any philosophy of language and philosophy of mind.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Quasi-Indicator Boer, St.
 
Books on Amazon
Fra I 387
Castaneda: thesis: both the singular indexical reference of the first person as well as its corresponding quasi-indexical reference is conceptually irreducible.   Boer / LycanVsCastaneda: +

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Quasi-Indicator Castaneda, H.N.
 
Books on Amazon
Fra I 167
Quasi-Indikator/Castaneda: bildet die fundamentale Rolle des Ich nur im Moment des Sprechakts. Muß sich auf ein Antezens beziehen: Peter glaubt, daß "er"... Fra I 165 These "er*" usw. können nicht durch Indikatoren, auch nicht als Variablen oder Stellvertreter sing Term oder (Kennzeichnungen) ersetzt werden. - These (Fazit von "ER"): die Bezugnahme von "ich" ist eine logisch irreduzible Kategorie, die nur durch den überpersönlichen und transsituativen Quasiï·"Indikator "er" äquivalent abgebildet werden kann.
Fra I 387
Castaneda: These sowohl die singuläre indexikalische Bezugnahme der ersten Person als auch die ihr entsprechende quasi-indexikalische Referenz ist begrifflich irreduzibel. Boer/LycanVsCastaneda:

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
pro Frege Evans, G.
 
Books on Amazon
Fra I 484
Evans: "Oxford neo-Fregean" (along with McDowell and Peacocke) - VsCastaneda - Thesis: Frege s distinction sense / meaning is essential for any philosophy of language and philosophy of mind.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Quasi-Indicator Lycan, W.
 
Books on Amazon
Fra I 387
Castaneda: both the singular indexical reference of the first person and its corresponding quasi-indexical reference is conceptually irreducible. Boer / LycanVsCastaneda.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
He* Perry, J.
 
Books on Amazon
Fra I 451
According to the common sense we are already assuming the right.   PerryVsCastaneda: one more argument for not making a difference between he* and he.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Additional Sense Perry, J.
 
Books on Amazon
Fra I 398
Perry: Extra senses are 1st irrelevant, 2nd not necessary, 3rd inadequate (not enough).   Extra-sense / "I" / PerryVsCastaneda: the ES is not part of the proposition.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994