Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 69 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Chisholm | II 64 Analytical/Chisholm: early: a preposition is analytical for which there is a conjunctive property such that it and the S property include one another (inclusion) and the P property is one of its sub-properties - late: different property relations: implicy and involve - (Involve/Chisholm: that which contains one also contains the other). II 66f Analytical/Language/Meaning Postulates/ChisholmVsCarnap: Problem: different intensional structure: E.g. squares have the conjunctive property of being rectangular and equilateral, or conjunctive property of being rectangular and have mutually perpendicular diagonals - same extension, different meaning, hence different properties. II 67 Carnap: the property expressions are L equivalent because of the rules of language (meaning postulates). ChisholmVsCarnap: for him it is not about the intensional structure, but about the structure of properties themselves. >Intensionality, >Meaning postulates, >Extensions. Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Quine | I 120 Lasting Sentences: In lasting sentences the meaning of the stimulus is more sparse. Accordingly, the synonymy of stimuli is less plumable. > VsAnalyticity. I 339 Material implication "p impl q" is not equal to "p > q" (> mention/use) "Implies" and "analytical" are the best general terms. V 114 QuineVsAnalyticity: one can form universal categorical sentences later e.g. "A dog is an animal". Of these, we will not say that they are analytical or even true. Analyticity is as social as language. Random first examples should not have any special status. Definition Analytical/Quine: a sentence is analytical if everyone learns the truth of the sentence by learning the words. That is bound as social uniformity because of the observation character. Every person has a different set of first learned analytical sentences - therefore Vs. VI 79 Quine: HolismVsAnalyticity. >Holism/Quine. --- VII (b) 21 Analytical/QuineVsKant: Quine limits them to the subject-predicate form. They can be reformulated as following: "true by force of meaning, regardless of the facts". VsEssentialism: a creature is arbitrary: a biped must be two-legged (because of his feet), but he does not need to be rational. This is relative. VII (b) 23 Analyticity/Quine: a) logically true: "No unmarried man is married" - b) this is translatable into logical truth: Bachelor/unmarried. The problem is that it is based on unclear synonymy. Analytical/Carnap: "true under any state description" - QuineVsCarnap: this only works when the atom sentences are independent. it does not work with e.g. bachelor/unmarried. VII (b) 28ff Analyticity/Quine: we need an adverb "neccess.", which is designed in that way that it delivers truth when it is applied to an analytical truth, but then we would indeed have to know what "analytical" is. - Problem: The extensional agreement of bachelor/unmarried man relies more on random facts than on meaning. A. cannot mean that the fact component would be zero: that would be an unempirical dogma. VII (b) 37 Verification Theory/Peirce: the method is the meaning. Then "analytically" becomes a borderline case: method does not matter. Synonymous: the method of refutation and confirmation are the same. VII (b) 37 Analytical/Quine: early: a is a statement when it is synonymous with a logically true statement. VII (i) 161ff Analyticity/Quine: analyticity is an approximate truth because of meaning. That says nothing about existence. >Synonymy/Quine, >Verfication/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Schurz | I 106 Analytic/Synthetic/SchurzVsQuine: his discarding of the distinction is problematic: the relation between language and world contains a conventional element. E.g. if it is not clear what "raven" means, one cannot hypothesize. And this conventional element is supposed to capture just the analytic. Analytic/Schurz/(s): is the result of the conventional determination of meaning in a language. Quine/Schurz: Quine's problem is that this conventional moment operates predominantly in an ostensive way. >Ostension, >Conventions, >Meaning, >Sense. I 171 Analytic/Synthetic/QuineVsCarnap/Schurz: Quine's insight into local indistinguishability brought a profound upheaval. Carnap accepted it late. >Analyticity/Quine. However, he had recognized that several reduction theorems together produce empirical content. (see above). ((s) if one has observed that something dissolves in water, one has thereby "empirically inferred" that it does not dissolve in oil?). Reduction/Schurz: but with the term "reduction theorem" he just remained true to his reductionist program. Assignment law/terminology/Schurz: Carnap (1956)(1) calls it "correspondence rules" (K). I 172 Total theory/Carnap: "T u K". ("theory and assignment laws"). Assignment law/SchurzVsCarnap: this cannot be, because assignment laws are consequences of a theory T, which follow from the interaction of all theorems. ((s) circular). Analyticity/Carnap: sums up in (Carnap 1963(2), 964) that he failed to formulate an appropriate notion. Solution/Carnap: decomposition of theory into Ramsey-theorem and Carnap-theorem: Ramsey-theorem/Carnap: synthetic Carnap-theorem/Carnap: analytic. Analytic/synthetic/Ernest Nagel: (Nagel 1961)(3) the analytic content of mechanics is not localizable! 1. Carnap, R. "The Methological Character of Theoretical Concepts". In: Feigle,H./Scriven, M(eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol I, Menneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, pp. 38-76. 2. Carnap, R. (1963) "Carl G. Hempel on Scientific Theories". In: Schilpp, P. A. (ed.) The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, La Salle, pp. 958-965. 3. Nagel, E. (1961). The Structure of Science, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Coherence Theory | Ayer | I 21 AyerVsCoherence theory: there could be different systems of coherent statements. I 293 Coherence/Carnap/Ayer: Carnap tried to rescue the coherence theory: pragmatism: what serves our goals? - AyerVsCarnap: that ultimately only one of the competing culturally distinct systems is acceptable, already exceeds the coherence theory itself. >Pragmatism, cf. >Correspondence theory. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Colour | Carnap | VI 126 Colors/Carnap: arise as abstraction classes of color identity. VI 102 Abstraction class: class of elements related to an arbitrary element - (s)> Unit Sets. VI 152 Similarity Circles/Carnap: at first, you take all classes of elementary experiences (EE) that are partially similar to each other - (due to reflexivity). >Experience. Then the two-, three-, etc. classes of partially similar EE - then one removes from this list all the classes that are contained in a different one as subclass VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (color theory): we are to remain in the field of sensory perception itself and notice the laws in the area of perception that exist between them - CarnapVsGoethe: the laws of physics do not apply there, but different, more complicated ones do. >Perception, >Phenomena, >Qualia. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Empiricism | Goethe | Carnap VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Color theory): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. >Positivism, >Theory of Colors. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (in the perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all. >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Seeing, >Laws of nature. But these laws are of much more complicated form. Carnap VI 180 Physical world/CarnapVsGoethe: to be distinguished from the world of perception. Mere quadruples of numbers to which state variables are ascribed. VI 181 Only it is accessible to intersubjectivity, not the world of perception. >Nature, >World, >World/Thinking. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Empiricism | Quine | Graeser I 146 QuineVsCarnap: (Holism): since theory is only debatable as a whole, theoretical terms escape the reduction to sensual terms. But: Empiricism/Quine: is not a strict opponent. How else is knowledge of the world possible? >Theoretical Terms/Quine. Quine VII (b) 40ff Empiricism/Quine: empiricism has excessively rich ontology. Science is double dependent on language and experience, but thesis: this duality cannot be traced back to individual statements. XII 90/1 Empiricism/Quine pro: 1) everything that speaks for scientific theories comes from experience 2) every word meaning is ultimately based on experience XII 94 One has abandoned the following methods: 1) trying to explain everything from sensory data - 2) the rational reconstruction. Stalnaker I 3 QuineVsEmpiricism/Two Dogmas/Stalnaker: empiricism is no basis for the distinction between language rules (rules) and our judgments about the world - no theory - neutral basis. >Two Dogmas/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Epistemology | Quine | XII 86/87 Epistemology/Quine: a) conceptual side: is explanation of terms by terms. b) applicability/validity: by truth. II 35 Epistemology is about the question of how we animals managed to produce this ((s) highly differentiated) science in view of the sketchy neural input. This study shows that shifts due to the representative function would not have done any less justice to this input. This does not mean rejecting ontology. We can refuse them! II 36 Truth must not be confused with evidence. Truth is intrinsic and there is nothing about it. See also >Naturalized Epistemology. V 15 Berkeley/Traditional Epistemology: Problem: how do we know that there are objects and that science is true? V 16 Quine: the introduction of the physical sense organs would have appeared to them as a circle. V 17 Epistemology/Quine: the emancipated epistemologist works as an empirical psychologist (with >stimuli instead of >sense data, but without >gestalt theory.) VsGestalt Theory: it is about the connection of stimuli with receptors, not with consciousness. V 38 Epistemology/Quine: main question: if our theory of the outside world is true, how could we ever come up with it? X 12 Inductive Logic/Quine: is indistinguishable from epistemology. X II 86 Epistemology/Quine: we can look at it here analogous to mathematics: just as mathematics should be reduced to logic or to logic + set theory, so should empirical knowledge be somehow based on sensory experience. XII 87 a) conceptual side: is there to explain the concept of the body from the sensory experience b) (validity, truth): is there to justify our knowledge of nature from the sensory experience. Epistemology/Hume: a) conceptual side: here he equated it immediately with sensory experiences. I.e. an apple is a new apple in every moment. b) Validity, truth: Hume failed here and we still have no solution. Problem: general statements as well as singular statements about the future gain nothing in certainty by being understood as if they were talking about sensory impressions. Quine: We are still facing the same problem as Hume. On the conceptual side, however, progress was made. Solution: Bentham: XII 88 Def Theory of Fiction/Context Definition/Entire Sentences/Word/holophrastic/Bentham/Quine: Bentham discovered the Def Context Definition/Bentham/Quine: (Vs normal definition): to explain a term we do not need to specify a reference object, not even a synonymous word or phrase, we just need to show how to translate all complete sentences containing the term. Epistemology/Quine: apart from context theory, epistemology was enriched by set theory. Then you do not have to equate bodies with sense data or context definitions: XII 89 Def Object/Quine: Solution: Objects as sets of sets of sensations; then there may be a category of objects that enjoy the very qualities that bodies are supposed to have. Vs: this is not as untouchable as the context definition. Because of the recourse to the problematic ontology of quantities. Epistemology/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements and statements about the future are uncertain if they are understood to be about sense data or sensory impressions) is still unsolved today. Carnap/Quine: his constructions would have made it possible to translate all sentences about the world into sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observation terms does not mean that it can be proven with logical and set-theoretical means from observation sentences. ((s) Means of expression are not evidence. (> exterior/interior, description levels, circularity). Epistemology/Quine: N.B.: to want to endow the truths about nature with the full authority of immediate experience is just as doomed to failure as the return of the truths of mathematics to the potential insight of elementary logic. >Epistemology/Carnap. XII 91 Epistemology/Psychology/Quine: if sensory stimuli are the only thing, why not just turn to psychology? TraditionVsPsychology/Quine: this used to appear circular. No Circle/QuineVsVs: Solution: we just have to refrain from deducting science from observations. If we only want to understand the connection between observation and science, we need all the information we can get. Also those from science, which is investigating exactly this connection. See > Rational reconstruction. XII 98 Epistemology/Quine: still exists within psychology and thus within empirical sciences. It studies the human subject. Aim: to find out how observation is related to theory and to what extent theory goes beyond observation. XII 99 Epistemology/Quine: old: wanted to include empirical sciences, so to speak, to assemble them from sense data. New: now, conversely, epistemology is part of psychology. Quine: at the same time, the old relationship remains: epistemology is included in the empirical sciences and at the same time science is included in the epistemology. ((s) Epistemology studies the subject and the subject studies epistemology.) This is not a circle because we have given up the dream of deducing all science from sense data. This also solves the old mystery of seeing. See also Seeing/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Experience | Dilthey | Gadamer I 67 Experience/Dilthey/Gadamer: Something becomes an experience, as long as it was not only experienced, but its being experienced had a special emphasis, which gives it lasting meaning. What is in this way one, completely wins a new state of being in the expression of art. Dilthey's famous book title "Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung" (English: "The Experience and Poetry") brings this connection to a catchy formula. Indeed, it was Dilthey who first assigned a conceptual function to the word, which soon became a popular buzzword and was soon to rise to a term of such a plausible concept of value that many European languages have adopted it as a foreign word. Gadamer I 68 Dilthey's Goethe essay allows us (...) to look back (...) into the unconscious prehistory of the word, because this essay is available in the version of 1877(1) and in the later adaptation of "Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung" (1905). In this essay Dilthey compares Goethe with Rousseau, and in order to describe Rousseau's novel poetry from the world of his inner experiences, he uses the expression "the experience". In the paraphrase of a Rousseau text, the phrase "the experiences of earlier days"(2) can be found. DiltheyVsRationalism: The coinage of the word obviously evokes the criticism of the rationalism of the Enlightenment, which in Rousseau's late times emphasized the concept of life. It is probably Rousseau's influence on German Classicism that set the standard for "being experienced" ("Erlebtsein") and thus enabled the formation of the word experience ("Erlebnis").(3) Life/Idealism/Gadamer: The concept of life forms Gadamer I 69 also the metaphysical background that carries the speculative thinking of German idealism, and plays a fundamental role in both Fichte and Hegel, but also in Schleiermacher. In contrast to the abstraction of understanding as well as to the particularity of feeling or imagination, this concept implies the connection to totality, to infinity. Gadamer: This can be clearly heard in the tone that the word experience has had up to the present day. >Experience/Historical Development/Gadamer, >Given/Dilthey. Gadamer I 71 Dilthey/Gadamer: The entities of meaning we encounter in the humanities may be very strange and incomprehensible to us - they can be traced back to the last units of what is given in consciousness, which themselves no longer contain anything foreign, representational or in need of interpretation. They are the units of experience, which are themselves units of sense. Sensation/DiltheyVsMach/DiltheyVsCarnap/Gadamer: [It was of decisive importance (...) for Dilthey's] thinking (...) that as the last unit of consciousness not sensation or feeling is mentioned, as was taken for granted in Kantianism and still in the positivist epistemology of the 19th century up to Ernst Mach, but what Dilthey says for it. He thus limits the constructive ideal of a construction of knowledge from sensation atoms and opposes it with a sharper version of the concept of the given. >Life/Dilthey. Gadamer I 226 Experience/Dilthey/Gadamer: The question is (...) how the experience of the individual and his or her insight can be elevated to historical experience. History is no longer about interrelations that are experienced as such by the individual or are relived as such by others. Dilthey develops how the individual acquires a life context and from there seeks to gain the constitutive terms that are also important for the historical context and his recognition. In contrast to the categories of the knowledge of nature, these concepts are concepts of life. For the last prerequisite for the knowledge of the historical world, in which the identity of consciousness and object, Gadamer I 227 this speculative postulate of idealism, is still a demonstrable reality and is according to Dilthey the experience. Here is immediate certainty. For what is experience is no longer differentiated into an act, such as becoming one, and a content, that which one is becoming(3). It is rather an inner being that cannot be further dissolved. Context/Dilthey: Already in his ideas "on descriptive and dissecting psychology" Dilthey had distinguished the task of deriving "the acquired context of the soul life" from the explanatory forms of the knowledge of nature(4). He had used the term structure in order to distinguish the experience of soul connections from the causal connections of the natural event. The logical characteristic of "structure" was, that here a whole of a relationship is meant, which is not based on the temporal sequence of being achieved, but on inner relationships. >Subject/Dilthey, >Interrelation/Dilthey. 1. Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie, Bd. X; cf. die Anmerkung Diltheys zu »Goethe und die dichterische Phantasie« (Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, p. 468 ff.). 2. Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung, 6. Aufl., p. 219; cf. Rousseau, Les Confessions, Partie Il, Livre 9. The exact correspondence cannot be proven. Obviously it is not a translation, but a paraphrase of the description to be read in Rousseau's work. 3. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften Vll, 27f.; 230. 4. VII, 13a. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Explanation | Goodman | IV 165 Explanation: a basic term is not defined, but explained by means of its different varieties. >Definitions. --- II 67 Reduction sentences/Carnap: if we want to construct a language of science, we must take some descriptive (i.e. not logical) expressions as basic expressions. Other expressions can then be introduced by means of reduction sentences. >Reduction, >Reducibility, >Reductionism. II 68 GoodmanVsCarnap/reduction sentences: [the whole thing is] pretty absurd (...) in my opinion. Philosophy has the task of explaining the science (and the everyday language), but not describing it. The explanation must refer to the pre-systematic use of the terms under consideration, but does not have to adhere to the ordering. It is all about economy and unification. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Expressions | Quine | I 230 QuineVsGrammatical word classes/homonymy (one word functions as another): there are problems with the concepts of word and lexical identity. I 230 Ambiguity: the name Paul is not ambiguous and not a general term but a singular term with proliferation - ambiguity action/habit: are ice skaters, delivery (action, object). >Singular Terms/Quine. I 407f Term: is not without articles, pronouns, plural, predication, identity ("considering" is not a term). A term should be accepted because of usefulness (VsNominalism). --- XII 90 Presentation/proof/expression/QuineVsCarnap: the fact that a sentence can be expressed using logic, set-theoretic and observational terms does not mean that it can be proved with set-theoretic and logical means only (s) means of expression are not means of evidence.)- (> exterior/interior, >circularity). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Exterior/interior | Quine | XII 90 Display/proof/expression/QuineVsCarnap: that a sentence can be expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms, does not mean that it could prove itself with set-theoretical and logical means alone. - ((s) Means of expression are not admissible evidence (inside/outside circle)). >Circular resoning, >Proofs, >Provability; cf. >Expressiveness of a language. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Exterior/interior | Stroud | I 206 General/Special/skepticism/verificationism/generalization/interior/exterior/Stroud: With Descartes the special is representative and can therefore be generalized. >René Descartes. VerificationismVsGeneralization: Verificationism considers eneralization as suspicious: one should not apply statements of the system to the system itself. >Verificationism, >Self-reference, >Cirular reasoning. StroudVsCarnap: the problem interior/exterior is not the same as that of the general and special. StroudVsCarnap: the sentence that Descartes does not know whether he is sitting by the fire is not meaningless, only in connection to the skeptical presumption that it is not verifiable. >Senseless, >Verification. Problem: the verificationism could come easily in the situation to have to assume that then all of our everyday language would be useless. >Everyday language. I 211 Naturalized epistemology/QuineVsCarnap/Stroud: denies the need for an external position - so that the interior/exterior-problem is avoided. >Naturalized epistemology. I 214 QuineVsKant: no a priori "knowledge". >a priori, >a priori/Quine, >outside/inside/Carnap, >exterior/interior/Carnap. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Fido-Fido-Principle | Logic Texts | Read III 32f RyleVsCarnap: (Review of Carnap's meaning and necessity): Error: "Fido"-Fido principle: because the name "Fido" gets its meaning from the fact that it refers to a single individual. Hence, we are tempted to assume that other words work in the same way. In his presentation of universals Russell fell into the same trap: according to his view, atomic statements consist of a number of individuals and a universal. >Predication. E.g. "Fido is a dog." What does "dog" refer to? According to the "Fido"-Fido theory, it must have its meaning from the fact that it is assigned to a single thing, to being-a-dog or the universal, dog. Statement/Russell: Russell's statements were designed by him to make the meaning of sentences. Consequently, he said, they must contain these generic entities, universals. This is an unjustified step. "Fido"-Fido principle: RyleVs: it mistakenly equates meaning with reference. >Meaning, >Reference. "Fido"-Fido Principle: incorrect equation of reference and condition: Russell: falsely believed that Fido was assigned to being-a-dog, whereas predicates, verbs and adjectives would be related to universals. >Universals, >Individual. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Generality | Stroud | I 206 General/Special/skepticism/verificationism/generalization/interior/exterior/Stroud: With Descartes the special is representative and can therefore be generalized. >René Descartes. VerificationismVsGeneralization: Verificationism considers eneralization as suspicious: one should not apply statements of the system to the system itself. >Verificationism, >Self-reference, >Cirular reasoning. StroudVsCarnap: the problem interior/exterior is not the same as that of the general and special. StroudVsCarnap: the sentence that Descartes does not know whether he is sitting by the fire is not meaningless, only in connection to the skeptical presumption that it is not verifiable. >Senseless, >Verification. Problem: the verificationism could come easily in the situation to have to assume that then all of our everyday language would be useless. >Everyday language. I 264 Public/knowledge/Stroud: there are indeed general statements about knowledge: e.g. that someone knows something about Sicily of the 4th century. - E.g. that no one knows the causes of cancer. VsMoore: that he does not achieve a general statement about knowledge, but is not due to a lack of generality. >G.E. Moore. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Grue | Carnap | IV 31 Grue /CarnapVsGoodman: "red", etc. are purely qualitative predicates; ’grue’, etc. are positional predicates. GoodmanvsCarnap: the distinction qualitative/positional is relative to a perspective on a respective base language. This could also include gred/reen as basic predicates, then "red" and "green" would have to be interpreted in relation to a time. IV 32 Then the attributions "qualitative"/"positional" was reversed. There is no perceptible color change: who understands "green" in the sense of "gred" understands understands "color" in the sense of "blolor": things of equal blolor are those which are gred etc. See more authors on >Grueness. