Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cartesianism | Avramides | I 107 ff Cartesianism/Asymmetry/Avramidis: the Cartesianism is an older tradition of deep epistemic asymmetry. >Terminology/Avramides. Mental objects are only accessible through first-person perspective. >First Person, >Priviledged acces. Other minds are only guessable through behavior. >Other minds. Then there is no superficial epistemic asymmetry. Important argument: ontological symmetry: the mental and the material are on the same level. >Levels/Order. This thesis is ot obliged to physicalism. >Physicalism. Variant of Cartesianism: one might even say the God standpoint could not recognize the intangible substance. Deep epistemic asymmetry/Avramides: if we could recognize the intangible substance, we could recognize foreign intentions without language. Cartesianism/Avramides: here: variant with divine access to the intangible. Cartesianism/Avramides:is not reductive! >Reduction, >Reductionism. I 110 AvramidesVsCartesianism: It is a mistake to proceed without observing behavior. >Behavior, >Understanding. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Cartesianism | Davidson | VI 165 Mind/DavidsonVsCartesianism/Rorty: The mind should contain a final source of evidence whose nature can be specified completely, without referring to that for which they are evidence! This mind should know its own content without knowing anything else in the world. Then the mind would be its own residence, freedom of movement independent of the environment. (DavidsonVs, RortyVs). >Husserl. But no one would assert that the brain was its own residence! Brain/Brains in a Vat/Davidson/Rorty: The brain cannot lose contact with the outside world. It is irrelevant if it is a brain in a vat! This is also true for the mind: it must always be connected to something. That cannot be negated by a mentalist re-description. >Brains in a vat. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cartesianism | Davidson Vs Cartesianism | Avramides I 109 DavidsonVsCartesianism/DavidsonVsPhysicalism/Avramidis: his doubts (and also Nagel’s argument) lead to a rejection both of Cartesianism (which is not so reductive) and of the reductive physicalism. Davidson/Nagel/Avramides: both say the impossibility of direct access to the mental lies in the method! Mind/CartesianismVsNagel//Physicalism/Avramides: Important argument: both (C. and Ph.) turn the mind into something objective. And with that in principle into an observation open to a being that has the appropriate skills. I 110 But the arguments of Nagel and DavidsonVsPhysicalism also apply to VsCartesianism. (1979c, p.211) |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Cartesianism | Lewis Vs Cartesianism | Schwarz I 158f Mary, the color scientist/Learning/Knowledge wie/LewisVsCartesianism: >color scientist Mary cannot learn anything new: even if there were a realm of "ectoplasmic" objects and characteristics which are responsible for mental processes. All facts will not supervene upon physical facts, but upon the physical and the ectoplasmic facts. ((s) Solution/(s): If the second element of the conjunction or the disjunction always states the same esoteric entity, it can be "shortened".) Lewis: But we have not gained anything by doing this. We can still imagine a zombie world, which is similar to our actual world, but is now physical and ectoplasmic. Had Mary attended black and white ectoplasmic classes prior to her first contact, it would also not have helped her. (1988e(1),280f,Churchland 1985(2),24f). 1. D. Lewis [1988e]: “What Experience Teaches”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 13: 29–57. 2. Paul M. Churchland [1985]: “Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States”. Journal of Philosophy, 82: 8–28 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Cartesianism | Physicalism Vs Cartesianism | Avramides I 135 PhysicalismVsCartesianism: turns it around: instead of the first person perspektve we have only the third person perspective. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Cartesianism | Avramides Vs Cartesianism | Avra I 110 AvramidisVsCartesianism: should be rejected primarily because of the image that it gives of the mind. But Loar wipes that aside when he makes use of naturalism. AvramidesVsPhysicalism: in Chapter 4, I will show that physicalism inherits its image of the mind from Cartesianism. I 111 AvramidesVsPhysicalism/AvramidesVsCartesianism: both make the same mistake. In reality, no perspective (God view point or science of the future) can ever fathom the mental life of an individual without observing its behavior. (Davidson ditto). I 133 Mind/AvramidesVsCartesianism: but that results in the loss of any real asymmetry of perspectives! And at the same time the mind loses every possibility to be determined as subjective. The mind becomes something objective to which godlike beings (at least in principle) ((s) i.e. also conceptually) can have access. (see above (Chapter 3)) Then there is nothing special about the perspective of the subject (to itself)! The subject perspective is then one that can be shared. The subject only remains privileged if it is compared with other human beings. ((s) But that is not a property of the mind itself anymore) AvramidesVsCartesianism: Irony: By trying to explain the special relation of the subject to the mind he loses sight of this special relation I 134 The introduction of a specific substance (immaterial) does not at all help to understand what is supposed to be special about the mind. Avra I 154 Behavior/Cartesianism: tries to explain the significance of behavior through hidden thinking (thoughts). AvramidesVsCartesianism: Question: how does a thought acquire its significance (importance)? |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Nagel, Th. | Cartesianism Vs Nagel, Th. | Avramides I 109 Mind/CartesianismVsNagel/Physicalism/Avramides: N.B.: both (C. and Ph.) transform the mind into something objective. And thus, it is in principle accessible for observation by a being who has the appropriate abilities. I 110 But the arguments of Nagel and Davidson VsPhysicalism also apply to VsCartesianism. (1979c,p.211) |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Physicalism | Avramides Vs Physicalism | Avramides I 111 AvramidesVsPhysicalism/AvramidsVsCartesianism: both make the same mistake. In reality no perspective (God viewpoint or science of the future) can ever fathom the mental life of an individual without observing his behavior. (Davidson ditto). I 135 AvramidesVsPhysicalism: by emphasizing the difficulties of an intangible empire, he loses sight of an important insight by Descartes: The subject has a unique relation to its interior. PhysicalismVsCartesianism: turns it around: instead of first-person perspektve we have only the third person perspective. I 137 Objective mind/Asymmetry/Concept/AvramidesVsLoar/AvramidesVsPhysicalism: thesis: if one understands the mind as objective, conceptual questions can no longer be separated from superficial epistemic questions or maintain a separation between our access to what the states of mind are in themselves and the normal evidence (behavior) that affect them. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
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