Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Inequalities | Burke | Rawls I 300 Inequality/Burke, E. /Rawls: many authors, including Edmund Burke, believed that some kind of hierarchical social structure and a ruling class with inherited prerogatives are essential for the development of public goods. >Public good, >Society. Political power should be exercised by experienced men whose ambitions are moderated by their privileges and advantages of their position. >Power. Burke believed that the great families of the ruling class, through their wisdom of exercising power, were deceiving from generation to generation for the general welfare. (E. Burke Reflections on the Revolution in France, (London, 1910), p. 49; John Plamenatz, Man and Society, (London, 1963), vol. I, pp. 346-351.) >Generational Justice. I 301 RawlsVsBurke: it is not enough to accept how Burke and Hegel did, that these forms of inequality also benefited the poorer people. We would also have to accept as a condition that, by correcting these injustices, the prospects of those who are worse off would be further worsened. The argumentation that all would benefit would only apply if the lexical order of principles (processing sequentially, See Principles/Rawls) were to be abolished. >Principles/Rawls. 1. E. Burke Reflections on the Revolution in France, (London, 1910), p. 49. 2. John Plamenatz, Man and Society, (London, 1963), vol. I, pp.346-351 |
BurkeE I Edmund Burke A Philosophical Enquiry Into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful 2nd Revised ed. Edition Oxford 2015 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 |
| Tradition | Burke | Sunstein I 121 Tradition/knowledge/E. Burke/Sunstein: According to Edmund Burke, judgments based on long-standing traditions are more reliable than judgments of individuals with conflicting interests. >Judgments, >Reliability, cf. >Cultural tradition. Sunstein: Burke's major contribution to the study of knowledge and information is that it shows that knowledge is distributed over time. >Knowledge, >Education, >Culture. Sunstein I 122 Knowledge/Burke: is distributed by tradition in small fragments to many individuals and expands over time. >Learning, >Progress. Sunstein I 124 SunsteinVsBurke, E.: he does not take into account the effects of group pressure on information retention (>Information Cascades). Precisely this can contribute to the fact that traditional moral concepts last longer than necessary. >Morality, >Values, >Cultural values, >Change in values, >Change in meaning, >Society, >Public sphere, >Media. |
BurkeE I Edmund Burke A Philosophical Enquiry Into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful 2nd Revised ed. Edition Oxford 2015 Sunstein I Cass R. Sunstein Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008 Sunstein II Cass R. Sunstein #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burke, Michael | Simons Vs Burke, Michael | I 195 Interrupted Existence/Simons: interrupted existence met us in connection with temporal sums and products and will meet us again below in connection with superposition (to be in the same place at the same time). Anyway, it is not clear to decide if it exists: E.g. an artifact can be taken apart and reassembled, for example for maintenance or repair. Here, we will say that it exists again when it resumes its old function. I 197 E.g. if some parts are scattered and may be lost and must be replaced by other parts it is a matter of chance. Then the question is whether an object exists in the state, not only dependent on the current physical state and on the history but also on the further course of development, and that seems wrong. Artifacts/Simons: of course, the conditions for the survival of artifacts are vague. We certainly allow the replacement of parts. E.g. a machine that is fed with any powder and water and busts of Mozart are made of it. After a while, the busts are crashed and the powder is filled again in the machine. Then again a bust of Mozart is made. Should it be the same? No, because the atoms are in another place. E.g. variant: in the variant Mozart and Beethoven busts are produced alternately. Then the case would be clear anyway. (For the defenders of continuity): there is a new bust every time, despite the complete continuity. Stronger example: Chisholm's toy castle: here the building blocks are always in the same place. E.g. Michael Burke: a table is created with thirty blocks, then disassembled and with the same building blocks a chair and a bird house are created. Then again a table. I 198 Burke: 1. The table ended its existence when being disassembled: 2. The same table is created again. Simons: then the continuity theorists are in trouble no matter what strategies they apply. But Burke leaves the way open for them to deny identity across the gap: they can still claim that the example corresponds to the one of the busts, despite the fixed localization of parts: a new table is always created out of old material. BurkeVs: pro identity. SimonsVsBurke: Burke's arguments for identity are less convincing than for the ends of the existence of the table. His point is rather that so well controlled interruptions are ontologically harmless and not one has to search the traces of parts across the gap. "Continuity Theory"/terminology/Simons: the continuity theory is the thesis that the "old" existence is resumed after the interruption. SimonsVs: it paid a price for it: namely the exaggeration of objects which are broken down into its parts or duplication of objects that do not take place. Simons: but both views seem benign: each has its arguments. The only problem is that the two are contradicting each other. This can be seen with e.g. the Ship of Theseus. I 199 Ship of Theseus/Simons: problem: there are conflicting claims: between a) the "Collector": he places value on substantive continuity and b) the "Pragmatist": he wants functional continuity. Problem: both sides have complementary things that speak for each of them. Wrong solution: "relativized identity": then both sides would virtually no longer "touch" each other but that would not explain why there is a problem at all. SimonsVsBurke: that the type of an object is a function of its properties is regardless of it wrong: e.g. objects that are needed in a community: there are many pairs of objects which are physico-chemically exactly alike but belong to different types: e.g. holy/normal water, real/ perfectly counterfeit banknotes, originals/replicas, wedding rings/other rings, maybe also person/body. Of course, each of these objects falls under a higher sortal. Burke: thesis: various substantive objects cannot be simultaneously embodied in one and the same matter. SimonsVsBurke: on the contrary, e.g. (see above) different boards may have the same members. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Object/Property | Burke, P. | Simons 205 BurkeVsSimons: (Burke 1980 394ff): thesis: the type of an object is a function of its properties (qualities). coinciding objects must have the same characteristics - SimonsVsBurke: a folded sofa bed has other than the bed. I 204 Burke: thesis: different materials properties can not be simultaneously embodied in one and the same matter. SimonsVsBurke: but, eg different committees have the same members. |
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