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Grue | Schurz | I 219 Grue/gred/reen/Goodman/Schurz: logical form: (B: observed. G*: gred). G*: <> ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 > Rx)). Sa: emerald. Sample: {a:1 ≤ i ≤ n} Then the assertions Sai u Bat0 u Gai and Sai u Bat0 u G*ai are definitionally equivalent. If we apply the inductive generalization inference for both "green" and "gred," our sample yields the two all-hypotheses H:= "All emeralds are green" and H*: = "All emeralds are gred". Problem: However, H and H* imply contradictory predictions (green versus red) for all emeralds not observed before t0. Schurz: There is the following connection to subjective inductive permutability assumptions: for regular probability functions the permutability assumption cannot be valid for a predicate (Gx) and its pathological counterpart (G*) at the same time. Question: What criteria should we use to decide which predicates we consider to be exchangeable or inductively projectable? Many criteria have been proposed and proved to be unsuitable. Carnap: (1947(1),146, 1976(2), 211): Thesis: only qualitative predicates are inducible (projectable) "grue" is a Def "positional" predicate/Carnap, i.e. a predicate that in its definition refers to time t0. Ex grue. Def qualitative predicate/Carnap: has no definitional reference to individual constants. GoodmanVsCarnap: (Goodman 1955/75(3), 105): Problem of language dependence (sic: dependence): By mutual redefinition one can pass from our language (with "green" and "red") to a language equivalent in expressive power, in which "gred" and "reen" (G*x, R*x) function as basic terms (basic predicates): Language L (Gx,Rx primitive) Definitions in L G*x: <> ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 > Rx)) R*x: <> ((Bxt0 > Rx) u (~Bxt0 > Gx)) Language L* (G*x, R*x primitive) Definitions in L* Gx: <> ((Bxt0 > G*x) u (~Bxt0 > R*x)) Rx: <> ((Bxt0 > R*x) u (~Bxt0 > G*x)). Solution/Schurz: One can distinguish between qualitative and positional predicates language-independently with respect to ostensive learnability! (s) Properties dependent on a future time cannot be shown). I 220 GoodmanVsInduction/Schurz: but this still does not answer why induction should be based on qualitative and not on positional predicates. Induction consists in extending patterns previously observed as constant into the future. In order to formulate induction rules in a meaningful way, we need to know what remained constant! And that depends on qualitative features. Positional features are pseudo-features. Pointe: That individuals are "constant" "grot" means that they change their color from green to red at t0. In this case we have done "anti-induction" and not induction. This is the reason why we have (with Carnap) for induction rules basic predicates for qualitative and not positional features. 1. Carnap, R. "On the Application of Inductive Logic", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8, 133-147. 2. Carnap, R. (1976). Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft, 3. Aufl. München: Nymphenburger. (Engl. Orig. 1966). 3. Goodman, N. (1955/75) Tatsache, Fiktion, Voraussage, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. Engl, Orig. Fact, Fiction and Forecast (1955). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Intensions | Carnap | VII 146 Extension/Carnap: E.g. class of all blue objects - E.g. intension of "blue" in English: the quality of being blue - intension, not extension makes us understand statements. VII 149 Intension/Carnap: the analysis of the intension for a natural language is just as reliable as that of the extension! QuineVs: pragmatic intension terms are unclear and mysterious. VII 150 Quine: that is in principle, it is not only about the generally accepted technical difficulty of the determination. Carnap: Question: Assuming that the linguist can determine the extension, how can he also determine the intension? In any case, this is a completely new step: For example, suppose that two field linguists have reached complete agreement on the extensions of the natives. Now it is still possible to attribute different intensions to the predicates thus fixed extensionally! Because there is more than one and possibly infinitely many different properties, whose extension in the given area is just the extension for which the predicate in question has been determined! Example (s) If all considered dogs are brown, it is not clear whether the color or the dogs were picked out. Carnap: In addition, quadruped could be meant if the descriptive word is unknown. The whole extension would also be covered. VII 151 Intensionalist thesis of pragmatism/CarnapVsQuine: the determination of intension is an empirical hypothesis that can be tested by observing language habits. Extensionalist thesis / QuineVsCarnap: the determination of intension is ultimately a question of taste, the linguist is free because it cannot be tested. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise either. Quine: the completed encyclopedia is ex pede Herculem, i.e. we risk an error if we start at the end of the foot. But we can take advantage of it! If, on the other hand, we delay a definition of synonymity in the case of the lexicon, no problem arises, nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false. Intensionalist These/Carnap: pro: Example translation manual: the linguist begins: (1) horse, horse another linguist enters: (2) Horse, horse or unicorn since there is no unicorn, the two intentions have the same extension! ((s) Disjunction: for the extension two intentions can be assumed, if one is empty, like unicorn). Extensionalistic thesis/Quine: if it is correct, there is no way to make an empirical decision between (1) and (2). VII 152 Solution/CarnapVsQuine: the linguist not only has to calculate the real cases, but also the possible ones. ((s) David Lewis: applies modality not to objects, but to intensions, e.g. facts or characteristics!). Ambiguity/Intensions/Carnap: Ambiguity can be overcome by providing suitable explanations and examples. For me there are no objections against modality. But it is also not necessary: For example, the linguist could simply describe cases to the native that he knows are possible and leave open whether there is something that fulfills the descriptions. (So e.g. describe a unicorn, or point to a corresponding picture, etc.). The affirmative or negative answer will form an affirmative case for (1) or (2). This shows that (1) and (2) are different empirical hypotheses. Intension/Carnap: all logically possible cases of determination come into consideration. Also causally impossible! >Unicorn example, >Non-existence. VII 158 Intension/Carnap: scope of a predicate, truth conditions. So that the speaker can attribute the predicate Def analytical: if the intension includes all possible cases for the speaker Def synonymous: two expressions with the same intension for a speaker Def language/Carnap: system of related dispositions. Newen I 120 Def Intension/Carnap: = truth conditions - Def Extension/Carnap: = truth value. >Truth conditions, >Truth values. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Internal/external | Stalnaker | I 44 External questions/Carnap: an external question is a question about whether a frame is to be accepted. >Reference systems. QuineVsCarnap: all questions are asked within a linguistic context, therefore, internal and external issues are not easy to separate. >Context/Context dependence. I 45 Nevertheless, there are still external matters also in word + object. E.g. thesis: the talk about physical phenomena is regarded as a physical phenomenon itself. Stalnaker: that is possible without establishing ourselves outside the world. The the causal theory of reference has its place, too. >Causal theory of reference, >Naturalism, >Epistemology naturalized. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Justification | Davidson | McDowell I 37 Justification/Davidson: nothing can justify a belief, which is not itself a belief. >Beliefs/Davidson. Experience cannot justify beliefs. It is outside the space of concepts. Thus we would fall for the myth (of the given). >Experience, >myth of the given. I 95 DavidsonVsCarnap: Philosophy has made the mistake of assuming that any justification of empirical knowledge must be based on sensory experience. >Sensory impressions, >Perception. I 96 If this is true, epistemology has no need for purely private subjective objects of consciousness. While sensory experience plays a major role in the causal process by which beliefs are connected to the world, it is a mistake to believe that it plays an epistemological role in determining the content of these beliefs. >Causality/Davidson, >Content, >Propositional content, >Objects of thought. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Language Rules | Chisholm | II 68/69 Language rules/Carnap: a) what "square" is true of, is a square, b) what "rectangle" is true of, is a rectangle c) What are "square" is true of, is a rectangle - meaning postulates allow the step c) - Mention/use/Carnap: the expressions are not mentioned in the maning postulate, but only used - "(x) (Fx> Gx)" is a m.post. of S" is a statement about "F" and "G" in S. >Meaning postulates, >Mention, >Use. ChisholmVsCarnap: Tarski: on the left is a necessary condition for the truth of the expression on the right-hand side - that does not refer to language rules, but to non-linguistic entites - no sentence is true only due to the use. Cf. >Truth definition. Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Lexicon | Quine | VI 81 Dictionary/Lexicon/Quine: does not describe objects, but use of words - is not about synonymy of terms - is not about cognitive equivalence of sentences. VII (c) 49 Lexicon/Quine: shows couples of synonymous sequences (no monopoly on meaning). II 65 Lexicon: the lexicographer will often use a so-called "meaning distinction": he will call several partial synonyms, some of which fit into subcontexts, others into others. The contexts must then be kept apart with reference to the topic. II 99 Lexicon: the definition of words in the lexicon is nothing more than a recursive definition of sentence meanings. Russell's examination of incomplete symbols continues and extends to classes. II 139 Lexicon of Predicates: You can define an identity in any theory, even in one without classes and elements. This is the method of exhaustion of the Lexicon of Predicates. Trivial example: Suppose we have only two undefined single-digit predicates. F and G as well as a two-digit predicate H and no constant singular terms or functors, only quantifiers and truth functions. Then we can define "x = y" as Fx bik Fy.Gx bik GY.(z)(Hxz bik Hyz.Hzx bik Hzy) which ensures substitutivity in atomic contexts. Now the entire logic of identity can be derived. The method can be applied to any finite lexicon of undefined predicates and it defines real identity or an afterimage indistinguishable from it every time. Undistinguishable in terms of the corresponding theory. >Predicates/Quine. II 139/140 How will it work if our approach to explain identity by exhaustion of the predicates is generalized? Let us assume a rich lexicon of predicates. Certain predicates will be desired in terms of properties, in particular "has". Others will be superfluous (e.g. property "be pink" or property "divisible by four"). Ryle branded such predications as category confusion. Russell and Carnap the same. QuineVsRyle/QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsRussell: for years I have represented a minority of philosophers who prefer the opposite direction: we can simplify grammar and logic by minimizing our grammatical categories and maximizing their scope instead. II 141/142 Are all cases actually due to "has"? If so, the exhaustion of our encyclopedia would be done in no time at all, which would result in all properties being identical if exactly the same things "have" them. In this case, properties are extensional. We might as well read this "has" as being-contained and call properties classes. But they are classes as multiplicities, not as a unit. Because we declare it "ungrammatical" to present them as elements of other classes. They occur only through their values. However, if there are desired contexts of property variables that are not due to "has", it should be possible to create a list and thus individualize properties. >Properties/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Logic | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 138 Frege/logic/Hintikka: his logic is considered as the theory of complex sentences - Wittgenstein in contrast: easiest parts of the world - eliminate logical constants - They do not represent. >Logical constants, >Representation. I 205 Logic/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: no other author than Wittgenstein has ever had the thought, in the logic it had ultimately no more explanation than what is given to us in experience through the simple objects - all phenomenology is just logic. - HusserlVs - Husserl: possibilities are motivated by background beliefs. --- II 160 Logic/WittgensteinVsFrege: 1. It is rather arbitrary, what we call a sentence - therefore logic means something else in my opinion than in Frege's. 2. VsFrege: All words are equally important - Frege: thesis: "Word", "sentence", "world" are more important. >Sentences, >Words, >World, >Symbols. II 238 Logic/arbitrary/Wittgenstein: the rules of logic are insofar arbitrary that they can be eliminated for greater expressiveness - E.g. sentence of the excluded third (SaD) is invalid - at least "contradiction" is used in different meanings - as well as double negation -. Some authors: "the application is different." WittgensteinVs: one cannot talk independently of a sign from its use. - ((S) Then it is another sign - against see below. >Signs, >Use. II 328 The sentence of the excluded third is universal. II 327 Logic/Wittgenstein: it is not a science, but a calculus - in it you can make inventions, but no discoveries. II 333 Logic/WittgensteinVsCarnap: one cannot construct a logic for all cases - because one cannot abstract both applications from the application. --- VI 85 Logic/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Schulte: not we express with the signs what we want - but in the logic the nature of the nature-necessary sign states itself - (6,124). VI 89 Logic/border/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the logic is not given a limit through the use of the language, of course - it is, so to speak, the common framework of "my" and "your" language. VI 118 Logic/Wittgenstein: say/show: logic says nothing, it shows something about necessity - grammatical sentences (about the language) thus fall out of the language game -> training: no speakable rules but blind following. TrainingVsExplanation, instead: Description - (> tell/show: Explanation/Wittgenstein). --- IV 101 Logic/Tractatus: (6.1264) each sentence of logic is a, in characters expressed, modus ponens - (And this cannot be expressed by one sentence). - (> Show/tell: > Ostension/Wittgenstein). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Logical Possibility | Field | I 86 Logical possible/possibility/diamond/KripkeVsField: "it is possible that" is not a logical truth. - FieldVsKripke: yes it is, this is due to Kripke's model-theoretical definition. - It should not be read "mathematically" or "metaphysically possible". I 87 E.g. Carnap: "He is a bachelor and married": is logically wrong. - (> meaning postulates). - FieldVsCarnap: Meaning relations between predicates should not belong to logic. - Then the sentence is logically consistent. Consistency operator/Field: MEx (x is red & x is round) - should not only be true, but logical. - ((s) Even without meaning postulates.) ((s)Meaning postulate: this is about the extent of the logic.) I 118 Logical possible/FieldVsKripke: "It is possible that there is an electron": is true in all models, therefore logically true. (> Logical possibility is itself logically true). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Logical Truth | Quine | X 87 Logical Truth/Quine: is always in relation to a particular language, because grammatical structure (is not transcendent). - Because the same language (i.e. set of sentences) can be generated by different formation rules or encyclopedia - dependency on language and its grammar. X 88 Identity/logical truth/structure/Quine: Identity puts structural conception of the logical truth (as structural property of schemes) in question, because they become wrong if one inserts a different predicate instead of = (in logical truth each predicate must be replaceable by another). X 90 Identity/logical truth/structure/definition/Quine: if = is not simply interpreted as a predicate in the lexicon of the object language, but only as an abbreviation for compound sentences like (3), then the laws of identity are nothing but abbreviations of logical truths of the quantifier logic. Then the structural conception of the logical truth is saved. X 109 Logical truth/attitudes/propositional attitude/Quine: if we had schemes with them, we could not decide which of them are valid. - Laws for attitudes should not be logical laws, because propositional attitudes are too content rich. X 109 Logical Truth/modality/modal logic/Quine: the modalities leave more room here than the attitudes: we can get schemes here that are valid: E.g. ~(~ p necc. p) - Also, we receive from any valid scheme another one by prefixing of necessary E.g. necc. (p or ~p) from p or ~p. X 127 Logical truth/Carnap: Thesis: are purely linguistical, because they are true in every replacement from the lexicon. >Lexicon/Quine. X 127ff Logic/language/reality/QuineVsCarnap: logical truth is not purely linguistic, because evidence is as important as the translation. - E.g. expression of "it is raining" when it rains. - But no logical consequences from circumstances, because true sentences follow from any sentence. - All evident things are inseparable from the translation. - Semantic ascent seems to speak for the language of logic. - Vs: the truth predicate shows the separation from the language. - Quine: the logic is based on the world and not on the language. I 133 Yet: pro Carnap: we learn the logic by learning the language. - But that’s not different from everyday knowledge. >Logic/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Meaning | Putnam | I (a) 16 Meaning/Putnam: meaning is not in the head. Proof: the linguistic division of labor shows that I am not the only one who has the criteria ((s) at least I am willing to learn from others). PutnamVsTarski: understanding of the reference must be added. This must be independent of recognition (realistic position). >Reference/Putnam. I (g) 49 Meaning/theory/PutnamVsCarnap/VsPositivismus: the theory does not determine the meaning. Otherwise the term gravity would change if a 10th Planet was discovered. Positivists also require, that the theory is dependent of all additional assumptions, otherwise the schema theory and prediction would collapse. >Theory, >Additional assumptions, >Prediction. I (e) 141ff Meaning/Putnam: meaning results from the deletion of quotes. >Disquotation. I (k) 258 Term Transformation/change of meaning/significance/Putnam: e.g. if aliens had replaced all the stars of the Big Dipper through giant light bulbs, we would say : "that is not really a star" but not "this is not really the Big Dipper". >Meaning change. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Meaning Postulates | Chisholm | II 69ff Meaning postulates/analytically/ChisholmVsCarnap: it is not secure, that the fixing of ""square" means square" is not merely ad hoc and arbitrary. >Arbitrariness, >Language, >Language rules, >Use, >Meaning, >Reference, >Analyticity. Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Meaning Postulates | Cresswell | I 30 KatzVsCarnap/KatzVsMeaning postulates/NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsMeaning postulates. --- II 163 Meaning Postulates/Definition/Entailment/inconsistency/Cresswell: Meaning postulates are needed to define terms such as entailment and inconsistency. >Entailment, >Contradictions, >Definitions, >Definability. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Meaning Postulates | Katz | Cresswell I 30 Group: KatzVsCarnap/KatzVsMeaning Postulates/NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsMeaning Postulates. >Meaning, >Language rules, >Semantics, >Meaning postulates/Nagel. |
Katz I Jerrold J. Katz "The philosophical relevance of linguistic theory" aus The Linguistic Turn, Richard Rorty Chicago 1967 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974 Katz II Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz III Jerrold J. Katz Jerry Fodor The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Katz V J. J. Katz The Metaphysics of Meaning Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Metaphysical Possibility | Field | I 86 Logically possible/possibility/diamond/KripkeVsField: "it is possible that" is not a logical truth. FieldVsKripke: that is only due to Kripke's model-theoretical definition. - It should not be seen as "mathematically" or "metaphysically possible". >Possibility. I 87 E.g. Carnap: "He is a bachelor and married": is logically wrong. >Meaning postulates. FieldVsCarnap: Meaning relations between predicates should not belong to logic. - Then the sentence is logically consistent. >Predicates, >Predication. Consistency operator/Field: MEx (x is red & x is round) should not only be true, but logically true. ((s) Even without meaning postulates.) (Meaning postulate/(s): this is about the scope of logic.) |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Modalities | Church | Quine VII 153 Modality/Modal Logic/Ontology/Church: (1943)(1) Proposal: the quantified variables should be limited to intensional values. >Intensions, >Intensionality, cf. >Extension, >Extensionality. Carnap: took this in extreme form for his entire system. He himself presented this as a complicated double interpretation of his variables. QuineVsChurch, QuineVsCarnap: see above. Proposition/Church: (late): complex names of certain intensional objects. >Propositions. Intensional Logic/Church: later: instead of a necessity generator (related to whole sentences): New: Necessity predicate: which is related to complex names of certain intensional objects, called "propositions". >Intensional logic, >Operators, >Necessity operator. VII 154 In these propositions, the constants and variables of the corresponding propositions no longer appear (otherwise circular). >Names of sentences, >Circular reasoning, >Levels, >Constants, >Variables. This reflects the interplay between events inside and outside the modal contexts. Church did not call this modal logic, nor should we. Cf. >Modal Logic. Modal logic in the narrower sense has to do with the modal operator in relation to whole sentences. >Modal operators. 1. Church, Alonzo. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 8, no. 1, 1943, pp. 31–32. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2267985. Accessed 18 Nov. 2022. |
Chur I A. Church The Calculi of Lambda Conversion. (Am-6)(Annals of Mathematics Studies) Princeton 1985 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Natural Laws | Schurz | I 93 Natural Law/Schurz: Strict spatiotemporally unrestricted all propositions are candidates for natural laws. If they were true, they would express real laws of nature. They are called law-like. I 94 Law-like/Schurz: Spatiotemporally unrestricted Ex All bodies attract each other. Bsp All living beings must die once. Spatiotemporally limited: Bsp Mammals in polar regions have a rounder shape compared to conspecifics in warmer regions (Germann's law). Scientificity/Schurz: depends here on the size of the area. Allsatz/Schurz: In order to avoid gradual differences, one spoke of fundamental and derived Allsätze Def Fundamental All Theorem/Carnap/Hempel: contains no individual constants and no spatiotemporal restrictions. >Individual constants. Def Derived All Theorem/Carnap/Hempel: a derived all theorem can be derived from background knowledge from other all theorems together with singular initial conditions. >Initial conditions. I 95 Ernest NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsHempel: According to this, also an accidental all theorem can be a derived law: Ex "All screws on Smith's car are rusty". Solution/E. Nagel: Only fundamental all propositions can be laws. Hempel: conceded that, thus law-likeness remains gradual! Law-like/statistics/Schurz: also here there is law-likeness: Ex 50 % of all caesium 137 atoms have decayed after 30 years. Example 80 % of all lung cancer patients were heavy smokers. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Naturalized Epistemology | Stroud | I 209 Skepticism/naturalized epistemology/Stroud: Skepticism gets more inevitable, the more we take the external (distanced) position and look at evidence. >Epistemology, >Empiricism, >Evidence. There is no independent information about the world - E.g. room with monitors. Cf. >Colour researcher Mary. Brains in a vat/Descartes/Kant: such a distinction between sensory experience and other knowledge would cut us off from the world. >Brains in a vat. I 211 QuineVs: only applies to the traditional epistemology theory. Solution: we must only avoid a "distanced" position. Cf. >Naturalism, >Naturalized Epistemology. QuineVsKant: so works the examination of general human knowledge. >Knowlede/Kant. I 211 Naturalized epistemology/QuineVsCarnap/Stroud: denies the need for an external position - thus avoided interior/exterior problem. >Interior/exterior. I 214 QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge. >a priori, >a priori/Quine. I 250 Naturalized epistemology/knowledge/underdetermination/skepticism/ StroudVsQuine: naturalized epistemology: must explain: how distant events cause closer events? - How is our exuberant belief caused? But that would not explain them - (how the "gap" between data and knowledge is bridged.) >"Meager input"/Quine. Stroud: because it makes no sense to say that here there is a gap in a causal chain. - Then you cannot speak of underdetermination - that an event "underdetermines" another. -((s), there is no reason that would not be sufficient.) >Underdetermination/Quine. Underdetermination/Quine: E.g. truths about molecules are underdetermined by truths about everyday things. Gap/Stroud: Quine has to do with a gap, because he talkes about information ((s) content), not about mere events. >Knowledge/Quine. I 251 Input/Stroud: the individual input is not small - ((s) only as a mass term) - not small when it is conceived as an event - so we cannot speak of indeterminacy as events. >Indeterminacy, >Events. StroudVsQuine: Problem: if the input is too small, the transition to the over flowing output requires consciousness. >Consciousness. I 253 Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/StroudVsQuine: we cannot see all our beliefs as "projections". And we must not accept epistemic priority ((s) that sensations are closer to us than the external objects). >Beliefs, >Knowledge, >World/thinking, >Perception, >Evidence, >W.V.O. Quine. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Necessity | Carnap | Wessel I 345 Def factually necessary/Carnap: is a statement (i.e. "causally true") if and only if it follows logically from the class of all basic laws. I.e. no single event is necessary when it is isolated. Def Basic Law/Carnap: Claims that have the logical form of legal statements and are true. Basic Laws/ReichenbachVsCarnap: ditto, but the truth must also be ascertainable. >Laws, >Natural laws, >Truth, >Judgments. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Objects (Material Things) | Quine | III 270 Item/Thing/Object/Quine: is the sum of the simultaneous instantaneous states of distributed atoms or other small physical particles in space at any given moment. And over time it is the sum of its successive momentary states. QuineVsHeraclit: we can climb into the same river twice. What we cannot do is go twice to the same time stage of the river. (At least not if this part is shorter than the time we need to get in.) III 271 Change/Quine/(s): depends on the choice of time periods to be compared. XI 150 Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: accepting things only means choosing a certain language. It is not believing in those things. XI 151 CarnapVsQuine: its existence criterion (to be the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in that it only expresses a language choice. QuineVsCarnap: Language and theory cannot be separated in this way. Science is the continuation of our daily practice. >Language/Quine. VII (a) 18 Objects/Quine: their existence is postulated in order to simplify access to the stream of experience. >Experience/Quine. VII (d) 66f Objects/Particulars/Thing/Hume: the idea of physical objects arises from an error of identification. Every moment we really invent a new object! QuineVsHume: we do not need to share that. IX 35 Object/Class/Quine: every thing for us is a class, after we declared individuals in Chapter 4 to be their own elements, it follows that every class is a class of classes, and that every thing is in a class of classes. Benefit: wherever a free variable has a meaning, a set abstraction makes sense. Therefore, we can henceforth use Greek letters instead of variables in the free places. >Classes/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Other Minds | Carnap | VI 186 Other minds/attribution/behaviorism/Carnap: 1st the attribution of behavior happens in relation to the body, it is not attributed to the soul 2nd the ascribed mental states are intrinsical! Not experiences of others. The whole series of experiences of other people consists in nothing more than a rearrangement of my experiences and their components. >Experience. VI 187 There is no other mind without a body. VI 70/71 Characteristics/definition/constitution/Carnap: Problem: e.g.other minds: the behavior is not the same as the other mind itself. Realism: the angry behavior is not the anger itself. >Description levels. Solution/Carnap: but one can transform all scientific (not metaphysical) statements about F into statements about K while retaining the logical value (truth value). Then F and K are logically identical. VI 72 A meaning for K that did not agree with F could not be given scientifically! (many authors VsCarnap). Carnap: this has to do with Leibniz's identity. VI 78/79 Other minds/Carnap: every psychic process, if it occurs as foreign psychic, is in principle recognizable (by behavior) or can be asked). Thus each statement can be transformed into a statement about the corresponding characteristics. It follows from this that all psychological objects can be traced back to physical objects (movements of expression, behaviour). VI 192 Intersubjectivity/Other minds/ascription/Carnap: through the statements of the other I not only learn the facts of the case, but also that it is known to the other. VI 193 Constitution: at no stage does something new enter the system through the information (behavior) of the other. There is only a rearrangement of the given elements. ((s) Otherwise the behaviour would be incomprehensible.) VI 194 The whole attribution never leaves the psychic basis. The constitutional system of the other branches off at a high level. >Constitution system. VI 194 Other Mindes/world/attribution/Carnap: between my world and the world of the other exists a certain analogy, his constitutional system is only a part of my own! ((s) Because I can only attribute my own experiences.) >Self-attribution/Chisholm. VI 233 Other minds/Carnap: the foreign psychic is ascribed to the other as his own psychic. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Positivism | Goethe | Carnap VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Color theory): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. >Empiricism, >Theory of Colors. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (in the perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all. >Perception, >Sensory impressions, >Seeing, >Laws of nature. But these laws are of much more complicated form. Carnap VI 180 Physical world/CarnapVsGoethe: to be distinguished from the world of perception. Mere quadruples of numbers to which state variables are ascribed. VI 181 Only it is accessible to intersubjectivity, not the world of perception. >Nature, >World, >World/Thinking. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Positivism | Popper | I 116f Positivism/Popper: understands the problem of demarcation naturalistic, as fixed border - positivist radicalism: the laws of nature are not traceable to elementary experience sets. >Demarcation. I 117 Wittgenstein: after his criterion of meaning the laws of nature are meaningless, that means no legitimate sentences. PopperVsCarnap: failure to dismiss metaphysics through reviews. Instead, Popper: it has a heuristic value. (E.g. Speculative atomism). >Metaphysics. I 127 Log records/Popper: no preferred position. They appear in science only as psychological statements. >Protocol sentence. PopperVsPositivismus: positivism does not wish that there should still be meaningful problems except the problems of "positive" empirical science. He wants to see the so-called philosophical problems as pseudo-problems. That will be always feasible. There is nothing easier to uncover a problem as a pseudo-problem. One only needs to take the concept of "meaning" narrow enough. >Sense. --- Flor II 473 PopperVsLogical positivism: Science as a process emphasized more than the characterization of formal traits at theories that are regarded as scientific products. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Positivism | Putnam | I (a) 41 PutnamVsPopper/PutnamVsMach: VsPositivismus: positivism is idealistic and does not correspond to reality. I (a) 44 PutnamVsPositivismus: according to positivism truth is not trans-theoretical. It is only a trans-theoretical concept and "leads to successful prediction" >Prediction. Putnam: instead: realism must adhere to the logic of truth transfers. >Realism. I (a) 45 From the fact that two theories lead to successful predictions, it does not follow, that their conjunction leads to that. Reason: the predicate, which plays the role of truth ("leads to prediction") does not have the characteristics of truth. I (a) 49 Meaning/theory/PutnamVsCarnap/VsPositivism: the theory does not determine the significance. Otherwise the concept of gravity would change if a 10th planet would be discovered. Also, the positivists demand that the theory is dependent on all additional assumptions, otherwise the scheme of theory and prediction would collapse. I (h) 215 Truth/positivism: which degree of confirmation one accepts, is ultimately conventional and a question of purpose. Putnam: that is relativism. Relativism has no answer to the enemy that says, "in my system P is not rational". >Rationality/Putnam. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Possibility | Field | I 86 Logically possible/possibility/diamond/KripkeVsField: "it is possible that" is not a logical truth. FieldVsKripke: yes it is, this is only due to Kripke's model-theoretical definition. - It should not be read "mathematically" or "metaphysically possible". >Logical truth, >Metaphysical possibility. --- I 87 E.g. Carnap: "He is bachelor and married": is logically wrong. >Meaning postulates. FieldVsCarnap: Meaning relations between predicates should not count to logic. - Then the sentence is logically consistent. Consistency operator/Field: MEx (x is red & x is round) should not only be true, but logically true. - ((s) Also without meaning postulates.) ((s) Meaning postulate/(s): here it is about the extent of the logic.) --- I 203 Geometric Possibility/Field: instead of logical possibility: there are different geometries. >Geometry. Precondition: there are empirical axioms which differentiate the possibility from impossibility. However, the existential quantifier must be within the range of the modal operator. >Existential quantification, >Modal operator, >Scope. --- I 218 Problem of Quantities/mathematical entities/me/Field: For example, it is possible that the distance between x and y is twice as long as the one between x and w, even if the actual distance is more than twice as long. Problem: extensional adequacy does not guarantee that the defined expression is true in every non-actual situation - that is, that we must either presuppose the substantivalism or the heavy duty Platonism. That is what we do in practice. I 192 Heavy Duty Platonism/Field: assumes size relationships between objects and numbers. >Substantivalism. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Predicates | Goodman | I 127 Predicate/denotation/Goodman: names and certain images denote singular. Predicates and certain other images denote in general (for example, images in a bird book.) >Denotation, >Singular terms, >General terms. --- II I (preface Putnam) Goodman/Putnam: not all predicates are equally projectable. >Grueness, >Induction. II IV Preface No predicate is disjunctive by itself or non-disjunctive (VsCarnap). >Disjunctive predicates. II IV Nevertheless, according to Carnap both "length" and "length squared" are qualitative. This selection of predicates that should be fundamental or not fundamental is too arbitrary. II V More radical solution: proposed by Wesley Salmon: to allow for inductive logic only ostensively defined basic predicates. To distinguish normal from pathological predicates. PutnamVs: unmotivated and too strict: E.g. we call a bacillus S-shaped when it looks like that under a microscope. Then the concept is not based on observation, but it is totally projectable II IV Grue/Goodman: if we take the familiar color predicates, "grue" is a disjunctive predicate. If we take, however, the unusual predicates grue and bleen as basic expressions then grue can be defined as green and observed before the point of time t or as bleen and not observed before t. >Grueness. II 61 Misleading is, to regard the issue of disposition as the one of explanation of hidden properties. I do not want to say that there is some object like the property combustible or the property "burning". It is, after all, predicates that produce relations. >Properties, >Dispositions. II 64 A predicate such as "flexible" can be regarded as an extension or continuation of a predicate like "biggt". The problem is to define these continuations only with manifest predicates. When are two objects much of the same kind? The fact that they both belong to any class, is not enough. Because: any pair of objects belongs to any class. And that both should belong exactly to the same class would be a demand too great, because two objects never belong to exactly the same class. II 74 Continuation/predicates: statement: "time-space is red": two continuations: it continues the two predicates "red" and "time-space" on p + t. Variant: real time-space p1 + t1, head rotation, other color: the predicate "U-blue possible" only continues the predicate "blue" on a wider range of real objects. II 77 One can move fictitious mountains to London in true statements, simply by applying on London a certain continuation of the predicate "mountainous". II 78 Statements about what is possible do not need to exceed the boundaries of the real world. We often confuse a description of the real world with the real world itself. II 79 The possible objects and predicates disappear. Predicates refer to reality, but have extensions that are related in a very specific way with the extensions of certain manifest predicates and usually go further. The problem of the continuation of "burning" to "combustible" is akin to the problem of induction. II 121 "Green" and "grue" seem to be completely symmetrical to each other (in terms of continuation), but "green" is much better anchored. >Grueness, >Projectability. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Proofs | Quine | XII 90 View/proof/expression/QuineVsCarnap: that a sentence can be expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms, does not mean that it could be proved alone with set-theoretical and logical means - (s) means of expressions are not evidence - (> exterior/interior; > circularity). VII (e) 100 Proof/Quine: any proof of consistency is relative to a system! So we cannot have greater confidence in "consistency" than in the consistency of a logical system in which the proof of consistency is performed. >Consistency/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Properties | Quine | Rorty VI 151 Major Property/holism/Quine/Rorty: at best: "property, which is necessary for the use of a certain description" - but not: "property, which is necessary for the identity of an object with itself." Quine I 43 Features: independent existence is pointless. >Existence/Quine I 218 Mass Term/Quine: is archaic(> (> E. Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, Berlin 1923-1929))) - Properties: a) Is commonality decisive? b) Is it about cattered clumps? I 217 Features: are usually merely convenient abbreviations for long cross-references - Quine/Cassirer: features of archaic remains. I 219 Not all abstract objects are properties: numbers, classes, functions, geometric figures, ideas, possibilities - give up or trace back to abstract objects - one can faithfully distinguished concrete objects by use of "-ness". >Object/Quine I 322 Property abstraction (elimination) instead of "a = x(..x..)" - new: irreducible two-digit operator "0": "a0x(..x..)" - variables remain as the only ones - primacy of the pronoun. >Variables/Quine I 344/45 Properties/Quine: there are no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic) - there are only more or less important properties. I 344 Properties/relations: meaning of timeless open sentences - is unidentifiable (How-propositions). I 361 Elimination of relations and properties in favor of classes of ordered pairs, open sentences, general terms - even scattered objects (in the case of color) (46). I 412 QuineVsProperties: fallacy of subtraction: to derive existence from "about" and "deals with" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but no additional features. "Round" and "dog" are general terms for objects not singular terms for properties or classes. The same argument would be for classes instead of properties: general term symbolizes its extension as well as its intension. >General Term/Quine I 412 Properties: not every general term is necessarily about properties or classes - properties and classes are acceptable as values of variables. I 464 QuineVsRussell/Whitehead: theory of incomplete symbols: eliminated classes only in favor of properties. II 129f Properties: are hard to individuate - not to define like classes by the same elements - various properties can get to the same things. Properties: "Zettsky" (like Russell): properties are identical when they were members of the same classes - QuineVs - solution: property is identical if two sentences ↔ (follow seperately) - unsatisfactory, less analyticity and necessity-operator. Properties/Quine: identical when coextensive-classes: are not specified by elements, but by condition of containment (open sentence). Property is not the same as predicate - property: open sentences - propositions: completed sentences. Properties are not the same as classes: since no individuation principle for properties - solution "last classes" (do not belong to any other class, only have elements themselves) - like Russell: statement function only comes through their values - properties = last classes or properties = statement function. >Classes/Quine Properties as last classes are every element of the zero class, therefore all identical? - Vs: this identity definition only applies to theories that allow no objects who belong to no class (Unicorn). Properties/identity: (here) are interchangeability in all contexts - Prerequisite: exhaustion of a finite lexicon by interchangeability of atomic contexts - RyleVs: Category confusion. Properties: QuineVsCarnap/Russell: minimize grammatical categories, expand scope - if all can be attributed to "has", then all properties are extensional - rest could be listed by list. Properties: contexts with "has" unproblematic - "contained in" prohibited (less classes) - "is" leads to circular definition of properties - properties do not count. "Nap had all properties but one": is prohibited. - however: "all properties" allowed. II 144 f De re: E.g. spy should be an essential property (wrong) - no belief is de re (essential property). Modal Logic/Quine: the entire modal logic is context-dependent - what role does someone or something play? - Same level as essential properties. Necessity/Quine: the whole concept is only meaningful in context. Property Einstein/Quine: are preserved. - But not de re. >de re/Quine X 95 Properties/Quine: do not exist for lack of distinctness (only amounts) - "synonymy unclear" - open sentences that apply to the same objects never determine different amounts, but differnt properties could underlie. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Propositions | Tugendhat | III 215 Proposition/Carnap: judgment, its meaning should also contain the "real state" - Then this will be extended to sentences. >Judgments, >Sentences, >Assertions, >Meaning. Tugendhat: thus, the domain of semantics is exceeded, because the truth of the proposition in contrast to the truth of the sentence is not a semantic determination (not relative to a system of signs) but an "absolute" determination. >Semantics. TugendhatVsCarnap "real" state meaningless if pragmatics is excluded. >Reality, >"real"/Austin, >Pragmatics. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Protocol Sentences | Hempel | I 99 ~ Protocol Sentences/Hempel: compared to protocol sentences even singular assertions have the character of hypotheses. >Hypotheses. I 100 It follows: CarnapVsTractatus: the truth/falsity of all statements can no longer be defined by reference to the truth of certain basic statements (because they are indeed hypotheses). The significance criterion is too narrow. Then also protocol sentences are no longer unassailable. >Significance. I 102 Schlick: protocol sentences are not completely without basic sentences, otherwise they lead to relativism. >Relativism. I 104 SchlickVsCarnap/VsNeurath: the thesis that a statement is true if it is proven by protocol sentences sufficiently leads to absurd results, if the idea is absolutely true, protocol sentences are declined. There are obviously many different systems of protocol sentences - according to Carnap and Neurath each of these different, incompatible systems were true. I 105 Carnap: we learn through conditioning how to bring forth true protocol sentences, e.g. how to properly read meters, etc. I 106 In the new form of Carnap's theory, protocol sentences are even more radically stripped off their base character: they lose their irrefutability. Popper: statements of all forms may occur as protocol sentences. I 107 In the end they are superfluous. Cf. >Observation sentences, >Observation language. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
| Proxy | Geach | I 199f Variable/description/proxy/GeachVsCarnap: in his rules for descriptions E.g. "" ____ (ix) (.. x ..) ____ "etc. the strokes do not act, as Carnap believes as vacancies (proxy) but as variables. >Descriptions/Carnap. Variables/Carnap/Geach: Carnap thinks, if he renames them, he could prevent his problems with variables. I 224 "stand for"/Geach: there is no difference whether I say, a predicate "stands for" a proposition or was its name. >Name/Geach, >Naming, >Reference, >Meaning, >Variables. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Quantifiers | Geach | I 199, 200 Quantifier/GeachVsCarnap: all quantifiers contain variables. >Quantification, >Quantifiers, >Variables, >Variables/Geach. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Quine | Fodor | IV 37 Holism/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine represents a meaning holism (MH) but supposedly also a confirmation holism (CH) which equals the >Quine-Duhem Thesis. (>Two Dogmas: phrases do not stand individually before the tribunal). IV 39f PragmatismVsRealism/QuineVsReductionism: verification conditions are not analytically included in statements. Confirmation Holism/Fodor/Lepore: confirmation holism does not have to be a pragmatist, it can also be a realist. This is compatible with the Quine-Duhem thesis (i.e. that sentences are not individually verifiable). Confirmation is not a linguistic matter, but the way the world is (Quine pro realism). Quine: this is a priori equivalent to semantics. Quine pro verificationism: sentence meaning: is a method of verification. Quine-Duhem thesis: is highly consistent with realism. Quine-Duhem thesis: a) any statement can be maintained if appropriate auxiliary hypotheses are provided, b) the requirement that evidence must be a posteriori. Quine-Duhem thesis/Fodor/Lepore: the Quine-Duhem thesis can also be read as: a) QuineVsCarnap: Vs localism of confirmation or b) QuineVsCarnap: Vs localism of meaning. IV 2189 Network/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: the only fixed nodes are the observational concepts. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Radical Interpretation | Carnap | VII 146 Radical Interpretation/RI/Translation/Field Linguist/Carnap: Key point: first it is discovered that certain objects are designated by a given word (extension), then the intension is discovered (what natives understand by it). Extension before intension - order. 1) positive E.: attribute 2) negative E. (deny) 3) indefinite cases. It is still possible to attribute different intensions to the thus extensionally fixed predicates! Because there can be different properties, for which the extension of the predicate has been determined. ((s) Ex (s) if all considered dogs are brown, it is not clear whether the color or the animals were singled out. - Furthermore, "gloeb" could refer to four-footedness thus covering the entire extension. ChisholmVsCarnap: this does not take into account while any mistakes of the speaker or uncertainty.) >Reference, >Unambiguity, >Identification, >Individuation, >Properties, >Extension, >Intension. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Rational Reconstruction | Quine | XII 91 Definition Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: is a construction of physicalist statements of observation, of logical and set-theoretic terms. - QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions, and each would seem equally satisfactory, if it was only shown that the physicalist statements are true. Rational reconstruction was to show that all other scientific concepts are superfluous. Vs: Problem: assignment of sense qualities to space-time points does not work. Carnap later: only reduction sentences instead of context definition. XII 94 Vs: the rational reconstruction would have to provide whole theories instead of translated sentences or translated terms. XII 99 Rational Reconstruction/Naturalized Epistemology/Quine: the rational reconstruction survives by giving clues to psychological processes as an imaginative construction. New: that we can make free use of empirical psychology. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Reality | Quine | I 81 Stimulus meaning: is objective reality, needed by the linguist - Translation, not identity but approach to stimulus meaning. >Stimulus Meaning/Quine. XII 89 Reality/World/Russell/Quine: Russell's program was to present the outside world as a logical construct of sense data. Carnap's "construction" came closest to this. Epistemology/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements and statements about the future are uncertain if they are understood to be about sense data or sensory impressions) is still unsolved today. Carnap/Quine: his constructions would have made it possible to translate all sentences about the world into sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. >Sense Data/Quine. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observation terms does not mean that it can be proven with logical and set-theoretical means from observation sentences. >Observation Sentences/Quine ((s) Means of expression are not evidence. (> inside/outside, description levels, circularity). Epistemology/Quine: N.B.: to want to endow the truths about nature with the full authority of immediate experience is just as doomed to failure as the return of the truths of mathematics to the potential insight of elementary logic. See also >Theory of >Cognition, >Empiricism. VI 17 Theory/Reality/World/Quine: in philosophical theory we set demarcation lines where no really sharp boundaries can be drawn in practice. It still depends on whether a theory such as "All ravens are black" would actually be refuted by a white raven, that depends on how we would decide in view of the vague stimulus meaning of the word. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Reductionism | Quine | Quine VII (b) 40 Reductionism/QuineVsCarnap: his space time quadrupel set preuppose a sedentary world - the quadruples still increase the set of the general properties. Refined form of reductionism: any incident either increases the probability (likelihood) of a statement or deminishes it. Schiffer I 2 QuineVsReductionism: the semantic cannot be reduced to more fundamental facts because of the indeterminacy of translation - so he saw the whole semantics skeptical. Quine IV 412 Def Reductionism (radical form): according to him, every single meaningful expression can be translated into an expression of immediate experience. QuineVsReductionism: radical form: erroneous translatability of individual observations into individual expressions. >HolismVs. >Holism. Weaker form: still the idea: each (synthetic) statement is clearly assigned a certain range of sensory irritations. (False). Vs:Reactions to sensory stimuli are not rigid in humans. (>"Super Spartan"/Putnam). Two dogmas: 1. Reductionism 2. Differentiation analytic/synthetic. VII (b) 39 Radical Reductionism/Quine: 1. Example: Carnap's translation into sense data language plus logical notation plus higher set theory. Empiricism/Quine: is often wasteful in its ontology. Carnap: was the first empiricist to consistently reduce. VII (b) 40 But his work is still just a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presuppose a world with little movement ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement, should be the guideline for the construction of a world from experience. QuineVsCarnap: did not appear to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain general characteristics (over all features) and with increasing experience the truth values are revised in the same sense. But this does not help to see how a statement of the form "property q is at x,y,z,t" could ever be translated into Carnap's original sense data language and logic. Problem: the "is on" remains an undefined connection. The canon shows us how to use it, but not how to eliminate it! Carnap later recognized this and no longer used it. Reductionism/Dogma/Quine: 2. more refined form: each utterance is associated with a uniform range of possible sensations, so that each occurrence increases either the likelihood of the truth of the statement. VII (b) 41 or diminishes it. This is of course included in the verification theory. Quine Thesis: (comes from Carnap's "structure"): our statements stand before the tribunal of experience not individually, but as a whole corpus. >Quine-Duhem thesis. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Rylean Ancestors | Sellars | I 81ff Def Rylean ancestors/Sellars: language community with a primitive language, vocabulary for public properties of public objects, conjunction, disjunction, negation and quantification and especially the subjunctive conditional. Moreover, there is vagueness and openness. Intersubjectivity/SellarsVs: thesis: that an intersubjective language must be a Rylean language. >Intersubjectivity. Carnap: the resources for an intersubjective language can be known from the formal logic. SellarsVsCarnap. Sellars pro Ryle: thoughts are a short form for hypothetical and mixed categorical-hypothetical statements about behavior. >Terminology/Ryle. I 93 Def Rylean Language/Sellars: a behaviorist language that is limited to the non-theoretical vocabulary of a behaviorist psychology. - (s) So nothing unobservable). >Behaviorism. I 105f Rylean Language/Rylean ancestors/Sellars: actual declaration, new language - more than just code: conceptual framework of public objects in space and time. - Language of impressions: embodies the discovery that there are such things, but it is not specifically tailored to them. (Individual things have no antecedent objects of thought). Cf. >Thought objects. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Semantic Ascent | Stroud | I 213 Semantic Ascent / Quine: mention instead use - transition from substantive to formal speech. >Mention, >Use, >Formal speech, >Formal language, >Theoretical language. Stroud: It is still about reality and not just about language. - E.g. "Wombat" is true of some organisms. >"true-of", >Satisfaction, >Reality, >External world, >World/thinking, >Language. VsCarnap: these are not "external" questions. >External /internal, >Interior/exterior. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Skepticism | Carnap | Stroud I 170 CarnapVsSkepticism/Sense/Meaningful/Language/Empiricism/Verification/Verificationism/Stroud: Carnap: Thesis: we can only ever understand something or mean something with our expressions if an appropriate sensation is possible for us - if we can determine the truth of the corresponding sentences. - Then we have to determine a sphere within which this is possible. Stroud I 173 Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: but that does not mean that skepticism is wrong. But: E.g. the sentence: "No one will ever know if __." Here the "__" would have to be filled by an expression which can only be meaningless, because unverifiable - Meaningless: neither true nor false - then the question "Are there external things?" would be pointless, because neither true nor false. - Useful, however: internal questions: questions of existence within an area of knowledge. - Within an area of knowledge: the same sentence can be produced - i.e. the syntax is not decisive. - Sense: something that is true cannot contradict something that is meaningless. - CarnapVsSkepticsm: meaningless as a whole, because unverifiable. Stroud I 179 Descartes: has the same explanation for the truth of skepticism as Carnap for its futility: the lack of verifiability of empirical existence statements. >Existence statements. Stroud I 187 CarnapVsSkepticism: the traditional philosophical skepticism (external) is actually a "practical" question about the choice of linguistic frame (reference system) - Knowledge/Carnap: Two components: 1) Experience - 2) Linguistic frame (reference system), within which we understand the experience. Stroud I 188 The only theoretical question is that about the rules of the system. - Mother Tongue/Carnap: we do not choose it - therefore, it reflects no thesis about the existence of the outside world. - Decision: if we continue to use it. - Problem: because it is a decision there are no objective facts that make it. Stroud I 191 Skepticism/Reference System/StroudVsCarnap: introduces a "we" and experience as something that happens to us - The fact that we exist and have experience cannot just be regarded as an "internal" truth of the thing language. >exterior/interior. Stroud I 193ff StroudVsCarnap: either leads to idealism or to metaphysical realism or to skepticism all three of which he rejects - because of the futility of external questions. >External questions. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Statements | Hare | II 133 Statements/tradition/Hare: Hare divides statements into empirical and analytical ones. In addition to that there seems to be nothing else. >Analyticity. Problem: one can easily assume on the basis of a confusion that the proposition, which states that the other proposition is analytically true or false, is itself analytic. But it is at least not obviously true that e.g. the statement "propositions of the form 'p and not p' are analytically false" should be analytically true. Is it not a statement of how the words "and not" are used? And is it not analytically true that they are used in this way and not otherwise? Problem: there is a conflict here between the temptations to call the statement analytically, as well as empirically, as well as neither of both options. Wittgenstein: Wittgenstein calls the discussion "nonsensical." CarnapVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein's behavior is contradictory: instead of being silent, he writes a whole book. II 134 HareVsCarnap: Carnap does not take Wittgenstein's doubts seriously enough. >Wittgenstein, >Carnap. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Stimuli | Quine | I 66/67 Stimulus: here it is about stimuli, not rabbits! - (See also problems in relation to >forgery). - Verification by society. >Gavagai. I 67 Stimulus meaning: preliminary isolation of individual sentences for verification. VsCarnap: Advantage: distinction between the cases of unicorn and goblin is possible without preliminary decision on admissibility. >Stimulus meaning. I 81 Stimulus meaning: objective reality that the linguist needs. - Translation, not identity but approaching stimulus meaning. >Translation. I 120f Consistent sentences: stimulus meaning is more sparse - accordingly: stimulus synonymy less plumable. >VsAnalyticity. I 126 Stimulus synonymy improved by socialization (agreement) - same goes for stimulus analyticity: But now: 2 + 2 = 4 on the same level as "There are black dogs" (>acceptability). I 379 Stimuli are not intensional. I 402 Existence: does not arise from the dichotomy individual thing-universal - it does not matter whether it exists. Equator, North Pole. Linking with stimuli is a weak argument for primacy of physical objects, but makes terms accessible for all positions. --- II 57 QuineVsSensory qualities - people speak and do not think about their stimuli. - It is about stimulus and response. --- V 48f Stimulus/Response/Quine: this (polar) contradiction is mitigated by the notion of perception similarity. V 49 Truth similarity: includes auditory similarity of words. Truth similarity: analysis ignores the different origins - stimulus reaction analysis does not. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Synonymy | Carnap | Quine XII 36 Def Equality of properties/Carnap: (Meaning and Necessity)(1): two propositions ascribe the same property if they not only have the same truth value for each choice of x, but if this is necessarily and analytically the case by virtue of equality of meaning (synonymy). >Attribution, >Truth value. QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsSynonymy: Problem: it is already difficult to be sure in a foreign language (or in the language of the child) what an object should be there. Also: Synonymy/QuineVsCarnap: the concept of synonymy is unclear at all. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Syntax | Carnap | Tugendhat III 207ff Syntax/Carnap: all philosophical problems are part of the syntax. III 209 TugendhatVsCarnap: then sentences cannot be about anything. - They must be phys. facts themselves. III 211 Science/Tugendhat: Basic Concept: >observability. - This is inaccessible for the logical syntax. - The result was >behaviorism, to make the evidence accessible to science that is not accessible to the syntax. >Semantics, >Reference, >Presentation, >Language, >Concepts. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Systems | Feyerabend | Feyerabend I 242 Carnap/Feyerabend: the physicist assumes that the world only contains contradictory theoretical systems. FeyerabendVsCarnap: Now the only way to decide whether a particular property is necessary for science is a functional post-festum investigation. This leads back straight to the story that provides the data for such an investigation. There is no way to judge a particular proposed system. >Decidability, >Theories, >Hypotheses, >Confirmation, >Comparisons, >Data. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Theoretical Terms | Putnam | I (a) 48 Theoretical Terms/PutnamVsPositivism: the theoretical terms do not have different meanings in different theories. The semantic concepts are trans-theoritical. VsCarnap: the purely syntactical positivism cannot express that a formal language is successful when they correspond to a reasonable degree of probability to situations. >Positivism, >Formal language, >Observation language, >Theories. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Theories | Putnam | VI 389 Theory/Putnam: earlier theories are limiting cases of later theories. This is convergence and that explains also why theoretical terms retain their reference. >Convergence, >Theoretical terms, >Reference, >Theory change, >Meaning change. VI 392 Ideal Theory/Putnam: if we can see the fulfillment-relation as unintended, it is useless to say that even the ideal theory "in reality" could be wrong. >Satisfaction, >Satisfiability. --- I (a) 49 Meaning/theory/PutnamVsCarnap/VsPositivism: the theory does not determine the meaning. Otherwise, the term gravity would change if a 10th planet was discovered. In addition, the positivists demand that the theory is dependent on all additional assumptions, otherwise the schema theory and prediction would collapse. I (b) 63 Theory/Putnam: two theories do not have to have equivalent terms, but only the same reference. I (c) 97 Truth/logic/Putnam: the meaning of "true" and the connectives are not determined by their formal logic. -> Holism/Quine: the distinction between the whole theory and meanings of each statement is useless. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Two Dogmas | Esfeld | I 50ff Two Dogmas/QuineVsCarnap: experience cannot confirm individual statements. Science depends on both language and experience but is not traceble in individual sentences (> System). Also, logical truths can be invalidated without the separation analytic/synthetic: confirmation spreads over the whole system. >Language and thought, >World/thinking, >Experiences, >World, >Holism, >Systems, >Analyticity/Quine. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Understanding | Putnam | VI 394 Understanding/truth conditions/Dummett/Putnam: Dummett and I both agree that you cannot treat understanding as knowledge of the truth conditions. >Understanding/Dummett, >Truth conditions. Putnam: a theory of understanding cannot be the whole meaning theory. >Meaning theory. VI 400 But this only works with a verificationistic approach of understanding. Not with a truth conditional approach. Therefore, the use is already explained. >Verificationism, >Verification, >Truth-conditional semantics. --- V 38ff Understanding/Putnam: the phenomena do not constitute understanding, but rather the ability to apply sentences. Understanding is not an event ((s) otherwise it would be lost in the next moment). Putnam: understanding is a skill. Imagination does not help to use sentences correctly. No amount of mental images is constitutive or necessary for understanding. >Imagination. V 175 Truth/understanding/Tarski/Putnam: problem: we do not understand what it means to understand "snow is white". We do not know what standards the other creates for truth. --- I (a) 31 Understanding/PutnamVsCarnap: understanding is not merely knowledge. Also, the right relationship with excellent situations is necessary. (> Causal theory of reference, Causal theory of knowledge). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Variables | Geach | I 198f Variable/description/proxy/GeachVsCarnap: in its rules for descriptions, e.g. ""___ ___ (ix)(...x...)___ ___" etc. the strokes do not function, as Carnap believes as vacancies (substitutes) but as variables! Carnap thinks, however, if he renames them, he avoids his problems with variables. >Variables / >Constants. I 199/200 Variables/Constants/GeachVsCarnap: Carnap does not distinguish between them, as he himself says: E.g. Carnap: "If "Q" is a constant pr (determined or indeterminate), then the sentences (Prague)" (city),"Q(a)" are all equally derivable from "Q(x)". Geach: "determined or undetermined", shows that the alleged "constant pr" is used as a variable. - Solution: "For all "Q" if ..." - but then we have a variable ""Q"" that contains quotes as part of itself. I 201 Free Variables/Strawson: E.g. (A) In "x is a human", "x" is a free variable. - Here, "x" does not occur as a free variable - because "x" is "x is a human" occurs as a free variable, the theorem (A) is true. - If (A) contained a free variable, it would not be a statement, but a propositional function. >Free variable. I 203 Bound variables/use/mention/Geach: in e.g. "x is a human being", "x" is needed, therefore it is a bound variable! (Bound by the quotes) - at the same time the expression is the name of a description, even if it does not denote anything. >Bound variables. >Denotation, >Designation. Names do not denote anything. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Verification | Carnap | Stroud I 196 Probation/Carnap: correspondence between sentence and reality. Verifiability must be mitigated to probation ability. Stroud I 198 Skepticism/Verification Principle/V.P./StroudVsCarnap: does not introduce any distinction that we did not have before. - Whether the verification principle itself is necessary depends on how it is introduced. - But even then it will decide between meaningful and meaningless the way we have been doing so far. - Incorrect Introduction/(s): with the idea to provide something that we already knew before. >Sense, >Senseless, >Confirmation. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Verification | Danto | I 80 DantoVsCarnap: Heidegger s "Das Nichts nichtet" is not unverifiable. We all know it as existential fear. >Nothing/Heidegger, >M. Heidegger, >R. Carnap, >Verification, >Verifiability. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Verification (Confirmation) | Carnap | Nozick II 49 Confirmation/Carnap: is an intrinsic characteristic of the pair E, H (evidence, hypothesis). >Bayesianism. Some authors VsCarnap: the confirmation here also depends on what other predicates there are in the language. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Verification (Confirmation) | Nozick | Nozick II 49 Confirmation/Carnap: is an intrinsic characteristic of the pair E, H. >Evidence, >Hypotheses, >Intrinsicness. Some authors VsCarnap: the confirmation here also depends on what other predicates there are in the language. >Predicates, >Language, >Method, >Measurements, >Explanation. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analyticity | Quine Vs Analyticity | Danto I 239 QuineVsAnalyticity: we do not anticipate at which time we have to change the conditions under which we use a word. There is simply no clue. Lanz in Metz I 272 The lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and science are on one and the same continuum. McDowell I 158 QuineVsFirst Dogma: (distinction analytic/synthetic) against the notion that the truth of a synthetic sentence depended on two things: the meaning and the world. ((s) you cannot have meaning before you have the world). Quine, however, preserves duality: Apparently, the truth depends both on the language and on extra-linguistic facts. McDowell: Quine does not claim that these two factors do not exist, we simply cannot distinguish them sentence by sentence. Quine IV 407 QuineVsAnalyticity: reflects a failed notion of scientific theories and their reference to experience. There is no strict separation analytic/synthetic. "Roots of Reference": if you consistently proceed empirically, you gain an epistemologically harmless notion of analyticity. Analytic/Kant: does not even mention the meaning of concepts in this context! II 407/408 Analytic/Quine: Kant should rather have said that a statement is analytic if it is true because of meanings and regardless of of facts. This explicitly draws a connection between analyticity and meaning. QuineVsAnalyticity: considerable difficulties exist with sentences like: Ex "No bachelor is married", "cats are animals." Obviously, these are not logical truths, their negation would be no formal objection. (IV 410) Ex Quine: "I do not know whether the statement 'Everything green is extended' is analytic or not. This is not because of the ambiguity of "green" and "extended", but because of the ambiguity of "analytical". Artificial languages: semantic rules for determining analyticity are only interesting if we already understand analyticity. False notion: the idea that with the truth of a statement it is generally possible to distinguish between a linguistic and a fact component. The whole difficulty is perhaps only a symptom of a false notion of the relationship between language and the world. V 113 Logic/Frege/Carnap: the laws of logic apply because of language. I.e. its sentences are analytic. QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsFrege/QuineVsCarnap: the concept of meaning has not been given empirical meaning. Thus neither this linguistic theory of logic. Solution/Quine: through our observation of language learning: we learn truth functions by finding connections between dispositions. Alternation/Language Learning: the law that an alternation is implied by each of its components is learned with the word "or" itself. Something similar applies to the other laws. (>logical particles >logical constants). Analyticity/Analytical/Language Learning/Quine: Ex we learn "bachelor" by learning that our parents agreed under precisely the circumstances under which they agreed to "unmarried man". QuineVsAnalyticity: Important Argument: there are even disagreements about logical truths: Ex between classical logicians and intuitionists. Maybe we think that some truths are analytic and others are not? Law of the Excluded Middle/SaD/Language Learning/Quine: the law of the excluded middle rejected by intuitionism is not linked in such a way with learning "or"! It is rather due to the blind spot of alternation. Important Argument: perhaps the law of the excluded middle (Quine "law") which is true only in our point of view should only be seen as synthetic. V 116 Analytic/Analyticity/Quine: the analytic propositions are a subclass of stimulus analytic propositions agreeing to which is a disposition of any speaker of a language community. QuineVsCarnap: but even now we do not have such strict contrast to the synthetic propositions. Solution/Quine: Thesis: sentences that have been learned by many first are closer to analyticity than sentences that have only been learned by a few. The analytic propositions are those which are learned by all like that. These extreme cases, however, do not differ significantly from the neighboring ones. One cannot always specify which ones they are. >Two Dogmas/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Carnap, R. | Ayer Vs Carnap, R. | I 292 AyerVs coherence theory: there are many competing systems, whose acceptance depends on culture of scientists. VsCarnap: he hoped that only one of these systems would be accepted. But this means already to exceed the limits of the coherence theory. |
Ayer I Alfred J. Ayer "Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ayer II Alfred Jules Ayer Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936 In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Ayer III Alfred Jules Ayer "The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Carnap, R. | Carnap Vs Carnap, R. | VI VII Extensionality thesis/Carnap: (1928): all statements are extensional. Self-criticism CarnapVsCarnap: (1961) is not correct in this form. New: weaker form: not every extensional statement is translatable into a logically equivalent statement in an extensional language. Extensional method/Carnap: is basically just to use an extensional language for the whole constitutional system. Self-criticism: (1961) that is not clear: the impression could arise that for the validity of the re-construction of the concept A through a term B it was already sufficient for that B to have the same scope as A. Vs: in reality, the stronger condition must be satisfied that scope equality is not just a coincidence, but a necessity! (Because of logical rules or laws of nature). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Carnap, R. | Danto Vs Carnap, R. | Danto I 80f CarnapVsHeidegger: denied that a sentence like "Das Nichts nichtet" was verifiable. DantoVsCarnap: we all know a feeling of anxiety . Why should it be less empirical than seeing a table. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Carnap, R. | Davidson Vs Carnap, R. | I (e) 96 DavidsonVsCarnap: In philosophy, one has made the mistake to assume that any justification of empirical knowledge must go back to sensory experience. If so, the theory of knowledge has no need for purely private subjective objects of consciousness. >Epistemology/Carnap, >sensations/Carnap, >empiricism/Carnap. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Carnap, R. | Feyerabend Vs Carnap, R. | I 242 Carnap: the physicist assumes that the world contains only consistent theoretical systems. FeyerabendVsCarnap: the only way to decide if a particular property for science is necessary is to examine a functional postfestum. This leads straight back to the story, which provides the data for such an investigation. Then we have no way to assess a particular proposed system. I 362 Carnap: guiding principle: new and abstract languages can not be introduced directly, but must be linked to an existing observation language first. (FeyerabendVs). |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Carnap, R. | Field Vs Carnap, R. | I 118 FieldVsCarnap: although my approach is similar to that of Carnap in Meaning and Necessity, 1) it does not refer to meaning at all. I.e. no "meaning relations between predicates" ((s)> meaning postulates). 2) my treatment of free variables does not require the introduction of "individual concepts" and is consistently anti-essentialist. (FieldVsEssentialism): no formula of the form "MB" is true in a model with view to an attribution function if it is not also true in the model in relation to any other attribution function. Nino Cocchiarella/Carnap/Field: Cocchiarella: ("On the Primary and Secondary semantics of logical necessity"): an approach similar to Carnap: FieldVsCocchiarella/FieldVsRamseyFieldVsCarnap: leads to Ramsey’s bizarre conclusion that E.g. "it is possible that there are at least 10 to the power of 10 to the power of 10 objects" is logically false if the world happens to contain fewer objects (empirical). FieldVsCarnap: 3) his idea that modal concepts are derived from semantic concepts should be modified, Field: Just the other way around! (QuineVsField). II 186 Referential Indeterminacy/Reference/Theory Change/Reference Change/Semantic Change/Field: we now have all the components for the indeterminacy of reference: Only (HR) and (HP) remain, but are mutually exclusive. (HP) Newton’s word "mass" denoted net mass. (HR) Newton’s word "mass" denoted relativistic mass. In fact there is no fact on the basis of which you could opt for one of two. Vs: it could be argued that we only lack additional information. FieldVsVs: but then it should be possible already to say what kind of information that is supposed to be. And we have already found that there can be no fact here. "Mass"/Newton/Denotation/Reference/Field: the issue is not that we do not know what Newton’s "mass" denotes, but that Newton’s word was referentially indeterminate. (Because we do not know which of the two, HP or HR should be excluded.) II 187 The truth and falsity of (4R) and (5P) cannot be explained on the basis of what Newton referred to. FieldVsReferential Semantics/FieldVsCarnap: this is excluded by this indeterminacy of reference. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Carnap, R. | Fodor Vs Carnap, R. | II 111 Formal Language/ideal language/Carnap: suppose we had three artificial languages L1, L2, and L3, each of which is considered as a possible idealization of the natural language L. The sentence S in the language L should be: - analytic in L1, - synthetic in L2, and - none of both in L3. How do we know whether S in reality is analytic, synthetic, or none? We ask of a theory that it answers this question. FodorVsCarnap: the theory would have to explicate the concepts of analytic in L, synthetic in L, etc. But none of the languages developed by Carnap and his successors does that. Therefore, they are not idealizations of natural languages. II 112 As long as, beyond that, these idealizations use terms that are not interpreted for natural languages, they claim wrongly to explain something. Then we have no way to detect deviations. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Carnap, R. | Goodman Vs Carnap, R. | II 67 GoodmanVsCarnap/Reduction Sentences: the whole thing is pretty absurd. In my opinion, philosophy has the task to explicate, not to describe science (and the everyday language). The explication shall refer to pre-systematic use of the expressions of consideration, but does not need to comply with the order. It s all about economy and standardization. Schurz I 219 Grue/Bleen/Goodman/Schurz: logical form: (B: observes G*: grue) G*: ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 > Rx)). Sa: Emerald. Sample: {a:1 ‹ i ‹ n} Then the assertions Sai u Bat0 u Gai and Sai u Bat0 u G*ai are equivalent b< definition. If we apply the inductive generalization conclusion both for "green" and for "grue", our sample results in the two universal hypotheses H: = "All emeralds are green" and H*: = "All emeralds are grue". Problem: H and H* imply for all emeralds not observed before t0 conflicting forecasts (green vs red). Schurz: the following relationship exists to subjective inductive exchangeability assumptions: for regular probability functions the exchangeability assumption cannot be valid at the same time for the predicate (Gx) and its pathological counterpart (G*). Question: according to which criteria should we decide which predicates we consider as exchangeable or inductively projectable? Many criteria were proposed and proved to be unsuitable. Carnap: (1947.146 1976, 211): Thesis: only qualitative predicates are inducible (projectable) "grue" is a Def "Positional" Predicate/Carnap, that is a predicate that refers to the time t0 in its definition. E.g. grue. Def Qualitative Predicate/Carnap: has no definitional reference to individual constants. GoodmanVsCarnap: (Goodman 1955/75, 105): Problem of language dependence (sic: dependence): through reciprocal re-definition it is possible to move from our own language (with "green" and "red") to a language which is equivalent in its expressiveness and in which "grue" and "bleen"(G * x * x R,) act as basic concepts (basic predicates): Re-Definition/Language Dependence/Logical Form: Language L (Gx, Rx primitive) language L* (G*x, R*x primitive) Definitions in L Definitions in L* G*x: ‹› ((Bxt0 > Gx) u (~Bxt0 › Rx)) Gx: ‹› ((Bxt0 › G*x) u (~Bxt0 › R*x)) R*x: ‹› ((Bxt0 › Rx) u (~Bxt0 › Gx)) Rx: ‹› ((Bxt0 > R*x) u (~Bxt0 › G*x)). Solution/Schurz: it is possible to distinguish between qualitative and positional predicates in terms of ostensive learnability independent of the language! I 220 GoodmanVsInduction/Schurz: this does not answer why induction should be based on qualitative and not on positional predicates. Induction consists in extending pattern that were so far observed as consistent into the future. To be able to formulate useful induction rules we need to know what remained constant! And that depends on the qualitative features. Positional features are pseudo-features. Important argument: the fact that individuals are "constantly" "grue" means that they change their color from green to red at t0 . In this case, we have carried out "anti-induction" and not induction. That is the reason why we (with Carnap) have basic predicates for qualitative and not positional features for induction rules. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Carnap, R. | Husserl Vs Carnap, R. | Chisholm II 148 Mention/use/Husserl/Mulligan/Smith: (HusserlVsCarnap): the mentioning (abnormal use) of b in quotation marks is parasitic to the original use. One must know what 'b' is in order to be able to use 'b'. So the unmodified and the modified use must have something in common. Mention/Husserl: mention is a nominal function. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Carnap, R. | Kant Vs Carnap, R. | Stroud I 173 Transcendental idealism/KantVsCarnap/Stroud: would say that he could not be wrong, because it is necessary in order to clarify any other meaningful questions empirically. CarnapVsKant: According to the verification principle this is but a "pseudo-theory", which cannot explain or guarantee anything. Meaning/Sense/CarnapVsKant: In order to make sense, we need to know the truth value of the propositions which contain the corresponding expressions. weaker: We must be able to give a reason why it is better to believe the truth of something then his falsehood. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Carnap, R. | Lewis Vs Carnap, R. | Field II 196 Theoretical Terms/TT/Ramsey sentence/Carnap/Lewis/Field: (Carnap 1956, Kap.26, Lewis 1979b,1972). Theoretical Term/Introduction/Content/Ramsey sentence/Carnap: if a new TT was introduced by a theory Θ(T), then the content of the theory is equal to the content of the Ramsey sentence (Ex)Θ(x). Only realization: In a special case in which (E!x)Θ(x) is, we can say that T denotes the only object that fulfills Θ(x). multiple realization: Problem: what does the theoretical term denote here? (>Functionalism/Lewis, >Turing machine). It seems to need to denote something, if this were not possible we cannot explain why Θ(T) is true (and this must be according Carnap's thesis that it "has the content" of(Ex)Θ(x).) Solution/Carnap: if Θ (x) is realized multiple times, then T denotes one random object which fulfills Θ(x). LewisVsCarnap: This is not plausible because it is not explained how it is possible for a user of T to take a particular object instead of another one. Field II 197 Content/TT/Ramsey sentence/Lewis/Field: Lewis felt obliged (probably reluctantly) to not take the content of the Ramsey sentence Ex Θ (x), but the modified sentence of Ramsey: (E! x) Θ (x) ((s) which only presumes one object). I.e. the theory is wrong if Θ(x) is realized multiple times, so that T can be seen as without denotations. Then there is no ambiguity. LewisVs: (1970b): This is costly: Then if somebody states Θ (T), then it is absolutely implausible that he thereby has asserted that nothing than T Θ (x) can be fulfilled. LewisVs: (1972): even worse: it has been applied here on functionalism, which is after all based on multiple realization. Multiple Realization/Functionalism/Field: Many authors actually want to accept mR in one and the same organism at the same time. Partial Denotation/Lösung/Field: Lewis could simply say that (as Carnap says) the content of Θ (T) is simply the Ramsey sentence (Ex) Θ (x), and if Θ (x) is realized multiple ways, then T partially denotes each of the "Realisierer". Lewis IV 88 Theoretical Terms/TT/Definition/Description/Lewis: After having defined the TT through descriptions, we can eliminated the latter with their help. This is how we obtain O sentences. Def Extended Postulation/Lewis: the postulate of T that we get by replacing the TT by descriptions (O sentence). It says that the theory T is realized by the n tuple of the first, second...component of the only realization of T. The extended postulate is equivalent in definition to the postulate. It says that the theory is uniquely realized. It is logically equivalent to a shorter O phrase, which says the same in a shorter form. This is what we call the "sentence of the only realization of T": IV 89 Ey1...yn (x) x1...xn (T[x1,,,xn] ↔ . y1 = x1 & ..& yn = xn LewisVsCarnap: then the postulate is true if and only if the theory is realized once. Problem: the expanded postulate is an O phrase that is stronger than the Ramsey phrase that merely says that there is at least one realization. Nevertheless, if the definition sentences are part of T, then the extended postulate is a theorem of T. Then the definitions give us theorems that could not have been derived without them. This means that the definitions themselves, unlike the Carnap theorem, are not logically implied by the postulate. Therefore, if we want to say that the definition sets of T are correct definitions, we must abandon the idea that the theorems are all and only the logical consequences of T's postulate. And we like to give that up. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Carnap, R. | Putnam Vs Carnap, R. | Goodman II Putnam Foreword V Carnap/Putnam: according to Putnam Carnap has the constant tendency to identify terms with their syntactic representations (> Putnam I (a) 48). Carnap suggested that a predicate can also be disjunctive or non-disjunctive in itself, PutnamVsCarnap: E.g. "logical sky" e.g. "is to tell us" e.g. "metaphysical pointer". >Disjunctive predicate. Lewis IV 85 Partial Interpretation/PutnamVsCarnap: theories with false observation consequences have no interpretation! Because they have no "model" that is "standard" with respect to the observation concepts. IV 85/86 Putnam: such interpretations are wrong then, not pointless! Sense/Theory/LewisVsPutnam: the theoretical concept are also not meaningless here, but denotation-less (without denotation): their sense is given by their denotation in those possible worlds in which the theory is uniquely implemented and thus has no wrong consequences there. They have a sense as well as the reference-less term "Nicholas". Putnam V 244 Pain/Physical Object/Putnam: It is difficult to understand that the statement that a table stands in front of someone is easier to accept than the statement that someone is in pain. Popper/Carnap: would respond: the methodological difference consists in that one of them is public and the other is private. PutnamVsPopper/VsCarnap: both exaggerate the extent to which observations of physical objects are always publicly verifiable. >Observability. V 250 Method/Science/PutnamVsCarnap: many philosophers believed (wrongly) that science proceeded by a method (e.g. Carnap). Putnam I (a) 42 Carnap/Putnam: (Logischer Aufbau der Welt) Final Chapter: brings a sketch of the relation between object language to sensation language which is not a translation! PutnamVsCarnap/PutnamVsPhenomenology: this amounts to the old assertion that we would pick out the object theory that is the "easiest" and most useful. There is no evidence as to why a positivist is entitled to quantify over material things (or to refer to them). Phenomenology/Putnam: after their failure there were two reactions: 1) theories were no longer to be construed as statements systems that would need to have a perfectly understandable interpretation, they are now construed as calculi with the aim to make predictions. I 43 2) Transition from the phenomenalistic language to "language of observable things" as the basis of the reduction. I.e. one seeks an interpretation of physical theories in the "language of things", not in the "sensation language". Putnam I (a) 46 Simplicity/Putnam: gains nothing here: the conjunction of simple theories need not be simple. Def Truth/Theory/Carnap: the truth of a theory is the truth of its Ramsey sentence. PutnamVsCarnap: this again is not the same property as "truth"! (I 46 +: Hilbert's ε, formalization of Carnap: two theories with the same term). I (a) 48 Language/Syntax/Semantics/PutnamVsCarnap: he has the constant tendency to identify concepts with their syntactic representations, e.g. mathematical truth with the property of being a theorem. I (a) 49 Had he been successful with his formal language, it would have been successful because it would have corresponded to a reasonable degree of probability over the set of facts; However, it is precisely that which positivism did not allow him to say! |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Carnap, R. | Quine Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap VII 151 Intensionalist Thesis of Pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intention is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the linguistic habits. Extensionalist Thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste, the linguist is free, because it can not be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise. Quine: the completed lexicon is ex pede Herculem i.e. we risk an error if we start at the bottom. But we can gain an advantage from it! However, if in the case of the lexicon we delay a definition of synonymy no problem arises as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false. Carnap VII 154 Intention/Carnap: essential task: to find out which variations of a given specimen in different ways (for example, size, shape, color) are allowed in the area of the predicate. Intention: can be defined as the range of the predicate. QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man on the street would be unwilling to say anything about non-existent objects. Carnap VII 155 CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man on the street is very well able to understand questions related to assumed counterfactual situations. Lanz I 271 QuineVsCarnap: criticism of the distinction analytic/synthetic. This distinction was important for logical empiricism, because it allows an understanding of philosophy that assigns philosophy an independent task which is clearly distinct from that of empirical sciences! Quine undermines this assumption: the lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! I 272 There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and sciences are on one and the same continuum. --- Newen I 123 Quine/Newen: is like Carnap in the spirit of empiricism, but has modified it radically. I 124 Thought/Frege: irreducible. Thought/QuineVsFrege: seeks a reductive explanation of sentence content (like Carnap). Base/QuineVsCarnap: not individual sense data, but objectively describable stimuli. Sentence Meaning/Quine/Newen: is determined by two quantities: 1) the amount of stimuli leading to approval 2) the amount of the stimuli leading to rejection. This only applies for occasion sentences. I125 Def Cognitively Equivalent/Quine/Newen: = same meaning: two sentences if they trigger the same behavior of consent or reflection. For the entire language: if it applies to all speakers. QuineVsCarnap: sentences take precedence over words. Quine I 73 QuineVsCarnap: difference to Carnap's empirical semantics: Carnap proposes to explore meaning by asking the subject whether they would apply it under different, previously described circumstances. Advantage: opposites of terms such as "Goblin" and "Unicorn" are preserved, even if the world falls short of examples that could be so sharply distinct from each other in such a way. I 74 Quine: the stimulus meaning has the same advantage, because there are stimulus patterns that would cause consent to the question "unicorn?", but not for "Goblin?" QuineVsCarnap: Carnap's approach presumes decisions about which descriptions of imaginary states are permissible. So, e.g. "Unicorn", would be undesired in descriptions to explore the meaning of "Unicorn". Difference: Quine restricts the use of unfulfilled conditionals to the researchers, Carnap makes his researcher himself submit such judgments to the informant for evaluation. Stimulus meaning can be determined already in the first stages of radical translation, where Carnap's questionnaire is not even available yet. Quine: theory has primarily to do with records, Carnap: to do with terms. I 466 For a long time, Carnap advocated the view that the real problems of philosophy are linguistic ones. Pragmatic questions about our language behavior, not about objects. Why should this not apply to theoretical questions in general? I 467 This goes hand in hand with the analyticity concept. (§ 14) In the end, the theoretical sentences generally can only be justified pragmatically. QuineVsCarnap: How can Carnap draw a line there and claim that this does not apply for certain areas? However, we note that there is a transition from statements about objects to statements about words, for example, when we skip classes when moving from questions about the existence of unicorns to questions about the existence of points and kilometers. Through the much-used method of "semantic ascent": the transition from statements about kilometers to statements about "kilometers". From content-related to formal speech. It is the transition from speech in certain terms to talk about these concepts. It is precisely the transition of which Carnap said that it undressed philosophical questions of their deceptive appearance and made them step forward in their true form. QuineVsCarnap: this part, however, I do not accept. The semantic ascent of which I speak can be used anywhere. (Carnap: "content-related" can also be called "material".) Ex If it came down to it, the sentence "In Tasmania there are Wombats" could be paraphrased like this: ""Wombat" applies to some creatures in Tasmania." IV 404 Carnap/(Logical Particles): ("The logical structure of the world"): Thesis: it is possible in principle to reduce all concepts to the immediately given. QuineVsCarnap: that is too reductionist: Disposition concepts such as "soluble" cannot be defined like this. (Even later recognized by Carnap himself). IV 416 QuineVsCarnap: Why all these inventive reconstructions? Ultimately sense stimuli are the only thing we have. We have to determine how the image of the world is constructed from them. Why not be content with psychology? V 28 Disposition/Quine: Problem: the dependence on certain ceteris paribus clauses. Potential disturbances must be eliminated. Solution: some authors: (like Chomsky) retreat to probabilities. V 29 Carnap: instead of probability: reduction sentences seen as idealizations to which corrections are made. Carnap conceives these corrections as re-definitions, i.e. they lead to analytic sentences that are true from the meaning. QuineVsCarnap: I make no distinction between analytical and other sentences. V 30 Reflexes/Holt/Quine: those that are conditioned later are not fundamentally different from innate ones. They consist of nerve paths with reduced resistance. Quine: therefore, one can conceive disposition as this path itself! ((s) I.e. pratically physical. Precisely as physical state.) Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to an eventually mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms. QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I, unlike the two, am satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary, of which some fundamental physical predicates were initially learned with the help of dipositioned speech. (Heuristic role). VII (b) 40 But his work is still only a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presume a world with few movements ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement is to be the guide for the construction of a world from experience. QuineVsCarnap: he seemed not to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked in reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain overall features and with increasing experience the truth values are revised in the same sense. X 127 Logical Truth/Carnap: Thesis: only the language and not the structure of the world makes them true. Truth/Logical Truth/QuineVsCarnap: is not a purely linguistic matter. Logic/QuineVsCarnap: the two breakdowns that we have just seen are similar in form and effect: 1) The logic is true because of the language only insofar as it is trivially true because of everything. 2) The logic is inseparable from the translation only insofar as all evident is inseparable from the translation. Logic/Language/Quine: the semantic ascent seems to speak for linguistic theory. QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T predicate) already exists and helps precisely to separate logic from language by pointing to the world. Logic: While talks a lot about language, it is geared towards the world and not towards language. This is accomplished by the T predicate. X 133 We learn logic by learning language. VsCarnap: but that does not differentiate logic from other areas of everyday knowledge! XI 99 QuineVsProtocol Sentence/QuineVsCarnap/Lauener: describes private, non-public autopsychological experiences. XI 129 Intention/Carnap/Lauener: (Meaning and Necessity): attempts to introduce intentions without thereby entangling himself in metaphysics. QuineVsCarnap: you cannot take advantage of a theory without paying the ontological bill. Therefore, the assumed objects must be values of the variable. Another way would be to say that certain predicates must be true for the theory to be true. But that means that it is the objects that must be the values of variables. To every value applies a predicate or its negation. ((s) >continuous determination). XI 130 Conversely, everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable. Because a predicate is an open sentence. XI 138 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: Ex "x is a thing": at a higher level of universality existence assumptions no longer refer to the world, but only to the choice of a suitable linguistic framework. QuineVsCarnap: this is merely a gradual difference. XI 142 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: (temporarily represented): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. Semantic Ascent/QuineVsCarnap: it must not be misused for evasive ontological maneuvers. XI 150 Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things only means choosing a certain language. It does not mean believing in these things. XI 151 CarnapVsQuine: his existence criterion (being the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in as far as it only expresses a linguistic choice. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be separated like that. Science is the continuation of our daily practice. XII 69 QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsUniversal Words: it is not said what exactly is the feature for the scope. Ontological Relativity/QuineVsCarnap: cannot be enlightened by internal/external questions, universal words or universal predicates. It has nothing to do with universal predicates. The question about an absolute ontology is pointless. The fact that they make sense in terms of a framework is not because the background theory has a wider scope. Absolute Ontology/Quine: what makes it pointless, is not its universality but its circularity. Ex "What is an F?" can only be answered by recourse to another term: "An F is a G." XII 89 Epistemology/Scope/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements + statements about the future are uncertain if understood as about sense data or sensations) is still unsolved. Carnap/Quine: his structures would have allowed translating all sentences about the world in sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms does not mean that it could be proved by means of logic and set theory from observation statements. ((s) means of expression are not evidence. (inside/outside, plain, circles).) Epistemology/Quine: Important argument: wanting to equip the truths about nature with the full authority of direct experience is just as much sentenced to failure as the reduction of truths in mathematics to the potential intelligibility of elementary logic. XII 91 Carnap/QuineVsCarnap: If Carnap had successfully carried out its construction, how could he have known if it is the right one? The question would have been empty! Any one would have appeared satisfactory if only it had represented the physical contents properly. This is the rational reconstruction. Def Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalistic statements from observation terms, logical and set-theoretical concepts. QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions and each would have appeared equally satisfactory,if only it had represented the physicalistic statements properly. But each would have been a great achievement. XII 92 QuineVsCarnap: unfortunately, the "structure" provides no reduction qua translation that would make the physicalist concepts redundant. It would not even do that if his sketch was elaborated. Problem: the point where Carnap explains how points in physical space and time are attributed sensory qualities. But that does not provide a key for the translation of scientific sentences into such that are formed of logic, set-theoretical and observation concepts. CarnapVsCarnap: later: ("Testability and Meaning", 1936): reduction propositions instead of definitions. XII 94 Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1) abandoned the attempt to deduce the truth about nature from sensory experience. With that he has made a substantial concession. 2) He has abandoned rational reconstruction, i.e. attempt to translate these truths in observation terms and logical mathematical tools. QuineVsPeirce: Suppose we meant that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence in observation language any differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation? Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could also be trapped in an infinitely long axiomatization. Important argument: thus the empiricist abandons the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements about reality could be expressed. Quine: the problem is not too high a complexity for a finite axiomatization, but holism: XII 95 Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference in the experience") only refers to theories as a whole, not to individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" would have to be one in which the texts, into which the logical mathematical observation terms are to be translated, are entire theories and not just terms or short sentences. Rational Reconstruction/QuineVsCarnap: would be a strange "translation": it would translate the whole (whole theories), but not the parts! Instead of "translation" we should just speak of observation bases of theories. pro Peirce: we can very well call this the meaning of empirical theories. ((s) Assigning whole theories to observations). |
Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Carnap, R. | Searle Vs Carnap, R. | V 124/125 Axiom of identity/SearleVsCarnap: Paradoxes based on a misunderstanding of the function of the reference: (Carnap: interchangeability salva veritate). Searle: in this form it is not tautological but wrong. The problems are trivial. (Here not further treated). Def Principle of identification/Searle: ("Third Axiom") Referral identifies an object apart from all others, at all times. >Identification/Searle. Condition: the listener must be communicated a description (identification) by the utterance of the regarding phrase. V 126 Either by predicates, that only come to this object, or ostensive. This is equivalent to Frege's dictum that every indicating expression must have a meaning. >Fregean Sense, >Sense. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Carnap, R. | Sellars Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap VI 79 Self Psychological/Carnap: does not require the mediation of physical objects, but happens abruptly. (SellarsVsCarnap: only through the acquisition of language). |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Carnap, R. | Tarski Vs Carnap, R. | Skirbekk I 176 TarskiVsCarnap: the tendency to exclude semantic terms (such as truth and designation) from the discussion makes the discussion fragmented and inappropriate. Semantics/Tarski: it should not have to clarify the meaning of all scientific terms. This task is reserved for the sciences in which the terms are used, and is mastered by them. The task of semantics is to clarify the meaning of the term "true". And this task is fulfilled by it. (1) 1. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Carnap, R. | Tugendhat Vs Carnap, R. | III 213 Meta Language/Tugendhat: when translating into the meta-language it is assumed that we "understand" the meta language characters. Otherwise we would not have got beyond the syntax. What we then understand, the meaning of the meta language characters, cannot be indicated again by a "translation", otherwise one would remain ad infinitum in syntax. (recourse). We need the rules of use, i.e. pragmatics. (TugendhatVsCarnap). "Absolute" Truth/Tugendhat: here verification remains further excluded and therefore the concept of truth itself remains empty. TugendhatVsCarnap: what does "real state" mean if pragmatics is to be excluded? |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Carnap, R. | Wittgenstein Vs Carnap, R. | I 134 WittgensteinVsTarski/WittgensteinVsCarnap/Hintikka: would the logical semantics reject in the lump, because it cannot be articulated according to the conception of language as a universal medium. I 194 ff WittgensteinVsCarnap/Wittgenstein/Bio/Hintikka: accuses Carnap, he had used his idea of physicalist base language without permission and without reasonable notice. Neurath has demanded, as the first in the Vienna Circle, one should no longer speak of "experience content" and the "comparison between sentence and reality", but only of sentences. (> Coherence theory). II 333 Logic/WittgensteinVsCarnap: the attempt to construct a logic that should be prepared for any situation, is an absurdity of great importance, such as Carnap's construction of a relation system, but which leaves it open whether something fits to what gives it content. VI 94 WittgensteinVsCarnap/Schulte: one cannot assume a priori that elementary propositions should consist of binary relations. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Carnap, R. | Verschiedene Vs Carnap, R. | Skirbekk I 16 Probation: correspondence between sentence and the reality NeurathVsCarnap: coherence rather than correspondence. Carnap VI 177 Attribution/Quality/Sensory Quality/Carnap: there is no sharp line between attributable and non-attributable sensory qualities. Organ sensations can hardly or not at all be attributed to certain world lines (i.e. visual things). Example "melancholic forest": This attribution is justified! VI 178 Because it arouses a sensation of corresponding quality. Like sugar the sweet one. (external) VsCarnap: "pathetic fallacy". VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Theory of Colours): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (n of perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all. But these laws are of a much more complicated form. VI 71 Characteristics/characteristic/definition/constitution/Carnap: Problem: e.g. foreign psychic: the behavior is not the same as the foreign psychic itself! Realism: the angry behavior is not the anger itself. Solution/Carnap: but one can transform all scientific (not metaphysical) statements about F into statements about K while keeping the logical value (truth value). Then F and K are logically identical. (s) But not vice versa: the concept of behavior is not the concept of anger. VI 72 A meaning for K that did not agree with F could not be given scientifically! (many authors VsCarnap). Carnap: this has to do with Leibniz's identity. VI 78/79 Foreign Psychic/Carnap: every psychological process, if it occurs as foreign psychic, is in principle recognizable (by behavior) or questionable. So every statement can be transformed into a statement about the corresponding characteristics. It follows from this that all psychological objects can be traced back to physical objects (movements of expression, behaviour). (BergsonVsCarnap). |
Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Carnap, R. | Church Vs Carnap, R. | EMD II 146 Carnap: (Meaning and Necessity): Bsp "Jones glaubt, daß S": II 147 behauptet eine Relation zwischen Jones und dem Satz S. ChurchVsCarnap: es muß zusätzlich eine implizite Referenz auf die Satzbedeutung von S geben. Loar: und wie könnte man das, ohne prop Einst zu einer Relation zwischen Jones, S und eine intensionalen Entität zu machen: (R(Jones ,S, p)) ? (Das muss sich gar nicht auf S als zu einer bestimmten Sprache gehörig beziehen, sondern kann in seinem Kontext unzweideutig sein). Vs: aber dann wird die Referenz zweifelhaft, denn die Form der Wörter ist irrelevant in Bezug auf das, was als behauptet geglaubt wird, wenn man erst mal die Proposition weiß. Frege/Loar: seine Theorie ist viel besser: "dass S" bezeichnet die Entität, die tatsächlich die Bedeutung von S ist, aber ohne auf S selbst als eine bestimmte Bedeutung habend zu referieren. |
Chur I A. Church The Calculi of Lambda Conversion. (Am-6)(Annals of Mathematics Studies) Princeton 1985 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Carnap, R. | Stalnaker Vs Carnap, R. | I 43 Def Liberal Platonism/LP/terminology/Stalnaker: I developed the liberal platonism (LP) earlier to explain the difference between reference to numbers and normal things. But it is not a defense of the MR: thesis: one starts with facts of mathematical discourse e.g. existence of a practice that contains among others assertions, inference, arguments. If we then have Tarskian semantics (and require a domain of goods we are talking about) then this explains the facts about the discourse. Thesis: when we say that our practice is legitimate it is not a sufficient reason to say that we really make assertions and the semantics really tells us what the statements say? ((s) >content, >assertion). ((s) short: LP: thesis: practice is sufficiently without immaterial realm). I 44 Problem: then the LP says carelessly, that the existence of numbers is constituted by the fact that there is a legitimate practice. FieldVsStalnaker: that is a kind of linguistic idealism. Field pro Carnap: (Carnap: "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology", 1950): as an external issue what numbers are it violates Carnap's principle. Platonism/Field: two theses: 1. numbers, functions and sets exist 2. they are mind-independent. Stalnaker: if I had formulated more cautiously, I would have set up a real platonism. Empiricist sense criterion/Carnap/Stalnaker: would say as we all: if the language did not exist, the statements would not be meaningful. Stalnaker: but that is still compatible with the fact that it still could be true. Internal issues: within a frame External issues: purely practical questions of whether to accept the frame. QuineVsCarnap/Stalnaker: thesis: all questions are asked in any linguistic context, and questions such as "Is it reasonable to accept a frame of numbers?" and "Are there numbers?" are not easy to separate. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Carnap, R. | Brendel Vs Carnap, R. | I 275 logischer EmpirismusVsSkeptizismus/Empirismus/Skeptizismus/Schlick/Carnap/Brendel: VerifikationismusVsSkeptizismus: (Wiener Kreis): verifikationistische BT: nicht verifizierbare Aussagen sind sinnlos. Skeptizismus: die Frage nach seiner Wahrheit oder Falschheit zählt auch zu den sinnlosen fragen bzw. „Scheinproblemen“. I 276 Verifizierbarkeit/BrendelVsWiener Kreis/BrendelVsSchlick/BrendelVsCarnap/Brendel: dieser Begriff war damals schon ständig schwankend. I 277 Problem: welches sollte die empiristische Basis für Aussagen der verschiedenen Gebiete bilden? VsEmpirismus: Problem: Theoretische Termini. BrendelVsEmpirismus: dennoch ist die therapeutische Diagnose richtig, weil nicht alles sinnlos ist, das dem empiristischen Sinnkriterium nicht genügt. |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Carnap, R. | Neurath Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap I 16 Probation/Carnap: correspondence between sentence and reality, NeurathVsCarnap: coherence instead of correspondence. Carnap: the thesis of verifiability must be attenuated to the thesis of probation ability. Rescher I 364 NeurathVsCarnap: there is no way to make finally secured clean log sentences the starting point of scholarship. 1) All actual statements can be refuted in principle. 2) The benchmark for judging statements is the comparison with the system at our disposal. NeurathVsCorrespondence Theory: against all talk of truth as correspondence with reality. |
Neur I O. Neurath Philosophical Papers 1913-1946: With a Bibliography of Neurath in English (Vienna Circle Collection, Volume 16) 1983 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
| Carnap, R. | Stroud Vs Carnap, R. | I 182 External/internal/Carnap/Quine/Stroud: Quine seems to interpret Carnap this way. That the distinction between "category questions" and "subsets questions" corresponds to the distinction. External/QuineVsCarnap: this is nothing more than two ways of formalizing the language. If we have only one kind of bound variable for all things, it will be an external question: "Is there such and such?" if the variable goes over the whole range. (This is a question of category). Internally: if there is a variable for every kind of thing, it will be a subset question. Then the question does not refer to all the things that can exist. I 183 Philosophy/QuineVsCarnap: differs from the sciences only in the range of its categories. (Quine, Word and Object, p. 275). External/internal/QuineVsCarnap: Category questions differ from internal questions only in their generality from subset questions. We can get to the generality by letting some kind of variable go over all things. I 191 StroudVsCarnap: this introduces a "we", and something that happens to us, called "experience". That we exist and have experience cannot simply be seen as an "internal" truth of the thing language. One cannot then see the meaning of experience as the common goal of all "real alternatives", because then it is assumed that there are external things. Problem: the question of the common goal of all genuine alternatives cannot be regarded as an external question of all reference systems either, because then it becomes meaningless. But if it were "internal", what would be the difference if one were to switch from one reference system to another that does not even contain this goal? Carnap does not answer that. I 192 This makes it difficult to grasp his positive approach. CarnapVsSkepticism: misunderstands the relation between linguistic frame of expression about external objects and the truths expressed within this system of reference. StroudVsCarnap: but what exactly is his own non-sceptical approach to this relation? 1. To which system does Carnap's thesis belong that assertions of existence in the language of things are neither true nor false? 2. What does the thesis express at all then? Knowledge/internal/Carnap: for example the geometer in Africa really comes to knowledge about the mountain. StroudVsCarnap: but what does it mean in addition to the fact that this is not a truth that is independent of a reference system? Suppose for some reason we did not have the thing language and could freely choose another language. Does it follow from this that, for example, the sentence about the mountain in Africa would no longer be true? Surely we would express something completely different in a completely different language without thing expressions. But would the sentence we can make now not be true in this other language? I 193 And could it never be true if we had never accidentally adopted the thing language. Existence/Language/Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: that cannot be right and it leads to an extreme idealism that Carnap just rejects. It is absurd because we already know enough about mountains to see that they are not influenced by a chosen language. Language/object/Stroud: things were there long before language came into being in the world. And that again is something we know "internally" in the thing language. StroudVsCarnap: then his thesis, understood as "internal" to the language, is wrong. It contradicts what we already assume it as knowledge about ourselves and external things. Empirically speaking, it leads to idealism that contradicts the known facts. CarnapVsVs: would say that of course one must not understand his thesis "empirically" and not the thing language "internally". StroudVsCarnap: but within some reference system it must be internal, otherwise it is meaningless. Problem: but this is a statement about the relation between a chosen framework and the internal statements within that framework. And if that implies that these internal statements would have been neither true nor false, if a different frame of reference had been chosen, it is still idealism, whether empirical or non empirical idealism. Truth Value/tr.v./Convention/StroudVsCarnap: the truth value of the internal sentences would depend on the choice of language (of the reference system). I 194 StroudVsCarnap: it is important to see that if this did not follow, Carnap's thesis would not be different from traditional skepticism! There would then be room for the possibility that statements about things would remain true, even if we abandoned the thing language and truth would again be independent of language. Problem: that would again lead to our choice of a linguistic framework being necessary only to formulate or recognize something that would be true anyway ((s) > metaphysical realism) independently of that framework. Theoretically: according to Carnap this would then be a "theoretical" question about the acceptability of the thing language as a whole. But in terms of objectivity, which we then presuppose. CarnapVsTradition: it is precisely the incomprehensibility of such theoretical questions that is important in Carnap. Because Problem: then it could be that even if we carefully apply our best procedures (> Best explanation), things could still be different from what we think they are. This is equivalent to skepticism. "Conditional Correctness"/Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: Carnap accepts what I have called the "conditional correctness" of skepticism: if the skeptic could ask a meaningful question, he would prevail. StroudVsCarnap: if he now would not deny that the "internal" sentences remain true or false when changing the reference system, his approach would be just as tolerant of skepticism as tradition. ((s) So both denial and non-denial would become a problem.) Kant/Stroud: he also accepts the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If Descartes' description of experience and its relation to external things were correct, we could never know anything about these things. Carnap/Stroud: his thesis is a version of Kant's "Copernican Turn". And he obtains it for the same reasons as Kant: without it we would have no explanation, how is it possible that we know anything at all? Reference system/frame/StroudVsCarnap: a gap opens up between the frame and what is true independently of it. ((s) If a choice between different frames is to be possible). StroudVsCarnap: in this respect, Carnap's approach is entirely Kantian. I 196 And he also inherits all the obscurity and idealism of Kant. There are parallels everywhere: for both there can be a kind of distancing from our belief. We can do a philosophical study of everyday life (as far as the conditions of knowledge are concerned). I 197 Reference system/framework/StroudVsCarnap: to which framework does Carnap's thesis belong that no propositions about external objects are true or false regardless of the choice of a reference system (language)? And is this thesis - analytical or not - itself "internal" in any framework? And whether it is or not, is it not merely an expression of Kantian Transcendental Idealism? Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: the basic mistake is to develop any competing theory at all to tradition. I 198 A purely negative approach or deflationary use of the verification principle would simply eliminate skepticism as pointless. If that were possible, scepticism would no longer need to be undermined. But: Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: Problem: the status of the verification principle itself, or its acceptability. We can only use it to refute Descartes if we have a good reason to accept it as necessary. But that depends on how it is introduced. It should serve to prevent the excesses of senseless philosophical speculation. StroudVsCarnap: 1. Then we can only watch and see how far the principle can lead to a distinction that we have already made before! The only test would be sentences, which we would have recognized as senseless before! 2. But even assuming that the principle would be adequately proven as extensional and descriptive, i.e. it would distinguish between meaningful and senseless, as we do, I 199 it would not allow us to eliminate something as senseless that we had not already recognized as senseless by other means. Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: was incorrectly introduced ((s) with the ulterior motive of producing a result that was already fully known). Early Carnap sketches show that general laws of nature were initially wrongly excluded. Verification principle/VP/StroudVsCarnap: a correct introduction would provide a strong destructive tool that Kant was already looking for: it would have to explain why the verfication principle is correct. This would probably be identical to an explanation of how knowledge of external things is possible. Verification Principle/Hempel/Carnap/Stroud: the early representatives had in mind that 1. a sentence is meaningful only if it expresses an "actual content", 2. that understanding a sentence means knowing what would happen if the sentence were true. Verificationism/Stroud: There is nothing particularly original about this approach. What gives it the verificationist twist is the idea that we cannot even understand anything that cannot be known as true or false, or weaker: at least to believe as more rational than its opposite. StroudVsCarnap: that failed, even as an attempt to extract empirically verifiable sentences. I 205 SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: even if verificationism is true, we still need an explanation of how and why traditional philosophical ((s) non-empirical) inquiry fails. ((s) should correspond here to skepticism). (>Why-question). I 207 StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap/StroudVsHempel: it is more plausible to reject the verification principle ((s) > empiricist sense criterion) than to claim that Descartes never said anything meaningful. StroudVsVerification Principle: it will remain implausible as long as it is not understood why the traditional distinction internal/external should not be correct. I 214 Formal manner of speaking: ""Wombat" applies to (is true of) some living beings in Tasmania". QuineVsCarnap: misunderstands the semantic ascent when he speaks of external issues. But this does not reject Carnap's pragmatic approach to simplicity and fertility of theories. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Carnap, R. | Hempel. Vs Carnap, R. | II 139 Isolated Statements/Hempel: we could establish a criterion for the elimination of isolated statements: Def (4.1) a theoretical system is cognitively significant iff. it is partially interpreted up to at least the degree that none of its primitive statements is an isolated statement. Vs: but that can wrongly exclude well-supported statements. E.g. a system contains the primitive statement (S1) (S1) (x)(P1x > (Qx P2x) wherein P1 and P2 are observation predicates while "Q" is supposed to be a theoretical construction (see above). Now S1 is not a truth or falsity of formal logic. And if further S1 is excluded from the set of primitive statements of T, then the system T’, which is thus obtained, has exactly the same systematic i.e. the same explanatory power as T. The method may be too strict. S1 is an E.g. for what Carnap calls analytical statements! (Of course, it is not a truth of formal logic). Reason: all their consequences are truths of formal logic. II 140 HempelVsCarnap: E.g. Suppose our system T contained the additional statement (S2) (x) (P3x> (Qx P4x)) wherein P3 and P4 are additional observation predicates. From the standpoint that "any bilateral reduction statement is analytical" (Carnap), S2 would then be as analytical as S1. Still, the two statements taken together contain non-analytical consequences that are expressible solely in terms of observation predicates: (O) (x)(~(P1x u P2x u P3x u ~P4x) u ~(P1x u ~P2x u P3x u P4x)). We would hardly want to alow the consequence that the conjunction of two analytical statements may be synthetic. Analyticity/HempelVsCarnap: if the concept can be applied to statements of interpreted deductive systems at all, then it must be relativized with respect to the present theoretical context. It must also be put into perspective with view to the rules of the language at hand. II 141 Isolated Statement/Hempel: if we apply the other strategy and discard S1 as isolated statements, we arrive at an analogous conclusion. Whether a statement is isolated or not depends on the linguistic frame and theoretical context. |
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| Carnap, R. | Chisholm Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap VIII 164 Pragmatics/ChisholmVsCarnap: his representation was over-simplified. Carnap: ditto. I have ignored possible effects of uncertainty and actual errors of the speaker. (> Radical Interpretation, RI). Chisholm: the analysis can be simplified by the concept of belief. Carnap pro. Belief/Pragmatics/Carnap: requires a conceptual framework of theoretical pragmatics. The basic concepts of pragmatics are best not behavioristically defined, but introduced as theoretical constructions in the theoretical language connected with the observation language on the basis of postulates and correspondence rules. Def Belief/Church: relationship between a person and a fact. Def Belief/Carnap: relationship between a person and a statement. The concept of Church is not pragmatic: (state which does not necessarily include language). VIII 165 It is neither implied that the person is aware of the belief, nor that they could verbalize it. Carnap: for the statement, verbalization is of course the condition. This corresponds to the believing-to-be-true. The pragmatic concept of intension serves the purpose of linking Churchian belief and believing of a statement. Chisholm II 68/69 Meaning postulates/ChisholmVsCarnap: there is "no clear sense" in which such a sentence is related to words and their use! SauerVsChisholm: the objection is not severe: Solution: if ’(x) (Fx > Gx)’ is a meaning postulate in S, then one should not depart from this sentence itself, but from " ’(x)(Fx > GX)’ is a meaning postulate in S". That is a statement about "F" and "G" in S. II 71 Analytical/Meaning postulates/ChisholmVsCarnap: do not secure that the definition of "square" means square is not merely ad hoc and arbitrary. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Carnap, R. | Hare Vs Carnap, R. | Hare II 133 Statements/Tradition/Hare: splits statements into empirical and analytical ones. There seems to be nothing beyond that. Problem: Because of confusion, you can easily come to the assumption that the proposition that states this and the other proposition is analytically true or false, is itself analytical. But it is at least not obviously true that. E.g. The statement: "propositions of the form ’p and not p’ are analytically false" should be analytically true. Because is it not a statement about how the words "and not" are used? And is it not analytically true that they are used like this and not otherwise? Problem: there is a conflict here between the temptations to call the statement analytical as well as empirical as well as none of both. Wittgenstein: considers the debate "absurd". >Silence. CarnapVsWittgenstein: his behavior is contradictory: instead of remaining silent, he wrote a whole book. Hare II 134 HareVsCarnap: does not take Wittgenstein’s doubts seriously enough. |
Hare I Richard Mervyn Hare The Language of Morals Oxford 1991 Hare II Richard M. Hare Philosophical discoveries", in: Mind, LXIX, 1960 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Carnap, R. | Soames Vs Carnap, R. | 478 Set Theory/Truth-Definition/Tarski/Soames: ["snow is white" is T] and "snow is white" are necessarily equivalent in elementary set theory. ((s) > Redundancy Theory). Truth-Predicate/Tarski/Soames: Tarski would not accept a predicate as a truth predicate if [ a is T] would not be material equivalent I 480 to any meta-linguistic paraphrase of the object-language sentence named by a. On this basis, Tarski can be interpreted as implicitly assuming that instances of (19) are necessary or a priori. (Soames pro). (19) If "T" is a truth-predicate for L and "S" in L means that p, then "S" is T iff p. Soames: but this is quite different from claiming that "T" in (20) is replaced by a T-predicate for L, that then the resulting instances of the scheme would be necessary and a priori: (20) If "S" in L means that p, then "S" is T iff p. Soames: but this is what it takes to claim (17) and (18)! PutnamVsTarski/Soames: used the contrast (17/17 Tarski). DummettVsTarski/Soames: used the contrast (18/18 Tarski). Putnam/Dummett/Soames: both show that Tarski's truth definition has nothing to do with understanding or semantic interpretation. Davidson/Soames: is best understood as not trying to analyze meaning in terms of truth, but to eliminate the concept of meaning in favor of the concept of truth. Then the defender of Davidson of "Truth and Meaning" would have the following instead of (i): (i) If x knows that what is expressed by the relevant instance of "S" is true in L iff p, for each sentence of L, then x is a competent speaker of L. Soames/Problem: if now "true in L" is understood as an abbreviation for the definition provided by Tarski, then (i) is as absurd as (18Tarski). SoamesVsCarnap: exactly this kind of absurdity lies in the following (which would allow Tarski's definitions to be the central concept in a meaning theory): (T) S is T iff p. Carnap/Soames: this occurs in Carnap in Meaning and Necessity p. 5/6 and section 7 of his Introduction to Semantics). Meaning Theory/M.th./Soames: must not appeal to other semantic terms. Truth-Predicate/Soames: the concept of truth does not play an ostensible role in our original problem. The refinement of the problem leads to the view that an adequate meaning theory must characterize a predicate that fulfills certain conditions. Soames: it was a discovery that it applies exactly to the true propositions. ((s) That all true propositions have in common). |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Carnap, R. | Meixner Vs Carnap, R. | I 159 Def "individual terms"/Carnap/Meixner: has thus the properties in mind, which are the singularities of properties. MeixnerVsCarnap: the entities he refers to are neither individual nor terms. They are unsaturated entities, I 160 adn thus no individuals. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
| Carnap, R. | Newen Vs Carnap, R. | New I 115 Science/Carnap/Newen: Thesis: is dealing only with relations ((s) extrinsic properties, no intrinsic ones). Scientific statements are purely structural statements. E.g. rail network (subway map, subway network): Structural Description/Carnap/Newen: does not use names for places. Solution: identification of places by number of connections, in case of same number, the connections of the nearest neighboring places, etc. This probably already allows clearly describing a very complex network by consideration of the immediate neighboring stations. I 116 If unexpectedly two nodes cannot be distinguished by the number of connections, they are also scientifically indistinguishable! VsCarnap/Newen: only relations with regard to a subject area ((s) parameter) are taken into account. Problem: then all structurally identical networks can scientifically be reflected one to one on each other. E.g. a rail network could happen to represent the bloodstream in an organism. Relevance/CarnapVsVs: scientific differences would manifest themselves in differences of the relevant relations. VsCarnap: there is no absolute concept of relevant relations. I 117 VCarnap: it is debatable whether the world can be described without irreducible intrinsic properties. Constitution System/Carnap/Newen: Example 1) statements about our own consciousness 2) statements about the world of physical objects 3) about the consciousness of others 4) about intellectual and cultural objects. Fundamental Experience/Carnap/Newen: is the total content of what is given to consciousness in a moment. I 118 The impressions of all senses together with memories, feelings, etc. Basic relationship of experiences: the similarity memory. Empirical Statements/Carnap: are ultimately very complex statements about similarity memories. Def Quasi Analysis/Carnap/Newen: is the way to appropriate definitions. Quasi objects are constituted from fundamental experiences. All everyday objects are conceived as quasi objects. Fundamental experiences (= node in the network). Relation: Similarity memory. E.g. colors: here, for example, 5 items are set in relationship on the basis of similarity in color. I 119 Def Color/Carnap/Newen: the greatest set of elementary experiences that are of the same color. Quasi Property/Carnap/Newen: what emerges from a quasi analysis, for example, the quasi property of having a particular color, e.g. being red. Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Newen: this systematic derivation of all knowledge from basic elements is not necessarily psychologically adequate. It's not about syntheses and formations, as they are present in the real process of cognition, but precisely about rational reconstruction. VsCarnap/Newen: Problem: There can be several quasi analysis on an equal footing in a distribution: I 120 (From Mormann Rudolf Carnap p.100): T: 1. A 2. ABC 3. C 4.ABD 5.BCE 6.D 7.DE 8.E T* 1. A 2. BC 3. C 4.AB*D 5.B*CE 6.D 7.DB*E 8.E Both series provide the same structural color relations, because B and B * play symmetrical roles. In addition, A and D as well as C and E are structurally interchangeable. I.e. if you exchange one of them, the fundamental experience 2 in T * is structurally concurrent with no. 7 in T, etc. Point: despite their structural equality T and T * are essentially different, because the fundamental experiences have different properties: according to theory T 2 has the colors A, B and C, according to T * it only has the colors A and C. Problem: Carnap neglected GoodmanVsCarnap: thus the quasi analysis fails principle. NewenVsGoodman: this is controversial. I 121 Carnap/Newen: his theory is solipsistic; it assumes a subject and its experiences (mental states). Consciousness/NewenVsCarnap: we can only represent consciousness without interaction and radical difference. The world of the other can only be considered as a part of my world. NewenVsCarnap: his theory can only succeed if a non-solipsistic approach is chosen. NS I 30 CarnapVsFrege/CarnapVsPlatonism: no platonic realm of thoughts. VsCarnap/VsPossible World Semantics/VsSemantics of Possible Worlds: two problems: 1) problem of empty names. a) how can they be integrated usefully in a sentence b) how can various empty names be distinguished? 2) Problem: Def Hyper-Intentionality/Newen/Schrenk: necessarily true propositions are true in exactly the same sets of possible worlds (i.e. in all). Therefore, they cannot be distinguished by the possible world semantics. Their different content cannot be grasped by the intention if the intention is equated with sets of possible worlds in which the sentence is true. NS I 101 Sense/Names/Frege: Thesis: the sense of a name is given by the description. This is the so-called description theory, a simple variant of the description theory. NS I 102 Reference/Names/Frege: also by reference to description: the description whose sense is the contribution of a name to the thought expressed also defines the object. Names/Carnap/Newen/Schrenk: like Frege. VsFrege/VsCarnap: both have the problem that it is not clear which individual concept is associated with a name. Various speakers could associate various descriptions with a name so that communication remains enigmatic. Solution: Searle: bundle theory. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Carnap, R. | Schurz Vs Carnap, R. | Schurz I 171 analytisch/synthetisch/QuineVsCarnap/Schurz: Quines Einsicht in die lokale Ununterscheidbarkeit brachte eine tiefgreifende Umwälzung. Carnap akzeptierte sie erst spät. Allerdings hatte er erkannt, dass mehrere Reduktionssätze zusammen empirischen Gehalt erzeugen. (s.o.). Reduktion/Schurz: doch mit dem Begriff "reduction sentence"“ blieb er eben seinem reduktionistischen Programm treu. Zuordnungsgesetz/Terminologie/Schurz: nennt Carnap (1956) "Correspondence Rules" (C) I 172 Gesamttheorie/Carnap:. „T and C“. ("Theory and Assignment Laws"). Zuordnungsgesetz/SchurzVsCarnap: das kann nicht sein, weil assignment laws Konsequenzen aus einer Theorie T sind, die aus dem Zusammenwirken aller Theoreme folgen. ((s) zirkulär). Analytizität/Carnap: resümiert in (1963, 964) dass es ihm nicht gelang, einen entsprechenden Begriff zu formulieren. Lösung/Carnap: Zerlegung der Theorie in Ramsey-Satz und Carnap-Satz: Ramsey Satz/Carnap: synthetisch Carnap Satz/Carnap: analytisch. Analytisch/synthetisch/Ernest Nagel:(1961) der analytische Gehalt der Mechanik ist nicht lokalisierbar! |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Carnap, R. | Stegmüller Vs Carnap, R. | Stegmüller IV 342 StegmüllerVsPositivism: because of the laws of nature contained in the statements, statements by natural scientists cannot be verified! IV 343 Planning must also be based on assumptions that are not verifiable at the moment of planning. Criteria/sense criterion/Theology/VsCarnap/Stegmüller: instead of a questionable criterion of meaning, we have to look at the definitions of God and ask whether our intuitive prior understanding is sufficient. Theologians make claims of validity independent of criteria of meaning. Example: an incorporeal person can at least be thought of! Example: likewise that something was created from nothing does not represent mental difficulties! IV 344 For example a problem forms only the concept of the necessary being. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Carnap, R. | Wessel Vs Carnap, R. | I 20 Justification/Logics/Wessel: all attempts at justification are ultimately circular here! Pro Carnap: of course every logician and every mathematician has the right to build up any calculi first, where he has to specify the rules correctly. VsCarnap: this does not mean, however, that the possible or existing calculi are equal! That would be a "principle of equivalence". I 345 Factual Modality/Carnap/Wessel: Carnap proposes: Def factually necessary/Carnap: is a statement (i.e. "causally true") iff it follows logically from the class of all basic laws. Def Basic Law/Carnap: Assertions which have the logical form of law statements and are true. Basic Laws/ReichenbachVsCarnap: ditto, but the truth must also be ascertainable. Necessary/Wessel: is a future event sA, if from the present knowledge A follows logically. Necessary/Carnap: no single event is logically necessary, if it is considered isolated from everything. I 346 Modality/WesselVsCarnap: too narrow a view. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Descartes, R. | Carnap Vs Descartes, R. | VI 226 Ego/Carnap: is a class of elementary experiences. No bundle, because classes do not consist of their elements! CarnapVsDescartes: the existence of the ego is not a primordial fact of the given. From "cogito" does not follow "sum". Carnap: the ego does not belong to expression of the fundamental experience. But the "this experience". Thinking/RussellVsDescartes: "it thinks". (> Lichtenberg). ("Mind", p.18). Stroud I 196 KantVsDescartes/CarnapVsDescartes. Frame/Reference system/Carnap/Stroud: for Carnap there is no point of view from which one can judge a frame as adequate or inadequate. That would be an "external" question. Kant/Stroud: Kant's parallel to this is transcendental idealism: if things were independent of us, skepticism would be inevitable. Problem: the transcendental idealism should not be crossed with the verification principle. Is Carnap's own positive theory better off here? That is a question of its status. It pursues the same goal as Kant: to explain the conditions of the possibility of knowledge, but without going beyond the limits of comprehensibility. General/special/internal/external/generalization/Stroud: it would be necessary to explain how the general sceptical conclusion can be meaningless, even if the particular everyday empirical assertions are meaningful. This cannot simply be because one is general and the other particular. Descartes/Stroud: the particular is representative in its argument and can therefore be generalized. The uncertainty in the individual case is representative of all our knowledge. This is the strength of the argument. VerificationismVsGeneralization: he considers this generalization suspicious. CarnapVsSkepticism/CarnapVsDescartes: statements that make sense within a reference system cannot be applied to the reference system itself. Stroud: but this is the problem inside/outside and not a question of generality or special. StroudVsCarnap: so he has to show that movement from the inside out is impossible and not the generalization. But he needed an explanation why the traditional view of the relation between "internal" and "external" questions is wrong if he wants to avoid skepticism. ((s) Why Question). Special/VerificationismVsDescartes: Thesis: the single sentence of Descartes is meaningless from the beginning. (Because unverifiable). (StroudVsVs). I 207 StroudVsVerificationism: he must now show why this verdict does not apply to all individual (special) sentences of everyday life. Verificationism would otherwise have to assume that our whole language (everyday language) is meaningless! (Because it is not verifiable according to skeptical criteria). For example "I don't know if explanation is caused by sitting in a draught" or "The aircraft spotter doesn't know if the aircraft is an F" would be damned as senseless! If verificationism condemns certain sentences as meaningless only if they are uttered, for example, by Descartes or another skeptic, he would have to show that there is a deviant use on such occasions. Otherwise he could not even indicate what VsDescartes is supposed to have gone wrong with his utterance. ((s) utterance here = action, not sentence, which should be meaningless, neither true nor false). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Heidegger, M. | Carnap Vs Heidegger, M. | Danto I 89 CarnapVsHeidegger: Carnap denied, that a sentence like "Das Nichts nichtet" ((s) "Nothingness destroys") be verifiable. DantoVsCarnap: we all know a feeling of anxiety. Why should it be less empirical than seeing a table? |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Hempel, C. | Nagel, E. Vs Hempel, C. | Schurz I 93 Law of Nature/LoN/Schurz: strict spatio-temporally unlimited universal sentences are candidates for LoN. If they were true, they would express real LoN. They are called lawlike. I 94 Lawlike/Schurz: spatio-temporally unlimited E.g. All objects attract each other ((s) only true if protons, electrons, etc., are not objects.) E.g. All living things must die spatio-temporally limited: E.g. mammals in polar regions have - compared with their counterparts in warmer areas - a more rounded shape (Germann's law). Scientific/Schurz: depends on the size of the area in this case. Universal Sentence/Schurz: to avoid differences of degree they were called fundamental and derived universal sentences Def Fundamental Universal Sentence/Carnap/Hempel: does not contain any individual constants and no spatio-temporal limitations. Def Derived Universal Sentence/Carnap/Hempel: can be derived from background knowledge from other universal sentences together with singular starting conditions. I 95 Ernest NagelVsCarnap/NagelVsHempel: according to this, no accidental universal sentence can be a derived law: E.g. "All screws on Smith's car are rusty". Solution/Nagel: only fundamental universal sentences can be laws. Hempel: admitted this, thus the lawlikeness remains gradual! Lawlike/Statistics/Schurz: even here there is lawlikeness: E.g. 50% of all cesium-137 atoms have decayed after 30 years. E.g. 80% of all lung cancer patients used to be heavy smokers. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Kant | Carnap Vs Kant | Newen I 112 CarnapVsKant: no synthetic judgements are a priori possible. Stroud I 171 Def Pseudo-Question/CarnapVsMetaphysics/CarnapVsKant/Stroud: are questions that cannot be answered because there is no possible sensory experience that decides the truth or falsity of the sentences in which certain expressions occur. ((s) e.g. metaphysical or transcendental expressions). Carnap: For example, two geographers want to find out whether a certain mountain in Africa is real or just a legend. I 172 a) If they find a mountain there that more or less corresponds to what was assumed, they can say that it is real, that it exists. Reality/Carnap: thus, they use an empirical, non-metaphysical concept of reality. (Carnap, Chicago 1958, 207). b) Assuming they were not only scientists, but also philosophers: one of them calls himself "2Realist", the other "Idealist": "Realist"/Carnap: will say that the mountain not only has the qualities (characteristics) that one has discovered in it, but it is also real, i.e. independent of our perception. "Idealist"/Carnap: denies that the mountain is independent of our perception. I.e. it is not real in the sense of the realist. Sciences/Empiricism/Carnap: here this divergence between the two cannot arise at all. (333f) But that does not mean that both theses are wrong. I 173 Transcendental idealism/KantVsCarnap/Stroud: would say that it could not be wrong because it is necessary to empirically clarify all other meaningful questions. CarnapVsKant: according to the verification principle, however, this is a "pseudo-theory" that cannot explain or guarantee anything. Sense/Sensible/CarnapVsKant: for something to be sensible, we need to know the truth value (WW) of the sentences that contain the corresponding expressions. Weaker: we must be able to give a reason why it is better to believe the truth of something than its falsity. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Lorenzen, P. | Wessel Vs Lorenzen, P. | I 345/346 Laws/Wessel: always have the logical form of a formal implication (although not all true formal implications are laws) ((x)(P(x) > Q(x)). As conclusions from this alone we never get formulas of the form Q(a), where a is an individual constant. Modality/Lorenzen/Wessel: it is assumed that a certain group of people has accepted a certain system of statements W as true. From these people all statements are then also recognized as true, which logically follow from these statements. Lorenzen regards this as meaningful only for future statements. Knowledge/Lorenzen/Wessel: for Lorenzen it results that everything we know is necessary regarding this knowledge. Tradition: For example if we know that there are five peas in a pea pod and that it contains protein. So only the second is necessary knowledge. According to Lorenzen, both statements are necessary knowledge. (WesselVs). Modality/WesselVsCarnap: too narrow a view. Modality/WesselVsLorenzen: too broad a view. That all knowledge should be necessary is a "fatalistic consequence". I 347 Modality/Wessel: is not a kind of truth value, as is often mistakenly assumed! Carnap: identifies truth and logical necessity, Lukasiewicz: has a third truth value "possible" Lorenzen: uses "possible" and "possibly true" synonymously. WesselVsLorenzen. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Neurath, O. | Schlick Vs Neurath, O. | Hempel I 104 Protocol statement/SchlickVsCarnap/VsNeurath: their thesis that a statement is true if it is proven adequately by a protocol statement, is leading to absurd results, unless the idea of absolutely true protocol statements is rejected. There are obviously many different systems of protocol statements. After Carnap and Neurath each of these different, incompatible systems were true. For each tale a system of protocol statements could be set up. Carnap, Neurath: There is actually no formal or logical difference between the systems, however, an empirical! The historical fact that there is an excellent system that the humanity and the scientists of our culture actually accept. Hempel I 105 In fact, the majority of scientists sooner or later come to an agreement. Protocol statements/Carnap: how do we learn to produce "true" protocol statements? Obviously by conditioning. For example, by learning to read gauges properly or by stating reliably: "this document comes from the 17th century." Hempel I 106 In the new form of Carnap's theory protocol statements are even more radically stripped of their base character: they lose their originally awarded irrefutability. Popper: Statements of all forms may occur as protocol statements. Hempel I 107 At the end of the term will be superfluous. Fact/statement/Hempel: transition from substantive to formal speech. Coherence theory/Carnap/Neurath: do not settle for a pure coherence theory, but for a limited. Rescher I 348 SchlickVsNeurath: there may not be mere conherence in the scientific knowledge: there can be no knowledge of any truth, if there is nothing of which we are absolutely certain. |
Schlick I Moritz Schlick "Facts and Propositions" Analysis 2 (1935) pp. 65-70 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich 1994 Schlick II M. Schlick General Theory of Knowledge 1985 Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
| Ordinary Language | Dummett Vs Ordinary Language | Dummett (e) III 185 Oxford Philosophy/Dummett: strongest influence: by Ryle. RyleVsCarnap: false methodology VsHeidegger: Laughing stock - Ryle: influence of Husserl. III (e) 196 Particularism/Utility Theory/Oxford/Dummett: supposedly, the UT could only explain each sentence. The philosopher should not want to discover a pattern where there is none. DummettVs: we do not learn language sentence by sentence, either! However, right: It is the sentences and not the words which have a "use" in the general sense. III (e) 196/197 Everyday language: here the Oxford philosophy could not contribute anything (because of their anti systematic approach) to the better understanding of those principles on the basis of which we obviously learn the language so quickly. (> Chomsky). DummettVsOxford: continuously used psychological and semantic terms that a theory of meaning must not assume but explain! E.g. "Express an attitude" "reject a question", etc. (DummettVsAustin). Likewise "truth" and "falsehood" were constantly used unexplained. III (e) 198 DummettVsParticularism: disregarded the distinction semantic/pragmatic. Anyone who is not in the claws of theory would initially tend to distinguish what a sentence literally says from what one might try to communicate with it in special circumstances. According to the "philosophy of everyday language" only the latter term is considered to be legitimate. "literal meaning" was considered an illegitimate byproduct. III (e) 199 DummettVsOxford, DummettVsStrawson: artificially introduced new concepts such as "presupposition" or "conversation implicature" or DummettvsAustin: the distinction between "illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" acts (DummettVsSpeech act theory) took the place of the general semantic concepts, and without anyone noticing the "normal language" (everyday language) ceased to exist. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Peirce, Ch.S. | Quine Vs Peirce, Ch.S. | I 54 Method/Quine: The question of what exists is the question of proof. The final arbitration in this matter is the scientific method, as amorphous it may be. However it is defined in detail, the scientific method produces theories, whose connection with any surface stimulation is solely in the scientific method, without independent testing instance, by which they are supported. In this sense, it is the final arbitrator of truth. Peirce was trying to define the truth straight as a scientific method. Namely an ideal theory, which one approaches as a limit if one does not disist to apply the (supposedly canonical) rules of method to the constantly renewing experience. Definition Truth/Pierce: Ideal Theory QuineVsPeirce: there is a lot wrong with this analogy: Appointment of Organon for infinite process, limit, erroneous use of the analogy with numbers, because the concept of the limit is dependent on the term "closer than". And this is defined for numbers, but not for theories. --- I 55 Vs: but we have, after all, no reason to believe that the surface stimulation of people, even if one considers it in the eternity, allows a certain systematization, which is scientifically seen better or easier, than possible alternatives. Although the scientific method is the way to the truth, it does not even enable a definition of truth. Likewise, any so-called pragmatic truth-definition is doomed (QuineVsPragmatism) to fail. --- I 444 Definition ordered pair: provides the possibility to treat two objects as one. One can thus adjust relation classes by perceiving them as classes of ordered pairs. Footnote: we are interested in "relations-in-extension" here. They stand in a relationship to relations-in-intension like classes to properties (difference class/property.). E.g. The father-relation becomes the class of exactly those ordered pairs whose respective members - for example (Abraham, Isaac), are a man and one of his children. Peirce: Definition ordered pair: (terribly cumbersome with mental charts, etc.) QuineVsPeirce: simply a defective noun that is not used to be at home, where we are used to embed completely grown-up general terms. Mathematical --- I 445 Definition: (1) If (x, y) = (z, w), so x = z and y = w. If relations are classes of ordered pairs, then pairs on the same level as other objects as members of classes must be available. The ordered pair plays the role of an object, which performs the task of two. --- X 23 Verification Theory/Peirce/Quine: roughly: "tell me what difference the truth/falsehood of a sentence would make for the possible experience, and you have said everything about its meaning." QuineVsPeirce: also this equates the concept of proposition with the concept of objective information. Basic Rules: is here the whole of possible distinctions and combinations of sensory perceptions. Introspection: some epistemologists would catalog these alternatives by introspection of sense data, others (naturalists) would observe the nerve stimulation (at the nerve endings). Problem: you can not assign senses proof to unique individuals sentences. (Underdetermination of empiricism). --- XII 94 Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1. abandoned to deduce the truth about the nature of the sensory experience. Thus, it has made a substantial concession. 2. it has abandoned the rational reconstruction, that is, the attempt to translate these truths into observation terms and logical mathematical tools. QuineVsPeirce: Suppose, we think that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence of observation language all differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation? Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could then be trapped in an infinite long axiomatization. N.B.: thus, the empiricist gives up the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements can be expressed via the reality. Quine: the problem is a not too high complexity for a finite axiomatization, but the holism: --- XII 95 Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference of opinions") only relates to theories as a whole, not individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" should be one in which the texts, in which logical mathematical observation terms will be translated into, are whole theories and not just terms or short sentences. |
Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Carnap Vs Quine, W.V.O. | II 173 Analytic/Synthetic: CarnapVsQuine: trying to overcome the difficulties in order to maintain the distinction. Restriction: the distinction should apply only to the so-called constructed languages. Here there are clear rules as to when a composition is allowed.(1) 1. J. R: Flor, "Ernst Mach: Der Vater des Wiener Kreises" in: A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek 1993 VII 147 Pragmatics/Carnap: additional problem: whether the objects exist. Quine: doubts that in the case of absence an explication of the words is possible, since he requires clear behavioral criteria. So these words become meaningless. CarnapVsQuine: it is theoretically possible to show the fruitfulness of semantic concepts through the evolution of language systems without pragmatic basis (language use, behaviourist). (operational procedures). VII 151 Intensionalist thesis of pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intension is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the language habits. Extensionalist thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste; the linguist is free, because it cannot be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise, either. Quine: the completed lexicon is e.g. pede Herculem, i.e. we risk an error if we start at the foot. But we can draw an advantage from that. On the other hand, if we postpone a definition of synonymy in the case of the lexicon, no problem appears as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false. VII 152 Solution/CarnapVsQuine: the linguist must provide not only the real cases, but also the possible ones. VII 153 CarnapVsQuine: The extensionalist thesis is inappropriate: E.g. entry in the lexicon: (3) Einhorn, unicorn Kobold, goblin On the other hand the wrong registration: (4) Einhorn, goblin Kobold, unicorn Carnap: The two German words here have the same extension, namely the zero class (Carnap pro). If the extensionalist thesis is correct, then there is no essential, empirically verifiable difference between (3) and (4). VII 154 QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man in the street was unwilling to say anything about nonexistent objects. VII 155 CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man in the street is very well able to understand issues related to assumed counterfactual situations. Quine XI 150 Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things is only to choose a certain language. It does not mean to believe in these things. XI 151 CarnapVsQuine: its existence criterion (to be a value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning as it only expresses a choice of language. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be so separated. Science is the continuation of our daily practice. Stroud I 221 Dream/Quine/Stroud: Quine does not exclude the possibility that we dream all the time. (>Descartes). Skepticism/Empiricism/Carnap: cannot be answered empirically. Knowledge/Carnap: however, there may be empirical studies that show how we arrive at knowledge. Naturalized Epistemology/Quine: is supposed to do that. CarnapVsQuine: N.B.: precisely because it is an empirical investigation, it cannot answer the traditional question of the philosopher. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Goodman Vs Quine, W.V.O. | IV 21 Quine: individuation is determined by a bunch of mutually interrelated grammatical particles and constructions. Plurals, pronouns, numerals, the "is" (of identity) and its derived "same" and "other". GoodmanVsQuine: he failed to declare that the interpretation of these particles can not be made without consideration of the places they individuate. The interpretation changes when they are used in different systems. IV 22 E.g. sunset. Whether we see the same thing as yesterday, depends on whether we are employed with the identification of suns or sunsets. (> description). Quine V 30 Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to a finally mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms. QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I am, unlike the two, satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary of which some of the physical basic predicates were initially learned by using the dispo way of speaking. (Heuristic role). |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Ramsey, F. P. | Fraassen Vs Ramsey, F. P. | I 54 FraassenVsSyntactical Approach: all this was a mistake: the empirical meaning (set of observation consequences) of a theory cannot be isolated in this syntactic way. If that were possible, T/E would say the same as T about what is observable and how the observed behaves, and nothing else. Unobservable/Fraassen: Will naturally differ from the observable in that it systematically lacks the characteristics of the observed. Unobservability/Fraassen: unless we ban the negation, we can express in a language of observation that something is unobservable. And to a certain degree even how these unobserved entities are. E.g. unobservable/Copenhagen Interpretation/Observation Language: says that there are things that sometimes have a particular position, and sometimes don’t. Important argument/Fraassen: I have just expressed this conclusion, without using a single TT. I 55 PhilosophyVsSyntaktical Approach: philosophers thought it to be rather too wide: many theories T are such that T/E is tautological. Such theories probably derive their empirical meaning from the observation consequences along with other theories or empirical hypotheses. I 56 Syntactical/FraassenVsSyntactical Approach: the syntactically defined relations are simply the wrong ones! The biggest mistake of the syntactical approach was to focus on irrelevant technical questions: FraassenVsRamsey/FraassenVsCarnap/FraassenVsCraig: things like the Ramsey sentence, Carnap Conditional, Craig’s Theorem, "reduction sentence", "empirical language", theoretical terms (TT) "axiomatization in limited vocabulary" were all self-inflicted problems! They are philosophically not important!. FraassenVsRamsey Sentence. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Russell, B. | Ryle Vs Russell, B. | Read III 33 Russell fell into the trap in his account of universals: according to his opinion, atomic statements consists of a number of individuals and a universal. E.g. "Fido is a dog." What does "dog" refer to? According to the "Fido"-Fido-theory of the Fido, it must get its meaning through the fact that it is assigned to a single thing, to "being-a-dog" or the universal, dog. (>RyleVsCarnap). Statement/Russell's statements were designed by him to make the meaning of sentences. Consequently, he said, they must contain these generic entities, universals. This is an unjustified step. --- Read III 296 "Fido"-Fido principle: RyleVs: reference equals meaning. --- Read III 34 > Various AuthorsVsRussell: >statements, >facts. Russell: believed that predicate expressions, verbs, and adjectives related to universals, "is president" refers to presidency, "runs" to what is common to all things that are going. But many philosophers deny that the concept of the object reference can be applied to such parts of speech. Meaning: Russell and others simply identify meaning and object reference. (>reference/VsRussell). |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Skepticism | Carnap Vs Skepticism | Stroud I 170 CarnapVsSkepticism/Sense/Meaningful/Language/Empiricism/Verification/Verificationism/Stroud: Thesis: the significance of our expressions is limited to their empirical use. This means that the use of the expressions themselves is limited by whether there is a possible sensation which is relevant for determining the truth or falsity of the sentence in which these expressions occur. Def Principle of Verification/Understanding/Meaning/Carnap/Stroud: Thesis: then we can only ever understand something or mean something with our expressions if appropriate sensations are possible for us. Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: but that does not mean that skepticism is wrong. But: sentence: "Nobody will ever know if__." Here, the "__" would have to be filled by an expression which can only be meaningless, because it is unverifiable. Def Meaningless: neither true nor false. I 174 CarnapVsSkepticism: the question "Are there external things?" would thus be pointless. It would not be a question that you could not answer (sic), because there is no meaningful question and no meaningful response here. Important argument: but that does not mean that there are no entirely meaningful questions about the existence of external things: these are the internal questions ((s) within an area of knowledge). I 176 Truth/Sense/Meaningless/Carnap/Stroud: something that is true, cannot contradict something that is meaningless. Moore/Carnap/Stroud: verificationism shows that everything Moore says can be true, without however refuting skepticism. But there is nothing meaningful that he does not consider. VerificationismVsSkepticism/CarnapVsStroud: the skepticism is not, as Kant says, to be understood transcendentally, but it is meaningless as a whole, because unverifiable. Def External/External Questions/Existence/Carnap/Stroud: are "philosophical" questions that relate to the whole (the outer frame, i.e. that is initially not possible). Def Internal/Internal Questions/Science/Existence/Carnap/Stroud: these are questions about the existence of things that are asked within a science. E.g. the question of the existence of numbers is useful in mathematics, but not outside of it. I 177 External/Existence/Verificationism/CarnapVsSkepticism/Stroud: if skepticism allows the things outside of us to be useful at all ((s) The sentences about the things that cannot be things may be useful or useless), then he cannot describe them as unknowable. I 178 Objectivity/Verification Principle/Carnap/Stroud: this principle prevents any concept of objectivity that does not contain the possibility of empirical verification. VsSkepticism: every concept of objectivity which includes the possibility of knowledge then makes skepticism impossible. Practical/Theoretical/Verification Principle/Carnap/Stroud: the distinction theoretical/practical goes far beyond the verification principle. Stroud I 187 CarnapVsSekpticism: the traditional philosophical skepticism (external) is actually a "practical" question about the choice of linguistic framework (reference system). This does not follow from the verification principle alone. It is part of a theory of knowledge (epistemology) according to which the insignificance of the skeptical question is indicated by a non-skeptical answer to the question how it is possible that we know something. Knowledge/Carnap/Stroud: two essential components: 1. Experience, 2. linguistic frame (reference system) within which we understand the experience. Language/Carnap/Stroud: is a rule system for the formation of sentences and for their verification or rejection (ESO 208). Thus we are equipped to determine that some statements coincide with our experience and others do not. Without those statements, which are made possible for us by the acceptance of the language, we would have nothing either to confirm or to refute the experience. Skepticism: would agree so far. It also needs expressions of language for the things of the outside world. CarnapVsSkepticism: he misunderstands the relation between the linguistic context and the truths that can be expressed within it. He thinks the frame was only needed I 188 To express something that was "objectively" true or false. ((s)> Quine:> Immanence theory of truth, immanent truth > Ontological relativity: truth only within a theory/system). Objectivity/CarnapVsSkepticism/Stroud: every speech on objective facts or external things is within a reference system (frame) and cannot justify our possession of this frame. ((s) which is a practical choice (convention). Theoretical Question/Philosophy/Carnap: the only theoretical question that can we ask here is that about the rules of language. I 192 CarnapVsSkepticism: misunderstands the relation between linguistic context of the expression about external objects and the truths that are expressed within this reference system. StroudVsCarnap: but what exactly is his own non-skeptical approach to this relation?. 1) to what system belongs Carnap's thesis that existence claims are neither true nor false in the thing language?. 2) what does the thesis then express at all?. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Tarski, A. | Wittgenstein Vs Tarski, A. | I 134 WittgensteinVsTarski/WittgensteinVsCarnap/Hintikka: would reject the logical semantics as a whole, because according to the view of language as a universal medium it cannot be articulated. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Various Authors | Wessel Vs Various Authors | I 17 Tolerance Principle/Carnap: ("Die logische Syntax der Sprache", 1934): "We do not want to establish prohibitions, we want to make determinations. Prohibitions can be replaced by a definitory distinction. There is no morality in logic. Everyone may construct his logic, i.e. his linguistic form, as he wants, but if he wants to discuss with us, he must indicate syntactic determinations instead of philosophical discussions." (The principle of tolerance was first formulated by Karl Menger). I 20 WesselVsTolerance Principle: overall we reject it, but we agree with Menger that the concept of constructiveness is unclear. VsMenger: the broadest concept of constructiveness is not the demand for mere consistency! (Wessel like Chr. Thiel). Justification/Logics/Wessel: all attempts at justification here are ultimately circular! Pro Carnap: of course, every logician and every mathematician has the right to build up arbitrary calculi first, whereby he has to specify the rules correctly. VsCarnap: this does not mean, however, that the possible or existing calculi are equal! That would be a "principle of indifference" . I 136 Def Analytical Implication/Parry/Wessel: (1933): If a formula A analytically implies a formula B, then only those statement variables occur in B that also occur in A. I 137 Axioms: (selection) + A 12. (A ‹-› B) u F(A) -> F[A/B] A 13. F(A) -> (A -> A) Analytical Implication/WesselVsParry: no solution to the problem since > is again an operator and can occur more than once in axioms and theorems. Pro: here for the first time the idea is expressed that only those variables may occur in the conclusion, which are also contained in the prerequisite. Paradoxes/Implication/Non-Classical Direction/Wessel: Questions: 1. Are there any guarantees that paradoxical formulas are not provable? 2. Are there guarantees that non-paradoxical formulas are not erroneously excluded? 3. Are there criteria to decide whether an arbitrary formula is paradox or not? 4. Is it possible to build a system in which all paradox formulas are not provable, but all non-paradox formulas are provable? I 219 Identity/M.Stirner: "to see the human being in each other and to act against each other as human beings...I see in you the human being as I see in myself the human being and nothing but the human being, so I care for you as I would care for myself...both of us are nothing but mathematical propositions: A = C and B = C therefore A = B, i.e. I nothing but human and you nothing but human: I and you the same". WesselVsStirner, Max: this is the same logic as in "J.Kaspar (pseudonym of Stirner) is a living being, a donkey is a living being, so J. Kaspar is a donkey". This is the confusion of different logical forms. ((s) Predication is not a statement of identity: "I am a human being" does not mean "I = human being".) I 314 Euler Diagrams/Borkowski/Lejewski/"ontological table"/Wessel: Extension of Euler diagrams: Inclusion and exclusion of meaning, existence, etc. WesselVsLejewski: his theory is burdened with serious deficiencies. I 315 Term Theory/Wessel: there are unlimited singular terms possible, but each theory gets by with a limited number. WesselVsLejewski: For example, the term "cosmonaut" undergoes a mysterious transformation. first empty term, then singular term, then general term! WesselVs: it is a general term right from the start: the reference has absolutely nothing to do with it. The distinction between empty and non-empty is a completely different classification of terms. This is not a purely logical task. I 352 Intension/WesselVsStegmüller: the term "content-related" problem only shows that it has not yet been solved on the logical level. StegmüllerVsModal Logic: because modal contexts would have intensional character. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Verificationism | Stroud Vs Verificationism | I 201 Verificationism/Knowledge/Stroud: this draws attention to a little-noticed problem of the relation between the verification principle and traditional skepticism: one usually only sees a one-sided competition between them: the principle implies that the skeptical conclusion is meaningless. Asymmetry: so the whole problem is meaningless. Verification Principle/VP/Skepticism/Stroud: but in reality have the same task to solve: to explain how our belief is empirically confirmed. SkepticismVsVerificationism: its standards of confirmation are not fulfilled at all. Stroud: this is a dispute about what our standards are and if anything fulfils them. No side is in a better position, they share the problem. I 202 Skepticism/Stroud: is not refuted by the verification principle: if we do not know whether we are dreaming, we also do not know whether the confirmation by evidence does not only take place in the dream. ((s) The argument of empirical verification is something quite different from the argument about the use of language.) Confirmation/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: there is already a conflict about how the verification principle (VP) should be formulated at all, or about what can be considered a confirmation. If the verification principle is to be adequate, it must imply that there can be no meaningful difficulty of the kind that the traditional skeptic puts forward. Problem: when formulating the principle, the principle itself cannot yet be applied to the decisive concept of confirmation. ((s) Otherwise circular). Empirical confirmation/confirmability/Stroud: their definition would need an explanation of how and why the traditional concept of our everyday practice should be wrong. I 203 Skepticism/Stroud: cannot simply be rejected without showing the relationship between "internal" and "external" (distanced) access as incoherent. StroudVsVerificationism: in everyday life, the conditions of the verification principle are never completely fulfilled. A successful theory of empirical confirmation must therefore show what is wrong with the concept of confirmation. It could nevertheless be that verificationism is on the right track. I 204 Confirmation/Tradition/Stroud: it is generally true that the problem of the outside world (skepticism) is empirically undecidable, no matter what concept of empirical confirmability one chooses. This is the common problem that scepticism and verificationism must share. So it seems reasonable that the verification principle must first be formulated precisely before it can be used. SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism: as long as lack of verifiability is connected with futility, our speech about the world around us will be condemned to futility if skepticism is right. StroudVsRational Reconstruction/StroudVsCarnap: we can leave the rational reconstruction aside and simply ask how plausible it is to make sense of verifiability. And apparently we cannot do that without trying to assess the plausibility of skepticism ((s) and not dismissing it as meaningless ourselves). I 205 SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: even if verificationism is true, we still need an explanation of how and why traditional philosophical ((s) non-empirical) inquiry fails. ((s) should correspond here to skepticism). (>Why Question). Verification Principle/Stroud: to accept it, we need an understandable diagnosis of why and how skepticism is wrong. ((s) quasi circular, one presupposes the other). StroudVsVerificationism/DescartesVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: Descartes' example "I don't know if I'm really sitting by the fireplace with a piece of paper in my hand" is a perfectly sensible sentence! We understand it well enough to know what would be the case if it were true. And it can be true or false. It would be nonsense to claim that sentences like "Here is a human hand" or "There are mountains in Africa" would be meaningless. Verificationism/Stroud: but only claims that they are meaningless in connection with the traditional conclusion that their truth can never be known (skeptical conclusion). I 206 Verification Principle/Stroud: we would have to show that there is nothing to fear from scepticism. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Wittgenstein | Carnap Vs Wittgenstein | II 203 CarnapVsWittgenstein: it is quite possible to express the syntax of a language in this same language without causing inconsistencies (paradoxical) or nonsense. (> Wittgenstein: Picture theory). Hempel I 99/100 Language/Carnap: constructs two symbolic languages. Therein he can give an exact definition of "analytic" and "the logical consequence of", etc.. He then constructs the logical syntax for a group of language systems that only need to fulfill certain conditions. The most important one: the logical essence of the elements of this language system must not be dependent on a non-linguistic factor. This means that relations in natural languages with pronouns like "I" or "this" are not readily determinable. (> BrandomVsCarnap: anaphora). CarnapVsWittgenstein: his significance criterion is too narrow. Carnap characterized empirical laws as general statements that allow many inferences and differ in their form from the so-called singular statements like "At the moment, the temperature in here is twenty degrees". A general statement is checked by examining its singular consequences. But as each general statement determines an infinite class of singular consequences, it cannot be finally and completely verified by them, but only more or less protected. A general statement is not a truth-function of singular statements, but rather has, in relation to them, the character of a hypothesis. Laws of nature: In other words: a general law cannot be formally derived from a finite set of singular statements. Each finite set of statements allows an infinite number of hypotheses. In addition, the singular statements themselves have the character of hypotheses, even when compared to the protocol sentences. What singular statements we accept depends on which of the formally possible systems we choose. CarnapVsWittgenstein: truth: another fundamental principle of the Tractatus should be rejected: truth or falsity of all statements can no longer be defined by reference to the truth of certain basic statements, whether they be atomic statements, protocol sentences or other singular statements. (After all, the singular statements are hypotheses compared to base statements). What follows is a loosening of the concept of truth: in science a statement is accepted as true when it is sufficiently supported by protocol sentences. Carnap II 203 CarnapVsWittgenstein: it is quite possible to express the syntax of a language in this same language, without causing inconsistencies (paradoxical) or nonsense. (> Wittgenstein: picture theory). Language/Carnap: constructs two symbolic languages. Therein he can give an exact definition of "analytic" and "the logical consequence of", etc.. He then constructs the logical syntax for a group of language systems that only need to fulfill certain conditions. The most important one: the logical essence of the elements of this language system must not be dependent on a non-linguistic factor.This means that relations in natural languages with pronouns like "I" or "this" are not readily determinable. - (BrandomVsCarnap: anaphora) |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Theory/Observ. Language | Versus | Fraassen I 56 FraassenVsRamsey-Satz/FraassenVsCarnap/FraassenVsCraig - Vs distinction observation language/ theory language irrelevant technical questions - Vs syntatical interpretation of theories - FraassenVsLanguage Dependence. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Ramsey-Sentence | Versus | I 56 FraassenVsRamsey Sentence / FraassenVsCarnap / FraassenVsCraig - Vs separation observation language / theory of language - irrelevant technical questions - Vs syntactic representation of theories - FraassenVsLanguage Dependence. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Object Langauge | Carnap, R. | Stroud I 185 Thing Language/Carnap: in it the question of the existence of things (world of things) can be formulated. But this does not mean that the sentence "there are external things" is meaningless. Alternative to the thing language: phenomenal language. I 191 That we exist and have experiences cannot simply be seen as an "internal" truth of the thing language. I 192 1. To which system does Carnap's thesis belong that assertions of existence in the language of things are neither true nor false? 2. What does the thesis even express then? I 193 Language/object/Stroud: things were there long before language came into being in the world. And that again is something we know "internally" in the thing language. StroudVsCarnap: then his thesis, understood as "internal" to the language, is wrong. It contradicts what we already accept as knowledge about ourselves and external things. CarnapVsVs: would say that of course one must not understand his thesis "empiricially" and not the thing language "internally". Carnap/Stroud: his thesis is a version of the "Copernican Turn" by Kant. And he obtains it for the same reasons as Kant: without it we would have no explanation as to how it is possible that we know anything at all. I 197 Reference system/framework/StroudVsCarnap: to which framework does Carnap's thesis belong that no sentences about external objects are true or false regardless of the choice of a reference system (language)? |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Extensionality | Carnap, R. | VI XXI Extensionality-thesis / Carnap (1928): all statements are extensional. Self-criticism VsCarnap: (1961) is not correct in this form. New: weaker form: every non-extensional statement is translated into a logically equivalent statement in an extensional language. |
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| grue | Carnap, R. | Schurz I 219 Grue/CarnapVsGoodman: Example Carnap: Thesis: only qualitative predicates are inducible (projectable) "grue" is a Def "positional" predicate: its definition refers to the time t0 - GoodmanVsCarnap: one can introduce an equally expressive language with gred/reen as basic predicates - SchurzVsCarnap: positional/qualitative can be distinguished by difference in ostensive learnability - Induction/Goodman: Solution: in an induction we must know what remained constant - these are the qualitative characteristics. - "Gred" remains constant during the change! - But we used it for anti-induction. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Verifierbarkeit | Carnap, R. | I 16 Probation: correspondence between sentence and the reality NeurathVsCarnap: coherence rather than correspondence. Carnap: the thesis of verifiability must be mitigated to the thesis of probation ability. |
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| Analyticity | Quine, W.V.O. | V 116 Analytisch/Analytizität/Quine: die analytischen Sätze sind eine Teilklasse der reiz-analytischen Sätze, denen zuzustimmen jeder Sprecher einer Sprachgemeinschaft disponiert ist. QuineVsCarnap: doch auch jetzt haben wir keinen so strengen Unterschied zu den synthetischen Sätzen. Lösung/Quine: These Sätze, die von vielen zuerst gelernt wurden, sind der Analytizität näher als Sätze, die nur von wenigen gelernt wurden. Die analytischen Sätze sind die, die von allen so gelernt werden. Diese Extremfälle unterscheiden sich aber nicht wesentlich von den benachbarten. Man kann auch gar nicht immer angeben, welche es sind. |
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| Semantic Ascent | Quine, W.V.O. | XI 142 Ontology / Carnap / Lauener: (temporarily replaced): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. semantic ascent / QuineVsCarnap: this should not be misused for ontological evasive maneuvers. |
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| Referential Frame | Quine, W.V.O. | Staln I 44 QuineVsCarnap / Stalnaker: all questions are asked within any linguistic context, and questions such as "it is reasonable to adopt a framework of numbers?" and "Are there numbers?" are not easy to separate. |
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| Basis Sentence | Schlick, M. | Hempel I 102 Schlick: do not dispense entirely on basis sets, otherwise relativism" I 104 SchlickVsCarnap / VsNeurath: the thesis that a statement is true if it is proven by protocol sentences leads to absurd results, as far as the idea of absolutely true pr. s. is rejected.- There are obviously many different systems of pr. s. by Carnap and Neurath each of these different, incompatible systems were true. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Observability | Maxwell, G. | Fraassen I 14 Grover MaxwellVsCarnap/MaxwellVsPositivismus: (1962 -žThe Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities-œ): (locus classicus): These die Unterscheidung Theorie/Beobachtung kann nicht gezogen werden. I 17 Beobachtbarkeit/Maxwell: These es gibt nichts prinzipiell unbeobachtbares, weil ich Elektronenaugen hätte haben können (>MöWe) |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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